conflicted

Conflicted S1 E1 - 9/11

CONFLICTED

S01E01

Thomas Small Welcome to the first episode of Conflicted, a new podcast from Message Heard. My name is Thomas Small, and I'll be your host. So, the Middle East, the Muslim world. It's a place of conflict, endless conflict. Sometimes, people think they know more than they do about these conflicts. Sometimes, they know that they don't know anything about them, but they wish to know. What we're going to do is try to unpick these conflicts the best we can, expose the ideological underpinnings of the sides involved, contextualise them historically, add perspective from our personal experiences living in and studying the Middle East, so that hopefully, at the end of each episode, you'll come away thinking, "Aha. I understand this is a hard thing to resolve. These conflicts exist for a reason. It's not necessarily a question of good versus evil. It's a very nuanced problem." 

You're going to hear from my co-host, Aimen Dean, in just a minute, a man who, at one point, had decided to commit himself to al-Qaeda. 

Aimen Dean There were ten-minutes-walk to Khaled's house. My plan was to say goodbye. By the time I knocked on his door, my plan has changed. I told him, "I'm going to go with you." He said, you know, "For God's sake, Aimen. Do you know that jihad is not a picnic? It's a war. Why would you go?" You know? "Do you think the jihad needs you?" And I even remember that my answer to him changed his mind and changed my life. I said to him, "I know, Khaled, that the jihad doesn't need me, but I need it." 

Thomas Small Let's get into it. 

We'll start this series with an event that catapulted the conflicts of the Middle East into the global consciousness: The Twin Tower attacks on September 11th. 

Aimen Dean Okay.

Thomas Small Right. So, we're just starting. 

Aimen Dean Yeah. Go ahead.

Thomas Small Aimen Dean. How do I introduce Aimen Dean? There is literally no one on Planet Earth like Aimen Dean. Saudi-born, but Bahraini nationality. Grew up in Khobar, an oil suburb of the eastern province of Saudi Arabia. From a young age, was very pious, especially following the death of his father, I think that's right, and then his mother. Became a jihadist first in Bosnia then in other theatres, ending up through the vagaries of personal history. In the arms of Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan, where, following the East African Embassy bombings of 1998, he decided to get out. But unbeknownst to him, God or fate had a different idea and he ended up in MI6, working for the Brits, the most important double agent deep inside al-Qaeda, informing against his former jihadist comrades for the British government, thwarting several important terrorist attacks in the process until, sadly, he was outed and ever since has worked in the private sector as a security analyst, working for corporations and banks, living with a fatwā over his head as his former al-Qaeda – the surviving former al-Qaeda jihadists and their followers want to kill him dead for stabbing them in the back. Aimen Dean. 

Aimen Dean Well, that was, you know, a rather ominous introduction. Well, Thomas, how am I going to introduce you? Even after years of knowing you—possibly five years now, almost—you know, you're still a mystery to me. All I know is, basically, that you are an American, which I won't hold against you. That you are or you were in the past, you know, on your path to become a monk, a Greek Orthodox monk. And I won't hold that against you either. And, you know, the fact that, somehow, you ended up studying Arabic and Islamic studies. And then, when I met you, I was struck by how amazing your Arabic language skills were and your understanding of Islam and Islamic theology. And I was thinking, "How could a Californian, you know, so much about the theology that influenced my upbringing so much and not only know it well, but also understand the language, the nuances, the… Understand the Bedouin culture?' You know, if I want to describe Thomas Small in few words, I would say that he is no small at all. 

Thomas Small Well, here's the thing, Aimen. I met you and I felt weirdly like I had met some kind of spiritual brother.

Aimen Dean Likewise.

Thomas Small Though, on the surface, it may seem unlikely. If you think about it, it's not so unlikely. We both come from coastal regions. In some ways we come from boom regions, on the fringes of the civilisational heartlands of our various cultures. California on one end. The eastern province of Saudi Arabia, which, until oil, was a nothing. 

Aimen Dean Absolutely. 

Thomas Small It was a wild—. It was the Wild West of the Middle East. 

Aimen Dean mmhmm.

Thomas Small We both grew up in, you know, what detractors would call fundamentalist religion. Me a Christian. You, a Muslim. We both, from a young age, felt that turn towards perhaps problematically deep practice of the faith. And then, we both decided to take the most extreme path. 

I can tell you growing up in California as an evangelical Christian in the Reagan eighties, Muslims were very much the enemy. No question. They were Satan worshipers on the one hand and they were blowing up planes and killing Americans. And, you know, they – they seemed to me to be a pretty bloodthirsty people. That's how it was being portrayed. Now, I can remember very clearly 9/11. Everyone, of course, remembers where they were on 9/11. It's the watershed moment of our lives, certainly, where we're both about the same age, both born at the end of the seventies. I was in London already. I had been invited to the Travellers' Club on Pall Mall. Can you imagine this sort of young suburban brat being initiated into this wonderful gentlemanly world of the Travellers Club? But my friend, who was a member, he – he needed to get me a suit. So, we walked into Moss Bros on Regent Street to rent me a suit, to hire me a suit, and there was a big flat screen TV on the wall. And everyone was crowded around it. And I looked and I could see smoke coming out of the World Trade Center in New York. Of course, my first thought was: "This is a Hollywood movie." Or I thought maybe, "Is this a retrospective of the 1992 World Trade Center attack or '94?"

Aimen Dean '93.

Thomas Small '93 World Trade Center attack. And then, I was standing. And immediately, the towers began to fall. And I – I realised what was going on. And in my total shock, I just fell onto my knees. I just couldn't believe it. And from that point onward, everything changed. And these Muslims, who I had been raised to vaguely think were a malicious people, were revealed to be very malicious. Or so it seems to those of us who didn't know anything back then. Now, my "Where were you on 9/11 story?" is pretty ordinary, I think. But where were you on 9/11? 

Aimen Dean Well, you said you were on Regent Street, yeah? Well, I wasn't far away from you. I was in Oxford Street. That day, basically, I had my regular meeting with one of my handlers from MI6 and the other hundred from MI5. So, we had a meeting. And, of course, there were, in the three months preceding that, many, many different, you know, red flags and warnings and hints something big is about to happen. And we will come to that later. And I was walking down Oxford Street. And there, there were lots of people congregating around the screen in, you know, one of the shops that were selling, you know, TVs. So, I just looked at it and I saw the smoke coming out of the north tower. And I was looking at it and I was thinking, "Maybe that's the one. That's it. This is the one. This is the one that we were warned about, that something big is about to happen. But how did they get the bum way up there?" I thought it was actually not a plane, but a bomb exploding at the higher floors. And then, you know, within minutes, the other plane struck the south tower. And then, I started to realise that, no, these are planes being used as guided weapons against high structures. And it was the World Trade Center, which itself basically was a target just eight years prior. And, somehow – somehow, I knew even then who most likely culprit. And within thirty minutes, my MI6 handler called me and told me that "if you are still in London"—because I was supposed to go to another city—"stay, book a hotel. It's going to be a long week ahead."

Thomas Small When you say "I knew who – who the culprit was," ultimately, the culprit was your friends, your former comrades in al-Qaeda. But why didn't you know about it? I mean, surely they would have told you.

Aimen Dean Well, it comes down to the fact that I began spying against al-Qaeda in late 1998, after the East Africa bombings. And when I returned to Afghanistan to resume, you know, at least, on the surface, my al-Qaeda duties in early 1999, my duties were confined to two areas. One was operational, which was the WMD program for al-Qaeda. So, I was part of the research and development for explosives, poisons, chemical weapons, biological weapons. The second duty, which was also a cover story for me, was being part of the – called the business clan. We used to call it this way: business clan. My duty then, as someone with a valid passport, a young face, and someone basically with relatives in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, is to help a senior al-Qaeda members with families in Afghanistan to export items to the Gulf. Now, many people say, "Well, you were in al-Qaeda? How couldn't you seen it coming?" And the answer was because it was so tightly controlled. The entire process, the planning, the 9/11 hijackers, all of them were trained in separate camps. That's the first thing. So, we never saw them. I only knew three of them, three of the hijackers. You know, Abdulaziz al-Omar, Nawaf al-Hazmi, and [name].

Thomas Small What about the mastermind of – of 9/11? He's very famous. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. You knew him. You met him in Bosnia, didn't you? 

Aimen Dean I was one of college Khalid Sheikh Mohammed's, you know, first recruits into Afghanistan. 

Thomas Small Did he seem like the kind of person that would – that would put together and successfully launch a – a terrorist operation killing three thousand people?

Aimen Dean Well, he's a highly gifted engineer. 

Thomas Small Well, sure. There are many engineers in the world that don't blow – blow up of planes. It's not—. The fact that he's an engineer, you know, fine. But what I'm talking about, clearly, a very pious Muslim, he must have been.

Aimen Dean One, a pious Muslim. But two, someone with exceptionally deep hatred towards America.

Thomas Small Why do you think he hated America so much? What does America symbolise for these people? What's wrong with us Americans? We're such nice guys. 

A; Okay. So, if we are going to talk about what they thought was wrong with America, they believed that, you know, in the classic 1960s, '70, and '80s, they believed that America was, you know, the epitome of colonialism and imperialism, because of their support for, one, Israel; two, for Arab dictators as far as they are concerned. They saw America as the force that is holding back the Muslim world from, one, uniting and, two, progressing and advancing. So, that is why, in their mind, you know, if America is no longer there or, at least, if America would – would leave the Middle East alone, then progress could happen, unity could happen. You know, as if America is the only source of our ills while, in fact, basically, ninety percent of our problems are self-inflicted. But then, tell them that in 1995 and they would be basically telling you, "You know what? You are in the wrong place. Pack your bags and leave." 

Thomas Small That's interesting, because, about eighteen months before 9/11, I was in New York City. I had left home with very little money. I was nineteen, twenty years old. I was on my way to – to Greece to – to – to become a monk. That's what I told myself. And I was really full of – of – of a sense of – of – of hatred for what I saw as America's materialist, consumerist society that was – that was turning hearts away from God. I – I didn't even have a place to stay. And I was tramping around lower Manhattan. And I arrived at the World Trade Center. It was the middle of the night. It had rained. And I looked up at the towers and I shook my fist and I said, "I—. One day, I hope someone brings you down." Because for me, they just symbolised what, in fact, I imagine, they symbolise to some extent for al-Qaeda: the epitome of American consumerist finance capitalism, neo-colonial hegemony, which I, as a kind of, at that time, aspiring Christian monk, also very much hated. 

Aimen Dean You know what? You talk about American consumerism and, actually, you are not far off the mark as far as what motivated Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. Because they saw American consumerism as part of the capitalist evil. Because, for them, the entire global economic system and banking system is run, according to them and their conspiracy theories, run by the Jews, the Zionists, and it's all done in a manner of usury, in an imperial way.

Thomas Small Usury, meaning in- – meaning charging extravagant interest.

Aimen Dean Indeed, yes. The interest-based banking. And for them, basically, interest-based banking and the entire financial system of the world was controlled by a cabal of elite Zionists and Anglo-Saxon bankers in order to have hegemony over the world. So, that is how they saw it. So—. And remember that Khalid Sheikh actually came from an area in Pakistan called Balochistan, famous for its, you know, deeply socialist leanings, but also almost communist. In fact, in the 1960s and '70s, they used to call Balochistan the Red Balochistan.

Thomas Small That's interesting, because, at the same time that I was pursuing this sort of spiritual journey, which landed me in the monastery, and shaking my fist at the World Trade Center for being opposed, as I saw it, to spirituality …

Aimen Dean Mmhmm.

Thomas Small … you know, the materialism as opposed to spirituality, I was also reading Noam Chomsky at the time and Howard Zinn's A People's History of the United States. And that was very much influencing my antipathy to the West and to America, which, again, I think actually harmonises quite cleanly with the worldview of – of al-Qaeda and other such extremist Muslim jihadist, whatever you want to call them. Terrorists.

Aimen Dean Indeed.

Thomas Small So, when the World Trade Center fell down and I collapsed on my knees in shock, I wouldn't say that my reaction was anger. And I had no desire for revenge. It was more like sadness and, or so I thought, a sense that I understand why this is happening. Almost like justice had been done. I am ashamed to say now I wandered the streets of London the next day sad that, for justice to be done, such a thing was required. I utterly repent of this perspective now, I must say.

Aimen Dean Yeah.

Thomas Small But as a young man infused with religion, infused with Chomsky-style paranoid, left-wing, anti-colonialism, that's how I felt. Now, how did you feel about the attacks? Apart from operational. I mean, obviously, in MI6, you're immediately called upon to do a lot of hard work to find out who did it and stop them. But how did – did you feel? Did—? Was there the glimmer in your heart still of – of a sense of justice has been done or?

Aimen Dean Oh, no. My – my feeling at the time was more like regret, you know. Did I miss something? I mean, that was the moment when I realised that there were other signs that I could have interpreted or I could have picked up. And then, I was just thinking, "How could they have compartmentalised the entire operation in a way that no one else was able to see it coming?" I was told by other members of al-Qaeda in later years that the fifteen hijackers, most of them did not know they were in a suicide mission and most of them did not know until just a week before that they were going to hijack planes. But that's it. They were not told that the planes actually are going to be used as suicidal weapons. Only the pilots and the maybe two or three of the leaders of the hijackers who were told that it's going to be a suicide mission. Someone actually, you know, commented. They said that, until the day, more than two thirds of al-Qaeda's Shura council, which is the council of twenty top men, two-thirds of them—we're talking about twelve people within a twenty-men circle—did not know about it. So, if, you know, some of bin Laden's advisors, close advisors, never knew about it, how would I have known about it? However, there were signs [unintelligible] to that fateful day. I remember the last day I was in Afghanistan before 9/11 was in the first week of June of 2001. So, three months before the events. And by that time, I have stayed about seven weeks in Afghanistan. And I was going to the camps. One, Kabul. One to the – in the north of Kabul, in Muradbig, and then, I also went to Logar to say my farewells to one of my old friends from Saudi Arabia who was with us in Bosnia. And then, I made my way to Kandahar, to the tarnak farms, which is just close to the Kandahar airport. And that's a headquarters of al-Qaeda, where Osama bin Laden resided. And I was just in the prayer room of that, you know, of that complex when someone just came to me. He's a Yemeni. And he told me—. You know, my—. You know, my alias, at the time was [unintelligible]. And so, basically, he told me, [name], someone from the leadership is looking for someone who is actually going to be in the UK very soon. And I just thought of you. Are you going to be in the UK very soon?" And I said yes. And he said, "Okay. Just wait." And then, he came back later and he said, "[name], the deputy of Osama bin Laden wants to see you." So, I didn't understand, you know. I – I hardly ever been summoned by [name], someone as senior as him. And so, I went to see him. And, you know, it was in a very small study. If you can call it a study, actually. You know, there is no desk. There is no share. There is nothing. There's only mattresses on the floor and bookshelves. So, I sat down and they asked me. And he said, "When are you going to be in London exactly?" So, I told him my dates. And then, he said to me, "Then, I have a task for you. When you get to London, I want you to deliver a message." It's a verbal message, which was highly unusual. I always used to take letters sealed and take them and deliver them. So, I don't know the content. Although, MI6 at the time were so expert. They used to open them, copy them, then seal them and give them back to me without telling me the contents. So, I do not betray the information, you know. So – so, he told me, "I have a message, and this message is very simple. There are four individuals in the UK. You must tell them that they need to sort out their affairs, bring their families to Afghanistan before the end of August." So, end of August is the deadline. "If the end of August comes and they are still in the UK and haven't left to come to join us here, tell them then to stay there." So, I, you know—. I was listening to this and I was thinking, you know, "This is highly unusual. It's a verbal message." Then, he told me, "Something big is about to happen. Inshallah," which means "God-willing." "And if it happens, stay where you are. Stay in the UK. Do not be tempted to come to Afghanistan and join the jihad with us here if the Americans were to come to Afghanistan and invade us here. Do not be tempted. Stay where you are." 

Thomas Small Or you must have known then that something big was being planned. 

Aimen Dean Absolutely. This is when I started to put two and two together and realise that the activities I witnessed in the week before, where they were, you know evacuating many camps, taking away documents, taking away laptops, desktops, you know – you know, taking heavy weapons and munitions. They were transporting them to unknown locations. So, when I was on the plane back, from Pakistan back to the UK, and of course, basically my handlers were waiting for me at Heathrow, and, you know, I was basically carrying with me grim news that, hey, a big attack is about to happen, but I have no idea what it is, I remember some things that [name] said almost a year and a half prior to that, in November of 1999. As it is customary when one of al-Qaeda members, when they are blessed with a boy or a girl, they slaughter lambs and they invite people for this, you know, feast. So, in this feast, which I was part of, and sitting next to me was Abu Mus'ab al-Suri, who's one of the greatest strategic minds of the jihadist movement—.

Thomas Small His – his—. I mean, his works continued to inspire jihadists today. 

Aimen Dean Absolutely. He is the one basically who pioneered the lone wolf attack.

Thomas Small Yeah.

Aimen Dean The lone wolf jihad. The individual jihad. 

Thomas Small So, he's at this party with you. 

Aimen Dean Exactly. And Abu Mus'ab al-Suri was, you know, the one who was basically the guest of honour there. And I remember he actually took from his pocket a paper and he said, "This is a translation of a letter written by a think tank in America addressed to Bill Clinton." And that letter was written a year prior also. So, it's a bit of an old news. But nonetheless, he, you know—. And he and al-Qaeda leadership knew what to do then. He opened the letter. He said, "This is a think tank. It's called the Project for the New American Century." And in this letter addressed to Bill Clinton, the signatories, who are members of this think tank, urged President Bill Clinton, at that time, to invade Iraq and to start the process of democratising the entire Middle East in order to make it a beacon of stability, of hope, and to make the Middle East a more stable region in the long run. And the only way they can do that is by toppling Saddam Hussein using Iraq then as a example of democracy in the Middle East. Now, who are the signatories, the eighteen signatories. I mean, there are many names. We can go through all of them. 

Thomas Small Donald Rumsfeld. 

Aimen Dean Dick Cheney.

Thomas Small Dick Cheney, of course. Wolfowitz. 

Aimen Dean Yes. The deputy. Rumsfeld. Deputy. Condoleezza Rice was one of those. And, in fact, Jeb Bush, you know, George Bush's brother, was one of the signatories.

Thomas Small All the usual suspects.

Aimen Dean Kenneth Adelman, Richard Perle, William Kristol. 

Thomas Small I.e. The Neo-con- — the Leading Lights of the Neo-con Movement. 

Aimen Dean All the engineers and the architects of the Iraq War, which will happen, basically, five – in almost five years later, signed that letter.

Thomas Small So, Abu [Mus'ab] is reading a translation of this letter to – to you al-Qaeda people.

Aimen Dean Indeed. 

Thomas Small And what does he say? 

Aimen Dean And he said basically that there was one columnist in America who responded to this letter almost as if it was on behalf of Bill Clinton, saying that, you know, this will never happen, because, you know, the American people will never, ever accept such an undertaking, unless if there was an event in the magnitude of Pearl Harbor.

Thomas Small So—. But – but – but Abu Mus'ab doesn't want America to invade Iraq and bring democracy to the Middle East. 

Aimen Dean Oh, he does.

Thomas Small Why?

Aimen Dean He does. It wasn't about bringing democracy. Because they knew the region more than the Americans knew. You see, that's a difference between the Project for the New American Century and al-Qaeda, which was the project for the new Islamic century. They knew their own region and their own people better than the Americans. 

Thomas Small They knew that democracy would never just come at – at the – at the end of a bayonet.

Aimen Dean Absolutely. And you see that is the, you know, the genius of al-Qaeda. At least, you know, the up to that point. You see, al-Qaeda have two, you know, programs. First, destroy and then rebuild. They were good at destroy. They are never good at rebuilding.

Thomas Small Creative destruction.

Aimen Dean Exactly. 

Thomas Small They, like—. They should all—. They should just move to Silicon Valley.

Aimen Dean Creative disruption or creative destruction. In fact, they called it creative chaos. 

Thomas Small Ah.

Aimen Dean [foreign language].

Thomas Small And so, they knew what they were doing. These—. They're not idiots. 

Aimen Dean No. no. They were – they were not. They knew exactly what they were doing. 

Thomas Small So, they—.

Aimen Dean In fact, you know, Mustafa Abu al-Yazid, who later became the operational leader of al-Qaeda and who was killed, I think, in 2009, but Mustafa Abu al-Yazid, who was a member of the Shura council of Al-Qaeda, he said something very interesting. He said that, you know—and that was in later years and justifying why 9/11 was important—he said that "imagine that you have a house. It's dilapidated. You know, you want to destroy it. You want to build bulldoze it. But there is a problem: You're broke and you don't have a bulldozer. So, what do you do then? Well, in the village, there is, you know, someone who owns a bulldozer, and he's an idiot and someone who has short temper and easily provoked. So, what do you do then? You, you know—. You don't have even the money to hire a bulldozer. You can't pay for his services. So, what do you do? You write a lot of, you know, rude graffiti on the house, insulting him and his wife and his mother and his daughter and everything. And then, basically, he will come and destroy it for you for free. For free. 

Thomas Small So – so – so, they attack the World Trade Center in effect by writing huge graffiti in the sky—"Come attack us here in Afghanistan"—because they knew, as well as everyone else, that Afghanistan is the graveyard of empires.

Aimen Dean Indeed. 

Thomas Small And they know this, of course, because they, in their own lives, have seen it be a graveyard of empires—

Aimen Dean Absolutely.

Thomas Small —like the other great twentieth century empire, the Soviet Union. 

Aimen Dean Absolutely. 

Thomas Small So, they think, "Well, the Soviet Union reached its end in Afghanistan. We are going to entice the United States to reach its end in Afghanistan as well." Which is interesting, because, when I was a kid, I knew about the Mujahideen, the famous noble Mujahideen fighting valiantly against the evil empire of communism to free and liberate Afghanistan. And I was convinced, primarily by Hollywood, that the Mujahideen were holy warriors riding their white stallions to defend themselves against the evil empire, as Ronald Reagan called it. For example, I remember I loved James Bond movies, and in 1989, Timothy Dalton's classic, The Living Daylights, one of the great James Bond movies, came out. We watched it. At the end of that movie, James Bond becomes a Mujahid. He becomes a jihadist. Joins this ragtag group of Muslim warriors—

Aimen Dean mmhmm.

Thomas Small —fighting this nefarious plot by a renegade Soviet general in line with a renegade American arms dealer to sell opium. I was very confused. But there you see James Bond riding – riding into battle with the Mujahideen. I think the same year, if not the year before, Rambo III comes out. 

Aimen Dean I saw that.

Thomas Small Rambo becomes one of the Mujahideen as well. And at that last shot, he's riding his Mujahideen horse up against a whole battalion of tanks, Soviet tanks, all by himself. The – the Mujahideen were the great heroes, and the film ends with the dedication to the brave men of the Mujahideen. 

Aimen Dean Wow.

Thomas Small And, apparently, I'm told it's – it's—. That – that – that dedication remains to the state. You can watch it on Netflix, and – and you get to the end of the film. "To the brave men of the Mujahideen." When you were growing up in Saudi Arabia, you must have thought that those men were brave.

Aimen Dean Oh, indeed.

Thomas Small For all I know, you still think they're brave.

Aimen Dean Well, of course. I mean, after all you know, their – their cause was just, was to throw out the invaders. Any country would do that. Any people would do that. I remember there are people from our neighbourhood in Khobar who went to during the Mujahideen in Afghanistan, who, you know, thought it was a noble thing to do.

And there were thousands of Arab volunteers from Saudi Arabia, North Africa, Egypt, Jordan who went to fight there in Afghanistan. Except what happened in Afghanistan at the time is that many people who were in prison in Egypt, especially Egypt, for attempting to overthrow the government of Sadat first and then Mubarak [crosstalk]. 

Thomas Small Inspired by – by famous Muslim brotherhood ideologue, Sayyid Qutb.

Aimen Dean Absolutely. Sayyid Qutb. 

Thomas Small Sayyid Qutb, the most—. The sort of grandfather of – of – of modern jihadism. 

Aimen Dean Indeed. Actually, like, I mean, you know, his writings inspired those who killed Sadat and then wanted to overthrow Mubarak. So, they found in the Afghan jihad a space in which they can breathe, a train, a thing. And it was these people, especially three people—[name], Abu Mus'ab al-Suri, [name]. They met Osama bin Laden there. He was just young, idealistic, a – a—. 

Thomas Small Rich.

Aimen Dean Rich.

Thomas Small Handsome.

Aimen Dean Exactly. Tall.

Thomas Small Articulate.

Aimen Dean Charismatic. He was there and all he wanted was just to help the Afghan jihad. But what poisoned his mind were these three individuals who were released from prison, or escaped from prison in Egypt, made it all the way to Afghanistan,, because they saw in it a, you know, an ideal fertile land to not only recruit, but also to train and to strategize the next phase of jihad. So, they saw Osama bin Laden. They thought that's it. "This is it. This is the symbol. This is the man who we could ride as a horse towards the sunlit uplands, you know, of Islamic caliphate in Egypt. 

Thomas Small But, surely, they didn't introduce him to the ideas of Sayyid Qutb and stuff. I mean, people knew about Sayyid Qutb. I think you yourself, you drank deeply from the well of Sayyid Qutb following the death of your mother. You found in Sayyid Qutb tremendous constellation. What about Sayyid Qutb and his now infamous writings? 

Aimen Dean Well, these writings influenced Osama bin Laden greatly. 

Thomas Small No. no. You. I'm talking about you. 

Aimen Dean Okay. 

Thomas Small What—? How did they? Why did they – why did they give you so much constellation as a young Muslim growing up in Saudi Arabia?

Aimen Dean Well, I must remember, you know, how Sayyid Qutb wrote these books. I mean, there is a book called Fi Zilal al-Quran, which means "in the shades of the Qur'an." And this book was written over nine years period, because it covers the entire Qur'an. It's – it's – it's a commentary on the Qur'an. But not from a theological sense, but from a literary sense, from an inspirational sense. And he wrote that book, four thousand pages when he was in prison, over nine years. And Nasser's prisons in Egypt in the 1950s and '60s were no picnic. I mean, they were exceptionally hard, harsh, dark prisons. 

Thomas Small And so, how—? Why – why would these [unintelligible]? Why would these words, these four thousands have spoken to you?

Aimen Dean Because they were written through the prism of pain. And the pain wasn't just only about his own pain being inside prison and isolation and, you know, living sometime, you know, in a scary cell where he was doused with animal fat and let loose the dogs on him to bite him, or, sometime, basically, he would find, you know, snakes, you know, coming into his cell. So, of course, all of these dark, scary moments for him were reflected in his writings, where he turned that suffering into something that was of – of immense literary beauty. So, he spoke from the heart to the heart.

Thomas Small And he spoke to your young heart?

Aimen Dean Indeed. 

Thomas Small Put – put – put me in your head at that time. What what's going on in your head? 

Aimen Dean There were so many things going on inside of my head, because, you see, I grew up in Saudi Arabia. My mother was Lebanese. So, in the 1980s, she was worried about her family back home suffering the effects of the civil war in Lebanon.

It was a ethnic and sectarian and religious civil war. 

Thomas Small And sort of in microcosm what – what – what one can see now em- – embroiling the whole Middle East.

Aimen Dean Indeed. And I was living in the Eastern province of Saudi Arabia where, just across the water from us, to the north, we have a raging brutal war between Iraq and Iran that was also both ethnic and sectarian. And then, later when I was only twelve, you know, just before my mother's death, I saw that my city, Khobar, was swamped with the world's wealthiest refugees. You know, basically, refugees arriving in their Cadillacs and Mercedes-Benz and BMWs from Kuwait. 

Thomas Small From Kuwait.

Aimen Dean Because, you know, Saddam Hussein just invaded Kuwait. And, of course, Kuwait is – had a fabulous rich lifestyle. Suddenly, they found themselves refugees, even though they were in a riding Mercedes-Benz and BMWs and Cadillacsm, you know. 

Thomas Small And shortly thereafter, then your – your – your area's swarming with American 

troops. 

Aimen Dean Oh, Humvees everywhere. And, you know, we used to have some American fast food chains. You know, basically, we have to stand in line way behind these, you know – you know, very hungry, you know, American soldiers basically who were or- ordering four burgers and ten fries, you know, apiece. 

Aimen Dean It's – it's amazing to think you over there in Khobar watching the Humvees arrive and these big American soldiers. 'Cause in America, I was being told, "Saddam Hussein is gonna come get us. He – he's probably got nuke – nukes. He's going to kill you all." And we would have on the radio: "I'm proud to be in America or, at least, I know I'm free." It was this big thing. We were all like, "Get Saddam. Get Saddam." And there you are having to, you know, queue in line while the Americans get their burgers first. 

Aimen Dean Absolutely. And, you know, we thought, basically, "This is unfair." But, you know – you know, it shows basically how, at the time, Americans – American soldiers were leaving their weapons and their Humvees, parking in the normal streets, going into a Saudi, you know, based burger chains and mixing with us and having no fear of us whatsoever. Whatsoever. I mean, basically, you cannot imagine this in this world anymore, you know. And they were there because we saw them basically as some sort of guarantee that Saddam Hussein is not going to venture south and capture the oil fields of the eastern province of Saudi Arabia. 

Thomas Small So – so, in general, you were pleased that they were there. You felt they were protecting you. Because, as we all know, in a way King Fahd of Saudi Arabia's decision to invite the Americans in was the fateful decision that led to some kind of ideological justification for al-Qaeda and similar groups and their antipathy to the Saudi Royal family to America's presence in the Middle East and so on. 

Aimen Dean Indeed. You see, this is where my conflict began. You know, Osama bin Laden did not like one bit the presence of those troops inside Saudi Arabia. Not one bit. And he was trying to convince the Saudi Royal family, "Please do not invite the Americans. Let us, the Mujahideen, sort this out."

Thomas Small And he was able to get the ear of the Saudi Royal family, because, as a Mujahid in the Afghanistan war, he had developed close contacts with the Saudi government at the highest level, including the fact that, as a member of the prominent bin Laden family, he was well-known. Would have Osama bin Laden's Mujahideen been able to take care of this situation, expelled the battle-hardened Iraqi army from Kuwait? Surely not. 

Aimen Dean Well, come on. Of course, basically, there was no way this would be sorted out by the Mujahideen. It needed American firepower.

Thomas Small Why not? The Mujahideen had sorted out the Soviet Union?

Aimen Dean Yeah. In a long, protracted, eleven years war. No [crosstalk].

Thomas Small In the mountains, not in the—. 

Aimen Dean Exactly. Not in the desert. And Saddam Hussein's army was eight years veteran army of the Iraq-Iran war. And, plus, at the same time, basically, they were a different cookie altogether. So, here, however, you know, this is where the conflict began. Because, basically, I was already part of Islamic awareness circles. There were already religious clerics who I listened to, I – I respected, adhered to. These clerics were giving lectures and talking about their displeasure with the presence of the Americans. So, on one hand, I'm happy they are there. But on the other hand, I have a loyalty to my clerics and my clergy, who basically were not very happy about these Americans being there.

Thomas Small So, there you are. You're conflicted. On the one hand, the American troops are protecting you. On the other hand, all of these radical clerics are – are encouraging you to be very displeased about their presence. What is the through-line from that place of conflict two, three or four years later you deciding to go to Bosnia as a young jihadist? 

Aimen Dean Well, after the Gulf War ended and Saddam Hussein was expelled from Kuwait, there was another event basically that really propelled me towards, you know, great – towards searching for a greater meaning, greater purpose, which was the passing of my mother. She was only forty-nine at that time. And it was a brain aneurysm that, you know, was – was so unforeseen. And for me, that event led me to delve deeper into the world of theology from the perspective of politics. 

Thomas Small Why? 

Aimen Dean Well, I mean, first of all, you are looking for a spirituality, but a spirituality basically that has a place in the world, you know, that shapes history.

Thomas Small But I still don't see the link between that and your mother's death.

Aimen Dean Because, remember, my mother was my moral compass and, basically, she is the one who actually I would say politicise me because of her worry about the Lebanese civil war.

Thomas Small I see.

Aimen Dean You know, the effects of that on the sectarian and ethnic harmony of the Middle East. Or lack of harmony, I would say. So, my political educator is gone. 

Thomas Small Do you think she would have supported your decision to go to Bosnia as a 

jihadist? 

Aimen Dean Oh, I would say basically she would have confiscated my passport, locked me up in a room until, basically, I came back to my senses. 

Thomas Small And did you know that – that you would have been going against her wishes by doing it?

Aimen Dean Indeed. But I was interpreting that in my mind as it was her wishes as a mother, not her wishes as someone who have a duty towards fellow Muslims.

Thomas Small So, you lost your moral compass and the ideology of the Mujahideen provides you with a replacement, which allows you both to get some sense of spiritual fulfilment and allows you to pursue a path with real political ramifications. 

Aimen Dean Indeed. 

Thomas Small And what – what, at that time, in your mind, what political ramifications were you pursuing? 

Aimen Dean Well, of course, the Bosnian conflict was raging. I remember one of my own teachers, our beloved math teacher–—his name was Osama [name]; ironically, another Osama—you know. died in Bosnia. And, you know, we were thinking, you know, first of all, Bosnia, why, you know, what is happening, you know, so suddenly the conflict in Bosnia that was raging for a few months already became a reality in our classroom, even though it was, you know, three thousand kilometres away. And I remember another fellow teacher of his, when he came to our classroom in order to, you know, give us or attempting to give us, you know, what he thought was counselling, you know, he, you know, answered one of the questions as to why would a young man with a life – a full life, a wonderful life, you know, potentially rich life ahead of him, would go and, you know, die somewhere else for people we hardly know.

Aimen Dean Why would he? 

Thomas Small And he said that because it is our duty to help those fellow Muslims who are in desperate need. And, sometimes, if you don't do it, then who will do it? And then, he talked about the fact that it doesn't matter if you come from a rich family or a poor family, from a middle class or from an upper class. What matters in the end is your willingness to sacrifice. And in the case of our teacher, his sacrifice would have tasted far sweeter, because he had it all and gave it all away. So, the words [unintelligible]. Sacrifice, jihad, Bosnia. All of them started to resonate, because it was in our own classroom. So, that was the first trigger, you know, for me as far as I'm concerned, that Bosnia is a place where I could go. Because if my teacher who was standing in front of that blackboard was able to go there, fight, and die there, then, why couldn't I? I remember when I turned sixteen, I was having a dinner with a friend of mine. And, in fact, his brother was even a closer friend of mine. So, I remember I was having a dinner with his brother, and he was telling me, "Did you say goodbye to Khalid?" So, I looked at him and I would say, "Why would I say goodbye to him?" So, he just realised, "Oops." You know? "I'm not supposed to have told you this." But then he told me that Khalid actually is living to Bosnia within a week. So, you know, he's sorting out his affairs. "And so, if you want to say goodbye to him, go and say goodbye." There were ten minutes, you know, walk, you know, from that dinner place to Khalid's house. My plan was to say goodbye. By the time I knocked on his door, my plan has changed. I told him, "I'm going to go with you." And I still remember basically he's looking at me and thinking, "Come again. What did you say?" I said, "I'm going with you." He said, "No." You know? "For God's sake, Aimen. Do you know, basically, the jihad is not a picnic? It's a war. People lose lives, limbs, get injured so badly. I mean, it's scary. You know, shells landing, bullets whizzing by. It's not going to be a picnic." So, I said, "Yeah, I know. I mean, I know basically that it's not going to be something easy or, you know—. But I, you know, I really want to go." And he said to me, "Yes. But, Aimen, you know – you know, you're sixteen. Bespectacled, bookish, nerdish, geek-ish, boy. Like, I mean, why would you go?" You know? "Do you think the jihad needs you?" And I remember that my answer to him changed his mind and changed my life. I said to him, "I know, Khalid, that the jihad doesn't need. But I need it. So—." 

Thomas Small You need it for?

Aimen Dean For my own betterment. For my own spiritual betterment. For my own place in history. For me not being a spectator on the side line, just watching the caravan passing by and, later years, regretting that I never hopped on that caravan and went with them into that journey. Not just only to explore, you know, what is there at the very end, but beyond it, which – which means the afterlife. 

Thomas Small Well, certainly, your journey took you in places you never foresaw. But also, I think the journey of the jihadist movement went in places that no one could foresee. So, you know, you joined the Mujahideen in Bosnia for, let's – let's face it, noble aims. Bosnian Muslims were being slaughtered by Serbs and Croats, and you went to defend them. But how do you go from that? How does a movement go from that to the morning of September 11th, when men fly airplanes into a building in America and kill civilians? Who are they defending? What – what—? When – when did jihadism change from the characters at the end of Rambo III and The Living Daylight to the 9/11 hijackers and Osama bin Laden. What happened? 

Aimen Dean What happened, Thomas, was Bosnia. Bosnia happened. You see, many people don't understand that Bosnia was the fork in the road that separated now the jihadist from the west, where the interest diverged, where the ideological alliance that happened during the jihad against the Soviets completely disappeared. And, basically, the west went in one direction and the jihadist went into the other. What happened in Bosnia is that the war was ugly. It was genocidal and it was over identity, a Muslim identity that was attacked with the intention of annihilating it. And what was shocking for us is that the Muslims of Bosnia looked nothing like, you know, the Muslims in the rest of the Muslim world. They were, you know, blue- and green-eyed. They were blonde-haired. They were fair-skinned. Except that, you know, they didn't look any different from their Serbian neighbours. In fact, genetically even, they are the same. 

Thomas Small South Slavs. They all speak the same language, basically.

Aimen Dean Exactly. They spoke the same line. They intermarried actually before the war. You know, they looked like each other, but except, the difference where in the names only in. Because even Muslims lived under communism in Yugoslavia for seventy years. They almost – almost became indistinguishable in there. 

Thomas Small It was a secular state. They didn't [crosstalk].

Aimen Dean Absolutely. 

Thomas Small There's not much religiosity going on.

Aimen Dean Absolutely. Only that their names were Ahmed and Mohammed and Mirsad or, you know—. So, they – they had these Muslim names. And, basically, slaughter was happening based on your name. If your name is Muslim, that's it. You're done. And that is what shook us to the core. That if Muslims who had only just their names, the remnants and, you know, the mosques, which served more like ornaments, you know, rather than an actual place of worship.

Thomas Small But what does it have to do with flying planes into the World Trade Center?

Aimen Dean For the jihadist there, they believe that the war was taking on a Christian symbology against Islam. This is a new crusade. So, the language in which the jihadists were framing this conflict and the narrative they were putting together was that this is a new crusade. So, this is the Christian world. It's not just only the Serbs with their nationalism masquerading as Christianity, you know, slaughtering Muslims. No. No. No. No. This is a Western—American, British, French—enabled genocide against Muslims, which was, of course, far from the truth.

Thomas Small But that's total nonsense. 

Aimen Dean Absolutely.

Thomas Small They must have known it was nonsense. That's a cynical way of describing what was going on in Bosnia, because they were already convinced that the Americans were an evil empire that needed to be destroyed. 

Aimen Dean Exactly. But, of course, when I went there to Bosnia, how would I have known that our leaders will be Jemaah Islamiyah, Egyptian Jemaah Islamiyah who actually killed Sadat in 1981 because of the fact that he signed the peace treaty with Israel. So, of course, they were the enemies of peace. But I did not know that. I was only sixteen. I went there thinking I was going to do something noble. And this is the problem, is that you have a noble cause, but then it's led by the wrong leaders who basically use it in order to manufacture a narrative that there is a greater conflict. For me, now with hindsight years, he is later, I realised that the Serbs were fighting a nationalist war. Yes, they cloaked their nationalistic cause with Christian symbology. But it was enough to fool the naive young men from the Arab world who came to fight in Bosnia that it is a crusade. And they then turned their hatred against America, because they believed, by the end of the war that the Americans are rewarded the Serbs with half of the Bosnian territory, even though there were only one third of the population. You know, they rewarded their genocide by having this in a half-baked peace treaty between the two – the three sides—the Bosnians, the Serbs, and the Croats. So, how Khalid Sheikh Mohammed—we come back again to him—the architect of 9/11, when he arrived in Bosnia, just only, you know, several weeks before the date and agreement was signed, he was telling us that the conflict is about to end, because, already, the negotiations are taking place. There is a truce. There is a ceasefire. "And remember brothers—." I remember his words. He said, "Remember, brothers. Why do we allow the Americans and other world powers to dictate where we fight? Why are we running from one fringe conflict on the fringes of the Muslim world from a Bosnia to a Chechnya to a Kashmir, and we keep fighting in these conflicts and we leave the centre? It's the centre of the Muslim world that is so weak that actually allowed the fringes of the Muslim world to suffer so greatly in these conflicts. So, we need to reclaim the centre, reshape the centre, remake the centre, and recreate the glories of the Muslim caliphate."

Thomas Small That get us to the – the question, the important question of what al-Qaeda really wanted to happen following 9/11. What did they think was going to happen? So, they run—. They fly two planes into the World Trade Center. They elicit this massive response from the great global hegemon, the United States, which they hope will get bogged down in Afghanistan, will be become bankrupt, will upset the local population in America to turn against the government so that America would withdraw from the Middle East, leaving it open for the Mujahideen to topple governments like the Saudi government, relay claim to the heartlands of the Muslim world from which they could then spread out and conquer the Muslim world in order to return it to the glories of – of the past. That's basically the – the narrative?

Aimen Dean No. The—. It's—. I would say basically, like, you are half right. But it's not about forcing the Americans to leave the Middle East. Actually, it is inviting the Americans to come to the Middle East. Again, we come back to the bulldozer analogy. You know, they saw the Americans, not as, you know, a stability factor, but instability factor. Bringing the Americans to be the bulldozer that will bulldoze Iraq. Why Iraq was important and why it needed to be bulldozed, because Saddam Hussein was the last standing pillar of Arab nationalism. And Arab nationalism was the last hurdle in front of Islamism as an ideology.

Thomas Small The last secular ideology in the Middle East.

Aimen Dean Exactly. The least the last hurdle in front of an Islamist takeover. So, doing 9/11 enticed the Americans to go into Iraq, because, already, as we talked about before, Abu Mus'ab al-Suri saw that the American administration might be actually tempted to go into Iraq if there was a massive attack, you know, on American soil. You know, and bin Laden particularly chose deliberate all the hijackers—not the pilots, the hijackers—to be from Saudi Arabia. Because what is the biggest target for Osama bin Laden? Always—.

Thomas Small Saudi Arabia, 

Aimen Dean Saudi Arabia.

Thomas Small From 1995, I think, his first war against the house of Saud. 

Aimen Dean Exactly. And, you know, in 1996, when he landed back from Sudan into Afghanistan, we went to meet him. You know, we were in a camp not far away from where he was, forty-five minutes drive. And I still remember when we met him at the first time, when he arrived from Sudan, he looked dishevelled. He looked like a refugee. Many people who saw some of, a lot of them for the first time, they see this neat turban, you know, nice robes, well, you know, ironed, no crease in them whatsoever. No. The Osama bin Laden I met for the first time in August of 1996 looked like a refugee. Along with his al-Qaeda followers.

Thomas Small He – he was a refugee. 

Aimen Dean Exactly. He's just lucky to be escaping with his life and he was in compound belonging to another Afghan warlord. It wasn't his. You know, all of their belongings are still basically in boxes and metal boxes, and it's all around, you know, in a disorganised way. So, when we sat with him, there were fourteen of us. When we sat with him, because he was asking if there are any people from Saudi Arabia [unintelligible]. Of course, basically, that's why we went to see him. So, he was talking to us and he was telling us about how God brought him from Sudan into Afghanistan. And I was thinking, "Are you trying to comfort yourself here? I mean, isn't it the fact that you were stabbed in the back by President Bashir of Sudan and his ally, Turabi." And, you know, and then he started talking about prophecies. And he started to weaponize eschatology, Islamic eschatology, and the prophecies of old to justify that he is in Afghanistan, because Afghanistan is going to be the launch place for the army of the Black Banners that will liberate Mecca, Medina, and Jerusalem, all of these three holy cities, you know. So, of course, if you want to liberate Mecca and Medina, then from who? Because who is actually ruling over Mecca and Medina? The Saudi Royal family. And for him, he was talking about how the Americans are occupying the two holy places. That the land of Muhammad is occupied by the American forces and their presence in Saudi Arabia is an affront to Islam. I was thinking, "Well, there are only fifteen thousand of them at the time, basically. I mean, the Saudi army is three hundred thousand. So, I don't think it wasn't occupation. It was just basically, you know, a form of, you know, protection and military cooperation." But, you know, don't tell this to them. He then went on to say, when he looked at our faces—. And bin Laden was so good at reading faces. He can read your expression and see if you are happy or sceptical, if you are convinced or not. So, he saw that bewildered looks on our faces, because now he's telling us, and still a foreign, alien idea to us, that we'll be fighting against Saudi Arabia, against our own people, against our own relatives who work in the security services. He said, "Remember, when the Prophet Mohammed was escaping from Mecca, going on his dangerous migration trip to Medina, when he was escaping, Arab tribes put a huge bounty on his head, trying to prevent him from reaching Medina and establishing his, you know, early political society there. And when, finally, one knight caught up with him, the prophet confronted that knight, who was trying to get the bounty—he was trying to kill the prophet—he confronted him and he said that 'I will be reaching Medina, and my faith will reach the horizons from the east to the west, and the Persian empire will fall. And I see you'"—he was talking to the Arab knight; his name was [Suraca]—"'I see you Suraca wearing the crown and the bracelets of the Persian emperor." So, of course, you know, the knight was so sceptical. It's like, you know, "You're a fugitive. You are a fugitive and you are threatening the might of Persia, you know, which no one has ever threatened this might before. It's a mighty empire." And he said, "It's either you're crazy or you're truly telling the truth. So, if you are telling the truth, then I want it in writing." So, the Prophet Muhammad, you know, instructed his companion to scribe, you know, for that night that he will be wearing the crown and the bracelets of the Persian emperor. Sixteen years to that day, it came true that, that knight was wearing the crown and the bracelets of the Persian emperor, and the Persian empire collapsed under the weight of the Muslim armies. So, bin Laden was telling us this story to restore our faith, to tell us that we could be refugees now, but we could change history. So, if you—. Thomas, if you see them as I saw them in 1996 and you can't believe that five years later, just only five years, these people, these bunch of refugees will change world history and will launch the most audacious and deadly terrorist attack in human history. 

Thomas Small And so much of what they calculated to happen did happen. The Americans went to Afghanistan where they remain bogged down. They did enter Iraq, participating in destabilising the political patchwork of the region. 

Aimen Dean Yes.

Thomas Small Of course, the jihadists that she had assisted them in that. They did withdraw their troops from Saudi Arabia, moving them to Qatar.

Aimen Dean Indeed. 

Thomas Small And nothing has been the same. But nonetheless, still Osama bin Laden, his goal, ultimately, was political power. Once the house of Saud was toppled, once the Americans had done their dirty work for them and destabilised the region and then withdrawn, so the region is – is now, you know—. There's tremendous power vacuum opening up, Osama bin Laden imagined himself with the crown of the Persian emperor on his head. Do you think that's what he wanted? 

Aimen Dean I think he wanted the restoration of the caliphate. He believed in eschatology. He believed that he was one of those foretold in the prophecies that would be paving the way for the Mahdi. You know, the Messiah. So, basically 9/11, not only have, you know, eschatology behind it, messianic vision behind it, and, you know, a political vision behind it, and ideological vision behind it, but also what was ultimately the aim and the goal is creative chaos. That chaos that should reign over the entire region to allow the forces of Islamism to take over. Because he saw what happened in Afghanistan after the civil war between the Mujahideen and the collapse of law and order and the raise of the warlords. That chaos was what enabled the Taliban to take over the entirety of Afghanistan except for a small pocket in the north. You know, so, he saw that chaos will make people yearn for law and order. And the only people who can give law and order based on Sharia are who? The Mujahideen. 

Thomas Small When I was growing up an evangelical in California, it was absolutely an article of faith to us all that the world was coming to an end soon and that the prophecies in the book of revelation at the end of the Bible—

Aimen Dean [unintelligible].

Thomas Small were coming true through, at that time, the clash between the divine United States and the godless Soviet Union. And we were all told, absolutely, that there was no real need for us to dream about our future careers or our future lives, because it was going to happen. The end of the world was nigh. Ronald Reagan was acting as a vehicle for God's power by destroying the Soviet Union, and the state of Israel was a sign that Christ was going to return. And I mean, that sort of thing that was populating my mind as a kid, was that also in the air of these jihadist camps? Did you think the end of the world was soon? 

Aimen Dean Wow. I mean, you just mentioned, you know, the state of Israel. And now, I'm thinking, "Wow." Why? Because, you know, in, you know, in summer of 1997, when the head of bin Laden's bodyguard, [name]. He was trying to recruit me into al-Qaeda. And, you know, he was walking with me and telling me about the age of prophecies and how these prophecies, which Osama bin Laden spoke about a year area and I heard him talk about them, he was adamant that we are in the age of prophecies. And if we don't fulfil them, then who would do? Aliens from Mars coming down to do it for us? No. It would be us. So, I told him, you know, "Okay. How do you know that we are living in the age of prophecies?" He said, "Because the age of prophecies." And the trigger was the return of the Jews to the Holy Land. 

Thomas Small How fascinating. It's the same thing. 

Aimen Dean Exactly. 

Thomas Small Although, of course, as a Christian, we thought that that was a good thing, 'cause, you know, the – the Jews are still the chosen people and Israel is theirs.

And, you know, of course, we didn't care about Muslim claims or Arab claims on Israel at all. 

Aimen Dean Yeah.

Thomas Small They just seemed to be extraneous. We didn't even think about them, to be perfectly honest. But you're on the other side of the – of that story. You – you see it as a profoundly satanic sign that the end of the world is nigh. The Jews were turning to Israel is a sign that the forces of darkness are gathering, which will incite the Mahdi to return and the end of the world to occur. 

Aimen Dean Exactly. Because, you know, the eschatology taught in al-Qaeda camps is that the return of the Jews to the Holy Land. And they don't date it from 1948, which is the establishment of the state of Israel. No, they date it from the 1967. Because in the six days war in 1967, Israel captured Jerusalem. So, for them, the – the – the Temple Mount, you know, the site where Al-Aqsa Mosque and the dome of the rock stands, the capture of that site is the trigger of the beginning of the end. So, that's how they see it. So, they say, basically, that the Mahdi, who's the Muslim Messiah, will emerge because—.

Thomas Small No. Let's be – let's be specific about that. The Muslim Messiah is Jesus. 

Aimen Dean And—. 

Thomas Small [crosstalk] Jesus. 

Aimen Dean Indeed. 

Thomas Small So, who is—? What's the difference between the Mahdi and the Messiah?

Aimen Dean Well, the Mahdi means "the guided one." He's a saviour who would emerge to reunite the Muslim world. But the Muslim world the unification will trigger the return or the emergence of the antichrist, you know, who will lead the Jews and the Zionist Christians in a battle against Muslims, which will basically then, you know, lead to the descent of Jesus into this world in order to end this conflict on the side of Muslims. That's what we were taught in the camps.

Thomas Small And you believed it?

Aimen Dean At the time, I believed it. 

Thomas Small Did it make you feel very excited? 

Aimen Dean [unintelligible].

Thomas Small The end of the world. The age of prophecies.

Aimen Dean Well, it's not just only about the end of the world. You are doing God's work, you know. And you are here as a God's agent doing God's work. 

Thomas Small And that included hacking people to death in Bosnia? 

Aimen Dean That was included. You know, the idea basically was that you are here on earth as a God's instrument. So, when you tell people that you are here on earth as a God's instrument, what do you think they will do? Anything they do, basically, is sacrosanct, is basically something that is ordained by God. 

Thomas Small But why in the mentality of jihadists—

Aimen Dean Mmhmm.

Thomas Small —is being an instrument of God, a license to kill people? Why is it that God wants people to be killed all the time?

Aimen Dean I think it's one of the most difficult questions that are hard to reconcile myself with. I mean, basically, how do we see this avenge-ful God who wants people to fight against other people? And I remember I asked myself this question so many times. And I remember that, in the Qur'an, there is a verse, which talks about war as a necessary evil, as war being the instrument of progress. You know, if you look at the Qur'an or how, you know, scholars of the Qur'an interpreted that verse, they're talking about the fact that we are put here on this earth as a test. Some of us will do good. Some of us will do evil. And those who do good will need to push against those who do evil or evil will reign. So, it is almost what [name] said before, that evil triumph when good people do nothing. So, in essence, war was ordained by God in order to ensure that the world will have peace or the security and stability and progress. The Qur'an described war as an instrument of progress. 

Thomas Small As a Christian, though, I actually understand the logic of what you're saying and can see that on some level it is true, it is impossible for me to believe that that is something ordained by God. That God would actually wish young men to kill civilians in order to further His own aims. I mean, even in the – in the New Testament, Christ—. 

Aimen Dean I don't believe that myself. [crosstalk]. 

Thomas Small No. I know you don't. I know you don't. But nonetheless, there is a – there is a sort of stark divide—

Aimen Dean Yeah.

Thomas Small —between the mentalities here.

Aimen Dean Indeed.

Thomas Small That in – in Islam, God uses violence to further His aims and, in Christianity, that idea that God would use violence any more, at least, to further His aims is – is – is very difficult to believe. Christ said, "Offenses must come, but woe unto him through whom those offenses come." This idea that God knows that there will be evil in the world, that there will be violence war, et cetera. But the instruments for whom that violence occurs are never within his grace or whatever. It's very different.

Aimen Dean Indeed. But you see, in from the Islamic point of view, we see ourselves nothing as an extension of the New Testament, but as an extension of the Old Testament. So, the God of Islam is identical to the God of the Old Testament, of the Torah, of the Tanakh. You know, of the Jewish Tanakh. Rather than, you know, of the Christian New Testament, the Christian Bible. Because you see, in – in Islam, the relationship between the individual and the Creator are far more complex, for example, than the relationship between the individual and the Creator in Christianity. And Islam, it is based on love, fear, and hope while, in Christianity, it's solely based on love, so. 

Thomas Small Well, I think that's a simplification, to be honest.

Aimen Dean Yeah.

Thomas Small I think there's a lot of fear in Christianity, because God does send you to hell after all if you've been very bad. 

Aimen Dean Yeah. Well, it's the same in Islam, except, you know, in Islam, basically the complexity of that relationship, it governs why we sometime have to go to war, not just only for defence, but for offense. And that's basically how, you know, al-Qaeda, for example, used up that. Because, you see, we come back to the issue here. Al-Qaeda uses violence. But there is a great divide within Islam right now, who has the prerogative to use violence? Is it the individual or the state? Throughout thirteen hundred years of Islam, we always, always understood that violence can only be deployed by the state. Whether in defensive or offensive measure, that's up to the state and up to the leaders of the state. But it cannot be wielded or be deployed by individuals or groups of things. The civil war within Islam right now raging over this very question between those who believe that jihad and violence can only be deployed by the state and those who believe no, not only can be deployed by individuals and groups of individuals, but it could also be deployed by them against the state.

Thomas Small Well, certainly, as a result of 9/11, all hell broke loose in the Middle East and a new chapter in the conflicts of the region opened. It's called the War on Terror. You played a role in that war. I certainly did not. I watched from the side lines like the rest of humanity. And that's what we're going to talk about in the next podcast, the War on Terror and what it was like as a double agent working both in MI6 and al-Qaeda in that war. And what I look forward to hearing about really having—. You've – you've – you've described so well the motivations and psychology of – of the jihadist, what they expected. It'd be interesting to hear as well next time what – what goes through the mind of a spy and whether those are actually quite similar, maybe. I don't know. 

Aimen Dean Well, I look forward to having this discussion. I enjoyed it so much. 

Thomas Small This episode of Conflicted was produced by Jake Warren and Sandra Ferrari. Original music by Matt Huxley. If you want to hear more of Conflicted, make sure you search for us on Apple Podcasts or wherever you download yours. 

Conflicted S1 E2 - War on Terror

CONFLICTED

S01E02

Thomas Small Hello, everyone. Thomas Small with you again. In our last episode, we set the stage for the series by talking about the terrorist attacks of 9/11. Aimen Dean, my co-host, and I discussed what they meant for al-Qaeda, the jihadist group behind these attacks. We talked about why Aimen and others had felt compelled to join the jihad. We also got some insight into these events as Aimen saw them while working as a double agent for MI6. We left off by leading into what followed 9/11, the War on Terror, and what it was like for Aimen as al-Qaeda leaders became increasingly suspicious of its members. 

Aimen Dean I remember, you know, someone entering into the kitchen, but I wasn't aware of who he was. And then, I realised basically that my other helpers in the kitchen left in a hurry. Before I was going to turn around distinctively, I felt the end of a pistol against my spine. 

Thomas Small The War on Terror has been going on for eighteen years, but many people don't know the story well. 9/11 happens. Osama bin Laden, then safe and sound in Afghanistan, being protected by his Taliban allies, is suddenly met with a ferocious onslaught from the United States and its partners in the international coalition, which pounds the Taliban, topples their government in Kabul, and forces. al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden's deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and everyone else to leave Afghanistan. Some of them stay in AfPak, the mountainous region of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. 

Some of them stay under house arrest in Iran. Many of them flee to their home countries throughout the Middle East, regroup and begin slowly plotting attacks elsewhere in Saudi Arabia, in Iraq following the American invasion of that country, in Yemen following the smashing of the Saudi cells. And so, it goes on and on and on. 

We'll try to unpack all of that for you. This is Conflicted

Aimen, how are you today?

Aimen Dean Still alive. 

Thomas Small Oh, still alive. That's saying somethings since there's a fatwā on your head.

Aimen Dean Indeed. 

Thomas Small So, Aimen, people in the west often think that Islamist terrorism is primarily directed at the west and that the west are its primary victims. But as you know, as people in the know know, Islamist terrorism has been primarily directed at Islamic targets inside the Middle East, perhaps most explosively in 2003, when al-Qaeda launched its long-gestated ambition to overthrow the house of Saud and take control of the kingdom of Saudi Arabia, its oil, wealth, and the two holy mosques in Mecca in Medina. 

Eighteen years now since the launch of the War on Terror, Aimen, what do you think? Has it been overall a success? Has it been worth it morally? Strategically, were we right to wage it? 

Aimen Dean In my opinion, I think the War on Terror was necessary, but the way it was executed was abysmal. To make an analogy here, imagine if there is a swamp, a huge swamp—and I'm talking here about the Middle East and beyond—what do swamps attract? Mosquitoes. And mosquitoes spread malaria. So, the world powers, instead of draining the swamp—the swamp of injustice, corruption, lack of opportunities, alienation, you know, bad religious preaching and practice—so instead of draining that swamp, they were competing with each other on who will kill more mosquitoes. So, they just keep spraying the mosquitoes with anti-pet and all of that. They all just keep killing and killing, but the – but the swamp is there, giving birth to more mosquitoes.

Thomas Small But how can the Western powers drain that swamp? They don't rule the Middle East

Aimen Dean What is needed is a global effort in order to introduce better governance and, at the same time help the locals, both governments and people, find a way to drain that swamp.

Thomas Small Is it really a war at all? Do you think it's right to call the War on Terror a war?

Aimen Dean What does a wall really? It's just a campaign. You know, you could fight a war in many different settings. I remember when we were trained, you know, in the jihadist camps, there were different kinds of training for different kinds of conflicts. So, you have urban warfare, you know. So, they train you to fight in the cities. Then, there is mountain warfare where you are trained to fight in the mountains. And then, I remember, in the Philippines, we were told about jungle warfare. Also, basically, there were, you know, terror warfare where you are trained to be a bombmaker. You are trained on assassinations in urban settings. You are trained in ambush. Also, in urban settings, you are trained in taking hostages whether in planes or in cruise ships or in government buildings or hotels. So, of course, a war could take any shape and could take place in any environment. 

Thomas Small Sure. But most people, when they think of a war, they think of a clash between armies, of course, attached to a nation state or a collection of nation states. This war, the War on Terror, is a bit different. Who are, in the ultimate sense, the combatants of this war? On the one side you have, what, the United States. 

Aimen Dean Mmhmm. That's very simplistic way of looking at it. I would say that the War on Terrorism is fought between nation states and those who want to bring down nation states. So, we can't say that it's only the United States that is fighting the War on Terrorism. I would say that Turkey was fighting a war against its own terrorists, whether they were Islamist or the Kurdish PKK speaker. The Spanish fought against the Basque separatists. The Colombians fought against the FARC in Colombia. And what is the common denominator between all of them, is that they are what we call either paramilitary forces—they are not a legitimate military force; they are just paramilitaries—or they are insurgents or they are what we would call non-state players, NSPs. Or some people call them non-state actors, NSAs.

Thomas Small But, really, isn't it a war on Islamist terrorism, really? I mean, the – the world didn't come together to fight terrorism until its Islamic form attacked New York in 2001. So, it's really a war against Islamic terrorism. Why? What makes Islamist terror more threatening to the world? 

Aimen Dean There is a good reason for it. And that is the fact that, in the case of FARC, ETA, the IRA, and many other separatists/insurgents/terrorists is that these groups were fighting localised conflicts. In the case of Islamic-inspired terrorism, it's a transnational phenomenon. It is actually cross border groups that are united together to bring down nation states, not just only in the Muslim world, but beyond. Islamic-inspired terrorism is one of the very, very, very few instances of history where a group is united around the identity of a faith that spans many, many continents and countries. And as a result, you end up in a situation where they're fighting against everyone. So, everyone must fight against them.

Thomas Small So, I can imagine why left-wing radicals, for example, might be fighting against the nation state. The internationalist Marxist ideology has long fought against nation states, since the nineteenth century. I can even understand why, in the twenty-first century, a kind of neoliberal globalist ideology would fight against the nation state or, at least, try to water it down. But the nation state clearly brings almost every blessing of the modern world, from education to security to finance, you know, banking. Why do the Islamist hate the nation state? 

Aimen Dean The Islamists hate the nation state because the nation state is the biggest obstacle and hurdle in their path to establish Islamic caliphate. Because, you see, this is a problem with modern-day Islamism, is that they believe that having a caliphate fit a United Muslim nation is a obligation. And that couldn't have been farther from the truth. 

Thomas Small What the hell is a caliphate?

Aimen Dean Okay. Imagine the Catholic world united under the Pope, not only in a religious sense, but in a political, social, and economic and military sense. 

Thomas Small Sort of as it was, say, in the twelfth century.

Aimen Dean Exactly.

Thomas Small In Europe.

Aimen Dean Exactly. So, imagine the Pope, but not just only with the religious authority, but also with political economic, military, and social authorities. Imagine that, and that is basically what a caliph is. But there is a problem. This concept of the caliphate and the absolute authority entrusted in the caliph was really only viable within the Muslim world for the first two centuries, after the death of the Prophet Muhammad. It was exercised, of course. The four caliphs after the prophet. Then, the Umayyad Dynasty. And then, the first nine Abbasid caliphs. But after that, the Abbasid empire started to disintegrate. 

Thomas Small And when you say Abbasid, I mean, I think the listener needs to imagine almost the stereotypical period of Muslim glory that's even sort of mythologised in a movie like Aladdin. The classic image of the grand turbaned figure on the throne, commanding armies across the world of noble warriors. That's the – the Abbasid caliph.

Aimen Dean Indeed. Very good description. Very good description.

Thomas Small The – the Muslim empire of the – of the thousand and one nights. 

Aimen Dean Indeed. And for twelve hundred years after that, we never had that. We never had one single caliphate that encompassed the entire Muslim world. It's just disintegrated into clan-based or tribal-based or family-based kingdoms and fiefdoms and sheikhdoms.

Thomas Small Sure. But that fact alone doesn't necessarily mean the Islamist thinkers would stop hearkening back to the period when the Muslim world was politically united. 

Aimen Dean Indeed. But there is a problem, you see. If you look at Islam lamb as a whole, if we want to take the legalistic aspect of Islam, it splits into two parts. One part is ibadah, which means "worship," and one part is muamalat. It means "transactions." So, the majority of the Muslim scholars and theologians, they placed caliphate, not under a worship section of Islam, I know, that will make it obligatory. Actually, they put it under the transaction, you know, aspect of Islam, under muamalat [crosstalk].

Thomas Small Which aren't – which obligatory.

Aimen Dean They're not obligatory. They are just optional. I mean, whether you'll have a caliph or not as an optional thing. You know, at the end of the day, the fact that they say that the caliphate is a obligation, this is one of the biggest lies ever perpetrated on the Muslim people by Islamists in the twentieth and twenty-first century. 

Thomas Small Nonetheless, these Islamists think, for sure, it is an obligation, and that is leading them to carry out the actions that they're carrying out. Now, what do they think will happen once this caliphate is re-established? Do they think a caliphate will usher in a period of glory and prosperity, or do they even care about that? 

Aimen Dean Well, based on my experience and the fact that I spent more than twenty-four years in the Islamist movement—you know, since I was nine—I could tell you easily that we can bring in a thousand Islamists from different walks of life, whether they were violent Islamist, nonviolent Islamist, progressive Islamist, regressive Islamist. Bring them all together and asked them, "What is the ideal caliphate? Give us an answer." Remember, there are a thousand Islamists. What we will get is ten thousand answers. I haven't yet met two Islamists who agree what form this caliphate will take, what shape it will take, what will it be providing the people? Is it going to be encompassing only the Muslim world? Is it going to go beyond that? Are they going to fight the perpetual, you know, never-ending conflict against the rest of the world to subjugate the world into Islam? 

Aimen Dean It reminds me of my time at SOAS here in London, which is a famously left-wing university, talking to, you know, student leftists of the radical type and how, you know, when you ask them really, "What do you think this grand proletarian revolution is going to result in?" they – they could never really agree either. 

And let's go back. So, 9/11 happens. You're already in MI6. George Bush announces the War on Terror. America invades Afghanistan. But let's move in and focus in on your own experience. At the beginning of the War on Terror, as an MI6 double agent inside al-Qaeda, what were you given to do?

Aimen Dean Well, of course, basically before 9/11 and after 9/11, you know, my tasks, you know, differed sharply. Before 9/11, it was an exercise on building a matrix. So, understanding, you know, everything that we need to know about not just only al-Qaeda, but other two jihadist groups who are affiliated to it and orbiting the centre of al-Qaeda. So, before 9/11, I was supposed to know the locations of the camps, the leaders, the visitors, the recruits, their nationalities, where they come from, their names if we can get, their aliases. You know, recognise their pictures. Make sure basically we make all these connections. Then, we look into the network of safe houses, the – the bank accounts, the phone numbers, emails when – whenever emails were available all the time.

Thomas Small You're building – you're building up a comprehensive map of the terrorist entity before 9/11.

Aimen Dean Indeed.

Thomas Small After 9/11?

Aimen Dean After 9/11, it's all about looking at the cells. Before 9/11, we had one group concentrated in one country with a network of openly visible camps.

Thomas Small Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. 

Aimen Dean Indeed. So, that was easy. You know, that was easier. My – my task before 9/11 was easier actually than after 9/11, because—.

Thomas Small Because the – the group was shattered. It scattered to the wind. And now, you're dealing with underground cells of terrorists in how many countries? 

Aimen Dean Several. I mean, you know, we're talking here about Lebanon and Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Kuwait, Qatar. We're talking about, of course…

Thomas Small Pakistan.

Aimen Dean … the UK, France you know, and Pakistan, Iran. Then, after that, Iraq, of course. And Syria. So, the task was immense. If you remember, on the last podcast, I said basically that Abu Mus'ab al-Suri, bin Laden's deputy who died just two months after 9/11 by a US drone, he said to me, "Stay in the UK. Stay in London. We will get in touch with you when we need you." Of course, basically, I had to be guided by that. So, you know, if you remember, I told you that my phone was ringing just an hour after the attack. 

Thomas Small MI6 six called you up. 

Aimen Dean Indeed. And they told me to stay. And so, over the next three weeks, I felt like I was in a war room, because we were looking over satellite images of Afghan camps, the arial photographs of the cities, of the villages, of the encampments to pinpoint exactly the locations of weapon dumps, you know, a storage facilities. You know, the – the routes, basically they will be taking. The best time basically to launch raids against them. You know, so, it was all about discussing the military capabilities. How will they react in certain situations? So, actually, I became one of those who helped in military planning for a war, which wasn't, you know, my job description. But nonetheless, it shows you how fluid the situation could be.

Thomas Small And at that point, did you think this war will be a cake walk? Al-Qaeda's going to be destroyed in a matter of weeks, months? Did you know it would stretch on? You know, now what, we're in the eighteenth year. 

Aimen Dean Well, I – I – I recall saying that the structure of the Taliban supported by al-Qaeda would fall within three to six weeks. And they fell within six weeks. But I said, "And after that, the war will start." You see—. 

Thomas Small The War on Terror? 

Aimen Dean Yes. 

Thomas Small Because then the structure, the state, the proto-state they created in Afghanistan would collapse eventually, because, you know, the might of the American firepower is just something that no nation state on earth, with the exception maybe of China or Russia, but no other nation states on earth could withstand. So, therefore, the structure itself will fall. But then after that, they always say, "You can win the battle, but you can't win the war."

Thomas Small So, you America's military might can topple states very quickly. But as we've seen, it can't actually destroy terrorism. Why is that? 

Aimen Dean Okay. Terrorism, at the end of the day, is a shadowy practice. It's shadowy tactic in which you can have groups of individuals split into hundreds of cells, you know, and they can operate in a network of safe houses, network of hidden valleys, cave networks even, and, you know, jungles or forests and urban settings. And therefore, how could you basically target these people when they have split into a hundred different entities? They are not an army standing before you where you can annihilate them with bombs. Yeah.

Thomas Small But the – the follow-up question is why would you employ an army to fight that war then? 

Aimen Dean Well, the army is to make sure that these cells don't come together and form an army. So, the idea is you need to have presence to prevent them from taking over the state apparatus again. Look at what happened. I mean, the Americans withdrew from Iraq in 2012. By 2014, ISIS took over. You know, when you are fighting against cells, you need the ultimate weapon against these cells' information. And information and intelligence can only be gathered and obtained through three distinct channels. So, you have the first one, which we call reconnaissance, you know. You know, you have aerial footage, looking at the movement of people, detecting, you know, the presence of weapons. Suspicious vehicles moving around. Suspicious, you know, houses. You have lots of visitors who are all male, you know, wearing, you know, certain distinct items of clothing. So, that's [crosstalk]. 

Thomas Small And this reconnaissance, I imagine, is – is carried out under a certain fog of doubt. The person—. You know, the intelligence officers carrying out reconnaissance, they see shadowy figures moving here in their cars. They don't necessarily know that these people are terrorists or implicated in terrorism. They're just using hunches, gut instinct. How do they know to follow that car and not that car? 

Aimen Dean Indeed. Yeah. And this is one of the purest forms of intelligence gathering, you know, and there was a true case of both drones and Apache helicopters following certain individuals in Iraq. And they were almost certain that the movement was suspicious. The cars were suspicious. And then, they looked at the individuals. They thought that they were carrying something, you know, that resembles an AK-47. It turns out to be actually cameras. They were journalists. 

Thomas Small [crosstalk]. 

Aimen Dean They were local journalists and they were shot to pieces. 

Thomas Small What's the second form?

Aimen Dean The second form is called "signal intelligence." And in the intelligence circles, it's called "SIGINT." 

Thomas Small SIGINT? 

Aimen Dean Yes.

Thomas Small All right. 

A; That is basically by intercepting phone calls whether it's landlines or mobiles, by intercepting emails, by intercepting text messages, by intercepting Skype calls or any form of other apps you use, as well as intercepting radio communication. 

Thomas Small This is what the NSA in the states and GCHQ in Britain are doing.

Aimen Dean Absolutely. Spot on. That's exactly what signal intelligence is. And that is extremely laborious, because, you know, you're looking at twenty needles in a billion haystacks. 

Thomas Small Amazing. I mean, can you imagine how many phone calls are placed every day across the world? 

Aimen Dean Oh, billions. It is actually becoming more and more reliable form of intelligence gathering than it used to be in the past. Why? Because you are using algorithms. You know, and ironically, algo- – algorithms was invented by Muslim scholars. al-Khwārizmī, as you know. 

Thomas Small It's the "al" at the top – at the front of the word that gives it away. 

Aimen Dean Indeed. "al."

Thomas Small Like, al- – alcohol, ironically. 

Aimen Dean Indeed. So, funny enough, Muslims give the west the tools through which basically they can have fun, which is alcohol and, you know, basically…

Thomas Small Algorithm.

Aimen Dean …algorithm, so they can advance.

Thomas Small The Internet.

Aimen Dean Yeah. So, algorithms are very important in intelligence gathering, because you can put something called trigger words. And I was one of those people from the beginning, you know, from 2001 onwards, basically, who created lists, you know. 

Thomas Small Of trigger words? 

Aimen Dean Of trigger words. 

Thomas Small Well, give us an example of the words. 

Aimen Dean You know, at that time, of course, basically, you know, it's useless to tell people. Put "Osama bin Laden," you know, basically, or put "Muhammad Omar," or the "Taliban" or [crosstalk].

Thomas Small Because none would say these words if they were – knew what they were talking about. 

Aimen Dean That's one. And two, basically there was—. There were millions of journalists and political commentators and ordinary people saying these words. In other words, basically, again, the haystack problem and the needle problem. So, you know—. So, therefore, you have to go deeper to actually, you know, get phrases that only jihadists would be speaking about. So, for example, instead of, like, you know, saying with "Osama bin Laden," we will say, " Sheikh Abu Abdullah." 

Thomas Small Ah.

Aimen Dean So, now that's very unique. 

Thomas Small So, "Sheikh" is the term that the jihadists use of Osama bin Laden because they respected him. "Abu Abdullah" is an Arabic—. It's called a kunya

Aimen Dean Yes.

Thomas Small So, the eldest son of – of – of Osama bin Laden is called Abdullah. 

Aimen Dean Yeah.

Thomas Small So, he's Abu Abdullah, the father of Abdullah. Sheikh Abu Abdullah. And only an intimate of Osama bin Laden would use such an expression. 

Aimen Dean Indeed. So, I remember that was my first contribution. The first trigger phrase that went into signal intelligence apparatus, which is "Sheikh Abu Abdullah." If anyone is using that basically on the phone or an email or in a text, then, you know, basically, that is a – that is a – a call or a person of interest. It needs to be logged and investigated. And then, we started on and on and again, you know. So, for example, adding titles of books. So, for example, if someone were to use the book, "Al-Kawashif al-jaliyah—." Now, you know, I'm not going to bother translating this. But basically this book is written by Abu Mohammed al-Maqdisi, who is one of the pillars of the jihadist theology.

Thomas Small Palestinian?

Aimen Dean He's a Palestinian-Jordanian. And he's also a, you know, a comrade of Abu Qatada. You know, the famous cleric who was in prison present here in the UK for a while before he was kicked out. If I put the book that he wrote about justifying fight against Saudi Arabia—. That book was written in 1992, you know. But in 2002, ten years later, it started to be taken seriously and basically used as a recruitment tool to recruit people into al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia and beyond. So, I remember I decided, you know, that I should include it in the list of trigger phrases. That was amazing. 

Thomas Small It was successful, 

Aimen Dean It was successful.

Thomas Small It resulted in some real – some real intelligence.

Aimen Dean You know, the ground-breaking intelligence that led the Saudis, with the help of the British intelligence services, to actually track many inside the kingdom who were texting or emailing or calling and talking about this book, Al-Kawashif al-jaliyah. You know, it's like, "Okay." When—. You know, they are so careful on the phone. And I've listened to some of these phone calls. They were so careful on the phone to talk about weddings and, you know, honey selling and, you know, buying vegetables. 

Thomas Small It's all codes. 

Aimen Dean Codes. Yeah. But then basically, when – when the other party is asking, "Okay. How can I be sure that the contract is absolutely binding or good or decent or I'm going to be—. It's all legit under Islamic rules." So, they will say, "Read Al-Kawashif al-jaliyah." You know? And that's it. This actually phrase triggers immediately, you know, that the call needed to be logged and then listened to. And then, they determine.

Thomas Small Traced?

Aimen Dean Yes.

Thomas Small People these days are particularly worried that SIGINT intelligence gathering contravenes rights to privacy, human rights. People are very uncomfortable with the idea that the government is constantly listening to all of our phone calls and scanning all of our emails. I suppose you think those people shouldn't worry that if you're not a bad guy, you've got nothing to worry about. 

Aimen Dean I can assure you and I can assure you listeners that ninety-nine-point-ninety-nine percent of the entire population wouldn't utter a trigger phrase. You know, a UK grandmother, you know, calling her, you know, grandchildren, you know, in America, you know, would not be talking about Al-Kawashif al-jaliyah or Anwar al-Awlaki or his – one of his books or anything like that.

Thomas Small But what about filmmakers and journalists like me working in the subject matter? I mean, if – if – if GCHQ could search my Google search for all the number of jihadist, even in the Arabic language, jihadist terms that I've searched for. I suppose I'm on a list somewhere. I mean, they know – they know that I've gotten up to that and they scan all my emails?

Aimen Dean Well, of course, the signal intelligence is so sophisticated these days that it actually shows, you know, a pattern of research. It analyze your profile. It shows that basically that you are not, you know… 

Thomas Small A threat. 

Aimen Dean …a likely. That you are in the research business. Although, basically, there has been. I know personally the story of one of the academics in Kings College—you know, a UK national—who was traveling to the U S and he was banned from entering the country, because of many Skype calls he had with ISIS members who were inside of Syria.

Thomas Small For research purposes? 

Aimen Dean For research purposes. But then, it's – it's a wholly different level that you are researching something and you are reading articles and you are watching videos. That's a different thing. But having phone calls and, you know, Skype calls with—. You know, proper communication, basically, with…

Thomas Small Known terrorist.

Aimen Dean …a known terrorist. That's – that's a different issue. That's—. Even if you're a researcher, you will still be subject to restrictions. 

Thomas Small So, that's the second kind. SIGINT. We've had reconnaissance SIGINT. Now, what's the third kind of intelligence. 

Aimen Dean Now, that is something basically that it was, you know, mostly my responsibility and responsibility of other people like me. It's called human intelligence or HUMINT.

Thomas Small HUMINT?

Aimen Dean HUMINT.

Thomas Small HUMINT?

Aimen Dean Yes. HUMINT. You know? So, human intelligence is the, you know, as we call it basically, is the second oldest profession in human history. The first one, basically, of course, is prostitution. But, you know—. And, you know, of course, basically, I find it extremely difficult likening [unintelligible], you know. I described spying and prostitution in the same sentence. But, you know, as the oldest professions that ever existed. But it's a classic—. It's, again, the classic human spy. 

Thomas Small What sort of training did you receive in order to – to do this? I mean, you went from being a bomb maker for al-Qaeda to being – to being a double agent quite quickly. So, how did you learn the skills necessary to be an effective spy? 

Aimen Dean Well, this is where it was, you know, at the beginning, nerve-wracking, because, you see, when I defected and started working for the UK intelligence services, I was only twenty. So, can you imagine by the age of twenty, I was already, you know, a qualified bomb maker for al-Qaeda and was one of their operatives. But here's the problem: Now, I need to be a spy against them. I'm going to be spying against them and, actually, for the next eight years, although I didn't know that. I thought, basically, it will be a year or two, and that's it. 

So, the first worry I had, which is: How do I now maintain this double life? How do I maintain the veneer of jihadism and beneath that, you know, is really someone who, not just only despise them, but actually want to dismantle what they are building? So, the first training that MI5 and MI6 would give you is that be yourself. That's the first thing. No one should notice a change about you, you know. Just forget that life is changing around you, that you are changing your mind. You need to play that down so much to really repress it, because no one should notice that you're changing. Not only, you know, from your own words and use of terminology and phrases, but also from your facial expressions.

Thomas Small It's easy enough to tell someone, "Be yourself." But I mean, how can you? How could you not give the game away? I feel that if I went back into an infamous terrorist organisation, having agreed to spy against them for their enemy, I would – I would have been sweating bullets the whole time. Shaking, looking down, looking nervous. How did you do it? 

Aimen Dean Well, I remember when I first was told I would be going back to Afghanistan and, of course, basically, I will have to meet my fellow jihadist here in London, I sat down with, you know, several operatives on both MI5 and MI6. And what they were telling me was so interesting and so reassuring. They were saying, "Look, you are already a spy and an operative. It's just you don't know it. You know, Aimen, they sent you on missions before. Al-Qaeda sent you on missions. Yes?" "Yes." I said yes. "Okay. And these missions included traveling into, sometime, hostile countries like the UAE or, you know, Oman or Kuwait or Pak—. And even when you go into—. You know, when you enter into Pakistan, any Pakistani airport. When you leave a Pakistani airport, you know, you're always alert, you know, that you don't want to bring suspicion to yourself. You want to basically just pass through without being detected. Did they train you for that?" I said, "Yes. They gave me counter-intelligence and counter-surveillance courses, you know, in order to fool immigration officials, custom officials, border officials. You know, that was, you know, normal. It came with the territory." They said, "Exactly. Use what they gave you. They already gave you the tools. Just use what they gave you against them. That's all you need to do. Imagine them as if they were border agents, you know, custom officials, immigration officers. Imagine them to be the same people that you need to avoid finding the truth about you." 

Thomas Small And that assuaged your worries? That made you confident that you could do this?

Aimen Dean They told me, "If you were able to fool Pakistani immigration and border officials, you can easily fool them." You know? So, they made it sound easy. In fact, it wasn't. But they made it sound easy. And this reassuring tone was extremely important. Remember, you know, British intelligence operatives, they are actually fore-, you know, foremost, trained psychologists. I mean, they – they are trained in psychology. They are trained in handling assets like me. So, reassurance is one of the most important things. And also, basically, knowing your asset, knowing the talents of your asset. If your asset was already trained by the target organisation, then that's even better. 

Thomas Small When you see a show like Homeland or watch a James Bond film, to what extent does that come near the truth?

Aimen Dean It's as far from the truth as it could be. Because first of all, spying is basically, you know, long periods of boredom punctuated by some exciting times. But the exciting times is when information come to you. And you discover. You make discoveries. But these discoveries are not made through a car races and chases and adrenaline rush. You know, running after people and, you know, breaking into high security vault. No. It's really all about meeting people in restaurants, in hotels. As a spy, you spend more time in restaurants, hotels, mosques, you know, university campuses. This is what spying is about: networking. And, you know, there is always this myth that the intelligence service officials are cool, cold, calculating. No, they are just average human beings, who watch The Simpsons and support football clubs and go for holidays with their families. And, you know, they are just civil servants. You know, except basically, they do something exciting and they, you know, they do it – they keep it in secret. But in reality, they are human beings and, by the way, people who are genuinely good, decent, chosen for their high-quality education and their love and devotion for their country and fellow countrymen. So, the idea that they are sinister, evil people who are planning plots and then, you know, smearing Muslims, you know, this is, you know, this is just nonsense. 

Thomas Small So, you became at double agent three years before 9/11. But after 9/11, you were still a double agent. How did al-Qaeda change in response to the War on Terror? 

Aimen Dean There were difficulties, you know, facing us after 9/11, because, first, we, you know, had al-Qaeda scattered to the wind over so many countries. Many of them returned to Saudi Arabia, to Bahrain, to Qatar, to Kuwait, to the – to Europe, to Turkey, and to Iraq. And, you know, it means that Afghanistan and Pakistan no longer basically the ground where I was going there for, you know, for spying. And my cover as a businessman, gone. Because, you know, the people basically that I did business with within al-Qaeda are gone. You know, some are in Guantanamo, some are dead, and some are in Iran. I can't have access to them. And that is basically where I was worried. The services were worried. And so—. 

Thomas Small So, you were no longer useful? 

Aimen Dean Indeed. This is a moment, basically, where I was transferred from human to SIGINT, you know, to help with the signal intelligence, you know, based on my experience, you know, from October 2001 until February of 2002. These four months were really SIGINT, because I was waiting for someone from al-Qaeda to go – to get in touch. 

Thomas Small When they got in touch…

Aimen Dean Yeah. 

Thomas Small …what happened?

Aimen Dean Well, an operative, you know, from al-Qaeda who I knew for many, many years, and he said, basically, that "we need you because of your past training with Abu Khabab as a bombmaker.

Thomas Small 'Cause by this point, four months after 9/11, many of their top bombmakers, their top fighters, their top thinkers have been killed or captured. They're—. They actually need talent like you.

Aimen Dean Indeed. So, you know, that was obviously the delightful news that, you know, the British intelligence services were waiting for. So, I was told, "Okay. We have to assess, you know, first of all the validity of this. So, we will just send you, you know, into Bahrain just for two weeks to look into things and then come back." So, when I went to Bahrain for two weeks, I realised that, one, al-Qaeda is building a capability to start the war in Saudi Arabia. This was as early as February or March of 2002.

Thomas Small Mmhmm. 

Aimen Dean You know, almost a year before the real start of the campaign against Saudi Arabia. More than a year.

Thomas Small Mmhmm. A lot of people actually don't realise that there was this al-Qaeda uprising and war within Saudi Arabia against the kingdom.

Aimen Dean Indeed. And they were actually even scouting and, you know, targets that are both American and British. So, of course, basically, this was extremely important, you know, for the safety and security of American and British expats in Saudi Arabia.

Thomas Small But what – what really interests me is the psychology of the al-Qaeda members at the time. I mean, what—? How—? What were their spirits like? Were they shaken by what had happened in Afghanistan after the American invasion?

Aimen Dean I was struck by the resilience of their morale and their spirits despite what seemed to be a massive defeat for the al-Qaeda and Taliban apparatus in Afghanistan. 

Thomas Small What – what kept their spirits high? 

Aimen Dean They believe it is part of a greater conflict. This is just basically the opening, you know, battle. This is just basically the – the first skirmish. 

Thomas Small So, there they were living in the age of prophecy? The prophecies were coming true.

Aimen Dean Indeed. So, for them, "Look, it's just a skirmish." You know? "But the plan will go ahead regardless and we are going to topple the regime in Saudi Arabia. The Americans are going to invade Iraq. It's all going according to plan." According to, you know, what they believed. 

Thomas Small But I'm still confused as well. I would have thought following the defeat in Afghanistan that more of the recruits to al-Qaeda would have left the organisation as you did. Why did you leave in 1998? What made you different? Why did so few of your comrades leave?

Aimen Dean There are two factors here. First of all, I did not leave because the group lost. They were in the ascendance, actually. I left the group when it was in the ascendance. 

Thomas Small That's sort of true. But you've told me that, after the 1998 East Africa Embassy bombings, when Bill Clinton shot some patriot missiles, I think. 

Aimen Dean Cruise missiles. 

Thomas Small Shot some cruise missiles into the camps in Afghanistan, I believe you were standing outside one of the camps that was attacked. Maybe even peeing in the middle of the night? Did you tell me that? 

Aimen Dean No, I didn't say that. 

Thomas Small I—. 

Aimen Dean I went to the bathroom. 

Thomas Small Oh.

Aimen Dean You know, which was, you know, basically, you know, the toilet facilities were almost half a kilometre away from the camp.

Thomas Small Like outhouses?

Aimen Dean Yeah. Because why? [crosstalk].

Thomas Small Half a kilometre? They really make you work for it, these terrorists.

Aimen Dean Of course. And half a kilometre. Why? Because, basically, there is a river. There is running water. And so, that's why.

Thomas Small Ah, I see. Old-fashioned.

Aimen Dean Indeed. It was very a old-fashioned, you know, toilet facility and—. 

Thomas Small So, you wake up in the middle of the night. You have to—. You head to the facilities. You walk half of a kilometre. There you are, doing your business, when, boom, Bill – Bill Clinton loves a missile at your camp. 

Aimen Dean Well, you know, there were, you know, dozens of muscles. And the same time, I remember I was on my way back to the camp when, you know, the attack happened. And, you know, and I remember by the end of the night, basically, there were three dead, you know, thirteen wounded in our camp, at least;.

Thomas Small Wait. So, you're telling me that despite that, you felt that this organisation is in the ascendancy? You must have thought, "Oh, we're finished." 

Aimen Dean Oh, no. Because, you know, the reason why there was a low death toll that night is because we evacuated the camp already to a nearby location. 

Thomas Small How did you know Bill Clinton was going to attack you? 

Aimen Dean Oh, we didn't need to. Basically, we already knew that after the East Africa Embassy attacks, there could be airstrikes or anything like that. So, we didn't know it was going to be cruise muscles, but we knew basically some retaliation will happen. And so, therefore, basically we were outside of the camp rather than in it.

Thomas Small So, there you are. You're in the organisation. They've just launched, you know, their biggest first daring attack. They're in the ascendancy. And yet you begin to wobble and, within a few months, you've decided to leave. What happened? 

Aimen Dean Well, actually, I decided to leave, you know, almost, you know, within a week after the attacks on East African American embassies. You know, the reality is that I couldn't be part of a group that decided to launch war against civilians in Africa, you know, over a war between them and America. I mean, you know, it doesn't make sense. And at the same time, the fact that the death toll was just way beyond what I could stomach and it's against civilians who had no business whatsoever in the war that we're fighting. 

Thomas Small But you knew you were in a terrorist group. You know what terrorist groups do.

Aimen Dean Okay. When I joined al-Qaeda, I was under the impression that whatever attacks that were going to be launched against the Americans, it will be according to the same pattern of [name] bombings in 1995, which killed seven American military personnel.

Thomas Small This is in – this is in Riyadh, in Saudi Arabia.

Aimen Dean In Riyadh. 

Thomas Small The first—. Actually, the first bombing that al-Qaeda carried 

Aimen Dean Indeed. And the second one, which al-Qaeda never carried out, but it was basically a similar line, which is the attack against the nineteen American pilots who were, you know, carrying the no-fly, you know, or enforcing the no-fly zone over Iraq. So, there were us air force pilots. It was a military target. This was in Khobar, in my hometown, basically, in 1996.

Thomas Small It's called the Khobar tower bombings in 1996.

Aimen Dean Indeed. That, you know, you see, against the backdrop of these, you know, attacks that I joined al-Qaeda. I thought it's going to be a war to attack American army… 

Thomas Small Military targets.

Aimen Dean …personnel in the Arabian Peninsula, not, you know, American diplomatic missions in heavily-populated areas in Africa. 

Thomas Small But al-Qaeda thought they were attacking the CIA headquarters for that part of the world. And, in fact, they were attacking those headquarters, because they were located in those embassies. Were they not? 

Aimen Dean Indeed, they were. But, you see, this is a problem. It was in East Africa. So, nothing to do with the, you know, vision of liberating Saudi Arabia, as bin Laden was putting it. You know, what does Kenya or Tanzania had anything to do with Saudi Arabia? That's the first thing that came to – to my mind. The second thing is that two hundred and twenty-four innocent Africans were killed in order to get at twelve American diplomats. 

Thomas Small And it didn't take you long to realise "this is not an organisation I want to be in?"

Aimen Dean No. Because, you see, if it was, you know, an attack against an American military barracks in Saudi, you know, I would have understood it. Actually, basically, I would have cheered and supported it at the time, because that was my mentality. I would have still, you know, drank the Kool-Aid and decided basically that this is exactly what we should be doing. However, you know, the attacks in East Africa and the fact that it was done by someone I knew very well, a friend of mine from Saudi Arabia, the fact that it happened on African soil, taking the lives of so many people. Two hundred and twenty-plus dead, five thousand people wounded, a hundred and fifty of them blinded for life because of the so many shrapnels that were embedded within the device. And it was a huge device. So, how do I reconcile that? And the fact that they give themselves justification, that we are allowed under a long ancient fatwā that we can.

Thomas Small Yeah. What is this justification? Why would they think it was okay to kill so many civilians? 

Aimen Dean Because there is a fatwā from eight hundred years that—.

Thomas Small Eight hundred years ago?

Aimen Dean Indeed. 

Thomas Small All right. 

Aimen Dean That says that it—.

Thomas Small That's, like, Magna Carta sort of period. Around the time Magna Carta is.

Aimen Dean Indeed.

Thomas Small I suppose the English law is also based on a fatwā from eight hundred years ago. But all right.

Aimen Dean Maybe. But it's—. 

Thomas Small What's this fatwā?

Aimen Dean It's called the Tatarrus fatwā, which means the human shield fatwā. And the human shield fatwā is a fatwā that in its essence or how al-Qaeda interpreted is that if the enemy is located within a heavily populated area with civilians, you can attack. And if civilians die, then it's up to God to solve them. But you need to do your duty and eliminate the enemy. 

Thomas Small Where did this fatwā come from? 

Aimen Dean The—.

Thomas Small What's the context of this fatwā?

Aimen Dean Ex- – exactly. That's what I asked Abu Abdullah al-Muhajir. He's a sheikh, you know, and he is the—.

Thomas Small An al-Qaeda sheikh?

Aimen Dean Indeed. I asked him, I said, like, "I mean, look. I'm—.It's not like I'm doubting or anything, but, please, can you put my heart at peace? I want to know how can we justify killing so many people who just were there at the wrong time, at the wrong place. So, how do we justify killing them?" You know? 

Thomas Small And what did he say? 

Aimen Dean He said to me, "While we have this fatwā, Tatarrus fatwā—you can go and look it up—but it allows us to do." So, I decided I would go and look for it. So, you know, within a week, I was in al-Qaeda's safe house in Kabul, the headquarters in Kabul, and they have a huge library there. And there is a book called The Comprehensive Works of Ibn Taymiyyah. It's a thirty-seven-volume book. 

Thomas Small The famous Ibn Taymiyyah?

Aimen Dean Indeed.

Thomas Small Thirteenth century stellar. Considered the grandfather of fundamentalist, legal jurisprudence in Islam. 

Aimen Dean Indeed. So, you know, it took me a while to find the fatwā, but the fatwā was there. And it's true. It's basically called the human shield fatwā based on the earlier fatwās from the, you know, from eight hundred days ago. And there, the context shocked me. 

Thomas Small What was it? 

Aimen Dean The context was that the Mongols, you know, were invading their Muslim city states of central Asia.

Thomas Small The Mongols. So, we're talking Genghis Kahn, Kyrgyz—. You know, the – the – the—. Genghis Khan. What was his—? Kublai Khan? This – this – this era of history.

The – the sweeping hordes from Central Asia burning all before them. 

Aimen Dean Indeed. So, what their practice was, was whenever they sacked a Muslim city, they would take a few thousand of the inhabitants, the civilian inhabitants of that city, and they make them push the siege tower to the walls of the next city they want to sack.

Thomas Small So, captured civilians from one city are pushing the siege towers to the next city, which puts the Muslims in the – in the next city in a – in a quandary. "Do we – do we – do we fire upon the siege towers? We'll kill our fellow Muslims."

Aimen Dean Indeed. "Do we shoot them? Did we kill them?" So, that's what the fatwā is about. The fatwā is about life and death situation. That if the enemy is advancing on you using, you know, prisoners, your fellow Muslim prisoners as human shields out, are you allowed to kill them in order to save yourself? And the fatwās that came from across the Muslim world to the defenders of these cities was, yes, you can kill them, because they are already dead anyway. 

Thomas Small And you—. 

Aimen Dean If you don't, the Mongols will kill them. 

Thomas Small And you thought this doesn't bear much relation to what's going on in – in the East Africa Embassy bombings.

Aimen Dean No, of course not. I mean, I didn't see the American embassy in Nairobi, for example, pushing the siege towers towards Mecca and Medina. 

Thomas Small No.

Aimen Dean There was no life and death situation that necessitated, you know, killing so many civilians in order to kill twelve American diplomats.

Thomas Small So, I would have guessed there would have been a mass exodus at the time of recruits like yourself. Why were there so few? What makes you different from the other recruit?

Aimen Dean What – what made me different was two things. First, a good moral compass, you know, that I think was instilled by my mother. That's the first thing. The second thing: I was annoyingly inquisitive and independent thinker. So, I just never allowed anyone to think on my behalf. 

Thomas Small It sounds like a strange mentality for someone who joined a, you know—let's call a spade a spade—a totalitarian cult. 

Aimen Dean Well, indeed. I grew up in a totalitarian society. You know, Saudi Arabia. I believed in religious totalitarianism and authoritarianism. I believed in the concept of the caliphate as the best system that will save us, you know, from the tyranny of other global powers. I, you know, didn't join straight away. I ended up first going to defend Muslims in Bosnia, you know. So, it didn't feel to me as if I was joining a terror organisation. And the context through which I joined was to, you know, liberate an occupied land by the Americans and to liberate ourselves, y, from the encroachment—cultural, military and economic encroachment of the Americans. It's only that what happened in East Africa woke me up to the fact that all these noble aims were just, you know, a charade. 

Thomas Small So, the—. So, you have this inquisitiveness, which leaves you to leave al-Qaeda. And this distinguishes you from most recruits to al-Qaeda. And I think it's interesting in the War on Terror era. What is the average al-Qaeda recruit like and what is motivating him not only to join the organisation, but to stay? Put us in the heads of the average al-Qaeda recruit. And I think it's safe to say you're an above average al-Qaeda recruit at that time. 

Aimen Dean You know, it is important for the listener to understand that groups like al-Qaeda and ISIS are highly hierarchical and actually stratified. They are, you know, like the Hindu caste system, you know. First, you have the, you know, big priests and the Brahmas, you know. And then, below that, you have the warriors. And below that, you have the, you know, the business classes and the traders. And then, below that you have the, you know, the untouchables. [crosstalk].

Thomas Small So, I'm interested at the bottom there of al-Qaeda. 

Aimen Dean Exactly. 

Thomas Small Who's on the bottom? Who are the untouchables?

Aimen Dean Okay. 

Thomas Small The expendables, really, 'cause they – they might be asked to strap a bomb to themselves. 

Aimen Dean Indeed. So, what do we have here is that, at the very bottom, you know, of al-Qaeda or ISIS hierarchy are the foot soldiers. The expendables, as you call them. You know? And, sometime, I used to call them the idiots. So, these are the ones who came for a variety of reasons to join. So, there isn't a particular average there. But, you know, there are—. They are divided into three, you know, distinct categories. First, you have the criminal class. People who basically, in a way, are graduates of prisons. Because, you see, prisons were always a fertile ground for recruitment as far as al-Qaeda and ISIS were concerned. Why is that? Because, in prison, you have people who exhibit three traits. The first one is that they want redemption. You know, hey feel bad about everything they've done.

Thomas Small Stealing, thieving, raping, murdering.

Aimen Dean Drug dealing. You know, being members of gangs. You know, domestic violence. All of that. So, they feel guilty about everything they've done. They want a way out. They want a redemption. And so, they are too lazy to become pious. But if I go to prison and say, "Look, I can guarantee you heaven. You think you're going to hell. You're certain in your mind you're going to hell. But if I tell you that you do not have to go out of prison, start praying five times a day, start fasting, basically, so many, you know, days of the – in the year—." 

Thomas Small All you have to do is?

Aimen Dean "All you have to do is just join us, fight for us. And if you die in the process, you are going to heaven with all of your sins forgiven." Totally. Completely. According to the scripture. 

Thomas Small It's a very tempting offer. 

Aimen Dean Absolutely. Because, you know, imagine a life of crime can all be wiped out in an instant if you actually die for this cause, for jihad. That's why they say jihad and martyrdom, or jihad and shahada, are the shortest path to heaven. After this, the fact that the second trait to exhibit—we're talking here about the criminal class—is that they have repressed inner sadism and violence and psychopathic tendencies.

Thomas Small Which landed them in prison in the first place.

Aimen Dean Indeed. So, if you tell them that you can liberate the inner psychopath, the inner sadist, the inner violent – violence within you, but you will direct it towards the enemies, it's – it's – it's a liberation of all of these dark forces that you are not going to be punished for. In fact, you will be rewarded, because that's exactly where you need to direct them, at the enemy. So, the 

first one—. 

Thomas Small So, a guilt – a guilty conscience, repressed sadism. 

Aimen Dean Indeed.

Thomas Small And third?

Aimen Dean And the third is empowerment. You see, prison is the ultimate humiliation, you know, for an individual. So, you come to them and you say, "Not only I will give you one-way express ticket to heaven, not only I will liberate your inner sadist, violent, psychopath, I will also empower you, because today you are under their boots. Tomorrow, they will be under yours."

Thomas Small So, a guilty conscience, repressed sadism, and humiliated pride. This is the recipe for making a jihadist out of a criminal. What are the other two classes of recruits to the underclass of al-Qaeda?

Aimen Dean After that, you have that working class, aspirational dreamers. So, people basically who came from either a poor background. You know, they want to make something out of themselves. People basically who feel so much the injustice of this world on them, on their families. They see basically that the alienation, the disenfranchisement. So, these people who come from the slums, whether they are the other slums of Baghdad, the slums of Damascus, the refugee camps of the Palestinians in Lebanon or Jordan. You know, these are the people who come because they feel that they have been trodden on. So, again, empowerment is such an important—.

Thomas Small A burning sense of injustice. A burning sense of injustice. 

Aimen Dean Exactly.

Thomas Small Okay. That kind of—. I think that really does – would make sense to people. 

Aimen Dean Exactly. 

Thomas Small That's – that's, in a way, the – the idea we have of a terrorist as a freedom fighter. These are the freedom fighter brand terrorists. They're – they're fighting for their families.

They're fighting for the underdog, for the oppressed.

Aimen Dean Yeah.

Thomas Small And the third kind?

Aimen Dean And the third kind, basically, are what we call the middle-class revolutionary dreamers, you know, who come—. They would have had some education, some background, [unintelligible].

Thomas Small These are the Saudis. The Gulf Arabs in general. 

Aimen Dean Indeed.

Thomas Small The more wealth—. The more wealthy, more affluent, more educated. 

Aimen Dean Yeah. So, these people, some of them make up, you know, the third part of the bottom of the pile, let's put it this way, because they are not exactly very bright. But nonetheless, they came from an affluent background. So, they are—.

Thomas Small There from the idiotic bourgeoisie. 

Aimen Dean Exactly. Because this is what we use to say, basically, that there are really two classes within jihad, basically. I mean, you have the bourgeoisie jihadist and you have the proletariat jihadist, you know. So, you have the foot soldiers, but also you have those who came from an affluent background. If you remember, basically, there were many affluent people from Europe who went to join the international brigade in the Spanish Civil War. 

Thomas Small Absolutely.

Aimen Dean So, they are the same way. You know, university students. You know, people basically who have this aspiration of joining a global revolution against the, you know, globalisation and the New World Order led by the Americans. 

Thomas Small Idealist – idealists. I suppose, it's these people who – who are particularly inflamed by the ideology of jihadism, because they're slightly more intellectual. They get trapped, in – in a way, in – in the perfection of an – of ideological thinking. This sort of clockwork thinking of a perfect ideology. 

Aimen Dean Indeed. And then, above these classes, you have people who have a better education in theology or a useful skill. 

Thomas Small Engineering, medicine. 

Aimen Dean In- – indeed. Engineering, medicine. And I remember—. 

Thomas Small Chemistry. 

Aimen Dean Absolutely. And I remember, you know – you know, when these people used to come, we used to celebrate a lot. So, basically, if someone who comes with a degree in theology or a degree in chemistry or a degree in engineering, especially, you know, I remember, in Afghanistan, we had a celebration when someone who is an engineer in water sanitisation, you know, who came. So, of course, basically these are very important skills. Doctors are always celebrated, you know, when they come. And so, they form, you know, the upper class of jihadism. You know, these people are very important. You know, they are not easily disposed of. You just don't send your doctors to the frontline all the time to get killed. You try to preserve them as much as possible, even though they insist on fighting, because they came from the jihad. So, you indulge them a little bit. But you do not throw them into the thick of battle or you chose them to become a suicide bombers. Now—.

Thomas Small So, you weren't put on the front lines. 

Aimen Dean I did go to the front lines, because, sometime, basically what they do whenever they feel that they need to test your resolve and see if you are a coward, so they would put you in the front line. So, I remember one of al-Qaeda's leaders, he said, "Oh, by the way, [unintelligible]. We need to send you to the front line, because we are doing the rotation. Everyone, regardless, must do the rotation." And, you know, years later, I was joking about it, that I fought against UK assets and the other side of the, you know – you know, the front line, which is another alliance. So—. But nonetheless, I was sent to the front line. And I remember basically, you know, there, during a routine patrol, you know, in our pickup, in a military car, we came under ambush. And the person next to me, an Egyptian, you know, a man in his fifties who was a UK citizen, was shot in the head, you know, in the pickup, in the back. And we were just speeding, because we were under ambush. We were speeding back. And two other people were wounded. 

Thomas Small Oh, my. And oh, my God. And his – his corpse was there the whole time?

Aimen Dean The whole time I was actually holding, you know, his neck and his head. And, basically, the blood was seeping from his head where the bullet came into my palm and then into – in the rest of my sleeve. 

Thomas Small Were you horrified? Were you terrified? Or does the adrenaline just take over? 

Aimen Dean No. I was actually sad, because I liked him. You know, I liked him so much. Because he was in his fifties, he was a fatherly figure. He was quiet, humorous. He was one of those extremely intellectual people. And he was a good bombmaker also. So, it shows you they spare no one sometime when they feel that there is a need for rotation. 

Thomas Small This is a recurrent theme with you that, in fact, when, like when – when Khalid [name], your friend that you told us last time, when he died, you felt sad. This – this – this sense of sadness at the waste of life. It – it goes to show, really, that these recruits that we've been discussing, either the criminals or the – the lower-class recruits or the middle-class recruits, they are human beings. 

Aimen Dean Indeed.

Thomas Small They have been brainwashed into an idiotic ideology. But in your day-to-day encounters with them, they were nice people. They were friendly people. You felt a bond with them.

Aimen Dean Indeed. Because, you know, no matter what, you know—. Let's say, like, you know, if one of the listeners is thinking, basically, "Are these really nice people?" Of course, they are nice people to each other. Because, again, we come back to the fact that they're psychopathic and violent tendencies are directed towards a defined enemy. So, what is left there towards their comrades is nothing but, you know, really sweet, you know, comradery, you know, which they exhibit towards others. So, basically, they have managed to direct their rage, anger, and violence towards a defined enemy, which left their better characteristics to be, you know, directed towards their fellow jihadists. 

Thomas Small If only they knew then you were actually an enemy in their midst. 

Aimen Dean Well, they didn't know. Thank God for that. 

Thomas Small If – if they had found out, what would they have done to you? What – what threat were you living under? The threat of immediate execution? 

Aimen Dean You know, in the thirty-three months I used to go and come into Afghanistan and into the camps, during that time, from 1999 until 2001, five members of al-Qaeda were apprehended and given trials and then executed for being spies inside the organisation. Two were accused of working for the Jordanian intelligence services and three were accused of being spies for the Egyptian intelligence services. So, of course, you know, I never attended any of the executions, because I did not want to envision my head, you know, being the one, you know, basically fallen to the ground after a swift, sharp sword strike. 

Thomas Small How close were you personally ever to being found out, to being executed by 

al-Qaeda? 

Aimen Dean There are—. There was a practice, especially in the run-up to 9/11, where, at some point, they would do random checks. And I didn't know about this. Remember, I told you about the rotation for the frontline?

Thomas Small Yeah.

Aimen Dean When we are in the camps or in the headquarters or anywhere, we have something called a rotation for the services. And that includes not just only guard duty, but kitchen duty. So, whenever I'm in the kitchen, basically, you know, this is a cause of celebration for my fellow al-Qaeda members, because I always used to love to cooking, you know, fries. You know, fries were something important.

Thomas Small French fries?

Aimen Dean French fries. Yeah. So, they love it. 

Thomas Small Free- – freedom fries, I think, they were called at the time.

Aimen Dean Yeah. But that was after 9/11, I mean, basically, because of stupid American, you know—.

Thomas Small Ha. I beg your pardon. 

Aimen Dean Okay. Sorry. Sorry.

Thomas Small There's nothing stupid about us at all. We'd never done anything stupid, Aimen.

Aimen Dean If only. So, I was in the kitchen and I was basically just, you know, cutting the potatoes into, you know, fry shapes. And I remember, you know, someone entering into the kitchen, but I wasn't aware of who he was. And then, I realised, basically, that some movement happening in the kitchen that my other, you know, helpers in the kitchen left in a hurry. And so, I was thinking, before I was going to turn around, distinctively, I felt the end of a pistol against my spine, you know. And so, I heard, you know, a rather familiar voice, someone I knew, saying, "[name], you have to come with me quietly. We know who you are. We know who you work for. It's over. It's done. Resistance is futile." 

Thomas Small Oh, my God. 

Aimen Dean So—. And I remember I just looked around like this and I say, "Do you know that it is explicitly forbidden to point a gun, even if it's empty, against another brother? Take, you know—. Put it down. Put your gun down now." And I remember he looked at me shocked a little bit. I said to him, "Put it down. I'm not going to tolerate this joke." So, I pretend that it was a joke. And trust me, inside of my heart, my heart was beating not inside my chest, but inside my neck. This is how I felt it. The pulse was so strong. But I had to survive. I had to really convince him that I thought it was a joke.

Thomas Small Because you knew that he might think that you had no idea what he was talking about.

Aimen Dean Yeah. So, I told him, "I'm not tolerating this joke." So, he said, "It's not a joke." You know? And I said, "Look, don't try to save yourself." You know? "I'm going to report to you now, you know, to everyone here, you know. So, take it, you know, down. Take the gun down." So, he took it down and he said, "[name], I'm sorry. But they told me basically I have to do random checks like, you know, against people. You know, like, you know, how, you know, it is. It's not – nothing personal. But, you know, you are one of the travellers." You know, we – we – we are called travellers. You know, the in and out people. So—.

Thomas Small It was just a random check?

Aimen Dean It was a random.

Thomas Small He had no—. No one had any idea that you actually were a double agent?

Aimen Dean No. 

Thomas Small How did you keep your cool, Aimen? I would have peed my pants. 

Aimen Dean You know, by then, it was 2001 and I have been, you know, in jihad since 1994. So, seven years of being in different war zones, man, you know. This is how you keep your calm.

Thomas Small Let's go back to when you left al-Qaeda. Why did you choose to join MI6? 

Aimen Dean Well, when I left al-Qaeda and I was on my way to Qatar at that time, under the pretext of medical attention, which was true. I needed medical attention for my liver, which was suffering from, you know, the – the after effects of typhoid, and malaria is tracking me at the same time. You know, that was very merciless period. I lost half of my weight and almost died. So—. 

Thomas Small Sounds like a very effective diet, actually.

Aimen Dean Indeed, yes. You know, malaria and typhoid, good for your health. Anyway, so—. So, I remember when I arrived in Qatar. My mission, or at least what I thought was my mission, was to get the medical treatment necessary and then tell al-Qaeda that "oh, my passport has been confiscated, you know, by the Qatari authorities. I'm banned from traveling. I can't come back. Well, see you in another life. Goodbye." And then, enrol into a university, study history, graduate, become a history teacher. That was the plan. And what a naive plan it was.

Thomas Small You land in Qatar. 

Aimen Dean Yes. 

Thomas Small And the Qataris apprehend you.

Aimen Dean Indeed. The story was that I land there. And it so happened I land during a time when the Qataris had their own internal investigation about suspicious phone calls, you know, coming out of Pakistan into Qatar, from the phone of a well-known operative, Abu Zubaydah. So, I remember, when I landed there, I was just picked up in order to clarify why was I using Abu Zubaydah's phone and if I know him. And if I know him, what was the nature of my relationship with him? So, I remember the Qatari intelligence service officers, you know, all of them were sitting in a very menacing, you know, behind the long desk, you know. And I'm alone in a chair, you know. And they were looking at me menacing. And I was looking at them basically about to burst laughing, because their facial expressions were so fake, you know. And I could tell that they were, you know, trying to be menacing, but in reality, they are all just, you know, cuddly, nice people, you know, in their daily lives. 

Thomas Small Gulf Arabs have that problem, don't they?

Aimen Dean Indeed. 

Thomas Small They're – they're menacing, but they're such cuddly, nice people. 

Aimen Dean Indeed.

Thomas Small And so, you – you yourself are one of these people.

Aimen Dean Exactly. So, I just look at them and I think, "Guys, like, I mean your facial expressions are just so fake." But nonetheless, you know, they're looking at me menacingly and they were saying, "Look, we know who you are and we need you to tell the truth and be – and assist us in our inquiry. Otherwise, basically, you know, we could exhibit another awful nature of ours with you." So, I was looking at them. "Okay. Tell me. What is the inquiry?" They said, "Do you deny that you made a phone call from Abu Zubaydah's phone, you know, to one of your friends here in Qatar?" "Oh, no. I made that phone call, all right." "Really? Did you?" "Yeah. I did." "So, you don't deny it?" "You know, why would I deny it?" "Yeah. But it's Abu Zubaydah's phone. Like, [unintelligible]. You know, you don't – you don't want to distance yourself from Abu Zubaydah?" I said, "Well, you asked me for the truth and I'm telling the truth. So, you know, why can't you just accept it? And I—. Yes, I did use Abu Zubaydah's phone to call my friend in Qatar. I mean, I needed medical attention and, you know, I was almost dying a year earlier, you know. And so, I couldn't go to a phone box or a phone booth or any other, you know, service, so I can call my friends from there. So, Abu Zubaydah gave me his phone and told me to make the phone call." 

Thomas Small What did they say next?

Aimen Dean So, they said, "And—. So, basically, it was all about medical attention? But why were you Abu Zubaydah, you know, safe house in the first place? And why would he trust you with your phone – with his phone to begin with?" I said, "Well, I can—. I'm a member of al-Qaeda. And, you know, basically, of course, Abu Zubaydah is one of the facilitators for our organisation and—."

S: Easiest interrogation ever. 

Aimen Dean Yeah. 

Thomas Small You cracked under pressure immediately. 

Aimen Dean Oh, there was no pressure at the beginning. Actually, I, you know—. On the plane, when I was actually flying from Bashar and landing in Doha—. 

Thomas Small You had already decided to leave al-Qaeda anyway.

Aimen Dean Not the only that. Actually, in my own heart, I started reciting the renunciation of my allegiance to al-Qaeda. You know, basically, you say, "Oh, Lord." You know? "The allegiance I gave to Osama bin Laden and to al-Qaeda, I declare to You that it is null and void, and I take it back."

Thomas Small Well, how do you say that in Arabic? 

Aimen Dean You say, you know—. You say, like, you know, "[foreign language]." You know? "[foreign language]."

Thomas Small "I renounce my allegiance to al-Qaeda." 

Aimen Dean Yes. 

Thomas Small "Oh, Lord of [crosstalk]." 

Aimen Dean And to Osama bin Laden. So, I renounced that allegiance on the plane, leaving, you know, Pakistan. So—. 

Thomas Small You say, "I'm in al-Qaeda." And what do they say next?

Aimen Dean And they look at me and they say, basically, you know, "Okay. One minute. Just—." You know? "Are we missing something here? Why are you so candid here?" And then, I told them what happened after East Africa, what I found out, all the way to the fact that I was renouncing my [unintelligible] my allegiance on the plane landing in Doha. And that—. I remember when they just looked at each other and, you know, they started whispering into each other's ears and coming together and huddling together. And then, after that, basically, they decided to switch on all the lights, you know, within the room, you know, basically, feeling relaxed. You know, they came to me one after another, shaking my hand, you know, patting me on the, you know, on the shoulder and saying, "Well done." 

Thomas Small How did you get into MI6?

Aimen Dean The fact is that after the Qataris, you know, were able to check all of the facts I gave them, they told me that, "Look, we would love to facilitate your dream of becoming a history teacher and living with us here in Qatar. But the problem is Doha is a city of two hundred and fifty thousand people. It's like a small suburb of London. So, you will be running into your friends every day, you know, for the rest of your life. And that is something that we do not think is a good idea. You know, if you want to have a normal life, in which basically you can be protected, we think that you need to immigrate and leave, you know, to work with one of three countries and work for their intelligence agencies. Just only for six months. Debriefing. That's it." 

Thomas Small The US…

Aimen Dean France.

Thomas Small …France, or Britain? 

Aimen Dean Yeah.

Thomas Small Why did you choose Britain? 

Aimen Dean Okay. As far as Americans were concerned—and I'm sorry, Tom—but the memory of your cruise missiles, you know, landing over our heads, you know, just, you know, a few months earlier—.

Thomas Small On your way back from the bathroom.

Aimen Dean Indeed. Were not exactly, you know, encouraging me, you know, to go and work with those who just, months earlier, pressed the button to kill me. So, I thought, "Okay. Not Americans." So, as far as the French were concerned, first, I don't like their language. I don't like their manner. I don't like, like, the way they behave.

Thomas Small Ooh.

Aimen Dean There are—. Again, they're aloof, you know. And that's the best things about them, actually. I didn't go even to the worst things.

Thomas Small I—. Now, I understand why you joined MI6. 

Aimen Dean Okay. So – so, I decided, you know, that, you know, since my grandfather, you know, fought for the British, actually, in Iraq, in the battles of Al Amara, Al Kut, and Baghdad and was actually a major, an official major in the British army.

Thomas Small In the First World War. 

Aimen Dean In the First World War, he fought against the Ottomans alongside the British. And so, I thought that there is some affinity there, you know, with the British foreign office and then the intelligence services. And so, I decided that, at least, I was familiar with London. I've been there before. So, I decided to go with familiarity and affinity. That actually what, you know, made up my mind.

Thomas Small So, you were a double agent working with MI6 for eight years. 

Aimen Dean Indeed.

Thomas Small And in that time, the War on Terror was launched and went through many different vicissitudes. Where, n your opinion, did the War on Terror go wrong? What were the biggest mistakes that were made?

Aimen Dean The first mistake, the biggest mistake, the mother of all mistakes was Iraq.

Thomas Small Invading Iraq in 2003?

Aimen Dean Indeed. That was absolutely not necessary, whatsoever. There was no immediate danger. Saddam Hussein, in fact, was the, you know, the last standing pillar of Arab secular nationalism. He was a big hurdle against al-Qaeda and also against Iran and their brand of Shia political and militant Islam. So, you know, taking Saddam down was the dumbest strategic mistake that Bush and Blair ever done. And that what revived the fortunes of al-Qaeda and the global jihad.

Thomas Small The Iraq War. Well, that's what we're going to talk about in the next episode, Aimen. And I'm sure the listener will be looking forward to hearing your idiosyncratic views on what remains, to this day, the great seeping wound of modern Middle Eastern history. 

Aimen Dean Indeed.

Thomas Small This episode of Conflicted was produced by Jake Warren and Sandra Ferrari. Original music by Matt Huxley. If you want to hear more of Conflicted, make sure you search for us on Apple Podcasts or wherever you download yours.

Conflicted S1 E3 - Iraq

CONFLICTED

S01E03

Thomas Small Welcome back to Conflicted. If this is your first time listening, this is a podcast series where we explore the real story of the War on Terror and the conflicts raging throughout the Middle East. It's an extremely complex tapestry, but stick with us. We are going to do our best to unpick those threads for you to make sense of what seems to be a lot of chaos. 

Some of you know me already. I'm one of your guides through this exploration of the Middle East, Thomas Small. So, in the last episode we spoke about the War on Terror, and my co-host for the series, Aimen Dean, talked about his role within that war. I asked him whether this US-led counter-terrorism campaign had been a success, and he said that it was launched with good intentions, but it was carried out in an idiotic way. And he specifically pointed to one event in particular that caused the whole thing to unravel.

Aimen Dean Taking Saddam down was the dumbest strategic mistake that Bush and Blair ever done. And that what revived the fortunes of al-Qaeda and the global jihad. 

Thomas Small We'll explore why in this episode. This is Conflicted

Right. Has the bomb squad left? Did they find any bombs under my chair tonight? Here I am with Aimen Dean again, with a fatwā on his head, former al-Qaeda member, author of Nine Lives: My Time as MI6

Aimen Dean My Time as MI6's Top Spy Inside al-Qaeda. How many times do I have to remind you? 

Thomas Small My Time as MI6's Top Spy Inside al-Qaeda. Well, that tells us everything we need to know about you. I'm Thomas Small, co-producer of the documentary film Path of Blood: The True Story of al-Qaeda's Attempts to Overthrow the Saudi Monarchy. Welcome. How are you today? 

Aimen Dean Well, as I always remind you, Thomas, I'm still alive. 

Thomas Small You still have one life left.

Aimen Dean Touch wood. I would rather think there are quite few more of them. 

Thomas Small Me, too. I hope. I hope. So, in the last episode we spoke about the War on Terror and your role within that war. I asked you whether it has been a success. And you said, "Well, it was launched with good intentions, but it was carried out in an idiotic way." And you specified one event in particular that caused the whole thing to unravel, which we'll talk about today: the Iraq War. 

So, you say that America invaded the wrong country. It was a huge mistake. It was based on their stupidity. But was it also perhaps premeditated? Did they know it was going to result in chaos? I remember, I think, it was Richard Perle or Wolfowitz. You know, the neo-con security advisors in the Bush administration. One of them said what the Middle East really needs is for someone to throw a grenade into the middle of it, to see what results. Creative chaos, just like the jihadists.

Aimen Dean You see, I do believe in creative chaos as a force for good sometime, because, you know, forests need forest fires between now and then to rejuvenate. But that has to be organically grown from within. 

Thomas Small Sure. But do you think that the neo-cons knew they were going to create chaos in Iraq? For the listener, the neo-cons being a group of geopolitical strategists around the George W. Bush administration. For many decades, they had been advocating a more muscular American approach to policing the world, especially in the Middle East. Do you think they knew what they were doing to Iraq, Aimen?

Aimen Dean I don't think they really realise, you know, what kind of a disaster they are going to. I mean, they were just a bunch of teenagers going into the forest, having an uncontrolled campfire. And then, basically, they set the entire forest on fire. That it wasn't their intention. I think their intention was, "Oh, we're going to build this, you know, democracy. You know, [unintelligible]. The war, you know, as Donald Trump stupidly once said, will pay for itself. Well, it didn't. 

Thomas Small No.

Aimen Dean It did not. It cost trillions. And even all the oil of Iraq, if it was ever extracted and sold right now, it won't even cover fifty percent of the war costs. So, anyone who says, "Oh, it was only for oil," they don't get it. 

Thomas Small But we now know, I think it's pretty fair to say, that the justifications they gave at the time for launching the war, the WMDs, that Saddam Hussein was in league with bin Laden, they knew that this was not true. The dossier was sexed up. They were lying to people. They had had it in their minds all along to invade Iraq. 9/11 was just the pretext they needed to sell it to the American people. 

Aimen Dean Do you remember when we talked about how al-Qaeda leaders read the letter that was written in 1998, five years before the Iraq invasion and—?

Thomas Small The letter from the Project for the New American Century.

Aimen Dean Indeed. That letter was signed by all the architects of the Iraq War when they were just only in a think tank and not in government. 

Thomas Small Yes. It's amazing. It goes to show you.

Aimen Dean So, their intention was there a long time ago, because they wanted to throw that grenade into the Middle East, but it wasn't with the intention of creating this, you know, blood-soaked chaos. What they wanted basically is to rearrange the Middle East in a way that will be favourable towards America. But what happened is that they rearranged the Middle East in a way that is favourable to Iran and Russia ironically.

Thomas Small It was the bulldozer, the bulldozer that al-Qaeda was looking forward to from the United States to come and cause chaos in the. Is that right? 

Aimen Dean Oh, yes. Indeed. 

Thomas Small Okay. So, let's discussed Saddam Hussein. Saddam Hussein from Tikrit, in Iraq, rose up through the military, joined the Ba'ath Party at an early age, and, eventually, by proving himself a consummate insider, the power behind the throne of the leader of the Ba'ath Party at the time, eventually became vice president where he effectively ruled the country and then president from 1979 until his hanging in 2006. 

Aimen Dean Yeah. We have to remember that Saddam Hussein was the pillar of secular Arab nationalism. So, secular nationalism is an ideology that began to emerge, you know, in the 1940s and '50s, especially with the uprising in Egypt in 1952, which deposed the monarchy and brought about the idea of Arab nationalism. Arab nationalism was more or less invented as a way in order to create a identity around the Arabic language as something that will rally the people behind. Why? So, in order to rally the people behind the cause, you need to have a cause that is uniting, not dividing. 

So, the thought that religion could be dividing, because, don't forget, you have a lot of Christians within the Arab world. Those Christians, even though they were a minority—roughly ten percent—they were the educated classes. They were really highly educated, motivated, engaged, involved.

Thomas Small Also, to some extent, the capitalist classes. They were wealthy.

Aimen Dean Absolutely. So, you know, without them, there will be no progress. Without them, we couldn't go forward. And so, therefore, the idea was that Arab secular nationalism. So, they spoke Arabic. We spoke Arabic, you know. So, how about we use Arabic identity and Arab identity as the rallying cause, as the uniting ideology? 

Thomas Small And the Arab leaders who subscribed to this ideology wanted to unite the Arab world, because, well, because they wanted power, but also because they thought only if the Arab world were truly united could it withstand the combined onslaught of America and the Soviets. 

Now, I know it seems we're going off track, but let's discuss the Israel-Palestine conflict for. I promise you, listeners, that this is relevant to Saddam Hussein and the work of the Ba'ath Party in the region. So, Aimen, how resonant to this day is the Israel-Palestine situation to these conflicts that are raging?

Aimen Dean You see, the 1960s, '70s, '80s, and even in the 1990s and the early 2000s, the Palestinian cause was so ever-present in the minds and the hearts of the people, 'cause, of course, it was reinforced by the constant propaganda by the dictators. Because for the dictators, for the Arab, you know, world autocrats, the Palestinian was a good painkiller to give to the people. If the people basically are hungry, "Oh, we have to be hungry for Palestine." If the people are saying, "Yes. But we have no freedom." "Oh, yeah. Because if we have freedom, then we lose the Palestinian cause and we lose Palestine." So, Palestine as a cause was used and abused by a multitude of Arab dictators. 

Thomas Small Not just the dictators. The monarchs as well. Everyone was playing that game. 

Aimen Dean Everyone. Everyone. Everyone..

Thomas Small If you were an Arab leader, you were a defender of Palestine. It became really part and parcel of – of Arab leadership. 

Aimen Dean Yeah. Well, indeed. The only one who broke away from that was the wisest Arab leader to have ever existed.

Thomas Small Anwar Sadat. 

Aimen Dean Exactly.

Thomas Small Anwar Sadat, president of Egypt throughout the '70s, famously signed the Camp David Peace Accords with the Israelis to put an end, or so he hoped, to conflict between Israel and the Arabs, was paid for his pains by being assassinated by jihadists at that time, including Ayman al-Zawahiri, now the leader of al-Qaeda, the grandfather of the sort of total violence we associate now with ISIS. After a time in prison, ended up joining al-Qaeda. And after a series of adventures, establishing what was known as al-Qaeda in Iraq, I remember, in the mid-noughties, he was releasing videos of himself, propaganda videos, brandishing – brandishing knives, brandishing Kalashnikovs, rallying the Muslims to rise up and join him in Iraq to expel the American invader. He was a harbinger for things to come. 

The story goes on and on. It's an immense tapestry of events. You know, I'm sure listeners are thinking, "How do we keep this in our heads?" But it's very important to realise that the War on Terror, 9/11, the Gulf War, this story stretches back decades. This is a decades-long conflict between various forces in the Middle East. And this podcast is attempting to string together this very complex tapestry. Now, what did jihadists have against Israel?

Aimen Dean Because, remember. Do you remember when we discussed in the first episode, when we talked about the apocalyptic and eschatological and prophetic visions of jihadists?

Thomas Small The prophecies. The end time prophecies. 

Aimen Dean They believe that the return of the Jews to the Holy Land was the trigger for the age of prophecies and that it will end all of it. All of it will end in a great, huge battle around Jerusalem. So—.

Thomas Small Basically, their version of the Christian Armageddon. 

Aimen Dean Exactly. That is why attacking Israel is always going to earn you some brownie points. 

Thomas Small So, let's put the characters in place. We've got a slew of Arab leaders who wanted to strengthen and unite the Muslim world by subscribing to what is known as secular Arab nationalism. For these Arab leaders, this unity would strengthen the Arab. For jihadists, it's a good thing, because it all plays into their cause: the fulfilment of the prophecies. 

We'll get to where they play a role in all of this in a bit. But first, let's bring this conversation back to Iraq. We said earlier Saddam Hussein was a pillar of Arab nationalism and he led the Ba'ath Party. So, Aimen, what's so important about the Ba'ath Party?

Aimen Dean By the way, the Ba'ath Party in Arabic means the Renaissance Party. The founder of the Ba'ath Party was a Christian Syrian, and his name was Michel Aflaq. You know, he was supported by many Syrian, Iraq, and Lebanese Christian intellectuals who saw, in the Ba'ath Party, a mechanism to unite Muslims who are also Sunni and Shia together with Alawites and with Christians of all sorts—Christian Orthodox, Christian Catholics—, you know, around this banner of Arab nationalism. So, you know, the Ba'ath Party was an umbrella organisation that actually gathered beneath it many forces from Iraq, from Syria, and also from Egypt and Libya and Algeria. But in fact, it took hold in both Iraq and Syria. 

Thomas Small I mean, we've all been told that Saddam Hussein, leader of the Iraqi Ba'ath Party, was a maniac. Wasn't he, in the Ba'ath Party, was utterly oppressive of the people? 

Aimen Dean Remember, the Ba'ath Party was modelled on the socialist Bolshevik, you know, model. So, it was not exactly a plural, capitalist, you know, model. It was actually—.

Thomas Small It wasn't liberal, say.

Aimen Dean No. No. No. There was no – nothing liberal about the Ba'ath Party. The Ba'ath Party was a – an organisation or a party that basically sought to enforce unity from the top. And at the same time, if you are believing that you are the only vehicle for progress, then you want to, you know, basically be the only ruling party. And that was the case in both Iraq and Syria, where the Ba'ath Party became the ruling party. 

Thomas Small So, the American invasion of Iraq and the destruction of Saddam Hussein's regime served the interests of al-Qaeda. 

Aimen Dean Of course. You know, you see the Ba'ath Party was ruling Iraq since 1968 and Syria since 1970. And in both cases, it was one-single party rule completely dominated by ideologues. And these ideologues wanted to destroy any semblance of involvement of religion and politics. But that, of course, failed, you know, at later stage, because Saddam's version of Arab nationalism and Iraq became not anti-Shia, because he wasn't sectarian. I would say it became, you know, an anti-Persian. 

Thomas Small Yes. Because, of course, Saddam Hussein, throughout the '80s, was the great lion of the Arabs, protecting the Arab world from the spread of the Iranian revolution. And at that point, his regime, secular in nature, did take on the trappings of Islamic symbology, which led him, eventually, into conflict with the House of Saud, the custodians of the two Holy Mosques, which, you know, eventually culminated in the Gulf War, the first Gulf War of 1991.

Aimen Dean Absolutely. And, you know, and in Syria, it was a very different story altogether. President Assad, you know, the father of the current one, Hafez al-Assad, he decided to go in a different path. So, he was a Ba'ath Party, yes. But because of his Alawite minority background and the—. 

Thomas Small Yes. He was not as Sunni. The Alawites are a strange sectarian, Shia branch of Islam. Very small numbers within – within the Muslim world.

Aimen Dean Indeed. A fringe, you know – you know, sect, you can call them. But they – they saw Iran as more ideologically aligned with them than Iraq. And because of the competition between the two Ba'ath Party branches—the Baghdad branch and the Damascus branch—was so intense, it's similar to the intensity of the competition between Beijing and Moscow over who was the true communist after the breakup 

between the two powers. 

Thomas Small During the Cold War. That's right. Yes, that's right. So, when you were growing up in Khobar, before Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait and potentially threatened you and your family by invading Saudi Arabia, what image did you have of Saddam Hussein as an Arab leader? 

Aimen Dean Well, we used to call him, in Arabic, the phrase "hami albawaabat alsharqia." You know, the protector of the Eastern gate, you know, of course, against the savage Persian hordes, you know, who were trying to bring, you know, this kind of messianic version of Islam and overwhelm our, you know, sparsely populated Arabian Peninsula. So, of course, his image was that of a strong man, you know. He was Stalin who defeated Hitler, you know. He knows that—. You know, the Iraqi Stalin who defeated the, you know, Iranian Hitler, Khomeini. So, that's how he was seen. 

Thomas Small You are talking about Saddam Hussein as if he was an admirable character. But, you know, he was a real arsehole.

Aimen Dean Oh, no. No – no question about it. Like, not only he was a brutal, brutal dictator, you know, modelling the style of his rule on Stalin, but he did, in fact, use chemical weapons to great effect against the Iranians, you know, in the Iran-Iraq war, and also against the Kurd in the north of the country. But we must also remember it wasn't only Iraq and Saddam Hussein that used chemical weapons during the Iraq-Iran War. Iran used chemical weapons, too. 

Thomas Small Yes. We also have to remember that, I think, that if you were to look at the canisters of Saddam Hussein's chemical weapons arsenal, they would have imprinted upon them a factory probably located somewhere in the Midwest of the United States.

Aimen Dean Indeed. And you see, the use of those chemical weapons, you know, happened during the 1980s when Saddam was the darling of the DC, so. 

Thomas Small The darling of DC.

Aimen Dean Yeah.

Thomas Small But—. So, you know—. So, yeah. Saddam Hussein was an arsehole. But perhaps what you're saying is that Iraq needed an arsehole. Only a real brutal dictator would be the master chemist that Iraq needed to keep it together. 

Aimen Dean Saddam Hussein used to say that Iraq is a complicated chemical formula. Only a master chemist can understand it. And he was that master chemist, because he actually reigned over Iraq for thirty-four years. He knew basically how to rule the country and keep it together. Actually, Iraq, throughout the Islamic history, was always stable under the rule of a tyrant. Always. 

Thomas Small Now, I remember where I was when I heard that George W. Bush and the Americans had invaded Iraq on the 20th of March, 2003. I was still in the monastery in Greece. In fact, I left ten days later. I don't think there's a connection between those two events, but it just so happened I did leave ten days later. And at the time inside the monastery—and I think this resonates with what you were talking about in the first episode—there was a genuine apocalyptic mentality going on. The monks believed that this war was the beginning salvo in the end of times war, the great war that would culminate in Armageddon. I wouldn't say that they were excited about it. They weren't supporting the war, but they were excited about the prospect of the end of history coming imminently. 

And this is true as well within the ranks of the jihadists, I suppose. They thought the prophecies are coming true. The Americans have taken the bait. They've moved into Iraq. "They're the bulldozer we need to create the creative chaos in which we will be able to reform the caliphate." 

Aimen Dean Well, you just summed it absolutely, perfectly right. The problem is that the proceeding five years before the Iraq War, between 1998 and 2003, those last five years of Saddam Hussein's reign in Iraq were actually the best of his reign. You know, it was a time of the least repression, I would call it this way. It was a time when he started to open up a bit as far as the population were concerned. You know, even though there were severe sanctions, but the effects of the sanction started to subside. 

Thomas Small Sanctions overseen by the UN, most famously the oil for food program where Saddam Hussein was only able to sell oil on the global market in exchange for food for his people.

Aimen Dean You know, it started to actually improve. And it became clear that Iraq actually was on the cusp of breaking the sanctions, of having rapprochement with Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and already the relationship with Jordan was excellent. And with Turkey, was excellent. So, you know, things started to improve considerably. 

Thomas Small Well, if that's the case, you know, put us in the mind of the neo-con establishment in Washington. Why did they want to get rid of Saddam Hussein so badly then? Clearly, this is someone that, perhaps with a little bit more time, they could have worked with to combat the rising tide of violent Islamism?

Aimen Dean The ironic thing is that they already worked with him in the 1980s. They 

already did. 

Thomas Small So, why did they want to get rid of him so badly? In fact, as you said in the first episode, they wanted to get rid of him before 9/11. He was their main target. Why?

Aimen Dean They saw Iraq and they saw Saddam Hussein, you know, as someone who could be a threat in the future, you know, forgetting that, at some point, basically, he was useful for their policy of containing Iran. And he managed actually to contain Iran all the way 'til the end. Iran's ambitions in the region was only unleashed after his fall in 2003. But if you see what the neo-cons were looking at, if you read their writings, they thought that Iraq was ideally situated, you know, within the Middle East, in the heart of the Middle East, bordering different civilisations and ethnic groups. It's bordering the Persians, the Kurds, the Turks, the Arabs. And the idea is that it is oil-rich and it is strategically positioned at the heart of the Muslim world. So, it is the ideal place to start a new experiment in bringing about democracy. Because they believe that only when we remove dictators and installed democratic values, then these countries will forever be grateful to America and American intervention. 

There was one problem, though. It might seem small, but it was what undermined the whole strategy altogether. The people who were talking about this were looking at Iraq on the map. They were looking at the green, yellow, and brown colours of Iraq on the map, with the rivers crisscrossing the map. And that's it. They were not looking at the demographics and the history of the people. They ignore that Iraq was always, always a bastion of instability within the Middle East. 

Thomas Small The Iraq War was the great mistake, you said. As a double agent working for MI6b inside al-Qaeda, you must have felt demoralised. 

Aimen Dean Well, I always felt that we were involved in one of the worst historical exercise in futility. That we are capturing or killing terrorists only for these terrorists to be replaced ten times 'cause of what's happening in, you know, in many parts of Iraq, And why? I always ask myself, "Why am I continuing? Why am I working? You know, what's the point?" Because the Iraq war has radicalised so many young Muslims across the world. You see, if it was necessary, I would have supported it. And I have supported the war in Afghanistan…

Thomas Small As you said.

Aimen Dean …to depose the Taliban. I supported that, because it was right to do. Although maybe it's later execution was not exactly perfect, but at least, you know, the initial campaign was on the right track. And if they just—. If the Americans just persevered just another year or a year and a half, they would have finished al-Qaeda and Taliban for good. 

On the eve of the invasion of Iraq and before that, I was advising my MI6 handlers and other officers I used to meet to read the writings of Professor Ali Al-Wardi.

Thomas Small Who's Ali Al-Wardi? I've never heard of him. 

Aimen Dean Oh. He is the most important person you never heard of, Thomas.

Thomas Small You're the expert here, Aimen. I'm just trying to get – get the gold nuggets out of your head.

Aimen Dean Well, Professor Ali Al-Wardi was an Iraqi professor of sociology in Baghdad University. He was a professor in the '40s and '50s. So, we're talking, really, a while ago. But his writings are so accurate in its analysis of the Iraqi individual personality. 

Thomas Small What – what is this personality? 

Aimen Dean Well, he said, basically, that the census tells us that there are fifteen million Iraqis in Iraq, but he believed there were thirty million, because each Iraq, in his opinion, basically, was, you know, two individuals within one body—an individual that is capable of being a good husband, a good father, a good neighbour, a wonderful person, a humorous, generous, selfless. But then on the other hand, the sample – the same person is capable of being sadist, violent psychopath. You know, capable of murder, dismemberment, torture. 

Thomas Small Now, I mean, if this guy wasn't an Iraqi himself, you know, I would be inclined to dismiss this as just, you know, quack sociological racism, really. I mean, it seem—. It does seem a bit – a bit extreme to say that every Iraqi has the capacity for being a brutal sadist. 

Aimen Dean But remember he was talking about his own people. He was analysing how, you know, how Iraq, throughout the ages, was always basically a bastion of instability. 

Thomas Small So, you then, when you realised that the Americans were going to invade Iraq, you knew it would be a disaster. Where were you when you first realised this is going to happen? The Americans are going to make this godawful mistake.

Aimen Dean I was in Bahrain, monitoring the al-Qaeda's movement between Iran and Saudi Arabia. And the, you know—. And, of course, basically, al-Qaeda was keeping an eye on the American preparations for invading Iraq. So, this is when I realised that this was a mistake, because the reaction of al-Qaeda individuals and operatives who I was meeting on regular basis at the time was that of gleeful anticipation. So excited. "That's exactly the trap that we want the Americans to walk into."

Thomas Small Amazing. Amazing. And the irony, of course, is there you are in Bahrain, keeping tabs on al-Qaeda militants inside Iran. That's where the al-Qaeda militants were. That's who was facilitating them, not Saddam Hussein. 

Aimen Dean I will tell you something. I used to have screaming sessions with my MI5 and MI6 handlers when I used to hear Colin Powell and others talking about how Iraq was a source of al-Qaeda's chemical weapons capabilities.

Thomas Small You, of course, had intimate knowledge of those capabilities. You had been a chem- – chemical weapons expert for al-Qaeda.

Aimen Dean Indeed. And those actually did not come from Iraq. Those came from people who worked in the Egyptian and Syrian chemical weapons programs in the 1970s and '80s Nothing to do with Iraq. These were people who converted to jihadism from Egypt and from Syria, came to Afghanistan and brought that capability. Not a single Iraqi came, you know, and gave that capability to al-Qaeda.

Thomas Small But what about Iran, though? I mean, Iran was actually a facilitating al-Qaeda at this time, was it? I mean, it was keeping it some of its top leaders, like Saif al-Adel, the military head of al-Qaeda at that time, under house arrest, was allowing him to contact his al-Qaeda comrades across the – across the world. Is that not right? 

Aimen Dean Well, I remember when one of the envoys of Hamza Rabia—. Hamza Rabia was the head of al-Qaeda's operation, external operations. So, he was based in Iran. And the envoy used to tell us that the Iranians, you know, programmed landlines and the phones that we had to dial only two international codes—009006 and 00973, which are the international codes for Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, respectively. 

Thomas Small And why – why those two countries? Why did they allow al-Qaeda operatives inside Iran to contact people inside Bahrain and Saudi Arabia? 

Aimen Dean Because they—. These countries where the target. Because Bahrain is the home of the US Fifth fleet. You know, thousands of US personnel are stationed there. And, of course, Saudi Arabia is the home of the Saudi monarchy, the greatest obstacle against Iran's total hegemony of the Middle East. 

Thomas Small Yes. I mean, that's very interesting, because not enough people realise that two months after the invasion of Iraq, the uprising inside Saudi Arabia of al-Qaeda cells that had been planted there in the proceeding years occurred. Osama bin Ladin thought, following the invasion of Iraq, that anti-American sentiment would be so strong inside Saudi Arabia, that ordinary Saudi civilians would answer his call to rise up and overthrow the government there. So, he pressed go on a series of audacious bombings, shootings, kidnappings, beheadings that ravaged the kingdom for three years, all the while America is in Iraq and the jihadists there are causing havoc as well. You must have been aware that this was all going on. You were intimately involved in countering the al-Qaeda campaign inside Saudi Arabia. 

Aimen Dean Indeed. That campaign actually also had considerable links with a group in Iraq that began to emerge and had strong links and ties to al-Qaeda. Because many Saudis were also traveling to Iraq to fight there against the Americans. 

Thomas Small Well, that's the irony. That, in fact, the radicalised Saudis, in general, did not respond to al-Qaeda's call to attack their own government. What they did is they went to Iraq and attack the Americans.

Aimen Dean More than three thousand Saudis, at least, went to fight in Iraq. Many of them. 

Thomas Small So, had you still been in the organisation properly, not as a double agent, but as a true believer, do you think you would have rallied to Zarqawi's cause? Or do you think you would have been one of those scratching their heads, thinking, "This is not the right way to go?"

Aimen Dean Well, if I was still possessing the same mentality when I gave my allegiance to Osama bin Laden in the autumn of '97, I would say yes. I would have gone to fight in Iraq, because it was a pure case of an aggressive war that has no just calls, whatsoever. It was a pure invasion, you know. And so, I would have gotten and, you know, and fought against the Americans. But, of course, basically, I mean, by that time you know, my allegiance was completely different. 

Thomas Small The—. Was the atmosphere within al-Qaeda during the – the high watermark of Zarqawi's reign of terror particularly tense? Were they on the lookout for double agents like yourself? Did you feel ever that you were being scrutinised especially strongly at this time?

Aimen Dean The – the irony was that, while al-Qaeda was less paranoid—. Of course, they were extremely paranoid organisation, but they managed even to be less paranoid before 9/11, because they were comfortable. They had their own camps. They have their own structure in Afghanistan. And they were less, you know, paranoid. But that atmosphere was far more difficult to work in, because you—. You know, when you are there, you are seen by multitude of people seeing you. You know, you're praying next to them. You are, you know, eating next to them. So, you are scrutinised by a large number of people who are together within the same tent, let's put it this way. After 9/11, al-Qaeda cells became so paranoid. So paranoid that we're always worried about infiltration. But, you know, what helped me there, even though the paranoia was higher, but it was easier environment to work in, because I was always dealing only with very few people, because it was cells. Cells here. Cells there. A cell here. A cell there. So, they were separated. So, I'm not scrutinised by a large number of people at the same time, but scrutinised by few people at any given time, which means that I can deploy my own charm offensive to win them over. 

Thomas Small Did you ever come close to being discovered? 

Aimen Dean No. It was before rather than after 9/11 that, you know, people basically were more suspicious, even though they were less paranoid. So, it – it shows basically that it's not necessarily that the general pa- – paranoia could actually be, you know, positive or negative for you. It's all about the structure of the organisation you are infiltrating. If it is a solid structure with a centre that is vibrant, it's more difficult to infiltrate it than if you infiltrate just individual cells. Not to mention, of course, the fact, as we mentioned before that many of al-Qaeda's talented bowmakers were either captured or killed. The lack of talent after 9/11 opened the door wide for me to be welcomed into, you know, several cells and that enabled me, basically, to thwart several plots happening. 

So, the issue here was that, if the Americans really wanted to end the phenomenon of al-Qaeda and to finish it, they should have stayed in Afghanistan and finished the job there. And then, al-Qaeda was really drawing the last two or three breaths. But somehow—somehow—the Americans just were fixated with Iraq or Saddam Hussein who posed no threat to – whatsoever to American, British, European, or even regional interests.

Thomas Small No WMDs? The famous WMDs? Weapons of mass destruction?

Aimen Dean Well, of course, as Scott Ritter and other UN WMD inspectors always testified that, you know, it's almost impossible to think that Iraq has retained any credible capability in terms of production or store. So, what are they now? Where are the chemical weapons? You know, it's been, what, almost, you know, fifteen years since they invasion. You will have thought that someone would have found them by now. 

Thomas Small So, really, with the invasion of Iraq and everything that followed, you have a clash of two totalitarian ideologies or totalising ideologies. And, actually, underneath them, there is something like a similar religiosity. Obviously, the religiosity of al-Qaeda is well-known. "This is the end of times. The prophecies are coming true. The caliphate will be reborn." Et cetera. Et cetera. But even on the neo-con side, and its allies like Tony Blair in the UK, there was this undercurrent of fervent Christian piety. Tony Blair and George W. Bush praying together the evening before the launch of the war. The sense that George W. Bush certainly had. And I think that if you look into his eyes, Tony Blair clearly has of being elected by some kind of destiny to bring about peace, harmony, democracy, liberalism, prosperity to the whole world. There's something mad there.

Aimen Dean Yeah. At the end of barrel of a gun. I mean, that doesn't work. In comparison to Saddam Hussein, America seemed like a pizza delivery boy. Clueless. Didn't know basically what they were getting into and how will they, basically, manage the place. And that basically opened the door for Iran to come and, you know, sectarianise, you know, the Iraqi Shia who were mostly secular throughout Saddam Hussein's rule. So, suddenly, basically, there is a new radicalised generation. And then, the Sunnis who were secular during Saddam Hussein's rule were radicalised by al-Qaeda. So, al-Qaeda camel, radicalised the Sunnis. Iran came, radicalised the Shia. And suddenly, that, you know, miraculous sectarian harmony that existed, yuk, for almost a thousand years in Iraq completely disintegrated. 

Thomas Small Now, Iran is really playing a double game. Iran knows what it's doing. It's going to radicalise the Iraqi people, at least a minority of the Iraqi people, to make it impossible for America to achieve any of its objectives in Iraq. 

Aimen Dean Well, of course. I remember on the eve of the invasion when it happened, I used to joke, you know, to many friends. I used to say, "Well, yeah. They invaded the wrong. I mean, you know, if you want to establish democracy, why do you actually go after a secular Arab nationalist country? I mean, why don't you go after a radical, fanatic, theocratic country just next door? Iran?"

Thomas Small Well, I mean, God help us if America decides to invade Iran. The Iranians don't take things like that lying down.

Aimen Dean Indeed. And, you know, in my opinion, there shouldn't be any invasion of anyone whatsoever. 

Thomas Small No. Of course.

Aimen Dean You know, unless if someone's threaten you directly. And, you know, for me, I'm one of those people who, again, controversially, you know, supported the war in Afghanistan. You know, I believe basically it was a just cause to remove the Taliban, because they harboured someone who attacked America on a big scale. And, of course, you can't, you know, be, you know, empathetic, pacifist, basically saying, "Oh, no. No. No. Invasion will not going to solve the problem." No, of course, invasion would have solved the problem. Again, if they stayed the course just another year, with immense fire power and with good planning using special forces, they would have finished al-Qaeda. What happened is that al-Qaeda relocated to Iraq. And that's where—call it destiny, fate, whatever, luck—that one of the most psychopathic jihadist happened to take over the reigns of leadership of the jihad cause in Iraq. 

Thomas Small Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, did you ever meet him? Did you know him? 

Aimen Dean Indeed. 

Thomas Small You met Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. My goodness. Bring the bomb experts back in. 

Aimen Dean So, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. I would say basically that my first encounter with him was in late 1999, when he arrived to Afghanistan and specifically Abu Khabab Camp. Abu Khabab, of course, is the most famous master bombmaker al-Qaeda ever had. 

Thomas Small So, what – what kind of a man was he? What was – what was your—? I mean, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, during his reign at the top of al-Qaeda in Iraq, he unleashed an unbelievable tidal wave of jihadist terror across the country. When you met him, what was your impression of him? 

Aimen Dean Do you remember when I said in the first podcast that my first impression of Osama bin Laden is very different from everyone's impression, because I saw him when he was just a refugee…

Thomas Small Yes.

Aimen Dean …landing of a plane coming from Sudan, looking dishevelled? 

Thomas Small Yes.

Aimen Dean Not exactly wearing, you know, these neat, you know, crease-free robes and turbans.

Thomas Small Zarqawi?

Aimen Dean Zarqawi, you know, he's not the same guy who the world met through these neat videos, who looked menacing, you know, and, you know, looked as if, basically, he was about to, you know, have you for breakfast, have your brother for dinner, and have your grandfather for lunch. I mean, he looked different when I met him. First of all, he just came out of prison. He left Jordan after he came out of prison and came to Afghanistan. And he just looked as someone basically who is embarking on a big plan, but doesn't know yet how or what shape this plan will take. He just was on a revenge mission against the Hashemite royal family of Jordan. And he believed that they were the biggest obstacle to jihad against the Israelis. So, for him, there were two very defined targets—Jordan and Israel. 

So, I remember when he came to the camp. He stated his intention. He said to us that he is here with Abu Khabab to train and then to pass that knowledge on, to build a separate camp for young Jordanians and Palestinians who want to come learn to make bombs and then use that knowledge to destabilise Jordan, and to possibly even cross the border and attack the Israelis. That was his plan. No Iraq. Nothing. So—.

Thomas Small How – how did he end up in Iraq then? 

Aimen Dean Well, you see, what happened is that, you know, after the two weeks he spent with us, he tried to attack Jordan as he was, you know, always saying. He kept true to his word that he wanted to attack Jordan. And there was a plot that's failed. But nonetheless, he managed to establish a camp in the northeast of Afghanistan..

Thomas Small So, on the Iranian border?

Aimen Dean On the Iranian border. In Herat. And that camp was for Palestinians and Jordanians only. Then, the Americans invaded Afghanistan after 9/11. And he escaped. And the only route of escape was towards Iran. He went into Iran. And there, with the help of Kurdish jihadists from Iraq, and they smuggled him into the mountain just north of [selamaniya] in Iraqi Kurdistan, there – there was a group called Ansar Islam. And, in fact, one of their leaders was someone who I knew quite well from my hometown also, from an Khobar, and who was later killed in the cruise myself that, you know, were the first actually American strike against Iraq. It wasn't against Saddam Hussein, actually it was against that particular camp. And Zarqawi survived that attack.

And, of course, the jihadist started to congregate there, because they knew that the Americans were about to invade. So, they need to be in a prime position. Zarqawi then made his way to Baghdad during the chaos of the American invasion. And that's basically when he set up a with cells of Iraqi, Jordanian, Palestinian, and Kurdish militants. They set up together the first cell that was called Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad. 

Thomas Small A group of monotheism and jihad.

Aimen Dean Indeed. So, al-Tawhid wal-Jihad was the first cell that was organised there. But their greatest coup, when some Ba'athists intelligence officers who were having Salafist sympathies joined up with them. 

Thomas Small Now, this is one of America's biggest mistakes. That it basically sacked any member of the Ba'ath Party from both the civil service and the military. So, if you had been a member of the Ba'ath Party, you no longer had a career. You no longer had an income. You had to do something to make money. And, probably, you were going to do that by joining a criminal organisation like al-Qaeda.

Aimen Dean Indeed. In fact, the American administration of Iraq sacked the entire army. The whole Iraqi army was sacked, dismissed, including the Republican guard. You know, people who you could have relied on to pacify the country. But because, of course, basically the Shia Iraq, as we're saying, we will rebel if you don't do it. But then, that was a mistake. The Americans could have said to the Shia Iraqis, "Shut up. Sit down. We are on the show, not you." And, unfortunately, the Americans did not have the guts to say that. Instead they obeyed that demand, which was not exactly a Shia Iraqi demand. It was actually a clandestine Iranian demand. So – so, what happened is those Ba'athist from the Ba'ath Party, the intelligence, the Republican guard, they went and joined Zarqawi, because some of them were already having some Salafist Jihadi sympathies. So, they went to join him and they gave him the most important piece of intelligence that enabled him to become the monster he became. 

Thomas Small What's that? What did they tell? 

Aimen Dean "We know where to find a big pile of cash." 

Thomas Small Money. 

Aimen Dean Exactly. 

Thomas Small Zarqawi needed money. 

Aimen Dean Yes. 

Thomas Small And where was this big pile of cash? 

Aimen Dean This big pile of cash happened to be with one of Saddam Hussein's son, Qusay Saddam Hussein. So, Qusay Saddam Hussein, along with the then-Iraqi vice president, Izzat al-Douri, they went to the central bank in Iraq and they emptied north of six hundred to $660 million in cash into, you know, big truck and they took it.

Thomas Small This is astonishing. This is something out of a Hollywood movie. You're saying that the Americans invade. Immediately, one of Saddam Hussein's sons goes to the central bank and just unloads a tremendous amount of cash into a truck and drives off. 

Aimen Dean Absolutely. Cash and gold bars. So, they took everything into the, you know, this truck and basically drove off. And that was, you know, as the Americans were on the gates of Baghdad itself. So, it was 9th of April. That's a date when the Iraqi9 Central Bank was rated by Qusay Saddam Hussein and Ibrahim Izzat al-Douri, the Iraqi VP. 

So, the idea is that this money will be distributed among Ba'athist cells in order to carry out the counter offensive. You know, a Vietcong kind of offensive. 

Thomas Small That was Saddam Hussein son's idea?

Aimen Dean Indeed.

Thomas Small But Zarqawi had another idea with what he could use the money for.

Aimen Dean Indeed. And so, basically, with the knowledge he obtained from those Ba'athist intelligence and the Republican guard officers who defected to him, he located Qusay Saddam Hussein and confiscated whatever remained, which was roughly $340 million.

Thomas Small And what – what would he have done with that money? 

Aimen Dean Oh. Then, Zarqawi, basically, you know, embarked on one of the most impressive M&A exercise in terror history.

Thomas Small M&A?

Aimen Dean Merger and acquisition. 

Thomas Small I see. So, he was a – he was a great capitalist. What do you mean by that? He merged with home and acquired what?

Aimen Dean Okay. So, you know, imagine, you know, Iraq and the insurgency/terrorism scene in Iraq after the American invasion. Imagine it's like the chaos of the dot-com bubble, you know. The chaos of the Silicon Valley, you know. Ten thousand start-ups everywhere. So, suddenly, you know, those who have cash can swallow those who don't.

Thomas Small I see. So, we're – we're in a – we're in an environment now where there are lots of disparate unconnected cells of people pissed off at the Americans and wanting to kill. Zarqawi bribes them, pays them off, brings them into his big tent.

Aimen Dean Indeed. 

Thomas Small And there you have al-Qaeda in Iraq. 

Aimen Dean So, it was a process that lasted more than a year and a half, from May 2003, you know, all the way until November of 2004.

Thomas Small And if I'm not mistaken, in fact, Iraq was rather peaceful during this time, lulling the Americans into a sense that, "Oh, we've got this. This is going to be fine." And then, suddenly, pfft. 

Aimen Dean Absolutely. You see, Zarqawi should have been given the title of CEO of the year. 

Thomas Small So, what – what was Zarqawi's aim then now? 'Cause, originally, you said he wanted to rally Jordanians and Palestinians against Israel. What's his new aim? He's now in charge of a huge number of jihadists in Iraq. They're – they're attacking America, planting IEDs along roadsides, blowing up armoured vehicles, popping up here and there. Shooting, taking pot shots at soldiers, while at the same time, kidnapping other Iraqis, killing people, participating in the ethnic cleansing of neighbourhoods, participating in that whole great bloodshed that was going on. What's his ultimate goal? 

Aimen Dean His two ultimate goals—. Well, there were three ultimate goals as far as al-Zarqawi was concerned. The first one was to frustrate the establishment of a Shia-dominated government in Iraq. 

Thomas Small That was – that was one of their fears, that the Shia, the majority, would dominate the government. What was the second goal? 

Aimen Dean The second goal was to expel the Americans out of Iraq. 

Thomas Small And the third?

Aimen Dean And the third was to establish a Sunni Islamic state in Iraq.

Thomas Small Well, that's funny, because that reminds me of a certain institution that was established about ten years later in Iraq called ISIS. Of course, we'll get there in 

the end.

Aimen Dean Actually, Zarqawi joined al-Qaeda 2005 officially, you know, and gave the [unintelligible] to Osama bin Laden, because he wanted this legitimacy that comes with his connection to al-Qaeda. That's the first thing. And he called his group al-Qaeda in Iraq. And the next year, he established something called the Shura council of the Mujahideen or the United Council of the Mujahideen. But in a film that was, you know, released by Zarqawi and his people six weeks before he died, he was meeting with his Shura council. He was meeting with his—. 

Thomas Small Council of advisors. 

Aimen Dean Absolutely. And the commanders, also. And in that meeting, he was asked, "What about the project for the Islamic state? What about the project for the Islamic state?" And he said, "God-willing, this will be concluded within a year." So, actually that film, you know, you can see him, his face, talking, answering that question and saying that the project for the Islamic state in Iraq is going to conclude within a year. They will have an Islamic state in Iraq. Of course, he died six weeks after that. But less than a year later, his successors announced the Islamic State of Iraq. 

Thomas Small Now, let's talk about the consequences on the Arab street to Zarqawi's his reign of terror. Because actually, in the end, Zarqawi alienated himself from Osama bin Laden. Even Osama bin Ladin thought that Zarqawi's methods were too cruel, that he was behaving in too much indiscriminate killing, and that it was turning Arabs against jihadism. They were realising that scratched the surface and these people are just sadistic psychopaths. Was that your experience as an Arab at the time? Were you aware that maybe Arabs were thinking, were seeing the beheadings, were seeing the – the – the – the sheer number of their fellow Muslims being killed as collateral damage or as targets, and thinking, "What the hell? We don't want anything to do with this?"

Aimen Dean No. I will tell you something even more interesting than just what the Arabs though on the street. What the al-Qaeda members thought themselves.

Thomas Small What did they think? 

Aimen Dean Well, the al-Qaeda members I used to mingle with, you know, in Bahrain and in Saudi Arabia and then the rest of the gulf, you can see within the ranks of al-Qaeda the immediate division based on class rather than on ideology. 

Thomas Small This is back to what we were talking about in episode two, the – the bourgeois recruits and the working-class recruits. 

Aimen Dean Even worse. The criminal class recruits.

Thomas Small The criminal class recruits.

Aimen Dean Because—. 

Thomas Small They – they loved Zarqawi, of course. They thought, "Oh, my God. He's our – he's our hero."

Aimen Dean Exactly. Because Zarqawi is the graduate of Jordanian prisons. First, in his previous life, he was a thug. He was a thug. You know, a street criminal. And later became a jihadist. So, he brought with him that sadism and psychopathic tendencies, you know, to the jihad he embraced. And that is why, you know, you can see considerable brutality and you can see the gangster in him emerging in the way he behaved with his opponents. With his followers, he was a sweet, gentle, charismatic, and easy to deal with and easy to—. 

Thomas Small Like Don Corleone. If – if you're on his good side, he's your grandfather. If you're on his bad side, he takes you to the mattresses.

Aimen Dean Absolutely. I mean, after all, basically, how did he, you know, manage to coerce his way into being the largest leader of the largest insurgency in Iraq? 

Because he made people offer they can't refuse. So, you know—. And that's exactly what happened here. So—. 

Thomas Small The bourgeois—. Your bourgeois—. 

Aimen Dean Were upset. 

Thomas Small Because they just thought this is – this is uncivilised. I mean, they're just a bit more – more – more sensitive souls?

Aimen Dean Well, the bourgeoisie jihadist, you know, they felt that they were closer, you know, to the mentality of the average individual in the Arab world. They understand that too much brutality will put off people. You need to behave in a more magnanimous way if you want to signal to the people that you are ready to rule. The problem with the criminal classes within the jihadist movement is that they lacked magnanimity. The phrase—. The word "magnanimity" is not present in their dictionary. And that was their downfall. 

Thomas Small So, inside al-Qaeda, the bourgeois jihadists were growing rather disillusioned with Zarqawi's methods and with the brutality that the criminal class within al-Qaeda was manifesting. Now, this is interesting, because, as I said before, at the same time, as all of this is going on in Iraq, inside Saudi Arabia, there's a violent jihadist campaign going on, trying to overthrow the government, increasingly resorting to more and more brutal methods, including kidnapping and killing people. And the Saudi government doing a very good job of highlighting the brutality, turning the people against jihadists, creating within al-Qaeda this – this dialogue. "Have we gone too far? Are we losing hearts and minds?" 

Now, that's interesting, of course, because America, we're always being told, was losing hearts and minds in Iraq and elsewhere. At the same time, al-Qaeda is losing hearts and minds. So, did the Iraq War and America's bundling of that, did it turn you against the American global order? What's called the Atlanticist World Order, that world order underpinned by American military power, keeping markets open, advocating for global trade, for greater liberalism. Did it turn you against that as a – as a global ideal? 

Aimen Dean Ironically, my faith in the nation states and the global order was only reinforced, actually, after the Iraq War. Ironically. And the reason for this is because I saw what chaos can do to a nation state once the leadership has decapitated. And I'm talking about Iraq. Yes, I deeply loathed American foreign policy at that time. But I did not – I did not return to being anti-American. Why? Because I always closed my eyes and I was thinking, "If America disappeared today, what would happen to the world?" And the reality is we will have China and Russia terrorising the rest of the world into submission while Europe is cowering in a corner, because America is no more, is not there anymore. So, America became, for me, the necessary evil during the Iraq War. Now, it is unnecessary nuisance. 

Thomas Small Yes. The importance of the nation state. I can understand how that might have been reinforced in you as an ideal during the Iraq War as you watched Iraq descend into chaos. Of course, only a few years later, the so-called Arab Spring would begin when the destabilisation of nation states across the Arab world rocked that world, and the consequences of which, we're still living with. 

And that brings us up to the next episode where we'll talk about the Arab Spring, specifically the way it has played out in Yemen, where they begin to regroup, they begin to think, "What went wrong? Why have we been so thoroughly defeated? Why have we lost Arab hearts and minds?" 

And in Yemen, they're going to form, in a way, al-Qaeda 3.0. First, you had the al-Qaeda that launched 9/11. Then, you had the brutal bloodletting al-Qaeda of Zarqawi and that era. And then, in Yemen, al-Qaeda 3.0, which would be much more sensitive to the local populations' needs and their ideas, much, much more shrewd in their dealings with people in the way they carried out terrorism. Of course, we'll talk about Yemen and its history following the Arab Spring uprisings and the launch of the war that is currently ravaging that country. A conflict which has created great human suffering there, including what is being reported as the worst famine in a hundred years.

This episode of Conflicted was produced by Jake Warren and Sandra Ferrari. Original music by Matt Huxley. If you want to hear more of Conflicted, make sure you search for us on Apple Podcasts or wherever you download yours.

Conflicted S1 E4 - Yemen

Conflicted

S01E04

Thomas Small Welcome back to Conflicted. This is the podcast where I, Thomas Small, co-producer of Path of Blood, and Aimen Dean, former MI6 double agent inside al-Qaeda, try to unpick the tangled web of the War on Terror and sundry Middle Eastern conflicts for you, the listener. 

Aimen Dean You should be on radio. You have a very perfect voice for it.

Thomas Small I—. This is—. I am now on radio. This is how—. It's happening. It's happening. 

Before we get into this episode, I'm just going to recap what happened in episode three. Last time, Aimen and I talked about the Iraq War, the great mistake of American foreign policy, which opened the floodgates to a whole host of unexpected tragedies, though perhaps they could have been foreseen.

In this episode, we're going to start wading through the murky waters of issues like Arab nationalism, we'll get to the fallout from the Arab Spring, and, eventually, we're going to come to the sad story of Yemen, a beautiful country that some would say has been held hostage to the eschatological ideals of the Iranian regime via a group called the Houthis. Some call them terrorists. Others call them freedom fighters. Aimen and I have our own opinions of what we think are pretty tell-tale signs of who the Houthis are. 

Aimen Dean The flag of the Houthis have four sentences on it. al-mawt li-ʾAmrīkā. Death to America. al-mawt li-ʾIsrāʾīl. Death to Israel. al-laʿnah ʿalā 'l-Yahūd. Damn the Jews. an-naṣr lil-ʾIslām. Victory for Islam. So, is that a kind of group that we should sympathise with?

Thomas Small This is Conflicted

So, Aimen, last time ended the episode with you quite passionately articulating your belief in the fundamental importance of the nation state as an institution in contradistinction to internationalist ideologically globalist movements like al-Qaeda, like the Muslim brotherhood, I suppose. Organisations and ideologies that seek to undermine or destroy the nation state. Now, what I'd like to ask you, though, is given the checky record of Arab nationalism, you have from Abdel Nasser to, now, you have the spectre of names like Saddam Hussein, Muammar Gaddafi, Hafez al-Assad, his son Bashar al-Assad. How can you defend the idea of nationalism in an Arab context given what we've seen unfold over the last decades by these dictators?

Aimen Dean I do not defend nationalism. What I do defend actually is the nation state. 

Thomas Small It's actually a very important distinction that people don't make enough these days.

Aimen Dean Indeed. Not just only as an institution, but as a concept. Because the problem we have now throughout the world is that the narrative, the prevailing narrative, that there is a war between Islam and the West. In reality, there is actually a war within Islam. A war between those who believe in the nation state as a concept and as an institution, and those who do not believe in the nation state. Instead, they believe in transnational ideologies. So, if you want an accurate picture of how this civil war within Islam is taking place, I would say that there are four distinct factions here. 

The first one is a nation state. With all their faults and shortcomings, but they are still the nation states, as we know them, modern nation states with, you know, flags, passport borders, you know, national anthem. You know, identity. You have, whatever, the baggage of the nation state. Then, you have three other factions. All of them seek to undermine the nation state and they are very relevant, all of them, funny enough, to our subject today. 

Thomas Small Okay. So, what are they? The first one? 

Aimen Dean The first one is political Sunni Islam. 

Thomas Small So, that's, like, the Muslim brotherhood. 

Aimen Dean Yeah, you're right. The second one is a militant Sunni Islam. 

Thomas Small So, that's, like, al-Qaeda, ISIS, these kinds of guys.

Aimen Dean Hamas. You know, Al-Shabab. You know, Taliban, even. Boko Haram.

Thomas Small Yeah.

Aimen Dean And the last faction is the political and militant Shia Islam. 

Thomas Small This is the Iranian revolution, the Iranian regime, its proxies, Hezbollah, and, actually, its semi proxies like Hamas, because there's an overlap between these groups. 

Aimen Dean Indeed. And in fact, one of the proxies of Iran will be very essential to today's podcast.

Thomas Small The Houthis in Yemen. 

Aimen Dean Absolutely. 

Thomas Small Yes. We will get there. We will get there. 

Aimen Dean Yeah.

Thomas Small So, I mean, I think it's very interesting that you say there's this civil war raging within Islam over the question of the nation state or transnational ideologies, because, in fact, I think for Western listeners, especially, they might feel that this resonates with what we in the West are going through at the moment, because things like Brexit, things like what's called the rise of populism. To some extent, that's participating in something like a civil war within the West, between those who still see the sovereignty of the nation state as the most fundamental building block of governance, of politics, and those who are seeking, well, at least in the eyes of the nation state people, seeking to undermine the nation state in pursuit of larger globalists aims, institutions like the WTO, you know. Like the EU, I suppose. Other such institutions.

Aimen Dean Absolutely, you know. And this is why while the debate and the civil war within the West over the question of the nation state remains peaceful. May it forever remain peaceful. 

Thomas Small Well, I want to ask you that. Why in—? 

Aimen Dean Yeah. 

Thomas Small Why in – in the world of Islam is this debate raging with such unbelievable violence? 

Aimen Dean I think the fundamental reason for the violence is because the transnational ideologies I describe, with the exception of the Muslim brotherhood, they have taken up arms to begin with. Because, basically, for them, there is no other avenue reaching power apart from armed struggle. So, armed struggle is an idea that, you know, comes with heroism, chivalry. You know, the idea that, you know, you are a part of an elite vanguard that would take over and remodel the whole society as you see fit. 

Thomas Small You use – you see the word "vanguard." This sounds very much like, you know, Bolshevism, Marxism, Leninism. That sort of movement of the early twentieth century, which was very violent, which was revolutionary in its intense. Unlike, say, an institution like the EU or the WTO, which is consensual, which is incremental, which is liberal, in fact. Though, global, it is liberal. Unlike these movements that you're describing. They are radical. They seek a root and branch and violent transformation of society. 

Aimen Dean Yeah. I mean, you asked me the question, you know, why the debate within the Islamic world over nation states on one hand and the transnational ideologies on the other hand became violent. You know, however, I want to ask you this question. You know, as an observer, as someone who really looked into the Middle East throughout many, many years, and you've learned the language, Thomas. By the way, you know, for those who never heard Thomas speak Arabic, it's one of the most beautiful accents in Arabic I ever heard.

Thomas Small You're far too generous. You're far—. Arabs are so generous. Any idiot who can sue – who opens his mouth and speaks a few words of Arabic suddenly sounds like the prophet himself. 

Aimen Dean Well, you know. But nonetheless, I want to hear your take. Why do you think that the conflict between the nation states and the transnational ideologists became so violent?

Thomas Small In the Middle East?

Aimen Dean Yes.

Thomas Small In the Muslim world? Well, I mean, the fallback answer is always, well, Islam is violent. Islam is a violent religion. The Qur'an calls for violence in a way that, certainly, the New Testament does not. The Old Testament does. 

Aimen Dean Indeed.

Thomas Small And – and other religious texts, like the Bhagavad Gita, which is a Hindu text, which is based around the idea of a war. But nonetheless, there's this idea around – in – in – in – around. You know, I've sometimes contemplated it. That Islam is just inherently violent and that Muslims, when they seek to change the situation, they tend to reach for their weapons. 

Ultimately, I'm not satisfied with that answer, because no amount of reading the New Testament prevented western Europeans from slaughtering themselves in unbelievable unspeakable acts of violence during their transformation from a feudal/ aristocratic/traditional political structure to the modern nation state consensual liberal democratic structure. It does – it does seem to require violence. Why is that? God only knows. But I suppose it's tempting to see the Middle East going through a situation in the twenty-first century, with all things being equal, might resemble what Europe went through in the seventeenth century, during the thirty years war, which ended in the Peace of Westphalia and the establishment of the nation state system, which the Middle East is still growing into, I guess, 'cause to a certain extent, the nation states were imposed on them by the French and the British to some extent. And to another extent, because it didn't – they didn't rise from within, they didn't involve the same level of—. 

Aimen Dean Evolution.

Thomas Small Of evolution and of – of destroying the previous way of doing things. So, you have a kind of uncomfortable mix, on the one hand, of the authoritarianism, of the pre-modern way of doing things and the tools of the nation state, including the police, including secret police, including armies, including weapons. And that combination is slightly uncomfortable. Does that sound like a good answer? [crosstalk].

Aimen Dean I – I totally agree. I couldn't have put it better myself. And I think that is why, you know, some models of the nation states succeeded more than others. For example, I have always been pro-monarchist in the Middle East. Just within the context of the Middle East. Not beyond that. Or the Arab world, at least. The monarchical system in the arable that have survived so far. 

Thomas Small So, that includes Morocco, Jordan, the Gulf states. 

Aimen Dean Indeed. 

Thomas Small Basically, that's what it is these days. 

Aimen Dean Eight countries. That's it. You know, only eight countries in the Arab world basically have monarchies. But these eight countries, including the poor ones, you know, like Jordan and Morocco have far better stability than their autocratic republics. 

Thomas Small Well, this became blindingly obvious to everyone, I think, when the Arab Spring broke out, you know. This episode is going to talk about the situation in Yemen. But you can't talk about the situation in Yemen without talking about the Arab Spring, because the war in Yemen and everything that proceeded it is a chapter in the unfolding story of the Arab Spring. And in the Arab Spring, we saw quite clearly that those Arab countries that were shaken to the ground were the republics whereas the monarchies were much, much, much more stable. They were much better able to neutralise opposition, neutralise discontent, and respond to that sudden upsurge of unrest.

Aimen Dean Indeed, actually. You know, if we want to quantify this, because the listener wants us to quantify this for them, you know, there were ten countries in the Arab world that suffer the consequences of the Arab Spring. The five republics were Egypt, Tunisia. You know, both of them are semi stable right now. Then, you have Libya, Yemen, and Syria, all three are going through civil wars. The death toll in all these ten is almost reaching a million.

Thomas Small Unbelievable.

Aimen Dean That includes Syria and Yemen and Libya.

Thomas Small Unbelievable. 

Aimen Dean A million dead in seven or eight years. 

Thomas Small That's something, like, twice the dead in the American Civil War just to put that in context.

Aimen Dean Indeed. Absolutely.

Thomas Small We're talking about a serious, serious number of dead people.

Aimen Dean And the number of people who are displaced or refugees in all these countries, we're talking about more than twenty-one million. And the number of people who are even going to either experience famine or about to experience famine and hunger and malnutrition is almost reaching thirteen million. 

Aimen Dean And those numbers remind one of the sort of numbers that prevailed after the Second World War in Eastern Europe and in the lands of the German. The number of – of refugees fleeing into different countries. The tremendous famine that were going on because of the deprivations of that war. This is what we're talking about in the Middle East right now: apocalyptic levels of suffering and instability. 

Aimen Dean Indeed. Then, we con- – contrast that with the monarchies. There were five monarchies that were affected by the Arab Spring. Bahrain, which was the worst affected. The death toll in Bahrain, entirety, you know, whether from the protestors or the, you know, or the police, it does not exceed ninety-five. Ninety-five. We're not talking about millions or hundreds of thousands or tens of thousands or thousands, even. We're talking really about double digits, you know, as far as Bahrain is concerned. 

In Saudi Arabia, there were fourteen protestors killed. In Oman, there were six. In Jordan, there were two. And in Morocco, there was zero. Yeah. You know, no one died in the Moroccan uprising, because the king decided to concede, you know, and give as much – as much as he can give. And the opposition accepted as much low they can actually accept. 

Thomas Small So, what distinguishes an Arab monarch from an Arab president? What lies behind the stark difference in these numbers? Millions on the one hand. Double digits on the other hand.

Aimen Dean One word, Thomas. One word. "Legitimacy."

Thomas Small "Legitimacy." 

Aimen Dean You see, you know, the monarchical system, it's been around in the Middle East since the days of Sumerians, you know, seven thousand years ago.

Thomas Small The Sumerians. Before the Bible was even conceived. 

Aimen Dean Indeed. We had kings, you know, since 5,000 BC. So, I think we have come now to the end of the trial periods if – if we want to say that it's been tried and tested. It is actually I tried and tested, you know, system, because it is a system that provides stability. And at the same time—.

Thomas Small But why? What can a king do that a president can't do?

Aimen Dean First, a president who came to power through either rigged elections or military coup will always know that he came there through, you know, thoughtful means. And, therefore, he will always remain in secure that, as he took it by force or by deception, someone else will come and take it by force and deception. So, he always view his people as, you know, the competitors, as people who could, one day, flip against him and he could lose it. That's why those who are in power through presidential means, they tend to be more corrupt, because they want to get as much money as possible, stash it in Swiss banks, and just wait for the moment that they are deposed. And then, they flee. And then, they enjoy the fruits of their corrupt labour. 

Thomas Small They flee if you're lucky. If you're unlucky, they – they double down and they turn their – their guns on you.

Aimen Dean Indeed. Because is power is poisonous. Power, basically, stick in the mind of people, and they want to stay. But monarchs, on the other hand, what happened to them is that they inherit that from their parents, you know. So, the father, you know, the – the last king, pass it on to his son, the current king, who wants to leave it even better to his son who will be the future king. Add to this that the oath of allegiance that Arabs give to their kings is exactly the oath of allegiance that we would have given to the religious caliphs. So, it is a religious allegiance, which means that you swear an oath before God to obey the king. And, therefore, it's binding. And people think that, actually, while monarchy is not an Islamic system of ruling, it is actually a Muslim system of ruling. 

Thomas Small What do you mean? What's the difference between Islamic and Muslim in this way?

Aimen Dean Islamic means that it adheres entirely to the principles of sharia. But when I say Muslim, it means basically that it has a Muslim character to it and it has Muslim principles to it, but not entirely Islamic according to the theology. So, basically, it is legitimate enough that there would be so many Muslim clerics who would defend kings more than Muslim clerics who would defend the presidents.

Thomas Small Why not actual liberal democracy? Why not through non-rigged elections, civil society, elect politicians to represent them? Why is that not able to take root in the Middle East? Because, ultimately, that's what the Arab Spring was about, wasn't it? That's what we were told.

Aimen Dean In order to have democratic institutions, we need to have a democratic culture. So, the people themselves are actually democrats. But if the people are not democrats, how can you build democratic institutions? The problem is you can't build skyscrapers over a foundation of sand, even in Dubai, where there are lots of skyscrapers [crosstalk].

Thomas Small I think your bias proved you wrong there.

Aimen Dean No. But what's happened is they just build huge concrete foundations, you know, in order to stabilise these skyscrapers. We don't have concrete democracy, as a culture, among the people. The people are not Democrats.

Thomas Small That can't be true. There are millions of Muslims in democratic countries in the west, and they're Democrats. They participate in election. 

Aimen Dean You know, we're not talking about Muslims in the West. We're talking about Muslims in the Muslim world. They are not yet ready for democracy. There are some Muslim democracies that have done really well like Malaysia and even Indonesia now. 

Thomas Small That's interesting. So, is it—? Are we talking about Arab society then? 

Aimen Dean Yes.

Thomas Small Okay. Arabs aren't ready for democracy. This is what you're saying.

Aimen Dean Yes. I know this would be controversial for many people. But until the majority believe in democratic values, believe in pluralism, believe that the opinion of the other, however offensive it is, is as sacred as your own opinion, until that happens, we are not yet ready. And I can tell you we are not yet ready. 

Thomas Small Well, I must say my countrymen might think that I'm a total traitor about this, but I – I completely agree with you. I myself am a unapologetic monarchist for all the reasons you say. I mean, especially when you see the poisonous political culture raging in the United States today, where the head of state is such a politicised figure that, as soon as the president is elected, half of the country hates him. Half of the country begins to work to undermine him. It happened when Obama became president. It's happened when Trump becomes president. It is essentially divisive. Whereas in this country, in England, which is going through somewhat of a similar process through Brexit, it is being carried in a much more civilised way. And I think that it's because, at the top of this pack of fools, is the queen, is a monarch, and she does weirdly just sort of bestow a certain grace on the proceedings. 

Obviously, people will disagree with me and my passport will not be revoked and I'll never be able to go home. So, now, this reminds me of what we talked about last time with the Iraq War. Because, of course, the neoconservative project was to bring democracy to the Middle East. They thought all you have to do is remove the dictators and democracy will spring up. When it comes to the Arab Spring, something like a spontaneous uprising calling for democratic values occurred. What lay behind that?

Aimen Dean What lay behind that was the fact that the Arab dictators were just suffocating the wrong people. I mean, and you see, whenever I observed what's happening in the Middle East, I realised that what people lacked wasn't so much, you know, the question of freedom of expression or freedom of association. You know, they could live without that. They could. What they actually hated so much was the uncertainty of the future. You see, people will tolerate the darkness of the tunnel if there is that little dim light at the end of it. The problem with the Arab dictators is that they switched off even that very little dim light at the very end of the tunnel and they plunged their people into total darkness about what the future would be like. 

Thomas Small And as a result, beginning in December 2010, first in Tunisia when a market seller set himself on fire. 

Aimen Dean And set the rest of the Arab world on fire with him. 

Thomas Small Exactly. From – from there to Egypt. And then, you—. It was like a domino. Then, you had protests in Syria, protests in Libya, protests in Bahrain, as we discussed, protests in Yemen. Now, Yemen is an interesting and extremely complex story. So complex that even you and I could not do it justice in this podcast. And we won't even try.

Aimen Dean We need ten podcasts, at least, just to discuss, you know, the transition between, you know, imamate monarchy and the Republic of Yemen. That alone, you know… 

Thomas Small Exactly. 

Aimen Dean …in the '60s. 

Thomas Small So, a summary of what went on is that Ali Abdullah Saleh, the president of Yemen from 1979, I think.

Aimen Dean Yeah. 

Thomas Small From 1979 to 2011, when the protests first erupted, knitting together a tribal society full of instability, having inherited his presidential throne after a series of assassinations of his predecessors. No one expected him to last. He was a sort of nobody from a minor tribe and a minor village. But he survives. He called it the art of dancing on the heads of snakes. 

Aimen Dean Yeah.

Thomas Small He learnt how to do it to neutralise the tribal ambitions, to pay off this tribe in order to fight that tribe, to allow a little bit of al-Qaeda fighters out, so the Americans focus on that while taking the American money and funnelling it into – secretly into the Muslim brotherhood party while also keeping his own party in line. He was brilliant at it. In the meantime, he had erected a tremendously corrupt state apparatus, which had actually neglected the everyday concerns of people. He wasn't actually creating a very strong state apparatus in terms of public services, in terms of welfare services. Is that a fair description of what went on? 

Aimen Dean Oh, indeed. And some people say, basically, dancing on the head of snakes, you know, I would say basically he was actually, you know, making the snakes dance to his tune. I mean, he, really, by the end of it was able to, you know, to make so many parts of the Yemeni political mosaic, you know, move according to his will. But it's just the parts became too much for him.

Thomas Small And in the era of the War on Terror, Ali Abdullah Saleh, the president of Yemen, was very important. He had become a key ally of George W. Bush's project of destroying terrorism, but he was not actually a reliable ally. 

Aimen Dean No. Because he was actually not just only taking, you know, US counter-terrorism money and then giving some of it to al-Qaeda beneath the table in order for them to become even more powerful and more menacing, so he can get even more money, you know, from the US. [unintelligible]. This is, again, the entrepreneurial, you know – you know, aspect of the War on Terrorism, is that even the Pakistani ISI—. You know, the intelligence service of Pakistan did it, where, you know, you take money, you give some of it, just some of it, initially, to the terrorists who would then carry out outrageous attacks against either locals or westerners. And then, of course, you go back to the US and the UK and France and Germany and others, and scream, "Hey. It's actually getting worse. I need more money." So, actually, this is how, you know, Saleh worked. But then this started to backfire on him.

Thomas Small Backfire indeed. And when the Arab Spring broke out in Yemen, the international community, the United States and the neighbours of Yemen, especially Saudi Arabia, but its Gulf allies, were particularly concerned that Yemen not descend into the anarchy that they could see happening in Libya and Syria, particularly. Why is it so important to maintain stability in Yemen? 

Aimen Dean Okay. Yemen and Afghanistan, they share four major issues in common between them. The first one is that Yemen is a mountainous country and Afghanistan is a mountainous country. 

Thomas Small Mountains. Okay.

Aimen Dean Afghanistan is heavily tribal country. Yemen is heavily tribal country. 

Thomas Small Mountains and tribes. 

Aimen Dean Then, you have the fact that Afghanistan is a heavily-armed country, where the people and the tribes are armed to the teeth. 

Thomas Small Mountains, tribes, and guns.

Aimen Dean Yeah. Yemen is the same.

Thomas Small So, I mean, you're painting a really, really lovely picture. I'm going to book my ticket tomorrow. 

Aimen Dean The last one is the drugs. You know, both countries basically produce drugs. You know, unexplored drugs whence – once there is instability. So—.

Thomas Small Mountains, tribes, weapons, and drugs. 

Aimen Dean Yes. You couldn't have asked for worse, you know, four ingredients to be in the same place.

Thomas Small Yemen, quite a large country, really—very mountainous—in the southwest corner of the Arabian Peninsula. So, it borders, to its north, Saudi Arabia and, up to its east, Oman. It's extremely geo-strategically important. The port of Aden is a big port on the Arabian Sea. Yemen is where the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait is, the straight leading into the Red Sea and the Suez Canal. It is the place where all of the world shipping from Asia and elsewhere gets to Europe. Extremely important population, about thirty million people in Yemen.

Aimen Dean Yes.

Thomas Small Yemen, as you say, mountains, tribes, drugs, guns, and sectarianism. Yemen has been the Wild West of the Arabian Peninsula for a long time, a haven for all sorts of criminal activities, terrorist activities, including al-Qaeda, from the very beginning. We mustn't forget the attack that al-Qaeda carried out against the American warship, the USS Cole, in the year 2000. al-Qaeda and other such groups have been in Yemen forever. 

Aimen Dean Indeed. Actually, when I was in al-Qaeda myself, I visited Yemen in 1997 and I still remember, you know, the chaotic nature. I remember I emerged out of Sanaa Airport. And there, in front of me, I found a group of young Yemini kids between the ages of nine, ten, eleven. They were well-dressed. Their robes are really well ironed. You know, they looked in the quite middle-class kids. But all them, without a single exception, were wearing, as part of the uniform, AK-47s. So, you can imagine that every Yemeni held a gun as a sign of maturity, as a sign of respect. 

Thomas Small I've read that Yemen is the most heavily armed state in the world in terms of the civilian population, and its black market gun markets are proverbial. If you want to get your hands on Kalashnikovs, on rocket launchers, you go to one of the gun markets of Yemen. 

Aimen Dean And, in fact, I experienced myself first-hand how weak the nation state was in Yemen in favour of tribalism. To give you an example, my hosts on the suburbs of Sanaa where from the tribe of Yafa. And, obviously, they were talking to me about how easy it was basically, you know, to obtain documents here in Yemen.

And so, for a dare, I dared them that they could actually make me a Yemeni. And then, in the next two days, you know, they dressed me up as a Yemeni. They put the little dagger, basically, like, I mean, wearing around the waist. And I looked so Yemeni. And so, they took me to the local registry just on the suburb of Sanaa. And there, they registered me, you know, as this man. "This is his name. This is his father's name. This is his father's father's name. And we are two witnesses from the tribe that he is one of us." You know, they got me a birth certificate and they got me a ID within seven days. And then, after that, by the end of my trip, I had a Yemeni passport in my hand.

Thomas Small Amazing. 

Aimen Dean Just based on the testimony of two members of the tribe, I had a Yemeni identity with different place of birth, different date of birth, different name altogether. 

Thomas Small I think that story is really important for the listener. Because we hear about the tribalism of the Arab world all the time, but it's impossible for us in the West to really understand what that means practically, what it means on the ground. But it means something like this. The trust that the tribe gives to other members of the tribe is absolutely. 

Aimen Dean Absolutely. And that's why the Yemeni state trusted the tribal system to act. Well, I mean, but the problem is you can see in my story where I became a Yemeni citizen, you know, in a matter of two weeks. In a fortnight, I became a Yemeni citizen with different name, identity, different date of birth, place of birth, based on the testimony of two individuals who were my friends and wanted to make me Yemeni. 

Thomas Small I would like to point out that I have met many Yemenis who I think are amongst the most openhearted and wonderful people in the world. And I don't want anyone to think that the Yemenis are just these horrible, horrible people. But, sometimes, when I hear about the way Yemen functions, I am reminded of that line in the first Star Wars film when – when Obi wan Kenobi is standing with Luke Skywalker, looking down at Mos Eisley and says something like, "A haven of scum and villainy will never [unintelligible]." I mean, and when I talked to, my—.

Aimen Dean [crosstalk].

Thomas Small And when I talked to my Gulf Arab friends, they – they say, "Oh. Yemen. Oh, my God. Wonderful people, lovely people. We love them, but they cause us so many problems."

Aimen Dean Indeed. I agree. Totally.

Thomas Small As briefly as possible, tell the poor listener, what is the sectarian landscape of Yemen? Because it matters for the conflict that's raging there. I mean, it really matters. 

Aimen Dean Okay. Yemen has always been divided half and half. Half between the Sunnis and the other half is Zaid. 

Thomas Small So, Sunnis, I think, people know. Sunnis are the majority of Muslims. Zaidis are an offshoot of the Shia branch of Islam. 

Aimen Dean The difference here is that Zaidis are not as antagonistic towards the Sudanese as the rest of the Shia. There are three kinds of Zaidis in Yemen. So, we have the Salafis and the Hadawis on one hand. So, they are extremely closer to Sunnis and Shia to the point where they pray in the same mosques. They marry each other. 

Thomas Small And the third Zaidi sect? 

Aimen Dean And the third Zaidi sect, which is very important for this podcast today, is the Jarudi Zaidis.

Thomas Small Jarudi.

Aimen Dean Yes. Those are much closer to the mainstream Shia Islam practice in Iran than to the Sunni Islam that is practiced in the Arabian Peninsula.

Thomas Small And it is the Jarudis that gave rise to the Houthi movement. 

Aimen Dean Indeed. 

Thomas Small Now, the Houthi movement was founded in the early '90s by Badreddin al-Houthi. And the Houthi movement—. We don't want to get into it too much. It really is very complicated. But in short, the Houthis believe that they are the natural heirs to the imamate, to this theocratic monarchical system that had prevailed in Yemen for hundreds of years. That Yemen is theirs to rule over. 

Aimen Dean Yes.

Thomas Small At the same time, over the last decades, the Iranian regime, especially through its proxies, Hezbollah in Lebanon, have reached out to the Houthis and have encouraged them to reinterpret their own ideology more in line with the Ayatollah Khomeini's concepts of – of revolution and governance and statecraft. Is that fair? 

Aimen Dean Absolutely. Because, you see, Badreddin al-Houthi, he was invited to Iran, to the religious seminaries in Qom in the early 1990s. And he took his son Hussein with him. Hussein would later then become the leader of the Houthi movement in the political and military sense. By the way, even in the 1980s, he went to fight with the Badr Brigade, which was a brigade of Arabs—Arab – Shia from Iraq, Lebanon, and even from Yemen—formed by the Iranians to fight against Saddam Hussein and the Iraq-Iran war. So, he even fought for the Iranians. So, when people say to you that, "Oh, we don't see that much link between the Houthis and the Iranians," they are kidding themselves. 

Thomas Small So, by the time the Arab Spring arrives in Yemen, the Houthi the movement is 18 years old. And throughout the noughties, they have engaged in a series of, I believe, six wars with Ali Abdullah Saleh, president of Yemen, over the northern provinces of Yemen. So, when the Arab Spring breaks out, they're well positioned to take advantage of any chaos that might follow.

Aimen Dean What happened in 2011 and 2012 when, of course, there was the movement for change and Ali Abdullah Saleh, who was forced to resign—. Of course, he did not take that resignation lightly.

Thomas Small Ali Abdullah Saleh at first tries to stay like all the other dictators, but tremendous pressure is put on him by Saudi Arabia and its Gulf allies and the US and the UN, which culminates in something known as the Gulf Initiative. This was seen, at the time, as a great achievement. Yemen was considered to be a leading light in the Arab Spring. It seemed like civil war was averted. What happened? 

Aimen Dean What happened is that a state within a state was festering in Yemen, and no one took notice of that, which is the Houthis in the north. The problem is all the components of Yemen were concerned with either tribal or nationalist concerns, except for the Houthis in the north, whose concerns were, you know, regional, according to Iranian interpretation of Islam. You know? "National dialogue doesn't concern us. A stable Yemen? What's the point of stable Yemen if we don't become part of the global regional struggle for the return of the Mahdi, you know, for the, you know." 

Thomas Small Because the Houthis are also—. They've drunk the Kool-Aid of apocalyptic expectations of prophecy. They believe that they're soon going to take over Mecca and Medina. They believe a whole host of – of such beliefs.

Aimen Dean Indeed. And many people basically who—. Unfortunately, we have a prevailing narrative among the left establishment, you know, in the West where – whether in the media or academia or even in some parliaments, even in Europe, where they believe the Houthis to be some sort of freedom fighters. You know, people basically who were oppressed, who were marginalised, and, therefore, basically, they are rebelling against the status quo. You know, these people never read even the biography of Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi. If they bothered to read his biography, they will know what's an ideologically-driven, eschatologically-influenced person he was. He fought in the Iran – Iran-Iraq war on the side of Iran, even though he was a Yemeni and Arab. That should tell you enough about his ideological leanings. And the fact that he chose the flag, you know, of the Houthis to have four sentences on it. These four sentences was: al-mawt li-ʾIsrāʾīl. Death to Israel. al-laʿnah ʿalā 'l-Yahūd. Damn the Jews. an-naṣr lil-ʾIslām. Victory for Islam. 

Thomas Small This is very similar to the kind of chants that were being cried out during the Iranian revolution, weren't they?

Aimen Dean Yeah. But I urge the listener to go to Google and put "Houthi flag" on Google and then click on "Images." And you will see that flag. It's the only flag they have. So, is that a kind of group that we should sympathise with? If this flag doesn't convince you that these people are drug-infused, you know, clueless mountain warriors who are on an ideological and messianic mission, then I don't know what would convince you then. 

So, that is why the Houthis remain, to some extent, an enigma to many on the left, in the European and Western context, because they choose to ignore the ideological roots and the ideological symbology of the Houthis.

Thomas Small So, the Houthis are determined to take over Yemen. And in the era of the Arab Spring, they find a very useful ally. On their own, they never could have taken over Yemen. 

Aimen Dean No. 

Thomas Small Because the sad story is that, even though he had resigned and handed power over to his vice president and was pretending to be participating constructively in the national dialogue, Ali Abdullah Saleh, who still commanded the allegiance of the vast majority of the army, allied with his erstwhile enemies the Houthis, whom he had fought in six wars and killed and hated in order to come back to power. So, the Houthis and Ali Abdullah Saleh and – and Ali Abdullah Saleh's army units take over the country. The UN-backed president Hadi flees Aden. The Houthi Saleh forces chased him to Aden. They are—. They – they get to Aden. They are on the verge of overwhelming the presidential palace there and – and killing him, no doubt. At which point, famously, Saudi Arabia and its Gulf allies…

Aimen Dean Yeah.

Thomas Small …intervened to save—. 

Aimen Dean President Hadi. 

Thomas Small To save President Hadi. In the name of legitimacy, in fact. That's what they say. So, why would Saudi Arabia in particular have felt it so necessary to intervene in this civil war? 

Aimen Dean And that is really the crux of the entire conundrum of Yemen. The Yemen war, really, it has been painted by so many people in the west who are too lazy to pick up a history book and read – or a geography, you know, a book and understand the complexities of the Arabian Peninsula and its politics. They painted this war as, you know, this big bully, Saudi Arabia, is throttling those ragtag militants, you know, who are fighting for freedom, you know, the Houthis, who were always oppressed and marginalised. You know, this is the problem, you know, when you look at a conflict from a very myopic, you know, point of view and you only see an underdog and the bully dog, and you don't see that, actually, it's far more complex than this.

Thomas Small Now, Aimen, in the Arab Spring era, of course, you had left MI6. You were no longer a double agent inside al-Qaeda and you had become an even worst terrorist in your own words, a banker, meaning that you were advising a global banks, particularly on how to combat terrorist financing. So, there you are, advising top bankers, proper masters of the universe, about this chaos that's raging across the region and especially Yemen. Why would captains of the universe and Western leaders in general be particularly interested in the stability of Yemen?

Aimen Dean Because as we have highlighted before, the five major points that both Yemen and Afghanistan share.

Thomas Small Yes. That's right. Mountains, tribes, weapons, drugs, and religious extremism. and sectarianism. 

Aimen Dean Perfect. You are a good student, Thomas. You know, A star. Okay. So, the issue here is that Yemen sits just to the – on the south Western flank of Saudi Arabia and on a very important maritime corridor where, roughly, I think, eleven percent of the world global trade go through there. But—. 

Thomas Small Well, let's – let's specify. This is the Bab-el-Mandeb leading into the Red Sea and the Suez Canal This is one of the most important maritime corridors in the world. 

Aimen Dean Absolutely. So, that stretch of water passage between Yemen and Djibouti is only about maybe ten miles wide. And that is the bottleneck, you know, on the journey between Europe and Asia. So, you have the first one in Bab-el-Mandeb, between Yemen and Djibouti. And then, after that you go north to the Suez Canal. So, if you block that one, then the Suez Canal actually is useless. What's the point of going through the Suez Canal if Bab-el-Mandeb Strait is experiencing high levels of maritime terrorism and maritime insurgency. 

Thomas Small Well, you could still go to Sudan

Aimen Dean You can still go to the Sudan. But, you know, what would you do in Sudan? I mean, there is nothing. So, the trouble here is that, if we want to understand why Saudi Arabia, which, by the way, represents the Achilles' heel of the global economy—and we will come to that later—why would Saudi Arabia go to war in Yemen and even still continue on this spot for – for three and a half years by now?

It took longer than – than they anticipated. And yet, they still, according to my own sources inside Saudi Arabia, which I have quite plenty, you know, budgeted for the war until March 2020. It's still—. There is seventeen more months in the military budget as far as Saudi Arabia is concerned to fight a war. 

Thomas Small So, they were prepared for a long fight?

Aimen Dean They were up about for a long fight. Now, why is that? Now, imagine the Arabian Peninsula. I want the listener either to imagine the map or, for those who are, you know, about the geography, pull a map of the Arabian Peninsula, which includes Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Oman, and the rest of the Gulf countries. Look at that landmass. It's the size of India. Or to put it mildly, basically, it is the size of the UK, Ireland, Spain, France, Germany, Italy, Poland combined. And yet, there isn't a single lake or river. 

Thomas Small Yes. This is what people don't quite understand. It is a massive, massive area. And you look at the map, and there is no blue. 

Aimen Dean Not a single speck of blue at all. Not a single lake, not a single river. The water scarcity there, it represent the largest and the biggest challenge, at the same time also a vulnerability, a strategic vulnerability for Saudi Arabia and for the other.

Thomas Small Now, you've totally flummoxed me. I did not expect you to talk about water security when talking about the reasons Saudi Arabia intervened in Yemen. This is very confusing.

Aimen Dean It is the ultimate reason as to why Saudi Arabia went to war in Yemen.

Thomas Small I'm going to press you on this, 'cause, surely, the real reason is they didn't want Iran to spread its hegemony further. That's the real reason surely..

Aimen Dean Of course. But it's related to water.

Thomas Small Iran and water, they're related how? 

Aimen Dean Yeah. Saudi Arabia has no water. So, where does the water come from them? There are, you know, thirty-eight million people living in Saudi Arabia. They must have water. They must get water from somewhere. And the answer is water desalination, the process of building huge plants on the coast, which sucks in water from the sea, desalinate it, take away the salt, and produce fresh drinking water. So, Saudi Arabia is so world-leading power in this field that they produce one-third of the entire global output of desalinated water. 

Thomas Small So, Saudi Arabia, the country that brings you oil and desalinated water. 

Aimen Dean Yeah. They produce water on huge quantities every day. And this operation is considered to be the strategic vulnerability of Saudi Arabia, their dependence on the sea to produce water. 

Thomas Small That's funny, because I think a lot of people who even think about these things would think, "Okay. Well, if you wanted to take out Saudi Arabia, you need to direct a tremendous missile strike against the oil fields of the eastern province." 

Aimen Dean Oh, no.

Thomas Small "Hit it in the juggler of the oil fields." But you're saying, no, the juggler or the desalination plants.

Aimen Dean Absolutely. During the Iran-Iraq War, of course, basically King Fahd at the—.

Thomas Small The Iran-Iraq War raged between 1981 and 1988 between Iran and Iraq, during the reign, in Saudi Arabia, of King Fahd. 

Aimen Dean Yes. He realised that the Iranians could easily target the largest water desalination plants on the eastern province of Saudi Arabia.

Thomas Small So, this is on the Persian Gulf coast?

Aimen Dean Absolutely. Just facing Iran, which is not far away. Two hundred kilometres gap. That's it. So, he realised the vulnerability of Saudi Arabia. Imagine, you know, people in the desert, living in desert, millions of them, and suddenly water is cut. What do you think is going to happen? It's a collapse. 

Thomas Small Yes. Paint a picture. Imagine if suddenly all of the desalination plants of Saudi Arabia were – were cut off, were destroyed. How long would it take before the whole country descended into total chaos? 

Aimen Dean Well, in theoretical terms, you know, there is enough water basically to last, you know, a month in the storage. But that's just theory. But the psychological terms, if people hear that there would be no more water produced, that's it. Basically, there will be millions of people on the move. A collapse of law and order, a collapse of society as we know it. Everyone will be for himself. You know, when you are on the desert and there is water scarcity, a different mentality takes over. This is difficult for Europeans to understand who lived thousands of years with the nearest source of water is just basically metres away. 

Thomas Small But is it important for the rest of us to understand? Because, actually, who cares of Saudi Arabia were to descend into chaos?

Aimen Dean Because Saudi Arabia is the Achilles' heel of the global economy.

Thomas Small The Achilles' heel of the global economy. You hit it, and you hit the whole global economy. 

Aimen Dean I'll tell you why. Because whenever you go, you know—. Keep this thought in your mind. Whenever you go to any petrol pump and you fill your car with petrol, what's happening is that, no matter where you are around the world, one out of nine litres of that dinosaur juice you are actually filling your car with in, you know, came from Saudi Arabia. And if you include the neighbouring countries who would collapse if Saudi Arabia collapsed—Kuwait, UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, and possibly even Oman—then, basically, one out of seven of these litres that you're filling your car with came from that part of the world. Now, even if we don't import in the West—. Let's say, in the West, we stop important completely. Completely. We stop importing oil and gas. Remember, natural gas is important. Even if we stop importing natural gas and oil from Saudi Arabia or any of the Gulf countries, while you might be independent of their oil, you are not independent of the oil price index, which is global. And then, the price will go from $80 per barrel to $250 per barrel, which means, basically, that the price of a big Mac will jump, you know, from £4 per meal to £10 per meal. Because the price of everything—logistics, farming, power, electricity, transportation. Saudi Arabia stability is our stability. It's the global stability. 

Thomas Small And as you said, Saudi Arabia's chief vulnerability are the desalination plants. You know, during the Iran-Iraq War, the desalination plants on the Persian Gulf Coast were threatened by the Iranians. So, what did King Fahd do?

Aimen Dean He built far more desalination plants on the western coast of Saudi Arabia, on the Red Sea.

Thomas Small So, up north and south of Jeddah, the city of Jeddah.

Aimen Dean Indeed.

Thomas Small Too far, from Iran, for its missiles to hit.

Aimen Dean Absolutely. And also, the Saudis invested heavily in the anti-ballistic missile system, patriot missile system, PAC-2 and PAC-3. Also, they are buying the THAAD missile system from America, which shows you, basically, that, for them, their greatest fear is ballistic missiles. But then, there is problem. Even—even—sometime, if the Saudis have the ability to intercept these ballistic missiles over the target, all the Iranians have to do is, basically, arm the warheads with radioactive isotopes. And then, even if they intercept them in the – above the target, the radioactive fallout over the water desalination plant would render the plant shut for weeks, months, possibly years, because of the radioactive contamination. 

Thomas Small So – so, bring this back to the Houthis. And what does this have to do with the Houthis?

Aimen Dean You see, the Houthis are sitting where? In the southwestern flank of Saudi Arabia. So, basically the entire western seaboard of Saudi Arabia is vulnerable. So, what happened is, in October of 2014, when the Houthis took over the Yemeni capital with the help of former President Ali Abdullah Saleh, what they did is they took over immediately the entire arsenal of Yemen's army's ballistic missiles.

Thomas Small Which was not negligible. Ali Abdullah Saleh had—. 

Aimen Dean Six hundred of them. Six hundred.

Thomas Small Ali – Ali Abdullah Saleh had built up an arsenal of six hundred Scud missiles. 

Aimen Dean Yeah. All of them capable of reaching every single—. Sorry. All of them are capable of reaching every single water desalination plant on the west coast of Saudi Arabia. So, this is the first vulnerability that Saudi Arabia experiencing as far as the Yemen conflict was concerned. That now, Iran even not just only were content with the fact that the Houthis took over the ballistic missile arsenal of the Yemeni army, they even started importing, from Iran, ballistic missiles, you know, with even longer range and bigger capability. 

Thomas Small So, Iran is telling the Saudis, "Ha ha ha. We've got you now on both coasts. We can destroy the desalination plants on the Persian Gulf. We can destroy them on the Red Sea."

Aimen Dean Absolutely. Or render them useless with possible attack by radioactive warheads. Now, this is something the Saudis cannot and will not tolerate. They will never admit it to the world that they are strategically vulnerable. No one does that. But at the same time, they couldn't just sit back and allow Iran to have a complete hegemony over Yemen uninterrupted. 

Thomas Small Now, you say that they wouldn't admit that. That's hard for me to understand. Why wouldn't you just say to the world, "Look, guys. Our lifeblood water is under threat." Why couldn't they say that? 

Aimen Dean Because they are Hobbs. And after all, basically, they never, never admit that they are vulnerable. They never admit what their vulnerabilities are. I – I got to remind the listeners of something. You remember that scene in Lawrence of Arabia

when Lawrence's guide, the Bedouin guide, he took him into a water well that wasn't his or wasn't his tribes.

Thomas Small Oh, yes. When Omar Sharif arrives out of the mirage. The greatest entrance into cinema history.

Aimen Dean Yes.

Thomas Small The slow long shot as Omar Sharif, the handsomest actor in the history of the world, appears out of the sunrise. Amazing. 

Aimen Dean And then, he shoots that Bedouin for drinking his water without permission.

Thomas Small Then, he shoots the Bedouin for drinking his water without his permission. You're saying this typifies the Arab mentality. 

Aimen Dean Yes. Water is sacred. Water is our DNA. It's something really sacred. Every living thing is made out of water, according to the Qur'an.

Thomas Small Not just sacred. More importantly, in that part of the world, scarce. 

Aimen Dean Scarce. Actually, we have more oil, you know, than water. Water is more expensive than Saudi Arabia than oil, you know. And that's saying something. That's why I remember, when I was going around in Scotland and seeing all of these rivers and lakes, saying, "Wow, if this wasn't Saudi Arabia, these people will be called Sheikh MacDonald or, you know, or Sheikh McLeish."

Thomas Small That reminds me of the scene in – in – in Robin Hood: Prince of Thieves, when Morgan Freeman's Moor character—. Obviously, he's Moroccan. He's not Saudi Arabian. But when he first sees a river running through an English, you know, in the English countryside and he says something like, "A paradise of this magnitude I never thought existed on earth." Just the sense of water.

Aimen Dean Exactly.

Thomas Small Of water and the greenness that it produces. It's very—. It's lodged very deep in the – in the heart of the Arabian imagination. 

Aimen Dean Absolutely. And you threatened a Bedouin with his water, you will have to bear the consequences. You know, you do not threaten Bedouins with their water. It's simple as that.

Thomas Small So, you say that – that they didn't say this openly. They would never admit openly to – to this vulnerability. How do you know about it then?

Aimen Dean Well, I—. 

Thomas Small Do people inside the kingdom talk about it quite openly? 

Aimen Dean Well, not just only quite openly, but also, I had access, you know, to certain, you know, report that was written in October of 2014 by the Saudi intelligence, submitted to the Royal Court, which basically talks about the—. Not just only the water security, vulnerability, but the four vulnerabilities. So, if the listener thought that it was only water that actually pushed the Saudis to go to war in Yemen, you know, we are in for a surprise, because there are three other strategic vulnerabilities that the Saudis took into consideration when they went to war in Yemen. 

Thomas Small Briefly.

Aimen Dean Food.

Thomas Small Food.

Aimen Dean Energy security.

Thomas Small Energy security.

Aimen Dean Mercantile security.

Thomas Small I see. So, basically, keeping trade routes open, keeping their people fed, keeping them watered, and keeping the lights on. 

Aimen Dean Absolutely. 

Thomas Small Now, for all of these reasons, Saudi Arabia did intervene in the Yemeni civil war. It has prosecuted that war for much longer than anyone expected. As a result, the Yemeni people are suffering to a great degree. Often, the blame for this is placed on the Saudis and the coalition. We hear about the worst famine in the last hundred years, millions and millions of children, starving to death diseases breaking out, not enough medicines. What – what lies behind this tragedy? I mean, is it the – the Saudi coalition that bears the brunt of the blame for this terrible, terrible humanitarian disaster?

Aimen Dean I think this has got all the ingredients of the perfect storm where you have an ideologically committed militia believing in, you know, messianic fairy tales, you know, effected them by Iran, deciding to take Yemen as a whole hostage, you know, on behalf of the Iranian grand scheme for the entire Middle East and threatening the water security, food security, energy security, and mercantile security of Saudi Arabia. And the Saudis basically were looking at the scenario. I'm thinking, "We are doomed if we act. We are doomed if we don't." It's a perfect catch-22 situation.

Thomas Small For the Saudis. But what about the Yemenis? 

Aimen Dean For the Yemenis, they are being held hostage, as I said, by this ideologically committed militia who have taken over Yemen, even killed, you know, their ally, Ali Abdullah Saleh, just about a year ago. 

Thomas Small Yes. In the end, Ali Abdullah Saleh did get it. He got it in the end. 

Aimen Dean He got it in the end. That he handed over his country to a group of militia that are so merciless that they have killed him in three days after he betrayed them. And despite the fact he betrayed Saudi Arabia for three years, they did not even touch him. Saudi Arabia did not start to go after the Houthi leaders until they killed Saleh, because they have broken the cardinal rule of the Bedouin, you know, honourable style of war, which is basically you do not go after the leaders. But they did. They killed Saleh just three days after he switched back to aligning himself with the Saudis. Three days. So, for three years, the Saudis gave him, you know, some room for manoeuvre, hoping one day he will go back to his senses. But the Houthis did not. Within three days now. 

Of course, why the war went wrong, you know, in Yemen, there are lots of reasons. But the first reason is that the Saudis are, one, not a great military power. It's a medium-sized power. And it's taking on a militia that is four times the size of the Taliban in Afghanistan. And the US with all its might, the UK, France, Germany, and other NATO countries, as well as the Afghan army, they were fighting the Taliban now for seventeen years in Afghanistan. And no are—. We are nowhere near an end. In fact, they fought—.

Thomas Small And now, we're in negotiations with the Taliban [unintelligible] in a power sharing agreement for the country. 

Aimen Dean Absolutely. So, in a sense, if the Americans and the entire NATO coalition couldn't do it in Afghanistan, how could the Saudis basically be able to finish the war decisively?

Thomas Small Well, this is why people say, "Well, let's stop the war. Let's bring every—. Let's bring the Houthis these to the table. They have power on the ground. We have to respect that. They must participate in a power sharing arrangement."

Aimen Dean The Saudis will never agree to this for a very simple reason. If the Houthis where only after power, the Saudis would have basically struck a deal with them very, very long time ago, before even a war would have stopped it. Because the first recommendation of that report I was telling you about from October of 2014 was to negotiate with the Houthis and buy them off. No matter what the price is, whatever billions of dollars they demand buy them off. And the demand was very simple. 

There are two strategic demands that the Saudis have for this war to end. The first one is that the Houthis must abandon access to the sea. So, they give up all the territories they have on the coast of Yemen. So, Saudi Arabia's food imports and oil exports and mercantile activities are no longer under threat in Bab-el-Mandeb Strait. The second strategic demand is that the Houthis give up any ballistic muscle with a capability of more than a hundred and twenty kilometres to a third party. They must give up their ballistic missile capability, which, by the way, the ballistic missile capability of al-Houthis, which is – which they are actually a non-state player, have better ballistic missiles in terms of range and in terms of power than the armies of Egypt and Turkey. And that's saying something.

Thomas Small Yes. I mean, I think it's very important for people to understand that when the Houthis captured the arsenal of Yemen, when they captured Yemen's arsenal of ballistic missiles, it was the first time that non-state actors—you know, like Hezbollah, like Hamas, like the Tamil Tigers, you name them—the first time that non-state actors had, under their control, such weaponry. 

Aimen Dean Absolutely. It was scary. 

Thomas Small It's a turning point in history.

Aimen Dean Absolutely. It's scary. And, you know, this shouldn't be tolerated. So, when people say, "Oh, they are a ragtag army of freedom fighters," no. No. 

Thomas Small So, the Houthis refused. They—. the Saudis demanded that they – that they withdraw from the sea and that they hand over their arsenal of ballistic missiles to a third party. What does this tell you about their ultimate strategic aims and the extent to which they are part of Iranians larger aims?

Aimen Dean Because as far as Iran is concerned, you know, having a strategic edge over Saudi Arabia is what matters above everything else. And that's—.

Thomas Small Why? Why? Put us into the heads of – of – of the Ayatollahs and the Revolutionary Guard in Iran? What do they want? Because they are also enamoured of these prophetic apocalyptic dreams. They believe that, with the Iranian revolution and everything that's followed, the end of times has begun. The Mahdi is going to come. They are destined to conquer Jerusalem, Mecca, Medina. They have the same sort of scenario in mind. 

Aimen Dean You know, I sat down in 2017 with an Iranian businessman living in Dubai who himself, until eight years ago, was one of the mid-ranking, ideologically-driven officers of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, IRGC. 

Thomas Small What a dinner party. My goodness.

Aimen Dean Indeed. And it was in a very nice Iranian restaurant. By the way, I love Iranian food and music.

Thomas Small Oh, yes. It's very good. Oh, yes.

Aimen Dean You know, it's just like—. I don't like the Iranian regime, but that doesn't make – make me anti-Iranian. 

Thomas Small Oh, no. Iran, what a wonderful country.

Aimen Dean Indeed. So, I sat down with him and I had this lengthy discussion. And he really told me, you know, some astonishing things. He said that "in the IRGC, we believe that Yemen—." 

Thomas Small The IRGC, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, which is the military wing of the revolution.

Aimen Dean Yeah.

Thomas Small Both committed to making sure it succeeds inside Iran and also exporting it to other countries. 

Aimen Dean Absolutely. He said that the prophecies of the Mahdi, the Shia Mahdi, indicate that we must be, in order for him to emerge, we must be primarily positioned in ideal strategic situations in Iraq, in Syria, and in Yemen. These are the prophecies. And by the way, I checked them. Actually, they are there in the, within the Shia, you know, religious narrative. 

Thomas Small So, what did the Shia prophecies say? Why do they need to be in Yemen? 

Aimen Dean Because the Mahdi could only emerge if his armies, his armies that he's going to lead to Mecca and Medina—. 

Thomas Small Shia armies.

Aimen Dean Exactly. Are in Iraq, which is already happening; in Syria, already happening; and in Yemen, which is already happening.

Thomas Small So, they're making sure that the prophecies are coming true. 

Aimen Dean Absolutely. The prophetic edge, you know, of the Iranian regime is always understated by Westerners, because Western analysts just—. They are always cynical themselves. So—. And they don't believe in prophecies or anything. So, they think the rest of the world don't. But this is the problem. You know, basically trying to understand the mentality of others through your own mentality is a trap. It will lead you nowhere. And that is why you need to understand the Iranian regime as an ideologically-driven, not a pragmatically driven regime.

Thomas Small So, as much as members of the Politburo in the Soviet Union believed in their heart of hearts that, imminently, the proletariat worldwide would rise up and destroy the bourgeoisie and usher in a period of millenarian peace and prosperity for everyone, the Iranian mullahs believe in their heart of hearts that, at any moment, because they've amassed these armies in these three countries, the Mahdi will return, and glorious future awaits for Shias. 

Aimen Dean Absolutely. And so, if you look at the Houthis' brigades and their chanting, they always say, "[foreign language]," which is, like, you know, "We are there for you, Mahdi." This is their daily cries. And after this, when the Houthis took over Sanaa in September and October of 2014, what they were chanting on the street—. 'm going to repeat what they were saying, basically, in Yemeni accent. You know, they were saying, "[foreign language]." "I want my rights. I'm not afraid." From Sanaa to Taif. Taif is deep in Saudi Arabia. It is just next to Mecca, you know. And so, they are saying that they will reclaim the ancestral home of Yemen, which is going all the way basically to Mecca, which has even an exaggeration. So, in a sense, from the beginning, you know, they were a part of this pan-regional Iranian vision, imperial vision, and they are part of the extension of that vision. So, when they say, "We are not going to give up the ballistic missiles," what they mean is that "Iran is not letting us give up the ballistic missiles." When they say to the international community, "We are not giving up access to the sea even though it's not necessary," what they mean is that Iran is not letting them do so. 

So, who's ultimately responsible for the suffering of the Yemeni people? The Houthis, because of these two simple demands. Simple for them, but strategically important for Saudi Arabia. Imagine—.

Thomas Small And for the world [crosstalk].

Aimen Dean And for the world. It's for wealth security. You know, people—. You know, for example, I'll give you an example, how, you know, the left and the human rights organisations in the West are so, you know, I would say, naive in the way they think about the war in Yemen, is that they always see it from the prism of, "Oh, people are suffering." I mean, of course, people suffer in war. But in war, there isn't just only one side that is wrong and one side that is right. There is—. It's a complex situation here. But if Saudi Arabia were to concede to al-Houthi and basically stopped the war on humanitarian ground without taking any important concessions, strategic concession from the Houthis, which means Iran, then they will put the entire global economic security at the mercy of Iran. And that is not something that need to happen. To give you an example why, you know, this is important: Boris Johnson, before he became—.

Thomas Small I did not expect Boris Johnson to come up.

Aimen Dean But I bring him up as an example of buffoonery, you know. Whether before on the right or on the left. He was vociferous in his opposition to the war in Yemen and to selling arms to the Saudis. Completely. Saying, "No way. We can't condone that." So, that's, before he became foreign secretary. The day he became foreign secretary, he was given a file containing all the facts I'm telling you about today, in this podcast, which tells him in clear terms that we are doomed if the Houthis were to prevail in Yemen. No matter what. Their win in Yemen is a loss to the entire international community. So, that is when he changed his tune completely and started defending weapon shipments to Saudi Arabia. Just—. Regardless of how he despised how the Saudis conducting the war, you know, we come back to the issue: Saudi is a medium-sized power without military experience, and they are not nation builders. But yet, upon their shoulders, rest this responsibility of ridding Yemen of this cancer called the Houthis.

Thomas Small Well, there you have it: the Yemen war through the eyes of Aimen Dean.

Aimen Dean And Thomas Small. 

Thomas Small And Thomas Small. Though I – I just basically sit here slack-jawed, with – with my mouth gaping open, thinking, "Oh, my God." So, Iran's regional ambitions, empowered by their prophetic beliefs in the coming Mahdi, I think this is a nice place to stop today and to throw forward to our next episode, which will explain the very complicated tale of the sad killing fields of Syria. 

This episode of Conflicted was produced by Jake Warren and Sandra Ferrari. Original music by Matt Huxley. If you want to hear more of Conflicted, make sure you search for us on Apple Podcasts or wherever you download yours.

Conflicted S1 E5 - Syria

CONFLICTED

S01E05

Thomas Small Welcome back to Conflicted. The last episode was dedicated to the Yemeni Civil War, an intractable conflict that continues to ravage the lives of the Yemeni people. Today, we're going to talk about, perhaps, the greatest tragedy of modern times, the Syrian civil war. In this war, you'll certainly notice a lot of the same players involved. It is a highly complicated civil war. And we're going to try to help you understand how on Earth serious leader, Bashar al-Assad, asset and the world let this beautiful country and its people get caught in the dangerous crossfire between government and terrorists and foreign interest.

Aimen Dean Syria wasn't known for extremism or for this kind of brutality and bloodshed. This is foreign and alien to it. And this is why, whenever, basically, I see jihadists, you know, and jihadist sympathizers, you know, whether they are in Europe or North America, in the Middle East or South Asia. and they keep telling me about Bashar this, Bashar this, Bashar that, you know, the first thing I tell them, "Shut up. You and people like you empowered him."

Thomas Small Stick with us. 

This is Conflicted

Here we are again, dear listener. I'm here as always with Aimen Dean, author of Nine Lives: My Life as MI6's Top Agent Inside al-Qaeda. Nine Lives: My Time as MI6's Top al-Qaeda—

Aimen Dean Oh, dear. You have put me in trouble now. 

Thomas Small Author – author – author of Nine Lives: My Time as MI6's Top Agent Inside al-Qaeda. Aimen Dean, welcome as always. And I'm Thomas Small, co-producer of Path of Blood, a documentary film about Saudi Arabia and al-Qaeda. 

Today, we will be discussing the great tragedy of modern times, the Syrian civil war. The last episode, we devoted to the Yemeni Civil War, a tragic conflict that is extremely complicated, in which Iran plays an important role, the Gulf states play an important role, the international community plays an important role. Today, we will be talking about another tragic civil war, the Syrian civil war, with many of the same players on the stageIran, the United States, Sunni jihadists, Shia militants, the Gulf states, and, in this case, Turkey as well.

Aimen Dean Russia.

Thomas Small Ugh. And, of course, Russia. It's an extremely complicated story, the Syrian civil war, much more complicated than even this podcast can do justice to. But we will do our best. 

So, to talk about Syria is a difficult thing. It's a complicated country. Its history is very complicated. The current president of Syria, Bashar al-Assad, came to power in 2000, following the death of his father Hafez al-Assad, who had been dictator of the country for thirty years. For the first three years or so Bashar al-Assad's rule, the West, in particular, was encouraged. It thought that Bashar al-Assad would introduce liberal reforms and would dial down some of the oppressive police state aspects of his regime. This was called the Damascus Spring. These hopes proved to be ill-founded when, following the American invasion of Iraq in 2003, Bashar al-Assad returned to the old ways of the Assad dynasty. He doubled down on oppression of his own people. He facilitated jihadist moving into Iraq to help undermine American efforts there. And by 2011, his people had had enough. They rose up against him, demanding reform. When he rejected those demands and instead ordered his police to fire on the crowds, the uprising became a rebellion, which was quickly infiltrated by Sunni jihadist on the one side, Iranian radicals on the other, and the whole country descended into anarchy and death and destruction. 

Aimen, tell us again, briefly, what is Iran's geostrategic aim in the region and why would it focus on Syria? 

Aimen Dean We have to remember that when we are dealing with the Iranian regime, we're not dealing with an ordinary political entity. We are dealing with a leadership of a country that believes passionately in religious ideology and eschatology. 

Thomas Small [unintelligible]. These are—. These prophecies, again, that you've been mentioning, the prophecies of the end times, and, somehow, these end times prophecies plays in – in Syria. 

Aimen Dean Indeed. And that's why I have to beg the indulgence of a Western audience when they hear, you know, prophecies. When they hear the phrase "eschatology," they immediately become cynical. But the answer is: Do not try to analyse the mindset of the Iranian regime through your own religious scepticism and cynicism. No. You know, if you try to apply your own pragmatist Western-based cynicism and scepticism, then you will fail to understand the motives and the strategic engines of the Iranian regime. 

Thomas Small So, what you're saying is some people in the West might think that the Iranian regime employs religious rhetoric in order to further strictly pragmatic aims, but they don't really believe it. Because who could really believe that nonsense? That's what you're saying the West needs to get over and realise that the Mullahs, the Iranian regime really believes this. 

Aimen Dean Yes, they do believe this nonsense. I mean, we—. This is what we have to, you know. emphasize. You know, the rallying cry of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, of the Hezbollah, the Lebanese Hezbollah brigades, of the battalions of the Houthis in Yemen, of the Shia militias in Iraq, in Syria, and elsewhere in the world, their rallying cry is: "Labaik ya, Mahdi." You know? "We are here for you, Mahdi."

Thomas Small The Mahdi, which is a sort of end-of-times figure who comes, what, on a white horse, carrying a sword to vanquish the enemies of Islams?

Aimen Dean Oh, the enemies of the Shia Islam, I would say.

Thomas Small In this case. 

Aimen Dean In this case. Yeah.

Thomas Small In– in the eyes of the Iranians, the Shia. Yeah.

Aimen Dean Exactly. And, you know, the saviour figure. So, you know—. And this is why when, you know, the entire political system in Iran is based on the Mahdi. I know many people will be sceptical, but actually, you know, the system is called Wilayat al-Faqih, which, basically, you know, for those who read Lord of the Rings trilogy, you know, you have an absent king. And so, in his stead, there is a steward. 

Thomas Small That's right. So, yes, the ancient kingdom of Ghandour has languished without a king for centuries. And in the king's place, a steward has sat on a little chair just beside the king's throne. 

Aimen Dean Absolutely. So, what you have here is that the Grand Ayatollah of Iran, Ali Khamenei and Khomeini before him, actually, they are called Wilayat al-Faqih, which their mission is to just sit there, deputising on behalf of the absent imam, the Mahdi, who disappeared twelve hundred years ago and – when he was only a baby or, I think, he was 40 years old, according to Shia theology. And he's prophesised to emerge again when the Shia are in dire need of him. 

You know, the entire political system is based on that. The title of the Grand Ayatollah, his mission, the – what is written into the constitution of Iran is actually all based on deputising on behalf of that absent imam, the twelfth imam who disappeared twelve hundred years ago. 

Thomas Small And when twelfth imam, the Mahdi returns, he's going to return to Syria?

Aimen Dean He's going to return to a place which is between Syria and Iraq. And the idea is that, from there, he will use the armies that are based in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, who are his supporters, to invade the Hejaz, the western part of Saudi Arabia where Mecca and Medina, the two holy cities in Islam, are located. So, therefore, Iran's strategy was that the Mahdi could only appear if all the Shia of the regions are united under one banner and one goal, which is the Islamic revolution, which will place armies that are in Yemen and in Syria and in Iraq. 

And, actually, during the Houthi war and the Syrian war, many of the discussions emerged among the Shia militias. And you can see it online, everywhere. It centres around the fact that we are fulfilling the prophecies of the end of time. Even Assad of Syria features heavily in the prophetic texts, modern prophetic texts of the Grand Ayatollahs in Iran.

Thomas Small Bashar al-Assad, the president of Syria, he will no doubt to take up a certain amount of the – of our time today, because he's a very important figure. But first I'd like to just talk about Syria. Not the Syria of prophecy, but the Syria of everyday reality. I lived in Syria for a year in 2007, 2008, during my university degree.

Aimen Dean Well, that's just one year before I visited myself.

Thomas Small Oh, my goodness. Well, you – you – you've been haunting me my whole life, Aimen. Just shadowing me like a, you know, like a – like an unlucky penny. I don't know. That's a mixed metaphor. 

Aimen Dean You have no idea what I had in my mind for you. 

Thomas Small Oh, no. [unintelligible]. I know a podcast. When I lived in Syria ten years ago—. And it's amazing to think, ten years ago, Syria was, to those of us visiting it, a haven of stability, friendliness, sectarian, cooperation, and peace. None of us would have thought that, within four years, the country was going to descend into what is arguably the most tragic civil war in – in modern Middle Eastern history, I think, without a doubt. Would you say—? How would you characterise the Syrian civil war?

Aimen Dean I would say it is. Not just only the most tragic civil war, but I would say it's the most unnecessary war to have ever occurred, you know, in modern Middle Eastern history. And – and, you know, when you compare that to Iraq, which was the most unnecessarily invasion ever, you know, that's saying something.

Thomas Small It's a double whammy. The most unnecessary invasion on one side of the Levant and the most unnecessary civil war on the other side, creating this petri dish of chaos. I mean, it's hard to imagine actually how the region will escape from it. 

Aimen, tell me, as an Arab, as a Muslim, what is Syria to the average Arab and Muslim? 

Aimen Dean If you asked me about Syria, I would say is that sitting here represents, to every Arab, the glories of the Umayyad dynasty. 

Thomas Small The Umayyad dynasty. The first great—.

Aimen Dean Dee-nasty, not die-nasty. 

Thomas Small Is that true? I'm an American. I—.

Aimen Dean Yeah. Yeah. I don't – I don't care if I'm American. You are in the UK. Here, you are supposed to say dee-nasty, not die-nasty. 

Thomas Small Listen, I spent every – every day after – after school watching reruns of Dynasty. It was die-nasty. 

Anyway, the Umayyad dynasty, the first great, let's say, secular dynasty. How would you describe it? The first great—. 

Aimen Dean Royalist dynasty.

Thomas Small The first great royalist dynasty.

Aimen Dean In Islam.

Thomas Small In Islam, in Muslim history. Centred on Damascus and ruling much of the known world at the time.

Aimen Dean Absolutely. The greatest extent of the early Muslim empire happened during the Umayyad dynasty when Damascus was the centre of the Muslim world. So, Damascus is synonymous with great architecture, with great intellectual renaissance. And at the same time, Damascus and the whole of Syria, including Aleppo and Homs, [unintelligible], many of the great cities there, are synonymous with the great heroes who resisted the crusades Saladin, Nūr al-Dīn, Imad al-Din Zengi, and all of these wonderful figures from, you know, Muslim and Arab history. After this, that—. 

You know, in modern time, you know, Syria is synonymous with amazing cuisine, synonymous with brilliant music and also with drama. I mean, you know, many of the drama and comedies that used to come out of Syria in terms of, you know, TV, production, and films up until 2011, up until the beginning of the civil war, they were catching up with the Egyptians and they were projected to replace the Egyptians as the most prolific in terms of production and in terms of viewership.

Thomas Small Something else that made Syria not – not – not entirely unique, but very special, I would say, in the Middle East is its demographic diversity. It was an extremely diverse country. It is an extremely diverse country. Yes, they're all Arabic-speaking. They're all Arabs. But within that umbrella, there – there was a tremendous diversity in terms of sect, in terms of class, in terms of ethnicity. 

Aimen Dean And history. I'll tell you something. You have Sunni Arabs. You have Kurds. You have Arab who are Ala- – Alawites. You know, a more—. A fringe sect of Shia Islam. You have Shia Muslims. You have Ismailis. And, in fact, the centre of Ismailis is in the world, in the whole world, whether they are in East Africa or in India or in Europe or in North America, their centre is a small town in Syria called so Salamiya. 

Thomas Small You have the Druze.

Aimen Dean The Druze, of course, in the – in the south.

Thomas Small And all sorts of Christians as well.

Aimen Dean Oh.

Thomas Small You have an Orthodox Christian, Syriac Christians, Catholic Christians. Even Pentecostal is Christians these days. 

Aimen Dean Oh, don't forget the Armenians.

Thomas Small And Armenians. 

Aimen Dean I—. Absolutely. I mean, you know, not to for- – forget also that we have Kildanians. You know, we have Assyrians. And, in fact, the language, the mother tongue of Jesus, you know, it still survives to this day in Syria and spoken, you know, among many Syrians.

Thomas Small Yes. Aramaic.

A Aramaic.

Thomas Small The Aramaic language. It's the only place where it's still spoken in some villages. I mean, I hope it's still spoken, my goodness. 

Aimen Dean There were—. There was a village called Jacobi. Another village called—.

Thomas Small Malula. 

Aimen Dean And Malula. And also [place]. All of these villages, you know, Aramaic, and, sometimes – sometimes, they call it Syriac, you know, was spoken and beautifully. And you can listen to the hymns. You know? So, basically—.

Thomas Small Oh, I remember when I was touring Syria and I visited Malula and I went to a monastery up in the hills above Malula, and the priest there showed me the altar, which actually was a pagan altar. It had been a pagan altar before it was converted to a Christian altar. And he said, "Would you like me to recite the Lord's prayer in Aramaic for you, i.e., the language that the Lord himself, if you like, would have recited originally?" That was a very powerful moment. 

Aimen Dean Indeed. I still remember it and I actually memorised it by heart.

Thomas Small Did you?

Aimen Dean Indeed.

Thomas Small You are a poster child—. 

Aimen Dean [foreign language]. I mean—. And—. Yeah. And so—. 

Thomas Small Poster child for ecumenical harmony and peace, you former al-Qaeda member. 

Aimen Dean So – so – so, of course, Syria, you know, was diverse. And, you know, there was great harmony there. But the problem is all of this was a charade. 

Thomas Small Well, not a charade. It was all held in, I would say, extremely taut tension by a regime…

Aimen Dean Mmhmm. 

Thomas Small …a Ba'athist regime run by the Assad family for the Assad family and for the Alawite sect of the Assad family, which ended up smashing the country to pieces.

Aimen Dean Indeed

Thomas Small . So, who is Bashar al-Assad? Why has he become now a byword for dictatorship and bloodletting? This man, in addition to being a psychopath and an extremely ugly man, lived in London for several years, where he trained as an eye doctor. Lived, you know, in Northwest London. Very, very nice, civilised, middle-class area. Ended up falling in love with a Syrian British woman who grew up here, a nice West London girl with a cut glass accent, who is now the first lady of Asma al-Assad. A very strange contradiction, really. On the one hand, a nice British or Anglicised middle-class family, a doctor working on Harley Street, and, at the same time, a psychopathic dictator of Syria. 

Aimen Dean Well, shall I tell you about another evil eye doctor. Ayman al-Zawahiri?

Thomas Small Oh. Maybe it's a problem with eye – with – with eye doctors. 

Aimen Dean Yeah. Yeah. The leader of al-Qaeda is an eye doctor. 

Thomas Small Eye doctors, we've got your number.

Aimen Dean Indeed.

Thomas Small So, Bashar al-Assad, he's famously soft-spoken. If you look at him, he's – he's a bit of a pencil neck, actually. He doesn't seem so scary. 

Aimen Dean Well, you see, this is a problem with narcissistic psychopaths, is that they do not appear to you to be willing to sacrifice a whole nation in order for them to stay in power. You know, don't forget the man wasn't actually going to be the successor. 

Thomas Small That's true. He had his older brother, Bassel al-Assad, who was groomed to succeed the, father Hafez al-Assad. Bassel al-Assad, he died in a car crash in Damascus. He was a famously reckless driver and, famously, a psychopath. He was supposed to be the psychopath, not Bashar.

Aimen Dean Indeed. But don't forget the entire family is just a family of psychopaths. And I now, I will tell you why. First of all, we have to go back to the 1966 when, you know, you have the Ba'ath Party coming to power in Syria. Hafez al-Assas became the defence minister. And then, in 1970, he staged a coup and became the president. Hafez al-Assad, the greatest survivor of Middle Eastern modern politics. And the trouble is that he held onto power so much and he allowed his fellow minority Alawites to become powerful in the cabinet, in the army…

Thomas Small The army. 

Aimen Dean …the intelligence services. So, they know they have, you know, taken over most of the important apparatus of power within Syria. So, it became a rule of minority. Power resided with the Alawites. 

Thomas Small And within the Alawites, with the family, it was very much a mafia state in that – in that regard. 

Aimen Dean Just like Saddam Hussein in Iraq. You know, it's simple. It's like carbon copies of each other. One is a Ba'ath Party, but Sunni in terms of its, you know, makeup, in terms of power. And, in Syria, it was the Ba'ath Party, but Alawite in its makeup, with dependence on some other minorities, like the Christians and the Druze and the Ismailis.

Thomas Small One thing that's often brought up in Hafez al-Assad's favour is that not only did he bring to power the minority, Alawites, but he also protected all the other minorities in Syria. And to this day, the minorities of Syria—Christians, Armenians, Druze, as we said—they tend to support, but Bashar al-Assad to this day, despite all the destruction that's going on. 

Aimen Dean Well, the problem is, if the protection of the minorities against the majority happen not through consensus means but by brute force, this is not a treatment. 

It's just painkillers. Painkillers. And then the pain would come back again. Many people don't understand that, in Hama, in 1982—.

Thomas Small I'm glad you brought that up, 'cause I wanted to bring that up now.

Aimen Dean Yeah. 

Thomas Small That the – the sort of – the sort of uncompromising response of Bashar al-Assad to the Arab Spring uprisings in 2011 was foreshadowed by his father's response, in 1982, to a Muslim Brotherhood inspired uprising in the city of Hama, where quite infamously, Hafez al-Assad ordered his brother, Rifaat…

Aimen Dean Rifaat. Yes.

Thomas Small …to utterly destroy and crush that rebellion, resulting in tens of thousands of civilian deaths and the leveling of much of that city in 1982. So, Bashar al-Assad's response to the Arab Spring could have been foreseen. And another thing about the Hama massacre of 1982 that's quite instructive, I would say, is that it was a Muslim Brotherhood uprising that the Syrian state under Hafez al-Assad Hoff crushed. You have, in that conflict, in 1982, a similar ideological conflict of – of the one that, at least in rhetorical terms, is going on in Syria now. That between a sort of Sunni Islamist movement and the "secularism" of the al-Assad state, of the Ba'ath Party state. What does secularism mean in the context of the Ba'ath Party? And why—? And – and do you think that it is fair to hold up the secularism of – of a state like Syria before it collapsed as a – as a great achievement?

Aimen Dean You see, this is one of the debates that divides people the world over when it comes to Middle East politics. The Syrian Ba'ath Party, and they will say, "Oh, my God. It is secular. We must support it, because secular equals good." And they see the Muslim Brotherhood and anyone else basically, and they say, "Oh, they are religious. Oh, my God. Then, they are so bad.": Because religious movement equals bad. And this is where this oversimplification of the ideological, you know, tectonic plates in the Middle East that's pushing against each other, you know, result in myopic and inaccurate analysis of what happened in Syria. 

Not all seculars in the Arab world are good. Look at Saddam. He was secular. And look how many people he killed and gassed and everything and all of that. And in the name of Arab nationalism. And the Ba'ath Party, look at them. Basically, they are all secular, you know, in Syria. And yet, look how many people they have killed and caused to kill. The problem here is not about "secular equal good" and "religious equal bad." You know, it's far more complex than that. Sometime, you have religious people who have more respect for democratic process and human rights than their secular counterparts. And that the most vicious dictators in the Middle East actually were secular in their outlook. Look at Gadhafi. Look at Mubarak. Before him, Gamal – Gamal Abdel Nasser and look at Hafez al-Assad and look at Saddam Hussein. All of them are secular.

Thomas Small Sure. But you might say, if the greatest threat of all is some sort of Taliban-style government rolling across the Middle East, then perhaps you need an authoritarian secularist to crack some skulls and break some eggs to prevent an even worse evil from – from establishing itself.

Aimen Dean This is why I always say that between the two wolves, you know—. So, you have a wolfpack there and you have a wolfpack here, and they are are fighting each other. And what's happening is that the world is divided, cheering, you know, for one side against another. And I was saying no. No. You know, there are other alternatives, you know, especially when it comes to the fact that I'm an unabashed monarchists. Because monarchies tend to behave better. 

Look at Morocco, less resources than Syria. And yet, basically, the living standards and Morocco are better than in Syria. We have to ask ourselves why. The system of governance, it seems to be more resilient and less prone to torture, imprisonment, and brutal tactics. 

You know, the king of Jordan, no one is going to – going to call him a dictator, even though he is, actually, in all sense of the word "dictator." That is where people got it wrong as far as Bashar al-Assad. They saw his secularism and they viewed it as a virtue when, in fact, actually, it is not a virtue. 

Thomas Small  There's a tragic irony with – in the story of Bashar al-Assad, because when he came to power following his father Hafez's death in 2000, the first three years or so of his rule in Syria was known as the Damascus Spring, when it seemed that Bashar al-Assad was going to liberalise slightly, was going to open up more to the West, was going to bring Syria back into the fold of the international community from its self-imposed isolation and strident anti-Israeli rhetoric and all that sort of thing. That, in the end didn't happen. And it's possible to say that one of the reasons it didn't happen was because of that other tragic war in the Middle East, the invasion of Iraq, at which point, Bashar al-Assad thinks, "Hmmm, I'm probably going to be next here. Why should I be playing along with America? These neo-cons are clearly threatening me." Do you feel that that was a turning point for Bashar al-Assad, the Iraq War?

Aimen Dean Yes. And also, don't forget that many people don't understand that, you know, while Bashar was, you know, of course, basically a secular dictator, his greatest ally in the region was the theocratic government of Iran, because of the fact that, while he is secular on paper, but because he belongs to a minority that belonged to a fringe Shia sect, he asked that he saw in Iran a great ally and a protector.

So, this is where the irony comes when people say, "But Bashar is so secular." No. And, in fact, that is why when the Iraq, Bashar decided to pull two strings here. His alliance with Iran made him allow many of al-Qaeda members to actually come and pass through Syria and then get into—.

Thomas Small Yes. Let's – let's – let's go into this in great detail…

Aimen Dean Yeah.

Thomas Small …'cause it's actually a wonderful story. I mean…

Aimen Dean Yeah.

Thomas Small …because Bashar al-Assad oversaw a secularist regime, at least on paper, and because Sunni jihadists, in particular, and Muslim Brotherhood-influenced revolutionaries were a threat to that regime, they languished in Syrian prisons. Come the Iraq War, Bashar al-Assad, in collusion with the Iranian regime, is – is what people understand today, agreed to release those jihadists from Syrian prisons and facilitate their entry into Iraq in order to discomfit the American forces there. 

And not only that, but from all around the world, jihadists who went to Iraq to fight, to join al-Qaeda in Iraq, under Zarqawi, as we discussed two podcasts ago, they came via Damascus, and the Syrian regime facilitated that movement. Is that right? 

Aimen Dean Absolutely. In fact, you know, I happened to have met one of the grandees of the Syrian redeem, you know, who later defected and against Bashar al-Assad. He was the son of the former defence minister class. And so, when I talked to him, he confessed. He said, "Yes, we did it. We did it, because, basically for us, we wanted to make sure that the project for the Americans in Iraq never succeed." 

Then, don't forget the other string I was talking about, you know, Assad pulled the first string, which is the Iranian alliance. But the second string here was the fact that the Ba'ath Party in Iraq was still ideologically, you know, linked to the Ba'ath Party in Damascus. And, of course, they lost that power. So, many of the Ba'ath Party members fled to Syria. And there, they—.

Thomas Small So, ISIS—. So, Iraqi Ba'athists fled to Syria…

Aimen Dean Yeah.

Thomas Small …where they regrouped, where they – where they also conspired against the American occupying [crosstalk].

Aimen Dean Absolutely. So, you know, basically, Bashar al-Assad was playing both sides,. was playing the Ba'athists, you know, the Iraqi Ba'athists who resided in Syria. And also he was—. He, you know—. He played the, you know, the Iraqi. So, the Iraqi al-Qaeda members and also the foreign al-Qaeda members who were coming, and he facilitated their entry into Syria. 

Thomas Small When Bashar al-Assad was facilitating foreign fighters into going into Iraq to attack the Americans there in 2006, around 2005, 2006, you were still an MI6 double agent.

Aimen Dean Indeed.

Thomas Small Were you working in any direct way on countering that or – or—. I mean, how – how did – how did the Western intelligence agencies counter that – that conspiracy? 

Aimen Dean Well, it's simple. I mean, we discovered, at the time, that Syria was the root from as early as 2004. How? Because what happened is, of course, many people who were in Saudi Arabia and in Kuwait and in Bahrain—. And these are the countries I was monitoring at the time. I was monitoring of activities in these countries. Whenever you have a new young man recruited and wants to go to Iraq, where would he go? You would immediately find that there are certain people, who I knew personally in Bahrain, in Kuwait, who would hand over small pieces of paper with instructions and phone numbers. And all of them are where? In the Damascus. 

So, I'm talking about one example, two or ten or twenty. I'm talking about dozens of examples here.

Thomas Small But Bashar al-Assad, by allowing this jihadist activity to take place inside Syria in those years, he was really laying the foundations for the destruction of his own country. Because, in the end, these jihadists, they came back to Syria and began fighting him. So, the Arab Spring, of course, afflicted many countries throughout the Middle East. In Syria, it played out in a unique way. Protests began in the south of the country, but quite quickly it descended into violence. What happened?

Aimen Dean Well, I'll give you my take on what really happened here. They—.

Thomas Small Well, first, give us the official narrative.

Aimen Dean Yeah.

Thomas Small And then, undermine that narrative, if you wish.

Aimen Dean The official narrative is that there is a conspiracy by Saudi Arabia, by Qatar, by Turkey, by the Muslim Brotherhood, by the US, by the European Union, by Jordan, even, by Israel. So, all of these powers. In fact, you know, the – the – the city TV used to call it the globalist conspiracy to topple the regime there. And what many people don't understand that no one had any interest of the regime actually falling. No one. Even the Saudis and the Qataris. No one wanted that to happen, actually. They wanted just to punish Bashar for everything he did, the killing of the prime minister of Lebanon in 2005 as – as a nation of so many Lebanese pro-Saudi and pro-Gulf politicians. But that's another story. But no one wanted him to be toppled. 

So, what happened here is that they said these protests in Daraa, which is the first city to experience protests [crosstalk].

Thomas Small In the south of Syria.

Aimen Dean Yeah. In late March of 2011. What happened there? According to the people, they were saying the three young kids, they were taken into custody for mischievous behaviour. They were just kids from a poor neighbourhood. There were young boys around the age of eleven, twelve, or thirteen. And then, their bodies were found ditched somewhere.

Thomas Small Mutilated. 

Aimen Dean Yes. And raped. By the way, you know, there has been many instances, many numerous documented instances, of rogue police officers in Syria kidnapping and raping young boys. 

Thomas Small Hmmm.

Aimen Dean And that was rampant. And no one can deny that. Because the people themselves would admit it happened. So, of course, what happened is that the atmosphere of the Arab Spring, the fall of Ben Ali in Tunisia and Mubarak in Egypt convinced people of Daraa that, "Look, do we have to put up with this anymore?" 

Thomas Small "Do we have to put up with Bashar al-Assad's policemen raping our boys?"

Aimen Dean Exactly. So, what happened is when the uprising in – in Daraa, it was actually directed at the local police. And they sent a delegation to Damascus to meet Bashar al-Assad to say, "Reign in your – in your police. The Arab world is changing, and you have to change. And your police need to be less impressive. Less powers of the police. That's how it all started. 

Thomas Small Which, it seems to me, a perfectly legitimate thing for the people to do.

Aimen Dean Exactly. Because I've been to Syria. You've been to Syria. You see how the police were behaving with impunity, taking bribes from people, you know, oppressing people. If you are a police officer, it's just—. Basically, your salary, it's just, you know, like a tip. The rest of your income actually come from bribes. So, the city a was incredibly corrupt police state, you know. Don't forget. It's the only country in the world almost where, undemocratically, a son succeeded his father as a president. The second one was North Korea. It wasn't like a bastion of democracy and human rights and [crosstalk].

Thomas Small Certainly not. No one would claim that.

Aimen Dean No one. Yeah. So, you know, the – the people said, "Well, enough is enough." Because the atmosphere in the Arab world was that of freedom.

Thomas Small So, what happened? They say, "Enough is enough." They sent a delegation to Bashar al-Assad in Damascus. What does he do?

Aimen Dean Bashar promised them to do everything right. And then, as soon as they returned, [unintelligible] were arrested. And this is basically when things started to get more ugly. People went more into the streets and started to infect other cities, where—. Then, in Homs, there was another young boy who was kidnapped by the police. Hamza Ali Al-Khateeb. Very famous case. Kidnapped, raped, and his body was dumped into the rubbish. And the police station that done it said, "If you keep protesting, we will kidnap more boys and do it." They don't understand that the world is changing and there is social media. And, you know, and this kind of tit-for-tat, "If you do this, we will do that," it's no longer applicable. People will rebel. 

Thomas Small And quite soon after, the rebellion started. The regime turned their guns on the crowds.

Aimen Dean Exactly. So, what happened here is that, you know, the protests all around the country were not anti-Bashar. Actually, it was more anti-government repression. So, their demands in the first three months, I still remember. And people unfortunately have short memories, they think basically that they wanted to topple the regime. No. The demands were the repeal of Article VIII of the constitution, which is that the Ba'ath Party is the only party that is allowed to be, you know, empowered or—. 

Thomas Small So, they – they wanted more political pluralism. 

Aimen Dean Exactly. Which is fair enough. 

Thomas Small It seems to me. 

Aimen Dean Yeah. And also, they demanded that the seventeen security agencies to be, you know, more merged into one or two or three agencies, and more – with more oversight, because every agency thought they are immune and they could kidnap boys or take bribes or arrest people at a whim and disappear them without any trace.

Thomas Small They wished for the state security apparatus to be disempowered.

Aimen Dean Indeed. 

Thomas Small So, political pluralism, less state oppression.

Aimen Dean Yeah. And the political prisoners. 

Thomas Small Now, what does that mean though? Because political prisoners in Syria, I mean, aren't these, the jihadists we were talking about? Does that – does that mean that, already amongst this movement, there was a – there was a Sunni jihadist undercurrent?

Aimen Dean Oh, no. There were so many different, you know, types of political prisoners, you know. Even sometimes comedians and, you know – you know, and even artists. Like, you know, we are part of the political prisoner movement. Sometimes, children, unfortunately. You know, there was a, a young teenage girl, sixteen-year-old. She was fifteen when she was arrested and seventeen when she was executed. [name]. She was living in Egypt. She had the blog where she was reminding Bashar al-Assad of his democratic promises when he came to power. 

Thomas Small During the Damascus Spring. 

Aimen Dean Exactly. You know, when she arrived back in Syria, she was arrested at the age of fifteen. [name], her name. She was arrested at the age of fifteen for writing a blog. And then, they decided to put her on trial in front of a military tribunal for being a spy for the Israelis. And she gave information to the Israelis, which enabled, you know, a, you know, the Israelis to target, you know, a – an intelligence officer of the Syrians, and he became paralysed for life, which is completely pathetic [unintelligible]. 

Thomas Small Clearly—. Yeah. Clearly, these are trump charges

Aimen Dean And then, she was executed. 

Thomas Small Unbelievable.

Aimen Dean Yeah. 

Thomas Small So, the protesters were in fact appealing to their president, Bashar al-Assad, to make these very reasonable reforms. But instead…

Aimen Dean Yeah.

Thomas Small …he switches the psychopath button in his mind and he orders his men to fire into the crowds. And within months, the whole movement is militarised. 

Aimen Dean There as a sentence he uttered just one month after the beginning of the uprising. After one month or less than that, he gave a speech to parliament.

Well, I mean, to the appointed parliament, as you know, in Syria. And in that speech—. You know, I was listening to him so intently. Of course, basically, I was trying to see where will he go, which direction he will take. And one sentence, just one sentence, in my opinion, inaugurated the whole civil war. Because he said—. Of course, at the time there were about seven hundred, eight hundred thousand people on the streets of Syria. After—. Out of about, you know, twenty-five million, you know, population. So, it was still easily containable. 

He said that "from the videos of the protests, we have identified sixty-four thousand protestors who we believe are criminals and we will arrest them, and justice will be done." That is, in my opinion, the stupidest, most idiotic, dangerous sentence ever uttered in modern Middle Eastern history. When there are eight hundred thousand people on the streets, and you are saying, "We have identified sixty-four thousand," each and every one of these eight hundred thousand will never come back home. That you have basically inaugurated civil war, because you told them, "Keep on protesting, keep on being violent, keep on, you know, this uprising, because if you go back home, you will have the secret prisons treatment." And Bashar's prisons are very infamous, unfortunately, for being nothing but death factory. 

Thomas Small He undermined the possibility that these protests could have resulted in something like reform. 'Cause he wasn't interested in reform.

Aimen Dean Not – not just only not interested in reform. You know, when you threaten the protesters on the street that possibly all of you will be in prison—because none of them know which one of them is part of the sixty-four thousand—you give them a point of no return. You—. You give—. You put them in a – on a path where there is no return. 

Thomas Small The Syrian civil war did quickly devolve into total violence on all sides. And I'll have to ask us to sort of skip forward three or four years to when the civil war was raging at its most violent. We have a battlefield scenario where there are myriad Sunni jihadist groups, myriad so-called moderate revolutionary groups, although who these people are has never been entirely clear to anyone. You have Bashar al-Assad's forces. You have Hezbollah in Lebanon, providing troops to Bashar al-Assad to fight the Sunni jihadist. You have Iranian Revolutionary Guard commanders overseeing that Bashar al-Assad effort. You have Afghan Shia mercenaries shipped in by the Iranian regime to Syria to provide further troops. It's a total shit storm. And at the same time, you have foreign powers—the United States, the EU, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar—on the opposition side to Bashar al-Assad, coordinating, mis-coordinating. And then, in the midst of all this, you have ISIS arise. 

Let's talk about these jihadists. 

Aimen Dean Yeah.

Thomas Small Why such a patchwork? Why such a kaleidoscope of jihadist groups fighting each other, fighting the regime, fighting the Americans. What was going on? 

Aimen Dean You see, the greatest calamity that Syria suffered after Bashar al-Assad, you know, was the arrival of al-Qaeda. When my wife asked me, you know, "Could you tell me in one sentence what went wrong with Syria?" So, I told her, "al-Qaeda came to town."

Thomas Small Now, tell us that story. 

Aimen Dean Yeah. Well, you see, Bashar was partly responsible for that in two ways, one before the war and one after the war.

Thomas Small Before the war, as we – as we said, he released al-Qaeda prisoners and such like people from prison and – and sent them to the Iraq, where they regrouped and came back to bite him in the butt. 

Aimen Dean Exactly. The second way after the war in which the way he responded to the uprising, which was moderate at the beginning, with violence, led to people, you know, trying to find—. "Okay. Who will protect us? Who will actually, you know, be the force that could actually force Assad us to re-evaluate his options?" [crosstalk].

Thomas Small And they turned to al-Qaeda, which was called, initially, in Syria, the Nusfra Front.

Aimen Dean  Exactly. Jabhat al-Nusra…

Thomas Small Which—.

Aimen Dean …which means the support front. 

Thomas Small And it was – it was—. The—. So, the Nusfra Front was an al-Qaeda franchise, if you like. But at the very—. At the beginning, not everyone knew that. Is that right? They was—. They had done a pretty good job of – of – of hiding their al-Qaeda affiliation.

Aimen Dean I knew. 

Thomas Small Well, yeah. You're not – you're not just everybody.

Aimen Dean But I knew, because, immediately, I started to notice. Because, don't forget, after I left the service of MI5 and MI6 2006, I became a banker, as many listeners would have known by now. And because I was a banker, I was always, you know, in the banking section, which monitored terrorism finance. 

Around November, December of 2011, just about seven, eight months after the beginning of the uprising, that there are certain, the financials in Kuwait, in Bahrain, in Qatar started some movement of collecting money for certain groups. And that's when I started to become suspicious that something is not right. And I remember, even at a great risk to me, I went all the way to Kuwait at the beginning of 2012 and even attended one of these fundraising meetings… 

Thomas Small Wow

Aimen Dean …which was risky, but I just wanted to—.

Thomas Small Risky, because, at that point, you – there was already the fatwa against you.

Aimen Dean Exactly. 

Thomas Small Your former al-Qaeda, you know, brothers were – were – were going to kill you. 

Aimen Dean So, I thank God there were hundreds basically in that big tent erected, you know, near one of the [foreign language] in Kuwait, basically. So—.

Thomas Small So, you're saying you went to a – you went to a – a – a jamboree in Kuwait specifically oriented towards raising money for terrorists in Syria.

Aimen Dean Well, tThey didn't call them terrorists. They called them basically, you know, a, you know, the cause of jihad in Syria against the tyrant Bashar al-Assad.

Thomas Small Right. 

Aimen Dean And funny enough—funny enough—I started listening to the speakers, and they were talking about eschatology. 

Thomas Small Oh, the prophecies.

Aimen Dean Again. Again. 

Thomas Small Goodness gracious.

Aimen Dean Among them were, you know, [name]. You know, he was—. He's a famous Salafist cleric in Kuwait. Among them was Hammad Ali, one of the famous supporters of al-Qaeda in Iraq. In fact, in al-Qaeda [crosstalk]. 

Thomas Small Now, why are these – why are these people able to come out in the open and Kuwait and say these things? Why aren't these people in prison, Aimen?

Aimen Dean Because not far away, just about fifteen, sixteen kilometres away in Kuwait— I'm not kidding you—in Kuwait, just at, you know, at the same week, there was another big tent that—. Yes. I'm not kidding. There was another big tent, another [unintelligible] gathering of Shia Kuwaitis, raising funds for, you know, militants to go and fight in Syria alongside Bashar al-Assad. 

Thomas Small So – so, Gulf funding was funding both sides. 

Aimen Dean Yes. 

Thomas Small Yes. It's—. The Syrian civil war has been a sort of solvent that has – that has caused national identities, other identities to wither away, and the sectarian identities are all that's left. 

Aimen Dean Exactly. And, actually, you know, to give an example, you know, I'm a Bahraini.

Thomas Small Yeah.

Aimen Dean And my nephew and cousin, both of them are Bahrainis. You know, my nephew, Ibrahim, was – he was only nineteen and my cousin, Abdurrahman, he was only twenty. Abdurrahman went to fight with Jabhat al-Nusra.

Thomas Small With al-Qaeda in Syria?

Aimen Dean With – with al-Qaeda in Syria. And he died there in May 2013, in Damascus.

Thomas Small I'm sorry to hear that. That's very sad. 

Aimen Dean Then, my nephew went. First, he was tempted to join ISIS, but I, after many Skype calls, you know, myself, his father, I mean, basically we convinced him not to join them. Basically, like, you know, just try to go somewhere else. And he joined another more moderate group, which belonged to [unintelligible], another, you know, Muslim Brotherhood offshoot, of the insurgents. And he died there in September of 2013. 

There are two Bahrainis, but there we're not the only two Bahrainis, from Bahrain, to fight and die there. There were other trainees who were from the other side, Shia Bahrainis…

Thomas Small Shia. Shia Bahrainis. 

Aimen Dean …who fought alongside Hezbollah and Bashar al-Assad. So, there are Kuwaitis fighting Kuwaitis and Bahrainis fighting Bahrainis and Saudis fighting Saudis in that conflict. It is—. You know, with the arrival of al-Qaeda, which brought with it, of course, ISIS, after that, and their purest Sunni jihadist ideology, and because they came not from al-Qaeda central—they came from al-Qaeda in Iraq, which was known at the time as the Islamic State of Iraq—and then, when they break rock away from al-Qaeda as a whole, in 2013, they announced that, "Oh, al-Nusra, these people in Syria, they are ours." And that caused al-Nusra to split, with two-thirds going to ISIS and one-third remaining, you know, which basically grew up later, of course.

Thomas Small It's quite complicated. But the takeaway is that ISIS and al-Qaeda in Syria are essentially the same organisation. They just had picked… 

Aimen Dean Split.

Thomas Small They had picked a fight with each other. 

Aimen Dean Yeah. They split in May 2013.

Thomas Small When I was in Syria, one of the monasteries that I visited there, Mar Musa, not far from Damascus, not far from Malula, in fact, where Aramaic, the language of Jesus Christ, is still spoken. It was a Roman Catholic monastery, and it's Abbott, Father Paolo, in Italian Franciscan, if I'm not mistaken, who had really worked hard for twenty years to form close relations with the Sunnis, with the Shia, with all the different groups in the vicinity. And the mo- – the monastery had become a place of pilgrimage for all these groups. When the Syrian civil war started, Father Paolo very famously refused the Vatican's demand that he – that he leaves Syria because it was too dangerous, 'cause he wanted to remain a spokesman for sectarian unity in Syria. In the end, he was kidnapped and beheaded by ISIS. 

Aimen Dean And that's the tragedy. You see, Syria wasn't known for extremism or for this kind of brutality and bloodshed. And this is foreign and alien to it. And this is why, whenever, basically, you know, I see jihadists, you know, and jihadist sympathizers, you know, whether they are in Europe or North America, in the Middle East or South Asia, and they keep telling me about Bashar this, Bashar this, Bashar that, you know, the first thing I tell them, "Shut up. You and people like you empowered him." He was about to fall. Many people defected. Even his own prime minister, Riyad Hijab, left him in March of 2012. Many people were leaving him. His army was – started – started to disintegrate. And it was clear that he either concede reforms or give up. He might lose, but what saved him was al-Qaeda.

Thomas Small The arrival of al-Qaeda. The arrival of al-Qaeda on the scene gave him a rhetorical victory. He could always say, "I'm defending Syria from al-Qaeda."

Aimen Dean Exactly. al-Qaeda did not start. They just arrived and taken advantage of that war, and, as a result, turned the war from a war of liberation in order to bring about some sort of a better Syria into a conflict that is based on sectarian jihadism. 

Thomas Small What about these moderate rebels, Aimen? We – we heard, especially here in Britain, because the UK was always going to support the moderate – the moderate rebels in the Syrian civil war. Who were these moderates?

Aimen Dean At the beginning, they were mostly soldiers from al-Assad army who actually defected.

Thomas Small The Free Syrian Army.

Aimen Dean Indeed. And many of them had purely nationalistic aspirations. Many of them were not just only Sunnis, but also they had Druze and Christians. 

Thomas Small So, what happened to the Free Syrian Army? 

Aimen Dean They were taken over by, you know, and marginalized by the jihadist and the ideological, you know, groups that were linked to the Muslim Brotherhood.

Thomas Small So, you say jihadists both infiltrated the Free Syrian Army and also attacked the Free Syrian Army and defeated them on the battlefield.

Aimen Dean Well, not just only that. But actually, more or less, just like what happened if you listen to the podcast on Iraq, when we talked about Zarqawi. What Zarqawi was money – was money, but also the name of al-Qaeda and the name of jihad. And so, they were able to cannibalize other groups, including the Free Syrian Army. So, it's just pure cannibalism on the part of the jihadists that marginalized the moderate rebels completely.

Thomas Small And what role did the Gulf states play in all of this? Because, you know, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the Emirates, they're often accused of fueling the bloody mess of Syria with money, with – with – with weapons. What's – what's the truth there?

Aimen Dean Well, the truth that is that it happened. And in fact—. You know, I'm not going to deny it. It happened. The Qataris we're supporting [name]. The Saudis were supporting Jamal Maarouf and Hazim. You know, it's a group called Hazim. And they supported Unit 13. They supported Unit 49. You know, the Turks, of course, they supported Nūr al-Dīn Zengī group. And others they supported the [unintelligible], the TIP or the Turkistan Islamic Party. You know, we will talk about them in the next podcast.

So – so, in a sense, you know, all of this was not coordinated. And at the same time, many of them, while they were moderate, but they were not moderate enough. They still had this stingy of either jihadism or Muslim Brotherhood, you know, ideology about them. 

Thomas Small But, surely, some of these Gulf states also supported al-Qaeda directly, ISIS directly. That's what we're always told. 

Aimen Dean No.

Thomas Small None of them did?

Aimen Dean None of them. See, you know—. You know, I – I always basically had—.

Thomas Small How can we believe you, Aimen, actually? I mean, surely, you're just – you're just, you know, you're just – you're just a – an apologist for Gulf – for Gulf states.

Aimen Dean No. Of course not. I'm not an apologist for anyone. I'm apologist only for the truth. And, for me, I am a ex-spy and, after that, a financial banking investigator, which means that I follow the money. And whenever someone challenged me on this and says, "The Saudis are supporting ISIS and al-Qaeda, the Qataris as supporter – supporting ISIS and al-Qaeda. The Americans actually are supporting and creating ISIS and al-Qaeda."

Thomas Small These are all the accusations?

Aimen Dean Yeah. And I would say to everyone, "Look, I have spent eleven years of my life in the banking sector. Before that, eight years of my life as a spy against terrorist groups. So, unless if you have with you, you know, official transactions, banking transactions, or any other form of transactions that I can take actually to court, then, please, do not utter this nonsense." Why? Because I have followed terrorism finance for nineteen years of my life. 

Thomas Small And you're saying there's no hard evidence that Gulf state supported either ISIS or al-Qaeda in Syria?

Aimen Dean If you have—. If you are, as a listener, have an evidence, I will actually guarantee you hundreds of thousands of pounds of – in payment from many lawyers who want to hold these countries to account and demand justice for the victims, whether they are in North America or Europe. If you have evidence, come forward. You don't, then it's not there. 

If you hear about me buying a Lamborghini and basically living in one of the machines in Beverly Hills, it means that I finally found the evidence. [crosstalk].

Thomas Small That's the lottery ticket. That's the lottery ticket. The proof we've all been looking for.

Aimen Dean Yes. Because if it happened, I would be a rich man by now. But it never happened. They were supporting groups that are not related to al-Qaeda or ISIS. They did, but these groups cannot be classified as terrorists, because they were not classified as terrorists by the US Treasury or by the EU. 

Thomas Small And in—. But—. And sadly, indirectly, the support of these other groups may have led to the empowerment and aggrandizement of al-Qaeda and ISIS when al-Qaeda and ISIS conquered those groups and expropriated the funds and the weapons that had been given them. So, it was blow back. 

Aimen Dean Indeed. Absolutely. And that's why, you know, all of these countries stopped completely, you know, by, I would say, the end of 2016. That's it. All the support dried out.

Thomas Small They realised that their support for other jihadist groups, other resistance groups in Syria had backfired. 

Aimen Dean Exactly. First, the Americans told them stop. And they also stopped on their own volition, as well as the fact that the Americans decided that the best one to fight ISEs are not those so-called moderate, you know, Syrian groups. They are useless. The only ones who can do that were the Kurds.

Thomas Small America empowered the Kurds. Now, that allows me to ask a question about America in the Syrian civil war and, especially, the former president, Barack Obama, often accused of waffling in his response to that conflict, accused of – of drawing his red lines beyond which he said Bashar al-Assad would not be allowed to – to pass, but then Bashar al-Assad would transgress the red line, and – and Obama would do little or nothing. What is your estimation of America's intervention or lack of intervention in the Syrian civil war, especially given the fact that you say America's intervention in Iraq was such a disaster?

Aimen Dean You see, the problem of the Syrian conflict is that it was a victim of the Iraq War in many ways, of the radicalization that took place in Iraq, which basically sent ISIS and al-Qaeda from Iraq back to Syria. But also, because in Iraq, the West was over-committed. In Syria, because of what happened in Iraq, the West was under committed. And what Syria needed, especially—especially—that window, between November 2011 and June of 2012. That window, if the Americans used it wisely, all what – all what was needed was just two American submarines and seventy-two Tomahawk missiles raining on Bashar al-Assad's security and military apparatus. And his own army would have ditched him immediately. There would have been a coup. And his vice president, Sunni yet secular and Ba'athist, Farouk al-Sharaa, would have become president. And the Syrian civil war would have ended before it even started. 

Thomas Small So, why didn't Barack Obama order the Tomahawks to – to rain down?

Aimen Dean Because he was a chicken.

Thomas Small He was a chicken?

Aimen Dean Yes. 

Thomas Small Okay. Expand on that. 

Aimen Dean Okay. The problem with Barack Obama is that he was always a hesitant leader when it come to world events. You know, this is why Putin took advantage of Obama's hesitation on the world stage. And he supported, of course, stupidly, the Arab uprising, especially against Mubarak. But then he did not want to intervene. 

He was always anti-intervention. 

Thomas Small But what about Libya? We intervened in Libya. Why did we intervene in Libya, but not in Syria? Oil?

Aimen Dean No. There was more to it than that. Barack Obama wanted to appease the Iranians over the nuclear deal, and he wanted to negotiate a nuclear deal with them. Antagonising them on Syria meant that he would lose Iran forever. So, for the sake of that nuclear deal, which is gone now, anyway—.

Thomas Small 'Cause Trump has vetoed it. 

Aimen Dean Exactly. 

Thomas Small Or he has abrogated it. 

Aimen Dean Absolutely. So, for the sake of that deal, he hesitated on Syria so much that this hesitation cost the Syrians and the world, especially Europe, with the waves of migration, a lot of great pain.

Thomas Small And, finally, Russia. Russia intervened in the Syrian civil war on the side of Bashar al-Assad to protect its naval base in Tartus, on the Mediterranean Coast, to project its own influence in the Middle East further, to take advantage of Barack Obama's hesitation and, in general, Obama's withdrawal of American influence from the region. And in alliance with Iran, Russia has ended up being the major player in that part of the world. No one would have foreseen this ten years ago. 

Aimen Dean Of course not. And that's the problem with, you know, the fact that Barack Obama's foreign policy was absolutely disastrous as far as the Middle East was concerned. Because he could have put an end to this war. Even – even if he really, really forced Bashar al-Assad into a corner, he could have forced him to concede at least some reforms. But, unfortunately, he decided to sit on the side lines and allow this, you know, to happen. Why—?

S; And does – does Russia now call the shots in the region then? 

Aimen Dean Well, not in the region, but in Syria, at least. And I want to raise another issue: how to show the globalist thing of it. There are two people—two people—I blame personally for sending Syria into this chaos even further because of their constant interference—theological, ideological interference—with the uprising in Syria. Abu Qatada, the Jordanian cleric, who was based here in the UK for more than thirteen years. Possibly even more. Actually, no. Twenty years, almost. And he went to Jordan after he left the UK, of course, when he was extradited to Jordan. And there, the Jordanians, you know, allowed him to have his own Twitter account and online presence. And he kept talking about "You must do this. You mustn't do that. You must do this. Don't agree to democracy. Don't agree to pluralism. Don't agree to do [crosstalk] harmony." 

Thomas Small He's addressing the Syrian uprising, is he?

Aimen Dean Absolutely. And he just kept along with the other snake, Abu Mohammed al-Maqdisi, who was also responsible for informing the ideology of al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia in the early days, which, you know, informed your film, Path of Blood. He—. Both of them, you know, your put their poisons into the mind of the young people in Syria who were, you know, protesting based on, you know, civil rights demands and turned all of this into ideological battlefield over jihadist ideology purity. 

Thomas Small So, when you said at the beginning of the episode that the Syrian civil war was the most preventable civil war in the Middle Eastern history, is it because al-Qaeda didn't need to have arrived on the scene?

Aimen Dean I would say it was preventable because of several facts. One, Assad did not need to use repression or violence against his own people. 

Thomas Small No.

Aimen Dean He could have just conceited fewer reforms, and the number of protestors would have plummeted from the hundreds of thousands to only a few thousands, which then he can deal with. But he could have conceded reforms. Some people would say, "Oh, no. The protesters would have kept on." No. I will say no. Because we have two other countries where, when reforms were promised, the protesters went home—Jordan and Morocco. Both of them led by young people. King Abdullah of Jordan and King Mohammed VI Morocco both conceded the reforms and, in both cases, the protesters went home. 

Thomas Small So, Bashar could have conceded reforms. What – what else? 

Aimen Dean He did not need to utter that sentence, the most fateful sentence in the Syrian history when he said that "there are sixty-four thousand people we identified. We will let us them." That was wrong. You know, you just forced them to stay on the streets and then become militants. 

Thomas Small Okay. And three?

Aimen Dean And three, al-Qaeda did not need to come there.

Thomas Small When you say they did not need to come there, but who—. No. How—? Who is going to sit down with al-Qaeda and talk sense into them? They did need to go there in their own minds, because of the prophecies, because of everything they'd been working towards for twenty years. 

Aimen Dean Ah, yes, the prophecies. The bloody prophecies. I mean, basically, I—. you know, I wish, really, these prophecies never existed. 

Thomas Small So, Aimen, al-Qaeda didn't have to come to Syria. Sure. Certainly, Bashar al-Assad didn't have to respond the way he did. But now, what is it, seven years later, is it safe to say Bashar al-Assad, despite being the asshole that he is, has won the war and will be on his throne in Damascus for the time being?

Aimen Dean No. If this is winning, what is losing? Seven hundred thousand people dead. Thirteen million people displaced. The entire country ravaged, destroyed. The infrastructure is non-existent. It will cost $500 billion, half a trillion dollars, to rebuild the whole thing. If this is winning, God knows what losing is. 

Thomas Small But he's in power. 

Aimen Dean Well, at what cost and at what price? And the question is: Maybe he won the war, can he win the peace? Because why? Still, a quarter of the country is in the hands of the Kurds, and they are not going to play ball with him. They are not going to give up the sovereignty, the sovereignty they had won. One quarter of the entire Syrian territory is in the hands of the YPG, the Kurds who fought so hard against ISIS onslaught, the massacres that ISIS has committed against them, and the enslavement of many as eighty women among them. 

So, do you think they will just roll over and give up everything they have? Because, basically, Assad was repressing the Kurds also. Denying them their language. Denying them—. Denying three million of them citizenship, even. So, now that they have been empowered, they have an army almost the size of two hundred thousand fighter, do you think they are going to give all this up and go back to being subservient to Assad? 

Thomas Small So, what you're really saying is the war is not over.

Aimen Dean No.

Thomas Small It's too early to declare a victor. 

Aimen Dean No. This is why I would say, basically, that Assad has won back about seventy per cent of the territory, because twenty-five per cent is in the hands of the Kurds and five per cent still in the hands of al-Qaeda and their allies in Idlib. So, we are not there yet. Because don't forget three and a half million people live under al-Qaeda's rule in Idlib and other jihadist groups and roughly another three to three-and-a-half million live under the rule of the Kurds. Everything that is basically east – north of the Euphrates is under the hands of the Kurds. So, the idea that he won, well—. And don't forget he won the war, but with the help of so many foreign mercenaries. One day, they have to go back. Their salaries are just draining the Iranian and Syrian coffers. One day, they will have to go back to their families and homelands. And then, Assad will not have enough manpower to control even the territories that he has won.

Thomas Small Aimen, you say that Bashar al-Assad's military strength has relied almost entirely on mercenaries for a while now, mercenaries who will eventually return home. Of course, al-Qaeda militants and other Sunni jihadist militants, they also have a tendency, eventually, to return home, which is what we're going to be talking about in the next podcast. What is the world to do about the phenomenon of jihadists, battle-hardened, ideologically-committed jihadists returning home? 

This episode of Conflicted was produced by Jake Warren and Sandra Ferrari. Original music by Matt Huxley. If you want to hear more of Conflicted, make sure you search for us on Apple Podcasts or wherever you download yours.

Conflicted S3 E4 - Borderline Post-Soviet Disorder

Conflicted S3 E4 - Borderline Post-Soviet Disorder

In the last episode we talked about how the American half of the Cold War was established in Saudi Arabia. Today, we’re shifting our focus to the other half of that epic conflict: the Soviet Union. What were the Soviet Union’s designs on the Middle East? Or were their forays into Middle Eastern geopolitics simply countermoves in a Cold War chess game, attempts to wrongfoot their American opponent? And now, as the spectre of war between Russia and Ukraine hangs over Europe, to what extent can Soviet history, and indeed the earlier history of imperial Russia, help us to understand what’s going on?

Listen to exclusive bonus content and get all episodes ad-free by subscribing to Conflicted Extra on Apple Podcasts and Spotify for just 99p/month.

Conflicted S3 E3 - Spying for Saudi

In this week’s episode, we focus attention on Aimen’s homeland: Saudi Arabia. Arabia is as old as time, and we explore how the depth and profundity of its history inform the present day. Saudi Arabia is also, as we’ll show, where the Cold War began, and to understand how, we’ll explain the way in which long-standing British power in the region gave way, fitfully and almost without anyone noticing, to those upstart imperialists from Thomas’s homeland: the United States. And we’ll see how the Cold War world of spycraft, ideological conflict, and state paranoia continues into the present, through Aimen’s take on the notorious murder of Jamal Khashoggi.

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