Conflicted S1 E2 - War on Terror
CONFLICTED
S01E02
Thomas Small Hello, everyone. Thomas Small with you again. In our last episode, we set the stage for the series by talking about the terrorist attacks of 9/11. Aimen Dean, my co-host, and I discussed what they meant for al-Qaeda, the jihadist group behind these attacks. We talked about why Aimen and others had felt compelled to join the jihad. We also got some insight into these events as Aimen saw them while working as a double agent for MI6. We left off by leading into what followed 9/11, the War on Terror, and what it was like for Aimen as al-Qaeda leaders became increasingly suspicious of its members.
Aimen Dean I remember, you know, someone entering into the kitchen, but I wasn't aware of who he was. And then, I realised basically that my other helpers in the kitchen left in a hurry. Before I was going to turn around distinctively, I felt the end of a pistol against my spine.
Thomas Small The War on Terror has been going on for eighteen years, but many people don't know the story well. 9/11 happens. Osama bin Laden, then safe and sound in Afghanistan, being protected by his Taliban allies, is suddenly met with a ferocious onslaught from the United States and its partners in the international coalition, which pounds the Taliban, topples their government in Kabul, and forces. al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden's deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and everyone else to leave Afghanistan. Some of them stay in AfPak, the mountainous region of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.
Some of them stay under house arrest in Iran. Many of them flee to their home countries throughout the Middle East, regroup and begin slowly plotting attacks elsewhere in Saudi Arabia, in Iraq following the American invasion of that country, in Yemen following the smashing of the Saudi cells. And so, it goes on and on and on.
We'll try to unpack all of that for you. This is Conflicted.
Aimen, how are you today?
Aimen Dean Still alive.
Thomas Small Oh, still alive. That's saying somethings since there's a fatwā on your head.
Aimen Dean Indeed.
Thomas Small So, Aimen, people in the west often think that Islamist terrorism is primarily directed at the west and that the west are its primary victims. But as you know, as people in the know know, Islamist terrorism has been primarily directed at Islamic targets inside the Middle East, perhaps most explosively in 2003, when al-Qaeda launched its long-gestated ambition to overthrow the house of Saud and take control of the kingdom of Saudi Arabia, its oil, wealth, and the two holy mosques in Mecca in Medina.
Eighteen years now since the launch of the War on Terror, Aimen, what do you think? Has it been overall a success? Has it been worth it morally? Strategically, were we right to wage it?
Aimen Dean In my opinion, I think the War on Terror was necessary, but the way it was executed was abysmal. To make an analogy here, imagine if there is a swamp, a huge swamp—and I'm talking here about the Middle East and beyond—what do swamps attract? Mosquitoes. And mosquitoes spread malaria. So, the world powers, instead of draining the swamp—the swamp of injustice, corruption, lack of opportunities, alienation, you know, bad religious preaching and practice—so instead of draining that swamp, they were competing with each other on who will kill more mosquitoes. So, they just keep spraying the mosquitoes with anti-pet and all of that. They all just keep killing and killing, but the – but the swamp is there, giving birth to more mosquitoes.
Thomas Small But how can the Western powers drain that swamp? They don't rule the Middle East
Aimen Dean What is needed is a global effort in order to introduce better governance and, at the same time help the locals, both governments and people, find a way to drain that swamp.
Thomas Small Is it really a war at all? Do you think it's right to call the War on Terror a war?
Aimen Dean What does a wall really? It's just a campaign. You know, you could fight a war in many different settings. I remember when we were trained, you know, in the jihadist camps, there were different kinds of training for different kinds of conflicts. So, you have urban warfare, you know. So, they train you to fight in the cities. Then, there is mountain warfare where you are trained to fight in the mountains. And then, I remember, in the Philippines, we were told about jungle warfare. Also, basically, there were, you know, terror warfare where you are trained to be a bombmaker. You are trained on assassinations in urban settings. You are trained in ambush. Also, in urban settings, you are trained in taking hostages whether in planes or in cruise ships or in government buildings or hotels. So, of course, a war could take any shape and could take place in any environment.
Thomas Small Sure. But most people, when they think of a war, they think of a clash between armies, of course, attached to a nation state or a collection of nation states. This war, the War on Terror, is a bit different. Who are, in the ultimate sense, the combatants of this war? On the one side you have, what, the United States.
Aimen Dean Mmhmm. That's very simplistic way of looking at it. I would say that the War on Terrorism is fought between nation states and those who want to bring down nation states. So, we can't say that it's only the United States that is fighting the War on Terrorism. I would say that Turkey was fighting a war against its own terrorists, whether they were Islamist or the Kurdish PKK speaker. The Spanish fought against the Basque separatists. The Colombians fought against the FARC in Colombia. And what is the common denominator between all of them, is that they are what we call either paramilitary forces—they are not a legitimate military force; they are just paramilitaries—or they are insurgents or they are what we would call non-state players, NSPs. Or some people call them non-state actors, NSAs.
Thomas Small But, really, isn't it a war on Islamist terrorism, really? I mean, the – the world didn't come together to fight terrorism until its Islamic form attacked New York in 2001. So, it's really a war against Islamic terrorism. Why? What makes Islamist terror more threatening to the world?
Aimen Dean There is a good reason for it. And that is the fact that, in the case of FARC, ETA, the IRA, and many other separatists/insurgents/terrorists is that these groups were fighting localised conflicts. In the case of Islamic-inspired terrorism, it's a transnational phenomenon. It is actually cross border groups that are united together to bring down nation states, not just only in the Muslim world, but beyond. Islamic-inspired terrorism is one of the very, very, very few instances of history where a group is united around the identity of a faith that spans many, many continents and countries. And as a result, you end up in a situation where they're fighting against everyone. So, everyone must fight against them.
Thomas Small So, I can imagine why left-wing radicals, for example, might be fighting against the nation state. The internationalist Marxist ideology has long fought against nation states, since the nineteenth century. I can even understand why, in the twenty-first century, a kind of neoliberal globalist ideology would fight against the nation state or, at least, try to water it down. But the nation state clearly brings almost every blessing of the modern world, from education to security to finance, you know, banking. Why do the Islamist hate the nation state?
Aimen Dean The Islamists hate the nation state because the nation state is the biggest obstacle and hurdle in their path to establish Islamic caliphate. Because, you see, this is a problem with modern-day Islamism, is that they believe that having a caliphate fit a United Muslim nation is a obligation. And that couldn't have been farther from the truth.
Thomas Small What the hell is a caliphate?
Aimen Dean Okay. Imagine the Catholic world united under the Pope, not only in a religious sense, but in a political, social, and economic and military sense.
Thomas Small Sort of as it was, say, in the twelfth century.
Aimen Dean Exactly.
Thomas Small In Europe.
Aimen Dean Exactly. So, imagine the Pope, but not just only with the religious authority, but also with political economic, military, and social authorities. Imagine that, and that is basically what a caliph is. But there is a problem. This concept of the caliphate and the absolute authority entrusted in the caliph was really only viable within the Muslim world for the first two centuries, after the death of the Prophet Muhammad. It was exercised, of course. The four caliphs after the prophet. Then, the Umayyad Dynasty. And then, the first nine Abbasid caliphs. But after that, the Abbasid empire started to disintegrate.
Thomas Small And when you say Abbasid, I mean, I think the listener needs to imagine almost the stereotypical period of Muslim glory that's even sort of mythologised in a movie like Aladdin. The classic image of the grand turbaned figure on the throne, commanding armies across the world of noble warriors. That's the – the Abbasid caliph.
Aimen Dean Indeed. Very good description. Very good description.
Thomas Small The – the Muslim empire of the – of the thousand and one nights.
Aimen Dean Indeed. And for twelve hundred years after that, we never had that. We never had one single caliphate that encompassed the entire Muslim world. It's just disintegrated into clan-based or tribal-based or family-based kingdoms and fiefdoms and sheikhdoms.
Thomas Small Sure. But that fact alone doesn't necessarily mean the Islamist thinkers would stop hearkening back to the period when the Muslim world was politically united.
Aimen Dean Indeed. But there is a problem, you see. If you look at Islam lamb as a whole, if we want to take the legalistic aspect of Islam, it splits into two parts. One part is ibadah, which means "worship," and one part is muamalat. It means "transactions." So, the majority of the Muslim scholars and theologians, they placed caliphate, not under a worship section of Islam, I know, that will make it obligatory. Actually, they put it under the transaction, you know, aspect of Islam, under muamalat [crosstalk].
Thomas Small Which aren't – which obligatory.
Aimen Dean They're not obligatory. They are just optional. I mean, whether you'll have a caliph or not as an optional thing. You know, at the end of the day, the fact that they say that the caliphate is a obligation, this is one of the biggest lies ever perpetrated on the Muslim people by Islamists in the twentieth and twenty-first century.
Thomas Small Nonetheless, these Islamists think, for sure, it is an obligation, and that is leading them to carry out the actions that they're carrying out. Now, what do they think will happen once this caliphate is re-established? Do they think a caliphate will usher in a period of glory and prosperity, or do they even care about that?
Aimen Dean Well, based on my experience and the fact that I spent more than twenty-four years in the Islamist movement—you know, since I was nine—I could tell you easily that we can bring in a thousand Islamists from different walks of life, whether they were violent Islamist, nonviolent Islamist, progressive Islamist, regressive Islamist. Bring them all together and asked them, "What is the ideal caliphate? Give us an answer." Remember, there are a thousand Islamists. What we will get is ten thousand answers. I haven't yet met two Islamists who agree what form this caliphate will take, what shape it will take, what will it be providing the people? Is it going to be encompassing only the Muslim world? Is it going to go beyond that? Are they going to fight the perpetual, you know, never-ending conflict against the rest of the world to subjugate the world into Islam?
Aimen Dean It reminds me of my time at SOAS here in London, which is a famously left-wing university, talking to, you know, student leftists of the radical type and how, you know, when you ask them really, "What do you think this grand proletarian revolution is going to result in?" they – they could never really agree either.
And let's go back. So, 9/11 happens. You're already in MI6. George Bush announces the War on Terror. America invades Afghanistan. But let's move in and focus in on your own experience. At the beginning of the War on Terror, as an MI6 double agent inside al-Qaeda, what were you given to do?
Aimen Dean Well, of course, basically before 9/11 and after 9/11, you know, my tasks, you know, differed sharply. Before 9/11, it was an exercise on building a matrix. So, understanding, you know, everything that we need to know about not just only al-Qaeda, but other two jihadist groups who are affiliated to it and orbiting the centre of al-Qaeda. So, before 9/11, I was supposed to know the locations of the camps, the leaders, the visitors, the recruits, their nationalities, where they come from, their names if we can get, their aliases. You know, recognise their pictures. Make sure basically we make all these connections. Then, we look into the network of safe houses, the – the bank accounts, the phone numbers, emails when – whenever emails were available all the time.
Thomas Small You're building – you're building up a comprehensive map of the terrorist entity before 9/11.
Aimen Dean Indeed.
Thomas Small After 9/11?
Aimen Dean After 9/11, it's all about looking at the cells. Before 9/11, we had one group concentrated in one country with a network of openly visible camps.
Thomas Small Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan.
Aimen Dean Indeed. So, that was easy. You know, that was easier. My – my task before 9/11 was easier actually than after 9/11, because—.
Thomas Small Because the – the group was shattered. It scattered to the wind. And now, you're dealing with underground cells of terrorists in how many countries?
Aimen Dean Several. I mean, you know, we're talking here about Lebanon and Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Kuwait, Qatar. We're talking about, of course…
Thomas Small Pakistan.
Aimen Dean … the UK, France you know, and Pakistan, Iran. Then, after that, Iraq, of course. And Syria. So, the task was immense. If you remember, on the last podcast, I said basically that Abu Mus'ab al-Suri, bin Laden's deputy who died just two months after 9/11 by a US drone, he said to me, "Stay in the UK. Stay in London. We will get in touch with you when we need you." Of course, basically, I had to be guided by that. So, you know, if you remember, I told you that my phone was ringing just an hour after the attack.
Thomas Small MI6 six called you up.
Aimen Dean Indeed. And they told me to stay. And so, over the next three weeks, I felt like I was in a war room, because we were looking over satellite images of Afghan camps, the arial photographs of the cities, of the villages, of the encampments to pinpoint exactly the locations of weapon dumps, you know, a storage facilities. You know, the – the routes, basically they will be taking. The best time basically to launch raids against them. You know, so, it was all about discussing the military capabilities. How will they react in certain situations? So, actually, I became one of those who helped in military planning for a war, which wasn't, you know, my job description. But nonetheless, it shows you how fluid the situation could be.
Thomas Small And at that point, did you think this war will be a cake walk? Al-Qaeda's going to be destroyed in a matter of weeks, months? Did you know it would stretch on? You know, now what, we're in the eighteenth year.
Aimen Dean Well, I – I – I recall saying that the structure of the Taliban supported by al-Qaeda would fall within three to six weeks. And they fell within six weeks. But I said, "And after that, the war will start." You see—.
Thomas Small The War on Terror?
Aimen Dean Yes.
Thomas Small Because then the structure, the state, the proto-state they created in Afghanistan would collapse eventually, because, you know, the might of the American firepower is just something that no nation state on earth, with the exception maybe of China or Russia, but no other nation states on earth could withstand. So, therefore, the structure itself will fall. But then after that, they always say, "You can win the battle, but you can't win the war."
Thomas Small So, you America's military might can topple states very quickly. But as we've seen, it can't actually destroy terrorism. Why is that?
Aimen Dean Okay. Terrorism, at the end of the day, is a shadowy practice. It's shadowy tactic in which you can have groups of individuals split into hundreds of cells, you know, and they can operate in a network of safe houses, network of hidden valleys, cave networks even, and, you know, jungles or forests and urban settings. And therefore, how could you basically target these people when they have split into a hundred different entities? They are not an army standing before you where you can annihilate them with bombs. Yeah.
Thomas Small But the – the follow-up question is why would you employ an army to fight that war then?
Aimen Dean Well, the army is to make sure that these cells don't come together and form an army. So, the idea is you need to have presence to prevent them from taking over the state apparatus again. Look at what happened. I mean, the Americans withdrew from Iraq in 2012. By 2014, ISIS took over. You know, when you are fighting against cells, you need the ultimate weapon against these cells' information. And information and intelligence can only be gathered and obtained through three distinct channels. So, you have the first one, which we call reconnaissance, you know. You know, you have aerial footage, looking at the movement of people, detecting, you know, the presence of weapons. Suspicious vehicles moving around. Suspicious, you know, houses. You have lots of visitors who are all male, you know, wearing, you know, certain distinct items of clothing. So, that's [crosstalk].
Thomas Small And this reconnaissance, I imagine, is – is carried out under a certain fog of doubt. The person—. You know, the intelligence officers carrying out reconnaissance, they see shadowy figures moving here in their cars. They don't necessarily know that these people are terrorists or implicated in terrorism. They're just using hunches, gut instinct. How do they know to follow that car and not that car?
Aimen Dean Indeed. Yeah. And this is one of the purest forms of intelligence gathering, you know, and there was a true case of both drones and Apache helicopters following certain individuals in Iraq. And they were almost certain that the movement was suspicious. The cars were suspicious. And then, they looked at the individuals. They thought that they were carrying something, you know, that resembles an AK-47. It turns out to be actually cameras. They were journalists.
Thomas Small [crosstalk].
Aimen Dean They were local journalists and they were shot to pieces.
Thomas Small What's the second form?
Aimen Dean The second form is called "signal intelligence." And in the intelligence circles, it's called "SIGINT."
Thomas Small SIGINT?
Aimen Dean Yes.
Thomas Small All right.
A; That is basically by intercepting phone calls whether it's landlines or mobiles, by intercepting emails, by intercepting text messages, by intercepting Skype calls or any form of other apps you use, as well as intercepting radio communication.
Thomas Small This is what the NSA in the states and GCHQ in Britain are doing.
Aimen Dean Absolutely. Spot on. That's exactly what signal intelligence is. And that is extremely laborious, because, you know, you're looking at twenty needles in a billion haystacks.
Thomas Small Amazing. I mean, can you imagine how many phone calls are placed every day across the world?
Aimen Dean Oh, billions. It is actually becoming more and more reliable form of intelligence gathering than it used to be in the past. Why? Because you are using algorithms. You know, and ironically, algo- – algorithms was invented by Muslim scholars. al-Khwārizmī, as you know.
Thomas Small It's the "al" at the top – at the front of the word that gives it away.
Aimen Dean Indeed. "al."
Thomas Small Like, al- – alcohol, ironically.
Aimen Dean Indeed. So, funny enough, Muslims give the west the tools through which basically they can have fun, which is alcohol and, you know, basically…
Thomas Small Algorithm.
Aimen Dean …algorithm, so they can advance.
Thomas Small The Internet.
Aimen Dean Yeah. So, algorithms are very important in intelligence gathering, because you can put something called trigger words. And I was one of those people from the beginning, you know, from 2001 onwards, basically, who created lists, you know.
Thomas Small Of trigger words?
Aimen Dean Of trigger words.
Thomas Small Well, give us an example of the words.
Aimen Dean You know, at that time, of course, basically, you know, it's useless to tell people. Put "Osama bin Laden," you know, basically, or put "Muhammad Omar," or the "Taliban" or [crosstalk].
Thomas Small Because none would say these words if they were – knew what they were talking about.
Aimen Dean That's one. And two, basically there was—. There were millions of journalists and political commentators and ordinary people saying these words. In other words, basically, again, the haystack problem and the needle problem. So, you know—. So, therefore, you have to go deeper to actually, you know, get phrases that only jihadists would be speaking about. So, for example, instead of, like, you know, saying with "Osama bin Laden," we will say, " Sheikh Abu Abdullah."
Thomas Small Ah.
Aimen Dean So, now that's very unique.
Thomas Small So, "Sheikh" is the term that the jihadists use of Osama bin Laden because they respected him. "Abu Abdullah" is an Arabic—. It's called a kunya.
Aimen Dean Yes.
Thomas Small So, the eldest son of – of – of Osama bin Laden is called Abdullah.
Aimen Dean Yeah.
Thomas Small So, he's Abu Abdullah, the father of Abdullah. Sheikh Abu Abdullah. And only an intimate of Osama bin Laden would use such an expression.
Aimen Dean Indeed. So, I remember that was my first contribution. The first trigger phrase that went into signal intelligence apparatus, which is "Sheikh Abu Abdullah." If anyone is using that basically on the phone or an email or in a text, then, you know, basically, that is a – that is a – a call or a person of interest. It needs to be logged and investigated. And then, we started on and on and again, you know. So, for example, adding titles of books. So, for example, if someone were to use the book, "Al-Kawashif al-jaliyah—." Now, you know, I'm not going to bother translating this. But basically this book is written by Abu Mohammed al-Maqdisi, who is one of the pillars of the jihadist theology.
Thomas Small Palestinian?
Aimen Dean He's a Palestinian-Jordanian. And he's also a, you know, a comrade of Abu Qatada. You know, the famous cleric who was in prison present here in the UK for a while before he was kicked out. If I put the book that he wrote about justifying fight against Saudi Arabia—. That book was written in 1992, you know. But in 2002, ten years later, it started to be taken seriously and basically used as a recruitment tool to recruit people into al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia and beyond. So, I remember I decided, you know, that I should include it in the list of trigger phrases. That was amazing.
Thomas Small It was successful,
Aimen Dean It was successful.
Thomas Small It resulted in some real – some real intelligence.
Aimen Dean You know, the ground-breaking intelligence that led the Saudis, with the help of the British intelligence services, to actually track many inside the kingdom who were texting or emailing or calling and talking about this book, Al-Kawashif al-jaliyah. You know, it's like, "Okay." When—. You know, they are so careful on the phone. And I've listened to some of these phone calls. They were so careful on the phone to talk about weddings and, you know, honey selling and, you know, buying vegetables.
Thomas Small It's all codes.
Aimen Dean Codes. Yeah. But then basically, when – when the other party is asking, "Okay. How can I be sure that the contract is absolutely binding or good or decent or I'm going to be—. It's all legit under Islamic rules." So, they will say, "Read Al-Kawashif al-jaliyah." You know? And that's it. This actually phrase triggers immediately, you know, that the call needed to be logged and then listened to. And then, they determine.
Thomas Small Traced?
Aimen Dean Yes.
Thomas Small People these days are particularly worried that SIGINT intelligence gathering contravenes rights to privacy, human rights. People are very uncomfortable with the idea that the government is constantly listening to all of our phone calls and scanning all of our emails. I suppose you think those people shouldn't worry that if you're not a bad guy, you've got nothing to worry about.
Aimen Dean I can assure you and I can assure you listeners that ninety-nine-point-ninety-nine percent of the entire population wouldn't utter a trigger phrase. You know, a UK grandmother, you know, calling her, you know, grandchildren, you know, in America, you know, would not be talking about Al-Kawashif al-jaliyah or Anwar al-Awlaki or his – one of his books or anything like that.
Thomas Small But what about filmmakers and journalists like me working in the subject matter? I mean, if – if – if GCHQ could search my Google search for all the number of jihadist, even in the Arabic language, jihadist terms that I've searched for. I suppose I'm on a list somewhere. I mean, they know – they know that I've gotten up to that and they scan all my emails?
Aimen Dean Well, of course, the signal intelligence is so sophisticated these days that it actually shows, you know, a pattern of research. It analyze your profile. It shows that basically that you are not, you know…
Thomas Small A threat.
Aimen Dean …a likely. That you are in the research business. Although, basically, there has been. I know personally the story of one of the academics in Kings College—you know, a UK national—who was traveling to the U S and he was banned from entering the country, because of many Skype calls he had with ISIS members who were inside of Syria.
Thomas Small For research purposes?
Aimen Dean For research purposes. But then, it's – it's a wholly different level that you are researching something and you are reading articles and you are watching videos. That's a different thing. But having phone calls and, you know, Skype calls with—. You know, proper communication, basically, with…
Thomas Small Known terrorist.
Aimen Dean …a known terrorist. That's – that's a different issue. That's—. Even if you're a researcher, you will still be subject to restrictions.
Thomas Small So, that's the second kind. SIGINT. We've had reconnaissance SIGINT. Now, what's the third kind of intelligence.
Aimen Dean Now, that is something basically that it was, you know, mostly my responsibility and responsibility of other people like me. It's called human intelligence or HUMINT.
Thomas Small HUMINT?
Aimen Dean HUMINT.
Thomas Small HUMINT?
Aimen Dean Yes. HUMINT. You know? So, human intelligence is the, you know, as we call it basically, is the second oldest profession in human history. The first one, basically, of course, is prostitution. But, you know—. And, you know, of course, basically, I find it extremely difficult likening [unintelligible], you know. I described spying and prostitution in the same sentence. But, you know, as the oldest professions that ever existed. But it's a classic—. It's, again, the classic human spy.
Thomas Small What sort of training did you receive in order to – to do this? I mean, you went from being a bomb maker for al-Qaeda to being – to being a double agent quite quickly. So, how did you learn the skills necessary to be an effective spy?
Aimen Dean Well, this is where it was, you know, at the beginning, nerve-wracking, because, you see, when I defected and started working for the UK intelligence services, I was only twenty. So, can you imagine by the age of twenty, I was already, you know, a qualified bomb maker for al-Qaeda and was one of their operatives. But here's the problem: Now, I need to be a spy against them. I'm going to be spying against them and, actually, for the next eight years, although I didn't know that. I thought, basically, it will be a year or two, and that's it.
So, the first worry I had, which is: How do I now maintain this double life? How do I maintain the veneer of jihadism and beneath that, you know, is really someone who, not just only despise them, but actually want to dismantle what they are building? So, the first training that MI5 and MI6 would give you is that be yourself. That's the first thing. No one should notice a change about you, you know. Just forget that life is changing around you, that you are changing your mind. You need to play that down so much to really repress it, because no one should notice that you're changing. Not only, you know, from your own words and use of terminology and phrases, but also from your facial expressions.
Thomas Small It's easy enough to tell someone, "Be yourself." But I mean, how can you? How could you not give the game away? I feel that if I went back into an infamous terrorist organisation, having agreed to spy against them for their enemy, I would – I would have been sweating bullets the whole time. Shaking, looking down, looking nervous. How did you do it?
Aimen Dean Well, I remember when I first was told I would be going back to Afghanistan and, of course, basically, I will have to meet my fellow jihadist here in London, I sat down with, you know, several operatives on both MI5 and MI6. And what they were telling me was so interesting and so reassuring. They were saying, "Look, you are already a spy and an operative. It's just you don't know it. You know, Aimen, they sent you on missions before. Al-Qaeda sent you on missions. Yes?" "Yes." I said yes. "Okay. And these missions included traveling into, sometime, hostile countries like the UAE or, you know, Oman or Kuwait or Pak—. And even when you go into—. You know, when you enter into Pakistan, any Pakistani airport. When you leave a Pakistani airport, you know, you're always alert, you know, that you don't want to bring suspicion to yourself. You want to basically just pass through without being detected. Did they train you for that?" I said, "Yes. They gave me counter-intelligence and counter-surveillance courses, you know, in order to fool immigration officials, custom officials, border officials. You know, that was, you know, normal. It came with the territory." They said, "Exactly. Use what they gave you. They already gave you the tools. Just use what they gave you against them. That's all you need to do. Imagine them as if they were border agents, you know, custom officials, immigration officers. Imagine them to be the same people that you need to avoid finding the truth about you."
Thomas Small And that assuaged your worries? That made you confident that you could do this?
Aimen Dean They told me, "If you were able to fool Pakistani immigration and border officials, you can easily fool them." You know? So, they made it sound easy. In fact, it wasn't. But they made it sound easy. And this reassuring tone was extremely important. Remember, you know, British intelligence operatives, they are actually fore-, you know, foremost, trained psychologists. I mean, they – they are trained in psychology. They are trained in handling assets like me. So, reassurance is one of the most important things. And also, basically, knowing your asset, knowing the talents of your asset. If your asset was already trained by the target organisation, then that's even better.
Thomas Small When you see a show like Homeland or watch a James Bond film, to what extent does that come near the truth?
Aimen Dean It's as far from the truth as it could be. Because first of all, spying is basically, you know, long periods of boredom punctuated by some exciting times. But the exciting times is when information come to you. And you discover. You make discoveries. But these discoveries are not made through a car races and chases and adrenaline rush. You know, running after people and, you know, breaking into high security vault. No. It's really all about meeting people in restaurants, in hotels. As a spy, you spend more time in restaurants, hotels, mosques, you know, university campuses. This is what spying is about: networking. And, you know, there is always this myth that the intelligence service officials are cool, cold, calculating. No, they are just average human beings, who watch The Simpsons and support football clubs and go for holidays with their families. And, you know, they are just civil servants. You know, except basically, they do something exciting and they, you know, they do it – they keep it in secret. But in reality, they are human beings and, by the way, people who are genuinely good, decent, chosen for their high-quality education and their love and devotion for their country and fellow countrymen. So, the idea that they are sinister, evil people who are planning plots and then, you know, smearing Muslims, you know, this is, you know, this is just nonsense.
Thomas Small So, you became at double agent three years before 9/11. But after 9/11, you were still a double agent. How did al-Qaeda change in response to the War on Terror?
Aimen Dean There were difficulties, you know, facing us after 9/11, because, first, we, you know, had al-Qaeda scattered to the wind over so many countries. Many of them returned to Saudi Arabia, to Bahrain, to Qatar, to Kuwait, to the – to Europe, to Turkey, and to Iraq. And, you know, it means that Afghanistan and Pakistan no longer basically the ground where I was going there for, you know, for spying. And my cover as a businessman, gone. Because, you know, the people basically that I did business with within al-Qaeda are gone. You know, some are in Guantanamo, some are dead, and some are in Iran. I can't have access to them. And that is basically where I was worried. The services were worried. And so—.
Thomas Small So, you were no longer useful?
Aimen Dean Indeed. This is a moment, basically, where I was transferred from human to SIGINT, you know, to help with the signal intelligence, you know, based on my experience, you know, from October 2001 until February of 2002. These four months were really SIGINT, because I was waiting for someone from al-Qaeda to go – to get in touch.
Thomas Small When they got in touch…
Aimen Dean Yeah.
Thomas Small …what happened?
Aimen Dean Well, an operative, you know, from al-Qaeda who I knew for many, many years, and he said, basically, that "we need you because of your past training with Abu Khabab as a bombmaker.
Thomas Small 'Cause by this point, four months after 9/11, many of their top bombmakers, their top fighters, their top thinkers have been killed or captured. They're—. They actually need talent like you.
Aimen Dean Indeed. So, you know, that was obviously the delightful news that, you know, the British intelligence services were waiting for. So, I was told, "Okay. We have to assess, you know, first of all the validity of this. So, we will just send you, you know, into Bahrain just for two weeks to look into things and then come back." So, when I went to Bahrain for two weeks, I realised that, one, al-Qaeda is building a capability to start the war in Saudi Arabia. This was as early as February or March of 2002.
Thomas Small Mmhmm.
Aimen Dean You know, almost a year before the real start of the campaign against Saudi Arabia. More than a year.
Thomas Small Mmhmm. A lot of people actually don't realise that there was this al-Qaeda uprising and war within Saudi Arabia against the kingdom.
Aimen Dean Indeed. And they were actually even scouting and, you know, targets that are both American and British. So, of course, basically, this was extremely important, you know, for the safety and security of American and British expats in Saudi Arabia.
Thomas Small But what – what really interests me is the psychology of the al-Qaeda members at the time. I mean, what—? How—? What were their spirits like? Were they shaken by what had happened in Afghanistan after the American invasion?
Aimen Dean I was struck by the resilience of their morale and their spirits despite what seemed to be a massive defeat for the al-Qaeda and Taliban apparatus in Afghanistan.
Thomas Small What – what kept their spirits high?
Aimen Dean They believe it is part of a greater conflict. This is just basically the opening, you know, battle. This is just basically the – the first skirmish.
Thomas Small So, there they were living in the age of prophecy? The prophecies were coming true.
Aimen Dean Indeed. So, for them, "Look, it's just a skirmish." You know? "But the plan will go ahead regardless and we are going to topple the regime in Saudi Arabia. The Americans are going to invade Iraq. It's all going according to plan." According to, you know, what they believed.
Thomas Small But I'm still confused as well. I would have thought following the defeat in Afghanistan that more of the recruits to al-Qaeda would have left the organisation as you did. Why did you leave in 1998? What made you different? Why did so few of your comrades leave?
Aimen Dean There are two factors here. First of all, I did not leave because the group lost. They were in the ascendance, actually. I left the group when it was in the ascendance.
Thomas Small That's sort of true. But you've told me that, after the 1998 East Africa Embassy bombings, when Bill Clinton shot some patriot missiles, I think.
Aimen Dean Cruise missiles.
Thomas Small Shot some cruise missiles into the camps in Afghanistan, I believe you were standing outside one of the camps that was attacked. Maybe even peeing in the middle of the night? Did you tell me that?
Aimen Dean No, I didn't say that.
Thomas Small I—.
Aimen Dean I went to the bathroom.
Thomas Small Oh.
Aimen Dean You know, which was, you know, basically, you know, the toilet facilities were almost half a kilometre away from the camp.
Thomas Small Like outhouses?
Aimen Dean Yeah. Because why? [crosstalk].
Thomas Small Half a kilometre? They really make you work for it, these terrorists.
Aimen Dean Of course. And half a kilometre. Why? Because, basically, there is a river. There is running water. And so, that's why.
Thomas Small Ah, I see. Old-fashioned.
Aimen Dean Indeed. It was very a old-fashioned, you know, toilet facility and—.
Thomas Small So, you wake up in the middle of the night. You have to—. You head to the facilities. You walk half of a kilometre. There you are, doing your business, when, boom, Bill – Bill Clinton loves a missile at your camp.
Aimen Dean Well, you know, there were, you know, dozens of muscles. And the same time, I remember I was on my way back to the camp when, you know, the attack happened. And, you know, and I remember by the end of the night, basically, there were three dead, you know, thirteen wounded in our camp, at least;.
Thomas Small Wait. So, you're telling me that despite that, you felt that this organisation is in the ascendancy? You must have thought, "Oh, we're finished."
Aimen Dean Oh, no. Because, you know, the reason why there was a low death toll that night is because we evacuated the camp already to a nearby location.
Thomas Small How did you know Bill Clinton was going to attack you?
Aimen Dean Oh, we didn't need to. Basically, we already knew that after the East Africa Embassy attacks, there could be airstrikes or anything like that. So, we didn't know it was going to be cruise muscles, but we knew basically some retaliation will happen. And so, therefore, basically we were outside of the camp rather than in it.
Thomas Small So, there you are. You're in the organisation. They've just launched, you know, their biggest first daring attack. They're in the ascendancy. And yet you begin to wobble and, within a few months, you've decided to leave. What happened?
Aimen Dean Well, actually, I decided to leave, you know, almost, you know, within a week after the attacks on East African American embassies. You know, the reality is that I couldn't be part of a group that decided to launch war against civilians in Africa, you know, over a war between them and America. I mean, you know, it doesn't make sense. And at the same time, the fact that the death toll was just way beyond what I could stomach and it's against civilians who had no business whatsoever in the war that we're fighting.
Thomas Small But you knew you were in a terrorist group. You know what terrorist groups do.
Aimen Dean Okay. When I joined al-Qaeda, I was under the impression that whatever attacks that were going to be launched against the Americans, it will be according to the same pattern of [name] bombings in 1995, which killed seven American military personnel.
Thomas Small This is in – this is in Riyadh, in Saudi Arabia.
Aimen Dean In Riyadh.
Thomas Small The first—. Actually, the first bombing that al-Qaeda carried
Aimen Dean Indeed. And the second one, which al-Qaeda never carried out, but it was basically a similar line, which is the attack against the nineteen American pilots who were, you know, carrying the no-fly, you know, or enforcing the no-fly zone over Iraq. So, there were us air force pilots. It was a military target. This was in Khobar, in my hometown, basically, in 1996.
Thomas Small It's called the Khobar tower bombings in 1996.
Aimen Dean Indeed. That, you know, you see, against the backdrop of these, you know, attacks that I joined al-Qaeda. I thought it's going to be a war to attack American army…
Thomas Small Military targets.
Aimen Dean …personnel in the Arabian Peninsula, not, you know, American diplomatic missions in heavily-populated areas in Africa.
Thomas Small But al-Qaeda thought they were attacking the CIA headquarters for that part of the world. And, in fact, they were attacking those headquarters, because they were located in those embassies. Were they not?
Aimen Dean Indeed, they were. But, you see, this is a problem. It was in East Africa. So, nothing to do with the, you know, vision of liberating Saudi Arabia, as bin Laden was putting it. You know, what does Kenya or Tanzania had anything to do with Saudi Arabia? That's the first thing that came to – to my mind. The second thing is that two hundred and twenty-four innocent Africans were killed in order to get at twelve American diplomats.
Thomas Small And it didn't take you long to realise "this is not an organisation I want to be in?"
Aimen Dean No. Because, you see, if it was, you know, an attack against an American military barracks in Saudi, you know, I would have understood it. Actually, basically, I would have cheered and supported it at the time, because that was my mentality. I would have still, you know, drank the Kool-Aid and decided basically that this is exactly what we should be doing. However, you know, the attacks in East Africa and the fact that it was done by someone I knew very well, a friend of mine from Saudi Arabia, the fact that it happened on African soil, taking the lives of so many people. Two hundred and twenty-plus dead, five thousand people wounded, a hundred and fifty of them blinded for life because of the so many shrapnels that were embedded within the device. And it was a huge device. So, how do I reconcile that? And the fact that they give themselves justification, that we are allowed under a long ancient fatwā that we can.
Thomas Small Yeah. What is this justification? Why would they think it was okay to kill so many civilians?
Aimen Dean Because there is a fatwā from eight hundred years that—.
Thomas Small Eight hundred years ago?
Aimen Dean Indeed.
Thomas Small All right.
Aimen Dean That says that it—.
Thomas Small That's, like, Magna Carta sort of period. Around the time Magna Carta is.
Aimen Dean Indeed.
Thomas Small I suppose the English law is also based on a fatwā from eight hundred years ago. But all right.
Aimen Dean Maybe. But it's—.
Thomas Small What's this fatwā?
Aimen Dean It's called the Tatarrus fatwā, which means the human shield fatwā. And the human shield fatwā is a fatwā that in its essence or how al-Qaeda interpreted is that if the enemy is located within a heavily populated area with civilians, you can attack. And if civilians die, then it's up to God to solve them. But you need to do your duty and eliminate the enemy.
Thomas Small Where did this fatwā come from?
Aimen Dean The—.
Thomas Small What's the context of this fatwā?
Aimen Dean Ex- – exactly. That's what I asked Abu Abdullah al-Muhajir. He's a sheikh, you know, and he is the—.
Thomas Small An al-Qaeda sheikh?
Aimen Dean Indeed. I asked him, I said, like, "I mean, look. I'm—.It's not like I'm doubting or anything, but, please, can you put my heart at peace? I want to know how can we justify killing so many people who just were there at the wrong time, at the wrong place. So, how do we justify killing them?" You know?
Thomas Small And what did he say?
Aimen Dean He said to me, "While we have this fatwā, Tatarrus fatwā—you can go and look it up—but it allows us to do." So, I decided I would go and look for it. So, you know, within a week, I was in al-Qaeda's safe house in Kabul, the headquarters in Kabul, and they have a huge library there. And there is a book called The Comprehensive Works of Ibn Taymiyyah. It's a thirty-seven-volume book.
Thomas Small The famous Ibn Taymiyyah?
Aimen Dean Indeed.
Thomas Small Thirteenth century stellar. Considered the grandfather of fundamentalist, legal jurisprudence in Islam.
Aimen Dean Indeed. So, you know, it took me a while to find the fatwā, but the fatwā was there. And it's true. It's basically called the human shield fatwā based on the earlier fatwās from the, you know, from eight hundred days ago. And there, the context shocked me.
Thomas Small What was it?
Aimen Dean The context was that the Mongols, you know, were invading their Muslim city states of central Asia.
Thomas Small The Mongols. So, we're talking Genghis Kahn, Kyrgyz—. You know, the – the – the—. Genghis Khan. What was his—? Kublai Khan? This – this – this era of history.
The – the sweeping hordes from Central Asia burning all before them.
Aimen Dean Indeed. So, what their practice was, was whenever they sacked a Muslim city, they would take a few thousand of the inhabitants, the civilian inhabitants of that city, and they make them push the siege tower to the walls of the next city they want to sack.
Thomas Small So, captured civilians from one city are pushing the siege towers to the next city, which puts the Muslims in the – in the next city in a – in a quandary. "Do we – do we – do we fire upon the siege towers? We'll kill our fellow Muslims."
Aimen Dean Indeed. "Do we shoot them? Did we kill them?" So, that's what the fatwā is about. The fatwā is about life and death situation. That if the enemy is advancing on you using, you know, prisoners, your fellow Muslim prisoners as human shields out, are you allowed to kill them in order to save yourself? And the fatwās that came from across the Muslim world to the defenders of these cities was, yes, you can kill them, because they are already dead anyway.
Thomas Small And you—.
Aimen Dean If you don't, the Mongols will kill them.
Thomas Small And you thought this doesn't bear much relation to what's going on in – in the East Africa Embassy bombings.
Aimen Dean No, of course not. I mean, I didn't see the American embassy in Nairobi, for example, pushing the siege towers towards Mecca and Medina.
Thomas Small No.
Aimen Dean There was no life and death situation that necessitated, you know, killing so many civilians in order to kill twelve American diplomats.
Thomas Small So, I would have guessed there would have been a mass exodus at the time of recruits like yourself. Why were there so few? What makes you different from the other recruit?
Aimen Dean What – what made me different was two things. First, a good moral compass, you know, that I think was instilled by my mother. That's the first thing. The second thing: I was annoyingly inquisitive and independent thinker. So, I just never allowed anyone to think on my behalf.
Thomas Small It sounds like a strange mentality for someone who joined a, you know—let's call a spade a spade—a totalitarian cult.
Aimen Dean Well, indeed. I grew up in a totalitarian society. You know, Saudi Arabia. I believed in religious totalitarianism and authoritarianism. I believed in the concept of the caliphate as the best system that will save us, you know, from the tyranny of other global powers. I, you know, didn't join straight away. I ended up first going to defend Muslims in Bosnia, you know. So, it didn't feel to me as if I was joining a terror organisation. And the context through which I joined was to, you know, liberate an occupied land by the Americans and to liberate ourselves, y, from the encroachment—cultural, military and economic encroachment of the Americans. It's only that what happened in East Africa woke me up to the fact that all these noble aims were just, you know, a charade.
Thomas Small So, the—. So, you have this inquisitiveness, which leaves you to leave al-Qaeda. And this distinguishes you from most recruits to al-Qaeda. And I think it's interesting in the War on Terror era. What is the average al-Qaeda recruit like and what is motivating him not only to join the organisation, but to stay? Put us in the heads of the average al-Qaeda recruit. And I think it's safe to say you're an above average al-Qaeda recruit at that time.
Aimen Dean You know, it is important for the listener to understand that groups like al-Qaeda and ISIS are highly hierarchical and actually stratified. They are, you know, like the Hindu caste system, you know. First, you have the, you know, big priests and the Brahmas, you know. And then, below that, you have the warriors. And below that, you have the, you know, the business classes and the traders. And then, below that you have the, you know, the untouchables. [crosstalk].
Thomas Small So, I'm interested at the bottom there of al-Qaeda.
Aimen Dean Exactly.
Thomas Small Who's on the bottom? Who are the untouchables?
Aimen Dean Okay.
Thomas Small The expendables, really, 'cause they – they might be asked to strap a bomb to themselves.
Aimen Dean Indeed. So, what do we have here is that, at the very bottom, you know, of al-Qaeda or ISIS hierarchy are the foot soldiers. The expendables, as you call them. You know? And, sometime, I used to call them the idiots. So, these are the ones who came for a variety of reasons to join. So, there isn't a particular average there. But, you know, there are—. They are divided into three, you know, distinct categories. First, you have the criminal class. People who basically, in a way, are graduates of prisons. Because, you see, prisons were always a fertile ground for recruitment as far as al-Qaeda and ISIS were concerned. Why is that? Because, in prison, you have people who exhibit three traits. The first one is that they want redemption. You know, hey feel bad about everything they've done.
Thomas Small Stealing, thieving, raping, murdering.
Aimen Dean Drug dealing. You know, being members of gangs. You know, domestic violence. All of that. So, they feel guilty about everything they've done. They want a way out. They want a redemption. And so, they are too lazy to become pious. But if I go to prison and say, "Look, I can guarantee you heaven. You think you're going to hell. You're certain in your mind you're going to hell. But if I tell you that you do not have to go out of prison, start praying five times a day, start fasting, basically, so many, you know, days of the – in the year—."
Thomas Small All you have to do is?
Aimen Dean "All you have to do is just join us, fight for us. And if you die in the process, you are going to heaven with all of your sins forgiven." Totally. Completely. According to the scripture.
Thomas Small It's a very tempting offer.
Aimen Dean Absolutely. Because, you know, imagine a life of crime can all be wiped out in an instant if you actually die for this cause, for jihad. That's why they say jihad and martyrdom, or jihad and shahada, are the shortest path to heaven. After this, the fact that the second trait to exhibit—we're talking here about the criminal class—is that they have repressed inner sadism and violence and psychopathic tendencies.
Thomas Small Which landed them in prison in the first place.
Aimen Dean Indeed. So, if you tell them that you can liberate the inner psychopath, the inner sadist, the inner violent – violence within you, but you will direct it towards the enemies, it's – it's – it's a liberation of all of these dark forces that you are not going to be punished for. In fact, you will be rewarded, because that's exactly where you need to direct them, at the enemy. So, the
first one—.
Thomas Small So, a guilt – a guilty conscience, repressed sadism.
Aimen Dean Indeed.
Thomas Small And third?
Aimen Dean And the third is empowerment. You see, prison is the ultimate humiliation, you know, for an individual. So, you come to them and you say, "Not only I will give you one-way express ticket to heaven, not only I will liberate your inner sadist, violent, psychopath, I will also empower you, because today you are under their boots. Tomorrow, they will be under yours."
Thomas Small So, a guilty conscience, repressed sadism, and humiliated pride. This is the recipe for making a jihadist out of a criminal. What are the other two classes of recruits to the underclass of al-Qaeda?
Aimen Dean After that, you have that working class, aspirational dreamers. So, people basically who came from either a poor background. You know, they want to make something out of themselves. People basically who feel so much the injustice of this world on them, on their families. They see basically that the alienation, the disenfranchisement. So, these people who come from the slums, whether they are the other slums of Baghdad, the slums of Damascus, the refugee camps of the Palestinians in Lebanon or Jordan. You know, these are the people who come because they feel that they have been trodden on. So, again, empowerment is such an important—.
Thomas Small A burning sense of injustice. A burning sense of injustice.
Aimen Dean Exactly.
Thomas Small Okay. That kind of—. I think that really does – would make sense to people.
Aimen Dean Exactly.
Thomas Small That's – that's, in a way, the – the idea we have of a terrorist as a freedom fighter. These are the freedom fighter brand terrorists. They're – they're fighting for their families.
They're fighting for the underdog, for the oppressed.
Aimen Dean Yeah.
Thomas Small And the third kind?
Aimen Dean And the third kind, basically, are what we call the middle-class revolutionary dreamers, you know, who come—. They would have had some education, some background, [unintelligible].
Thomas Small These are the Saudis. The Gulf Arabs in general.
Aimen Dean Indeed.
Thomas Small The more wealth—. The more wealthy, more affluent, more educated.
Aimen Dean Yeah. So, these people, some of them make up, you know, the third part of the bottom of the pile, let's put it this way, because they are not exactly very bright. But nonetheless, they came from an affluent background. So, they are—.
Thomas Small There from the idiotic bourgeoisie.
Aimen Dean Exactly. Because this is what we use to say, basically, that there are really two classes within jihad, basically. I mean, you have the bourgeoisie jihadist and you have the proletariat jihadist, you know. So, you have the foot soldiers, but also you have those who came from an affluent background. If you remember, basically, there were many affluent people from Europe who went to join the international brigade in the Spanish Civil War.
Thomas Small Absolutely.
Aimen Dean So, they are the same way. You know, university students. You know, people basically who have this aspiration of joining a global revolution against the, you know, globalisation and the New World Order led by the Americans.
Thomas Small Idealist – idealists. I suppose, it's these people who – who are particularly inflamed by the ideology of jihadism, because they're slightly more intellectual. They get trapped, in – in a way, in – in the perfection of an – of ideological thinking. This sort of clockwork thinking of a perfect ideology.
Aimen Dean Indeed. And then, above these classes, you have people who have a better education in theology or a useful skill.
Thomas Small Engineering, medicine.
Aimen Dean In- – indeed. Engineering, medicine. And I remember—.
Thomas Small Chemistry.
Aimen Dean Absolutely. And I remember, you know – you know, when these people used to come, we used to celebrate a lot. So, basically, if someone who comes with a degree in theology or a degree in chemistry or a degree in engineering, especially, you know, I remember, in Afghanistan, we had a celebration when someone who is an engineer in water sanitisation, you know, who came. So, of course, basically these are very important skills. Doctors are always celebrated, you know, when they come. And so, they form, you know, the upper class of jihadism. You know, these people are very important. You know, they are not easily disposed of. You just don't send your doctors to the frontline all the time to get killed. You try to preserve them as much as possible, even though they insist on fighting, because they came from the jihad. So, you indulge them a little bit. But you do not throw them into the thick of battle or you chose them to become a suicide bombers. Now—.
Thomas Small So, you weren't put on the front lines.
Aimen Dean I did go to the front lines, because, sometime, basically what they do whenever they feel that they need to test your resolve and see if you are a coward, so they would put you in the front line. So, I remember one of al-Qaeda's leaders, he said, "Oh, by the way, [unintelligible]. We need to send you to the front line, because we are doing the rotation. Everyone, regardless, must do the rotation." And, you know, years later, I was joking about it, that I fought against UK assets and the other side of the, you know – you know, the front line, which is another alliance. So—. But nonetheless, I was sent to the front line. And I remember basically, you know, there, during a routine patrol, you know, in our pickup, in a military car, we came under ambush. And the person next to me, an Egyptian, you know, a man in his fifties who was a UK citizen, was shot in the head, you know, in the pickup, in the back. And we were just speeding, because we were under ambush. We were speeding back. And two other people were wounded.
Thomas Small Oh, my. And oh, my God. And his – his corpse was there the whole time?
Aimen Dean The whole time I was actually holding, you know, his neck and his head. And, basically, the blood was seeping from his head where the bullet came into my palm and then into – in the rest of my sleeve.
Thomas Small Were you horrified? Were you terrified? Or does the adrenaline just take over?
Aimen Dean No. I was actually sad, because I liked him. You know, I liked him so much. Because he was in his fifties, he was a fatherly figure. He was quiet, humorous. He was one of those extremely intellectual people. And he was a good bombmaker also. So, it shows you they spare no one sometime when they feel that there is a need for rotation.
Thomas Small This is a recurrent theme with you that, in fact, when, like when – when Khalid [name], your friend that you told us last time, when he died, you felt sad. This – this – this sense of sadness at the waste of life. It – it goes to show, really, that these recruits that we've been discussing, either the criminals or the – the lower-class recruits or the middle-class recruits, they are human beings.
Aimen Dean Indeed.
Thomas Small They have been brainwashed into an idiotic ideology. But in your day-to-day encounters with them, they were nice people. They were friendly people. You felt a bond with them.
Aimen Dean Indeed. Because, you know, no matter what, you know—. Let's say, like, you know, if one of the listeners is thinking, basically, "Are these really nice people?" Of course, they are nice people to each other. Because, again, we come back to the fact that they're psychopathic and violent tendencies are directed towards a defined enemy. So, what is left there towards their comrades is nothing but, you know, really sweet, you know, comradery, you know, which they exhibit towards others. So, basically, they have managed to direct their rage, anger, and violence towards a defined enemy, which left their better characteristics to be, you know, directed towards their fellow jihadists.
Thomas Small If only they knew then you were actually an enemy in their midst.
Aimen Dean Well, they didn't know. Thank God for that.
Thomas Small If – if they had found out, what would they have done to you? What – what threat were you living under? The threat of immediate execution?
Aimen Dean You know, in the thirty-three months I used to go and come into Afghanistan and into the camps, during that time, from 1999 until 2001, five members of al-Qaeda were apprehended and given trials and then executed for being spies inside the organisation. Two were accused of working for the Jordanian intelligence services and three were accused of being spies for the Egyptian intelligence services. So, of course, you know, I never attended any of the executions, because I did not want to envision my head, you know, being the one, you know, basically fallen to the ground after a swift, sharp sword strike.
Thomas Small How close were you personally ever to being found out, to being executed by
al-Qaeda?
Aimen Dean There are—. There was a practice, especially in the run-up to 9/11, where, at some point, they would do random checks. And I didn't know about this. Remember, I told you about the rotation for the frontline?
Thomas Small Yeah.
Aimen Dean When we are in the camps or in the headquarters or anywhere, we have something called a rotation for the services. And that includes not just only guard duty, but kitchen duty. So, whenever I'm in the kitchen, basically, you know, this is a cause of celebration for my fellow al-Qaeda members, because I always used to love to cooking, you know, fries. You know, fries were something important.
Thomas Small French fries?
Aimen Dean French fries. Yeah. So, they love it.
Thomas Small Free- – freedom fries, I think, they were called at the time.
Aimen Dean Yeah. But that was after 9/11, I mean, basically, because of stupid American, you know—.
Thomas Small Ha. I beg your pardon.
Aimen Dean Okay. Sorry. Sorry.
Thomas Small There's nothing stupid about us at all. We'd never done anything stupid, Aimen.
Aimen Dean If only. So, I was in the kitchen and I was basically just, you know, cutting the potatoes into, you know, fry shapes. And I remember, you know, someone entering into the kitchen, but I wasn't aware of who he was. And then, I realised, basically, that some movement happening in the kitchen that my other, you know, helpers in the kitchen left in a hurry. And so, I was thinking, before I was going to turn around, distinctively, I felt the end of a pistol against my spine, you know. And so, I heard, you know, a rather familiar voice, someone I knew, saying, "[name], you have to come with me quietly. We know who you are. We know who you work for. It's over. It's done. Resistance is futile."
Thomas Small Oh, my God.
Aimen Dean So—. And I remember I just looked around like this and I say, "Do you know that it is explicitly forbidden to point a gun, even if it's empty, against another brother? Take, you know—. Put it down. Put your gun down now." And I remember he looked at me shocked a little bit. I said to him, "Put it down. I'm not going to tolerate this joke." So, I pretend that it was a joke. And trust me, inside of my heart, my heart was beating not inside my chest, but inside my neck. This is how I felt it. The pulse was so strong. But I had to survive. I had to really convince him that I thought it was a joke.
Thomas Small Because you knew that he might think that you had no idea what he was talking about.
Aimen Dean Yeah. So, I told him, "I'm not tolerating this joke." So, he said, "It's not a joke." You know? And I said, "Look, don't try to save yourself." You know? "I'm going to report to you now, you know, to everyone here, you know. So, take it, you know, down. Take the gun down." So, he took it down and he said, "[name], I'm sorry. But they told me basically I have to do random checks like, you know, against people. You know, like, you know, how, you know, it is. It's not – nothing personal. But, you know, you are one of the travellers." You know, we – we – we are called travellers. You know, the in and out people. So—.
Thomas Small It was just a random check?
Aimen Dean It was a random.
Thomas Small He had no—. No one had any idea that you actually were a double agent?
Aimen Dean No.
Thomas Small How did you keep your cool, Aimen? I would have peed my pants.
Aimen Dean You know, by then, it was 2001 and I have been, you know, in jihad since 1994. So, seven years of being in different war zones, man, you know. This is how you keep your calm.
Thomas Small Let's go back to when you left al-Qaeda. Why did you choose to join MI6?
Aimen Dean Well, when I left al-Qaeda and I was on my way to Qatar at that time, under the pretext of medical attention, which was true. I needed medical attention for my liver, which was suffering from, you know, the – the after effects of typhoid, and malaria is tracking me at the same time. You know, that was very merciless period. I lost half of my weight and almost died. So—.
Thomas Small Sounds like a very effective diet, actually.
Aimen Dean Indeed, yes. You know, malaria and typhoid, good for your health. Anyway, so—. So, I remember when I arrived in Qatar. My mission, or at least what I thought was my mission, was to get the medical treatment necessary and then tell al-Qaeda that "oh, my passport has been confiscated, you know, by the Qatari authorities. I'm banned from traveling. I can't come back. Well, see you in another life. Goodbye." And then, enrol into a university, study history, graduate, become a history teacher. That was the plan. And what a naive plan it was.
Thomas Small You land in Qatar.
Aimen Dean Yes.
Thomas Small And the Qataris apprehend you.
Aimen Dean Indeed. The story was that I land there. And it so happened I land during a time when the Qataris had their own internal investigation about suspicious phone calls, you know, coming out of Pakistan into Qatar, from the phone of a well-known operative, Abu Zubaydah. So, I remember, when I landed there, I was just picked up in order to clarify why was I using Abu Zubaydah's phone and if I know him. And if I know him, what was the nature of my relationship with him? So, I remember the Qatari intelligence service officers, you know, all of them were sitting in a very menacing, you know, behind the long desk, you know. And I'm alone in a chair, you know. And they were looking at me menacing. And I was looking at them basically about to burst laughing, because their facial expressions were so fake, you know. And I could tell that they were, you know, trying to be menacing, but in reality, they are all just, you know, cuddly, nice people, you know, in their daily lives.
Thomas Small Gulf Arabs have that problem, don't they?
Aimen Dean Indeed.
Thomas Small They're – they're menacing, but they're such cuddly, nice people.
Aimen Dean Indeed.
Thomas Small And so, you – you yourself are one of these people.
Aimen Dean Exactly. So, I just look at them and I think, "Guys, like, I mean your facial expressions are just so fake." But nonetheless, you know, they're looking at me menacingly and they were saying, "Look, we know who you are and we need you to tell the truth and be – and assist us in our inquiry. Otherwise, basically, you know, we could exhibit another awful nature of ours with you." So, I was looking at them. "Okay. Tell me. What is the inquiry?" They said, "Do you deny that you made a phone call from Abu Zubaydah's phone, you know, to one of your friends here in Qatar?" "Oh, no. I made that phone call, all right." "Really? Did you?" "Yeah. I did." "So, you don't deny it?" "You know, why would I deny it?" "Yeah. But it's Abu Zubaydah's phone. Like, [unintelligible]. You know, you don't – you don't want to distance yourself from Abu Zubaydah?" I said, "Well, you asked me for the truth and I'm telling the truth. So, you know, why can't you just accept it? And I—. Yes, I did use Abu Zubaydah's phone to call my friend in Qatar. I mean, I needed medical attention and, you know, I was almost dying a year earlier, you know. And so, I couldn't go to a phone box or a phone booth or any other, you know, service, so I can call my friends from there. So, Abu Zubaydah gave me his phone and told me to make the phone call."
Thomas Small What did they say next?
Aimen Dean So, they said, "And—. So, basically, it was all about medical attention? But why were you Abu Zubaydah, you know, safe house in the first place? And why would he trust you with your phone – with his phone to begin with?" I said, "Well, I can—. I'm a member of al-Qaeda. And, you know, basically, of course, Abu Zubaydah is one of the facilitators for our organisation and—."
S: Easiest interrogation ever.
Aimen Dean Yeah.
Thomas Small You cracked under pressure immediately.
Aimen Dean Oh, there was no pressure at the beginning. Actually, I, you know—. On the plane, when I was actually flying from Bashar and landing in Doha—.
Thomas Small You had already decided to leave al-Qaeda anyway.
Aimen Dean Not the only that. Actually, in my own heart, I started reciting the renunciation of my allegiance to al-Qaeda. You know, basically, you say, "Oh, Lord." You know? "The allegiance I gave to Osama bin Laden and to al-Qaeda, I declare to You that it is null and void, and I take it back."
Thomas Small Well, how do you say that in Arabic?
Aimen Dean You say, you know—. You say, like, you know, "[foreign language]." You know? "[foreign language]."
Thomas Small "I renounce my allegiance to al-Qaeda."
Aimen Dean Yes.
Thomas Small "Oh, Lord of [crosstalk]."
Aimen Dean And to Osama bin Laden. So, I renounced that allegiance on the plane, leaving, you know, Pakistan. So—.
Thomas Small You say, "I'm in al-Qaeda." And what do they say next?
Aimen Dean And they look at me and they say, basically, you know, "Okay. One minute. Just—." You know? "Are we missing something here? Why are you so candid here?" And then, I told them what happened after East Africa, what I found out, all the way to the fact that I was renouncing my [unintelligible] my allegiance on the plane landing in Doha. And that—. I remember when they just looked at each other and, you know, they started whispering into each other's ears and coming together and huddling together. And then, after that, basically, they decided to switch on all the lights, you know, within the room, you know, basically, feeling relaxed. You know, they came to me one after another, shaking my hand, you know, patting me on the, you know, on the shoulder and saying, "Well done."
Thomas Small How did you get into MI6?
Aimen Dean The fact is that after the Qataris, you know, were able to check all of the facts I gave them, they told me that, "Look, we would love to facilitate your dream of becoming a history teacher and living with us here in Qatar. But the problem is Doha is a city of two hundred and fifty thousand people. It's like a small suburb of London. So, you will be running into your friends every day, you know, for the rest of your life. And that is something that we do not think is a good idea. You know, if you want to have a normal life, in which basically you can be protected, we think that you need to immigrate and leave, you know, to work with one of three countries and work for their intelligence agencies. Just only for six months. Debriefing. That's it."
Thomas Small The US…
Aimen Dean France.
Thomas Small …France, or Britain?
Aimen Dean Yeah.
Thomas Small Why did you choose Britain?
Aimen Dean Okay. As far as Americans were concerned—and I'm sorry, Tom—but the memory of your cruise missiles, you know, landing over our heads, you know, just, you know, a few months earlier—.
Thomas Small On your way back from the bathroom.
Aimen Dean Indeed. Were not exactly, you know, encouraging me, you know, to go and work with those who just, months earlier, pressed the button to kill me. So, I thought, "Okay. Not Americans." So, as far as the French were concerned, first, I don't like their language. I don't like their manner. I don't like, like, the way they behave.
Thomas Small Ooh.
Aimen Dean There are—. Again, they're aloof, you know. And that's the best things about them, actually. I didn't go even to the worst things.
Thomas Small I—. Now, I understand why you joined MI6.
Aimen Dean Okay. So – so, I decided, you know, that, you know, since my grandfather, you know, fought for the British, actually, in Iraq, in the battles of Al Amara, Al Kut, and Baghdad and was actually a major, an official major in the British army.
Thomas Small In the First World War.
Aimen Dean In the First World War, he fought against the Ottomans alongside the British. And so, I thought that there is some affinity there, you know, with the British foreign office and then the intelligence services. And so, I decided that, at least, I was familiar with London. I've been there before. So, I decided to go with familiarity and affinity. That actually what, you know, made up my mind.
Thomas Small So, you were a double agent working with MI6 for eight years.
Aimen Dean Indeed.
Thomas Small And in that time, the War on Terror was launched and went through many different vicissitudes. Where, n your opinion, did the War on Terror go wrong? What were the biggest mistakes that were made?
Aimen Dean The first mistake, the biggest mistake, the mother of all mistakes was Iraq.
Thomas Small Invading Iraq in 2003?
Aimen Dean Indeed. That was absolutely not necessary, whatsoever. There was no immediate danger. Saddam Hussein, in fact, was the, you know, the last standing pillar of Arab secular nationalism. He was a big hurdle against al-Qaeda and also against Iran and their brand of Shia political and militant Islam. So, you know, taking Saddam down was the dumbest strategic mistake that Bush and Blair ever done. And that what revived the fortunes of al-Qaeda and the global jihad.
Thomas Small The Iraq War. Well, that's what we're going to talk about in the next episode, Aimen. And I'm sure the listener will be looking forward to hearing your idiosyncratic views on what remains, to this day, the great seeping wound of modern Middle Eastern history.
Aimen Dean Indeed.
Thomas Small This episode of Conflicted was produced by Jake Warren and Sandra Ferrari. Original music by Matt Huxley. If you want to hear more of Conflicted, make sure you search for us on Apple Podcasts or wherever you download yours.