Conflicted S3 E1 - Afghanistan Continued

CONFLICTED
S03E01

Thomas Small Dear, listener. It's finally happening. Welcome to season three of Conflicted. My name is Thomas Small, and I am very happy to say that the wonderful and mysterious Aimen Dean is here with me as always.

Hello, Aimen.

Aimen Dean Hello, Thomas. I'm so happy that we finally do it.

Thomas Small It's been a long time, my friend. I mean, we did have that wonderful bonus episode on Afghanistan a few months ago, which – which you guys really liked, listeners. You loved it. But we haven't had a full season for nearly two years.

Aimen Dean Indeed. It's overdue.

Thomas Small Yes, it is. And – and what a couple of years they have been, as well. My goodness. The whole world has changed. I mean, we – we reached the end of season two of Conflicted, which was all about the collapse of the new world order just in time for the new world order to well and truly collapsed all around us.

And you'll never guess, I'm actually, Aimen, in your home country of Saudi Arabia. Here I am in my hotel room in Riyadh, coming to direct dear listener from the heart of the Middle East.

[THEME IN]

So, are you ready to start season three?

Aimen Dean Oh, my God. You have no idea.

[THEME OUT]

Thomas Small Just before we get going, we first wanted to say a huge thank you for your patience in season two. We are so happy that you stuck with us. And, at last, we are back with a brand-new run of episodes. More than ever before, in this season of conflicted, we're coming at you with at least sixteen episodes. So, get ready to hear our voices a lot in 2022.

Season three is also more ambitious. We're focusing on the Middle East, but this time, even more deeply, going further back in time and exploring history and religion in more complex ways than before. Our hope is to genuinely alter the way you think about the world. And, today, in our first episode, we're picking up where we left off: in Afghanistan.

In our bonus episode, we focused on the story of the Taliban's rise to power in the nineties and took you, the listener, behind the scenes with Aimen's dramatic story of facing an oncoming caravan of Taliban warriors and being unable to fire upon them. We thought it was important to go on a historical deep dive, because, at the time, the news reports were all focused on the present. But that's what Conflicted does best. On the picture of the present, we paint in the background to help you understand the present better.

So, to take up where we left off, and also, once again, back to where we began, all those episodes ago in season one, we start with 9-11. Aimen, by that point, you've been working for MI5 and MI6 as a double agent inside Al-Qaeda for, what, like, thirty-three months?

Aimen Dean Almost. Yes.

Thomas Small Obviously, your brief must have included Afghanistan.

Aimen Dean Well, actually, most of my time was spent in Afghanistan over the thirty-three months prior to 9-11.

Thomas Small So, the Twin Towers come crumbling down. The world is in shock. And on September 12th, what did you think was in store for Afghanistan?

Aimen Dean There was no question that there would be massive retaliation. America was wounded deeply. And that sense of the two oceans and the nuclear deterrent that protected America for a very long time was shattered.

Thomas Small So, what were you doing then, on that September 12th, and – and on the days following? What was your job inside the intelligence services?

Aimen Dean Well, I ended up, basically, looking at maps of Afghanistan and pinpointing locations of cams, supply routes, weapon storage facilities. So, my role was to familiarise the intelligence services and, you know, of course, the UK's MOD, the Ministry of Defence, with the military apparatus of Al-Qaeda.

Thomas Small And what did you consider the American-led invasions prospects to be at that time? And were you – were you bullish? Were you bearish? What did you think? Did you think that it would be a cakewalk or did you think America would get bogged down as it did?

Aimen Dean I thought that the Taliban will be able to withstand the American onslaught for roughly six months, because it's not a Vietnam. I knew that the advanced technology and the experience of the Americans in Iraq in the Gulf War against Saddam Hussein to liberate Kuwait made sure that the Americans basically will not, you know, be bogged down in the sense that they would be able to smash the Taliban's fighting ability as a coherent force.

Thomas Small You thought the Taliban would hold out for six months. But in the end, they – they barely survived six weeks. Why is that?

Aimen Dean You know, many Taliban units who were tribal in their nature, they decided to basically, "Just pack and leave. I'm not going to withstand the B52s dropping, you know, know hundreds of tons of explosive over my head. I can't fight that. So, I'm going to go back to my family." Because, don't forget, the Talibans were not wearing, you know, distinct informs. They all wore civilian clothing. So, they melted into the background, which collapsed the Taliban's ability to run a military campaign to—. It was just the Americans.

Thomas Small And what kind of a firepower did America bring to the table?

Aimen Dean At the beginning, they had the difficulty, because, you know, Pakistan, did not really open all the military air bases. And so, they were using the American aircraft carriers, F18s and even they converted F14s, to carry smart-guided bombs. But then, of course, it is the long-range firepower of both the B52 and the B2. These are long range bombers. They can fly all the way from Arizona to Afghanistan over eighteen hours, drop their bombs, and then come back again.

So, you know, that continuous barrage of massive ordinance falling over Taliban positions, which actually had more psychological effect, you know, than just actual the damage.

Thomas Small So, at that time, I mean, here we have this lightning strike invasion of the Taliban fold quite quickly and the coalition has – has clamped the country fast.

But did you feel then that – that America was pursuing some kind of overall strategic goal? Or was it just revenge? Was it just in response to 9-11? "You hit us. We hit you." Or – or was – was there already a glimmer of a kind of – of a long-term goal here?

Aimen Dean From the beginning, you know, the thinking in DC and in 10 Downing Street was the Taliban must go. And, therefore, who will replace them? So, from the beginning, the question of nation building was on the table.

Thomas Small And how did this idea of nation building strike you?

Aimen Dean For me, at that time, because it was maybe swept in the moment, I believe that maybe it could work. Because, at the time, I still was believing that Tony Blair was a forceful good.

Thomas Small Okay. So, at the beginning, you thought, "Well, maybe Tony Blair can save the situation." But when did – when did you realise that that was unlikely to happen?

Aimen Dean I think three weeks into the war. When you start to see over-reliance of, you know, on warlords who were involved, you know, in gang activities and drugs. So, the over-reliance on these—. Yes, they were opposing forces to the Taliban, but they were criminal classes. I mean, they were, you know, people who the Taliban put away for a good reason. They were terrorising the civilian population before. And so, this Machiavellian execution of the war started to, you know, give me doubts that—. I don't think basically they are serious about nation building.

Thomas Small Well, were there other actors on the ground in Afghanistan that the US could have – could have allied with? I mean, maybe – maybe they were stuck with these warlords. Who else might they have allied with?

Aimen Dean They could have more or less picked up their allies in a better way and allied themselves more with the tribal leadership and relied on a more tribal consensus building, you know, effort rather than trying to, you know, rely on warlords and people who were involved in the drug trade, you know, prior to the rise of Taliban. However, you know, more or less the biggest doubt that came to my mind that there is going to be a difficulty in this nation building was the rejection of the return of the monarchy to Afghanistan.

Thomas Small Yes. That in December of 2001, at the – during the negotiations and bond between the Afghan power players, not including the Taliban, the Afghan party wanted to bring back the king, but the Americans vetoed that. And you – you think that that was a sign that the American nation building project was – was sort of more ideologically slanted than it should have been?

Aimen Dean Yes. And there is actually another, you know, a mistake, which I highlighted at the time. You know that the Taliban are Deobandis and they listen, you know, a lot to the Deobandi scholars in Pakistan and India.

Thomas Small So, long-term listeners will remember that the Deobandi movement, which comes from Northern India during the – during the Raj, during the British rule there, is one of the – one of the biggest ref- – reformist, revivalist political Islamic movements in the world. Because it – because it grew up in the context of throwing out the British. It has a particularly strong anti-Western anti-imperialist edge to it. And the Taliban are – are – are a part of that stream of modern Islamist thought.

Aimen Dean Exactly. I suggested, at that time, that there are many moderate pacifist Deobandi scholars, Afghan and Pakistani and Indian who could have been actually courted initially, even if it was just outside of the bomb process in order to, you know, facilitate the—. Not only the—. Well, we don't call it the surrender, but the rehabilitation of the Taliban back into the political fold. So, they can be, you know, placated and, at the same time, not be pushed towards mounting a resistance movement in the future.

And the third issue, which we already talked about it before in the last episode, which is the rejection of the, you know, aspects of sharia to be incorporated into the new Afghan constitution. All of this, give me doubt that, nah, it's not going to work.

Thomas Small So, as you say too many warlords had been invited into the process, warlords whom the Afghans had effectively rejected earlier. And this is because the Americans, you know, they'd assumed, if you were against the Taliban, you were good, forgetting that the Taliban had, of course, arisen by – by fighting arseholes.

Let's be honest. But that's what America went in there thinking, "The enemy of my enemy must be a good guy," which is a pretty naive view. So, what opportunities in those early months were lost? I mean, you once told me that you had an idea—this sounds crazy—but you had an idea that America should have actually consciously put together a massive Islamic, a Muslim invading force to conquer the country.

Aimen Dean Well, or at least the peacekeeping force.

Thomas Small Which countries might have – might have contributed to this force?

Aimen Dean I would say Saudi Arabia. I would say the UAE. The UAE already, like, contributed, you know, before. Indonesia, Malaysia.

Thomas Small I mean, countries with – with – with men – with manpower. Arm—. you know, big armies.

Aimen Dean Turkey, Iran, Egypt. I mean, there is no shortage of big armies in the Muslim world. I mean, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Bangladesh, as well as Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, all of these countries, basically, among them, they have millions of men, you know, men in terms of manpower. They could have spared the a hundred thousand troops easy in order to facilitate that kind of, you know, revivalist, Afghan political tradition of the loya jirga. Like, you know, I mean, of this kind of rule by consensus. It could have happened. But no one reached out to them, because, somehow, the Taliban basically were viewed as the absolute villains. Everyone forget that Afghan, you know, society and Afghan history is full of villains. It's just basically some of them are better than others.

Thomas Small The plan that you're suggesting isn't so different from the plan that informed the invasion of Kuwait in 1991 to expel Saddam Hussein. And in that case, America working closely with King Fahad of Saudi Arabia, brought together an enormous coalition of Islamic countries to help legitimise that – that invasion. So, they could have done the same thing. Although, you know, that took months to – to cobble together. That took six, seven months for – for that invasion force to be – to be formed. I suppose America just didn't – didn't feel they – they had the time for that kind of diplomacy.

Aimen Dean I think it's just the inability to see further than a four-year election cycle. It's a question of "Okay. We want to show the American public that we took revenge." And, you know, you – you could have taken the revenge right away, like—. And I mean, just bomb the hell out of them. But the question here is what will replace the Taliban afterwards to make sure that the Taliban do not return. Because, guess what, twenty years later, the Taliban returned.

Thomas Small Okay. So, to—. Before we get to the now, we can do a quick summary of what happened after the invasion. So, between 2001 and 2008, the peace process did – did sort of move ahead, the bond agreement was signed, elections were held, Hamid Karzai became president. And you know, it was fairly calm at first. Then, as you told us in the last episode, the US got distracted by Iraq and the Al Qaeda terrorists leader there, Zarqawi, rose, began sending money to the Taliban where they were held out in the – in the Af-Pak border. And then, they started launching terrorist attacks inside Afghanistan, again creating the instability that became endemic there.

George W. Bush goes. Barack Obama arrives. Now, he promises to sort out Afghanistan. When he arrived, did you feel more encouraged, Aimen?

Aimen Dean No. On multiple levels. I just did not trust him. I did not feel that he was going to make any significant changes. I say this why? Because he had a much bigger fish to fry, which is the financial crisis. I mean, America and the American economic system was in dire situation. So, for him, the focus was actually how to get America out of the mess they are in financially before he can actually get America out of the military mess in both Iraq and Afghanistan.

Thomas Small That is certainly true, Aimen. That's certainly true. But he did increase troop numbers in Afghanistan. He did try to solve the problem there. So, let's – let's speak about – about those – those efforts, I mean, in a concrete way. What were the US tactical errors at that time?

Aimen Dean It's like this, you know—. It's – it's like a gambler going into a casino and saying, "Okay. Well, how do I recover my losses? Put more money in, so I might, like, recover the old losses." It is that habitual gambler, you know, situation, which is hopeless.

Thomas Small Well, that makes sense to me, Aimen. More troops, more – more, you know, more fists punching the Taliban in the face.

Aimen Dean Yeah. But, again, we come back to comparing oranges and apples here. We come back to comparing Iraq and Afghanistan. You can't compare a rock, which is an open desert, to Afghanistan, which is a mountain society. You know, Iraq, which has a decades of central government with Afghanistan, which has decades of rural, you know, population. You can't compare the two at all. And, therefore, you know, the idea that the troops there will actually serve as a catalyst for the Taliban to, you know, capitulate, it was the opposite. They increased their ranks. They increased their number. More recruits joined them, because, you know, it's like introducing more virus into a body that will, you know, create more antibodies. Obama would have actually done better if he spent the money on the infrastructure of the country than actually sending more troops.

Thomas Small Another problem, I suppose, that when you send more troops to Afghanistan, more American troops, all you're doing possibly—and I'd love to hear what you think about this—is bloating a corpse, really, that was already riddled with – with corruption. I mean, the US corruption in Afghanistan was – is pretty infamous.

Aimen Dean Oh, my God. Don't get me started.

Thomas Small No. No. I want to get you started. Come on. Let us – let us – let us have it, Aimen. Talk to us about the corruption in the US forces in Afghanistan and how it contributed to the long-term failure there.

Aimen Dean You know, in the last episode, we talked about the rotten corpse of the Afghan nation state and how it – the army and the military and the ministry of interior, they were all corrupt. They were actually more or less a reflection of how corrupt the US military was. The US military there in Afghanistan relied a lot on contractors. You know, some contractors who were based in the US, some contractors who are ex-Marines and ex, you know, Green Berets and ex whatever. You know, special forces.

Thomas Small So, by contractors, you don't mean people who are building bridges. You mean contractors, people who come with – with weapons of their own. These are contract killers, mercenaries, warriors.

Aimen Dean Mercenaries. You know, people who can, basically, you know, raise private militias from the locals. But they're Americans. You know, they are American contractors who have contracts with the Department of Defence, with the DOD, with the Pentagon, or with the state department or with the CIA. And these contractors then who are based either in places like Hong Kong or Singapore, or, you know, in the Middle East, in Dubai or other places, but what they do is that they end up being the logistical arm of the Pentagon. They are the not just only logistical, but also they do some of the operations in which will go under the radar. I'm not saying Black Ops, but we are talking here about raising private militias, establishing private security firms to, you know, employ Afghans, former warlords who are rejected by the Afghan National Army from joining their ranks. So, they become the private thugs of the US military. And you end up in a situation where these contracts are worth so much in terms of protecting convoys, protecting the transport of weapons, the transport of fuels, the transport of food. After all, American troops used to enjoy McDonald's and Subway and other fast-food chains in their bases.

Thomas Small Delicacies. I think we call them delicacies in America, Aimen.

Aimen Dean Exactly. But these delicacies need to be transported somehow. And, you know, America is not going to spend the life of American Marines and GIs protecting, you know, the shipments of Big Macs.

Thomas Small I was just going to ask you why in God's name would – would the Pentagon be relying on American, you know, contract killers and mercenaries when they have a huge army of their own. And you're saying it's because – it's because of the political optics of the situation. They would rather mercenaries be killed than – than their own boys, if you like.

Aimen Dean Exactly. Because these mercenaries are not just only Americans. You know, these mercenaries are South Africans, Colombians, Venezuelan army, you know, ex-soldiers. You know, people from Nepal in, from the Gurkhas. I mean – I mean, we're talking about multinational forces. As well as from local Afghans and local Pakistanis, I mean, basically, who joined these private security firms set up by these American contractors. And they are given the job and the task of protecting logistical supplies. The Pentagon did not want to spend American blood protecting these shipments. So, who will do it? These people.

Thomas Small But where does the corruption come in, Aimen? Where does the actual corruption come in? I can understand, you know, the Pentagon is making – is paying people to do some jobs. But how is that corruption?

Aimen Dean The corruption comes in the form of obscene amounts, you know, of overpayments for this project. You will have the contractor coming, American contractor, with South African, Venezuela, and Columbian mercenaries, saying, "Well, I have a two-thousand manpower. I'm happy basically to, you know, supply you with whatever you need in terms of manpower and to protect these shipments and to protect the logistical support lines." But the problem is that he's only employing twelve hundred, and he is pocketing the salaries of the eight hundred, you know, he is quoting, you know, the DOD for.

Thomas Small This is precisely the sort of corruption you outlined for us in the previous episode about how the Afghan military was working.

Aimen Dean Exactly. But the difference here is that the American generals—and I'm not naming anyone.

Thomas Small No. No. Come on, Aimen. Give us the names. Who are these guys? Who are those? Come on.

Aimen Dean No.

Thomas Small We want to throw the book at them.

Aimen Dean It's – it's our policy, we don't.

Thomas Small You see, the trouble with corruption, Aimen, people who know about it, they don't speak openly about it.

Aimen Dean I have kids. So—.

Thomas Small Oh, that's true.

Aimen Dean But, you know, you – you will see, like – like, you know, there will be a certain contractor who I know and a certain general who I know. The general will turn a blind eye to how much the contractor is overcharging, you know, for the services and the obscene amounts of money asked for these, you know, services and for these contracts. And then, you know, four or five, six years later, when that general's time is over in the middle, you will find him serving on the board, you know, of directors as an executive director in that company. And he is paid, you know, six, seven figures sums of money, you know, in terms of, you know, remunera- – remuneration and bonuses and salaries and stock options. Yes, that's how the entire gravy train.

Thomas Small That – that – that is the classic example of corruption. But you know, Obama, President Obama, must have known about this. Many people must have known about this. Why didn't he do anything about it?

Aimen Dean Well, you know, when you are, you know, fighting a war, you don't rock the boat. I mean, you're already fighting a war and you know, basically, that, you know, this money is going here on there, and it is important that this money keeps flowing because it is feeding, you know, the Black Ops, it is feeding the irregular rendition sites, it is feeding, you know, the, operations that you need to be done in order to win the war against the Taliban in a dirty way, which your military is restrained from doing. That is exactly, you know, the issue. Bribing certain officials. Bribing tribal leaders. Paying ransom money, you know, to certain local commanders in order – you know, from the Afghan, you know, society in order to facilitate the American intelligence gathering, and, you know, so on. So—. And so, you know, that's why in any war, you will find that dirty money is part of it. But in Afghanistan, the dirty money almost – almost matched to the legitimate money.

Thomas Small So, in 2014, 2015, 2016, a new player arrives on the field of – of the Middle East: ISIS. And before long, they're also in Afghanistan. Why were they in Afghanistan? What did they seek to achieve there?

Aimen Dean Well, Afghanistan had three important elements for them. First, it's a ungovernable space. Second, it's full of American forces. And third, it has, you know, Shia minorities. So, for ISIS, their two favourite targets, Americans and Shia, you know, they were available there in Afghanistan. And also, it is a failed state ready to be infected with the virus of ISIS.

Thomas Small And when we talk about ISIS in Afghanistan, are we talking about the whole country? Are they everywhere? And I mean, I would've thought, you know, ISIS and the Taliban would get along, you know. I mean, why – why – why are ISIS there, fighting the Taliban, and ISIS—. I mean, it seems crazy. Aren't ISIS and Taliban equally bad guys, you know? Aren't they both terrorists?

Aimen Dean No. I mean, I wouldn't equate the two. And, actually, the two wouldn't get along whatsoever. ISIS is a extreme, like, absolute extreme version of Salafist jihadism.

Thomas Small The Kharijite were a very, very early Islamic movement that were so zealous in pursuit of what they considered to be Islamic purity that they took it upon themselves to excommunicate fellow Muslims and to tell – to – basically, to say that "you are an apostate. Therefore, you can be killed. Your property can be looted. alluded. Your women can be raped." And – and this was very early on, within the first century of Islam. This tendency within Islam manifested itself, and the broader community rejected it. ISIS is an – is another manifestation of this possibility within the bosom of Islam.

And – and – and by Salafist, we mentioned earlier how the Taliban are attached to the Deobandi movement. Salafism is a different movement. It comes from the Arab part of the Middle East. It is associated with the Muslim Brotherhood, with characters like Sayyid Qutb. It comes with – with a fusion with Saudi-inflicted Wahhabism.

It's the sort of Islam that underpins Al-Qaeda and other such movements.

Aimen Dean Exactly. You know, while Al-Qaeda was tolerant towards Deobandism, and Deobandis were tolerant towards Al-Qaeda, because Al-Qaeda did not represent a rejectionist Jihadi Salafism towards other Suni trends, ISIS, however, completely, re—. you know, they rejected Al-Qaeda themselves, actually, and they agreed that Al-Qaeda were kafir. You know, they were, you know, infidels. They were apostates.

Thomas Small You're – you're an extreme Muslim when you think that Al-Qaeda isn't extreme enough.

Aimen Dean Exactly. But they were not all over Afghanistan. I mean, they found their, you know, natural habitat in the province of Kunar.

Thomas Small So, Kunar. This is in the east of Afghanistan where the majority of the population there are Salafist, not Deobandis. Is that why ISIS are there?

Aimen Dean Yeah. And they call themselves Ahl-i Hadith, you know. It's another name for Salafist there. It's just, you know—. We don't need to be bothered with the terminology. But, nonetheless, they found in the Salafist tradition, there is some sort of a incubator. So, a minority, of course of, you know, the Kanari Ahl-i Hadith Salafist joined ISIS, but they were just big enough, between five hundred to a thousand, they were big enough to actually cause significant headache for the American forces, for the Afghan government.

Thomas Small And did ISIS have any sort of – of big game plan in Afghanistan? I mean, you know, they're – obviously, they're crazy killers. But in Syria and Iraq, they had this basic goal of establishing a state, which they accomplished. But in Afghanistan, is that what they were trying to do or – or were they really just troublemakers there,

trying to make things difficult for – for their enemies?

Aimen Dean I believe they were just a disruptive force. I mean, their ultimate aim is just the disruption and to present themselves, hopefully, as the alternative to the Taliban, to those Taliban units who believed that the Taliban were not, you know, vigorous enough in their pursuit of an American withdrawal from Afghanistan. And they succeeded in attracting a few hundred disaffected Taliban fighters. But that's it.

I think the project of ISIS in Afghanistan failed on the same way that the project of ISIS failed in Yemen. Because there was already a traditional jihadist, you know, groups there, existing on the ground. And trying to out-compete them and trying to, you know, to supplant them, it takes considerable amount of persuasion, resources. And that's something that ISIS in Afghanistan did not have. So, instead of being the alternative, they became the disruptor.

Thomas Small I see. So, the Obama years are coming to a close now. We have this situation where ISIS is – is – is on the rampage in Afghanistan. The Taliban are well and truly back, causing problems. Corruption, heretofore, unimagined, is endemic both within the Afghan and the American security apparatus. And then, we come to Donald Trump. So, Donald Trump had risen to power by attaching himself to, really, the isolationist wing of the Republican party, the old right of the Republican party who were not interested in policing the world. They rejected the neo-conservative movement. He had no interest in nation building and was determined to get out of Afghanistan. So, as Donald Trump enters the scene, Aimen, were you encouraged?

Aimen Dean Well, there is always a tendency to believe that, you know, when a right-wing leader comes in, that troubles comes with him. It's not always the case. And in the case of Donald Trump, I [was encouraged when I saw that he was happy to talk to Kim Jong-un. You know, the president of North Korea or the leader. And it became clear that he is willing to talk, but on his own terms. And he and, in later years, his secretary of state, Mike Pompeo, sounded both like two New York, you know, mafia dons, I mean, basically trying to make a deal. And we'll get—. "I – I – I would make an offer you can't refuse." Kind of.

Thomas Small Well, you told me once, and I – I found it quite telling that, you know, Donald Trump is an expert at recognising lost causes, because, you know, he – he's failed so many times in his life. He's lost so much money. He's been bankrupt so many times. So many of his businesses have failed. So, coming to power him, he – he – he looked at Afghanistan and thought, "Well, this is a lost cause. We got to get out of here."

Aimen Dean Say whatever you want to say about Donald Trump—and there are, you know—. You know, we could be spending hours talking about his faults. But he recognised, in Afghanistan, not only a lost cause, but he recognised what Afghanistan really was: a money-making scheme for corrupt, you know, Afghan officials and American officials and American military, generals. And, therefore—. []x contractors. Therefore, he decided, "You know what? Let's talk to the Taliban. Let's continue the – those tentative inner first steps that Obama took in order to talk to the Taliban in Doha, in Qatar, and let – let the Qataris be the mediators." And this is, I think, where it started.

Thomas Small To move away from the American perspective and – and start walking in the Afghan shoes at the moment, I mean, it's obvious now that Afghans themselves agreed with you at the time and they knew that their hold on power was shaky and that they needed to negotiate with the Taliban. I mean, Hamid Karzai, then the president, he wanted negotiations to start in 2007, but the Bush administration refused. So, Karzai knew, as early as 2007, when the Taliban were then well and truly coming back. "We must negotiate with these players." But Bush said no. There were negotiations with other resistance militias, including your old friend Hekmatyar's group, Hezb-e-Islami.

Aimen Dean Yeah.

Thomas Small And they did sign a peace treaty with the Afghan government in 2016. So, on the ground in Afghanistan, the Afghan government, to the extent that it was sovereign, was trying to cobble together some sort of peaceful arrangement with these other actors. Now, in February 2018, Donald Trump is president and Karzai's successor as president of Afghanistan, Ashraf Ghani, publicly called for peace talks with the Taliban. Now, presumably, he would have discussed this move with the Americans, and Trump said, "Okay. Go for it." And then, a new – a resurgent peace movement began again in Afghanistan. And the people, they were worn out. They wanted an end to all the fighting. And then, there was a big conference in Tashkent, in Uzbekistan, where twenty countries, including the US, lent their support to President Ghani's call for peace talks. So, how is it that a few months later, in July 2018, the Taliban ended up talking peace with the Americans in Doha, in Qatar? Trump had asked the generals, "Look, how do we end this shit show there in Doha?" Why Doha?

Aimen Dean First of all, the Taliban, from the beginning, did not trust the government of Ashraf Ghani. So, the end of the day, you know, I want to talk with the paymasters. I mean, the Taliban knew exactly that. Abdul Rashid Dostum, Mohammad Fahim, Ismail Khan, all of the leaders, Abdullah Abdullah, all of the leaders of the Afghan government and their factions, you know, ethnic or otherwise, depend on American patronage. So, why am I going to waste my time talking to them? Because they will be going back to their paymasters, the American. They will be asking their opinion. They will come back again. And I don't trust if they are going to tell the Americans what we want to tell the Americans. And I can't trust that they will tell us what the Americans really wanted to tell us.

So, the Taliban insisted that it should be direct talks between the Taliban and the Americans, and that they want it to be in Doha, because it will be a safe, secure location. And the Qataris were more than happy to provide that safety, security and guarantees for the Taliban that no one will be arrested, no one will be harassed from your side. And, of course, the Americans were happy to see basically that, since they will be transported from Pakistan by military planes, Qatari military planes, to that military base in Doha, and then, from there, they can have the talks. The Taliban insisted direct talks, because "we don't trust the government of Ashraf Ghani." I think the Taliban and Trump, I would say, realised that the mediator here shouldn't be the Ashraf Ghani government and the other factions, because they have a lot to lose financially if there is peace.

Thomas Small And why not the Pakistanis, though? I mean, weren't they in a good position to – to be this mediator?

Aimen Dean The American intelligence, in particular the CIA, did not trust the Pakistanis. Also, the same time, Pakistan was still teaming with terror organisations, you know, from Al-Qaeda, Lashkar-e-Taiba, you know, that American officials wouldn't feel safe landing in Pakistan just to conduct talks with the Taliban. Therefore, Doha was the most secure location for the American mediators and for other Taliban felt that the Qataris will keep their words that no one will be harassed.

Thomas Small So, there we are in Doha. the Taliban are on one side of the negotiation table. The Americans are on the other side. What were these negotiations over? I mean, the Taliban presumably really wanted one thing: for the Americans to leave. So, why didn't Trump then just leave?

Aimen Dean Well, first of all, the manner of leaving needs to be done in a way in which, basically, it doesn't embarrass his government and to say, basically, that, you know, he left Afghanistan to be devoured by the Taliban. During that time, he basically wanted to empower as much as possible the Afghan National Army. He started the process of arming them with attack helicopters and attack propeller planes, which are light attack aircraft that will enable the Afghan National Army to have, you know, air superiority over the Taliban. The idea—.

Thomas Small So, before leaving Afghanistan, Trump wanted to make sure the Afghan army was strong enough to resist the Taliban for at least some time, so it wouldn't look like America had cut and run, left their allies high and dry, and the Taliban just took over the country in a lightning strike, which is, of course, what happened.

Aimen Dean Some people will always say that would the Taliban have taken over Afghanistan so quickly like this if it was Trump was in power rather than Biden.

And there is an interesting answer here. You see, during the negotiations between the Taliban and Trump administration in and Doha, ISIS in Kunar were presenting significant challenge in terms of security for the American forces. So, what Trump did, he authorised the use of the largest non-nuclear conventional bomb in the American military's arsenal, which is called the MOAB. The MOAB stands for the mother of all bombs. So—.

Thomas Small The mother of all bombs. He dropped the mother of all bombs on ISIS in Afghanistan.

Aimen Dean Exactly. Twenty thousand pounds. Ten tons of high-yield explosives, lie, were dropped on a cave network in the mountains of Kunar. It killed more than a hundred. And six ISIS members, including their leaders. You know, but many people did not understand that the significance of that bombing is that it was a message to the Taliban. "While we are negotiating with you, you know what, like, you know, we could actually use a fire power that could obliterate your hideouts. You know? So, deal with us now in a proper manner or we will do that." And so, Trump did not shy away from using massive bombs and massive orders in order to persuade the Taliban by attacking ISIS, that "we could do this to you."

Thomas Small And did the message land? Did the Taliban learn the message?

Aimen Dean Since that bomb fell on ISIS, the Taliban did not kill one single American soldier after that.

Thomas Small So, Trump had insisted any attack would be met with the swiftest retaliation, and he had proved that he was willing to do that by dropping this mother of all bombs. But it is also true that, following the US Taliban peace agreement, which was signed in February 2020—so, that's about a year before Trump left office, and which interestingly did not involve the Afghan government at all—the Taliban did begin a wave of attacks against Afghan government forces. So, they weren't attacking the Americans, but they were attacking the Afghans. From one point of view, it looks like the US had sold its allies in Kabul down the river.

Aimen Dean But some would say that it was the Kabul government actually that betrayed the Americans. Because for years, they misrepresented how many actual troops they have on the ground. They said, "We have recruited three hundred thousand strong Afghan army and security forces," when in fact they only have eighty thousand. Two hundred and twenty thousand were fictitious numbers in order to collect their salaries from the Americans. [crosstalk].

Thomas Small This is that corruption on the Afghan side.

Aimen Dean Exactly. They lied and lied and lied to the Americans about, you know, intelligence gathering. They lied to the Americans about their capability, their ability. They were unreliable allies. And so, as far as the Americans were concerned, how can—. Why should we be honourable to dishonourable allies? You know, so [as far as Trump was concerned, "I want to get out. This is the American taxpayer money. And it has enriched the pockets, you know, of so many corrupt Afghan officials, as well as American officials." You know? And he knows that. So, he decided, "You know what? As the Taliban demanded, let them slag it off with the Afghan National Army." And, actually, for Trump and Trump's administration, those months after the February 2020, they were a good, you know, testing ground of the capability of the Afghan National Army. They saw for themselves.

Because the Afghan National Army was absolutely unreliable in the sense they were telling the Americans every time, basically, they got beaten, "Oh, we have killed four hundred Taliban this day." And then, the next day, "We have killed two hundred and fifty-eight Taliban today." Actually, you know, some people were actually, you know, keeping tabs that the Afghan National Army, in a year, killed, you know, forty-five thousand Taliban, you know. But yet, at the same time, they were saying, "Oh, we estimate the number of Taliban thought about around the country to be about fifteen to twenty-five thousand. That's it." How could you – how could you kill forty-five thousand out of twenty-five? I mean, I don't know what creative math you come with, you know. With such creative math, they could become bankers.

Thomas Small So, the US and – and the Taliban, they agree peace in February 2020. Over the intervening year, negotiations were supposed to take place between the Taliban and the Afghan government. And they sort of did and then, they sort of didn't. There were prisoners swaps at times. A lot of fighting. It really was a mess. Which brings us to Joe Biden. Now, like Donald Trump, actually, Joe Biden, isn't a fan of state building. He never believed in the Afghan state building process. And as a Democrat, at the beginning of the war on terror, he had opposed Bush's war. And he – he largely stayed that way throughout. He was always opposed to the neo-conservative project. So, Trump and Biden are quite similar in that way. How are they different when it comes to Afghans?

Aimen Dean Well, actually, they were exactly similar. I mean, both of them did not believe in nation building. Both of them did not believe that the American taxpayer money should line up the pocket of corrupt people. And I think both of them believe in some sort of military might should be used as last resort. The only difference is that Trump was a bully and he could easily prove, you know, his willingness to use overwhelming power. He's willing to pull the trigger. Joe Biden is just little grandpa, man. Like, and I mean, he's such a nice guy. Like, and I mean, you know, harmless. And that is why the Taliban were thinking, "He will never drop, you know, a bullet on us, let alone, you know, drop a – the mother of all bombs. He is no Trump. You know what? Let's roll the government back like a carpet." You know? And they took over Afghanistan in nine days, in a lightning speed campaign, because they knew that Biden will not use any overwhelming force to stop them.

Trump, in my analysis, in order to appear strong in front of the American people, he would have dropped several of these mother of all bombs on the Taliban advancing forces to tell them, "Stop where you are until I evacuate everyone I want. You are going nowhere near the capitol." And they would have respected that. The Taliban would have respected that show. Biden was just, you know—. We have a saying in Arabic that he's the kind of a guy that he would not only let the cat has his dinner, but he will offer more.

Thomas Small In addition to being less of a bully than Donald Trump, Biden also made quite a serious tactical error. So, as soon as he came to power, his national security advisor, Jake Sullivan, immediately said that they were going to review the peace deal that Trump had signed with the Taliban and they were going to give their opinion on that deal by May 2021, which is actually precisely the month that Trump said the troops were going to be withdrawn from Afghanistan. And in the end, Biden announced that he was going to withdraw the troops on the 11th of September 2021, twenty years after 9-11. Sort of symbolic day to withdraw the troops for sure. But you believe, Aimen, that this was a major mistake. Why?

Aimen Dean It was a big mistake. Because Trump's secretary of state, Mike Pompeo, he knew what he was doing when he decided that we should withdraw around May. Why? Because for those people who do understand the dynamics of the Taliban jihad in Afghanistan, the Mujahideen or the Taliban are seasonal. So, they joined during the summer and then they go home during the winter. So, they went around their homes in massive numbers. And then, during the summer, they came back to swell the ranks of the Taliban.

So, the Taliban are always at only twenty-five percent military readiness during the winter. So, you know, the – the – the snow in the mount – in the mountain passes, you know, start to melt around, you know, March, April. So, only around May that the mobilisation starts. So, they are not exactly fully. By May, they will be around forty to fifty percent of their, you know, the military readiness. So, if you withdraw in May, you know, the Taliban won't have enough numbers to overwhelm the Afghan National Army at least for another month or two. So, when the Biden administration said, "Oh, we're going to delay until September," it was music to the ears of the Taliban. "Oh, thank you."

Thomas Small I think we can probably defend the Biden administration at least a little bit, given how unstructured, the transition was from Trump to Biden.

Aimen Dean Oh, yeah.

Thomas Small I mean, Trump – Trump was a very irresponsible president at the end, and a lot of his apparatchiks in the administration were tremendously irresponsible. And in addition, I imagine, within the Pentagon, there must have been a lot of higher ups who were unhappy with the idea of this very lucrative war coming to an end. Presumably, they were doing what they could to postpone things, hoping that maybe Biden would change tack and keep the war going.

Aimen Dean Not only that, but also the contracts for the evacuation of sensitive materials, equipment, military gear. Because not everything can be left behind. Some of it need to be to leave. Otherwise, it's so advanced. It will fall into the hands of the Chinese, you know. So, basically, the contracts for evacuating all of these were just the final cherry on top of the corruption game.

Thomas Small Oh, my goodness gracious.

Aimen Dean So, they wanted to prolong it as much as possible, because there was so much final, final money to be made.

Thomas Small Now, we all remember the scenes of the – of the American Withrow itself, the chaotic scenes. We also remember hearing about the Taliban getting their hands on a tremendous amount of American weaponry. Why did the Americans leave so much weaponry behind if, as you say, they had paid these men to get rid of it in advance?

I mean, what was going on there? Why didn't they sabotage at least these assets, so that they couldn't be used? Why didn't they destroy them?

Aimen Dean Well, first of all the majority of the weapons that you've seen captured, you know, were actually the weapons of the Afghan National Army.

Thomas Small Which the Americans had supplied them.

Aimen Dean Exactly. Yeah. So, the reality here is what you saw there was actually battalions and brigades, you know, worth of weapons. So, the commander of the unit will walk to the Taliban and he will say to them, "You know what? We have tens of millions, if not hundreds of millions of dollars' worth of weapons inside our base. We don't want to sabotage it. You know, pay us fifty thousand, a hundred thousand US dollars, and it's all yours." And so, the Taliban will pay them, and they will give them amnesty, and the Taliban will walk in and just pick up everything. That is what happened. And the reality here is that the Afghan National Army had far more weapons than they needed, because they lied to the Americans about their true numbers. They said, "We have three hundred thousand, you know, troops part of the Afghan National Army and the Afghan security forces," when, in fact, the maximum number was eighty thousand.

Thomas Small Were these weapons in the Afghan army—? I mean, were they very advanced weapons? Is America scared now that China is going to get their hands on them?

Aimen Dean Most of that phone swiping reads that the Americans didn't want the Chinese to have already evacuated. So, basically, what's happening is that the contracts evacuated the most sensitive technologies. Were done, were carried out. So, no sensitive technology fell into the hands of the Taliban. But what you have is already, you know, weapons that are quite advanced for, you know, even for Iran. I mean, you know, recently, there were clashes between the Taliban and the Iranian forces on the border, you know, in which the Taliban, you know, basically, like, you know, overran the Iranian forces because they had better weaponry.

Thomas Small Oh, my goodness.

Aimen Dean So, you know, and of course, basically the Iranians, you know, quickly throw in the towel and said, "Hey. Hey." Like, you know, "Just, you know, calm down, you know, guys." You know, easy tiger. Like, you know, "Let's talk." So, the reality is that, you know, there were tens of billions of dollars' worth of weaponry that the American supplied to the Afghan army that failed.

Thomas Small So, you say the Taliban have got their hands on some advanced American weaponry. But how – how might the Chinese get their hands on it then? Are they going to sell it to the Chinese?

Aimen Dean Oh, yeah. I mean, there is a tradition, you know. The—. Many times during the war, when – when an Apache helicopter, you know, during combat, you know, the Taliban, you know, came, dismantled it, and started selling the parts of the Chinese. You know, when any American drone, you know, would fall into Taliban territory, you know, during the Afghan war, they would basically sell the parts to the Chinese. And that's how the Chinese started their Wing Loong, you know, drone program, you know, reverse engineering, the American technology. So, you know, the—. I mean, one of the ironies of the Afghan conflict is that America was there to save its national security, but, at the same time, you know, their weaponry was finding its way through the Taliban to the Chinese markets in order to reverse engineer it and for the Chinese to become a bigger threat to the American national security, so.

Thomas Small Oh, my goodness. How many times during Conflicted have we pointed out how American policy has inadvertently benefited the Chinese? It's quite remarkable. Poor Afghanistan.

But what about the future, Aimen? You've described the situation in Afghanistan at present as a game of poker. Afghanistan is the chips lying there waiting to be taken. And the dealer is, weirdly, the Taliban. But who are the players around the table? I mean, obviously, we've—. There's China.

Aimen Dean Well, since the last episode, you know, things are becoming more clearer. I mean, there are now several players who want to get involved in Afghanistan. You know, the first, you know, two major players here are China and Pakistan in unison, because they want to become the, you know, the infrastructure builders. You know, the root, you know, for the rebuilding, for the commercial route for Afghanistan, the port for Afghanistan, the access to the sea. And then, you have the Emiratis and the Turks. They are fighting with each other over who will run the airports in Afghanistan. You know, the Emiratis are offering to run the airports in Kabul, [unintelligible] Kandahar for passenger and freight services. And, of course, the Emiratis, you know, want to have these contracts. The Turks want to have exactly these contracts, too.

Thomas Small And none of these players—not China, not Pakistan, not the Emirates, and not the Turks—none of them are – are against dealing with the Taliban. They don't care. They're there. They're – they're happy to deal with. They're behaving in a way that you think America should have been behaving all along, treating the Taliban like partners we can negotiate with, not imposing upon them. Some sort of bogeyman status.

Aimen Dean Absolutely. I mean, at the end of the day, the rehabilitation of the Taliban, if anything is possible like this, like, and I mean, it could take years and years. And that can only be basically happened with a tremendous amount of patience and diplomacy and trade and commerce. To isolate Afghanistan because of the Taliban is going to actually cause Al-Qaida and other unsavoury groups to re-emerge there again. Do we really need to go back and repeat the cyclical history again? No. Only—. The only way to strengthen the wing within the Taliban that wants to engage with the rest of the world is through talks and commerce in particular. Let commerce flow into Afghanistan.

Thomas Small So, those are the countries that you feel look upon a Taliban-run Afghanistan as an opportunity. But what about the countries in the – in the neighbourhood that are worried about it? I mean, Iran must be at the top of that list.

Aimen Dean Yeah. Iran – Iran is conflicted—and no pun intended—concerning Afghanistan. In one hand, they see them as an opportunity. But on the other hand, they see them as a threat, you know. And already, border clashes between the two shows that the Taliban bond I'm not going to take any dictates, you know, from Iran, whatsoever, and that the Taliban is demanding that Iran treat them as equals and not, like, you know, as, in the past, a group that just were supported by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard.

So, the Iranians are afraid of the Suni power next door and often emboldened Pakistan because of it. But at the same time, this could be a potential customer for greater trade, you know, in the future. You know, it all depends, you know, on Iran's ability to, you know, bribe the Taliban enough. But also, they're afraid that if the Emiratis and the Saudis and the Turks are going to get there with better terms, then these countries will have, you know, a significant amount of leverage over the Taliban, that the Afghanistan will become a territory through which espionage and possibly even sabotage against Iran could originate from.

Thomas Small What about Russia? What do they feel about what's going – what – what's been going on there?

Aimen Dean All what Russia wants is for the Taliban to control the IMU, you know, which is the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, the Tajik jihadists, and others from not launching cross-border attacks into these countries or trying to destabilise these countries. These countries are considered to be satellite countries as far as Moscow is concerned.

Thomas Small They were members of the Soviet Union, these countries. They were parts of the Soviet Union. So, there's a reason for that.

Aimen Dean Exactly. They are considered to be the security buffer, you know, know as far as Russia is concerned. And so, the – the Russians are offering a infrastructure projects, you know, maintaining the dams in Sarawbi and in Daruntah, and some hydroelectric power projects, you know, in the country in return for a goodwill from the Taliban. And the Taliban basically are, you know, feeling that, well, you know, why not? Like, and I mean, if the, you know—. And this is why the Taliban are actually, you know, playing some game here. They are making, you know, all these groups a little bit visible on the border, you know. They're making the IMU visible. They are making the jihadi Tajiks visible in Badakshan. Also, in Badakshan—.

Thomas Small Threatening the Russians, reminding the Russians of the possible threat, so that the Russians will give them concessions.

Aimen Dean Exactly. And they're making the Uyghurs, you know, the members of the Islamic Turkistan, the Is – the Turkistan Islamic Movement, ITM and TIP, which is the Turkistan Islamic Party. There are Chinese jihadist groups from Xinjiang province, which is bordering Afghanistan from the Wakhan Corridor, they actually are parading them a little bit, you know, around that border area.

Thomas Small Reminding the Chinese of what – what might happen if they don't play along.

Aimen Dean Exactly. So, the Taliban are, you know, savvy, you know, political operators. They are not your average tower heads. Like, you know, they are more smarter than you would give them credit for. And they are using this leverage on both China and Russia to gain as much concessions as possible.

Thomas Small But would you say that, all things considered, China's going to end up being the winner? I mean, when you think of the rare earth minerals that Afghanistan is loaded with, lithium especially, all – all of which China needs to be a leading chip battery in lithium processing power, they're going to win aren't they, the Chinese? They – they're certainly not going to be hobbled as the Americans have been hobbled by ideological and moral scruples. They're going to do what needs to be done to get their hands on those resources.

Aimen Dean Not only that. But how many other, you know, multinational companies, you know, are going to be crazy enough to go out and operate in Afghanistan? Most of the mining companies are either from Australia, Canada, and America and Europe. And none of these have the risk appetite to go and actually operate in a very dangerous environment like Afghanistan. So, you really only have the Chinese and, to some extent, the South Koreans and the Japanese and the Malaysians, you know, who – and the Turks who are more than willing and happy to come and operate. So, these are the countries that are already courting the Taliban over the question of the minerals and the minerals rights.

Thomas Small Well, it's been a long twenty years, Aimen, since America decided to venture into Afghanistan, only to withdraw in—. Well, let's – let's put it bluntly. In defeat.

Aimen Dean Exactly.

Thomas Small What's the takeaway? Where did America go wrong? A lot of money was spent. Not much – not much return on that investment. Where did they go wrong?

Aimen Dean I think the Americans went wrong when they actually decided that, instead of waging a campaign to rebuild Afghanistan in terms of infrastructure, they decided to actually just fund projects that were designed to say to the Taliban "in your face." They waged the cultural war on Taliban values, forgetting that some of these values are also entrenched Afghan values. So, trying to teach modern arts to Afghan people and trying to talk to them about, you know, modern liberal, you know, ideals as – and spend money on these programs that were supposed to be allocated to infrastructure and for things, basically, that will actually bring them benefit, that alienated more Afghan and actually emboldened the Taliban.

Thomas Small Well, Aimen, it sounds to me like you're discussing something that some people call hyper-liberalism or radical liberalism.

Aimen Dean Yes.

Thomas Small The people who hate it the most, they call it woke-ry and all that sort of thing.

Aimen Dean Yes.

Thomas Small This hyper liberalism, Aimen, this institutional woke-ry, if you like, is really the guiding ideology behind America's global hegemony. And over the past thirty years, since the end of the Cold War, that weird nexus of radical liberalism, global capitalism, and idealistic militarism has evolved, but it remains the US government's guidance. The question is for how long.

We've just told the story of America's retreat from Afghanistan, but some might say we've told the story of its retreat from the Middle East entirely as it pivots towards Asia and, quite frankly, focuses more and more on itself. America is fraying. The result of huge social and economic stresses, which the COVID pandemic has only exacerbate. So, America's "empire" in the Middle East, is it drawing to a close?

What we want to do in this third season of Conflicted is to tell the story of the rise of that "empire" in the Middle East, which will force us to go back to the end of the Second World War and the beginning of the Cold War. What we want to do—and stick with us, dear listener, because what we're proposing is a historical and cultural trip that will stretch your imaginations—is to deep dive into the subterranean conflicts that some thinkers have said are ultimately to blame for the riven, blood-soaked Middle East that we see today. Deep cultural conflicts that have been called the clash of civilisations.

Well, there you go. We've finally gotten up to the present day when it comes to Afghanistan. And on the next episode of Conflicted, we are properly going to explore this idea of the clash of civilisations, setting out the course for the rest of season three.

But before we head off, there are a couple of exciting things we want to tell you about. First of all, as always, I want to encourage you to join our discussion group on Facebook. We have almost two thousand members now, and we love seeing all your love for the show. In the group, you can continue the conversation with your fellow Conflicted fans after each new episode and get all the news about what's coming up before anyone else. First being news of brand-new, bonus content that we will be launching for Conflicted biggest fans very soon. And we need the Facebook group's help to come up with what that bonus stuff might be.

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So, find the Facebook group by searching for Conflicted Podcast Discussion Group and find out how to get access before anyone else.

And as always, make sure to follow us on Facebook and also Twitter by searching @MHConflicted. And please spread the word about Conflicted to all your friends. Word of mouth is still the best way to grow our community.

All right. That's everything for today. We'll be back in two weeks.

Conflicted is a message heard production. This episode was produced by the [late lamented] Jake Otajovic and Sondra Ferrari, and edited by Sandra Ferrari. Sandra Ferrari is also our executive producer. Our theme music is by Matt Huxley.

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