CONFLICTED
S03E02
Thomas Small Hello, faithful listeners. And, indeed, to all you, new listeners, welcome to Conflicted. You're joining us for episode two of season three. And gathering momentum for the new series with me as always is the great and powerful Aimen Dean.
Hi, Aimen. How are you?
Aimen Dean What a wonderful introduction. Please do it every episode. Please.
Thomas Small So, you see, listeners, Aimen is still alive. A lot of you in the Facebook page and on Twitter are always wondering. "Aimen, are you still alive? Are you still alive?" I'm glad to report he's still alive.
Aimen Dean Yeah. Rumours of my demise has been greatly exaggerated.
Thomas Small In fact, I'm glad to report that I'm still alive, because I am convalescing from COVID-19. It finally struck me down. I was, you know—. I thought I was going to get through this pandemic without being – without being hit. But I got it. I got the – I got the bug.
Aimen Dean And who advised you to get some home therapy and home, you know, medicine?
Thomas Small It's true. I immediately called you, Aimen. And you were very kind. You gave me your wife's sort of—. Well, I'm not going to say peasant remedies, but, you know, natural remedies informed from long experience, no doubt.
[THEME IN]
Aimen Dean Exactly.
Thomas Small Okay, Aimen. What do you say? Shall we dive right in?
Aimen Dean Absolutely.
[THEME OUT]
Aimen Dean Last time, we told the story of how incompetence and corruption within the American administration led to its shambolic and ignominious withdrawal from Afghanistan after twenty years of occupation. A symbol, really, of what we argued in series two of this podcast, that America's post-Cold War experiment in creating a new world order has failed. After the downfall of the Soviet Union, it looked to many observers that America was the last man standing and that its model of global governance rooted in liberalism, capitalism, and "rules-based internationalism," backed up by American military and financial power, would dominate the world forever.
As we stated, this idea was made most famous by Francis Fukuyama in his book The End of History and the Last Man. Fukuyama's book appeared in 1992. Four years later, a repost of sorts was published by Samuel Huntington. It was called The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order, which we also discussed briefly in series two. Huntington said that the ideological conflicts that underpinned the two world wars and the Cold War may have gone, but their departure wasn't necessarily going to lead to the optimistic scenario imagined by Fukuyama. Rather, the period of Western super-domination was coming to a close as the rest of the world fitfully caught up with the West. The West won the world, Huntington wrote, not by the superiority of its ideas or values or religion, but rather by its superiority in applying organised violence. Westerners often forget this fact. Non-Westerners never do. Now, as technological parody drew closer, geopolitics would return to how things had always been since time immemorial, a world of distinct civilisational zones between which would be encounter, competition, and conflict. The Cold War division of humanity is over, he wrote. The more fundamental divisions of humanity in terms of ethnicity, religions, and civilisations remain and spawn new conflicts. Human history is the history of civilisations.
Now, to prepare for this episode, I reread The Clash of Civilisations, and I can't pretend I liked it all that much. Huntington's thesis is so broad that it can pretty much accommodate anything, reducing its analytical power. Plus, there's the thorny issue of what civilisation really means. It's such an elastic concept that it can be stretched to include pretty much whatever he wants. As he basically admits, civilisations, he writes, have no clear-cut boundaries and no precise beginnings and endings. People can and do redefine their identities. And as a result, the composition and shapes of civilisations change over time. Civilisations are nonetheless meaningful entities. And while the lines between them are seldom sharp, they are real.
Right. That's it from Huntington. Series three is not going to be about his book. As I said, I don't really rate it. But we have named this series Clash of Civilisations. And we are going to use that idea as our launching point to explore—. Well, to explore a lot. On the surface, having just narrated the end of America's "empire" in the Middle East, if it is indeed the end.
In this series, we're going to tell the story of that empire from the beginning, which basically means we're going to tell the story of the Cold War as it played out in the Middle East. America and the Soviet, both manoeuvring for dominance in the region, both trying to stamp their model of modernity upon it, both inheriting imperial structures from the previous period of European colonialism, both giving rise to resistance movements of various stripes. All of this is fertile ground for asking the question: Doesn't essential clash of civilisations underlie the Middle East's experience of modernisation?
But in a way, that's just on the surface. Underneath, we'll be feeling our way to even deeper, more universal, and more ancient questions, questions of meaning and religion and the wider arc of history as it plays out on the stage, really, of the human imagination where matter and spirit, concept and reality, time and eternity meet, mingle, and clash.
Big stuff. Right. That's my opening spiel. Aimen, how does that all sound to you? You up for it?
Aimen Dean Well, between you and me, Thomas, I know I was listening to you and I was wondering some university there, you know, is missing its professor.
Thomas Small Oh, that's very kind of you. Right. So, let's – let's start by discussing what civilisation means. You know, it's—. It is a very difficult concept. In the West, we tend to – we tend to contrast civilisation with, I don't know, barbarism. What do you call it? The uncivilised world. It's a very difficult concept to grasp, especially since, in the Western world, you know, we have been, in our own minds at least, "civilised" for a very long time. But what interests me, Aimen, is that you actually come from a world where the dichotomy between the civilised and, let us say, the uncivilised is still quite fresh.
I mean, in Arabic, the word for civilisation, al-hadara, is contrasted with its opposite, al-badawa. Explain to us the difference between these two words. I mean, al-hadara really means "the settled," those people who don't move around. Al-badawa, from which the word "Bedouin" comes, are the nomads. But I think, as – as recently as fifty, sixty, seventy years ago, in Arabia, the distinction between those who lived a settled, civilised life and those who did not was really apparent. Is that right?
Aimen Dean Yeah. Because—. Let me put it this way. I mean, for the – for the Arabs, in particular, definition, you know, extend into two spheres here. You know, the physical sphere, you know, and the non-physical sphere, you know. You know? So, for the physical sphere, when you say to some – about someone, hadari, you know, as, you know, someone who is civilised, you know, actually, the word doesn't translate into "civilised" in English. You know, it – it actually translate into "urbanised." So, they say someone who's urbanised and someone who is nomad. Because why? The Arabs, you know, they always stressed that hadara or, you know – you know, in other words, you know, "civility," sometime can be main- – observed and maintained by nomads more than, sometimes, the urbanised.
Thomas Small This is very interesting. Because, throughout – throughout human history, there has been a sort of conflict, if you like, or tension between these concepts of the civilised and the uncivilised. On the one hand, people from the safety of their stonewalls and cities looking out at the wilderness, seeing nomadic peoples. On the one hand, they feared them. They – they held them in contempt. They saw that their manners and morals were less refined. But on the other hand, they valorised them. They – they thought that they – they had a kind of unsullied nobility of soul. So, there was a strange – a strange tension there.
Aimen Dean For me, if I'm looking for the perfect Arabic definition of what civilisation means, whether it is for the urbanised or the nomad, it is summarised by the Egyptian poet Ahmed Shawqi, who is nicknamed the Prince of all Arab poets. Amir al-shu'ara. He said, "[speaks in Arabic]." That nation's foundations are manners. So, civilisation equal manners. Therefore, it's your manners that determines how civilised you are regardless of your urbanised or nomadic status, I think.
Thomas Small That's interesting. However, I distinctly the first time that I visited Riyadh. Your—. You know, the capital of Saudi Arabia. And I was driving around with my colleague, who was a Saudi middle-class gentlemen who'd grown up in Riyadh. And he – he—. We – we – we stopped at a police checkpoint, and he had to roll down his window. And the policemen—. And he had a – had – had a bit of banter about them. And we drove off. And as we drove off, he chuckled to himself and he said, " Bedu," as if – as if the person – the person that he had just – that he'd just had this exchange with was sort of cute, but – but clearly rough around the edges. So, that was – that was the idea. That his …
Aimen Dean Yes.
Thomas Small … his manners, if you like, weren't very refined. But he was sweet.
Aimen Dean Exactly.
Thomas Small He treated him a bit like a child. I have to admit.
Aimen Dean Yes. Unfortunately, I am as guilty, you know. When – whenever I visit Saudi Arabia, you know, I always, you know, distinguish immediately between those who are urbanised and those who are, you know, coming from a Bedouin background. They are no longer nomad, you know. But it's – it's still, you know—. This, you know, lack of, you know, certain refinement is still there. And yet those who lack the certain refinement, I mean, they aren't going to tell you, "Oh, sir. How are you?" Whatever. All of that. Like, you know, he will say, "Papers, please." You know? "Show me your this. Show me that." Whatever. But, nonetheless, if he feels that you are in distress and if he feels that you are in need, he will be quicker, much quicker, than the urbanised person to offer you help, support and to see this [unintelligible]. His entire manner changed completely, you know. So, there is something that, you know—. Basically, like, you know, there is a pluses—. You know, there are cons and pros, like, you know, for each.
Thomas Small Yeah. There – there you go. There's that tension that I mentioned.
Aimen Dean Yeah.
Thomas Small The tension between viewing the – the nomad, viewing the person beyond civilisation as noble of spirit and soul while, at the same time, viewing them as – as – as, you know, as lesser in some way.
Aimen Dean Rough around the edges.
Thomas Small Rough around the edges in – in fact. Now, the reason I bring all of this up is that, as we begin to try to reach a wider understanding of Middle Eastern history and the way it informs the present, I think it's very important for people to realise that within the Middle East itself, there are different, if you like, civilisational strata or layers. And though we tend to look at maps today and we, you know—. In general, as human beings, now, we look down upon the world and we see a flat space. And that—. Those flat spaces are determined by borders, and we think of governments as controlling all of the land within the borders.
In historical terms, that's not really what happened at all. And that within these spaces, there were cities and there were villages and there were, at the same time, these nomadic peoples. And they were all mingling together. And, often, that distinction between a – a city life and a village life, an agricultural life, and a nomadic, a pastoral life and a merchant life, that distinction was often not just divided civilisational-ly, but ethnically, religiously, linguistically. And all of these different peoples, all of these different modes of life were mingling and together to create a very rich but often conflictual tapestry. Does – does that make sense, Aimen?
Aimen Dean Of course. Because even in Saudi Arabia, you know, that, you know—. And my Saudi listeners will, you know, I think, will chuckle when they listen to this. The distinction here is between not only two classes, you know, which is the – those who are of Bedouin, you know, in other word, nomadic, you know, roots, and those who are of, you know, urbanised roots, hadari. But, also, there is the third class, which is, you know, the qarawi, in, you know, in Fusha. You know, in classical Arabic. But also [speaks in Arabic], you know, in the slang.
Thomas Small [speaks in Arabic].
Aimen Dean Yeah. [speaks in Arabic]. So, whenever, you know—. You know, actually, sometime, if, you know—. A Bedouin is no longer an insult Actually, [speaks in Arabic] is the insult, you know – you know, which means a villager, you know. So, if you really want to insult someone in Saudi Arabia, call him a villager. So, you know.
Thomas Small The farmers get no love. The farmers get no love in any civilisation.
Aimen Dean No. Okay. Because, you know, the old kings of time, and to this day, you know, among the royal families of Arabia, what is their favourite sports, you know? Is it, you know, farming? No. Of course, not. It's hunting.
Thomas Small Yeah.
Aimen Dean You know, with falcons and with, you know, hounds and all of that. So, you know. Because hunting is the noble sport of kings, you know. But farming. Come on. This is for the peasants. And so, you know—. So, actually in the hierarchy, you know, of Arab, you know, mentality, first, there's the urbanised, educated, ruling class. And then, you have the Bedouins or, you know, no longer nomadic, but they are descendants of Bedouins. They form most of the security and military apparatus. You know, they are the warriors protecting the, you know, kingdoms. And then, below them, peasants, so.
Thomas Small Well, this distinction between a kind of noble pastoral, nomad people and a slightly corrupt backwards agricultural people, this is as old as certainly the Bible. I mean, the story of Cain and Abel …
Aimen Dean Yeah.
Thomas Small … is one hundred percent about this idea. You know, Cain is the farmer. Cain is somehow corrupt and wicked. Cain murders unjustly the noble – his noble brother, Abel, the pastoralist, the shepherd. And out—. And – and from – from Cain's lineage, it says, came all forms of wickedness as well as technology and cities and civilisation. So, from the very beginning of the human sort of spirit trying to work out these things, as – as – as at least it's in the Bible, we see this tension and this conflict from the very beginning.
Now, as Huntington wrote, defining civilisation is not easy. But it does mean something. And whatever reality that that word is gesturing towards, that reality plays a very real if very complex and subtle role in history and in current events.
Returning now, as we have so many times to the years following the end of the Cold War, in 1991, we can see this already playing out. In fact, in his book, Huntington provides a long list of examples from 1993 of how his civilisational paradigm was already manifesting itself in the post-Cold War world. We've discussed several already on Conflicted the wars that followed the breakup of Yugoslavia, which you participated in, Aimen.
Aimen Dean Yeah. In Bosnia.
Thomas Small The expansion of NATO into former Warsaw Pact countries, antagonising Russia, fighting in central Asia between a weakened Russia and Mujahideen troops. But one sticks out, both because it involves a conflict we haven't discussed and because it illustrates how ancient and how lasting the civilisational fault lines are. This conflict is the one between two small countries in the Caucasus region, Armenia and Azerbaijan.
Now, dear listener, you may remember that, starting in late September 2020 and lasting for about six weeks, a war broke out between Armenia and Azerbaijan over a disputed territory called Nagorno-Karabakh. This flare up was the sequel to the conflict in 1993, which Huntington referred to a clear sign that some places at least are still experiencing the fallout of the Cold War. But before we get into the details of the conflict, Aimen, in general, why have Armenians and Azeris been in conflict?
Aimen Dean Well, we need several hours, but in order to condense this—.
Thomas Small Well, it's really about territory. The fight is really about the territory.
Aimen Dean It's always about territory. But it's more than that. Don't forget. Like, you know, I mean, yes, the underlying, you know, reason is territory. But there is a lot. A reservoir of deep-seated, you know, feelings, grievances, insecurities. I mean, we could talk about it forever. Historical grievances that could last, you know, a thousand years. But the reality is, as someone who'd been to the Caucasus, and I participated in the conflicts of the Caucasus, you know, within Chechnya, Dagestan, and Azerbaijan.
Thomas Small Yes. I mean, you went to Baku, which is the capital Azerbaijan in 1996. Is that right?
Aimen Dean Yes. Indeed.
Thomas Small And – and the reason you were there was to – to help smuggle—. Was it peanut butter? To – to [unintelligible]. Mayonnaise to Mujahadeen in Chech- – in Chechnya.
Aimen Dean No. Not peanut butter. Mayonnaise. Yeah. Well, among other things, of course.
So, we have to understand that with such deep, you know, deeply held grievances that the Armenians feel about the fact that the, you know, history was not kind to them for almost fifteen hundred years, and on top of the fact that their ancestral homeland seems to have been eaten, you know, piece by piece by continuous Turkic tribal migration starting in the, you know, tenth and eleventh century, you know, with Turkish tribes coming from the steps of central Asia, they were pushed and pushed and pushed, you know, to the Caucasus regions. And that's it. I mean, basically, it's just long list of, you know, grievances against Turkic people for almost a thousand years.
Thomas Small It's important for the listener to understand that the Armenians are among the oldest peoples in the world. In the Bronze Age, there was a network, a patchwork of Indo-European kingdoms that stretched across Anatolia and into the Caucasus. Anatolia and the Caucasus really what is the modern state of Turkey. And those Indo-European peoples—. You may have heard of the Hittites, for example. They're in the Bible. So, they're – they're sometimes well-known. They're sort of a famous people. But they were just one of many Indo-European peoples, which, during what's called the Bronze Age collapse beginning in 1200 BC, sort of disappeared, certainly seemed to leave the historical record. They amalgamated. They were conquered.
But out of that strange several centuries of – of – of conflict and – and civilisational dissipation, the Armenians emerged. And it seems that they were focused around, you know, eastern Anatolia and into where they now live, around Lake Van in the Eastern part of – of the Anatolian plateau. So, we're talking a very old, well-established people. They were the first kingdom to officially adopt Christianity before any other kingdom. Before any other nation became Christian, the Armenians did. So, they're very ancient and they're very proud of that antiquity.
The Azeris are descendants of—well, from the perspective of – of – of Armenians—new Turkic arrivals, the Oghuz Turks who entered what the ancients called Albania, which is where Azerbaijan is today, beginning in the tenth century. Now, there's – there's echoes here of that civilised/uncivilised or – or hadara/badawi split. Of the Christian/Muslim split even. And – and these things still matter. So, the Armenians who are a "civilised," long-established Christian country saw nomadic, pastoral Turkic warrior peoples move into the valleys of their – of the zone that they had been living in, and it created tremendous conflict.
The Turkish migrations resulted in the establishment of many new states long established, which, you know, echo to the present as well. And the Armenians felt like they were a people trapped between imperial zones. If you look at the map of ancient Armenia, they're like the Poles of the Middle East. They're sort of like Poland there, always shifting back and forth.
Aimen Dean Yeah.
Thomas Small Victims of various imperial power struggles. They were stuck there between Safavid Iran and the Ottomans. The Russians to the north got involved. And, obviously, to the south, various Arab peoples as well. So, they're always in the middle. And that's when we reached the twentieth century and the sad story of the Armenian genocide.
So, that brings us up to the – the twentieth century, really, from the Armenian point of view. Now, Aimen, I mean, you spent some time in Baku, in – in Azerbaijan. What is the Azeri point of view about their own history and – and – and how it relates to coexisting or not with Armenians?
Aimen Dean I remember when I met several Azeris. And some of them actually were Shia, some of them were Sunni. As you know, the Azeris are almost seventy percent Shia Muslims, but they are not the same as the Iranians in terms of their belief in the supremacy of the supreme leader of Iran. So – so, basically, when you talk to them and they hear that I was in Bosnia, fighting, you know, against the Serbs and, you know, and the genocide that happened there in Bosnia, they say, "And what about the genocide that happened and the ethnic cleansing that happened against, you know, your Azeri brothers and sisters in the Nagorno-Karabakh region? You know, we were expelled from our homes there. I mean, our, you know, Azeri brothers and sisters were slaughtered, killed, and driven. You know, the Armenians are the Serbs of the Caucasus."
The Azeris share with Armenians, you know, the ideals that their homeland actually is supposed to be much bigger, you know, because of the spread of their ethnic group across other countries, including Iran, where they have, you know, a massive amount of Azeris living there. But they believe themselves to be also the descendants of great empires and great traditions of the Mongols, of the Tartars. In fact, the one of the biggest mosques in Baku is called the Tartars' mosque in order to stress that link between them and the ancient civilisations of the steps.
Thomas Small The first Oghuz Turks who came into that part of the world, they established a great empire known as the Seljuk Empire, the first really great Turkic Islamic empire. And they feel that they are the heirs of that empire and many empires that followed.
Aimen Dean Absolutely. Not only that. They say that they have contributed considerably to Islamic civilisation. They were the barrier between, you know, the Russian southward conquest of the Caucasus that – that, you know, that they—. That without them, you know, that the Cauca- – the – the entire, you know, Turco-Persian Muslim world would have been subjugated by the Russians. So, for them, they feel that they were the guardians, you know, of the, you know, northern gates of Islam. And – and they say it with zeal.
In fact, the city that lies between Azerbaijan and the Soviet – Soviet region of Dagestan—and now it's the Russian region of Dagestan—is called Derbent, you know, which, in Persian, means "the gate of gates." You know, this is where, you know, we protected, you know, the – the Turkish-Persian Muslim world from subjugation by the Russians.
Thomas Small So, there you have it. Two peoples, in their own minds both very ancient, both heirs of great civilisations, clashing. Now, let's return to the beginning of the twentieth century when the story takes a very tragic turn. So, at that time, two peoples who have – who were subject to the Ottomans revolted, encouraged by Western powers: the Arabs—and, of course, we'll cover that in another episode—and the Armenians. At the same time, the Bolshevik Revolution actually conquered much of what was Armenia. And the Armenians had to fight and resist them.
So, during this period, the Armenians are developing a very strong sense of nationhood and a very strong sense of their independence. This resulted in Turkish reprisals against Armenia, and at least hundreds of thousands of people were killed. Millions were displaced. For that reason, you – you find Armenians everywhere today, even in Los Angeles. I'm looking at you, Kim Kardashian. And this genocide is a very important component of Armenian self-identity today and informs their perspective towards their neighbours, their Turkic neighbours, really, on either side of the border. Both Turks and Azeris. Would you say that's true, Aimen?
Aimen Dean Oh, yeah. Because, for them, as far as the Armenians are concerned, and when you speak to Armenians, for them, the Azeris are the more aggressive and trespassing version of Turkish people.
Thomas Small Is that because they just live much closer to them?
Aimen Dean Oh, yeah. I mean, at the end of the day, like, you know, in order to justify taking back lands or, you know, basically conquering territories or fighting against them, you have to, you know, really—. I won't say dehumanise, but you have to demonise, you know, your enemy and to say, "Whoa, the Turks did genocide against us. But these Azeris are, you know, the worse versions of the Turks."
They don't distinguish actually between the Azeris and the Turks. They consider the Azeris an extension, and a more aggressive extension, of the Turks. And between you and me, you know, the Azeris, you know, and the Turks share almost the same language. When they speak to each other, it's almost—. You know, a slight difference in dial- – in – in dialect. But that's it. Like, you know, I mean, the Armenians view them as more aggressive Turks. Trespassing—. They were trespassing. I've heard that many times coming out of Armenian, you know, people when they talk to me.
Thomas Small In the end, both Armenia and Azerbaijan became Soviet republics. Nagorno-Karabakh, this disputed region that has caused the war, lies between Armenia and Azerbaijan, really. Although it's a very mountainous area with highlands and midlands and higher lands and low lands, 'cause it's so mountainous, and that's that more sort of, let's say, vertical stratification informs the ethnic diversity of the area.
But that region, Nagorno-Karabakh, which was within Azerbaijan, was largely self-governing, because it had a majority Armenian population. Now, this obviously is a recipe for conflict. And once the Soviet Union collapsed, war broke out in 1992. One conflict after another, during which, largely—I think you would agree with this, Aimen—the Armenians beat the shit out of the Azeris and they were able to occupy Nagorno-Karabakh, and though no country recognised that occupation as legal, effectively made it a part of Armenia.
Aimen Dean Yes. The conflict of 1993, 1994. So, the Armenian army – military really, really dominating the battlefield. And not only they were able to beat the Azerbaijani military, which was really pathetic at the time, they, you know, however, did not just be satisfied with the annexation and the occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh, which was three-quarters Armenian population.
The problem is not here. The problem is that Nagorno-Karabakh itself is an enclave, you know, inside Azerbaijan. And, actually, the area surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh that straddled the border between Armenia proper and Nagorno-Karabakh was almost eighty-five percent ethnic Azeris. So, the idea is you have to expel—. From the point of view of the Armenians, you have to expel almost seven hundred thousand Azeris from these – from their homes in order to make way for the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave to have a continuous, contiguous land connection with Armenia proper.
Thomas Small And were they successful in – in clearing out all the Azerbaijanis?
Aimen Dean Seven hundred thousand plus, you know, ended up as internal refugees in Azerbaijan. Now, I can't confirm that myself, because when I used to work for al-Haramain charity—It was a Saudi charity set up in Azerbaijan to help with internally displaced Azerbaijanis, as well as Chechen refugees coming from the Chechen war pouring into Azerbaijan—the numbers stack up. You know, they do actually. You know, the numbers stack up. The numbers are credible.
So, seven hundred thousand people were kicked out of their homes. And that's why the Azeris used to tell me, you know, "Well, you know, what about our, you know – you know, genocide and ethnic cleansing that took place here? You know? Why—? You know, you went to make jihad in Bosnia. Why don't you come and make it jihad here in Azerbaijan?" And, you know—. And I was like, "Yeah. I mean, really, do you view it as a Muslim against Christian?" And they said, "Yes." You know? So, there—. You know, they – they mixed everything. They, you know—. Just like the Serbs, you know, cloaked their ultra-nationalism in Bosnia with the symbology – symbology of Christianity, you know, the same thing. The Azeris felt that this is, you know, yet another manifestation, you know, of, you know, a Christian crusade against them, you know, in the Caucasus.
Thomas Small So, back then, in the nineties, you said that Armenian well-equipped and well-trained, and, therefore, one. Though there were more Azeris than Armenians, but the Armenians were better equipped. The Azeris, their military wasn't much. But what about the Turks? So, why – why didn't the Turks back then come to the Azeris' aid? I mean, here you have Armenia invading Azerbaijan. You have Armenia ethnically cleansing huge areas of – of Azerbaijan. Seven hundred thousand Azeris had to flee. Why didn't the Turks intervene?
Aimen Dean Turkey, at the time, did not intervene for two compelling reasons. First of all, the Turkish economy wasn't as great as it is right now. I mean, the Turkish GDP at the time, in, you know, in the early 1990s did not exceed a hundred billion dollars, you know, compared to about, you know, nearly nine hundred billion dollars right now. That's the first thing that we need to understand.
The second reason is that, you know, Turkish politics was so complicated at the time. Because of the proportional representation in the elections, you end up with governments comprising of six parties in a coalition. So, six small parties come together and make a coalition. And it doesn't last more than seven, eight months at a time. And they keep changing prime ministers more than they changed their socks.
Thomas Small This prevented the Turkish government from really executing its will. It was very divided. Internally divided and weak.
Aimen Dean Exactly. The third reason, which is very important, they were fighting a war against the PKK. So, a Kurdish Marxist, you know, guerrilla, you know, group, you know, an insurgent group, basically that were fighting a bloody war, you know, in Anatolia against the Turkish military.
Thomas Small It's funny that you bring up the Kurds, because the Kurds are yet another very ancient group who lived in this part of the world, who are contesting their – their – their statehood and their nationality against competitors. So, my goodness, it's a messy – a messy part of the world.
So, the Turks were—. They were poor, they were politically weak, and they were fighting a war with the Kurds. So, they couldn't intervene. Now, at the time, the president of Azerbaijan was a man called Heider Aliyev. Now, his son, Ilham, later became president. And that's when the game began to change. What did Ilham do, Aimen?
Aimen Dean Well, Ilham Aliyev is a man living in the future rather than living in the past. You know, this is the best I could describe him. I mean, he basically realised that there is no point crying over lost territories. The question is: How do I take them back?
So, he started, you know, a plan based on three simple, you know, steps. First, grow the wealth of the nation through oil and gas exports. That's the first thing. You know, make Azerbaijan wealthy.
The second, make Azerbaijan a diplomatically strong country by alliances with Russia, with Turkey, with Israel, and with Pakistan. So, you know, this is how it all started. And then, the third thing, make Azerbaijan militarily advanced, you know, with technology and smart planning.
Three steps. That's it. While, you know, the Armenians were savouring their victory of the mid-1990s and they were very complacent, you know, next door, Ilhan Aliyev put these three, you know, plans into action and executed each one flawlessly.
Thomas Small The – the – the Arab Spring informed Aliyev's geopolitical perspective as well, didn't it? I mean, he – he looked around at 2010, 2011, 2012, and all the instability. This encouraged him to strengthen his diplomatic ties both to Turkey and, surprisingly, to Israel.
Aimen Dean Well, he looks at the fact that he is sandwiched there between the Caspian Sea, Russia, mighty Russia, Turkey, and Iran. He doesn't trust Iran. He—. Even though, you know, basically, that he comes from a Shia family, but he doesn't feel that the Iranians are trustworthy allies. So, he looks across the border into Turkey. He realised that Turkey is a – the closest ally from a cultural and linguistic point of view. He looks at Russia and thinks, "A good partner, a good—.Someone who I can keep happy. But how do I keep the Russians happy? How do I keep the Iranians nervous? How do I keep the Americans, you know, from lecturing me about human rights, you know, and democracy, you know, and all of that?" Which basically, like, you know, I mean, Azerbaijan [unintelligible], like, you know, doesn't have a very good record neither, you know.
So, how do I keep them happy? Well, Israel. Israel is a great lobbying power in DC, but also Israel has something that I need, because Israel also know that I have something that they desperately need.
Thomas Small I can imagine what Israel gets from Azerbaijan: access to the Caspian Sea, and the ability to practice espionage against Iran. Now, what is it, though, that – that Israel can offer Azerbaijan?
Aimen Dean Israel is one of those countries that proven that, you know, with minimum manpower and maximum technological advancement, you can win a war against any conventional army, you know, as long as the numbers are manageable.
Thomas Small So, it's Israel's military technology, its military experience that was useful to the Azeris.
Aimen Dean Oh, yeah. I mean, no question about it. It was—. It's—. It's billions and billions of dollars', you know, worth of weapons and technology that were, you know, basically sold by the Israelis, you know, to the Azeris. So, that is one. But the other aspect that the Israelis can offer the – the – President Ilhan Aliyev is the lobbying power they have in DC in order to just keep the Americans away from criticising or over-criticising the regime of Ilhan Aliyev's, you know, records on human rights and democracy.
Thomas Small Which was useful to Aliyev, because Armenia has a – a pretty sophisticated lobbying effort in Washington, as well. There are so many Armenians living in the United States. American citizens now, but of Armenian background. They're often very rich. Armenians abroad have succeeded in becoming a very wealthy, merchant people.
Now, the – the funny thing is, though, that Armenia itself, the Armenian country, the country of Armenia, isn't very rich. Why isn't it? It should be rich. If – if Azerbaijan can become rich, why can't Armenia become rich?
Aimen Dean Unlike Azerbaijan, Armenia doesn't have any oil or gas or natural resources, and it's landlocked. I mean, it doesn't have access to the sea. So, two, you know, recipes for economic disaster. You know, and at the same time, the brain drain. Because the migration, it really, you know, drained the, you know, Armenian economy of important resource, which is the manpower, you know, and the brain power that they need in order to develop. But also surrounded by hostility. You know, you can be landlocked, you know, and prosperous. I mean, look at Switzerland.
Thomas Small Exactly. Well, Switzerland is famous for its banking sector, which I would have thought, given Armenians abroad, especially in – in Lebanon, for example, where, you know, Armenians are famous for their banking acumen, I would have thought that Armenia might be a financial centre for – for that part of the world.
Aimen Dean Again, we come back to the fact that Armenia is not lucky with its neighbours. You know, there is Iran. What do you do with Iran? They're already under sanctions. There is Turkey, which is hostile to you and can, you know, blockade you. There is Azerbaijan, which is at war with you. And then, there is Georgia to the north. And Georgia is actually the country that became the banker, you know, of the Caucasus. You know, they are the ones who actually decided to become the centre for banking operations in the Caucasus. And also because the Armenians minions themselves, like, you know, chose to become a little bit of an isolationist nation, you know, in – in their own way, you know, of thinking, of conducting diplomacy. You know, they seem to be an insular, you know. They adopted that insular.
Thomas Small Fortress Armenia.
Aimen Dean Yes. Exactly. Plus, the – the bureaucracy and the regulations and the laws, you know, which are complicated. The ease of business index of Armenia is not exactly there on the top, you know. Not even in the middle. So, all of this meant that Armenia was destined to be poor.
Thomas Small Now, in 1995, Armenia, as we said, conquers Nagorno-Karabakh, begins its ethnic cleansing campaign of the surrounding areas. And from that point onwards, there's been an on-again, off-again attempt to internationally broker a settlement between the two sides. Now, this resulted in 2007 in what are called the Madrid Principles, point-by-point principles outlining how maybe peace could be brought to bear on the situation.
It's funny when you read the Madrid Principles now point-by-point, it's really almost like a blueprint of America's New World Order. This idea that, through goodwill, through economic incentives, through international peacekeeping operations, that somehow conflicts could just be neutralised. But it doesn't really work out that way. It certainly didn't work out that way in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
At the same time, there's on-again, off-again breaches of the ceasefire. Fighting breaks out again and again and again. Eventually, Nagorno-Karabakh declares itself independent and establishes the Republic of Artsakh. But in effect, Armenia had annexed it and the surrounding areas.
So, finally, war broke out. And in September and October of 2020, Azerbaijan the Armenians. Why were they able to do this, Aimen?
Aimen Dean There is a joke in diplomatic circles in DC always about the Palestinians. You know, they say that the Palestinians never miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity. This applies even more to the Armenians.
Because the Madrid Six Principles, in 2007, 2009, 2011, you know, and the Russian attempts in 2012 and '13, I mean, all of these, you know, opportunities would have given them exactly what they wanted. The whole of Nagorno-Karabakh with a land corridor to Armenia proper, with, you know, the fact that, you know, except the – the surrounding areas, which they occupy, it should return back, you know, to the Azeris. The Azeris can go back to their homes, you know. But, nonetheless, Nagorno-Karabakh and a land corridor will be theirs.
So, you know—. And—. And also, the deal will also extend a oil and gas pipeline from Baku all the way through Armenia to Turkey for export, and that would have – would have given Armenia some semblance of energy security.
I would say it's a sweet deal. Why abandon it? We come back to the irrationality of nationalism, historical grievances, inability to live in the future and not – no longer live in the past, you know. This is a – the same plague, you know, basically that is plaguing the Palestinian mindset when it comes to negotiating with the Israelis. It's the same thing here.
Thomas Small At same time, the president of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev was—. He was ruthless, but he was very calculating. He was very smart. He never attacked Armenia proper.
Aimen Dean No.
Thomas Small He only attacked those areas that were still officially internationally recognised as part of Azerbaijan. So, no one could actually officially criticise his actions. He was simply defending his country's own borders.
Aimen Dean The problem was that the fact that the Armenian prime minister at the time, who came to power in 2018, you know, was someone who lacked, you know, the ability to, you know, to lead in a smart way. First, he alienated the Russians, his traditional allies. He was, you know, also someone who alienated the Turks by talking a lot about the fact that, you know, when he went to France and, you know, along with Macron, was saying that, you know, "We have to pressure Turkey to return certain territories to Armenia."
So, as soon as you start claiming territories from Turkey, while you, you know—. I mean, that actually woken, you know, the Turkish, you know, fears and, you know, and also the belligerence of the Turks. I mean, do not step on the tail of the Turks. You know, there is a famous, you know, Turkish cat called the Angora, you know – you know. It has the bushiest tail you could ever see on any cat breed. But to step on its tail, and it will scratch you, you know, and then it will bite. It's the same thing here.
The Armenian prime minister stepped on the Turkish Angora's cat, you know. And, as a result, the Turks took, you know, you know, notice of this. So, they reached out to, you know, the Azerbaijani, government to discuss further military cooperation, transfer of military technology.
And, suddenly, instead of having one ally, you know, which is the Israelis, he has the Turks now. So, Ilham Aliyev decided now is the time. Because, you know, three things happened. One, the Armenians are alienated from their traditional allies, the Russians. Two, the Armenians are threatening Turkish territorial integrity. And, therefore, he has an ally with the Turks. And three, now, the Azerbaijani military now has reached the level of readiness, thanks to Israeli and Turkish military support, you know, to take on the Armenians who have been sleeping on the wheel of technological advancement for a very long time.
Thomas Small And that's really the – the main point. Since the nineties, the Armenian military hadn't developed to the same extent. So, they were fighting a more conventional sort of war. They thought the Armenian fighting spirit would see them through. Whereas all along, the Azeris had built up an extremely sophisticated, hyper-modern military. Describe that military a little bit. Just a little bit. I mean, it – it involved the use of drones. What other sort of modern technologies did Azeris bring to the field?
Aimen Dean First of all, the most important element of any modern military is the ability to see your enemy while your enemy can't see you. So, the ability to have air superiority, where your enemy cannot see you but you can see them all the time move – moving using drone surveillance technologies, means that you know where they are and they don't where you are. So, that's – that's the first advanced, you know, advantage that you have. You know, your enemy is blind to your movement. You can see the enemy clearly everywhere.
Thomas Small And the Azeris had that advantage. They could just—. They were sort of using their drones, hovering over the battlefield. They could see their Armenian enemies on the ground, and they would just take them out.
Aimen Dean Exactly. At the same time, they are shooting down Armenian aircrafts and they are shutting down Armenian drones. In other words, basically, total air superiority. That's the first, you know, win that the Azeris scored.
Second is drone technology that is armed with small-sized but very smart bombs that can actually rain down on tanks and on artillery. So, the Armenians have their rocket launches. They have their T-72, advanced, you know—. Well, semi-advanced Russian tanks. They have their artillery pieces. They can feel them. But as soon as they put them in position, the Azeris basically, like, you know, I mean, with several drones—each drone carry about eight of these bombs—they can choose their targets and pick them one by one. And the Armenians can't do anything. They – they describe it. It's the equivalent of eagles hunting bunnies, you know. That—. Really, it's a war between eagles and bunnies.
Also, there is this technology, you know, coming out of Israel—and now even the Emiratis are actually, you know, manufacturing it—called loitering munitions. Basically, it's a drone, small-sized, that actually travels around, looking for military targets, something that looks like a rocket launcher or a tank, you know, for the enemy. And then, you don't need to do anything. It will—. It – it will have, you know, its own system, its own guidance systems to recognise the enemy's vehicles, positions, and it will just, you know, attack it immediately. It's a suicide drone ladened with explosive, and it will just attack. So, they can launch hundreds of these.
Thomas Small You mean, this – this sort of technology operates without even a man on the ground directing it?
Aimen Dean No.
Thomas Small But this is something out of science fiction. This is, like, out of the Terminator movies or something.
Aimen Dean Exactly. Exactly. It can recognise, you know, the enemy's vehicles, the enemy's tanks, because it's already fed, you know, it's – it – into its algorithms that, you know, "Okay. This is an – a 70 – 72 tank. This is a BM-40, you know, rocket launcher. This is a 152mm Howitzer. Go and attack it." And it will go and attack it on its own. And you can launch dozens of these, you know. And there is nothing, like, really, there is nothing, you know, the, you know, the Armenians can do about it, because they're too small to detect until it's too late.
Thomas Small So, the Azeri military prowess really won the day. Now, because of mistrust between Azerbaijan and Iran, Iran has, in recent years, been an ally of Armenia. And when the war broke out, Iran did smuggle munitions to Armenia. But when this became known, the big protests broke out in Iran amongst the Azeris there. And so, Iran had to kind of withdraw that support, further isolating Armenia.
Turkey, as you said, straightforwardly supported Azerbaijan. Russia, in general, a protector of Armenia, traditionally, refused to get involved, as you said, because the prime minister of Armenia had such a pro-Western position. It got Putin's back up. But, nonetheless, in the end, it was Russia who oversaw a ceasefire agreement between the two sides. Armenia withdrew from most of the territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh that it had occupied. Nagorno-Karabakh itself remains an autonomous Republic of Artsakh. And Russia is patrolling a corridor between it and Armenia to make sure that Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia are connected.
So, the war was over. According to official estimates that resulted in about three thousand Azari deaths and four thousand Armenian deaths, but tens of thousand wounded in Armenia.
So, what's the point of all this? The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is a good snapshot of the post-Cold War world. And the US's absence from the diplomatic table is a sign of its fading power.
More importantly, the conflict reveals the depth of historical memory, how ancient history informs the present and how the conflicts we see raging across the region are, in important ways, manifestations of the continuity of old civilisational fault lines.
Just in this episode, we've had to go back to the Bronze Age to understand what's going on. We've touched on a number of historical turning points that will come up again and again the season. The Bronze Age, as I've said. The religious dimension as paganism, Zoroastrianism, Judaism, Christianity, Islam, and many shaded areas in between work their magic on history.
The ethnic dimension as ancient dividing lines, Semite, Indo-Aryan, Greek, Turk are still in the. The imperial dimension. As the three great imperial zones that comprised Islamic civilisation, from the Mongol invasions onward, the Ottoman, the Iranian, and the moguls in India, weakened and collapsed in the face of European and then American power. All these dimensions are there, haunting the present. And in this series of Conflicted, we'll continue to shed light on them all as best we can as we explore the complex legacies of the Cold War in the Middle East and how that conflict often echoed earlier conflicts, both from the age of European imperialism and from the Islamic empires that proceeded and overlapped with it.
In a way, the Cold War began in the Middle East, when an Arabian king made a fateful decision. Instead of granting oil drilling rights to Britain, the region's foremost imperial power, he chose an upstart instead: the United States of America. That alliance between the White House and the House of Saud would become the linchpin of Cold War geopolitics, the echoes of which continue well into the present day. Aimen and I will tell that story.
And what I'm most excited about is hearing Aimen's insider view on an event both mysterious and macabre, one with roots in the Cold War, which dominated headlines for months, threatening to overturn decades of careful Saudi diplomacy.
Stay tuned for Conflicted's take on the infamous assassination of Jamal Khashoggi.
Aimen Dean Oh, I'm so looking forward to it.
Thomas Small As always, I'd like to extend the invitation to all listeners to join the Conflicted discussion group on Facebook, where you can connect with other fans of the show to discuss the themes and topics we cover in each episode and be the first to hear all the latest news about future episodes. You can find the Facebook group by searching for "Conflicted Podcast Discussion Group."
You can follow us on Twitter and Facebook @MHConflicted. We're also pleased to announce that you can now subscribe to ad-free listening and upcoming bonus content for just 99p on Apple Podcasts. And over on Spotify, you can also listen ad-free.
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Okay. I think that's everything for today. We'll be back in two weeks.
Conflicted is a Message Heard production. This episode was produced and edited by Rowan Bishop. Sandra Ferrari is our executive producer. Our theme music is by Matt Huxley.
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