CONFLICTED
S03E03
Thomas Small Hello, Aimen.
Aimen Dean Hello, Thomas.
Thomas Small We've got a huge episode today, so I just want to get right into it. Is that okay?
Aimen Dean Oh, yeah. Definitely.
Thomas Small So, in this series of Conflicted, we're exploring the various ways in which the idea of clash of civilisations can be used to understand Middle Eastern history and the conflicts, which continue to rage across the region. As we said before, what we're trying to do isn't straightforward, because "civilisation" is a difficult word to define. But we're going to try.
Having told the story of the end of America's "empire" in the Middle East, we're going to tell the story of how that empire began and developed during the Cold War, starting in your homeland, Aimen, Saudi Arabia.
Saudi Arabia is, in a way, where the Cold War began. And to understand how, we'll explain how long-standing British power in the region gave way fitfully, and almost without anyone noticing, to American power. And we'll see how the Cold War world of spy craft, ideological conflict, and state paranoia continues into the present through Aimen's take on the notorious murder of Jamal Khashoggi.
[THEME IN]
What an episode, Aimen. My goodness.
Aimen Dean Goodness. It's going to ruffle lots of feathers.
[THEME OUT]
Thomas Small The story we're telling today about the origins of the Cold War in Saudi Arabia dovetails remarkably neatly with your own family's history. And that story starts with the British Empire. Now, Aimen, your paternal grandfather was born in Afghanistan and moved to British India, the Raj, and became an officer in the British Indian Army. He was sent to Iraq, in 1915, as part of the UK's Mesopotamian campaign, during which Britain grabbed Iraq from the Ottomans and incorporated it into the British Empire. Now, after the war in Iraq, he became a head of police. Is that right?
Aimen Dean Yeah. He was the head of police in a Baghdad district then, for the whole of Basra.
Thomas Small The whole of Basra in southern Iraq. Wow, that's quite a job. He must have got his hands dirty.
Aimen Dean Absolutely. He was one of those responsible for the suppression of the 1920 rebellion. I don't know if I feel sorry about that or proud.
Thomas Small Ah, the 1920 Iraqi revolt. Now, this was an uprising of Iraqi nationalists, which was put down by the British. But it also encouraged the British to adopt indirect rule in Iraq. They installed a Hashemite as king, King Faisal bin Hussein. The Hashemites, of course, were the traditional rulers of the Hejaz, along the west coast of the Arabian Peninsula, where Mecca and Medina are. And, in fact, that King Faisal was whom Alec Guinness played in Lawrence of Arabia. Very memorably, of course.
Aimen Dean Absolutely.
Thomas Small So, eventually, your grandfather was invited by the ruler of Bahrain, which was then a British protectorate, to join the security services there. So, Aimen, the question is: Does spy craft, as well as working for foreign powers, run in your blood?
Aimen Dean Oh, it runs in the family. Like, my father did it. So, as my grandfather. So, yeah.
Thomas Small So, it was in Bahrain that your father grew up. And in the early 1930s, after deciding to seek their fortune just across the water, in the eastern province of Saudi Arabia, he and his older brother, your uncle, caught the attention of a certain British spy.
Aimen Dean That British spy is known to the English world, to the English-speaking world, as St John Philby.
Thomas Small St John Philby. St John Philby.
Aimen Dean Yeah. St John Philby. Very posh name. But to the Arabs, and especially to the Saudi royal family and to King Abdulaziz himself, he was known as Sheikh Abdullah Philby.
Thomas Small Sheikh Abdullah Philby. Now, St John Philby / Abdullah Philby is a fascinating figure in the history of the – of the later British Empire and the transition of that world order into the American-led world order, of the Cold War. And his life, St John Philby's life, mirrors your family's life, Aimen. He was also sent to Iraq during the First World War. And after the war, he became minister of Internal Security in Iraq, meaning he would have been your grandfather's boss.
Aimen Dean Absolutely.
Thomas Small But just before that, during the Arab revolt, which broke out during the war—and whereas the famous Lawrence of Arabia was the British agent most active in the Hejaz on the west, advocating the claims of the Sharif of Mecca to be the king of the Arabs—Philby was sent to the Nejd, the central Arabian plateau, on a mission to the then-Emir of the Nejd, Abdulaziz known in the west as Ibn Saud, who was then a rising power in Arabia. Philby ended up becoming a staunch advocate of Abdulaziz, who had conquered the eastern province, where you grew up, Aimen, only a few years before.
Now, explain how Arabians like yourself, who weren't from the Nejd, from the central Arabian plateau where Riyadh is, where the House of Saud come from, how would Arabians like yourself have regarded Nejdis?
Aimen Dean Well, if you remember, the Nejdis were always regarded by the rest of the population of Arabia as the noble warriors. Somewhat nomadic, but also with some settlements that were regarded as the trading centres of Nejd. So, they were warriors and, also, they were merchants, but also there were religious missionaries all at the same. Merchants, warriors, and religious missionaries.
Thomas Small Religious missionaries is a nice way of putting it. I mean—.
Aimen Dean Zealot. No. No.
Thomas Small Yeah.
Aimen Dean They were [crosstalk].
Thomas Small Wahhabi zealots, let's say.
Aimen Dean So, I wouldn't call them Wahhabis, you know, because, basically I myself am a Salafist. So, basically, I'll call them as Salafists in a sense.
Thomas Small Oh, I beg your pardon. Yes. Wahhabi is often regarded by Muslims themselves, Salafi Muslims themselves, as a slur. I don't mean it as a slur, of course.
Aimen Dean Yeah. Yeah. But, nonetheless, you know, for many people they were regarded as staunch religious fundamentalists. You know, this is the best I can describe them. You know, also, they were warriors and, at the same time, with a mercantile bend to them. So, that is why they were regarded as fearsome in both the east and the west of the Arabian Peninsula. But, nonetheless, these fears, you know, started to lessen a bit as King Abdulaziz adopted a more conciliatory tone towards both the east and the west of the Arabian Peninsula.
Thomas Small So, yeah. The House of Saud, now, they have a very long history. But they really burst into history properly in the eighteenth century, when they entered into a famous alliance with the Muslim reformer, Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (from whom the word "Wahhabi" comes) and – and they conquered at that time much of the Arabian Peninsula and formed the first Saudi state. That's how it's known to scholars. That state was destroyed by the Ottomans in 1818. But only a few years later, the House of Saud had recovered and established a smaller, but still impressive second Saudi state.
Now, this second state suffered from internal divisions and was eventually conquered by a rival Arabian clan, allies of the Ottomans, the House of Rashid. Abdulaziz, the king whom St. John Philby / Abdullah Philby was an advisor to and who founded the third Saudi state, the current kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Abdulaziz was then only sixteen years old. And he went into exile to Kuwait with his family where he nursed a powerful ambition to restore his royal house's fortunes.
Now, this he did starting in 1902, reconquering first, Riyadh, and, from there, slowly extending his rule across the peninsula. And he just started his expansion when Philby met him in 1917.
And it's important to point out that Philby was basically an intelligence operative. He actually became head of the Secret Service in Palestine during the mandate, where he would come to grief with the British and was eventually forced to resign on account of sending confidential information to Abdulaziz. He really, really respected Abdulaziz. He'd grown to believe that he was a great leader.
And after his resignation, Philby ended up settling in Jeddah, where he was living when Abdulaziz conquered the Hejaz, becoming its king in 1925. Philby grew then even closer to Abdulaziz, became one of his closest advisers, converted to Islam in 1930, and took the name Abdullah.
Now, Philby argued strongly that Abdulaziz should unite all of his domains under his sole rule, which he did in 1932, proclaiming the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. And that is the Saudi Arabia that we know today and in which you grew up. But your family knew St John Philby / Abdullah Philby. Is that right, Aimen?
Aimen Dean Of course. Because of the fact that both Philby and my grandfather were, you know, in Iraq serving the British in the military sense. But also, when my grandfather moved to Bahrain and, from there, my father and my uncle who were hyper-linguists, both of them—. I mean, you know, each—. I think my father spoke five languages and my uncles spoke six.
Thomas Small Another thing which must run in the blood, Aimen. Because, my goodness, you are also good at languages.
Aimen Dean Thank you. So – so, they moved across from Bahrain to Saudi Arabia just at the right time, in 1932, when Saudi Arabia became the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Abdullah Philby—as I would always call him, Abdullah Philby, because that's how my father and my uncle always called him, Sheikh Abdullah Philby—he was instrumental in really delivering a blow to the British Empire.
It doesn't sound right that, you know, an agent of the British Empire delivered a blow to the British Empire. But he was the reason why King Abdulaziz, when he was considering granting oil concessions to the Anglo-Persian, you know, Oil Company, he decided based on St John Philby or Sheikh Abdullah's advice to instead grant the rights to the Americans, to the—.
Thomas Small Haha.
Aimen Dean Yeah. To your part of America, actually. To California. To Southern California.
Thomas Small Before we go into the – the discovery of oil in Saudi Arabia, I'd like to zoom out and talk about Arabia in general. It's a very ancient place. It's vast. It's the size of India. It's been inhabited from, really, the beginning of time. And those beginnings have come down to us as – as sacred history, really, recorded in the Bible and, indeed, in the Quran, as well as an oral tradition.
Now, in the Bible, the forefathers of the Arabian people, as well as the Jews, is Abraham. Ibrahim, as he's known in – in the Arabic world. Abraham had two sons, the younger son born to his wife, Sarah, was Isaac, the father of Jacob from whose twelve sons came the twelve tribes of Israel and down through the centuries to the Jews today.
Now, Abraham's older son was Ishmael, born to his Egyptian concubine, Hagar.
Now, Aimen, tell us what happened to Hagar and Ishmael in the story. Sarah was jealous of Hagar and Ishmael, and instructed her husband Abraham to send them away. And he did so. Where did he take them, according to the story?
Aimen Dean According to Islamic teachings, God commanded him to go south. You know, from the Levant. So, he kept going south on south and south. He thought he might, you know, drop them in the [unintelligible 0:12:08], but actually, like, you know, he continued. He thought then it would be Yemen, but then God stopped him.
So, they ended up in a abandoned valley, in a very, you know, barren valley, you know. And that valley later became Mecca. So, there, he left them. And Hagar, of course, was left alone with a child, her son Ishmael. But with no water, with nothing. But then she just encouraged her husband. "If this is the God's command, then, you know, I will follow it. Just go."
Miraculously, beneath Ishmael's feet, water started to gush, you know, and to come from beneath the ground. And that would later become known as the Holy Well of Zamzam, which is, you know, still gushing water to this day.
Now, you know, when the birds started circling that valley, an Arab tribe—. Remember, Ishmael is half-Aramaic, half-Egyptian.
Thomas Small Yes. Because Abraham was an Aramean. So, Ab—. So, Ishmael's father was an Aramean and his mother was an Egyptian.
Aimen Dean Yeah. So, when – when Yemenite tribe from, you know, Yemen, who are Arabic people—.
Thomas Small Southern Arabs, really. Yeah.
Aimen Dean Yeah. So, when they were traveling towards the north, towards the Levant, they realised that the birds were circling that valley, and they were wondering, you know, "There is no water." I mean, you know, they only circled water, these birds. And so, they went to inquire and they found an Egyptian woman with a child in the middle of that barren valley, which has no water whatsoever or any trees, even, and they found there were with lots of water. And she was trying to build a well around it. And so, they asked her, you know, "Why on Earth do you have water? How did this happen?"
So, she explained, of course, in order to gain power over them that she is the concubine of a holy man and this is his son and that he was – they were left there on God's command. And a miracle happened. This water came out.
So, of course, the tribe realised that this is a special woman and her son will be special. And so, they said, "Can we settle beside you? Because if there is a water and this is on a caravan way, you know, trade caravan way, so we can make money, can we settle next to you?"
She said, "Yes. But me and my son are the masters of the water."
They accepted. So, they said, "But only on one condition. That when he comes of age, he will marry from us."
So, the tribe is called Jurhum. And when Ishmael became a young man, he married from them. And his language, Aramaic, and his half, you know, Egyptian heritage, mixed with the Southern Arabs. And, you know, his twelve sons became the twelve new Arabian tribes of the north, and their language became the dominant, which replaced the old southern Arabic.
Thomas Small It's a fascinating story, because it really holds in – in the cultural memory of the Arabs something real about their origins. They are a mixture of an ancient southern Arabian people, of the Aramean people of the north. Their language reflects a mixture of these two sources. And that's the story of how the city of Mecca was founded. Obviously, an extremely important city today, both for Arabs and all Muslims.
Now, when Abraham left Hagar and Ishmael there, thinking, of course, that they might die (There was—. The Holy Well of Zamzam had not yet been revealed), he gave a famous prayer. The Quran records this prayer as "My Lord, make this land secure and provide its people with fruits." This is called the Prayer of Abraham. And – and, Aimen, you told me quite interestingly that this prayer features importantly in Saudi self-identity today.
Aimen Dean Absolutely. They call it "Dua of Ibrahim." dour too. You know, the Prayer of Abraham. Whenever they discover oil, "Oh, this is Abraham's prayer."
When he said the fruits, the fruits in the Quran doesn't mean, like, you know, just only, like, you know, the fruits you buy from the grocery. But it means the bounties, you know. It means whatever treasures, you know, that you will find in Arabia. It is the blessings of Abraham, you know, upon this land.
So, oil, that is the prayer of Abraham. Gold, phosphate, bauxite. You know, silver. You know, gas. This is a prayer of Abraham. This is what Abraham, you know—. You know, how he blessed this land. And, therefore, this is why the descendants of Abraham right now are reaping the rewards of that prayer four thousand years ago.
Thomas Small Which brings us back to oil where we left off. Now, by the time King Abdulaziz was rising in power, the geopolitics of oil were already active in the region. It had first been discovered in Iran in 1908 by what would become British Petroleum. Then, the First World War proved that petroleum was the future and that whoever controlled the oil had a major tactical advantage. Britain was the major player, but also France. And they signed an agreement in 1920, shutting American oil companies out of the Iraq oil fields.
Standard Oil of California was one of those big American companies. And, in fact, you know, what—. The thing that puts Southern California, where I'm from, on the map was oil. And I can remember, as a kid, driving around and seeing still these creaky old oil pumps going up and down, probably something similar to – to what you experienced, Aimen, when you were driving around Khobar in the eastern province of Saudi Arabia.
Aimen Dean Absolutely.
Thomas Small Now, the Great Depression had reduced the pilgrimage of the Hajj by sixty percent. And that was the – the major source of revenues for the Saudi government in the pre-oil period. King Abdulaziz needed to find another source of funding. So, this inspired his desire to get some oil prospecting going. And that's, as you said before, Aimen, where St John Philby, despite being British, advised the king to grant the concession to the Americans. He thought it would better safeguard the country's independence.
And so, Standard Oil was given the concession in 1933 and started a subsidiary, which would in time be called the Arabian American Oil Company, Aramco. This is around the time that Philby met your uncle.
Aimen Dean Absolutely. So, I remember the story in the family is that when my uncle and my father, when they crossed, you know, from Bahrain into Saudi Arabia, their linguistic skills immediately caught the attention of St John Philby / Abdullah Philby, who was already talking to the American delegations and courting them in the eastern province and trying to convince them that there is oil.
If there is oil in Bahrain, you know, there will be oil here. It's just the same shelf. You know, the same continental shelf. It's the same, you know, place. I mean, if they find oil there, you will find oil here.
Of course, it took five years until they found the first, you know, oil well. And, you know, then later, you know, they found the largest oil field in the world.
Thomas Small Yes. Five years, it took them. But they finally struck gold—as you say, black gold—on the 3rd of March 1938. And this is the famous Dammam Oil Well No.7. Well, you can go visit it now. It's a kind of national monument.
Aimen Dean So, what happened here is that Abdullah Philby realised that, you know, my uncle, who spoke six languages and, you know, was very much wise, you know, in the ways of the world, you know, and he was well traveled, you know, from Iraq to Bahrain, to Cairo, and back again. So, he was very well educated. So, he decided that this young man could actually serve, you know, in the court of King Abdulaziz as a translator and interpreter, which was very much needed.
So, my uncle was then sent to the court of King Abdulaziz to become an interpreter. So, from being one of the first ten employees of Aramco—. And if you go to Aramco's museum, you will find his picture there as one of the first ten employees there. You know, all the way to the court of King Abdulaziz. And it shows that the influence of Abdullah Philby was positive in two areas as far as King Abdulaziz and his ruling, you know, strategy was concerned.
First, Abdullah Philby advised them to ignore the British and to give the oil concession to the Americans, which proved, in later years, to be absolutely vital not only for the independence of Saudi Arabia, but to the decline of the British Empire in later years as, of course, they were denied these riches, because of that advice, which, you know, absolutely hacked off the British in later years regarding Abdullah Philby and his betrayal.
But the second advice, which is – was – which was equally important, is that Abdullah told the king that "you need to rely on the educated classes in the east and the west of Arabia, the Hijazi intelligentsia, and the eastern province merchants who were mixing always with the British in India, and the trading networks that were taking place there. If you rely on both, then—."
You know, you – you have to understand also that he also told him to incorporate the southern tribes in the south of Arabia. [unintelligible 0:21:16], Al-Shahranis, [unintelligible 0:21:19]. All of these people.
Thomas Small Who – who really had – were Yemeni tribes, really, originally.
Aimen Dean Yeah.
Thomas Small But they'd been conquered by the House of Saud.
Aimen Dean Yeah. To incorporate them into the military. So, he told him that, you know, "a chair cannot stand on one leg. You have to have four legs. You know, you have to have the Nejdis, the easterners, the westerners, the Hijazis, and you know, the southern Arabian provinces all part of your court, part of your empire." You know, this new fledgling kingdom.
And this is exactly what he did. And this is how, you know, a Durrani Afghan, you know, individual like my uncle, who was, you know, who raised in Iraq and Bahrain and it started in Cairo, and then, you know, spotted by Philby, ended up being the translator of King Abdulaziz. At the same time when, you know, a Hijazi from another old Turkic family, a Turkish family, you know, Ottoman family, living in Medina for five hundred years, you know, became the personal physician of King Abdulaziz.
Thomas Small Ah, you're talking about Muhammad Khashoggi.
Aimen Dean Yes.
Thomas Small The – the grandfather of the famous Jamal Khashoggi. We'll get back to him in a second.
So, because of your father and his brother, your uncle, migrated to the east – eastern province, that's where you grew up. And, obviously, that whole part of Saudi Arabia was dominated by Aramco, an American company until beginning, in the late seventies, it introduced a phased transfer of – of ownership to the Saudi government.
Now, American culture must have, to some extent, been present there in – in your childhood, even before the troops arrived in 1991 to expel Saddam Hussein from Kuwait. Is there something like a hint of a clash of civilisations there? I mean, there were cordial relations between the Saudis and the Americans. But Americans largely lived behind walls. Paint a picture of – of how this strange modern society of the eastern province, the oil society, with American oil engineers and Arabs from all over the world working. What kind of culture was it?
Aimen Dean Well, actually, we used to see them more, you know, more often than, you know, people would think was possible. American families, British families, Dutch families. Because, don't forget the, you know – you know, BP (British Petroleum) and the Royal Dutch Shell, you know, Company, they all were present there also as sub-contractors or to provide services. Schlumberger, one of the companies that, you know, is famous in the world of oil, were there. So, there were so many Europeans and, you know, also like Americans, Canadians, Australians, Dutch, Germans, and British.
And, you know, there were certain supermarkets there that catered for their tastes. And so, places like Safeway, you know. And Aramco had their own TV station, which was broadcasting, you know, to the eastern province. And they had all the latest sitcoms from America. And so, we were watching sitcoms and we were watching comedy shows coming from America and dramas and all of that, because Aramco TV was broadcasting there to the American families and to the Western audience there.
So, no. There was actually not only a cultural, you know, interaction, but also educational. Why? Because the schools I went to, you know, first, you know, Ibn Jabr School and then Farabi School, these two schools, the primary and middle schools, were actually built by Aramco, and they were built to mirror exactly the same architecture and the same standard of high-end American schools. So, you know, with the lockers and everything and all of that.
If you – if you walk into them, you will think, you know—. If an American walked into them—ignore the dress code—you know, you will think you are in an American—. You know, there are basketball courts. You know, there are locker rooms and all of these things. And they were built by Aramco. And the King Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals also was completely Americanised. You know, the entire education there, from top to bottom basically, is American curriculum, and most of the professors and educators there were either Americans or were educated in America.
Thomas Small I wonder what the American residents of the eastern province thought about aspects of Arabian culture. Because, certainly, one thing which really divides Westerners from Muslims is Sharia law. Sharia law almost haunts Westerners. It's a sort of byword for harsh justice, bordering on injustice. You know, we're sort of scared of it. And we all have the image in our minds of beheadings and public executions.
I remember when I was first in Riyadh, in 2011, being told about its infamous "Chop-chop square" outside the city's main Friday mosque, where public beheadings were regularly carried out.
Now, growing up, Aimen, the fact of public executions wouldn't have been particularly unusual for you, I think. I mean, you told me that you attended your first execution when you were nine years old.
Aimen Dean Yes. You know, against the explicit orders of my family, of course. But, nonetheless, I, you know, I still remember there was a case of a – a paedophile. I mean, someone basically who kidnapped a young boy and, you know, raped, and killed him. And so, you know—.
Thomas Small He sounds like a real jerk, this guy.
Aimen Dean Yeah. Yeah. Of course. And so, one of my, you know—. The execution—. The executions in Khobar used to take place in a public square in front of a mosque called [inaudible 0:26:52]. I mean, for those listeners who are from Khobar, they would be familiar with it.
And I, you know—. So, one of my friends, his house was just overlooking the square. And so, you know, me and several friends, we, you know, went after Friday prayers to his house, to the rooftop, in order to observe. And even though the execution was taking place about two hundred metres away, the sight of the sword striking the man and the, of course, the head falling to the ground and the blood gushing, I mean, that, you know, basically sent me home back numb. I felt like, you know, my hands numb. You know, going—. Walking – walking home, I was still in shock, you know. And, you know, my mother was screaming her lungs off. Like, you know, "Why did you have to see it?"
Then, two years later, I saw the other execution. But this time, basically, I was ready for it. This time, I knew it was going to happen. And yeah. I mean—. But then, I saw in-between executions that were supposed to happen, but never happened.
Thomas Small Yeah. So, this is interesting. I'd never really encountered this aspect of Sharia law. I mean, you told me and it really fascinated me that – that the reason why public executions are encouraged in Sharia law isn't for the reasons that we might think. It's not because there's some prurient, sadistic desire to revel in someone's gruesome death. It's actually, in a way, the opposite,
Aimen Dean The reason why there are public ex- – executions and why, you know, the family of the victim or victims need to be present there to witness the justice, you know, being done is, and also for the other people to come and see, is also for them, for the people to encourage and to, you know, really, almost beg the family of the victims to forgive and to show forgiveness.
There are—. Especially if the murder happened, you know, due to rage or, you know, not a premeditated murder, but basically something happened during rage, and there are no other aspects like, you know, rape or kidnapping or anything like that. So, if – if it is just the question of a murder happened between two people, I mean, this is when the families are encouraged to forgive by the, you know, onlookers and bystanders who sometime, basically, will be willing to contribute to the blood money, you know, to the compensation that the family would receive if they forgive.
Thomas Small So, let's break this down. The—. In Sharia law, murder is a civil offense. It's not actually a criminal offense in the same way that we understand it. A murder case is settled between the victim and the – and the murderer. The state is there to establish guilt and to arbitrate between those two parties. And if the victim's family decide to forgive, then all is forgiven.
And this—. As a Westerner, this comes as a shock. I mean, I—. In – in a – in a – in a Western murder case, if the father or the son of a murder victim stands up in court and says, "Your honour, I forgive the murderer," the state will say, "Well, that's very nice of you, but this is up to us to punish the murderer, not you." This is different in Sharia law.
Aimen Dean Yeah. Because the Sharia focuses a lot on restitution. In cases like these, especially in murder, they focus on restitution for the victim's family. And, therefore, the victim's family are given control over the process. Why? Because if they want justice, they can get it. They can have a life for a life. You know – you know – you know – a life is taken, so the other life will be taken, too. An eye for an eye.
However, if the family of the victim are willing to forgive, it – still, it is in their control. It was their gift, you know. So, even if they forgive, still, justice is done, because you know, that person took a life. They spared a life. So, one way or another, that power gives, you know, immense, you know, restitution in both ways.
Thomas Small Yes. I mean, you sent me – you sent me some links, Aimen, to – to some YouTube videos, which I watched. I watched with some trepidation, because, you know, you could see there – there was the – the – the perpetrator. He was on his knees and he was circled by Arabs. And there was the sword. And I thought, "Oh, no. What am I going to see?" And to my surprise, what I saw was the crowd really encouraging the victim's family to forgive. Sometimes …
Aimen Dean Yeah.
Thomas Small … pushing money into – into the hands of the victim's family, saying, "Take this money. Forgive." It was very moving. It was clear that there was even a sheikh there that was – that was trying to negotiate forgiveness, if you can imagine such a thing.
Aimen Dean Because at the end of the day, you know, the Quran says, "[Arabic language]." That, you know, an eye for an eye, you know, basically. But what it says after that, "[Arabic language]." "Whoever, you know, forgive and, you know, seek the path of, you know, forgiveness, you know, God will reward him."
So, it is important to understand that, you know, it's—. You know, people are not there in a to witness executions out of morbid curiosity. They are there to encourage forgiveness.
One episode in particular of this forgiveness is that when the cleric who was responsible for my religious education as a young man, you know, from the age of nine until the age of sixteen. And under him, I learnt so much of Islamic theology, and I'm still grateful to him to this day. So, he was known for arbitrating between, you know, families of victims and families of murders in order to try to, you know, achieve forgiveness.
So, he had a son, and his son was in his twenties. And, in 2014, his son was murdered, you know, by, you know, basically a business associate over a dispute. I mean, it was, you know, just young people, hot-headed moment, and, you know, there was a stabbing. And, you know, his son was, you know, die—. He died. He died. So, the man was arrested. He was same age as the victim.
So, this cleric, he rushed to the prison to see that man. And when he went into the police station, of course, everyone in the police station know who he is. And they said to her—. You know, of course, after offering their condolences, they said, you know, "Please, sheikh, do not forgive." At the beginning. They—. You know, because they knew he was coming to forgive, you know, and rushing to forgive. And, you know, "let him just rot in prison for a while, so he can know what happened."
And he said no. You know? "I have a duty, and I know what I'm supposed to do." So, he went. He met him. He said, "Just tell me what happened." You know?
And he told him the story. And he was fully remorseful and cannot believe what happened and what rage overtook him.
So, the cleric said, "I forgive you. And I don't want any blood money or compensation or restitution or anything. You can go. Go. Just go home."
And, of course, there was that shock. And, you know, he said, "I just killed your son."
He said, "I spent the past twenty-five years of my life convincing families of murdered people to forgive the murderers and to spare their lives. It will be extremely hypocritical of me now to be in this situation. And I even hesitate, because I cannot hesitate for the sake of other, you know, people who I will try to spare their lives later. So, I have to spare yours now and without hesitation."
So, you know, sometimes, like, you know, I mean, when I reflect on this, I think that if only people know that forgiveness, you know, might always seem Christian, but it has a lot of room within Islamic society.
Thomas Small Well, I certainly thought that myself when you told me the story the first time of this – of this sheikh, whose – whose own son had been murdered and yet he forgave the murderer immediately. I just thought, "Oh, my goodness. He's more Christian than the Christians."
Aimen Dean Totally.
Thomas Small So, back to the rise of the Cold War. You know, it said famously that Britain conquered the world in "a fit of absence of mind." And if that's true, it's – it's really even truer of the United States, especially in the Middle East. As we've said, America's foothold in Saudi Arabia began as a private concern. Aramco was a private company run on the commercial lines only. And when the Second World War was brewing, King Abdulaziz in Riyadh adopted a neutral position. He favoured the allies, especially because Britain was still the great power in the region.
But he did flirt with the Axis powers. So, Japan, for example, did attempt to gain a countrywide oil concession in 1939. And King Abdulaziz listened to them. And this was particularly alarming to the Americans, because Japan, you know, obviously, was a growing imperial threat on the Pacific.
This is when the US military, the US government began to regard Saudi independence as a strategic asset. During the war, the US was also neutral at first. And for that reason, the British actually found it useful to allow the US to offer Abdulaziz various forms of aid to keep him more favouring the allies.
So, there was a huge drought in 1939, for example, and the US sent an agricultural mission to help relieve the suffering there. And, again, because the war had cut off global travel routes, the Hajj had collapsed, and Abdulaziz needed money. So, Aramco, through the encouragement of the US government, stepped up and lent the Saudi government money, amounting to the country's entire budget in 1939, in 1940, and in 1941.
Then, of course, America, after Pearl Harbor, joined the war, declared war on Germany and Japan, and its focus became increasingly on the Pacific Theatre, to combat Japan. And so, the US Navy needed Saudi Arabia as a waystation and to guarantee oil supplies, which were, of course, vital to the war effort.
And then, towards the very end of the – of the war, since aviation had really developed and would mean, in future, that air bases would be what tied the world together and allowed America's imperial power projection to take off in the way that naval bases had done before, the Dhahran airfield was negotiated with King Abdulaziz, and an air base was opened in Dhahran for the US Air Force, which would become a linchpin in the Cold War.
Aimen Dean The fence of that air base is only eight hundred metres from the home I grew up in Khobar.
Thomas Small You grew up with that air base just in your backyard.
Aimen Dean I used to hear the fighter jets flying in and out all the time.
Thomas Small So, with that base in Dhahran and with the firm foothold in Saudi Arabia, thanks to Aramco, America begins its Cold War journey. So, now, the – the—. You know, the American-Saudi partnership in the Cold War, it developed slowly, and it grew more important ideologically when the White House realised—and this is in the sixties now—that pan-Islamism grounded in the Saudi King's control of the two holy mosques was an effective counterweight to the competing ideology of Arab nationalism focused on Egypt, which was broadly speaking supported by the Soviet Union as a – as a means of eventually spreading communism into the region.
Now, Saudi pan-Islamism and anti-Arab nationalism led to the kingdom accepting ideological Islamists, mainly Muslim Brotherhood members, as refugees from other Muslim countries where they were being persecuted. These Muslim Brotherhood members entered the civil service, the security services, and the education system, and helped to spread modern Islamist ideas throughout Saudi society.
This would, in time, combine with the country's own version of Salafist Islam to create the monster we know as global jihadism. You know, al-Qaeda and other such groups that we've talked about a lot on Conflicted. But in the eighties, as we all know, this form of Islamism was harnessed by the US in its Cold War struggle against the Soviets in Afghanistan.
And as I say, this has all been covered in Conflicted before. The Saudis maintained this Cold War relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood long after the Cold War ended. And we can say that, within the Saudi political establishment, there have always been reformist voices advocating for change. And these reformist voices were on a spectrum with liberals at one end, advocating secularism for your markets, individual rights, things like that; and moderate Islamists on the other end, affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood.
This approach where the Saudi government attempted to balance Islamist and liberal voices within the political spectrum came to an end with the Arab Spring, especially in 2013. Isn't that right, Aimen?
Aimen Dean Oh, yeah. 2013, I think, was the moment in which the Saudis—. Oh, I would say, basically, the wing within the Saudis who wanted to divorce themselves from the Muslim Brotherhood won the argument against the other wing, which believed that a coexistence with the Muslim Brotherhood was possible.
Thomas Small At the time, you remember the Muslim Brotherhood had achieved power through democratic means in Egypt. This was the result of the Arab Spring in Egypt. There were elections, and Mohamed Morsi, the – became president. He was the leader of the Muslim Brotherhood or a Muslim Brotherhood leader there.
Aimen Dean Absolutely. But here we come to the thorny issue of the coup led by the current president of Egypt, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. And the question here, the choices that were presented to the Saudi leadership, at the time it was under the rule of King Abdullah.
Late King Abdullah convened the meeting, and that meeting was an urgent national security meeting in which, you know, his son, the head of the National Guard, Prince Mutaib bin Abdullah; his other son, the minister of Foreign Affairs, who was serving under the foreign minister, Abdulaziz bin Abdullah; Saud Faisal, the former minister was there; his brother, Turki Faisal, who was, in the past, the head of the GIP, the intelligence; Prince Muhammad bin Nayef, who was the Minister of Interior; and he's now on the run, Saad Al Jabri, you know, was there. And the question was like this: In six hours, the Egyptian military is going to depose the democratically elected president of Egypt, Mohamed Morsi.
Thomas Small So, CC had called King Abdullah to – to say, "Look, ins—. We're – we're going to do this. Do we have your buy-in?"
Aimen Dean I mean, the Egyptian military institution as a whole called up the Saudis and the Emiratis and told them, "We are going to move against President Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood. We are going to depose them completely from power."
And in order for this coup to be successful diplomatically and accepted by—.
Thomas Small Legitimised, really.
Aimen Dean Yeah. Yeah. Legitimised. Yeah. You know, in the eyes of the world. "We need your backing. You are the de facto leader or semi-leader of the Sunni Muslim world. And, therefore, we need you on our side."
Now, the reality is that the—. King Abdullah asked, you know, "Will that come back against us? I mean, because if we do that, you know, then we are going to be divorced completely from the Muslim Brotherhood. Like, you know, we cut all ties with them and we burn all the bridges."
So, those who were arguing, you know, for "No, we shouldn't back this up and we shouldn't let, you know, this happen. This will antagonise the Muslim Brotherhood. This will encourage more terrorism—."
Thomas Small Which – which – which had been an important plank in Saudi foreign policy. For example, in Yemen.
Aimen Dean Yeah.
Thomas Small I mean, the Saudis had very close relationships with the Islah party in Yemen, which is a largely Muslim Brotherhood party. It was one way in which Saudi Arabia kept a handle on things in Yemen. So, being open to the Muslim Brotherhood for many decades was an important part of Saudi foreign policy. But this was all changing.
Aimen Dean Yeah. And the reason is because those who actually advocated for burning the bridges said that, in the year between middle of 2012 to the middle of 2013, in which Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood were in charge of Egyptian politics and Egyptian diplomacy, it proved to be disastrous.
Why? Because the, you know, the fact is that the Muslim Brotherhood couldn't wait to enact certain policies that encouraged, you know, forms of extremism to grow. And I'm talking about the fact that they opened the prisons wide to jihadists and extremists, you know, to roam around, you know, without any restrictions. Hamas terrorists, like, you know, were roaming in the streets of Cairo and Alexandria without any checks on them.
So, for me, for example, I mean, as, you know, as someone with a fatwa on his head, like, you know, from al-Qaeda, I used to go to Egypt before and after the uprising, you know, in 2009 and 2010. And then, you know, and then after that, in 2011, even in Ramadan of 2011, I was in Egypt. I was praying in the mosques. I was going to Alexandria. I was going to Cairo. No problem whatsoever.
It is after Morsi took over that, you know, Muhammad al-Zawahari, you know, the brother of Ayman al-Zawahari, was roaming the streets fine. Like, you know, those returnees from Afghanistan, all of the people who the Egyptian intelligence, with the Pakistani intelligence help, rounded up from Peshawar, you know, in Pakistan, and from the camps in Afghanistan, they were in prison in Egypt. You know, their prison cells were opened.
The—. In fact, the master bomb maker of al-Qaeda, Abu Khabab, you know, who is – who is Egyptian, his own son—.
Thomas Small Who taught you how to make bombs.
Aimen Dean Absolutely. His own son, another qualified bomb maker, was let loose and was actually given a passport in order to go and fight in Syria. You know, so—. You know, suddenly, you know, the Saudis in particular were worried, as well as the Emiratis. And even the Kuwaitis, they were worried. We thought the Muslim Brotherhood rule in Egypt will be moderate and they will not, you know, appease the extremist to this level. You know, it – it was really worrying.
I know many listeners will be thinking, "Oh, but they were democratically elected." And I accept that. But as someone who was keeping an eye on all of the issues regarding security and safety in the Muslim world and the Arab world and in the Middle East, the level of extremist infiltration and jihadist congregation in Egypt between mid-2012 to 2013 was alarming for everyone, including the Saudis and myself also.
Thomas Small So, as you say, King Abdullah convened this meeting with all the top decision makers in the kingdom and said, "Look, are we going to support this coup or not?" And he – he took a straw poll of the room.
Aimen Dean The majority supported King Abdullah's inclination to support the coup. And especially princes Saud al-Faisal and Turki al-Faisal. Of course, Turki al-Faisal was worried about the number of jihadists, you know, who are free at large in Egypt, you know – you know, whether one day they will turn their gaze on Saudi Arabia again and we will have the bloody years of al-Qaeda's campaign, you know, between 2003 and 2006 in Saudi Arabia repeated.
Thomas Small Now, with all this background info, we're in a place to better understand an event that could have been ripped straight from the Cold War. And I'm talking about the notorious murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi inside the Saudi consulate in Istanbul, in October 2018.
I got to admit, Aimen, in the run-up to recording this episode today, I've been having sleepless nights. The Khashoggi affair is a landmine, and the things you've got to say about it don't entirely conform to the received narrative. Now, how can I be sure that you're not whitewashing what is unquestionably a gruesome murder and a heinous crime carried out by agents of the Saudi government?
Aimen Dean I would say that, here at Conflicted, we only deal with facts, you know. You know, and the facts are facts. And it doesn't care about, you know, our narratives and our prejudices and who we favour and who we don't favour. In real-world, basically, we're dealing with facts. And, you know, and based on the facts.
Facts alone also, sometime, basically, are orphans. And the parents of the facts are precedent and analysis. And you have to put these three together—facts, precedent, and analysis. And once you put them together, you reach the truth.
Thomas Small My problem, of course, as an ordinary guy—. I'm not – I'm not like you, Aimen. I don't have access to privileged information. So, as an ordinary guy, trying to find out the facts, I sometimes struggle. And this is one of the problems with the twenty-first century and with the sort of media environment that we have today. It's not always easy to know what the facts are.
Now, when it comes to Jamal Khashoggi, most of our listeners will know who he is. He was born in Medina in 1958 to that prominent Hijazi family that you mentioned before, with close connections to the royal family. As we said, his grandfather was King Abdulaziz's personal physician.
Now, in the late seventies, like many, many young men of his generation, Jamal Khashoggi was inspired by the Muslim Brotherhood. In fact, he claimed that he officially joined them for a time and he adopted their perspective on world affairs. Now, this was very usual at the time.
In the early eighties, he became a journalist and established himself as one of the Arab world's most dynamic voices, reporting on the jihad in Afghanistan especially, during which he became acquainted with leading figures in that campaign, including Osama bin Laden.
By the nineties, his journalism overlapped with intelligence work on behalf of the Saudi government as they sought to reign in and increasingly threatening in Ladin. And Khashoggi became an outspoken advocate of reform at home. A key spokesperson, in fact, for – for that wing of the reformist class, which inclined more towards a Muslim Brotherhood-influenced perspective on politics.
Now, I've – I've tried to be balanced there. I believe those are the facts about Jamal Khashoggi. If you agree, Aimen, then you can tell us about when you met Jamal Khashoggi in 2012.
Aimen Dean I ment him in 2012 in Jeddah, and I must say I was impressed by his intellect, by his knowledge, by his ability to recall events and dates with clarity. Individuals. He's know—. You know, and his knowledge radiated. You can tell basically that the man had spoke with an air of authority and understanding and background knowledge, which made him sometime come across as arrogant. But, nonetheless, if I was Jamal, I would be arrogant a little bit, too.
Thomas Small I mean, some people might consider you to be a bit arrogant in your knowledge, Aimen.
Aimen Dean Maybe I should be more humble, actually.
Thomas Small We all should be more humble, Aimen.
Aimen Dean Absolutely. There was a red flag, though, which annoyed me when he expressed a indignation that I worked for the British. Because, at the time, of course, I kept this issue secret. It was still 2012. I didn't come out, you know, publicly as a, you know, a double agent until 2015. But, of course, because of the—. You know, I didn't want to alarm him that, "Oh, I knew about bin Laden because I was a member of al-Qaeda." So, I thought, "Okay. I will soothe his fears by saying but also I was a double agent, you know." So—.
And he said, "Really? I mean, how – how could you? How could you, you know, do that even?"
And I was, "What? Joining al-Qaeda?"
He said, "No. Joining the British."
And I was like, "Jamal." You know? So, of course, like, you know, I didn't call Jamal. I said Ustaz Jamal. I have to, you know, show some respect. So, I said to him. I said, "Jamal, I mean, I was actually passing information to the British on al-Qaeda in Arabia, you know, including people like al-Ayeri and al-Mogrin and al-Hajj. Like, I mean, who were – who were terror masterminds in Saudi Arabia. They were actually in a terrorised terrorising this country."
Thomas Small Well, they launched enormous attacks, killing many, many people.
Aimen Dean Yes. Absolutely. Foreigners and Saudis alike. So, I said—. When I said this to him, that seemed to calm him down, you know.
And he was saying, "Yeah. But I don't like the British." I mean, basically. Like, you know, I mean, you know, he – he – he called Britain [Arabic language]. Like, you know, I mean, the mother of all evils.
Thomas Small Wow.
Aimen Dean Yeah.
Thomas Small He had lived in London for much of the nineties where he was editing a newspaper here. That's—.
Aimen Dean Exactly. I mean, so I was wondering, "Okay. Thank you for your insight."
Thomas Small No. He – he – he, of course, knew Osama bin Laden from – from early on in the eighties. There – there, you know—. He must have had some lingering disappointment, would you say?
Aimen Dean No. No. It's a romantic idea of Osama bin Laden. I mean, the man was on and on about the manner of his burial. It's like, you know, "Which idiot who advise the Americans, you know, to just dump his body to the sea? That's not how he should have been buried. He should have been buried with honour."
And I – and I kept telling him, you know, "Ustaz Jamal, I mean, remember, please, that, you know, the Osama bin Laden you knew in the 1980s and early 1990s is not the same man that I met in the mid-1990s. I mean, by then, the complete brainwash, you know, by the Egyptian jihadists and extremists around him, you know, was complete. They really totally, totally, like, you know, changed him into the monster that he, you know, was transformed into later. So, please, you know, do not confuse the two. He changed. People change, you know, to the worst."
And he still – he still had a lingering romantic vision of Osama bin Laden. And he said, you know, "If only we engaged with him." I remember this word exactly. "If only we engaged with him, we could have saved him, you know, from those Egyptians. Brought him back to Saudi Arabia for rehabilitation."
Thomas Small Of course, he actually was sent to the Sudan in the mid-nineties to engage with Osama bin Laden and bring him back to Saudi Arabia, and he failed. At that time, he was already an intelligence asset for the Saudi government. He became an advisor to Prince Turki al-Faisal, the head of Saudi intelligence, and remained in that capacity for Prince Turki until that fateful year of 2013, when Prince Turki decided to back King Abdullah's support of the coup against the Muslim Brotherhood government in Egypt.
This is where a kind of rift opened up between Jamal Khashoggi and the royal family.
Aimen Dean Oh, totally. That's exactly the time when Jamal realised that the government is now heading towards a direction of confrontation with the Muslim Brotherhood. So, this is why when, you know, when we talk about the fact that the rift between Jamal and the royal family didn't happen when you know, King Salman and his son, MBS, came to power. No. It happened, you know, two years earlier than that.
Thomas Small We don't want to get into the weeds here of Saudi politics. So, it is fascinating. King Salman becomes king in 2015. Shortly thereafter, he makes his nephew, Prince Mohammed bin Nayef, crown prince. Muhammad bin Nayef, it is understood, had opposed the move to support the coup in Egypt. He thought that Saudi Arabia should maintain its delicate balancing act with the Muslim Brotherhood. So, he was already a little bit out of step with the way things were going in Riyadh, which is why, in 2017, Mohammad bin Salman managed to replace Muhammad bin Nayef as crown prince.
Mohammed bin Nayef was placed under house arrest. Mohammed bin Nayef's closest adviser, Saad al-Jabri fled the country. And in the same month that that happened, Jamal Khashoggi fled the country. He moved to the United States and began writing editorials for The Washington Post.
So, there he is, writing editorials for The Washington Post, some of them critical of the Saudi government. But, nonetheless, that's what he's doing. How then, Aimen, does he end chopped into small bits in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul?
Aimen Dean Well, the Saudi intelligence were worried that since Jamal was one of their assets for almost twenty years, that he might leak sensitive information and intelligence to Saudi government opponents in the region. You know, namely Qatar and Turkey. And according to one of the intelligence officers I talked to at the time, you know, they feel that he might have done that. And there were some—.
Thomas Small Why did they think that? What – what are – what are the—? What was the evidence?
Aimen Dean Because some information were leaked, you know, to Qatari, you know, backed press, which suggests that Jamal might have been the source. Most likely, he was the source. And as a result, you know, the Saudis were extremely annoyed with him.
Countries tend to be annoyed with former intelligence operatives blabbing out to the press, you know, in a negative way. That's why I never speak ill of the British government ever. You know, you never heard that from me.
So – so – so – so, basically, the situation here is that the Saudis started to become agitated and, you know, they were trying several tactics to lure him back into the country. You know, with offers of amnesty, with offers of comeback. "We will just debrief you, and you will be fine." But he was having none of that. He know basically that, you know, as soon as he go back, he will disappear into one of the cells, you know, for a few years. Won't be released and won't see his family maybe for four or five years, at least.
So, he did what he – the sensible thing of staying in the United States. That's perfect. However, it all went horribly wrong when he fell in love with a young Turkish woman, who was an intelligence analyst and a Turkish military intelligence or called the MIT, which, you know, her own father also was a, you know, a intelligence operative in the same agency. So, he fell in love with her. He was lured to Turkey by the Turkish intelligence and with Qatari-backed money in order to set up something called the DAWN, you know, Initiative, which is a think-tank to promote democratic reform in Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf countries.
And he decided to move to Istanbul. And when he moved there, of course, he, you know, married that woman. All the press call her his fiancée, but in reality, the marriage actually was based on religious ceremony.
Thomas Small So, they went through a – a religious marriage. But – but according to the government, they weren't married.
Aimen Dean So, she was religiously his wife, but legally wasn't. And there is a reason for that. Because Jamal was already married to two ladies in, you know, Saudi Arabia. He already had two wives, you know, and he was married to them. Because, in Saudi Arabia, polygamy is allowed. But in Turkey, it wasn't. So, he needed proof of divorce from both wives, which, you know, he obtained in the end. But the idea is that he needed to go to the Saudi consulate, in Istanbul, in order to obtain these papers.
And that is where, you know, of course, the tragedy happened. First, he went for the first meeting there in order to ask for the papers. And the Saudi consulate promised, "Yeah. You can come back, and they will provide you with all the papers necessary."
However, of course, the Saudi consulate alerted the Saudi Royal Court that, you know, "Jamal was, you know, at our consulate. I mean, he was asking for the papers, you know, to marry someone."
Thomas Small And not only that. We know precisely when he's going to come back.
Aimen Dean Absolutely. So, as far as the Saudis were concerned, they were aware already of his plans with the Qataris and the Turks established at DAWN centre in Istanbul. They were worried about his links to a – a group of fanatics in Turkey called [Hezboll ummah], you know, which is the Ummah party run by, you know, people who are close to the Muslim Brotherhood opposition. People, you know, against the UAE, against Kuwait, against Egypt, against, you know, and, you know, linked to the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood. So, they were worried that he is getting deeper and deeper and deeper into the enemy's laps.
Thomas Small So, now, the Saudi government knows that on this and at this time, Jamal Khashoggi is going to be in our consulate in Istanbul.
Aimen Dean But they have only a week. And this is, I think, where things started to go horribly wrong as far as the Saudi plan was concerned.
Thomas Small What was this plan? What did they want to do? Did they want to kill him?
Aimen Dean Okay. This is where I really beg the listener's indulgence, because the prevailing narrative out there is that the Saudis wanted to kill him in their consulates. And this has – couldn't have been further from the truth. You know, the reality here is that, based on facts, precedent, and analysis, they wanted to kidnap him.
Because everything about the team that was sent, you know, to retrieve him from Istanbul, to kidnap him basically, is similar to previous, at least four occasions, you know, in 2016, 2013, and 2012 and 2011. I mean, there were many occasions in the past, especially four occasions, where the Saudis will send private jets with teams in order to kidnap either a rogue member of the Saudi royal family or a certain officer or a businessman who is running away.
Thomas Small I see. So, you go – you go abroad. You send a team abroad. They sedate the – their target and then they claim that the target is ill. And then, under the guise of medical evacuation, they're – they're airlifted out back to – back to Saudi. That's the kind of—. That's the precedent.
Aimen Dean Absolutely. That's the precedent. The analysis here is that if the Saudis wanted him dead—and I've been told this now by multitude of Saudi either officers or senior officials—"If we wanted him dead, why we sent our own to be caught on cameras, you know, to do the deed on our own soil there in Istanbul," which is, you know, the Saudi consulate, you know, "having our fingerprints all over it. You know, we don't do that. Like, you know, I mean, this is very stupid. If we wanted him dead, there are, in Istanbul, especially, you know, there are Chechen mafias, Russian mafias, Albanian mafias. We could have higher than you have them. For $200,000, they would have done the job perfectly and our hands will be clean. We didn't want to kill him, you know. And that's not our, you know, MO or modus, operandi." I mean—.
Thomas Small If that's the case, Aimen, then why did they send a forensic scientist with a bone saw? I mean, that's pretty—. That's – that's pretty damning evidence, isn't it?
Aimen Dean No. Absolutely not. And the reason is because, with every other kidnappings, they would have done the same. Why? Because at any given stage, either the victim would resist and die. So, you need to dispose. Or the victim, you know, the one who's, you know, you need to kidnap, could actually resist and kill someone. Kill a member of your team. So, you need also to, you know, basically dismember that member and bring him back.
Thomas Small It's not a very happy story. That's for sure. So – so, what happened in the consulate, according to your – your analysis and what you know?
Aimen Dean The week, you know, time scale in which they were supposed to put this team together and send them, you know, was one of the reasons why the whole operation failed, as well as who was put in charge of this operation. In the past, it used to be only the GIP, you know, the General Intelligence Presidency, which basically handled such cases.
Thomas Small Which is like the CIA of Saudi Arabia.
Aimen Dean Yeah. In this case, it was mostly done under the supervision of Saud al-Qahtani.
Thomas Small Saud al-Qahtani. At that time, the crown prince MBS's top advisor.
Aimen Dean Exactly. Now, he is an amateur, as well as a sadist. And incompetent, you know. To add, you know—. To put three things together. You know, deadly combination,
Thomas Small An incompetent sadistic amateur. Whoa. that doesn't sound like you—. You're not as biggest fan.
Aimen Dean Oh, God. Like, you know, I mean, you know – you know, he is one—. He was one of the obstacles to real reform in Saudi Arabia and, you know, maybe one of the, you know, one of the silver linings basically of what happened with Jamal, you know—may God bless his soul—was the fact that, you know, Saud al-Qahtani was taken out of the picture because of, you know, this incident.
But, nonetheless, what happened is that, in the embassy—and then we have to rely on, you know, at least two Western intelligence agents who I know, who listen to the, you know, carefully selected and edited seven and a half minutes audio tape from inside the consulate.
Thomas Small Now, the Turkish government had actually bugged the consulate, and then, after the fact, released seven and a half minutes of the audio to the intelligence community. So, Jamal Khashoggi arrives. They arrest him. They placed them in front of a Skype call to Saud al-Qahtani.
Aimen Dean Well, from what I gathered from these two European intelligence analysts who listened to the tape, he was rude, condescending.
Thomas Small You mean, Saud al-Qahtani?
Aimen Dean Yes.
Thomas Small Yeah.
Aimen Dean And disrespectful towards Jamal. I mean, there was no question, you know, that with all this disrespect and all this bile, you know, being thrown at him by, Saud al-Qahtani, I mean, he realised he's going to be kidnapped, because he's aware of all the kidnappings that happened before, and that he's going to be sedated. So, he started to resist.
So, when they inserted the sedative gun in his neck, the Saudi government narrative is that it malfunctioned. Whether it malfunctioned or not, the reality is that the pumping of the sedative might have been prolonged and, you know, more sedative went into his system, because either the struggle or malfunction of the sedative gun itself. Nonetheless, that caused a cardiac arrest and he died.
And this is where the team there, you know, could have salvaged the whole issue by basically just calling a ambulance. That is the right thing to do immediately. Call an ambulance and just say he just collapsed. You know, he was, you know, out of control. "We wanted to sedate him and just he collapsed." And they could have basically avoided the complete disaster that happened afterwards.
But—. And, you know—. And who knows? Maybe the Turkish medics could have revived them on the spot. But, unfortunately, they decided to go down the dark path of coverup. And this is where the, you know, the forensic medical expert was called in order to dismember and to get rid of Jamal's body.
And so, the dismemberment happened. And to this day, no one knows where Jamal's body is. And this is when the lies started to be concocted around what really happened.
Thomas Small Lies from the perpetrators. Lies from the Saudi government. Confusion. Mis- – mismessaging. The narrative was constantly changing. It was a terrible, terrible, terrible cock-up. And – and, you know, basically surrounded by tremendous evil and darkness.
Aimen Dean Absolutely. And the problem is because the advisors, you know, especially Saud al-Qahtani, and the perpetrators, the team, were not communicating properly with the, you know, with the government back home what really happened, and they gave conflicting narratives to the point where they started blaming each other. And everyone is saying, "Well, the fault lies with this person or that person or that person."
So, it became a, really – an issue of the truth lost, you know, between a group of incompetent, you know, operatives who basically, you know, bogged down the whole operation. What was supposed to be a straightforward medical evacuation/kidnapping, you know, turned into a grue- – gruesome murder and an international scandal on a big scale.
The Turkish, you know, government wanted to milk this as much as possible for their own advantage, you know, including, you know, trade deals or weapon deals with the Saudis. And they were negotiating these, you know, abs- – absolutely. The problem here is that the narrative was already out and decided that it is a murder.
Thomas Small It is an assassination. That's the—. That's the problem. We—. It was a murder. But the – but the—. I think the – the narrative is it was a premeditated assassination, which is what your claim—. But you're saying it was not.
Aimen Dean No. There was no premeditation for assassination. If they wanted to assassinate him, there are many other ways they could have done it without having to do it themselves.
Thomas Small Eventually, the perpetrators of the murder in the consulate were arrested by the Saudi government and an investigation was launched. And according to the Saudi government, justice was served there. They were found guilty of murder. The Saudi government eventually admitted that a murder had occurred. They denied that the crown prince, Mohammed bin Salman, knew anything about it in advance. People contest that, of course.
But no one was executed, Aimen. Its—. Reports are that people like Saud al-Qahtani are under house arrest, not even in prison. How can we say justice was served if, following this murder, no one was executed, no one is – is serving really hard time?
Aimen Dean And this is where we have to go back, you know, again to the question of who is in control of this process now? It will be the family.
Thomas Small The family of the victim.
Aimen Dean Khashoggi's family. Yes. Absolutely. So, we're talking about Salah and Abdullah. You know, his sons. You know, the question of: What will happen to the people?
Now, there were sixteen people involved, you know. Five were found not guilty of the murder, because, you know, they were away, you know. And the five were sentenced to death, and six people were sentenced to prison, you know, terms. Now, even the five who were supposed to be executed, they are still serving prison sentences.
Now, the question here is that it was put before the family that they were—. "We have these five who we believe that caused the struggle to go out of hand. They are the ones who agitated him more than anything else. They are the ones who are responsible for – responsible for not calling, you know, for help afterwards and then decided to let him just die on the floor and then be dismembered. And these five will face the death penalty."
So, a court sentenced them to death, and their fate then was presented to the sons of Jamal Khashoggi, Salah and Abdullah. They were presented with the facts that these people are sentenced to death. "What is your inner desire? Do you want to forgive or do you want to, you know, see justice, you know, served and these people executed?"
Now, you know, to show something, is that the family, you know, decided not to forgive for five months. For five months, they held their ground, all the way until May of 2020. And then, they said that the reason why they wanted to, you know, for, you know, to wait for five months is because May 2020 coincided with the month of Ramadan, in the holy month of Ramadan, and that they wanted to announce the forgiveness during the month of Ramadan in order for this act of forgiveness to be amplified in the eyes of God.
But also, at the same time, to my knowledge and in good authority, that the considerable compensation, you know, and restitution by the Saudi government was paid to the family, whether in a very large lump sum in terms millions of US dollars, as well as, you know, housing and income for life. So, it was one of the largest—still yet undisclosed, but largest—settlement in offered by the Saudi government.
Thomas Small In Western terms, we would not think that justice was served in the Jamal Khashoggi case. But you are saying that, in Saudi terms, justice was served?
Aimen Dean Well, and this is where the clash of civilisations, you know, is going to happen now. Because in the Western mindsets, you know, any Western listener listening to me right now, they will think, "This is a farce." You know? "These people should be sent to jail for the rest of their lives and, you know, MBS himself should answer for this."
And you know, you – you will have all of these things being said. Yes. That's fine. I respect that. I understand that.
From the Saudi perspective, it's no different than any other case. I mean, you know, it's—. You know, that—. If the family said, "Okay. We forgive. We forgive." The Saudi mindset is that, one, the state admitted guilt. Number one. Number two, the children were summoned to the royal court, and they got an apology from the king and his son, MBS. They apologised and they explained that "this was not our intention."
All the facts, you know, basically that's presented to the Khashoggi family—and they were always given the transcripts of the interrogations—you know, point to the fact that this was not supposed to be a assassination. It was supposed to be a kidnapping. But, unfortunately, it went horribly wrong.
And then, the blood money. The blood money was paid. Once the blood money is paid and accepted by the family, then, by Saudi standard, not mine, from the Saudi point of view, justice has been served.
Thomas Small Well, there you have it, Aimen's take on one of the most shocking and notorious stories of our time. If anything, it shows us once again that they do things differently in the Middle East, but also how the geopolitical and ideological fault lines of the Cold War continue to resonate today, perhaps more than ever given what we're seeing as of this recording along the Russian-Ukrainian border.
With that in mind, next time on Conflicted, we're going to pivot away from the United States and towards its Cold War superpower competitor, the Soviet Union. What were the Soviets' designs on the Middle East? To what extent was the Cold War just a continuation of Britain's competition with Tsarist Russia in the great game? And how does all of that help us to understand what's going on today as Vladimir Putin and Joe Biden play an increasingly tense game of chicken over the geopolitical direction that Kyiv face? East or west?
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There you have it. We can't wait for you to join us for another episode of Conflicted in two weeks' time.
Conflicted is a Message Heard production. This episode was produced and edited by Rowan Bishop. Sandra Ferrari is our executive producer. Our theme music is by Matt Huxley.
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