Season 1 Episode 7

Jakub: I’m back in Kyiv for the first time since the summer, and things are a bit different. Even after the full scale invasion began, during the warmer months people were spilling out on the streets: talking, drinking, sharing stories. But when the winter hits in Ukraine, it really hits. 

The temperatures are in the negatives now, there’s a blanket of snow covering everything. Everywhere you hear the hum of generators, producing power amid rolling blackouts. In some parts of the city, the fumes of gas and smoke are thick enough to leave a metallic aftertaste.

Because living in Kyiv now means living without the comforts of the 21st century that we’ve all become accustomed to. It means living without heating, internet, mobile connection, in some cases water. As civilians struggle to continue normal lives, while relying on an infrastructure that has been decimated by Russian attacks.

With the winter setting in, I wanted to go across town and speak to the people being affected, to see how they are getting through the cold and dark.

I started off at our offices at the Kyiv Independent.

Helen: My name is Helen Yoshiko. I'm the newsroom assistant at the Kyiv Independent. I'm very happy to be here. 

Jakub: The last couple of months have been really difficult. for basically working and living in Kyiv. Can you tell me a little bit about what it's been like?

Helen: Yeah, as we know, Russia commits attacks on the critical infrastructure as well as the civilian infrastructure. Not only in Eastern and Southern Ukraine, but also in Kyiv. And the last couple of weeks actually have been pretty hard because after the blackout that happened in late November, we have been out of electricity for almost two days straight in the office. 

We had no electricity, no water, no signs of connection. For example, I couldn't connect to my parents and they didn't know what was happening back home in Dnipro. And so I was running around the city trying to find some connection just to say that I'm alive, that everything's okay, and it has been very hard for us to stay online and to work, and to deliver news. But we have made it, and this has only made us stronger as a team and also as individuals. 

Jakub: The Kyiv Independt offices now often run by candlelight, connecting to the internet using a Starlink - that’s the satellite internet box created and run by Elon Musk’s SpaceX. It’s been a lifeline for communication.

Working here right now, everything has to be pretty ad hoc, but it works. There’s something about living through a war that forces you to be pragmatic.

Helen: So we are now more prepared for the blackouts that could happen because after the blackout happened, we have bought everything that can possibly help us to survive. Starting from power banks that could recharge our phones and laptops, and a Starlink. 

We also have the systems that can recharge everything in the office. We have the lights now. We have food, we have prepared, we have done our best actually to make life in the office bearable and to, to actually, uh, make it comfortable.

Jakub: But comfort isn’t the priority now in Kyiv. It’s about survival. 

Helen: Yeah, so it's been a very interesting story because we started looking for the new office in late August. And since it has been four months, and at the beginning we were looking for a nice office with big windows. But then when the Russian attacks began, the criteria changed drastically. 

So first of all we were looking for an office that had a bomb shelter. We were looking for the office that could have access to a generator and to the roof, so we could put our Starlink system and all the generators. 

This had to be the office with maximum security that is far away from all the governmental blocks. These details, they would not concern us if it was not war, but now we are looking for the office that could be secure, that could be comfortable for our team to stay and to survive this winter, that will be very hard. Probably the hardest winter in our lives. 

Jakub: The Starlinks, the heightened security, the bomb shelter - these are all things which are allowing us to continue reporting on the war. 

But not everyone in Ukraine is so fortunate. With homes ripped apart by bombs and power a scarce commodity, many are facing a bleak winter.

Following the missile attacks on November 23rd, the Ukrainian authorities set up 4,000 places of refuge across the country to combat this. They are called Invincibility Centers, and they are a lifeline for civilians - a place to warm up, to charge their phones so they can connect with loved ones, to get some food, to find solidarity in community. 

Helen and I went to a local invincibility centre in Kyiv. Outside, it looked like a simple tent, but inside you’ll find power, food, a bed, a place to find refuge from the harsh Ukrainian winter.

We spoke to Alexander, who is helping run the centre. We’ve translated the conversation.

Helen: I can see that you are a very popular place, many people come to you. Please tell me how many people come here every day to warm up, charge their phones or some gadgets?

Alexander: Less now. At the peak, I think, at our point, there were about 50 people at the same time who were constantly here. This was on November 23-24-25. Then, as they gave a little more power, people were coming less and less. Now, on average, there are about six people a day who come here to work. It may be cold, but in principle there is light, there is coffee, Wi-Fi, heat, there is also a generator.

Helen: So, you have food and drinks?

Alexander: Yes, there is food, you can take everything on the shelves. There is coffee, there is a cooler with water, there is also hot water. If there is no Wi-Fi, there will be a Starlink, they gave it to us, so we have everything here.

Helen: Thank you so much for your answers. Tell me, are you happy to represent the invincibility centre, to work in such a place?

Alexander: I t gives you interesting experiences, because you do your job, and at the same time people can get what they need. Some to charge their phone - because some women came who had not spoken with their relatives for a long time, and it is important for them to get in touch. So, they said that finally after three days they were able to communicate with their family. So it gives people elevation and strength.

Helen: Thank you very much, you are doing very important work. Thank you so much.

Jakub: Disconnection from family is one of the most difficult parts of war, and it’s hitting Ukrainians hard. A talk on the phone, hearing from a loved one across the country - it’s these vital connections that are keeping morale high.

Helen and the team at the Kyiv Independent feel it too.

Helen: My biggest concern personally is having no connection with my family. But the biggest concern for me as part of the team, as part of the company, I guess, is the moral tiredness that we all have. We don't talk much about it, but every one of us feels it. It's like on the background, and it really can affect our work and our effectiveness. So with all these blackouts and all these massive attacks happening, it is crucially important to stay focused on what we do.

So I really hope that we survive this winter as a company and as a country. 

Jakub: Russian attacks on civilian infrastructure have been consistent throughout the war, but recently it’s a tactic that they have used more and more.

In late November a missile struck an apartment block in Vyshgorod, a northern suburb of Kyiv, killing three people and wounding 15. The WHO has recorded more than 700 strikes on hospitals since the war began. Just this week, attacks from Russian Kamikaze drones on the Ukrainian power grid have left some 1.5 million people without power.

This all amounts to a deliberate and consistent targeting of people who aren’t even on the frontlines. It’s a type of warfare that some have even labelled terrorism for its methodical brutality. 

Helen: First things first, by destabilising civilians, Russia destabilises the military as well. And every time we don't give up, every time we find new ways of invincibility, every time we show the whole world how strong we are. Every time we find new ways to survive these things we humiliate Russians. And we defeat them, and we help the armed forces of Ukraine

We now create our own invincibility without invincibility centres. We also have invincibility inside of us, inside every one of us. 

Jakub: The one thing I was struck by being back in Kyiv was just how exhausting life has become. Getting a hot meal or a warm shower isn’t easy, and that takes its toll.

But this is the point of Russia targeting civilians and civilian infrastructure.

The consistent drumbeat of bombs and blackouts in Ukraine is an attempt to sow fear amongst the population. 

Civilians have always been seen as fair game for Russia in this war, and the recent attacks on Ukraine’s power grid and other infrastructure is just a new way of terrorising them.

But it’s places like Kyiv’s invincibility centres that are safeguarding Ukrainians against this kind of barbarity. The people we spoke to were not cowed by exhaustion and cold, they were resolute. 

Being back in Kyiv was different this time round, but the people’s steadfast commitment to continue their struggle against the Russian invaders remained the same.

Can the same can be said of the Russian military?

Anastasiia: From Message Heard and the Kyiv Independent, you're listening to Power Lines: From Ukraine to the World.

Jakub: In this series, we're going to be mapping the undercurrents and global consequences of the war in Ukraine, beginning in Kyiv and following the roads out wherever they may lead. I'm Jakub Parusinski.

Anastasiia: And I'm Anastasiia Lapatina. Jakub, are you in the office? What is happening there in the background?

Jakub: So, I'm actually in the closet or sort of the meet and groom of the Kyiv Independent office.

Anastasiia: Oh, yeah. Right.

Jakub: The power is off.

Anastasiia: Oh, my God.

Jakub: Something that happens on a daily basis to all the Ukrainians throughout the country. We have a backup internet thanks to Starlink. But it's basically become a fact of life now in Kyiv, that if you want to have access to power, if you want to have access to internet, if you want to have heating and perhaps warm water, you need to either get lucky, be constantly on the move or follow the-

Anastasiia: That's terrible.

Jakub: Schedule of which region, which district of Kyiv is powered down when. And the whole reason is that since Russia has been losing for months now, they have switched from focusing the battle on the military side to very actively targeting civilian infrastructure.

Anastasiia: I feel like it's a bit unfair to say that they've switched from military to civilians because they've been targeting civilians from day one. But for sure recently they've increased their attacks and it's quite obvious what they're trying to do. They're trying to take the power and the heating and the water and the internet and the connection away from us. It's only to scare us off, that's the only goal.

Jakub: You're absolutely right, Nastya. From the beginning of the war, Russia has been targeting civilians. The thing that has changed over the last couple of months is the focus on targeting civilian infrastructure, meaning the power grid, internet, basically the way that the country runs.

And the purpose of it is, of course, to break Ukrainian spirit, or in other words, to terrorise the population.

Anastasiia: Of course.

Jakub: And that's actually the question that we want to ask this week. It's been on the minds of a lot of people now. Can we call Russia a terrorist state? And is that something that's actually helpful for Ukraine?

Anastasiia: It's a very interesting question because a lot of people in Ukraine evoke the term terrorism. But I'm not sure whether it's actually useful to use that term, because in my studies I've focused on terrorism, and in my view, it has always been something that let's say, little men use.

So, the very key part of terrorism is asymmetry. It's a little group that doesn't have enough resources. It doesn't have a state military, because it's not a state. It's usually a non-state actor that uses terrorism as a method.

So, for me, it was kind of a little weird to call Russia a terrorist state because I thought there must be a better term, because this one doesn't fit.

Jakub: The other question that comes to mind is, well, what is the goal of this? How does labelling Russia help? And the thing that I keep coming back to is the level of atrocities that have been perpetrated on the Ukrainian people is absolutely unheard of in Europe in recent decades, at the very least.

And for me, one of the reasons that people are just demanding and clamoring that Russia be labeled as a terrorist state is that there's this fear that they will get away with it.

[Music playing]

Nastya, for this episode, you spoke to someone you already knew, didn't you?

Anastasiia: I did. I was really excited because when we first started making this series, this was one of the first people that I knew we had to speak to, and he's one of the reasons why I even pitched this episode to begin with. And it's Bruce Hoffman.

Bruce is a political analyst whose work on terrorism and counter terrorism is some of the most forward thinking and respected in the field. It's a subject he's been studying for four decades.

And his academic positions include his tenured professorship at Georgetown University, in Washington DC and he's also a visiting professor at St Andrews University in Scotland.

His publications on terrorism include Holy Terror, Inside Terrorism, which is a book that like every expert in the field has. I actually came across Bruce's work because as I already mentioned it, I do terrorism studies in my degree, and Bruce's work is like the cornerstone of the field.

Jakub: Sounds amazing. Let's hear it.

Anastasiia: Hi Bruce. Thank you so much for joining us.

Bruce: Of course, Nastya. Thank you for having me.

Anastasiia: So, before we get into the whole Russian related ordeal of this, let's get some definitions down. What is terrorism to begin with?

Bruce: Well, before I answer what terrorism is, let me observe that you've asked probably the most impossible question imaginable, because over the past half century, literally no one has been able to really agree on the definition of terrorism.

Anastasiia: Okay.

Bruce: About 40 years ago, there was a very prominent academic survey of the leading experts in the 1980s on terrorism, and a hundred experts were pulled what their definitions are, and 104 definitions were provided.

So, even the people offering definitions offered multiple ones. And in the United States, for example, every different governmental agency has its own definition of terrorism.

Anastasiia: But then there is one list of like state sponsors of terrorism, right?

Bruce: Right. There's list of state sponsors of terrorism and everybody agrees on things like the designation of foreign terrorist organizations.

But at least the definition that I use (and it's the definition that has appeared in every addition of my book Inside Terrorism, since it was first published in 1998), is that terrorism is the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence, or equally importantly, the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change.

Anastasiia: Okay. Is there such a thing as a terrorist state?

Bruce: Of course, there's something as a terrorist state, because states throughout history have terrorised their own populations. We only have to go to the Stalinist purchase, for example, which consumed millions of people. Of course, Nazi persecution of Germans whether Jews, LGBTQ, Catholics, communists, socialists and others.

But I think this is an important issue, is that terrorism in its most commonly used and accepted sense, is something that's perpetrated by sub-state or non-state actors. It's clear that states terrorise populations and not only their own.

Often when they engage in war and throughout history, we can cite numerous examples of states terrorizing civilian populations in war. You can go back to ancient times and see that that's been a factor.

But at least in attempting to demarcate what something means in a useful sense, most commonly the word terrorism is reserved for non-state actors.

And then we talk about state terror. And state terror can fold easily into warfare. We just have to think in the United States, of General William Tecumseh Sherman's scorched earth policy has marched to the sea in the South during the Civil War.

Or the terror bombings of Guernica and other Spanish cities by the nationalist forces during the Spanish Civil War. Of course, things like the Nazis Blitzkrieg, the bombing of London, for example, fire-bombing of Dresden by the allies.

Anastasiia: Right.

Bruce: Bombs dropped on Hiroshima, Nagasaki, specifically targeted civilians. But I wouldn't call that terrorism. That still is a unique category. That I think should be reserved for non-state or sub-state actors. When states engage in the terrorizing or the terrorization of civilians, we already have a term to use for that. It's war crimes, and often it includes genocide.

So, we don't need to default to terrorism. But you've kind of hit the nail on the head in the sense that in contemporary times, and certainly over the past 20 years since 9/11, but even before, terrorism is an indisputably, pejorative or negative term.

And it's the go-to term for many people and international organisations and countries, when they really want to express their most fulsome opprobrium of another state or of an act (it doesn't have to be a state) that they don't approve of.

For instance, gosh, back in 2014 or 2015, there was the Sony Pictures hacked by North Korea, for example, that was referred to as terrorism because people were so bored by it. When produce on food shelves have been poisoned, even if it has no political motive, it's been called terrorism.

But it's not correct. It's become a catchphrase that we use for anything that we just want to express our profound moral disapproval of. And it doesn't mean that it's accurate. And I think it's muddied the term and confused the term.

[Music playing]

Jakub: It feels to me like in order for terrorism to work, you need a couple of ingredients. So, you need a population that you can actually terrorise, which means that civilians need to matter in the political process.

So, in a dictatorship, terrorism would not be quite as effective. Like democracy is particularly vulnerable.

The second thing which feels very important is the mass communication. Because if you can't sort of show pictures of people that are terrorised or are suffering or you can't sort of transmit fear, then it also isn't really that effective. Because it seems that terrorism is all about taking a relatively small violence scary act or input and trying to get these sort of out scaled effects through it.

Anastasiia: It's true that actually relatively few people die from terrorist attacks. But the amount of discussion it gets, the wars that are waged in the pursuit of ending this, we use this term with so much emotion with it, that the actual numbers and the actual semantics of what it is don't matter much.

Jakub: It seems that this is actually not the bug, it's the feature. It's exactly the goal of terrorism, which is ultimately in its end, political.

Which makes me feel that it's something that has been employed quite significantly by Russia now and the Soviet Union before, with the goal of sort of scaring the population. And by the way, I'd argue that the Soviet Union used fear as a way to control its own population in the past.

Anastasiia: Definitely.

Jakub: So, this kind of political technique, [Speaking Russian] as they say in Russian, that almost goes towards the same purpose as terrorism.

So, to some extent, 9/11 really was the beginning of the new life of the word terrorism. Right?

Anastasiia: Right, yeah.

Jakub: The U.S. suffers from a horrible terrorist attack, and all of a sudden, it becomes a global thing. And it becomes a global thing, not just for democracies, but lots of dictatorships all of a sudden say, no, no, no, no, no, these activists and whatever that are protesting about free speech or autonomous rights for their province, they're terrorists.

All of a sudden, everyone starts labelling their enemies as terrorists. And actually, in Ukraine, at the beginning when Russia invaded in 2014 and Donbas War started, the initial name of Ukraine's reaction was, an anti-terrorist operation.

Anastasiia: That's true. I've completely forgot about that. That seems like a lifetime ago now.

[Music playing]

Jakub: Where are we headed next?

Anastasiia: Well, now that we sort of know what terrorism is, I wanted to ask Bruce whether Russia's action in Ukraine actually fit into that commonly used definition.

There are a lot of comparisons being made in Ukraine between well-known terrorist acts (even as far as 9/11), and Russian attacks that deliberately target civilians, because I think something like 98% of all Russian missile sell attacks have targeted civilian infrastructure.

Bruce: Absolutely.

Anastasiia: Which is terrible. Are those comparisons fair? And since you already mentioned war crimes, are you just happy with us using the term war crimes to describe these and not terrorism?

Bruce: Well, they're not mutually exclusive, acts of terrorism can be war crimes. But generally speaking, we don't wish to endow terrorists with the credibility or the legitimacy of being an established nation state. And at least in history, we generally regard war crimes as committed by states.

And I think that's part of the issue is firstly, terrorist organizations tend to be at least historically small, non-state actors with a limited capacity for violence. Already that's very different from any state actors where they have established standing militaries to do their work for them in the case of aggressive wars.

Also, don't forget historically, at least for the past 50 years, more than half of all terrorists’ attacks go unclaimed. So, there's often not an address, there's nothing that can really be done.

We may have a suspicion who perpetrated it, but it's very difficult to arrest and then to assemble evidence that could be proven in a court of law. This is why the United States, 20 years ago resorted to the indefinite detentions of the Guantanamo detainees, because there was no evidence.

This is very different in the case of states waging an aggressive unprovoked war, because firstly, we have an international mechanisms through the Genevan Hague Conventions, we have an international Court of Criminal Justice. We have the ability to hold the leaders of states responsible for war crimes.

So, the identity of the perpetrator is almost always completely clear when it's a war crime, when it's terrorism, it's not always as obvious.

Anastasiia: Interesting.

Jakub: And to me that means it's an important distinction. It's not to take away. You said it yourself; terrorism is really a tactic when you come down to it. It's a mode of warfare.

The United States declared a war on terror, which I thought was enormously significant because terror is an emotion. It's something that makes you scared or anxious.

Anastasiia: Right, yeah.

Jakub: The mistake was using an emotion rather than a tactic. But your question goes to the heart of it. You can't declare a war on a tactic. And that's why I think, of course, what's happening in Ukraine are war crimes, and of course it's designed to terrorise the population.

But I would just argue we have other terms, especially legal terms, that we can apply much more effectively to describing those acts and holding the perpetrators responsible, than in the messiness of terrorism.

Anastasiia: There's another comparison that is very interesting to me, so I want to talk about it. The U.S. for example, still uses the terms of terrorism for various sanctions and for various methods of punishment, let's say, because the U.S. State Department does have a list of state sponsors of terrorism.

First of all, is the state sponsor of terrorism somehow different from the terms we've been using, like state terror, et cetera?

Bruce: Well, if Russia, for instance, was going to be named sponsor of state terrorism, I would've said the infiltration of the green little men into the Donbas some years ago, was much more of a justification of our criteria. Because they were clearly surrogate warriors. They were clearly instruments of the state that were being sent to subvert a sovereign state of its own standing and to use violence in the pursuit of those ends.

Once you've got armies and air forces and navies invading another country, honestly, what could be worse than unprovoked warfare? Aggressive warfare? To my mind, it may satisfy a psychological need on the part of people, which I understand completely to label something terrorism, because terrorism is such a negative pejorative word.

But I think genocide war crimes are far worse and far more serious because they're done on a grand scale. Don't forget that inherent in the definition of terrorism is that these sub-state groups have a limited capacity for violence. Even on 9/11, Al-Qaeda was not going to defeat or conquer the United States.

But it's very different when states invade other states, that's exactly what they're out to do. And we don't need a term like terrorism. War crimes and genocide are far more serious.

The fact that Russians have taken Ukrainian children away from their parents and have disappeared them in essence, this (Nicholas Kristof argued, I think very cogently last week in the New York Times), amounts to genocide and certainly conforms to the definition of genocide.

The violence being rained down upon the Ukrainian people that are causing unparalleled casualties, that does amount to a genocide. You're trying to kill off a large section of the population, to cause the government to capitulate. Genocide to me is a far worse term, a far more negative term, a far more serious accusation that can be proven in court than terrorism.

[Music playing]

Anastasiia: So Jakub, you had some sort of brilliant thought about ISIS.

Jakub: Well, that's what I spend most of my day on. What's interesting about the use of terrorism to persecute various wrongdoings is where it wasn't really that widely used, which is the case of ISIS.

So, ISIS perpetrates violent acts on a scale that we have never seen. And it feels to me like no one really spent much time thinking about do we need to call them terrorists? It was almost so obvious, that the question didn't really rise up.

But it feels like there's also another element to it, which is everyone agreed that we need to stop these guys. And when I look at how Ukrainians and other people around the world are sort of lobbying to get Russia described as a terrorist state, it feels to me like the goal is we need to make sure that their crimes are punished.

And when you see people like the French president Emmanuel Macron talking about security guarantees for Russia, and a host of other Western leaders talking about look, now is time to sort of look at negotiations. There is this fear that, oh my God, all of these absolutely horrid, barbaric acts that were perpetrated by Russia, by Russians will not be avenged.

And it feels to me like the fight to label them as terrorists is to make sure that they just don't slip away.

Anastasiia: Yeah. I think that's definitely what it is. Of course, there is the sanctions part of it. We just want to have them sanctioned as much as possible and maybe impossible. But it is also to make them into this group of outcasts whereby it would be so shameful to have any interactions or any negotiations or any trade with them, that it would literally equate to something like trading with ISIS.

Anyway, I think the point is to bring the emotion into it. I think the point is to use the emotional response that terrorism evokes in people to kind of galvanise all of this hatred towards Russia and all of this understanding of just how utterly evil their actions are, to just make it as shameful as possible to have any sort of interaction with them. I think that is probably the goal of the Ukrainian government that is pushing for this designation.

But then the question of justice that he mentioned, I'm not sure that plays that huge of a role because as Bruce already mentioned, there are other terms that can be used and its war crimes and Russia has perpetrated at least 50,000 of them. For our audience, just let that number sink in, at least 50,000 war crimes.

And the only kind of infrastructure we have to prosecute that is the International Criminal Court. And the nuances of how that body works and Russia's involvement and Ukraine's involvement in it, makes it close to impossible that I think Putin, for example, will ever stand trial.

Jakub: So, the EU actually recently designated Russia as a terrorist state.

Anastasiia: Right. But I think it's a bit more complicated than people perceive it to be. And I asked Bruce about these designations both in the UN and the U.S., what they mean, what the practical consequences are and whether they're actually useful.

[Music playing]

The EU, recently passed a resolution that said that Russia was a state sponsor of terrorism and it was pretty interesting because the EU doesn't actually have a legal basis for that. Like that doesn't really (as far as I understand), mean anything.

It's interesting that there is this kind of state infrastructure in the U.S. with the state sponsors of terrorism. Could you talk a bit about the history of those designations? Of course, this is all highly politicised, but I know that some countries that have been taken off the list, those cases were definitely very politicised in the procedures, how that happened.

Bruce: The state sponsorship of terrorism dates back to the 1980s when during the Reagan administration, a number of countries (Syria, Iraq, North Korea, Cuba for a time, Sudan, for example, Iran as well), were designated by the U.S. State Department, state sponsors of terrorism.

You're right to say that it's often political because groups are added and removed for variety of reasons. But the idea was that this would trigger a range of economic and other sanctions on those countries that would have a tangible effect on not only expressing the opposition to them of using terrorist organizations as shadow or covert warriors or surrogate warriors. But this would put some teeth into it.

And that if the United States took the lead, then NATO of course would follow. And then other countries in the United Nations, hopefully it would follow to isolate those countries and get them to change their policies.

So, that in essence is the history of it. What that state-sponsored list is designed to do is change state behaviour. But it's to change state behaviour and not using these surrogate or covert forces as an instrument to foreign policy.

And that's again, when a country then wages war against another country, in my view, it's just gone way beyond using surrogate or covert warriors. It's something that's quite obvious and should trigger a whole range of other sanctions, which it has done.

Anastasiia: Could you describe what are some of the consequences of a state being put on that list?

Bruce: Well, we're already pretty much there with Russia. It's very severe economic sanctions that prevents international commerce. It certainly embargoes on commercial goods, even critical commercial goods nowadays, which would be things like computer chips and things like that.

And also, very restrictive travel imposed on citizens of that country. Not just the leaders who, of course, their assets overseas can be seized, as has been happening. But also, it puts a really heavy burden on the population of the country involved in terms of not just their commercial activities, but just their travel and freedom of movements.

So, all these things are quite serious. As I said, all them are already being implemented. So, we don't gain all that much. It's not that there's additional teeth that would be added to the way Russia's being treated.

Anastasiia: Right. I think in terms of Russia, there's also the interesting case of Wagner, their Wagner military group, which I think there were discussions of the West designating that as a specific terrorist organization of its own.

But then again, I think if Russia just decides to somehow incorporate that within their military structure, for example, like Ukraine has done with Azov, back in the day or something like that. Not to equate the actions of Azov in Wagner, but just saying that to incorporate a private military group within the national military, then again that means that all sorts of terrorist labels are no longer necessary or needed.

Bruce: Well, I think some could argue too that there was discussion in the United States of designating the Azov battalion in years past, or the National Corps as terrorist groups, but they didn't succeed because it was much more ambiguous situation. In that, acts of international terrorism were not sustained.

The Russian Imperial Movement, for instance, wasn't even designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the State Department two years ago. Firstly, that was a very important step forward because it was one of the first far right overseas groups that received that designation.

But it was very selective. And it wasn't even the FTO, the Foreign Terrorist Organization definition, it was a half-step below. It was the specially designated foreign terrorist entity is what it was described. So, even in that case, there was controversy.

I would argue that, at least from what I've gathered in the United States is that Azov and the National Corps became … whatever justification, the arguments for designating them may or may not have had, I think that changes in their structure and in their operations convince people that it was inappropriate. And that's what these designations are designed to do.

Vagner would be I think a much more suitable designation as a terrorist entity and Russia as a state sponsor of terrorism, than to label Russia itself because of the invasion of Ukraine as a state sponsor. As I said, I think that it's much more serious to focus on the war crimes and the genocide.

[Music playing]

Anastasiia: The EU designation, actually, as far as I understand, correct me if I'm wrong, but as far as I understand, it does close to nothing because there isn't actually a legal mechanism for what it is.

It was essentially just a resolution, like a document in which the EU affirmed a particular opinion. It's kind of how they recognise the Holodomor genocide, for example.

But it doesn't have like a string of economic sanctions additionally to it or some sort of cutting and trade or isolating diplomatic ties, nothing of that sort. So, it's just a symbolic gesture, isn't it?

Jakub: You are right, Nastya. It's mostly about the European parliament coming together and making a symbolic gesture. Unlike the U.S. where that kind of designation actually triggers a host of legal consequences, especially in terms of finances and those kinds of things, the EU actually called out on its member states saying that, “Look, we've designated Russia as a state sponsor of terrorism, now whatever that means for you, please act accordingly.”

But at the same time, it's not a completely empty gesture. It does send an important message, and it has a lot to do with how the EU works versus how the U.S. works. And it was also I think, an important point in rallying various stakeholders from across the union together on completing work on the latest 9th sanctions package.

So yeah, more of a consensus measure than a legal trigger. Nastya, have you seen the sledgehammer video? And I genuinely hope you haven’t.

Anastasiia: I have not.

Jakub: I did. It's Vagner executing one of their own for surrendering and then speaking out against them.

Anastasiia: Right.

Jakub: With a sledgehammer.

Anastasiia: I've heard of the incident. I did not see the video. Did you watch it?

Jakub: A portion of it, yes. It's exactly as bad as you think. Everyone who has compared it to ISIS style execution is-

Anastasiia: I was literally on the tip of my tongue just now.

Jakub: It is exactly the same. It is exactly the same atmosphere. It is the same type of organisation. It's hard to sort of distinguish between the two.

Anastasiia: Can you talk a bit about their history? Did they appear in 2014 as like a kind of Russian proxy tool in Donbas, or were they around before?

Jakub: So, Vagner traces its origins to around the time that the Russian invasion of Ukraine started in Donbas, in 2014. And it's been a bit of a shadowy group that sort of operates beyond the laws, beyond the rules.

And sort of, you could very much say beyond the civilised world, it's full of neo-Nazis, far-right extremists, prisoners, criminals. A lot of people have likened it to the Kaminski Brigade or SS RONA, which was this Russian unit that collaborated with the Nazis, that fought with the Nazis, that was composed of basically all kinds of criminals. And anyone that they could pick up was widely seen as one of the most brutal and barbaric organisations.

Anastasiia: But it's also important how global their reach is. Like they're involved in Africa, they're involved in Syria, if I'm not wrong.

Jakub: Yeah.

Anastasiia: They're definitely involved in Ukraine. And during the war, they took part in the brutal siege of Mariupol. There were stories of Wagner guys being in Bucha. Though some of these things are pretty hard to fan check, but the Wagner group is like one of the most brutal and notorious tools that Russia has in terms of manpower.

Jakub: Absolutely. And it's also a tool that's been used quite, I would say, widely to terrorise Russian and various allied troops. Obviously, a very bad bunch of guys, to put it mildly. Terrorists, I think yes, absolutely so. And as Bruce says, like the case for labelling Vagner as a terrorist organization is quite strong. And perhaps that's also one that is more useful.

[Music playing]

Anastasiia: Are these designations, you said that their prime purpose is to change state behaviour. Have they done that? Have they been successful?

Bruce: Yes, but I wouldn't say necessarily in a linear or consistent sense. It did prompt Libya in 2003 or 2004, I think it was 2003, to stop developing chemical and biological weapons, for example, to cease its support of foreign terrorist entities.

At times it has persuaded countries. Syria, for instance, was dropped from the list temporarily when it was cooperating with the United States on the war on terror. It was then reinserted onto the list when the Syrian civil war began.

But again, Syria wasn't put on the list because of what it was doing to its own population. It was put on the list because it was using terrorist groups as surrogates.

International law, the problem is that it always lacks a mechanism of coercive enforcement. There's an enforcement that’s certainly the collective moral opprobrium of states and the economic sanctions.

But there's some countries like Iran, for example, that regard with tremendous pride, the sanctions that are imposed on them, and the fact that they can withstand them. So, it cuts both ways.

Anastasiia: Right. It's just kind of like Ukrainians joke that they take pride of the fact that they're sanctioned by Russia.

Bruce: Right. Yeah, exactly. But we live in an imperfect world.

Anastasiia: Of course.

Bruce: I think what's important is that certainly the entirety of the free world has recognised what is going on in Ukraine as an unprovoked war of aggression, that very quickly has slid into the serial sustained perpetration of war crimes and indeed genocide. That's very important.

But as we know, these things unfold at a very slow pace. The consequences of all them, whether it's the sanctions imposed on state sponsors throughout history, or even the sanctions currently enforced against Russia, take time to have effect. And of course, when civilians are dying, everyone is rightly very impatient.

Anastasiia: I was just thinking that, I think this kind of goes back to something that I think about very often because I study politics. All of these discussions can so often be so non-emotional and people in the fields take pride in being objective and not letting their emotions affect their opinions.

But then the whole ordeal of political decisions, we're all humans who make these decisions. And we have these methods of punishing a state, and we can use the terms terrorism, or we can use the terms war crimes, and we have ways to legally pursue both, but still somehow, we resort to the one that evokes more emotion.

And we do that on a state level too. Like it's the Ukrainian government that's pushing for these designations. It's just very interesting to see that.

Bruce: No, rightly so. And I certainly don't fault the Ukrainian government for pushing in all directions.

Anastasiia: No, totally none. Yeah.

Bruce: It’s just I'm sitting here in Washington DC in a comfortable home that's not being shelled or bombed. And it's easy for me to make all these very academic assertions that sound very reasonable and objective.

But we're talking about people dying and suffering, and indeed not just — as the winter comes, dying and suffering with very … that they'll be cold. They may go hungry. This is like very, very serious means of warfare that we should rightly condemn in the strongest possible terms.

My only argument is that terrorism may be immensely satisfying, emotional to label this type of aggression, but I just don't think it's accurate.

And going back to your point, why with someone like Putin or Russia, they're treated differently like terrorists. The one thing we haven't addressed (and maybe you were getting to this, the elephant in the room), is that I think the United States and the international community is absolutely desperate not to provide Putin with an excuse or an opportunity to use a nuclear weapon, certainly on a tactical level, that would be a game changer and just the whole strategic nuclear issue.

As a child of the Cold War, I remember very clearly ducking underneath desks when there were air raid sirens in my public school in New York City. I remember very clearly the Cuban Missile Crisis. These are things I never thought we'd have to think about again.

But yet we are, and quite seriously. And that I think also shows the desperation of Russia and the fact that at least in its sabre-rattling, it is already crossed the line by threatening these weapons.

And that plays an enormous part, I think, in the calculations, certainly in the United States of not, for instance, labelling it a state sponsor, which might choke off certain diplomatic avenues, not necessarily to resolve this war, because of course president Zelenskyy and the Ukrainian people have declared that there's no compromise and that there's no negotiations.

But to prevent what would really be a disastrous line being crossed in terms of international security.

[Music playing]

Anastasiia: Okay. Bruce, thank you so much for joining us. It was really interesting to listen to you.

Bruce: You're very welcome. Thank you very much for having me.

Anastasiia: Okay. So, I want to read you a resolution that was introduced to the U.S. Congress; “To designate Russia a terrorist state.” And I just thought that the wording here was quite interesting. And to be clear this resolution has not been passed. It's been introduced and it's being reviewed and debated, et cetera.

It says that, “The direction of President Vladimir Putin, the government of the Russian Federation, has and continues to promote acts of international terrorism against political opponents and nation states.

“It also engages in campaign of terror, utilizing brutal force, targeting civilians during the Second Chechen War.”

It also mentions how since 2014, Russia's government has supported the so-called separatists engaging in acts of violence against Ukraine in Donbas.

And then it also mentions Wagner talking about how the Russian Federation spreads terror throughout the world through private military networks and mercenaries such as the Wagner Group, in an effort to project power cheaply and deniably.

So, my point is, first of all, the conversations of Russia being or not being a state sponsor of terrorism or a terrorist state or whichever you want, is a much broader conversation than Ukraine.

And I do think that together with what they did in Chechnya and together with what they did in Syria, I do think it starts looking a bit more convincing.

Jakub: Yeah. Don't get me wrong, I definitely agree that Russia employs terrorism as one of its toolkits in the asymmetrical war that it wages on Ukraine as well as on the West. For me, Bruce's argument’s that war crimes and the crime of genocide are so much bigger, they're persuasive.

Anastasiia: I think I agree with that.

Jakub: Yeah. They are persuasive. But in the end, if sort of the label, if the designation is something that can mobilise Western governments and governments all around the world, by the way, this isn't something that should be uniquely western that we abhor and oppose terrorism, then let's do it. Let's get that label.

But I do somehow feel like it is almost reductive to say that, “Yeah, it's a state sponsor of terrorism.” No, it's actually worse.

[Music playing]

Anastasiia: In two weeks in Power Lines, we're speaking with Lauren Zabierek, the Executive Director of the Cyber Project at Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center, to hear more about the war that is being fought online.

Jakub: If you want to support us, you can subscribe to our ad free feed on Apple, and by looking up Power Lines+ on Spotify.

You can also support Kyiv Independent by finding us on our Patreon, to get behind the scenes content. Go to patreon.com/kyivindependent to continue helping us report on the most important stories in Ukraine.

Anastasiia: Look up Message Heard wherever you're listening to this podcast, for more of our original shows, and find us on our website at messageheard.com or on our Power Lines Twitter @PowerLinesPod, as well as Instagram and Facebook, by looking up at Message Heard.

Jakub: You can also follow the Kyiv Independent on Twitter and Facebook at Kyiv Independent and Instagram at kyivindependent_official, to get the latest news and stay up to date with our coverage.

Please also subscribe and rate Power Lines in your podcast app as it really helps others find our show.

Anastasiia: Power Lines is a partnership between the Kyiv Independent and Message Heard. It was produced by Bea Duncan, Harry Stott, and Talia Augustidis. The executive producer is Sandra Ferrari. The theme music is by Tom Biddle and Alfie Godfrey.

Bonus Episode 6

Power Lines Episode 6 Bonus Transcript

[Music Playing]

Jakub: Hello, listeners. Welcome to your bonus episode of Power Lines; from Ukraine to the world.

Anastasiia: I am Anastasiia Lapatina.

Jakub: And I'm Jakub Parusinski. For this week's bonus, we're speaking about Roman Ratushnyi, a well-known Ukrainian activist who fought to preserve green spaces in Kyiv, then joined the military and was killed by Russians in June of this year.

Anastasiia: We're bringing you an extended version of our interview with Maryna Khromykh. She's an Executive Director of DEJURE Foundation, and a friend of Roman’s.

Jakub: We also reached out to Arthur Kharytonov the President of the Liberal Democratic League of Ukraine, and the main coordinator of Free Hong Kong Center. He was a close friend of Roman too, and he told us about Roman's legacy.

Nastya, you know a lot of civil society activists. Did you ever meet Roman?

Anastasiia: I didn't actually, and I regret this to this day because something like a year and a half ago before the war, I was in Kyiv, and Arthur actually, invited me to a conference that he was helping organise, and I was at that event.

A lot of activists also were there, including Roman, and of course, I knew of him, of course. And I saw him and I took my mental note that, oh, maybe I should go talk to him and introduce myself, we have a lot of common friends, but I never did.

I think there is even a picture of me sitting in one of the chairs and Roman is also in a corner talking. So, we were so close, but our paths never crossed. And I was with my friend the day that the news came out that he was killed. And I remember, it was tragic.

It was so tragic because somehow, it really felt like I did know him. And a lot of my friends told me the same thing, that they never met Roman, but they felt that this particular loss was so personal to them.

Yeah, it's difficult to talk about this. I can't even imagine what people who actually knew him go through.

[Music Playing]

Jakub: On that note, let's hear from Arthur.

Arthur: If you would like to ask who was Roman Ratushnyi, I would say definitely he was a hero for us, for his friends. He definitely was a good friend, a very close friend, and a very hard working friend, passionate about the future of Ukraine, and the future of the globe.

I think it's something very, very, very important to know about him, that he was very, very open-minded person and very global-minded person. And he was very justice lover because like Marvel heroes have like to fight injustice, to fight every evil we can find in the world.

And he tried to be everywhere. He tried to support everyone who needs the support. And very unfortunately, the Russian criminals, the Russian sacs have killed him, and we never will fulfil the lost.

Of course, Ukraine lost the brightest hero as well as the civil society, and we lost )people who know him) a very great friend of ours. But in my personal case, I think I lost a very important strategic partner to deal against the evil because it's very hard to find someone who shares the same wishing of freedom and have the same feeling of how to defend the freedom.

Also, I think that he actually became a symbol for the next generation of Ukrainians. And actually, it's something he personally would like, because I can say he was a kind of humble and he never been outspoken about himself and his personal achievements.

But it's something he actually also tried to do is to show that his example could be used by the upcoming young freedom fighters. And I do believe that many and many generations ahead, they will learn Roman stories. They will open the history book of Ukraine, find his pictures, read his biography, and to gain inspiration.

And I'm extremely happy that people outside Ukraine already know his story. And these people are actually exchanging these knowledges with old friends and old colleagues and fellow brothers and sisters fighting against global autocracies.

So, it's something making us very strong. I mean, his spirit and everything, he actually transferred to us after the death.

The loss still pains and there’s a gap inside us, inside myself. And it's very hard to say that we will remember him because it's very hard to accept that there is no Roman anymore.

But at the same time, I have very clear understanding that Roman will never accept our mourning, cries, or any bad mood. His motto was to do work and to do it effectively, and everything making us less effective is bad. Thus, any mourning is bad.

That is why with all my inside pain, I have also very strong feeling of hope. And I also know that we, as a civil society, as young people fighting for freedom in Ukraine, would need definitely to continue his work because he had a lot of points in his to-do list. And right now, this doing list is up to us.

So, we will definitely continue the way Roman started and we'll try to do our best.

Jakub: As Arthur says, it's very uplifting in a sense to see how much Roman's life and achievements were recognised abroad.

The story of his death travelled across the globe; there were obituaries in The Economist in Financial Times. And as painful as it is, it's important that his efforts have left a mark and have allowed the world to recognise the battle that young Ukrainians have fought for many years now to transform their country.

Anastasiia: Right. And I think Arthur's description of Roman kind of managing to bring people together, to work together for a particular goal and motivate people even after his death is so sad, of course, but it's also so beautiful and really echoes what Maryna had to say when I spoke with her.

[Music Playing]

Jakub: Let's hear more from Maryna.

[Speaking Ukrainian]

Anastasiia: I love saying hi in Ukrainian to guests from Ukraine. Let's start with just you introducing yourself and telling us how you know Roman.

Maryna: My name is Maryna Khromykh. Now, I work as an Executive Director of DEJURE Foundation. This is an advocacy and analytical centre, which is dealing primarily with judicial reform and rule of law issues in Ukraine.

Basically, we are pushing one of the most important issues in our country now because probably, you know that the judicial reform and the reform of constitutional court are two of seven obligations, which we have as EU candidate status.

We are doing our best to fight with corruption and lack of integrity in judicial system. We consider it as our own frontline because we know that a lot of judges has been always really connected to Russia.

We know plenty of cases when their children are living in Moscow and having some business there, having some property there.

Anastasiia: Some people even have a Russian passport. There was this whole scandal recently.

Maryna: Yes, we have this case with Bohdan Lvov, one of the main judges of the whole country. And yes, the journalists recently found out that he has a Russian passport, and he was dismissed from his position as a judge. But he's now trying to-

Anastasiia: Reinstate himself.

Maryna: Yes. And he's doing it through a very corrupted and pro-Russian court, [Ukrainian acronym]. It’s in Ukrainian.

Anastasiia: This is like the most notorious court in Ukraine for context, for context for our listeners.

Maryna: Yeah, yeah, yeah. 

Anastasiia: Nothing good happens in those walls.

Maryna: Yeah, and I've met Roman on one of the rallies that we have organised as an initiative for justice in Katya Gandzyuk case. She was a civil activist from Kherson. She was attacked in summer of 2018.

Basically her case wasn't the first attack on the representative of civil society in Ukraine because in 2017 and 2018, there was a huge wave of attacks and persecution of plenty of activists, civil activists from all around Ukraine, but her case was the most terrible because she was attacked with sulfuric acid.

Almost litter of this acid was poured on her body; on her head, on her back. And she spent three months in hospital fighting for her life. She had 14 surgeries during this period, but unfortunately, she died.

Anastasiia: This just shows how dangerous it is and how dangerous it can be to be an activist in Ukraine. So, Roman wasn't living the safest life with his activism.

Maryna: Sure. And Roman, as a lot of other people, a lot of other civil activists understood that this case is very important because if we do not get justice in this case, so we cannot expect anything good for ourselves, and each civil activist can be the same.

So, this was a case which united very different people; not only civil activists, but just ordinary people who just seek for justice in Ukraine and he helped us a lot because he was very active, very responsible person.

I knew that I can always rely on him, that if he said that he will be there on five o'clock, you can be there at five o'clock and expect Roman with everything he promised you to bring. So, yes, it was a pleasure being with him and knowing that this is the next generation.

You can just, I don't know, go retired and expect that Roman will be after you and will do the job of this civil society and so on. So, Kater actually united all of us, and she was doing that during all of her life.

And even after her death, she's doing that as Roman also did. He united very different people who lived in the area of Protasiv Yar. When he was telling the stories about his neighbours, it's unbelievable because very, very different people were united because of his will to save this area, to have justice again for this part of Kyiv, not to lose it, and so on.

Anastasiia: Could you then explain for our listeners a bit, what is even Protasiv Yar and what happened there? How did Roman get involved and who were the people trying to build over it and so forth?

Maryna: Roman was fighting with one of the strongest construction mafia in Kyiv, and he was trying to save the green area in the very centre of the Kyiv.

His case actually is a success story of having the justice for this community, which was fighting for this green area. Roman was elected by this community as a leader, and he has done so many things to unite this, as I said, very different people, and to get the support of other initiatives from Kyiv, from, I don’t know, other regions from ecological initiatives.

So yes, he had the aim to save this green area because it's a huge problem for Kyiv with this constructions. And I would be very frankly, that often they are very ugly, and impossible for living.

Anastasiia: I can agree with that. Why was it Protasiv Yar that mattered so much to him?

Maryna: I never asked him why he was doing that, but I guess, it's about what we can do. I’m just imagining that someone would ask me why do I do all of the things that I'm doing? That's just because I can.

You don't spend your childhood dreaming how you are going to be the civil activist or stuff like that. You are just becoming a grown up and you see some injustice, and if you want this injustice to be done, to be received, I don't know, you are just doing what you can do to make it happen.

That's, I guess, why Roman was doing it because he could do that. He was famous from 16 because he was one of the students who was beaten on Maidan, the beginning of the Revolution of Dignity.

Anastasiia: That was essentially one of the main events that sparked the revolution when the protesters were beaten up.

Maryna: Yes, and I remember him telling me about that night, and it was crazy because he had no fear.

The very interesting fact about Roman that when he was telling about something, even about that night on Maidan, he had no fear. He was just so oriented on the justice, on something which has to be done right in Ukraine.

So, yes, he was so fearless in all of this. And even when he went to fight for independence of Ukraine after the 24th of February, again, he was fearless. And that inspired me earlier, and I guess it would inspire me during the end of my life.

Anastasiia: Do you remember his reaction to the full scale invasion? Was he surprised? Did he anticipate it was going to happen?

Maryna: He was not, because he was one of those who realised that this big war will happen anyway, that the only reasonable actions what can be, is preparing for this war.

And I wasn't agreeing with him because I didn't believe that war like this could happen, because I can see that Russian people and Putin himself more clever because this war is not-

Anastasiia: Doesn't make sense.

Maryna: Yes, totally. But Roman was among those people who were just preparing himself, doing everything he could, learning how to shoot, learning how to do other things, and how to be good in all of that.

Anastasiia: So, he knew right away that he was going to join the army and go and fight. That wasn't a difficult decision for him?

Maryna: Yes, totally.

Anastasiia: Do you remember how you heard that he was killed?

Maryna: I was just out of my apartment. I have a dog, and I went for a walk with her. I just closed the door. And some of our common friends wrote a message in our chat that something happened to Roman.

Actually, I stopped. I sat down on the street, and I started crying. People were walking by and trying to calm me down, but I was like, “I'm okay, I'm okay. Just leave me alone.”

And unfortunately, I was the one who informed Evgeniya Zakrevska about this, because I thought that she might know more information, because of course, I didn't believe that this is true.

Because it's Roman, he cannot be dead. It’s Roman Ratushnyi. He is one of the most alive person that I know. So, it's impossible of course. And I expected that Evgeniya will say like, “Yes, he's okay. Why you are discussing something like that? It's a bullshit, just leave me alone.”

Because Evgeniya has joined the armed forces of Ukraine from the very beginning of the full scale invasion too. And from one side, I was worried that I will bother her and stuff like that. But from the other side, I just wanted her to say me that, “No, it's not true. Roman is okay, just go walk with your dog, and leave me alone.”

But she called me, I don't know, 10 or 15 minutes later when I mean, different friends of Roman who are still in one chat, we were trying to find out more information, something actually that could prove that this information is not real.

But unfortunately, we were finding more details about his death. And when Evgeniya called, I couldn't keep myself calm. And I was crying and telling her that Roman was dead.

Probably, I should do that in some other way, because Evgeniya Zakrevska was one of the closest friend of Roman, but I was so, so frustrated, so I don't know, so ruined. So, I did that how I did.

And the very first days were very terrible because we understood that we cannot go public with that because his body was still lying-

Anastasiia: In the gray zone.

Maryna: Yeah. And it is very risky for the militaries to go there just to take his body home.

They managed to do that because of the rain. I remember one of his friends wrote a tweet like “Infantry don't like rain, but not today.” We knew that rain will help them get the body back. And after they did it, all of the conversations regarding the funeral raised up and stuff like that.

And after we found out that he said that he would like to … the money, which should be paid after the deaths of the military should be transferred to the musician group, to the cultural initiative and stuff like that.

It was crazy because he was only 24, but he even thought about things like that because who are thinking about this when you are 24? You're thinking about, I don't know how to get in love, how to do something-

Anastasiia: Study, have a career.

Maryna: Your future, yeah, yeah, yeah. And that was crazy.

Anastasiia: I never knew Roman personally, but I remember when I started seeing on Twitter all of these news that he was killed, it was so tragic. And I saw so many people who knew of him, who knew a lot about his work, but didn't know him personally, who were absolutely devastated.

And it was so shocking to me in a way. Because like my day was totally ruined. I mean, I was just thinking about this story all day long, and then for days to come, and I never even knew the guy.

And then there were so many of my friends as well, who were in the same situation, some of them crying, even though still, they too didn't know Roman. So, he had this ability to touch people without ever knowing them.

There was a huge memorial for him on Maidan. I actually attended the funeral at the church, but I didn't go to the memorial later. That was happening in Maidan then to the burial. I assume you were there, right?

Maryna: Yeah.

Anastasiia: Were you shocked to see so many people? I remember the crowd was huge.

Maryna: So many people knew Roman, and as you said, even those who didn't know him personally, they obviously knew about his case, was this Black Square, about Protasiv Yar, about Serhii Sternenko and his support of Serhii.

So, I'm sure that lots of people knew about him and knew that he was a really great person. Really, one of the brightest, one of the bravest, very clever, very intelligent. And it's a great loss for the whole generation, because people like him should become, I don't know, at least the next mayor of Kyiv — at least, or probably the next president, something like that.

They shouldn't die. And it's awful that this Russian war is stealing the future of Ukraine, stealing the brightest people of our country, those who should be leading it and doing something useful, something great in here.

So, yes, I know that it's very important to tell the world stories about people like Roman, and the sacrifice during this war is so huge. So, we don't have any chance to get tired, to surrender or something like that.

So, we just have to remember that we are fighting not only for ourselves, but in the memory of Roman, of Kater, and other people who died for Ukraine, for our independence, for us to be free. It's very important for us to remember about them and to keep part of their soul in our hearts.

And sometimes, of course, it's painful to realise that these people are gone, but at the same time, it makes us stronger and it gives us no doubts in what we are doing and what we are fighting for.

[Music Playing]

Anastasiia: I'm so sorry that all of this is happening, and also, immense thank you for doing this.

[Speaking Ukrainian]

Jakub: Thank you so much for listening to Power Lines. We'll see you next week for our regular episode where we'll be speaking to Bruce Hoffman, a world renowned expert on terrorism studies, about a question that's been on a lot of people's minds; namely, whether Russia's invasion of Ukraine can be labeled as terrorism, and whether that's actually helpful.

Anastasiia: Power Lines is a partnership between the Kyiv Independent and Message Heard. It was produced by Bea Duncan, Harry Stott, and Talia Augustidis. The executive producer is Sandra Ferrari. The theme music is by Tom Biddle and Alfie Godfrey.

Season 1 Episode 6

Power Lines Episode 6 Transcript

[Music playing]

Maryna: My name is Maryna Khromykh. Now, I work as an executive director of DEJURE Foundation. This is an advocacy and analytical centre, which is dealing primarily with judicial and judicial reform and rule of law issues in Ukraine. We are doing our best to fight with corruption and lack of integrity in judicial system. We consider it as our own frontline.

Anastasiia: Maryna Khromykh is a Ukrainian who directs a think tank which fights against corruption in the Ukrainian judicial system.

I called her today to talk about another Ukrainian she knew, who stood for all the same ideals; Roman Ratushny. You might have heard his name; he’s been hailed across the world as one of the great Ukrainian heroes in this war.

Roman was a famous civil activist, and when the war began, like so many others, he joined the Ukrainian army.

He fought for many things, but he's best remembered for preserving public spaces in his hometown of Kyiv, against an oligarchy class that sought to destroy them.

His commitment to standing up against abuses of power by corrupt elites was unwavering. Maryna told me about when she first met him.

Maryna: I've met Roman on one of the rallies that we have organised as an initiative for justice in Katya Gandzyuk case. She was a civil activist from Kherson. She was attacked in summer of 2018. She was attacked with sulfuric acid. She spent three months in hospital fighting for her life.

And Roman, as a lot of other people, a lot of other civil activists understood that this case is very important because if we do not get justice in this case, so we cannot expect anything good for ourselves, and each civil activist can be the same.

It was a pleasure being with him and knowing that this is the next generation, and you can just, I don't know, go retire and expect that Roman will be after you and will do the job of this civil society and so on.

Anastasiia: Roman was the founder of an activist group, that came together to protect a public space in Kyiv called Protasiv Yar, a patch of woodland with a small ski slope that was loved by the locals. I used to ski there too as a kid.

In May, 2019, the developers from Daytona Group announced the construction of three 40-story buildings, right in this green zone. But dig a little deeper, and the whole enterprise seemed extremely shady with some even claiming it was illegal.

And the beneficiary of Daytona Group was a businessman, Hennadiy Korban, closely associated with one of Ukraine's most and famous oligarchs, Ihor Kolomoyskyi. Korban has since had his Ukrainian citizenship revoked.

Could you then explain for our listeners a bit, what is Protasiv Yar and what happened there? How did Roman get involved?

Maryna: Roman was fighting with one of the strongest construction mafia in Kyiv, and he was trying to save the green area in the very centre of the Kyiv. Roman was elected by this community as a leader. He had that aim to save this green area because it's a huge problem for Kyiv with these constructions.

Basically, they had a part of legal activities. Yes, and of course, here is the huge role of Evgeniya Zakrevska, who was the lawyer of Roman, and who is the lawyer in a lot of cases of Maidan. She's defending the relatives of those who died or suffered during the Revolution of Dignity. And that is why I guess, they won a lot of cases in courts.

Anastasiia: And what were those cases? What were they about?

Maryna: It was about saving these concrete parts of the land as a park, but not as a land where the construction can be built.

Anastasiia: So, designating that part of Kyiv as protected land.

Maryna: This case is very successful and it's really inspiring for a lot of people, not only in Kyiv, but in other cities of Ukraine where local civil activists are fighting with their regional construction Mafias and so on.

Anastasiia: Protecting public spaces from corrupt officials was not new to Roman. He'd done a similar thing before.

At just 15, he was one of the first people defending the Maidan Square during the Revolution of Dignity.

[Protest chants]

Along with other students, he was beaten up by Berkut, the government's riot police. Because of this injustice, something like a million people turned up to the Square the next day.

Maryna: I remember him telling me about this that night. He had no fear. He was just so oriented on the justice that inspired me earlier, and I guess, it would inspire me during the end of my life.

Anastasiia: After the revolution, Roman completed a law degree and worked as an investigative journalist. Then when Russia launched its full-scale invasion in February, 2022, Roman was one of the first to join the fight against Russia.

He was part of the volunteer force protecting Kyiv, and he also took part in the liberation of Trostyanets, a town near Kharkiv.

But his story, like the stories of so many other Ukrainians of my generation this year, is one that ends in tragedy. After being deployed to Donbas in the East, on June 9th, a few weeks before his 25th birthday, Roman was killed by Russians near the town of Izyum.

Do you remember how you heard that he was killed?

Maryna: I have a dog, and I went for a walk with her. I just closed the door. And some of our common friends wrote a message in our chat that something happened to Roman.

Actually, I stopped. I sat down on the street, and I started crying. People were walking by and trying to calm me down, but I was like, “I'm okay, I'm okay. Just leave me alone.”

And unfortunately, I was the one who informed Evgeniya Zakrevska about this, because I thought that she might know more information, because of course, I didn't believe that this is true. Because it's Roman, he cannot be dead. It’s Roman Ratushny. He is one of the most alive person that I know. So, it's impossible of course. But unfortunately, we were finding more details about his death.

Anastasiia: Roman's death was also announced on the “Let's Protect Protasiv Yar” Facebook page. The initiative intends to make a park in Protasiv Yar named after Roman, with an oak tree planted in his honour.

I never knew Roman personally. I saw so many people who knew of him, who knew a lot about his work, but didn't know him personally, who were absolutely devastated.

And then there were so many of my friends as well, who were in the same situation. Some of them crying, even though still, they too didn't know Roman. So, he had this ability to touch people without ever knowing them.

Maryna: It's a great loss for the whole generation. It's awful that this Russian war is stealing the future of Ukraine, stealing the brightest people of our country, those who should be leading it and doing something useful, something great in here.

The sacrifice during this war is so huge. So, we don't have any chance to get tired, to surrender or something like that. So, we just have to remember that we are fighting not only for ourselves, but in the memory of Roman, of Katya and other people who died for Ukraine, for our independence, for us to be free.

It's very important for us to remember about them and to keep part of their soul in our hearts. And sometimes, of course, it's painful to realise that these people are gone, but at the same time, it makes us stronger and it gives us no doubts in what we are doing and what we are fighting for.

Anastasiia: [Speaking Ukrainian] Thank you again.

Maryna: [Speaking Ukrainian] Thanks.

[Music playing]

Anastasiia: What started as a campaign to protect public space, saving a small patch of green in his hometown, ended with a fight to save Roman's entire country.

But what Roman stood for and who he fought against remained the same. Corruption leaves long trails, and when you follow them, you find the different strands end up in the same place.

Because in standing up to the rich and powerful in Kyiv, Roman was standing up to the same system, the same oligarchic idea that is funding Putin’s war. Roman's memory embodies Ukraine's thriving civil society, and stands as a testament to how vital each and every fight against corrupt elites is, no matter where on the globe.

From Message Heard and the Kyiv Independent, you're listening to Power Lines: From Ukraine to the World.

Jakub: In this series, we're going to be mapping the undercurrents and global consequences of the war in Ukraine, beginning in Kyiv, and following the roads out wherever they may lead. I'm Jakub Parusinski.

Anastasiia: And I am Anastasiia Lapatina.

Jakub: This week, we're exploring the rise and potential fall of oligarchies from Russia to Ukraine and across the world.

Everyone has heard about Russian oligarchs, these big, scary bad men who control the world from the shadows.

Anastasiia: Right.

Jakub: But at the same time, when we look across the West, we see the rise of the billionaire class growing inequality, increasing influence of business on politics. And there's very much a question about whether the world itself, or at least the Western democracies, are not seeing some form of oligarchisation.

And if so, well, what does the history of Ukraine and Russia, two countries that have suffered from the oligarchs, tell us about the fate of the world?

Anastasiia: Right. I think that is an excellent question, and to even begin answering that, we probably need a definition of what an oligarch is. And it's pretty difficult to come up with that. But I thought that we could literally pull up a law, because in Ukraine, we do have a law, right?

Jakub: Absolutely. It's one of the few countries that has actually formalised what it means to be an oligarch.

So, Nasyta, you actually have looked into this law. So, what does it tell us about who is and who isn't an oligarch?

Anastasiia: So, it's a definition from a law that came in effect this spring. It is this very well-known in Ukraine and abroad, piece of legislation passed by Zelenskyy’s administration.

And it's basically his attempt to curtail the influence of oligarchs in Ukraine. This law, essentially, introduces a registry, which as far as I understand, is supposed to be a public registry where people just can go and see essentially, the list of individuals in Ukraine, who are considered oligarchs under this law. And you are considered one if you meet three out of four criteria.

So, the four criterion are one, the person has to participate in Ukraine's political life. Second is that they have to have a significant influence on the mass media. Third is this long clause, which basically says that you have to be the ultimate beneficiary of a business that is a monopoly.

So, a business that occupies a dominant position in a particular market. And the fourth is that the total value of your assets exceeds roughly $60 million if you converted from the Ukrainian number.

And what's very, very interesting is that this person doesn't have to be Ukrainian citizen, actually. So, you can be a foreigner who does business in Ukraine, participates in Ukraine's political life, and you could be qualified as a Ukrainian oligarch.

Jakub: So, basically, you need enough money to buy a London apartment that gets you into Forbes, meaning the purchase of that apartment is newsworthy.

Anastasiia: Yeah, basically. But you also have to be connected to the mass media, which I think is not something that is necessary in Russia, for example. Like many of them are just business people who have nothing to do with the media.

Jakub: So, that's an interesting distinction. And I think when you look at Ukrainian and Russian oligarchs, especially how they've evolved over time, the political influence and the role that the Ukrainian oligarchs played was much greater. They were political players.

Anastasiia: Right. But in Russia, actually, there is this stereotype that all oligarchs are one way or another, Putin's friends in a way that they can influence his politics, which is one of the reasons why so many sanctions have been applied towards Russian oligarchs.

But some experts are saying that that is a gross misunderstanding of how that actually works, because there are hundreds of oligarchs who actually don't have a close connection. They can't just call Putin and be like, “Hey, this invasion thing is really not working out.”

But people think that that's how it happens. But that's not true. At least not in all cases, right?

Jakub: Essentially, it's applying a Ukrainian solution to a Russian problem. In Ukraine, you had quite a few oligarchs who ran political parties, financed them, had mass media, they had ways to influence whoever was in power. In Russia, not at all.

Anastasiia: Exactly, yeah. And it seems like Russian oligarchs are no longer really his inner circle. It's rather military generals. It's intelligence people. It's the FSB, it's those folks.

So, yeah, I think it's very important to understand that Russian oligarchs are not this keyword that if we sanction their yachts, they're going to go and like take over Putin’s seat in the Kremlin. Like that's very unlikely to happen.

[Music playing]

Jakub, I know you've been looking forward to doing this episode for a while. This topic clearly fascinates you. So, who did you interview?

Jakub: Well, I was lucky enough to sit down with the author and investigative journalist Oliver Bullough. Oliver has written and worked all over Russia, Central Asia, Eastern Europe, and has seen firsthand how the development of oligarchies has affected people living in those regions.

These days his gaze is mostly turned towards financial corruption and the mechanics of the global kleptocracy, which is to say how corrupt world powers are able to expropriate the wealth of countries for their own gains.

Obviously, oligarchies are the most potent example of this. And his recent books, Moneyland and Butler to the World are truly seminal studies of how corruption and dirty money from places like Russia, but all over the former Soviet Union, have managed to infect global financial systems in the West.

You can find Oliver's writing in The Guardian, GQ, as well as his very aptly named newsletter called Oligarchy, on Coda Story.

I wanted to first find out from Oliver about how the oligarchic system developed in Russia after the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

When we think about oligarchies in the modern sense, we invariably think about Russia, Ukraine and other former Soviet states. What was it about that time, the way the Soviet Union broke up or the newly independent states were established, that led to this phenomenon?

Oliver: Well, in 1991, all of the ex-Soviet republics faced the challenge of how they were going to transform their economies from being totally state-controlled to being capitalistic.

And no one had ever really done that before. So, how do you go about that? And the most influential model was what was being done in Russia, obviously, because Moscow had been the capital of the Soviet Union.

And their approach was to build democracy and capitalism by creating private property. So, they wanted to privatise everything as quickly as they could.

They didn't really care whether the privatisation auctions were fair or well-run. They just wanted to build a class of private property holders, who would then be the bedrock on which capitalism and democracy would be built.

So, they just created a series of auctions to get rid of everything the state owned. Inevitably the people who ended up owning state property were people with political connections or people who had already amassed wealth because of their political connections.

So, you had a very small group of men, and they were all men who ended up owning everything. And once you have that group of a very small number of people, then they will inevitably maintain their dominance over society and the economy because they own everything.

And we saw, I mean, this situation obviously wasn't the same in Ukraine at all. Privatisation happened much more slowly. There were totally different dynamics in play.

But eventually, certainly by the 2000s, you ended up with a small group, again, of men almost entirely who controlled the economy and therefore, also, controlled political parties, media channels, and therefore, had huge influence over what was happening in Kyiv.

Jakub: So, we've got the Soviet Union, almost all meaningful economic assets are to some extent owned and controlled by the state. You have the breakup and there's a lot of wealth lying around up for grabs. What happens next? What's sort of the genesis of this oligarchy?

Oliver: Well, in the most sort of well-studied example, in the most dramatic example, which remains what happened in Russia, you had, at the end of the Soviet Union, there were some private companies, which included a very small number of private banks. And essentially, those private banks, because they were the people with money, ended up as the people able to buy shares in the newly privatised entities.

Once they had shares, they could use that to raise more money. Once they had money, they could buy more shares, once they had shares. And so it went on.

And that gave them political influence. And then by the mid to late 1990s, they were bartering that political influence and the money they were able to lend to the government, for control of truly spectacular assets: ]oil companies, nickel mines and so on.

So, it began relatively small, it began with control of banks in the very, very early days of the free market in Russia.

But within seven, eight years, it had become control of oil companies, genuinely geopolitically strategic assets. And this is just a sign of the upheaval in the country that everything was for sale, everything was up for grabs, everything was overturned.

And although the situation was different in Ukraine, it still had similarities, obviously major sort of geo-strategic asset in Ukraine where the pipelines carrying gas from Russia and Turkmenistan to Western Europe. So, control over those pipelines became a key source of political patronage and corruption in Ukraine.

So, different countries were different, but the basic model was the same, that the people who had a little bit of money at the very beginning were able to use that small amount of money to obtain truly colossal amounts of property and influence within less than a decade, in a way that's probably unrivalled in modern history, that that much property was redistributed so quickly.

[Music playing]

Anastasiia: Jakub, how old were you in the ‘90s, after the Soviet Union collapsed?

Jakub: I was born in 1984 or so, let's say seven-years-old.

Anastasiia: You were tiny?

Jakub: Yeah.

Anastasiia: Okay. So, you probably don't remember much.

Jakub: No, not that much. And certainly, I had very little involvement in the shady appropriation of government enterprises.

Anastasiia: I'm just curious, like when all of these shady dealings were happening, that must have been shocking to people, after decades of a communist system, they have to wrap their heads around that. Like I was, when I was preparing for this episode. I'm just thinking, how did people react to this?

Jakub: I think you have to realise that at the time, people were mostly concerned with their own survival. A lot of the time what happened is you'd have a sort of a government factory, the shares, meaning the ownership in that factory is distributed to the workers. And what they have is a bunch of worthless pieces of paper.

Now, their families are hungry, they've probably lost their jobs. They're living in a pretty miserable place. And anyone who could show up with, let's say just a couple of brief cases of dollars was able to convince most of the people and buy up those shares.

Now, obviously, a lot of the times that didn't happen. People would just come in and threaten and menace and whatever, take over the property in other ways. But actually, a lot of this state property was purchased, let's say, more or less legally for people who just didn't have any other options.

Anastasiia: I think Oliver mentions that this post-Soviet gamble that was happening, from communism to somewhat capitalism, that that's an unheard-of situation. Like do we now know what should have been done differently to transition?

Jakub: Yeah. There's actually been quite a lot of research into the process of privatisation in different East European countries and– 

Anastasiia: Because Russia wasn't the only place that did it.

Jakub: Absolutely not. Similar things were happening in Poland, Hungary, Uzbekistan, and a lot of the economists who arrived on the ground with ideas, they were making it up as they went.

There's a reason why Poland, as well as some of the other Central European countries didn't really have oligarchs, or at least, not to the same extent. It's based on the size of the companies that were there under communist times.

There were no huge enterprises. There were no huge land holdings. Most of the businesses that you could privatise were relatively small and there were a lot of people competing for them.

So, while the privatisation process in Poland was hardly perfect, nobody was able to amass enough of these different assets to actually really stand out and become an oligarch.

But that wasn’t the case in Ukraine. Ukraine had massive enterprises, left over from the Soviet period, that were ripe for the takeover.

What’s interesting though is the subtle way in which Ukraine diverged from Russia, and the way that oligarchy was taking shape there. 

Jakub: And that's exactly what I asked Oliver.

[Music playing]

What is sort of the next scene or the next kind of stage of the development of oligarchy.

Oliver: In Russia, what happened was that the oligarchs battled each other. They sometimes cooperated, sometimes fought each other until Putin came along.

Putin came to power with a different power base. His power base is based in the security services, which was in turn, very strongly connected to organised crime.

And he essentially (by first destroying the two oligarchs with big media empires, in the very early years of his presidency, and then destroying the richest oligarch, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, a couple of years after that) — he essentially, intimidated the other oligarchs to such an extent, that they were willing to kind of recognise him as the don, as the first among equals.

So, Russia gained this very centralised, almost a pyramidical style of corruption with Putin at the top, then a small number of very wealthy, powerful men directly beneath him. Many of them people who he had known with and worked since his time in St. Petersburg city administration, and a few of the original oligarchs mixed in with that.

In Ukraine, it was different because corruption never became centralised in that way. Viktor Yanukovych tried to do it after 2010, but it didn't work.

So, you ended up with a far more kind of pluralistic system, whereby oligarchs would battle for political control, they would have control of the media, control of different parts of the country, control of political parties. And this was often presented as a kind of pro-Western versus pro-Russian split, which it was to a certain extent.

But also, it was more… that was a kind of frame placed on it by Russians and westerners, when within Ukraine everyone was corrupt. Whether they were pro-Western or pro-Russian, they were all corrupt just in different ways.

So, in a way, although the Ukrainian situation and the Russian situation began in similar ways back in the 1990s, they’re diverged quite widely, in that Ukraine had a much more pluralistic system with multiple oligarchs battling for influence. Which I think is probably why Ukraine was able to develop this incredible civil society, with extremely robust and imaginative NGOs working against corruption.

Because there remains space between the oligarchs in a way that there wasn't in Russia. That essentially, Russia, by controlling everything from the centre, it allowed Putin to essentially, crush anyone who opposed him, whether that was the Chechens or the oligarchs or the media, or independent political parties or independent NGOs or whoever, or Alexei Navalny.

Jakub: Yeah, absolutely. I think this is something really fascinating to dive into. My sort of observation is that in many ways, Ukraine diverged from almost all of the other post-Soviet states that went into the oligarchic model, by just how competitive it remained.

There really was a sense of the different regions of Ukraine might have had their big bosses, but even in many of those regions, there was even in-fighting. Part of the time, I think especially in the 2000s, the oligarchs used that civil society against each other.

There was a lot of feeling that you'd pay somebody off, one of the activists, to go off against your enemies. But that space in and of itself was enough to sort of build something different from the other countries.

Oliver: Yeah. And also, I think a lot of credit goes to the response of Ukrainian society to that. There are obviously differences in the society in Ukrainian's culture and history, which contribute to that.

But I think an awful lot of that is simply the fact that Russia had huge quantities of oil and gas, and Ukraine didn't, which meant that the Kremlin was able to dominate the economy in the way that the president or the government in Ukraine never was.

So, when Yanukovych tried to build his sort of pyramidical system of corruption after 2010, all he succeeded in doing was not only pissing off ordinary Ukrainians, but also alienating large numbers of the oligarchs. Which meant that when the big protests came, he simply didn't have the kind of people behind him that Putin would've had in Russia, because he couldn't buy people off.

[Music playing]

Anastasiia: Jakub, so it's important to kind of highlight the difference between the oligarchy in Ukraine and in Russia. Like I feel like our political climate when it comes to oligarchs, is just not as heated and as dangerous. It still is pretty bad, of course. And the civil society is constantly fighting against it, and against the corruption, but we don't have as many people falling out of windows, right?

Jakub: I would challenge that a little bit. If you look at where actually the former office of the Kyiv Post was located, on Pushkinska Street, next to Premier Palace, well, back in the day there were a couple of parties where people flew out of windows, actually from that very hotel, not from the Kyiv Post, from the hotel that was next door.

Anastasiia: Excellent correction.

Jakub: Looking more broadly, I wouldn't say that being an oligarch in Ukraine was particularly safe or being tied up with them either. But I think the big difference was that Ukraine was always more of a free for all.

Whereas in Russia very quickly, especially after the rise of Putin, the danger, the threat was concentrated on a central power level.

Anastasiia: So, what you are saying is even our oligarchy is more democratic.

Jakub: In talking, Oliver mentions a Russian oligarch, Mikhail Khodorkovsky.

Anastasiia: Khodorkovsky is a fascinating figure. So, Khodorkovsky used to be the wealthiest man in Russia. He was one of those oligarchs with the typical story where after the Soviet Union fell apart, a bunch of companies were auctioned, and he acquired a bunch of oil fields and united them under a company called Yukos.

So, Yukos controlled oil fields and oil infrastructure. And it was so big that in the 2000, this company controlled roughly 17% of total oil production in Russia. And his fortune at one point was around $15 billion.

Jakub: But then he also made a cardinal sin in Russian politics, which is to get involved, right?

Anastasiia: That is exactly what happened. So, he probably thought, “Well, now, that I have all of this money, let’s try doing an actual good thing for the society.” So, he opened an NGO called Open Russia, which… very basic civil rights NGO, advocated for democracy and human rights and openness and transparency.

And almost immediately, he gets in Kremlin's radar for that. And two years later, he's arrested and charged with fraud and like every financial crime in the book, like tax evasion and a dozen other things.

And he ends up spending 10 years in prison. But then he’s suddenly pardoned by Putin in 2013 because certain politicians lobbied for his release. After that, he lost all of his wealth, his organisation was banned.

And after his release, he never returned to Russia, he fled to the UK. He now lives in London, writes books about Russia and authoritarianism, has a YouTube channel about politics.

So, like a very typical opposition figure in exile kind of situation, writes op-eds for The New York Times and things like that.

As you said, this is very emblematic of the Russian cardinal sin, that once you have a lot of money and once you become an oligarch, don't you dare actually try to influence the political life in the country. And this goes back to the broad misconception that we mentioned in the beginning.

These people, the only reason why they have so much money is that they do not influence the Kremlin and try not to.

Jakub: But of course, this question of injustice, this isn't just a Ukrainian or a Russian issue these days, it's a feeling that is felt by people more and more all over the world.

[Music playing]

Anastasiia: Definitely.

Jakub: And one of the questions that I had for Oliver was whether we were not seeing the spread globally and specifically to the West of this oligarchic system.

Anastasiia: Oh, that's interesting. Let's get into it.

Jakub: We have this sort of eastern bloc kind of phenomenon, but the story of a few select number of businesspeople amassing undue influence over the development of society, it feels something that it might have been very Russian and Ukrainian in the 90s.

It feels kind of universal these days. Are we also in the age of the American oligarch? Because they meet all of the definition?

Oliver: Yeah, it's certainly true that the world has oligarchs, very influential tycoons. But the key difference I think between Russia and the U.S. in this regard, is that you can't imagine the Russian Supreme Court ruling against one of Putin's friends. It just wouldn't happen. It's impossible to imagine.

Whereas it's perfectly possible to imagine Jeff Bezos losing a case in the Supreme Court, or a case in the Supreme Court happening in a way that Jeff Bezos wouldn't like, or Elon Musk wouldn't like. The existence of the rule of law is what will maintain democracy. It's not elections that matter, it's the rule of law that matters.

This is something that the Russian friends when I lived in Russia would always say, that it wasn't really the elections that mattered, it was the law that mattered.

It's also true to say that this model of a small number of rich men dominating everything is something that most Western countries had, what? A hundred years ago.

The key difference between what was created in the former Soviet Union compared to say, the Gilded Age in the United States or whatever point of aristocratic Western Europe you want to point a finger at, is that the way that the former Soviet oligarchs owned their property was totally different.

They didn't own their property, only in their own country, the majority of their property, they exported to keep it elsewhere.

So, it is a feature of the former Soviet Union that more than half, certainly, in some places probably much more than half of the wealth owned by oligarchs was sent offshore and invested in property in London or New York or Paris, or in companies and shares or luxury goods, super yachts, football clubs and so on, overseas.

So, instead of investing back in their own societies with essentially, to a degree of long-term benefit to everyone, there's very little of that been seen in the former Soviet Union.

And that is a really important distinction, between the oligarchs of the former Soviet Union and the oligarchs of, say, the Gilded Age in the U.S. a hundred years previously.

Jakub: In a way, what makes this kind of unique is that essentially, what we have is a stationary bandit kind of political model in these countries post the breakup of the Soviet Union, and people who are leading it in a very extractive manner. It's basically, that is sort of the distinction in your view.

Oliver: Well, I would say it's different. Obviously, the idea of the stationary bandit, I would say is more what we saw in the, say the Gilded Age in the United States. That idea of an extractive bully who squats in the middle of a society and takes from everyone. But at least, they’re stationary, at least their wealth remains in that society.

What we saw in the former Soviet Union, this sort of offshore bandit, has all of the downsides of a stationary bandit, the bully, the extraction, the theft and the dominance, without the benefit of that wealth remaining in the society because they sent it elsewhere.

So, it was a new model of dominating a society, which is extremely harmful and very difficult to do anything about. Because even if there's a revolution, as we saw in Ukraine in 2004/5, and again in 2014, if the wealth is offshore, it's very hard, if not impossible to reclaim it.

When we've seen court cases to try and return wealth stolen from former Soviet countries and to return that wealth, whether that's in Kazakhstan or in Ukraine or indeed, in Russia, it's been unbelievably difficult to make that happen.

Jakub: And what's the difficulty here? It's a bit of a provocative question because part of the answer is obvious. But why has it been so hard to get this wealth back?

Surely, you'd think a lot of the Western countries that are sort of housing the bank accounts and the assets that have been purchased for this wealth, would be ready to cooperate.

Oliver: Western countries are ready to cooperate, but Western countries aren't just one thing. Western countries have governments and courts.

Jakub: Yes.

Oliver: And parliament and so on. So, you need to convince the courts that the case you are bringing is fair and well-evidenced. And extracting evidence from a corrupt country is very hard. Persuading a court that a case is not politically motivated when often it is politically motivated, is very hard.

And then you come up against all of the tricks that oligarchs are able to use to hide and protect their wealth. Because once wealth is hidden behind shell companies in multiple tax havens, it's very hard to find and it's very hard to confiscate because you need to win cases in the courts of all of those places, and all of those places, their economies are based on making it hard to get wealth out of them.

Jakub: Well, as you say, if I'm an oligarch who has been making money, whether it's in Kazakhstan, Russia, Ukraine, doesn't really matter — in each of these places, I have my people who have been earning money, I have friendly judges, politicians, et cetera. And I guess this is where the political aspect comes in and there's a whole series of places that also kind of depend on me.

So, it's basically you need to sort of break down the chain on each of the different steps. Is that basically sort of what the challenge is here, right?

Oliver: Exactly. You have countries which are almost mediaeval in their governance mechanisms, the way that they have informal mechanisms, political courts, everything dominated by a very small group of men in the centre.

And yet, those sort of mediaeval mechanisms are then plugged into the globalised financial system, which is based on the rule of law, on efficiency, on extremely large financial institutions whizzing money around the world very quickly.

And it's very difficult once wealth moves from one side of the system to the other and back again, it's very difficult to follow it, it's very difficult to have any idea who owns what. And that's a real challenge.

The answer, I think, doesn't really lie in expecting Kazakhstan or Russia to clean up, because let's face it, that's not in the interest of their ruling class. The answer lies in much more thorough checks in Western countries to prevent the wealth getting into them in the first place.

I think that confiscating that wealth is probably impossible. Once it's entered the Western financial system, it's so well protected and so well hidden that it's essentially impossible to find and confiscate. The answer has to be to prevent it coming in in the first place.

[Music playing]

Jakub: Nastya, how do you feel about the fact that now, in the U.S., we have Jeff Bezos who owns the Washington Post. We have Zuckerberg who, okay, he made his money and owns Facebook. And now, we have Musk who also has stepped in and is a billionaire with a social media platform. Is this an American oligarch?

Anastasiia: Don't even get me started on Musk right now. I'm not as threatened of course, by the American oligarchs because there are a lot of issues but those are very different issues. Those are the issues of monopoly and antitrust legislation and what a particular administration wants to do with those tools and how it wants to pursue these mega, huge companies.

But it's a totally different game altogether because as Oliver mentioned, it's the rule of law that matters. And being an ultra-rich person in a country that has rule of law, as opposed to the one that doesn't, are totally different circumstances.

Jakub: You're right that the U.S. is a much more robust state. And if we say that in the U.S. you have the state that is able to essentially cut an oligarch down to size, like if they become too influential in the economic and the political system.

In Russia, oligarchy has been broken by a very different mechanism, but it's essentially, Putin telling them to sit quiet and shut up. Virtually, everybody has bowed down to him and those who didn't, have seen their assets taken away from him.

In Ukraine, Zelenskyy through the legislation, through various measures, has also cut the oligarchs down to size. Do you think we're witnessing the end of the global oligarchy?

Anastasiia: I wouldn't go as far as to say that this is some sort of global end of the oligarchy. Well, first of all, because governments change and well, maybe in Ukraine. It's important note in Ukraine they do, maybe not in Russia, in Ukraine they do.

And we don't know who the next president will be, and we don't know what their approach to this issue will be. And I'm not saying that we're going to have some sort of return of a pro-oligarchy authoritarian, but I'm just saying that we don't know.

So, that's important to keep in mind. But there's also another interesting discussion happening, which it's difficult to estimate the scale and the similarity of this phenomenon to the traditional Russian oligarchy.

But I've read an article in foreign policy, I think, that talked about the emergence of this new wave of oligarchs in Russia, because when Russia launched its full-scale war against Ukraine, many foreign companies began leaving Russia because of the sanctions, and they have to sell off their assets.

And it's this kind of very similar situation to the ‘90s when suddenly, you have all of this kind of change of hands in different companies. So, like places like Sephora for example, all of these huge international corporations who've had stores and large warehouses and large buildings in Russia, they had to sell them off.

And there is a group of younger-ish Russian rich men who bought those assets off and are now making businesses out of that. And of course, it's not the same situation because Russia no longer has the same access to the foreign market. It's just a totally different economic game to play in.

But it is interesting that people who bought off some of these assets were unheard of previously. And I'm saying that to say that this is really not the end of history. Like we don't know how resistant the Russian economy is to these sanctions and we don't know how the ultra-rich in Russia are going to continue reacting to what's happening, because I think so far, something like four Russian oligarchs came out vaguely against the war.

And I think something like only one or two actually criticised Putin, like actually said, like this regime sucks. Everyone else just called for peace and against violence and things like that, so– 

Jakub: It's interesting what you're saying about how the political chaos in Russia is essentially building a new class of these future oligarchs. And it really makes you think whether it's in the U.S., in Ukraine, in Russia, in Europe, in China, or throughout the emerging world — it would certainly seem quite optimist to say that the rule or the times when rich, mostly men as Oliver points it out is over. The more things change, the more they stay the same.

[Music playing]

Up until the war, there was a lot of, I would say, belief that the oligarchs could influence Putin, the West sanctioned them, turned out almost no effect. At what point did that stop being true or was it maybe some other circumstance that made it not true? Did the oligarchs never have influence since the 2010s?

Oliver: It an interesting question. We don't know yet that it was wrong. We don't know yet that the oligarchs won't have influence over Putin. There are obviously, a lot of people around Putin who have become much poorer, as a result of his decision to attack Ukraine again in February, 2022.

And let's face it, I'm sure many of them, if not most of them, are very unhappy about that. So, we don't yet know that it was a bad calculation to sanction the oligarchs.

However, it is noticeable that they have not (with a few exceptions) been speaking out against what happened. They are quite obviously, scared of offending the Kremlin and being seen as being on the wrong side in this particular battle.

So, it's clear that Putin had done a far better job of centralising control over the oligarchs than perhaps many people thought. But that's not to say that sanctioning the oligarchs was a bad thing to do. If the oligarchs had independent voices in the Kremlin, sanctioning them was a good idea because that would've put pressure on Putin to do something.

If the oligarchs don't have independent voices in the Kremlin, sanctioning them is a good idea because essentially, you are thereby sanctioning the Kremlin. So, I think it was still a good idea and still the right thing to do however this ends up turning out.

Jakub: Yeah. So, let's move away from Russia for a second. We see sort of the trajectory that oligarchy is taking in Russia.

What about Ukraine? Has basically central government in Ukraine become strong enough to resist the oligarchy, and do we see a demise of the oligarchy whose assets in Eastern Ukraine have been obliterated, who no longer have a power base, an economic base? Is it the end for oligarchy in Ukraine?

Oliver: It's certainly true that if you look at the big sources of wealth for oligarchs in the past, the gas transit from Russia to Europe, that's obviously going to end as a source of influence. All of the industrial base in the Donbas, that's all going to end. It's been destroyed.

So, yes, the situation will be extremely different. Will the central government be able to stand up to the oligarchs in future? Is a question that probably to a large extent, depends on the Western creditors of Ukraine.

Ukraine is only able to fight, not just because it's been given weapons by the West, but because it's been given money by the West. Ukraine in any ordinary sense, would not just have been defeated on the battlefield by now, but would've been defeated economically by now, it would've collapsed.

It is being maintained by continuous Western credits and after the war, it's going to have to pay those back, or would not only need new ones, but will have to pay them back. And that means that Western countries will be able to demand significant reforms and significant anti-corruption measures as the price of continuing support.

So, yes, if I were a Ukrainian oligarch, I would not just be worried that I've had all my steel mills or whatever destroyed in Eastern Ukraine, but also, that I'm going to be entering a very unfriendly political climate in the next few years.

It is noticeable that a couple of the oligarchs, Victor Pinchuk, in particular, but also Dmytro Firtash to a certain extent, have been trying to position themselves as very pro-Western, with all these kind of peace plans and so on.

And I think that that's probably a response to their recognition of what the new reality is going to be. Ukraine, is going to be (when it wins the war) it's going to be broke, it won't have any money, and it would need money. And so, the people lending it, that money, will have colossal influence over what policies its government follows.

[Music playing]

Jakub: Very good. Wow, and we actually managed to make it through the whole interview without using the phrase London grad. Is that a failure or a success?

Oliver: It's a success. Or we didn't say Moscow on Thames either. Another one that makes me want to pull my hair out.

Jakub: No, that's a good one. Yeah, well done to us. Oliver, thanks so much.

Oliver: Thanks very much. It's my pleasure.

Jakub: Look, while oligarchy seems to be different in every single country, whether it's Russia, Ukraine, the U.S., China, it's clearly symptomatic of a global problem of inequality.

And what is to some extent surprising, but also, maybe gives a little bit of hope is that this is actually an issue that most of the world can rally around. Whether it's oligarchs as the enablers of autocrats, of vicious authoritarians. Well, that's something that most people can get behind.

But also, from let's say, the left wing and the people who are fighting for inequality, the oligarchs, all of these systems that are essentially propped up by extremely powerful, extremely wealthy men, this is also something that they've been fighting their whole lives against. This is a rare case where most of the world can be united against the common foe.

Anastasiia: Yeah, I think that's an important point. So, when we talk about sanctions not being enough, that's not to say that they shouldn't be there. I definitely think that we should be fighting like hell against Russian dirty money in the West. And that's what these sanctions are doing.

Because again, these assets, like one of the problems with these assets being in places like London and in the U.S. and everywhere else in Europe, it's not that it's Russian, it's that it's probably made as a result of criminal dealings.

So, I definitely think that these sanctions are a very good step, if not in stopping the war or overthrowing Putin, but in general, in fighting against Russian kleptocracy. I think that is an excellent tool for that. That's a bit of a more positive note to end on.

[Music playing]

In two weeks in Power Lines, we're going to be speaking about how the war in Ukraine is being fought online, as we explore what modern cyber warfare actually looks like.

Jakub: If you want to further support us, you can subscribe to our ad-free feed on Apple and by looking at Power Lines+ on Spotify. You can also support the Kyiv Independent by finding us on our Patreon, to get behind the scenes content. Go to patreon.com/kyivindependent to continue helping us report on the most important stories in Ukraine.

Anastasiia: Look up Message Heard wherever you're listening to the podcast, for more of our original shows, and find us on our website at messageheard.com or on our Power Lines twitter, @PowerLinesPod, as well as Instagram and Facebook, by looking at Message Heard.

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Please also subscribe and rate Power Lines in your podcast app, as it really helps others find our show.

Anastasiia: Power Lines is a partnership between the Kyiv Independent and Message Heard. It was produced by Bea Duncan, Harry Stott, and Talia Augustidis. The executive producer is Sandra Ferrari. The theme music is by Tom Biddle and Alfie Godfrey.

Bonus Episode 5

[Music playing]

Anastasiia: Hello listeners, welcome to our bonus episode of Power Lines: From Ukraine to the World. My name is Anastasiia Lapatina.

Jakub: And I'm Jakub Parusinski.

Anastasiia: For this week's bonus episode, we're giving you the extended version of last week's interview with Bektour Iskender.

Jakub: You'll remember that Bektour is a journalist and educator, who co-founded Kloop, an independent news publication in Kyrgyzstan. Kloop, is best known for its large-scale investigations on corruption, as well as its Journalism School, which teaches political and investigative journalism to young people.

Anastasiia: We discussed topics like Russian colonialism,racism, and even how Bektour has ended up speaking fluent Ukrainian.

Jakub: Yeah. What was the most interesting thing that came up?

Anastasiia: Even though I was coming into the interview knowing very little about Kyrgyzstan history, just the basics, I knew that I will understand how he feels and I will understand the history broadly because I'm Ukrainian, and because we both have very similar colonial histories. Both of our territories were occupied by Russia, at some point in time.it was just so sad to hear him talk about the genocide perpetrated by the Red Army and how to this day, there is a debate about whether we can call it a genocide or not.These things have happened decades and decades ago, and you'd think that when something as obviously evil as a genocide happens, we as humanity can come together and really call it what it is. But unfortunately, this is just my youthful naivete and we can't actually do that.But Bektour is lovely, and the story of his media outlet and just Kyrgyz youth in general, is very inspiring. So, I hope our listeners enjoy it.

[Music playing]

Anastasiia: I have so many questions, but first of all, introduce yourself and tell us a bit about what you do with your journalism and activism, and the civil society work.

Bektour: Hello everyone. My name is Bektour Iskender. I'm a journalist from Kyrgyzstan. I think I'm most famous for being one of the founders of a media organization called Kloop, which is based in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan but also, has now an office in Warsaw, Poland.

I think we are most famous for our Journalism School. Throughout the 16 years of our existence, we've brought up a whole new generation of journalists in Kyrgyzstan.Many of them have grown up to be really amazing investigative reporters.

And at some point, Kloop, also started being known for our investigations of corruption and organised crime. And the most famous investigative series that we published was in 2019, when we joined our efforts with Radio Liberty Kyrgyz Service, and also, with OCCRP and then with Bellingcat.

And together we published a series of investigations about corruption at the Kyrgyz custom service. But also, we uncovered like the whole scheme of underground cargo empire that operated from China, and then within Central Asia.

Anastasiia: That's huge.

Bektour: This is, I guess, what we are mostly famous for. But we've done a lot of other things as well. Not only with journalism, like we monitor elections and we actually managed to build like the largest election monitoring mission ever in Kyrgyzstan.

We use technologies, we build technologies that make lives of journalists easier, lives of activists easier.

Anastasiia: And what's the story of Kloop? Why did you found it?

Bektour: Well, I was lucky, when I was 16, I joined an organisation, a very cool organisation that unfortunately does not exist anymore. It was called Children's Media Center, also based in Bishkek.

It was a place where teenagers, like I was, we would produce our own TV program and we would also publish our own magazine.

Anastasiia: That's so cool.

Bektour: Yeah. And what was really great about that organisation, that it was run by a woman.Her name is Galina Gaparova. She used to be like a theatre playwright, and she just wanted to create the space for teenagers where they can express themselves.

And she didn't actually herself, intervene into what we produced. We had two grownup employees who would help us with editing sometimes, but most of the things were actually produced by ourselves. That's where I got really interested in journalism, and we had amazing trainers. That's where I got most of my knowledge.

Actually, on the premises of Children's Media Center, Kloop was born. And it was me and my very close friend, Rinat. We together at some point, came up with an idea that, we should actually start something online.

The thing is, there is a really interesting historical and political context behind it. And here we get, for the first time ever, we come to these interesting parallels with Ukraine.

Now, in 2004, when Ukraine had the Orange Revolution, Rinat and I, we were one of the few young people in Kyrgyzstan who were very closely following what actually is going on in Ukraine.

We were very much inspired by the processes. We were very much inspired by the will of the civil society to actually restore like the fair results of elections and so on.We also hated Russia.

And I remember it was in November, 2004, if I'm not mistaken, and we gathered friends and we actually explained to our friends like what exactly is going on inUkraine, as we thought.And I remember we were like thinking, “Oh, probably it's not going to happen in Kyrgyzstan.” Something like that. “Like I'm not sure that we are so active. Our civil society is probably not that brave, like we're not going to do something like that.”

It’s so funny that half a year later, we had a very similar revolution, which was also caused by elections, which was also sparked by people being very angry at how authorities actually organised the elections, and how authorities actually made sure that through a lot of violations, people who were very close allies of the president would be elected into the parliament.

And then one interesting thing happened during that revolution, online sources suddenly became quite important, at least in Bishkek, the capital of Kyrgyzstan,because most of the media outlets, they were blocked. Or if we're talking about newspapers, they were actually not allowed to print their newspapers if they were considered opposition, let's say newspapers. TV channels were not broadcasting anything that was worth watching.

And then suddenly, just a random blog of one young woman from Bishkek became like the main source of information for everybody. She was so brave. She was not even a journalist.

I think she used to be a coder or something, and she was just curious about the protests that started in Bishkek, and she just went with a camera and she just started photographing everything that was going on.

Anastasiia: That's amazing.

Bektour: And then every evening she would return home and she would start publishing basically her impressions of what has happened with photographs, with a lot of photographs. And then people flooded in like onto this live journal. It was still LiveJournal. Oh, my goodness, I even forgot that it existed.

Anastasiia: I was like four-years-old or something probably.

Bektour: Well, yeah, that was a long time ago.

Anastasiia: Yeah.

Bektour: And then this woman, she actually started on the day of the revolution itself when we had clashes with the police, when the president was forced to flee the country. She started something that had never been done before. She started like live text updates of what's going on.

Anastasiia: Yeah. It's a very typical thing to happen during the revolutions. The same happened during Maidan.

Bektour: Absolutely. It's really interesting how revolutions, they become a reason for a very sudden progress in communications. My input into that revolution sort of, was that I became a part of the team of volunteers who helped her to gather information because suddenly, her blog turned into like a small media outlet.

And suddenly, there was a team working on it. Suddenly, there was a team kind of gathering information from different parts of the country. It was very inspiring. It is kind of like a legendary story within Kyrgyzstan.

Anastasiia: Oh, wow.

Bektour: It is considered to be the story that gave birth to the power of online media inKyrgyzstan. And that inspired us to open Kloop. Because we thought, “Okay, this so-called classic media, they failed catastrophically.”

And suddenly, it was us, this young power kind of (we were very young back then. I was like 20 or something) that we should be the ones who would lead this revolution of how people get information.

That was the foundation of our idea behind founding Kloop. And we founded it in 2007, it’s still alive and kicking despite all the pressure from authorities that we've been experiencing from time to time.

Anastasiia: That's a fascinating story. It is very inspiring that just one person with a phone or a computer and a will to do a good thing can actually spark so many changes.
[Music playing]

You mentioned that you hate Russia, which I'm not surprised by. But when I was preparing for this interview and I was just reading up on Kyrgyzstan, the two basic Google searches that would come up, anytime I would Google anything about the country was, “Is Kyrgyzstan a part of Russia?” And, “Is Kyrgyzstan controlled by Russia?”

So, what is the context and sort of like the basic history of the relationship between the two countries, and why do you hate Russia?

Bektour: Actually, the fact that these results are coming like as top results when you search for Kyrgyzstan, is one of the reasons I really hate the Russian colonialism.

But anyway, some actually elements of the story would be very familiar to many Ukrainians. We were occupied by Russia in the 19th century — well, colonised. It's interesting that these terms were not even used for such a long time because–

Anastasiia: I think it's occupied both the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union.

Bektour: Exactly. But I also love the fact that people started using the term “colonisation” as well, very frequently during last several years. Because again, Russian empire, Soviet Union and Russia today, it's the only kind of colonial empire that still has not admitted that it was the one.

They keep on promoting this narrative that, “Oh, like you were savage people and we kind of developed you, we built you factories” and whatever.

Anastasiia: It's the typical colonial narrative though.

Bektour: Exactly. And then they killed so many people in Kyrgyzstan, and then they made everything to make Kyrgyz language not an important kind of language anymore.They Russified our capital and so on.

But coming back to the 19th century and to the early 20th century, it's interesting again to see how some events in the history repeat themselves, sort of in a way. So, what Russia did when Russia occupied Central Asia, it was a long process. It started in 1850s I guess, and then it lasted for the next 20 years or so. Because it's a huge territory.

They actually made use of Kyrgyz and Kazakh people being divided into many, many tribes. And because we didn't have like a statehood in a European understanding of what statehood is.

So, like Kyrgyz people were a union of many tribes, dozens of tribes who were not limiting themselves to any political borders or something because we were nomads, we didn't need borders.

Anastasiia: You're right.

Bektour: We would just hang out on one mountain and then–

Anastasiia: Go to another one.

Bektour: Exactly. That's how things were. And Kazakhs the same. They just preferred steppe instead of mountains, which I'm not judging. I think mountains are better.

Anastasiia: Is this some sort of like–

Bektour: Local rivalry?

Anastasiia: Yeah. Is this some sort of local rivalry?

Bektour: Yes, it exists. We love Kazakhs, of course. We love each other. Like we are like the closest nations to each other you can imagine. Kazakh and Kyrgyz language are as similar as, I don't know, Ukrainian and Belarusians, which basically means that we can understand each other.

But we have this local rivalry from time to time. We think that Kazakhs are rich and not free, and they think that we are poor and well, sort of free. Anyway okay, I will not use this podcast to spread stereotypes about us. We are cool and amazing.

Anastasiia: This is amazing analytical stuff.

Bektour: Anyway, yeah. So yeah, they started with Kazakhstan and Kazakhstan it's so huge.Oh, my God. It took them a long time to finally capture it. They occupy the whole central Asia.

And then in 1916, there was this famous central Asian revolt against Russia. It was caused by Russia trying to mobilise indigenous people of Central Asia to fight in the First World War.

Anastasiia: Well, nothing changes in their tactics.

Bektour: Exactly. And we were like, “What do you want us to do? To fight Austria-Hungary?Like we don't care about Austria-Hungary.” Really, like I'm not sure we knew where is that actually. “Why do we have to fight them, Austrians? Like we don't care aboutAustrians.”

So basically, people in Central Asia started a revolt against the Russian Empire. It was the first like serious, like huge revolt against the Russian Empire, which ended up with Russian soldiers basically coming and killing us. And again, nothing new.

Anastasiia: No.

Jakub: Unfortunately, it's still not known how many exactly people were murdered byRussian soldiers back then, because there is very, very small amount of data available. Estimates suggest that something between 100,000 and 250,000 people were killed. It's terrifying just to think.

Anastasiia: It is.

Bektour: And then those who were not killed, they were forced to flee to China. And the scale of that — we call it genocide in Kyrgyzstan.

Of course, the term “genocide” is being manipulated so much by so many different nations. So, legally, it has never been acknowledged as a genocide by anybody. But that's how we call it in Kyrgyzstan.

Anastasiia: Did the Kyrgyz authorities, did they acknowledge that it's designated as a genocide?

Bektour: No, no. This is an interesting question, by the way. I think because of ties with Russia, at the same time, they acknowledged that something horrible happened. We have the Kyrgyz word for that, Urkun. Basically, it means like exodus.

And the scale of it was so huge that it's hard to find a family in Kyrgyzstan (indigenous, Central Asian ethnicity family, let's say) that does not have at least one person from the extended family who was not affected by that.

We were granted the status of republic eventually. If it could revive all the people who were killed, I would probably be thankful for that. But of course, it didn't.

Anastasiia: What was the Soviet time like?

Bektour: There were many terrible things that the Soviet Union did during that time. This whole campaign of [Ukaranian 00:14:36] is basically taking people's property and killing the ones who are not ready not to give it away.

With Kyrgyz people, they did not just take away the property. They actually forced people to change their lifestyle.

So, as I said, we had been nomads and we were comfortable with that. We had this really interesting relationship within Central Asia, between different ethnic groups, which worked really well.

So, like Uzbeks and Tajiks, they were mostly settled people. They lived in towns. And they had a lot of agriculture.

Kyrgyz and Kazakhs were nomads, and we would mostly deal with animals. And we would then exchange. Every season, Kyrgyz and Kazakhs would come down from high altitude, mountain valleys and exchange meat for vegetables or fruits or crops or whatever.

And then when Bolsheviks came to power, they forced Kyrgyz and Kazakh people to stop being nomads. Because they were like, “Oh, you have so much livestock. Like why the hell do you have it? You should give it to the Soviet state.”

Anastasiia: Yeah, of course.

Bektour: You will now live in a fucking cold house, whatever.

Anastasiia: Yeah. And we will call that civilised.

Bektour: Yeah, exactly. That's how they sort of civilised us. I once wrote a thread on Twitter where I basically explained why in the Russian language you should say Kyrgyzstan instead of Kirghizia. Because Kirghizia is a colonial name of our country, which is basically just Russians not being able to pronounce Kyrgyzstan.

So, I wrote the whole thread about it. I received a lot of support in replies, but then it became sort of viral. And then many Russian trolls came in and started replying.

Anastasiia: As they do.

Bektour: The problem is many of them were not actually like trolls in terms of like bots. They were actual people, who actually think this way. And suddenly, I started getting a lot of racist replies.

Anastasiia: That's terrible.

Bektour: Usually, revolving around the topic of migrant workers. Because there are many, many Kyrgyz migrant workers in Russia, unfortunately. And people started replying me with words, something like, “Thank you. Can I get two shower masks please?” Or something like, “Excuse us, we didn't receive like food delivery.”

Anastasiia: What? That is disgusting.

Bektour: Yeah. And then one person wrote something like, “You should be thankful because we taught you how to wipe your asses.” I replied to him like, “Excuse me, we washed our asses before. Most of us were Muslims, we care about hygiene.”

Anastasiia: So, this kind of colonial outlook is continuing to this day, huh?

Bektour: Exactly. It does. Absolutely. Unfortunately, this colonialism, it just never disappeared anywhere.

I recently was analyzing, like what was happening in 1991, for example, in ‘92, the period which is praised by so many Russian liberals, so-called liberals. I recently watched a video from Crimea that was dated like 1992 or something. And then in Russia, people would react to that, that Crimea should return to Russia, whatever.

Anastasiia: That was in ‘92.

Bektour: Yes, exactly. They started this narrative about Crimea. Even back then, even in movies like Brat Dva for God's sake, they also have the Crimea joke there.

Anastasiia: Yeah.

Bektour: Transnistria story, it was in ‘92 or something. Tajikistan Civil War, which started in 92, current president Emomali Rahmon, he was supported by Russia in that war, Abkhazia and Chechnya, of course.

Anastasiia: Of course.

Bektour: There were so many signs that the colonialism has not gone anywhere. I don't know. Somehow the whole world just was not giving enough attention to that.

Anastasiia: Yeah. No one cared. And I think to this day, few people care about the history of Russian colonialism in Central Asia, and about the history of all of the very diverse, interesting, and rich with history places, which have become a part of the Russian Federation, the Republics.

People see Russia as this monolithic big thing, and they completely brush off the fact that it has so much history and so much different culture. And unfortunately, the majority of this history is the history of oppression.

Bektour: Absolutely.

Anastasiia: So, I have one final question. How come you speak Ukrainian?

Bektour: I was fascinated by Ukraine since I was a kid. I'm not joking. And then I started travelling to Ukraine a lot from 2010. Actually, my first city was Donetsk.

Anastasiia: That's insane.

Bektour: I was an election observer in Donetsk, in 2010 when Yanukovych was elected.

Anastasiia: Really?

Bektour: So, that was my introduction to Ukraine.

Anastasiia: That's incredible.

Bektour: Isn't it great, actually? And it just happened somehow that I've been witnessing the most important historical moments in Ukraine.

I witnessed Euromaidan, I witnessed the beginning of the war in 2014. I was in Donetsk in May 14 again. And then I travelled to the frontline, three more times actually.

Anastasiia: That's incredible.

Bektour: Anyway, I spent a lot of time in Lviv, where I was quite often a guest lecturer at the Ukrainian Catholic University. They have an amazing Journalism School.

And then, we actually even did a joined project together, Kloop and UCU, we organised like videography workshops for young people from Central Asia, Caucasus and Ukraine.

It was my attempt to strengthen the post-colonial solidarity (that's how I call it) between civil societies and activists of our countries, because I believe that we really should cooperate, we have so many common threats and everything.

And then I would come Lviv and what language should I use in Lviv when I talk to students? For the first like three or four years or so, I would give all my public talks, in Lviv in Russian. How strange is that? Isn't it?

Anastasiia: That is a bit strange now.

Bektour: But not so many students actually spoke English well enough to understand me. So, we needed to find some language that everybody would kind of understand. So, Russian was unfortunately the only choice available for many occasions.

Anastasiia: That's the shared colonial past.

Bektour: Exactly. But then on the other hand, it totally ruined the Russian narrative that I'm going to be like (I don't know) killed in Lviv immediately for speaking Russian. Of course, it never happened.

Anastasiia: Of course, that's not true.

Bektour: Nobody ever told me anything for it. But then I was really curious about, can I actually learn Ukrainian? And then at some point, I started talking just a little bit. It was very slow and awkward, but it was getting better and better. And today, I'm totally capable of even giving public talks in Ukrainian.

Anastasiia: That's amazing.

Bektour: It’s not perfect, of course, but I try my best, like I really enjoy speaking Ukrainian, actually.

Anastasiia: Well then, since you can speak Ukrainian, I'll say thank you in Ukrainian:

[Speaking Ukrainian]

Thank you so much for coming. It was really interesting to listen to you.

Bektour: Thank you very much. I really enjoyed talking to you.

[Music playing]

Jakub: Thank you for listening to Power Lines. Next week, we'll be speaking to the writer and investigative journalist Oliver Bullough, about the rise and impact of oligarchies.

Anastasiia: Power Lines is a partnership between the Kyiv Independent and Message Heard. It was produced by Bea Duncan, Harry Stott, and Talia Augustidis. The executive producer is Sandra Ferrari. The theme music is by Tom Biddle and Alfie Godfrey.

Season 1 Episode 5

Power Lines Episode 5 Transcript

[Music playing]

Anastasiia: Russia's war in Ukraine is just a continuation of a long line of Russian colonial aggression. It's just that now, people are finally starting to pay attention.

But the past still matters, and there remains a huge lack of knowledge in discussion about the history of Russian colonialism, all throughout the world, particularly in Central Asia.

Bektour: My name is Bektour Iskender. I'm a journalist from Kyrgyzstan. I think I'm most famous for being one of the founders of media organisation called Kloop, which is based in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan.

I think we are most famous for our Journalism School. And throughout the 16 years of our existence, we've brought up a whole new generation of journalists in Kyrgyzstan.

At some point, Kloop also started being known for our investigations of corruption and organised crime.

Anastasiia: Bektour Iskender, co-founder Kloop, with Rinat Tuhvatshin. This was Bektour’s gateway into the world of journalism.

Bektour: In 2004, when Ukraine had the Orange Revolution, Rinat and I, we were one of the few young people in Kyrgyzstan, who were very closely following what actually is going on in Ukraine.

We were very much inspired by the processes. We were very much inspired by the will of the civil society to actually restore like the fair results of elections and so on. We also hated Russia.

So, we gathered friends and we actually explained to our friends like what exactly is going on in Ukraine, as we thought. And I remember we were like thinking, “Oh, probably it's not going to happen in Kyrgyzstan.” Something like that. Like, “We are not sure that we are so active. Our civil society is probably not that brave, like we're not going to do something like that.”

So funny that half a year, later we had a very similar revolution, which was also caused by elections, which was also sparked by people being very angry at how authorities actually organised the elections, and how authorities actually made sure that through a lot of violations, people who were very close allies of the president would be elected into the parliament.

[Protest chants]

Anastasiia: The first Kyrgyz Revolution, known as the Tulip Revolution, began after elections in 2005. People took to the streets to protest against the alleged corruption and authoritarianism of Kyrgyzstan’s, then president, Askar Akaev. The people toppled Akaev, he fled to Kazakhstan and then onto Russia, of course, and resigned in April of that same year.

You mentioned that you hate Russia, which I am not surprised by. But when I was preparing for this interview, and I was just reading on Kyrgyzstan, the two basic Google searches that would come up anytime I’d google anything about the country was, “Is Kyrgyzstan a part of Russia?” And “Is Kyrgyzstan controlled by Russia?”

Bektour: We were occupied by Russia in the 19th century. When Russia occupied Central Asia, it was a long process. It started in the 1850s, I guess, and then it lasted for the next 20 years or so because it's a huge territory.

They actually made use of Kyrgyz and Kazakh people being divided into many, many tribes, because we didn't have like a statehood in a European understanding of what statehood is.

So, like Kyrgyz people were a union of many tribes, dozens of tribes, who were not limiting themselves to any like political borders or something, because we were nomads, we didn't need borders.

They occupied the whole Central Asia. And then, in 1916, there was this famous Central Asian revolt against Russia. And it was caused by Russia trying to mobilise indigenous people of Central Asia to fight in the first World War. And we were like, “What the hell is that?” Like, “What do you want us to do, to fight Austria-Hungary?” Like, “We don't care about Austria-Hungary.”

So, basically people in Central Asia started a revolt against Russian Empire. It was the first like series, like huge revolt against Russian Empire, which ended up with Russian soldiers basically coming and killing us.

Unfortunately, it's still not known how many exactly people were murdered by Russian soldiers back then, because there is very, very small amount of data available.

Estimates suggest that something between 100,000 and 250,000. Those who were not killed, they were forced to flee to China. We call it genocide in Kyrgyzstan.

Anastasiia: This is often referred to as the Urkun, in the Kyrgyz language, meaning the great exodus. The Kyrgyzstan government has often stopped short of calling it a genocide, presumably to maintain their political and economic ties to Russia.

However, in 2016, a public commission concluded that it was exactly that. But this was not the end of Russia's colonial violence against Kyrgyzstan, because the Russian revolution of 1917 saw the brutal imperial terrorists, absorbed by the equally brutal Soviet Union.

Bektour: We were granted the status of republic eventually, but then, we basically faced same horrors as people from all other republics occupied by the Soviet Union faced. There were many terrible things that the Soviet Union did during that time.

They also drew in all these borders in Central Asia, which I don't even know who decided to draw them that way. Somebody in Moscow, I guess. We still actually struggle from how the borders were drawn.

Anastasiia: Stalin’s USSR implemented another policy over this period, with even more devastating consequences. This was collectivisation, where the Russian state seized all agricultural land into government ownership, in an attempt to distribute the food supply from rural areas to the rapidly industrialising urban cities.

In Ukraine, historians agreed that this was a major cause of the great famine in 1932/1933, the Holodomor, which killed millions and was a genocide of Ukrainians too.

The Kazakhs and the Kyrgyz, similarly suffered. How could a process of agricultural collectivisation ever work for nomadic people without permanent settlements?

Bektour: So, Kyrgyz and Kazakhs were mostly dealing with livestock, while Uzbeks and Tajiks, would mostly deal with agriculture.

And we would then exchange. Like every season, especially before the winter, Kyrgyz and Kazakhs would come down from tallest mountain, valleys, and exchange meat for vegetables or fruits or crops or whatever they needed.

And then when Bolsheviks came to power, they forced Kyrgyz and Kazakh people to stop being nomads. Because they were like, “Oh, you have so much livestock. Like why the hell do you have it? You should give it to the Soviet state.”

[Music playing]

Anastasiia: So, I have one final question. How come you speak Ukrainian?

Bektour: I was fascinated by Ukraine since I was a kid. I'm not joking. And then, I started traveling to Ukraine a lot. Actually, my first city was Donetsk, really.

Anastasiia: That's insane.

Bektour: I was an election observer in Donetsk, in 2010, when the-

Anastasiia: Really?

Bektour: So, that was my introduction to Ukraine.

Anastasiia: That’s incredible.

Bektour: And then, I spent like a month in Kharkiv in 2012, and then I went to Euromaidan as a journalist.

So, when Euromaidan started, I think many people in Ukraine still do not realise how important it was for us in Central Asia. Actually, how current war is very important for us in Central Asia, because I believe that Ukraine really fights for our freedom too.

Anastasiia: Russia's vast size and diversity of peoples means it is not some static monolithic thing. Its brutal history of colonial oppression has scarred people and lands from Kyiv to Buchach. And now, the Eurasian lands, which border Russia to the South are feeling the aftershocks of the bombs falling on Ukraine.

Because this war and Russia's collapse is lighting the fuse on many of Central Asia's dormant conflicts, dismantling any semblance of peace that Russia's neighbours have relied on them to maintain.

In Eurasia, as much as in the West, the invasion of Ukraine has created a precarious, dangerous future.

Since you can speak Ukrainian, I'll say thank you in Ukrainian:

[Speaks Ukrainian]

From Message Heard and the Kyiv Independent, you're listening to Power Lines: From Ukraine to the World.

Jakub: In this series, we're going to be mapping the undercurrents and global consequences of the war in Ukraine. Beginning in Kyiv and following the roads out, wherever they may lead. I'm Jakub Parusinski.

Anastasiia: And I am Anastasiia Lapatina.

Jakub: This week, we're talking about the Eurasian region surrounding Russia, to explore just how destabilising the war in Ukraine has been to all the countries that lie on Russia's periphery to the south and east.

Anastasiia: I'm really excited about today's episode, because I feel like our listeners will love it, because this topic is not something that's very often discussed in the media or in podcasts, or just in general, in the public discussion of the war in Ukraine. Everyone just kind of tends to ignore the Caucasus and Central Asia.

But let's first start with defining what Eurasia even is, Jakub.

Jakub: So, Eurasia is essentially this idea that pops up a little bit over a hundred years ago, of Russia being a distinct civilisation between Europe and Asia. And it's very much the territory of the Russian empire. Something that Russians also like to call their near abroad, the territories that they influence.

Over the past couple of decades, it's been revived by people like Alexander Dugin, who is famously and somewhat erroneously, considered to be an ideological leader of sort of this Putinist expansionism.

Over the last couple of decades, this idea is reviving. And as we go along, Russia also creates a bunch of institutions to formalise this Eurasianism, whether it's the Commonwealth of Independent States, which appears after the dissolution of the USSR, and includes basically everybody except for the Baltic states. And then later, the CSTO, as well as the Eurasian Union.

Anastasiia: Wait Jakub, before you go on, the Eurasian Economic Union, was it, and the CSTO, what are those?

Jakub: Russia has this tradition of mimicking what is done in the West. So, the Eurasian Economic Union is essentially a crooked mirror version of the European Union, and the CSTO is a crooked mirror version of NATO.

Anastasiia: Okay, fantastic.

Jakub: Why are we looking at what's happening in Eurasia?

Anastasiia: Well, I think it's interesting that this part of the world is first of all, just geographically enormous, and it is also very closely tied to Russia, which is this huge, attempting to be a hegemon kind of state, which has been at everyone's radar for so long.

But few people tend to care about the brutal Russian imperial history that has affected all of these countries, that are within this space that we're talking about. Almost every country in this space has had some sort of huge tragedy perpetrated by the Russian state.

And for us, like for people who are surrounding Russia, this is just a part of the deal. 

Jakub: I would say equally, it was very much an integral part of the Russian Empire, and then of the Soviet Union, and all of the tragedies that came along with that. But it's also a source of great wealth, right?

Anastasiia: Oh, absolutely. And authoritarians too.

Jakub: Oh yeah, absolutely. So, it's very much a club of authoritarian countries these days, surrounded by other authoritarian countries.

You've got Russia, China, Iran, Turkey, bordering this zone. And then, within it, you've got Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, some of the most authoritarian and anti-democratic countries on the planet.

[Music playing]

So, who did you speak to this week?

Anastasiia: Well, Jakub, I'm honestly thrilled to tell you, because when it comes to looking at Russia and Putin and the enormous global consequences of Russia's war in Ukraine, there are very, very few people who are more qualified to speak on this than our guest this week, Fiona Hill.

She's originally from the UK, but has spent the past few decades working in the U.S. government. Fiona has served under three U.S. presidents, first as intelligence analyst, focusing on Russia and Eurasia for the National Intelligence Council. And more recently, as the Senior Director for European and Russian Affairs, on the National Security Council staff.

She's currently a senior fellow at Brookings, in Washington, where she works in policy, focusing again, on the Eurasian region. And she's also on top of all of that, the author of various books about Russian politics, including the incredible book called, Mr. Putin, Operative in the Kremlin.

So, first, I wanted to speak to her about Russia itself and the huge number of ethnic minorities, who live within its borders just to understand how this history and this diversity of Russia is affecting the war today.

So, I wanted to start with of course, Russia and the Russian Federation, and specifically, the federation part. Because I feel like a lot of people have this idea of Russia being sort of a homogenous entity.

But in fact, Russia has a very, very difficult federalist structure. It has all of these republics that are all equal subject to the Russian Federation, have their own laws, their own politicians, et cetera.

So, maybe, you could talk a bit about how that maybe historically developed and how that functions and why Russia is the way it is. And whether it is indeed homogenous, or whether there's a lot of diversity there.

Fiona: Well, no, thanks very much, Anastasiia. And obviously, that's a pretty critical question for thinking about the war in Ukraine in this context as well, because we always assume that Russia is monolithic.

And in fact, Vladimir Putin, and those around him in the Kremlin would like us to think so. Because going back to 2004 and in the wake of the Beslan attacks, when Chechen rebels seized a school in Beslan in the North Caucasus, the Russian government used that as an opportunity to impose what they called the vertical of power.

Which was in many respects, eroding some of the autonomy of the different regions of the Russian Federation that had really emerged since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and in the kind of political and economic and social chaos of the 1990s.

And what we saw in the initial construction of the Russian Federation, in the Soviet period, was a kind of mirroring of the Soviet Union, writ large.

So, just as in the 1920s, you had the constituent Soviet Republic set up the Russian Federation and Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, et cetera — inside of Russia itself, you had, as you described, this really complicated series of different subjects of the Russian Federation, which reflect in part, history, different cultures, different ethnicities, and in some cases, different forms of political control.

And in the 1990s, that all started to fall apart. There were parts of the Russian Federation that basically, tried to follow the same path of the Soviet Union towards dissolution, most notably, of course, Chechnya.

Anastasiia: Of course.

Fiona: Which had a population of over a million, had a special status within the Russian Federation. And through a very close reading, of the Russian constitution, felt that they also had a right to apply for independence, from the Russian Federation, just as the other constituent republics had become independent of the Soviet Union.

And in the 1990s, there was a whole process under President Boris Yeltsin at the time, to create a set of arrangements, almost for complete devolution of authority, including some degrees of fiscal devolution, not just political authority, with some of the most complicated parts of the Russian Federation.

Chechnya was one, which of course, was racked by war and conflict with Russia, but also Tatarstan in the Urals region, which had historical rights to a certain degree of autonomy, from Moscow going back, in fact, to the period of Catherine the Great.

And in 1994, there was a conclusion of a separate agreement between Moscow and Tatarstan, that then became a model for other bilateral agreements between Moscow and other regions, including some regions that had no different ethnic, religious or any kind of cultural difference in the center. But just that they were trying to exert their own autonomy.

Now, along came Beslan, Vladimir Putin was already four years into his presidency, he had obviously been completely opposed to this devolutionary activity, and he wanted to bring everything back to the center again.

And he used Beslan and the atrocities — of course, there's a lot of controversy around what actually happened in Beslan, whether that was also to some degree, instigated by the Russian services themselves.

But nonetheless, that was used as an excuse to overturn most of these autonomous arrangements, and to reimpose the central authority of the state, both politically and fiscally, which we saw kind of unfolding over the subsequent period.

Anastasiia: And in some of those republics, for example, Buryatia, Yakutia or the Republic of Sakha, Dagestan, we are seeing not only huge mobilisation efforts by the Russian government, but also, protest against that in some places.

Why do you think the Kremlin is targeting ethnic minorities in its mobilisation? Because to an average observer, I think a lot of them seem very poorly trained.

And then, also, places like Buryatia, that's nearly 6,000 kilometers away from Ukraine. So, why bother in spending the resources to move all of these people to the front as well.

So, what are the motivations here? Why not just mobilise people around Moscow or Saint Petersburg or anywhere closer to Ukraine?

Fiona: Well, there's some pretty obvious answers to this, but first of all, this is an old imperial, as well as Soviet tactic.

When you looked at other wars that the Soviet Union engaged in, in Afghanistan and elsewhere, there was a lot of mobilisation of citizens of the Soviet Union from Central Asia, for example.

They were also, kind of from impoverished areas with very little political clout. And so, they were obvious targets for conscription, and then recruitment, and then dispatching into these conflicts.

There is another element in the case of Ukraine, for example, that you don't want people who would necessarily identify themselves too closely to Ukrainians. But look, there's a long tradition in all empires, of sending conscript forces from the periphery to fight in your wars.

Also, what Russia has tried to do consistently, in it's more modern wars, including in Chechnya and elsewhere, has tried to avoid a concentration of casualties in places where that would have a political impact.

So, if there was a huge number of casualties from Saint Petersburg and Moscow, there would be backlash. If there are casualties from far flung regions, as you say, thousands of miles away from Moscow, it's much more difficult for people to have the protest impact felt.

And if you spread out the casualties across the whole country, then you don't get these concentrations of deaths and injuries, that could again, lead to protests.

Now, of course, there has actually been concentrations of casualties in the very initial parts of the war. And of course, we are seeing large numbers of casualties from places like Buryatia, from Dagestan, and other places that are producing a backlash.

So, this doesn't always work. And of course, we've seen now with the efforts to mobilise forces on a much larger scale, including from Saint Petersburg and Moscow, an outflux, the flight of young men from all of those cities showing very clearly that they protest with their feet, this effort to drag them into the war.

[Music playing]

Jakub: Here's the thing; the whole challenge of Russia and the danger of Russia, is that it's this kind of multicultural, multiethnic empire that essentially, has to constantly manage and manipulate all of these different nations, tribes, creeds, both across its border regions, but also inside. And that is something that Russia utilises to conquer new territories. It essentially goes out and tries to incorporate them.

But then, once you have all of these people inside, that's actually kind of difficult to manage. And if you look at the Russian Federation, it's got all of these different forms of federation. Like there isn't one type of state, there's a dozen of them. And so, these nations are essentially a source of great weakness, for Russia as well.

Anastasiia: You mean like the minorities within Russia? Or like the republics within Russia?

Jakub: Yes. I think, well, that's what has created today's Russia. And that's what also, is the potential trigger for the instability that everyone is afraid of, if all of a sudden, Russia is seen as weak, which it is right now, I think very much so.

Ukraine has proven that Russia is not as strong as it seems. Well, what prevents the Dagestanis, the Chechens, the Tartars, all of these other nations to rise up and demand independence.

Anastasiia: It is a very, very sad situation in my eyes, because this diversity is incredible. The amount of cultures, the amount of different religions and languages, all of these could be flourishing. But this imperial, and then Soviet past, has just like killed any hope now. Because we're not seeing some sort of full-scale upheavals.

Jakub: And I think, Fiona, also goes into this; the minorities nations, they are part of the way that you manage this country, because you send soldiers from distant regions to fight and die in other ones.

But frankly, Lenin put it best, “Russia is the prison of nations.” Right?

Anastasiia: Never thought I'd say that or agree with that, but yes, that is true.

[Music playing 00:24:56]

Jakub: And so, now the problem is that the gang that has been running this prison is in trouble.

Anastasiia: The Ukrainians have been talking about the fact that Russia has to disintegrate. That the perfect outcome for all of us, is if all of these minorities that are incorporated in the Kremlin’s machine might start finally realising that they're being used as cannon fodder, and start demanding some sort of independence or succession or something like that.

Do you think this sort of awakening of minorities is possible, or is this just wishful thinking?

Fiona: No, I think the minorities have been actually awake the entire time, but they have been suppressed in their ability to exert any influence, because of this vertical of power that's been steadily imposed over the last 20 years since Beslan. And the reversal of many of these agreements on autonomy that were concluded in the 1990s.

So, look, I'm not sure that we should be really aiming for the disintegration of Russia here. I think that could have all kinds of unintended consequences, to be very clear.

But it's the reassertion of what used to be Rossiya, the Rossiiskii Federatsii, not the Russkii Federatsii, because what Putin and others around him have been trying to emphasise, is this 80% so called ethnic Russian civilisational core, with most people being Russian Orthodox.

Anastasiia: Yeah. That’s not true, right?

Fiona: And that is not actually the multinational, multicultural, multi-confessional, Russian Federation.

And Putin himself, right up until his return to the presidency in 2011 and ‘12, when he started going on and on and on about Russia and Ukraine being one nation, and all of the ties there, was very careful to always emphasise this broader conception of Rossiya, not Russiya.

And the definition for kind of non-Russian speakers is significant, it was an idea of Russia was a more civic, citizen-based, multi-ethnic, multi-professional, multilingual state, as opposed to something that was narrowly defined about Russia, Russian language, and Russia orthodoxy.

And this was the lesson that was taken away from the 1990s, that the Russian Federation could have fallen apart in the same way that the Soviet Union did, because of all of these differences internally; regionally, geographically, and in terms of the different identities.

And Putin had spent a lot of time, like Yeltsin before him, creating and crafting a larger identity. He's thrown all of that out the window.

So, actually, I think Putin is getting himself into problems, by this narrow definition of the world, this fixation on Ukrainians having to be Russian because there's the dominance of Russian language or of orthodoxy, for example, and of the church.

It's actually opening back up again, the fishes that we saw emerging in the late Soviet period, and also, in the 1990s, during the early days of the Russian Federation.

Anastasiia: Right. So, it all goes back to Russia kind of grappling with its colonial past. This is something that Ukrainians talk about constantly, but clearly-

Fiona: It's a purely colonial war. Exactly. It's a war of the restoration of empire in Putin's own mind here.

I often make the parallel, that this is very similar to if the United Kingdom tried to retake Ireland. Basically, Ireland was colonised by the English centuries and centuries ago, long before Russia was even on the map.

And there was the imposition of the English language on top of the Irish Gaelic language. And of course, when Ireland got its independence, which is about the same time as the Russian Revolution, and ultimately, the creation of the Soviet Union, there was part of Ireland that was left independent of the new Irish state, still within the United Kingdom, Ulster, the northern part, which had been very heavily settled by protestants and British Scots and elsewhere, very similar to Donbas.

And in fact, that conflict has continued for a considerable period of time. So, if England suddenly decided that it wanted to reincorporate Ireland back into the United Kingdom, we'd be in the same kind of problem that we see today.

And I think that people persist in thinking somehow of Ukraine (this is people on the outside) as part of Russia because of that kind of imperial conquest, and that kind of imperial exertion of authority.

But it's no different what Russia is doing, than from any other old imperial power in trying to retake territory by conquest that has long moved away.

[Music playing]

Jakub: You know what all of this really reminds me of?

Anastasiia: What?

Jakub: – is this idea of Prometheism.

Anastasiia: Okay. What is that?

Jakub: This all goes back to interwar Poland, which has just become independent from the Russian Empire, has just fought a war against the Soviet Union, and is very worried about further aggression from the East.

And during this time, they essentially come up with this idea that they call Prometheism, which sort of goes back to the Greek God, Prometheus, who stole fire from the gods and gave it to mankind, in a symbol of enlightenment and resistance to democracy.

And basically, what they want to do, is they want to reach out and support all the non-Russian nations that inhabit the Baltic-Black Caspian Sea basins, with a message that emphasises freedom, uncompromising stance towards autocracy, and the need to rise up against Russian oppression.

Anastasiia: Sounds great so far.

Jakub: And if you look at that policy, which is essentially, rather than tackling Russia head-on, it's finding Russia through a hundred different battlefields. That is actually the policy that now, Zelenskyy has adopted.

So, a couple of months ago, now, I don't know if you remember, there was this video of Zelenskyy-

Anastasiia: Oh, of course. That speech was unforgettable.

Jakub: Well, he's in Kyiv and he's next to a monument of a hero of Dagestan and Chechnya. And he has this kind of speech that, “Ukraine honors and knows the heroes of Dagestan and Chechnya. We believe in you. We believe in your fight against Russian authoritarianism.”

And very soon after that, the Ukrainian parliament recognises Ichkeria, which is the name of Chechnya, the independent version as an occupied territory by Russia. Boom!

Anastasiia: Beautiful. I love that.

Jakub: Exactly the same sort of philosophy, 80 years later, back in play. Okay, that was my really excited part about Prometheism. But it really does raise a question of, is it possible for there to be new hotspots and new theatres to appear for the war?

And I guess the answer is, they kind of already have, just not within Russia, but within the regions abroad; Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, war is all over Russia's doorsteps.

Anastasiia: You're totally right. And I was really happy to hear Fiona mention how this is a typical colonial war, because Eurasia really should be said in this context of colonialism. Everything that happens here in this region has been affected in one way or another by Russian colonialism, be it language, literature, et cetera.

So, I think this is really important for people to understand, and this goes back to something we talked about in the beginning of the episode, that this kind of imperialism is just not discussed really.

[Music playing]

Jakub: Should we move deeper into Eurasia then?

Anastasiia: Yes. Because next, I wanted to hear more about the country surrounding Russia, the ones that make up actually, what we know of as Eurasia. And after speaking to Bektour, I wanted to hear from Fiona about the impact of the war over there.

Let's move beyond Russia and transitioning to talking about Central Asia and the Caucasus. So, all of these huge territories, what we'd call, for lack of a better term, it's a Russian sphere of influence. And I know it's a big task, but if you could put it simply, what is Russia currently doing there? What is its role?

Fiona: Well look, it's quite complicated, because as you're suggesting there, there's this history of conquest, but there's also a history of war among or between Russia and other neighbouring empires, the Ottoman Empire.

So, Turkey becomes an element in all of this. And it's important to bear that in mind, when we think about the way that Turkey and Russia face off in the Black Sea.

We've also got to remember Iran, because in terms of the Caucasus again, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, there was Iranian influence there, part of the Persian Empire, which also bled into parts of Central Asia as well.

And then look, even China, when we kind of start to think about the kind of larger influence in Central Asia, Xinjiang, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, the kind of back and forth of populations across those bodies there; Uyghurs, in addition to Kyrgyz and Kazakhs, for example — Russia doesn't operate in a vacuum.

So, when we say, what is Russia doing there? Russia's also having to kind of bear in mind what some of its earlier imperial enemies and kind of contemporary seeming allies are up to, and there's a lot of back and forth.

And what we've seen, is before the invasion of Ukraine, I think Russia was fairly confident that it had the upper hand in all of the relationships in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Although, China was emerging in Central Asia as a major economic and trading power.

But since the war, and particularly since its massive setbacks on the battlefield in Ukraine, Russia's star has faded. And we are now seeing the emergence of a backlash and pushback.

In Central Asia, there was this remarkable video of the Tajik President, Rahmon berating Putin for his lack of respect and offhand treatment of Tajiks and others in Central Asia.

We've seen Kazakhstan and others pulling away from Russia, even though last year it looked like Kazakhstan was increasingly dependent on Russia after Russia intervened to prop up current president, Tokayev, after a whole bunch of internal disputes.

And Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, are also exerting their own attempts at autonomy.

And Armenia is trying to seek a way of resolving its long-standing disputes and problems with Turkey. Azerbaijan of course, taking huge advantage of the war in Ukraine to press its advantage in Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenia by reigniting the conflict there.

We're actually sort of seeing that it's very difficult for Russia to remain the arbiter of all of the events in the neighbourhood. So, it's setbacks on the battlefield in Ukraine, it's also seeing setbacks in its once dominant relationship in places like the Caucasus and Central Asia.

But I see here now, a complete shift in the dynamic from what it was, prior to February, 2022.

Anastasiia: Now, let's turn to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, because both of these countries actually are members of this Russian dominated CSTO, the Collective Security Treaty Organisation, which for our listeners, is this Moscow-led alliance, made of Armenia, Kazakhstan, Russia, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. And it's essentially Russia's Eurasian NATO.

So, when in mid-September these two countries began fighting it off, it really seemed to observers, like it's a trend. It's if certain countries were seizing the moment when Putin's attention is elsewhere, in Ukraine.

Is this something that's beginning to happen? Is there a particular correlation between the fact that Putin is doing his own thing, and these countries kind of reigniting the conflicts, that have been frozen for some time?

Fiona: Yeah, so look, I think what we have to bear in mind here, is there were lots of contested borders, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, both internally, within states and also externally, on the kind of the borders between states, the borders that were inherited from the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

And then, of course, there’s that huge border with China, that extends all the way from Central Asia through Russia. Because what Putin has done in invading Ukraine twice; in 2014, annexing Crimea, and then sparking off all the war in Donbas.

And then, again, in 2022, he basically said, “Things have changed, the borders of the former Soviet Union, the borders of the newly independent states” (not so newly independent, but the established states) “are now up for grabs.”

So, all of those conflicts that have existed, since the time of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and some that have preceded it, are now in effect, reignited by what Russia's done.

That's why it's so critical to address what Russia is doing in Ukraine because, as you mentioned, there are disputes between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. There are disputes in the Himalayas, between India and China, for example.

Or in the borders where Tajikistan, kind of abuts there. There are old disputes that go along the border with Afghanistan, as well as disputes going along the borders with Iran and Turkey. So, this is again, a potential disaster.

Anastasiia: And India and Pakistan probably have something to say too.

Fiona: Well, exactly. In Kashmir and elsewhere, not to mention all of the disputes that China has with every single one of its neighbours, about territory.

And ultimately could have with Russia itself, because of vast swathes of territory in the Russian far East, along the Amur River, and extending east of Baikal, out to Vladivostok, this is all territory that was taken in the 1860s.

This was what we were grappling with in the wake of World War II and during the Cold Wars, how to basically acknowledge and settle the territorial disposition that Europe and Eurasia and the rest of the world found itself in, as a result of the dissolution of empires.

What Putin has done is basically put everything up for grabs. So, it's no surprise that all of the territorial conflicts are being fought out again.

[Music playing]

Anastasiia: Jakub, you were in Georgia recently, tell us what is it like there? I know a bunch of Russians are walking around, demanding that everybody speaks Russian with them and stuff like that.

Jakub: Well, at least that wasn't really my feeling. Yes, there are a lot of Russians right now, but they seem rather meek. Everyone feels like the fact that they have a place to live, to sleep, to eat, that is not in Russia, where they won't be mobilised and sent to the trenches of Ukraine, makes them feel rather grateful.

And they do realise that their existence in Georgia is precarious. Georgia, at any moment, could essentially ask them to return, not renew their stays, or kick them out in some other way. So, there is a very feeling of, “Please, please don't kick us out.”

So, look, one thing that we haven't talked about is, there's now been two wars involving CSTO members. Just for context, CSTO, this sort of Russian equivalent of NATO, is supposed to prevent war, especially like in the case of Armenia and Azerbaijan, where Armenia is a CSTO member, Azerbaijan is not. Aggression of a non-member on a member should result in some kind of action. It didn't.

Anastasiia: Of course.

Jakub: Like how big of a price is Russia going to pay for this? Like has it already lost its power in Central Asia, the Caucasus, Eurasia?

Anastasiia: Right. It was so bizarre and interesting to see how when the whole conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia reignited, and Armenia asked Russia for help, but Russia did pretty much nothing.

And Armenians went on to protest, demanding that the government withdraws from the CSTO, because it's useless and isn't actually being helpful. And like literally, a few days later, Pelosi, the U.S. House Speaker, lands in Yerevan.

Jakub: Shows up in Yerevan.

Anastasiia: And is like, “U.S. is firmly with Armenia. The U.S. has always supported Armenia and will always continue to support Armenia.” And I was just like, “Everyone knows what you're doing.”

And of course, this is just how diplomacy works, I get it, but in that specific instance, the timing was so quick, like the U.S. jumped on this ship immediately. Russia is in such deep shit (excuse me) in Ukraine, that like the hope for Armenia, that Russia is going to intervene and do something is very small.

Jakub: Yeah. At the same time, this isn't a vacuum, as Fiona pointed out. You have China, you have Iran, you have Turkey, you have the U.S., who are all looking to step in and shape the region. It's really hard to understate what a massive strategic mistake and self-own, the invasion of Ukraine has been.

[Music playing]

Anastasiia: I wanted to find out some more about these difficult implications for India and China, next. And I felt like this was the perfect way to end this episode.

Moving sort of southeast, we should also, probably talk about the two biggest players, arguably in all of this Eurasian mess, being China and India. And both countries are of course very close to Russia.

Together, I think they buy roughly half of all Russian exported oil, which is a huge amount, and also a huge amount of Russian weapons. But in the light of the war in Ukraine, it looks like both of them are starting to be a bit cautious about their relationship with Putin. Are you seeing this too?

Fiona: Yes. I think, for China obviously, and President Xi, we've just seen the Party Congress and the way that he has consolidated his power, admitting that he'd made any kind of mistake in his limitless partnership and support for Putin, ahead of the war in Ukraine, would be very difficult. He doesn't look like somebody who's ever ready to admit a mistake.

But we have seen China behaving very cautiously. And I still live in some hope that China will exert some constraint and restraint on Russia, particularly when it comes to some of the more extreme contemplations on the part of Putin, about using nuclear weapons, for example.

That would be deeply destabilising for China as well, not just, of course, the dreadful impacts that that would have, because China isn't I think in the mood to see the destabilising the strategic nuclear balance globally, which would have impact in its own region.

Putin is making the case for basically, the dilution really of China's strategic position, as being the dominant nuclear power apart from the United States in the Asia Pacific region. If I was South Korea and Japan and any other neighbour, I'd be wanting to have a nuclear weapon.

So, I think China sees that there's complexity here, and we'll have to just watch very carefully what China does.

For India, I think the whole situation is nightmarish. India relies heavily on Russian military capability – training, weapons – and of course, Russia will not be in a position now to boost India's military forces and equipment and ammunition, because of the war in Ukraine.

And India, of course, has continued to stand off with Pakistan, complications, very difficult relationship with China. And what India was looking to Russia, was support against potential comfort with China, which seems highly unlikely now.

Russia seems very much in China's camp. The support from China is critical for Putin. And if there's another outbreak of hostilities in the Himalayas, like we saw a couple of years ago, India could not rely on Russia in any way, I think.

But India, I think finds itself in an extraordinary difficult position, but I think India has a lot of disquiet and doesn't want to find that it's (as a result of all of this) in a massive rift with Russia, United States, China.

It basically wants to somehow balance all of this off. And that is of course, impossible under the current circumstances. But of course, as you said, India's cashing in, it's getting cheaper oil.

Anastasiia: This is just my personal reflections from what you said, but it really doesn't seem to be benefiting anybody, like at all.

Fiona: No. This war is a lose-lose proposition for absolutely everyone on the planet. Basically, I've said in other interviews, Vladimir Putin is behaving like it's the 1780s, when we're already in the end game for climate, COVID, all of these existential crises for humanity. And he's behaving as if we have hundreds of years still to play out, and we absolutely don't.

Anastasiia: So, to wrap this all up, it's clear that Russian influence in the region is weakening. As the co-host of this podcast, Jakub, my colleague, as he put it, it's almost as if this is a puzzle where Russia is so involved in all of these different countries, in the Caucasus and Central Asia.

And now, once it starts pulling away, and it’s influence is declining, and it’s power is declining, everything almost starts to fall apart. Is there going to be more instability? I know predictions are stupid in a way, but-

Fiona: Well, there's inevitably more instability from all of this. The invasion of Ukraine is an inherently destabilising act, that has global reverberations. This is why I've said many times, that this is another world war-like scenario, with great power conflict, with the unravelling of the global order and implications for pretty much every country out there.

Russia's manipulation of the narrative causes instability. Russia is out there with the Wagner Group, propping up dictators and regimes and hunters from Africa and elsewhere.

Anastasiia: And committing atrocities too.

Fiona: So, everything that Russia was doing at the moment, unfortunately, is inherently destabilising. This is not a one or even two or three-dimensional conflict, a war here. As I said, we need to have every perspective brought in. This is global.

And there have been the effects on food security and energy and climate change, because we are not tackling any of these issues. We're losing time. We need to have international cohesion and coherence of what we're going to do, on some of these critical issues.

Putin is making it impossible for any kind of international cooperation, and he's destroying one of the critical countries for thinking about climate change and the sustainability of agriculture in the form of Ukraine. Ukraine is a global breadbasket, not just a regional breadbasket.

And this is absolutely and utterly disastrous. There are so many tragic parts of this, but in actual fact, there's some very capable Russian diplomats. And there hasn't always been everything negative about Russian diplomacy in Russian foreign policy.

Russia actually, has in the past and in the recent past, played some important roles in creating diplomatic firms. The war in Tajikistan comes to mind, for example, in some of the settings as well. But that's all out the window at the moment.

So, the kind of the role that Russia could play, that could actually be destabilising some of these places, by trading on some of these past relationships, is being distorted, by these exigencies of basically getting a victory at any cost and every cost, in Ukraine.

[Music playing]

Anastasiia: Thank you so much again, for finding the time. It was fascinating to listen to you.

Fiona: Thank you so much Nastya. It was a pleasure.

Anastasiia: In two weeks in Power Lines, we will be speaking with Oliver Bullough, the writer and investigative journalist, to explore the rise and recent fall of oligarchies, from Moscow to Kyiv, and then across the world.

Jakub: If you want to further support us, you can subscribe to our ad-free feed on Apple, and by looking at Power Lines+ on Spotify.

You can also support the Kyiv Independent, by finding us on our Patreon, to get behind the scenes content. Go to patreon.com/kyivindependent, to continue helping us report on the most important stories in Ukraine.

Anastasiia: Look up Message Heard wherever you're listening to this podcast for more of our original shows. And find us on our website at messageheard.com or on our Power Lines Twitter, @PowerLinesPod, as well as Instagram and Facebook by looking up at Message Heard.

Jakub: You can also follow the Kyiv Independent on Twitter and Facebook, @KyivIndependent, and Instagram at kyivindependent_official, to get the latest news and stay up-to-date with our coverage.

Please also subscribe and rate Power Lines, in your podcast app, as it really helps others find our show.

Anastasiia: Power Lines is a partnership between the Kyiv Independent and Message Heard. It was produced by Bea Duncan, Harry Stott, and Talia Augustidis. The executive producer is Sandra Ferrari. The theme music is by Tom Biddle and Alfie Godfrey.

Bonus Episode 4

Anastasiia: Hello listeners, welcome to our bonus episode of Power Lines: From Ukraine to the World. I am Anastasiia Lapatina.

Jakub: And I'm Jakub Parusinski. For this week's bonus, we're bringing you an extended version of our interview with Kyiv Independent journalist, Alexander Query.

Anastasiia: Wait, it's “Kerry”? I thought it was Queer-y.

Jakub: Well, I think his name is very good for a journalist. Because journalists do deal with a lot of queries, but I think it's pronounced Query.

Anastasiia: So, Alex, our colleague, him and I talked more about Russia's strategy around resources and dove deeper into how energy diplomacy is shaping Europe.

Jakub: So, difficult gas diplomacy isn't necessarily limited to Ukraine and Russia.

Anastasiia: Right.

Jakub: There's actually a couple of other cases in Europe, including France and Algeria.

Anastasiia: And that's exactly what Alex and I talked about, because I asked him if European countries say no to Russian gas, where are they going to find the alternatives? And the alternatives don't look very bright either, because many of these are former colonized countries, with whom the relationship is definitely still very strained to this day.

And this entire post-colonial conversation is fascinating to me, because there is so much reckoning that has to be done.

Jakub: The thing is, every time that there's a gas crisis in Europe, we tend to look to one of the very few sort of large democratic friendly countries to supply our gas, basically Norway.

Anastasiia: Right.

Jakub: The problem is, Norway can't fill the whole world. It just doesn't have enough capacity to sort of deal with and replace all of these other suppliers.

Anastasiia: And also, isn't their gas more expensive? So, that's just not a good long-term solution?

Jakub: Well, their gas is, I think at the market price. It's not really like salmon, that just being from Norway, gives it a premium price.

Anastasiia: Okay. So, on that note, let's hear more from Alex.

Alexander or Alex, hello.

Alexander: Hi.

Anastasiia: Do you want to start with talking about what your role at the Kyiv Independent is and what you've been covering in the last few months and before the war?

Alexander: I began covering business for the Kyiv Independent. But of course, when the full-scale invasion happened, well, like a lot of reporters, I sort of turned into well, covering the war and its effects on the country.

Anastasiia: Yeah, you're French, but of course, you live and work in Ukraine, and you've been here for a while. How did that happen?

Alexander: So, 2016, I just had my journalist diploma and I was following the Euromaidan since 2013. And for me, it was crucial to follow what was happening in Ukraine, because you don't see an efficient revolution happening everywhere.

So, it's sort of, we would say in French, “embrasse” which like ignited my sort of romantic spirit really, the fact that one people can actually write its own history, despite its past, despite its very noisy and violent neighbor. For me, it's something that always fascinated me.

So, I decided to become a war reporter in Ukraine, in 2016, and I stayed.

Anastasiia: Amazing. You've recently interviewed Vitrenko, Yuriy Vitrenko, who is the CEO of Naftogaz. Do you want to briefly chat about that?

Alexander: Yes, it was indeed a quite fascinating interview, because right now, Naftogaz, which is Ukraine's gas monopoly, is facing I would say, a historically grueling winter when it comes to distributing gas to Ukraine and also outside Ukraine.

So, it is an extremely challenging winter for the company, for a company that actually tried to sort of change its skin from a post-Soviet and a Soviet commission, into a properly transparent and western-like, so to speak, company.

So, they're facing a couple of challenge here, which is of course, the priority. So, delivering gas to everyone, despite the war and despite refineries and despite most of the infrastructure being heavily shelled and basically, being destroyed by Russia, because Russia does that now.

And trying to transform and to follow the reforms that Ukraine is also trying to follow. You also have to take into account that more than 50% of Ukraine's natural resources when it comes to gas are in Eastern Ukraine, at the moment.

So, they are in territories that used to be captured by Russians that have been freshly liberated or are still under Russian control. Naftogaz people are literally working under fire.

And I had the chance, so to speak, to see that, because I recently went in some places which were recently liberated in Kharkiv Oblast, and I literally saw these people of Naftogaz actually working almost in military outfit to actually put in place the pipeline, to give gas back to population that needed the entrance of the winter.

Anastasiia: So, let's move to these almost mysterious explosions that have been happening in the Baltic Sea.

Alexander: How mysterious is it?

Anastasiia: Well, it depends on who you ask really. But of course, on September 26th and 27th, if I'm not mistaken, there were multiple explosions on the Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2. So, what exactly happened?

Alexander: So, Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 are two pipelines bringing gas from Russia to Germany. They are crossing a couple of waters including Denmark, including Sweden. And Nord Stream 2 was indeed the big project of Russia to sort of double the amount of gas that was brought to Germany.

So, per year, with Nord Stream 1, we're talking about 55 billion cubic meters. And with Nord Stream, it would've double it. So, 110 billion cubic meters. So, it was supposed to open, but it didn't happen.

Because of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Germany reduced its dependency to Russian gas. We're talking 55% of dependency to 26% of dependency.

But the main point is what happened to these pipelines. So, there were three explosions. The three explosions damaged three pipelines; the two pipelines on Nord Stream 1 and one pipeline, on Nord Stream 2. So, the only ones working right now is Nord Stream 2, is one pipeline on Nord Stream 2.

And sort of by coincidence, one might say, Vladimir Putin, recently said, “Oh, wait a minute, I can try and fix it.” Because that's what often happens with Russia; they create a problem and they put themself in the savior situation.

So, coming back to the investigation, Germany opened an investigation, Denmark opened an investigation and Sweden opened an investigation because this happened in their own territorial water.

What's interesting though, is that Germany involved the Navy, Denmark involved the Navy too, but Sweden involved the Counterintelligence.

A lot of countries were quick to actually point out Russia, because again, it does look like one of the many tools of Russia blackmail over gas and over resources. So, the investigation is still ongoing, but there's little doubt about who did it.

Anastasiia: Okay. But for someone who maybe doesn't really understand this context, how does that make sense? It's the pipeline that transports Russian gas to Europe, and Russia damages the pipeline, for what?

Alexander: It makes sense in the context of a false flag operation. It makes sense on the context of, for the Kremlin to blame the West and basically, to also say, “Oh, we have a solution, we can fix it if …” (and that's an important if), “You comply to our terms.”

And that's always the same problem. There was an issue with a Nord Stream 1 over a turbine that didn't work properly, and so, they had to send it back to Canada. There was some sort of diplomatic turmoil between Ukraine and Canada. Even when the turbine came back for Nordstrom 1 to work, actually Russia said, “Oh, we're going to reduce the gas flow by 20%.”

So, it’s not technical problem. It has never been a technical issue. It's just that, Russia invents excuses to sort of asphyxiate and manipulate the market and asphyxiate. And it's extremely important now, because Europe, after the COVID-19 crisis, had to face a spike in energy crisis. Because after the COVID crisis, people began consuming more and more gas.

So, the prices went up, and while the prices went up, Russia reduced its supply. And this decreasing supply of gas while Europe was already facing a spike in prices, is indeed problematic. And actually, the whole point of it is indeed to sow chaos, when it comes to energy.

Anastasiia: And is that working? Did you notice that European leaders are perplexed with how to react to this, with what to do with their gas supplies before winter? What's happening in Europe right now? What's the mood in response to this?

Alexander: To a certain extent, it's working. For example, Germany, they have to sort of ask themselves if they want to reopen nuclear power plants, even though it's a big taboo.

But here's the problem. By doing so, and by sort of pointing out the weaknesses in energy in every European country, Russia is actually showing the fragilities of every energy policy in every European country.

In France, for example, there's a massive issue when it comes to gasoline. There's a massive turmoil over French people not willing to accept that they're going to have to turn their heater down a bit because, well, there's less gas than usual.

I think just overall, they are just pushing on the weak points of every European countries, to sow divisions. Again, this is just one tool of a long-term strategy that Russia has been applying against Europe for a while.

Anastasiia: And are there any other tools?

Alexander: Well, gas is Russia's favorite blackmail tool, because it's actually one of the only resources that Russia has left. Fossil fuels are one of the only resources that Russia has, after the sanctions that the U.S. and Europe actually slammed against Russia.

So, Russia doesn't manufacture anything. They just export natural resources and they play with the supply of it. And that's basically their main tool. Now, how they use it, is a different story.

Anastasiia: Is there a connection between the sabotage, which most people are blaming Russia for, and Turkey's supplies of gas?

Alexander: Well, I believe that's an important and interesting point, because while Germany, Sweden, and Denmark are still struggling to officially point the fingers at Russia, Putin openly offered Erdoğan (Turkey's president) for Turkey to become a gas hub. And basically, to focus all the gas supply through TurkStream.

It's actually quite fascinating that in a last speech of Putin, he focused on TurkStream. He doesn't usually focus on such details, when it comes to, let's say, political speeches. But using literally this pipeline, I think is sort of a red flag.

And it's important because right now, Turkey is having quite an interesting role to play when it comes to Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

So, right now, the Azovstal defenders are in Turkey. Turkey definitely played a role into their liberation. Turkey played a role in the grain-export deal. Turkey's literally becoming the most important mediator between Russia and the West.

Turkey plays bets on two horses, so to speak. Turkey has an interest of staying into NATO, because it makes it a perfect partner when it comes to NATO. It makes it a perfect partner to Russia.

Geographically, if we come back to the issue of gas, I think it was last year or the year before, Turkey found a massive gas pocket in the Black Sea, which could make it one of the biggest gas player in this part of the world.

So, having control of the Black Sea, having control over gas and actually becoming a hub, that would be quite ironic. Actually, Russia throning, so to speak, Turkey as a major player, after trying to put Germany off the throne, of being the major supplier of Europe, is also a message sent to Europe, being like, “You don't want to comply to what I want to do, then I'm going to give it to Turkey.”

Anastasiia: Broadly. Let's talk about the general situation of Europe and its energy, especially, the winter is coming and everyone is talking about this now. We know that a lot of energy was coming from Russia and that has now decreased. So, how is Europe grappling with this crisis? What's happening?

Alexander: So, right now, the biggest supplier of Europe is Norway. Norway took over and became, well, first, a reliable supplier. What's interesting though is that actually Ukraine spearheaded this sort of change.

Because after 2014, when Ukraine was 70% dependent from gas from Russia, they had to choose another supplier. Vitrenko told me that, he had to negotiate basically who was the other biggest country who had like massive gas pockets in the land it owns — well, it's Norway.

So Equinor, which is a partially nationalized company from Norway, is actually supplying first gas to Ukraine and gas to most of Europe at the moment.

What's interesting, it also changes the attitude of certain countries to other countries. Today, France will have to face its own colonial past and will have to reconcile with Algeria.

Because Algeria is also a massive gas supplier. The problem is that Algeria war happened and basically, France destroyed Algeria, over the will of Algeria to be independent. And a lot of trauma will have to be overcome before these kind of gas deals can be done.

That's why recently there had been these trips from French officials to Algeria, et cetera.

Anastasiia: Of course.

Alexander: It sort of changes the mentalities. There is this, I believe, very interesting Hegelian sort of dynamic, which is the master and the slave. So, basically, the master depends more on the slave, than the slave depends on the master.

Meaning that basically, despite what you can see on the window shop at the end of the day, today, France depends more on Algeria green lighting its gas supply to France. So, France will have to actually face itself as a former empire and will have actually to ask for forgiveness.

Anastasiia: At the very least.

Alexander: At the very least. At the very least. So, it does change those dynamics in Europe. It changes dynamics, not only when it comes to Algeria, but then also when it comes to the south, country that have been overlook when it comes to gas supplying.

Spain has a liquefied natural gas terminal, Poland has a liquified natural gas terminal. But those countries have been overlooked because they don't have natural gas resources.

Since the very beginning of the foundation of Europe, Europe has been sort of spearheaded by this French-German couple. There was always this idea that Europe was built over peace between France and Germany and no more World War II, et cetera.

Today, we see the limit of this couple. We see the limit of this partnership, because who are the only countries in Europe that actually didn't sort of grasp the spirit of the time? France and Germany.

All the others understood that, because they actually understand that times are changing. Spain understood that, Poland understood that, only by the fact of building a liquified natural gas terminal, Spain did.

And what's interesting here is that the dynamic is changing. The power dynamic is changing, because the resource dynamic is changing. It's not about you having resources, it's how you can distribute it.

Anastasiia: So, how does this decrease in the import of Russian energy? How is that going to affect Russia itself?

Alexander: Well, the problem is that Russia tends to artificially maintain its market. When the sanctions, hard sanctions applied to Russia, Russia sort of pushed its own companies to de-register, delist from foreign markets and to come back into the Russian market.

So, Russia is creating its own bubble of rubles. And why do we think, why do we see Russian market is going well, is because Russia is artificially inflating its own market, because it's obliging everybody to pay with ruble, to go through its own market. It's creating some sort of protectionism in a massive scale, but at one point it will explode.

Anastasiia: Yeah.

Alexander: I don't know when, but at one point, this bubble will explode.

Anastasiia: As all bubbles do. So, Alex, you mentioned, in the beginning of the interview, that a lot of Ukraine's resources are located in Donbas. And of course, we know that large parts of the east of the country were occupied, then liberated, and a big part is still occupied. Does that play a role in Russia's calculations? Is it important to the way the war is unfolding?

Alexander: On the long-term, it's important. It would've worked in Russia's calculation, if Putin hadn't been lied to. It would've worked in Russia's calculation, if Russian army had been “greeted” with flowers. It would've worked if Russia’s annexation would've actually worked.

So, it's not the case. Russia doesn't control shit. Russia doesn't control its own army, Russia doesn't control its own soldiers, they can't even control their own planes.

So, at the end of the day, the long-term could and would indeed have been an exploitation of resources. But to exploit those resources, you need structures, you need refineries, you need these technicalities to work.

What struck me, for example, is there was this sort of questions among military experts when Russia began invading Ukraine, who were like, “Why don't they hit rollways?”

Because they think they're going to control the rollways, and because they don't have anyone to fix it. Russia will need to rebuild those refineries. Russia will need to bring in a lot of technical equipment that it doesn't have at the moment.

Anastasiia: Of course.

Jakub: Russia wasn't able to develop a proper gas program since few years already, because of sanctions. And that's why. There is this idea, there is this thing of like, if you cannot have it, I will destroy it.

I think it's something that also applies to this war. It's a very abusive mentality.

Anastasiia: I think it's interesting because in a way, of course, one could say that this war, apart from all of the other motivations in part, was also motivated by trying to control the resources.

But Russia has a lot of resources. Russia is the biggest country on planet earth. And the whole point of why they've been crashing down all of these nationalist movements around it and taking control of these lands, is to control the resources there.

So, another part of it, in my opinion, is just making sure Ukraine doesn't have it, making sure Ukraine isn't economically prosperous, because Russia doesn't need an economically prosperous Ukraine, along its borders.

It's not only the idea of taking those resources for themselves, but also just for the fact of taking them away from us.

Alexander: Yes, yes, I agree. It's literally depriving the right to exist, to its neighbor. The beginning of this war in 2014, was actually depriving the right to exist to a democracy nearby, to a potentially prosperous democracy. Unfortunately, it was expected, it’s actually the continuity in Russia's policy.

Anastasiia: Absolutely.

Alexander: And it’s said how an empire works, when some sort of a — what it considers as a vassal state actually rebels, “Well, let's actually destroy it because we're an empire.” But that's the problem. Right now, the empire is collapsing and the emperor is actually close to naked.

Anastasiia: It's preposterous to me that there are so many researchers or just regular people who are interested in politics, who were shocked when this war began. And of course, I was shocked too, because it's my own country and it's just scary.

But historically speaking, there is nothing shocking about what Russia is doing. They've erased cities off the map before, in other countries around it.

The same thing has happened in Chechnya. They've tried to do a similar thing in Georgia. They've done this in many other countries.

But Ukraine is now the only country that seems to be really pushing back to such a significant scale, which is why everyone is now shocked and paying attention. But Russia has been doing this. It's the same playbook.

Alexander: It's shocking if you read only Russia's playbook. It's shocking if you're a Kremlinologist, as you say, it's shocking if you actually only focused on Russia's history.

But maybe if people actually focused, not only on Ukraine history, but on the history of Dagestan, on the history of Georgia, on the history of actually all the states that Russia erased and tried to erase, and the history that Russia tried to erase as an empire, maybe they wouldn't be that shocked into the reaction that actually unfollows.

So, it's all about where you want to stand and actually what you want to get interested into. So, yeah.

Jakub: Thank you so much for listening to Power Lines. We'll see you next week for our regular episode, where we'll be speaking to Fiona Hill, about the future of Eurasia, and just how destabilizing Russia's invasion has been for its surrounding countries and the global order.

Anastasiia: Power Lines is a partnership between the Kyiv Independent and Message Heard. It was produced by Bea Duncan, Harry Stott, and Talia Augustidis. The executive producer is Sandra Ferrari. The theme music is by Tom Biddle and Alfie Godfrey.

Season 1 Episode 4

Anastasiia Lapatina: Finally, I don't need to be stressed about interviewing, like, a State Department official because this is someone I actually know and interact with and like.

Alexander Query: How dare you not be stressed when you talk to me?

Anastasiia Lapatina: Okay, I'll— [laughs]

Alexander Query: This is ridiculous. [laughs]

Anastasiia Lapatina: I'll go back into my stress mode. [laughs]

Alexander Query: All right, no, no, no, no. Don't worry.

Anastasiia Lapatina: Alexander Query is my colleague at The Kyiv Independent, and like most of us, he started off covering regular peacetime issues. Until February, 2022, that is.

Alexander Query: I began covering business, uh, for the Cuban Independent. But of course, when the full scale invasion happened, I sort of, well, like a lot of reporters, I sort of, you know, turned into covering the war and its effects on the country.

Anastasiia Lapatina: Alex recently did an interview for The Kyiv Independent with Yuriy Vitrenko, that's the CEO of Naftogaz, the largest national oil and gas company in Ukraine. You can find a link to it in the episode description.

Alexander Query: Formally, uh, formally starting, what are the preparations underway for this winter? 

Yuriy Vitrenko: First of all, we're producing as much gas as possible, so our people, they work literally under bullets. Due to this hard work of our people, we are able to more or less maintain the same level of production, and it's very important for us despite the war. Uh, in the West, they…

Anastasiia Lapatina: So, they talked about Russia's deliberate missile attacks on Ukraine's energy infrastructure and the difficulty the company's having in continuing to distribute gas at home and abroad, given the war being waged around them.

I wanted to find out some more about their conversation and the role energy's playing in the war because the global energy crisis it has caused is already having some real tangible effects. 

Alexander Query: Right now, natural gas, which is Ukraine's gas monopoly—they also have oil—it's facing, I would say, a historically gruelling winter when it comes to distributing gas to Ukraine and also outside Ukraine.

So it is an extremely challenging winter for the company delivering gas to everyone despite the war and despite, uh, refineries and despite most of the infrastructure being heavily shelled and basically being destroyed by Russia, because Russia does that. You also have to take into account that 50%, more than 50%, of Ukraine's natural resources when it comes to gas are in Eastern Ukraine at the moment.

So they are in territories that used to be captured by Russians, have been freshly liberated, or are still under Russian control. Right now, Naftogaz people are literally working under fire. And I had the– the– the chance, so to speak, to see that, because I recently went, uh, in some places which were recently liberated in the Kharkiv Oblast, and I literally saw these people actually working almost in, you know, military outfit to actually put in place the pipeline. To give gas back to population that needed, the entrance of the winter.

Anastasiia Lapatina: There is a reason why people in military uniforms are guarding this infrastructure. That's because Ukraine's vast network of pipelines distributing gas from Russia to Europe are some of the most pivotal on the continent. Russia has never, of course, liked paying transit fees to Ukraine for this, nor the bargaining power it gives to its neighbour.

So to bypass Ukraine in the last decade, Russia built two new gas pipelines. I'm sure you know them. They run under the Baltic Sea from northwest to Russia to northeast Germany, Nord Stream 1, and then later Nord Stream 2. They're now infamous as an example of a naive West becoming too reliant on cheap Russian energy.

Nord Stream 2 was never actually used, and Nord Stream 1 was indefinitely shut down this year because of the invasion, which made it all the more strange when on the 26th of September, this happened.

Newscaster: Gas bubbles churn the Baltic Sea. 70 metres below sea level, gases escaping from the Nord Stream pipelines. But researchers said they had detected possible explosions in the area where the leaks were observed.

Alexander Query: There were three explosions. The three explosions damaged, uh, three pipelines: the two pipelines on Nord Stream 1 and one pipeline on Nord Stream 2. So the only ones working right now is one pipeline on Nord Stream 2.

Anastasiia Lapatina: You've probably seen the pictures of gas bubbling up from these pipelines to the surface of the Baltic. They're pretty dramatic. At least 50 metres of the pipeline were ripped clean through, something that only an extremely powerful explosion could have caused. And as such, it immediately seemed suspicious. But no one is exactly sure what happened yet. It's currently under an international investigation by Denmark, Sweden, and Germany. 

Alexander Query: Germany involved the navy, Denmark involved the navy too. But Sweden involved the counterintelligence, which is quite an interesting, uh, uh, detail, I believe. So the investigation is still ongoing.

There's little doubt about who did it. A lot of countries, including the US, including, uh— Well, most of, actually, uh, NATO allies were quick to actually point out at Russia because again, it does look like one of the many tools of Russia, blackmail over gas and over resources.

Anastasiia Lapatina: It is a really strange story. And a lot of people are understandably confused by it. I mean, why would Russia want to sabotage its own infrastructure? One it sees as pivotal to ensuring the lucrative transit of gas to Europe.

Alexander Query: It makes sense in– in the context of a false flag operation. It makes sense in the context of for the Kremlin to blame the West and basically to also say, 'Oh, we have this solution. We can fix it. If— If—', and that's an important 'if', 'you comply to our terms'. And actually, the whole point of it is indeed to sow chaos, when it comes to energy. 

Anastasiia Lapatina: Is that working? 

Alexander Query: To a certain extent, it's working. By sort of pointing out the weaknesses in energy in every European country, Russia is actually showing, uh, the fragilities of every energy policy in every European country.

Anastasiia Lapatina: Are there any other tools of Russian blackmail? 

Alexander Query: Yes, it's– it is Russia's, uh, favourite blackmail tool, really, because it's actually one of the onl– only resources that Russia has left. Russia doesn't manufacture anything. They just export natural resources, and they play with the supply of it. And that's basically their main tool.

Anastasiia Lapatina: The case of the Nord Stream explosions is emblematic of one of Putin's favourite political strategies, using energy as a weapon. And across the globe, everyone is starting to feel the consequences. 

The resource war and ensuing energy crisis that Russia has started is really going to make this winter a deadly one, for many in Ukraine and beyond. It speaks to the vast, tangled consequences of this war, but also the breathtakingly sinister lengths that Putin will go to as he tries to get an upper hand over Ukraine and its allies. Because control of the gas and energy that the West craves is one of the few cards that Russia still holds.

Anastasiia Lapatina: From Message Heard and The Kyiv Independent, you're listening to Power Lines: From Ukraine to the World.

Jakub Parusinski: In this series, we're going to be mapping the undercurrents and global consequences of the war in Ukraine, beginning in Kyiv and following the roads out wherever they may lead. I'm Jakub Parusinski.

Anastasiia Lapatina: and I am Anastasiia Lapatina.

Jakub Parusinski: This week, we're taking a look at what is arguably the most consequential global economic impact of the war: its effect on energy and resources.

Anastasiia Lapatina: Jakub, did you see the news coming out of Norway? I think they've arrested some Russian spies poking around the energy infrastructure, taking pictures or something like that.

Jakub Parusinski: I did. And to be frank, it was kind of scary. I don't know if you've ever seen the series Okkupert? Occupied?

Anastasiia Lapatina: No.

Jakub Parusinski: The story is that the Norwegian government is really about green initiatives, and they shut down the whole petroleum oil, gas, uh, industry and Russia invades and takes over Norway.

Anastasiia Lapatina: What?

Jakub Parusinski: And, sort of, the European Union just nods along and doesn't really do anything: condemns the situation, but basically allows for it.

Anastasiia Lapatina: Well, that sounds extremely familiar, you know? Wouldn't even be surprised if that actually happened.

Jakub Parusinski: Well, it's an excellent series, and to be frank, that was my first thought when I saw, you know, Russian agent photographing energy fields, infrastructure in Norway, caught on the border, my first thought was, 'Oh my goodness. We're basically living in Occupied.' Which, to some extent, is very much what the past year has been about. I mean, we're living in some kind of crazy series or movie. You'd never think this would happen, but it is.

Anastasiia Lapatina: So, Jakub, when people talk about energy and how important it is, what do they really mean by that? What are the types of energy we have at some basic level? What do we use it for? And, and why is the war in Ukraine so consequential for this resource?

Jakub Parusinski: So, I'm not really an energy expert, but I've spent quite a few years reporting on energy in Ukraine, which is a pretty important player. Taking a very simple look at it, I mean, on the one hand you have oil, and that's basically the stuff that you use to run your cars, to run trucks or, uh, for Elon Musk to shoot rockets up into space.

Anastasiia Lapatina: [laughs]

Jakub Parusinski: On the other side, I would say, is everything that you have that is integrated into a combination of the gas grid and the electricity grid, and the two of them kind of run into each other.

So, the electricity grid, whether it's a coal power plant, a nuclear plant, or for that matter, solar, wind, anything that's sort of generating a constant input of electricity, that's the stuff that you use to power your house, to have Internet.

Anastasiia Lapatina: Mm-hmm.

Jakub Parusinski: And then you have gas, which is sent across a network of pipelines that you use to essentially heat large parts of the city. Now, the area where the two of them run into each other is that you can also use gas to generate electricity.

Anastasiia Lapatina: Okay.

Jakub Parusinski: The same as you can use coal. And that's actually kind of important because renewables are great, but they're not stable. You need a sort of constant level of energy, and the way that you do that is usually you balance it with something that is, uh, fossil fuels. Those are the easiest ones to turn on and off, and mainly in Europe, especially in central and eastern Europe, that's either coal or, potentially, gas.

Anastasiia Lapatina: Okay.

Jakub Parusinski: So why does Ukraine matter in all of this, right? 

Anastasiia Lapatina: Yeah.

Jakub Parusinski: ...and this is really important. Actually, when the whole gas industry sort of appears in Europe, and to some extent the oil industry, Ukraine is part of that story.

Anastasiia Lapatina: Yeah.

Jakub Parusinski: It turns out Ukraine, for a while, is actually one of the places that generates a lot of gas, and the Soviets build big pipelines that go through Ukraine into Russia.

Anastasiia Lapatina: And where geographically do we do that?

Jakub Parusinski: The parts that are being attacked are basically the ones that have the– the resources as well.

Anastasiia Lapatina: Okay.

Jakub Parusinski: And.those fields, they don't really have much gas anymore, but the pipelines that were built between Ukraine and Russia are now going the opposite direction.

Anastasiia Lapatina: Mm-hmm.

Jakub Parusinski: The pipelines that go from, sort of, Russia through Ukraine into Europe, that has been historically the biggest artery feeding Europe with natural gas over the past decades.

Last few years, situation changed. Through the Baltic, you've got capacity going through the Nord Stream. Under the Black Sea, you have TurkStream. There's also a pipeline that goes through Belarus, but Ukraine is still the big one, right? Like, this is the big vessel that carries gas from the East to the West. 

Anastasiia Lapatina: So Jakub, who did you interview for this episode?

Jakub Parusinski: We were actually very lucky to be able to speak to one of the world's leading academics on all things energy, Helen Thompson. Helen is a professor of political economy at the University of Cambridge, where she has been studying, basically, the connections between historical developments and disruptions in the energy and commodity markets over the past three decades.

She has written and spoken about this in publications like The New Statesman and the now off-air podcast Talking Politics. Her recent book Disorder is also one of the most illuminating retrospectives on the last couple of decades and how the energy crisis has essentially been fuelling a political crisis as well.

Now, the whole topic of energy and geopolitics can get pretty confusing and nebulous…

Anastasiia Lapatina: Definitely.

Jakub Parusinski: ...so I first wanted Helen to explain how the world got into the crisis that we're currently in and where Ukraine fits into all of it.

Jakub Parusinski: Right now, Europe is facing an energy crisis, but that didn't start with the Russian-Ukrainian war. How do we get to this point? What are the big trends that have gotten us to where we essentially are today? 

Helen Thompson: I think there are quite a few different trends in play. If we start with oil, I think that there's actually been some issues around the supply of oil in relation to demand that we could already see back in 2019.

So, the year before the pandemic started, and actually, total oil production in the world has still not hit the amount that was produced in 2018. If we talk about gas, I think we could definitely see that there was a gas crisis for Europe and a number of Asian countries last autumn. It was probably the omicron variation, you know, of COVID that stopped the energy crisis really accelerating from a already pretty precarious situation, I would say. You can see an enormous difference from that point in the prices being paid for natural gas in Europe and Asia compared to in the United States.

If we look in terms of nuclear power, which is obviously been part of the story of the energy year in Europe because of the French situation and the fact that the nuclear output has been really low in France, um, during the course of this year because of the maintenance issues. And then if we look at it in terms of the energy transition, we can see that that's been proving extremely difficult even in the electricity sector, which is where most progress has been made.

Even before we get to the 24th of February of this year, there were multiple energy problems piling up, I'd say most dramatically around gas.

Jakub Parusinski: So, I think we can dive into the political ramifications a little bit later, but in your book, you sort of mentioned this kind of tension between the, um, the exporters and the importers. Where does that tension come from? 

Helen Thompson: Yeah, I mean, I think that the problem for countries that are pretty much entirely dependent upon imports of oil and gas in particular is that there's a permanent vulnerability around that in terms of supply. Obviously this is what's happened to European countries this year, is– is that a country which you are used to receiving a steady supply from at a reasonable price, suddenly decides to use your dependency on their exports as a geopolitical weapon against you.

So, I think it's always been well understood by governments that there are certain vulnerabilities, sometimes very acute vulnerabilities that come from having to import energy from abroad. And it's always been understood by those countries with an export capacity that if they choose their ability to export and to turn the exports on and off, so to speak, can be used as a geopolitical weapon, so I would say that energy has always been geopolitical through the whole course of the 20th century. 

Jakub Parusinski: It's a very salient point regarding, sort of, perhaps the history in Europe as well as the policy of the US, but in Europe, I'm sure a lot of people were aware of the vulnerability, but did that awareness sort of surface? Did it really lead to much action?

Helen Thompson: I think it's true that European, um, governments were complacent in this respect. And, I'm gonna focus on Germany here because I think that Germany…

Jakub Parusinski: That's the big one.

Helen Thompson: ...in European terms, is a central country at issue here. Is it the case that the German government, German politicians, and the big industrial German firms had a pretty, let's say, clear-sighted view of the geopolitical risks around energy dependency upon Russia. I would say the answer to that is no, that they didn't. They kind of, for a long time—right, I'd say really until maybe the latter part of this last year, early part of this year—had a kind of mantra, which went essentially, look, the Soviets were a reliable exporter during the Cold War years, so why wouldn't they be a reliable exporter now the Cold War is over. 

In some sense, you know, if they could be trusted and delivered during the Cold War, why can't we trust that they will deliver now? I think that that was geopolitically naive for, like, a number of reasons, which we can come to, perhaps.

If you say, on the other hand, over the last 20-odd years, let's even just say during the period in which Putin has been in power, were European politicians regularly worried about dependency upon Russia? I think the answer is yes, that they were, and I think that at various points that a number of countries—not always Germany, it must be said—tried to diversify their energy supply, and they were looking for alternatives.Clearly, a number of North and East European countries saw the United States as an alternative years before the war began.

So from the point around 2017 when the US could start having capacity to export liquid natural gas, so a country like Poland was building liquid natural gas ports and taking, you know, imports from the United States and was doing it quite deliberately to try to escape having to import so much from Russia. So, was the question of energy security around in European governments' thinking for the last two decades? I think that yes, it was. 

How much it was in Berlin may be a different question, but even there, I would say that it wasn't really until the 2010s, when the US shale gas boom took off, that it was really clear that there was a– a potentially serious alternative that a lot of European countries could embrace. And even then, I'd still say, you know, there's still limits to that claim.

Jakub Parusinski: Yeah.

Helen Thompson: Because we can see from the kind of competition that now exists between European countries and Asian countries, that the world's existing liquid natural gas suppliers cannot take care of all the gas demand that there is now in the world.

Jakub Parusinski: So, Anastasiia, what's the problem with Germany? 

Anastasiia Lapatina: Yeah, I mean, when I was reading about the historical relationship between Germany and Russia after the Cold War, it was fascinating because basically what happened is that after Germany was unified, they had to develop, you know, a new foreign policy for independent Russia. And what they did is they were driven by this idea that the closer we get to Russia, the more we engage in trade, especially in terms of, you know, such important energy resources, the less likely we are to have an adversary relationship. 

Jakub Parusinski: So you are referring to this famous German phrase, 'Wandel durch Handel', which is 'change through trade', right?

Anastasiia Lapatina: Yeah. So, for the last three decades, Germany did exactly this. That was their whole core of their, you know, energy politics and foreign policy towards Russia, is that the closer we get to them, the friendlier we are to them, the better things are, generally. And that didn't change even after 2014 when they invaded Crimea, invaded Eastern Ukraine, annexed Crimea, and occupied huge swaths of the country, Germany didn't really care. 

The core of this is that for, like, the last three decades, Germany and Russia had this very close economic relationship, and now the German government is like, 'oh, we're screwed'. And they basically openly accept that they've been doing this wrong all along, or am I wrong, Jakub, what do you think?

Jakub Parusinski: What really shocks me is how little room there is to change energy in the short and medium term, right? So when you're faced with a situation that you've got winter coming in a couple of months, or you need to develop some kind of industry or something like that, like, energy has this huge lead time. If you wanna build a nuclear power plant, like, it's a decade of planning and building, et cetera, right?

Anastasiia Lapatina: And then voting on it too.

Jakub Parusinski: Right, absolutely. But what's kind of crazy is, like, okay, that's really, really difficult in the short term. But over a period of 20, 30 years, there's actually a lot you can do on energy. And, you know, um, Germans have a reputation for being organised and planning and, you know…

Anastasiia Lapatina: Meticulous with their work.

Jakub Parusinski: None of that happened. They just kicked this can down the road every single year. Like, it's crazy. 

Anastasiia Lapatina: You know, I'm thinking about this as a young person, because there are a lot of these conversations that are happening among my peers. Our generation is really trying to coincide ethics and– and economics, and we're really wondering, is that even something that is possible?

Can we be in a way where we make ethical decisions first and economical later? Because it's not like relying on Russian energy is the only way to go. Like, there are alternatives. Are they gonna take a lot of– a long– a long time to develop? Yes. Are they gonna take a lot of money? Yes. Is that gonna— Like, are you gonna need a lot of political will in certain countries? Yes. But those are possibilities. So the calculation here is only, are you willing to make those sacrifices for what's good and what's ethical. 

Jakub Parusinski: I think your generation has been the most idealistic, but also, uh, consequential on this.

Anastasiia Lapatina: Mm-hmm.

Jakub Parusinski: I think that the current—you know, Gen Z—I think it is doing it the most consequentially and the most radically. But is it possible to change everything at the same time? Well, here's where I think you end up making difficult and pragmatic compromises.

So, take energy. Is it possible to wean yourself off of Russia for most European countries? Probably, yes. It's difficult. It takes money, political will, et cetera. Some countries are in more difficult situation than others, but where do you cover the gap from?

Anastasiia Lapatina: Okay, so what did you get into next with Helen? 

Jakub Parusinski: So, basically I wanted to bring it into the now to see how Putin has utilized energy as a geopolitical weapon and used it to put pressure on countries supporting Ukraine.

Jakub Parusinski: Fast-forward to the 24th of February and the Russian invasion of Ukraine, all the events that have happened since. Are we currently in an energy war in Europe?

Helen Thompson: Yeah, I think that we are. I think that you can say that that's true in two— Well, maybe it's now true in several– more than two respects. But let's start with the first two respects. The first would be that the European Union countries, and obviously the United States as well, put in place a set of energy sanctions on Russia.

So, either you can think of that as retribution, or you can think of it as an attempt to try to change the calculus facing Putin about the war itself. And since then, we've obviously seen a willingness of the Russian government to terminate gas supplies through particular pipelines to European customers.

Indeed, I would argue that actually you could see evidence of Putin's energy war last year in 2021. So, if you look at the amount of gas that was coming through the pipelines and through the course of 2021, certainly from about the spring onwards, then the only stuff that was coming through was the absolutely the contracted stuff. So in that sense, you could say, I think that Putin started the energy war last year. 

Jakub Parusinski: Why would today's Russia be ready to take measures that the Soviet Union hesitated to implement for so many years? 

Helen Thompson: That's a good question. First of all, I would say that exports of energy, particularly the gas exports that began in, like, the late '60s—it began going to Austria, I think in 1968 or early 1969—they were crucial for the Soviet Union economically from the '70s onwards because the Soviet Union had become dependent upon agricultural imports from abroad, and it had to pay for them in hard currency. And the energy exports were the corollary of that. Obviously, Putin's Russia is now actually an agricultural exporter, or it was before the war, anyway. So, in that sense, Russia is a more self-sufficient state. 

The second thing I think that's important to see, and I think this is something that the– the Germans both understood and didn't understand the full implications of, is that from the point of view of Russia, the dissolution of the Soviet Union created a major energy problem, and that was transit. Because the pipelines that had been constructed to deliver Soviet export– energy exports to Europe went through a bunch of countries, obviously, most importantly, consequentially Ukraine, that post-1991 were now independent states with which the Soviet Union had to manage a transit relationship with and indeed had to pay fees to use the pipelines that ran through those countries. 

So, from the point of view of Russia, energy exports in the post-1991 world was a lot more complicated geopolitically, far more geopolitically complicated, than it had been to the Soviet Union.

And that created a set of risks for the European countries that were evident, I'd say, going back to the 1990s, let alone the 2000s, which was if there were conflicts over transit between Russia and Ukraine, then there were risks for European countries that they wouldn't get the gas that they thought was being delivered to them.

So, in that sense, I would say that the geopolitics of Russia selling into the European market was just a lot more complicated from the start, post-1991, than it had been during the– the Soviet period, and I'm not sure the German government in particular perhaps understood all the ramifications of that.

Jakub Parusinski: Mm-hmm. So, is there maybe a personal angle here?  I mean much has been made, at least amongst journalists, of Vladimir Putin's doctoral dissertation on the geopolitical applications of resources, energy in particular. This is a tool that's comfortable for him.

Helen Thompson: I think so, yes. I mean, I think that, if you go back to the beginning of Putin's ascendancy within, um, Russia, and you think about what– what he was trying to do in geopolitical terms and in the way in which he organised the Russian state itself, I think it's pretty clear that he saw that– the means, in his mind, by which Russia could be a great power again—and I'm using his language there, not what I would necessarily use, myself—was to turn Russia back into being a really important energy power, and that he was fortunate in this respect that the early 2000s, particularly from two-thousand sort of two onwards, was a period in which oil prices started to go up very rapidly, reaching their highest ever level in June of 2008. Took gas prices with them, uh, and that obviously provided a great deal of revenue for the Russian state.

And that was, I would say, the basis in which Putin went about reinventing Russian power in the post-Soviet world. And he also realized pretty quickly that he could use energy issues as a weapon against post-Soviet states like Ukraine, Belarus, Moldavia, and not to say there wasn't any of that went on in the 1990s, there was, but I think it went on to another level under Putin, and that he saw from the beginning that energy was Russia's most effective geopolitical weapon. And he set about, I think, trying to use it. And I think, in some sense, he went about trying to trap European countries in dependency upon Russian gas in particular, controlling which pipelines, et cetera, the gas was coming through in preparation, I would say, for a moment, like the one that then arrived.

Jakub Parusinski: Yeah.

Helen Thompson: Where he wanted to do something that would be completely unacceptable to the European governments, and he hoped that their energy dependency on Russia would constrain the way in which they would be able to respond to that.

Jakub Parusinski: So, Anastasiia, do you think that Putin has basically been playing Europe for a while? Is this part of a big evil plan?

Anastasiia Lapatina: I mean, I don't know how helpful it is to try to get into his head, because as you remember, people have been doing this before the invasion, and many people misunderstood what was happening, right? Like, I believed he wasn't gonna invade because it didn't make sense to me, but Putin operates in a whole different set of assumptions.

But, I do remember—and– and I think you and Helen got into this, actually—Putin has had this fascination with energy and energy as a– as a geopolitical matter and as a geopolitical weapon, in fact. So, you mentioned his doctoral thesis. Do you wanna– do you wanna tell the listeners what that whole thing was about? 

Jakub Parusinski: Yeah, so, supposedly you could call the politicisation of energy or– or actually using energy as a geopolitical weapon, as almost an academic interest of Putin's, um, because he wrote his dissertation about precisely this, uh, this topic.

And, look, it's really something that you can dive into. I agree that it probably doesn't make that much sense to try to, you know, guess what Putin's mood is on any given day, but the other instruments are much more delicate and I would say powerful 'cause when you sell a lot of energy to lots of people, well there are a question about who gets special licences, who actually does the importing, who sits on the board of a, you know, highly profitable energy company, and how they deal with each other. 

And I think when we look at Russia and specifically sort of the games that it's been playing, the geopolitical games with energy over the past decades, that's been a huge part of it. Handing out and punishing. So how are people feeling in Ukraine? 

Anastasiia Lapatina: I mean, I think that the feeling about the upcoming winter and energy and, you know, and not having enough heating, of course the Kremlin is trying to scare us and subdue us. I mean, that's– that's the reason why they– they hit civilian targets and kill people. That's also the reason—one of the reasons, one of the many reasons—why they disrupt our energy infrastructure.

But among the civil society, and of course I recognize that that's not entirely representative of the overall mood of the population, but certainly among the youth and among the civil society, people are not necessarily worried, because we're now kind of playing this game of, you know, Putin is trying so hard to– to get us to panic, and he's trying to, you know, get us to be worried and lost, but he's failing. 

And we're almost like playing this game of like, okay, what are you gonna try to do next? Like, you are gonna fail again. You know, in my circles, that's the mood. What do you think the broader mood is? Are people really worried?

Jakub Parusinski: No, I think you're right. A lot of people are— It's really important to not let Russia essentially break your spirit. So I think that's sort of the first thing and the first reaction. Everyone is very adamant that look, like, this is not going to change anyone's mind. At the same time. I think there's a lot of people who are starting to think about winter and preparing about winter. 

You know, just over the last week, I've had several conversations and we're now planning to help, um, deliver power generators, um, you know  arctic level, almost, sleeping bags. Winter in Ukraine is– can be brutal. That is basically what is happening. 

On the one hand, I mean, people– they're resilient. They're angry. They're not gonna let this sort of break them. Um, but I think they also, you know, they've been through similar situations before. And right now there's a lot of, let's organise ourselves, let's prepare ourselves. You know, winter is coming, but let's be ready.

Jakub Parusinski: It seems by all accounts, very credible that the plan from the beginning, and to a large extent still today, was to take over the entirety of Ukraine. What would have been the fallout in terms of strengthening Russia as a geopolitical energy player? 

Helen Thompson: This is a very interesting question. I mean, I find it easier to see that there was a resource motive for expanding, or attempting to expand, Russian control in the Black Sea in Donbas, that obviously the Donbas region is a resource rich part of Ukraine. So I think you can say it's not difficult to see that there could be a resource agenda, a clear resource agenda, in Putin's mind about the Black Sea and Donbas.

The pipeline issue, though, I think is harder to think about in these terms and to say that okay, it was really worth from his point of view in trying to engage in this, you know, absurd, you know, project of regime change in Ukraine in order to control the pipeline, because he was a long way to cutting Ukraine out of the transit system.

Jakub Parusinski: Yeah.

Helen Thompson: As I recall, he signed an agreement with France, Germany, Ukrainian government in late 2019 which extended Ukraine's gas transit until I think it was 2024. But if Nord Stream 2 had come online, which obviously there was a reasonable chance it would've done without him engaging in this war of conquest, I would've thought he would've achieved his aim, which had been– obviously engaged him for, you know, years and years of trying to cut Ukraine out of transit without having to contemplate, you know, such an absurd project as regime change. So I find it hard to think that the transit issue was part of his motivation.

Jakub Parusinski: Yeah, I fully agree. I don't think that this could have been the motive. The thing that is a more intriguing hypothesis is the question of food. As you mentioned, Russia not only went from sort of the Soviet Union's deficit in food to a country that is actually a– an agricultural exporter in a lot of goods, but it's neighbouring Ukraine, which is also, compared to its size, at least a middle agricultural power, is the combined force of agricultural output of Ukraine and Russia enough to sort of weaponise food?

Helen Thompson: Oh, very much so. I think very much so. Uh, and particularly I would say that it isn't just a question of, like, the volume of exports. It's the question of Black Sea itself and the ability, effectively, that Russia had really to blockade exports out from Ukraine via the– the Black Sea.

So you have two, as you say, really consequential agricultural exporters that are exporting through a body of water that has been, shall we just say, geopolitically fraught now for centuries and centuries. And in a context in which Russia is now, post-2014, the kind of agricultural exporter that it is, it's clear that there was a potential for a lot of really, I would, you know, like systemic pain being inflicted, uh, upon certain countries.

Particularly I would say in the Mediterranean Basin, you know, that those countries that were most dependent upon wheat imports in particular, from Ukraine and Russia. And then if you throw in all the other things that have been going on in food markets this year, uh, independently of the war—like drought problems—and generated by the war itself—fertiliser problems because of the gas crisis—that's a pretty, you know, like, heady mix of things that we're– we're– we're putting in there. So, I would say food security is definitely part of this war.

Jakub Parusinski: Look, back in– in sort of in February and March, there was a lot of concern about food security.as one of the elements of the commodity war. And, you know, there were questions about is the Middle East, is North Africa, is sort of South Asia going to be affected? Are we going to see widespread hunger? Do you think that's still an issue? Has it calmed down since then? 

Anastasiia Lapatina: So, this is actually fascinating because, of course, food security was, you know, one of the main global concerns about Russia's war in Ukraine. And now, it's sort of no longer making the headlines, because, um, Russia and Ukraine got into this deal that was brokered by the UN in Turkey– in Istanbul, I think it was called the Black Sea Grain Initiative, which essentially allowed Ukraine to continue exporting, you know, its grain out of three ports in Southern Ukraine, in the city of Odessa.

So that started working in, and suddenly the UN is, like, preaching this initiative saying that, you know, we're basically back to normal, all good, diplomacy wins. But the point is that that initiative was actually only signed for 120 days. And that initiative, the document, you know, like the agreement, is ending and it's gonna end, I'm pretty sure, on November 19th, and it's gonna have to be signed again if you wanna continue exporting grain.

Jakub Parusinski: And every time it's gonna be a problem. 

Anastasiia Lapatina: Yes, because now also we are doing very well, like comparatively to previous times, and so what some experts are saying is that Putin very well may use, of course, this agreement again as blackmail.

But a whole other avenue of this is that the grain that we've been exporting via these ports, that's grain from last year. So the reason why we had that, it's because, you know, we've already planted it, we've already harvested it this summer, and now we're gonna sell it for this winter. But what's gonna happen next winter?

Because now in the fall we have to, you know, plant new agricultural products, and I'm pretty sure that, if not the majority, but at least a big part, like something like half of Ukraine's agriculture is situated in the south and in the east, so exactly where that land corridor is, right, between occupied Crimea and occupied parts of Donbas, all of those are areas where we would harvest wheat and other types of grain. Now all of that's occupied. So for the next year, it's not only the transporting of grain is gonna be the problem, it's the amount of grain that we have. 

Jakub Parusinski: So this is a huge question. You know, um, a lot of the times when you look at sort of the ap– apocalyptic kind of predictions, a lot of people will point out that most of the world operates on a 90-day food cycle. And I think what happened this year is there was a lot of expectation that food will be weaponized

I think there were some ideas. But in order to weaponize it effectively, you know that you need to have a shortfall somewhere, right? And I think to some extent there were positive surprises. There was more crops than expected in different parts of the world, and other ones, you know, demand didn't– wasn't quite as high, so there were a lot of reasons why the crisis didn't manifest itself. But I think— You know, thinking that, one, a food crisis isn't coming in the next couple of years, especially with climate changes destroying, you know…

Anastasiia Lapatina: Definitely.

Jakub Parusinski: soil in huge parts of the world and expecting that the Russians will not use this as a weapon is absolutely crazy. I mean, Simonyan, the, sort of– who's a, let's say, a state propagandist. She's the Editor-in-chief of, um, Russia Today. You know, she had a famous speech this summer saying that hunger is our ally, right? Like, we want to weaponize hunger.

Anastasiia Lapatina: I mean, they literally say this openly. Like, we're not making this up because we're sad and emotional about the war. Like, this is a fact.

Jakub Parusinski: And, look, I don't know to what extent this is something that can be verified these days, maybe someday we'll know, but my gut tells me that a big part of invading Ukraine for Putin was actually about taking control of some of the world's most fertile land. Ukraine is a third of chernozem, that's sort of the black earth, the most fertile land. And if you take the fertile land that is in Ukraine, in Russia, and in Kazakhstan, you become more than the Saudi Arabia of food. You are essentially the, um, the OPEC of food by yourself.

Anastasiia Lapatina: Okay, so, Jakub, what did you wanna end on?

Jakub Parusinski: Look, the situation with the energy war, the commodity shortages are one of the big repercussions of the current war. You know, they're affecting people from Beijing to DC, and I wanted to ask Helen about the implications for, basically, the world and the coming resource wars.

Jakub Parusinski: Looking forward, we have a– a Russia that is substantially weakened, at the very least, by a very failing campaign to take over Ukraine. I think its previous power, especially across the Eurasian region, has been impacted. On the flip side, Russia does still benefit from high commodity prices. It does have levers to impact countries in the Middle East.

Do you see sort of energy being a vector for further chaos down the line, especially when we look at, sort of, the Eurasian kind of region around Russia? 

Helen Thompson: I do. I mean, I think that one of the things that's really both striking and destabilising in the situation we've now reached is– is that Russia's military weaknesses have been exposed, and yet I think on balance it's more winning the energy war than it's losing the energy war.

That isn't to say he hasn't got some energy problems that have brought upon itself as a consequence of the war that it has pursued both in military terms and in energy terms, but clearly the problems that are being caused elsewhere in the world as a result of the energy war in energy terms are harder for the rest of the world than they are for Russia.

Jakub Parusinski: That's very interesting and quite worrying to be– to be honest. How do you see this impacting, let's say, the West's relationship with such countries as China and India? Is this something that is setting up additional antagonism between, let's say, India, China, and the West?

Helen Thompson: Yeah, I mean, I think there's a quite a lot of different things going on here.

Obviously, as a starting place, there's the fact that, you know, India and China are not gonna engage in energy sanctions– have not been willing to engage in energy sanctions against Russia, and that they're not– they're not going to. And some of this is actually fortuitous from European point of view because it allows for indirect purchases of Russian oil and gas.

So, you know, you don't buy Russian crude yourself, but Russian crude goes to India and gets refined into petroleum products and gets them bought back into– you know, by European countries. And obviously, that resupplying Russian oil wouldn't be possible if India were also engaged in energy sanctions against– against Russia.

So that's one aspect of it, I think. Then there's the question of climate diplomacy and what the consequences of that have been. Because I think that, pretty clear, if you look at the, you know, the COP in Glasgow last autumn, you know, there was very acute tensions between US and European countries on the one side, China and India on the other, about commitments to phase out coal, which India and China were very reluctant to make, and the European countries and the United States were saying, 'you need to do this'. And I think it's very difficult for European governments to pursue that argument without, in some sense being laughed at– at now because they've shown that in the emergency when it comes to electricity generation, that coal is, if you like, the energy source of last resort.

So I then think there's the question of how China, really, reacts to OPEC+'s moves. OPEC+ is basically the world's oil producer cartel. China doesn't want high oil prices any more than the United States or the European countries do. In one sense, that there's a kind of paradox here because China has actually been helping keeping oil prices lower than they would otherwise be because of China's economic problems. So there's still a quite complicated geopolitics around oil, I think, in which the US and China actually do have some shared interests. 

Jakub Parusinski: Thank you so much. This was a really fascinating discussion.

Helen Thompson: That was really interesting. Thank you for asking me. 

Jakub Parusinski: I just wanted to say that, to be honest, all of this sounds quite depressing. If we look at how this is gonna play out over the next 10 years, and I'm sort of thinking, like, are we in the new normal now? 

Helen Thompson: Yeah, I think that this is the new— I mean, I'm leaving the war itself out of that. I mean, that's a– that's a separate question.

Jakub Parusinski: Yeah.

Helen Thompson: On the energy side, I think this is the new normal, yes.

Anastasiia Lapatina: In two weeks on Power Lines, we'll be looking into Russia and its surrounding countries as we take a deep dive into Eurasia with Fiona Hill, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institute, former official at the US National Security Council, and one of the world's leading experts on Russia and Putin. 

Jakub Parusinski: If you want to further support us, you can subscribe to our ad-free feed on Apple and by looking up Power Lines + on Spotify.

You can also support The Kyiv Independent by finding us on our Patreon. To get behind the scenes content, go to patreon.com/kyivindependent to continue helping us report on the most important stories in Ukraine. 

Anastasiia Lapatina: Look up Message Heard wherever you're listening to this podcast for more of our original shows, and find us on our website at messageheard.com or on our Power Lines Twitter, @PowerLinesPod, as well as Instagram and Facebook by looking up @MessageHeard. 

Jakub Parusinski: You can also follow The Kyiv Independent on Twitter and Facebook, @KyivIndependent and Instagram @kyivindependent_official to get the latest news and stay up to date with our coverage. Please also subscribe and rate Power Lines in your podcast app, as it really helps others find our show. 

Anastasiia Lapatina: Power Lines is a partnership between The Kyiv Independent and Message Heard. It was produced by Bea Duncan, Harry Stott, and Talia Augustidis. The executive producer is Sandra Ferrari. The theme music is by Tom Biddle and Alfie Godfrey.

Bonus Episode 3

Power Lines Season 1 Episode 3 Bonus

[music]

Jakub: Hello listeners, welcome to your Bonus episode of Power Lines: from Ukraine to the World

Anastasiia: I'm Anastasiia Lapatina.

Jakub: I'm Jakub Parusinski.

Anastasiia: So this week, as promised, we have a really special episode for you. A couple of weeks ago we got a chance to speak with one of the most significant people working on Eastern European policy, Radosław Sikorski. Jakub, I know you were really excited about doing this interview, so why don't you give us a quick intro?

Jakub: Radosław or as Poles call him Radek Sikorski, is a bit of an eclectic character. Initially, he was one of the student protesters under communism, ended up getting political asylum in the UK, studying at Oxford, and then became a war correspondent in Afghanistan. But he's best known for his political career as Poland's foreign minister, from 2007 to 2014, where he really shaped both Polish and European foreign policy towards Eastern Europe.

He's the co-architect, together with the former Swedish Prime Minister, Carl Bildt, of the Eastern Partnership, that is the EU policy towards six neighbors in the East, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan.

And throughout this time, he was essentially building a format to engage with these countries that I think purposefully, but certainly, from Moscow's perspective, ended up frustrating Russian efforts to reengage these countries in a sort of Neo-Imperial sphere of influence. Sikorski is interesting because he provides us with a view on how the environment was shaped in terms of foreign policy in Ukraine, but across the whole region, and where it might go next.

Anastasiia: He sounds like such a fascinating figure, especially given that in between all of that he managed to be a work respondent in Afghanistan, which just seemed like this very exciting patch of life that doesn't necessarily fit with all of his other pursuits, his experience is extremely impressive.

[music]

Jakub: And nowadays, he's best known as Anne Applebaum's husband.

Anastasiia: Let's get into the interview.

Jakub: Thank you so much for joining us on Power Lines podcast. I would like to jump back in time a little bit back to the mid-2000s. So, you played a huge role in shaping the EU's foreign policy, especially towards the east, as a principal architect of the Eastern Partnership, launching European Endowment for Democracy, amongst many other initiatives. Thinking back to those times and looking at how things have evolved in the past decade, what would you say worked? What should have been done differently? How do you see the evolution of the EU's foreign policy since those times?

Radosław: It was also under the Polish Presidency of the EU that we close the text of the association agreement with Ukraine that included deep and comprehensive free trade area. And one of the things that should have been done much faster was the processing of the text by commission services, by the lawyers, and by the translators. Unfortunately, despite my best efforts, it took something like 18 months, which gave the Russian side a long time to prepare a response.

Another mistake, I think, by the EU was to tie the Ukraine aspiration process with the fate of the Yulia Tymoshenko affair. And the third mistake was that in 2013 when Russia started a trade embargo on Ukraine in response to Ukraine joining the association agreement, the EU, despite again the protestations of Carl Bildt and myself, decided to treat that as a bilateral issue between Ukraine and Russia. Whereas actually, it was a Russian punishment of Ukraine for her European aspirations.

This is not the EU's fault, but perhaps some of the key Western leaders encouraged Ukraine in 2014 not to fight back against the Russian anschluss of Crimea. I'm sure it was well meant; the default position of Western leaders is to try to avoid violence and to seek stability. But I think with hindsight, I would speculate that if Ukraine had fought in Crimea, then the putsch in Donbas and elsewhere, might not have happened, and then things could have gone differently.

Jakub: I mean itt's something that we're painfully aware of now, I guess is that Russia stops pushing at the moment when you start fighting back. There isn't something that might seem reasonable from Brussels' perspective looks very different from Moscow's perspective. If I can go back to this, basically, if I understand that the integration of Ukraine into the European system because it is an integration, even if it isn't integration into the EU, you're still taking gone a lot of EU legislation, European acquis. That should have been done faster. It should have been done quicker, less time for Moscow to react.

Radosław: Yes, but remember that the country principally at fault for the slow process was actually, I have to say this, was Ukraine. Ukraine wasted a quarter of a century. Compare Poland's efforts with Ukraine's efforts, we were absolutely determined to join the West in the 1990s, because we knew that the geostrategic opening would not last forever. Whereas Ukraine played what her leaders thought was some kind of big game between Russia, the United States, and the EU, and choosing some kind of third way between the Soviet system and the free market system.

And all that happened was that Ukraine was drifting, was drifting economically, and was drifting geopolitically. Had Ukraine been more determined, Ukraine might have joined the EU already. So some of the blame has to be apportioned where it lies. Look, when the Soviet Union collapsed, Poland's GDP and Ukraine's were about the same per capita. And 25 years later, Poland is three times richer. That's the scale of Ukraine's failure, I'm afraid.

Jakub: Yes, definitely agree with that. I think there's both a lack of clarity of vision, but I would also argue a lack of bureaucratic capability.

Radosław: There is that, but there is also greed and corruption, let's remember. I talked to people who worked in the Ukrainian administration, and the corruption was just overwhelming. A former finance minister told me that her own secretaries were selling her calendar to oligarchs. Whatever for.

Jakub: That's the first time I've heard of that version, but that doesn't surprise me in the least. So you're absolutely right. Ukraine had a level of corruption that I think few in the West can really fathom for a quarter of a century, as you say.

Radosław: When I visited Kyiv, I would routinely notice that there were more Bentleys and Range Rovers in front of the Rada than in front of the House of Lords, that tells you something, too.

Anastasiia: Maybe the Lords have a different parking space.

[laughter]

Fast forward to today, we see, at least at the moment right now, it looks like the Russian so-called sphere of influence, the EU, the West, these are irreconcilable blocks. How should we think from the perspective of the EU, from the perspective of the West, think about future politics, future relationships with, let's say, Eurasia?

Radosław: Well, Putin has to lose and Ukraine has to win. And I think Putin bit far more than he can chew. He has already destroyed the reputation of the Russian army and Russia itself, of its defense industry, of its oil and gas industry. We will have a difficult winter, but I think he vastly underestimates the power of democracies to endure. And I think Russia is going into a decade of decline and a possible transition crisis.

At our last meeting with Lavrov in St. Petersburg, I told him, "Look, don't take on the West. We are 18 times bigger economically. If you add Japan, 20 times. You can't win." He seems surprised by this pretty obvious calculation. Unfortunately, Ukraine is paying the price, but the recent successes have convinced the West that this is winnable.

As regards the broader picture, my friend and mentor, Zbig Brzezinski, used to say that the choice for Russia is to be either an ally of the West or a vassal of China. I think you can see now that Putin has made the wrong choice. I think it's because the interests of Putin are actually not aligned with the interests of Russia. The interests of Russia to be an ally is to be an ally of the West. The interest of Putin is to be in an ideological alliance of autocrats.

But hopefully, there will be patriotic Russians who will turn this around because Putin is destroying the future of his country. I think the true victory of the West would be not only the securing of Ukraine but also the transformation of Russia.

Jakub: As you say, for Russia there is an alternative of turning West or turning East, so to speak. It looks like the idea of Russia has great power, has been very significantly damaged, perhaps irreversibly damaged for a long time by the war in Ukraine and the number of failures that have stacked up.

Radosław: I think it started earlier. Obviously, if you construct a system based on pervasive lies and total corruption, it should be no surprise that it's not efficient.

Jakub: Yes.

Radosław: It's just that Putin was maintaining a facade that was credible to us and partly to himself. He has believed in his own lies, that's the fate of dictators, that they believe in their own propaganda. Remember Putin was furious when Barack Obama once said that Russia is a regional power, because Putin was aspiring to parity. With at least one global power centre with China, with the EU, or with the United States.

And now Russia is becoming not just not a super power, it's becoming a large Iran. Putin will be seen not as a restorer of the Russian Empire, but as its a gravedigger.

Jakub: Absolutely. Yet there are many who still think that what we are seeing is a move towards a multipolar world. So I completely agree with your analysis of the situation from a Russian perspective, but then you look at, for example, the meeting that we had in Samarkand, and you see that Modi is there and Erdoğan is there, and a lot of people around the world are cheering for a more multipolar world, despite the horrors that we see of what that world actually looks like.

I think a multipolar world where the big neighbors bully their weaker neighbors is one that is quite terrifying. Yet a lot of people essentially, they just want the table to be overturned and they're tired of this hegemony of America, or whatever you call it.

Radosław: The hegemony has been over for some time. America had its unipolar moment in the 1990s, and then it chose to spend the political, financial, and military capital of that on the ill-conceived Iraq war where it was discredited and its resources were wasted. And look, the United States used to be 50% of world's GDP. Now it's what, 20, 18 in terms of demography the West is with every decade becoming a smaller proportion of global humanity.

But, we should be able to adjust to that. That doesn't mean that we can't still be very prosperous and very powerful as the club of democracies. And we can still be an example to follow, it's still the case that people migrate to the United States and to the European Union rather than vice versa. For some reason, they find our way of life preferable.

And this is what's at stake in the Ukraine, Russia war. The Ukrainian people decided that they didn't want to live under this old-fashioned and inefficient and cruel autocracy, and they want to "level up" to the standards of the Democratic West. And I think that's a great development. And I hope Putin is right in that sense, that if Ukraine becomes successful, the people of Russia will demand the same. That is a threat to Putinism. I just hope Putinism gets defeated.

Jakub: What do you think is the lesson that people in Deli or in Tehran or perhaps in Ankara are taking out of this?

Radosław: Well, the people of Iran, of course, pro-democratic and pro-western, but the regime has now tied itself to Russia. The sight of Putin going cap in hand to Iran to beg for some drones from a country that is an economic basket case and is not famous for the modernity of its military shows the scale of Russia's humiliation.

Jakub: Okay but let me challenge that a little bit because there's a different argument which says, "Look, these various autocracies, or let's say hybrid regimes as well if we zoom out a little bit more, it turns out that they do have some ability to help each other out in difficult times." So if I am running a regional power somewhere around the world, I see that when things are tough, when we get locked out by the West, from finance, from trade, from whatever it is, there are other friendly states that we can turn to for help.

Even after you have been shunned by the world, there is still this country club of mostly dictators that are ready to receive you. Is there now a big enough coalition there to actually pose a real threat?

Radosław: Yes. But the help that they're giving one another is actually resources down the drain. What has Russia benefited from its investments in Venezuela? And so on. Yes, we have a competition of systems. We have the free world and we have the hybrid systems and we shall see a decade or two down the line, which is more efficient. And it will be seen in economic progress, in technological progress, and at the cutting edge, I'm afraid also on the battlefield, we just have to prevail

Jakub: Turning back towards the EU. We now have a country that has bled for the EU like no other. Even if it doesn't become a full member, I think think that story in itself. It can't but not change the nature and what the EU represents, what Europe represents. It's a very powerful political symbol. I think it resonates in Poland. It resonates in the Baltic states. Do you think this is something that can resonate more broadly and will it change the EU?

Radosław: It's already changed the EU. Would you have thought a year ago that the EU would be funding weapons deliveries? Would you have thought that the European Central Bank would be freezing and aggressors' foreign currency reserves? Would you have guessed that the EU would be sending billions of euros in macro-financial assistance?

By its sacrifice and courage and success, Ukraine has got the candidate status, but here I have to tell Ukrainian viewers what I've always told them out of friendship, which is the unvarnished truth. I did it during the Madan where I warned them that Yanukovych was preparing a blood birth and that the agreement was a good tactical move. I told it to the Ukrainian parliamentarians in Munich a week before the war, that the war was indeed coming, which was an outlier view.

And I'll tell you now, just because you are a candidate and just because you are fighting our war, doesn't mean that there will be any lowering of standards for Ukraine before you become a member. Instead of imagining that the EU will make concessions, it will not. Take the realistic view and I'll tell it to you brutally so that it gets through. Okay.

This is not a negotiation because a negotiation suggests a process in which both sides make concessions. And the EU side has existed for decades now, has a body of laws that is an outcome of thousands of compromises. It'll not change that body of laws for the sake of Ukraine. Ukraine has to accept the whole body of European law as is, literally translate it into Ukrainian and pass it in the Rada.

If you waste your time on imagining that the EU will change to suit you, you will just delay the process. So to be even more blunt, I'll say this is not a negotiation, this is voluntary anschluss, and it's hard. It's painful and it's humiliating. We went through it ourselves. I know what I'm talking about. It's worth it in the end. The faster you do it, the quicker you'll get the prize and the less pain you'll inflict on yourself.

Jakub: There's also a lot of back-channel diplomacy that is involved over the war. Ukrainians have proved to be masterful in their communications, I would say to global audiences.

Radosław: I think Ukraine won the information war in the West but drew in the Global South.

Jakub: Why is that?

Radosław: Because the Global South tends to be anti-American, and this is seen as a Ukrainian war with American help, which is what it is. And so the Global South is very skeptical about the United States and therefore somewhat receptive to Russian arguments.

Jakub: On this issue of the information war because I think it's something very important. Last couple of years or last decade even, I think the West started to take it very seriously when it comes to Eastern Europe when it comes to countering Russian influence at home. It has taken it as seriously when it comes to Arabic, when it comes to the Spanish-speaking world. I mean, can the West even win this? It's such a big effort. It took so much effort to try to win it at home. Is it something that can be won abroad?

Radosław: As you say, we accepted the challenge way too late and it's only now that we are beginning to be successful, but look, in the Arab world or in India, you don't feel threatened by Russia or in Latin America. All these arguments are very theoretical until bombs start falling because then it's clear, whose bombs are hitting whose cities and that really clarifies many of the lies and misconceptions. We have this clarity now, unfortunately, because of what's happening in Ukraine, many others don't and probably never will.

Jakub: Thank you so much for your time. It was a real pleasure to speak and if you're ever in the Kyiv, we would be thrilled to host you at Kyiv independent.

Radosław: I actually will be in Kyiv because my wife and I have bought a pickup for the Ukrainian army which I intend to deliver personally. See you in Kyiv.

Jakub: That's amazing. No, it's really highly appreciated. I saw that actually, some friends of mine were helping out with the delivery on the Ukrainian side, so yes, thank you so much for that.

[music]

Radosław: Slava Ukraini.

Jakub: Heroiam slava.

Jakub: Thank you so much for listening to Power Lines. We'll see you next week for our regular episode, where we'll be speaking to Helen Thompson about  the impact of the war on global resources.

Anastasiia: Power Lines is a partnership between The Kyiv Independent and Message Heard. It was produced by Bea Duncan, Harry Stott, and Talia Augustidis. The executive producer is Sandra Ferrari. The theme music is by Tom Biddle and Alfie Godfrey.

[00:21:30] [END OF AUDIO]

Season 1 Episode 3

​​Speakers: Anastasiia Lapatina, Edward Reese, Jakub Parusinski and Alexander Clarkson

Edward Reese: My name is Edward Reese. My pronouns are he/him. My identity is, I call it Queer.

Anastasiia Lapatina: Edward Reese works for the Ukrainian NGO called Kyiv Pride. He's currently living in Copenhagen, which means that this year he attended Pride events in countries all across Europe. So I called him because I wanted to hear about his experiences, and how Pride in Ukraine compares with the rest of Europe.

Edward: I had to leave Kyiv because of health issues, and I was representing Ukraine and leading Ukrainian groups on seven Pride parades in different countries in Sweden, Poland, Denmark, Germany, and Hungary.

Anastasiia: What was the Queer community in Ukraine like in general before Russia invaded?

Edward: We had a very big and bright vibrant community, so this year is our 10th anniversary and we celebrated it in Warsaw. We had different events, we had been working with advocating laws like anti-hate crime law, and gay marriage or civil unions law. I would say that, yes, it was kind of a European movement, so the whole pride movement stood for Ukraine. The whole pride movement in Europe, in Canada, in the US, in New Zealand, everywhere were standing for Ukraine, and it was really important for us to see and to feel.

After the invasion I would say that definitely many people left the country and I know that many people don't want to return because we still don't have all the nice things that like Iceland or Germany or Canada have right now. Anther thing is that LGBTQ soldiers are visible, there are a lot of them. There is an organisation of LGBTQ soldiers and veterans in Ukraine. Actually, I would say that this visibility of LGBTQ soldiers also changes the mindset of Ukrainians.

Because Ukrainians see that there are gay men, trans-people, lesbians, bisexuals, protecting Ukraine and fighting together with the cis-hetero people in the army on the front line. Ukrainian society is really changing and it's changing because of the invasion. It's changing because of the visibility of Queer activists and Queer soldiers. Definitely it's changing because we want to go to Europe and we want to go as far from Russia as possible. We know that Russia is like one of the most homophobic countries in the world, one of the countries with the most discriminative politics.

Anastasiia: How do you think the fight for LGBTQ rights in Ukraine relates to this fight against Russia?

Edward: Ukraine has to go as far from Russia as it's possible, and definitely the talk about human rights as a whole, not only LGBTQ rights, but human rights as a whole is very important because Russia definitely doesn't think about human rights at all. They don't think about human rights starting from 2013, at least when they introduced the anti-gay propaganda law.

Anastasiia: Russia's anti-gay law claims to be for the purpose of protecting children from information that advocates for denial of traditional family values. Putin signed this law in June of 2013. It bans any so-called propaganda about nontraditional sexual relationships among minors. Well, that's what Russia claims it does anyway.

Edward: In my personal opinion, anti-gay propaganda law in Russia was like the first step into this country becoming total empire and dictatorship. Understanding that human rights is the core value of any modern country which wants to grow, which wants to change, which wants to be better for their people, that like human rights is the main thing. I see that Ukrainians and our politics, our politicians start to understand this, definitely they start to understand this also because of all the rules for going into the EU. We have seen Zelensky signing the Istanbul Convention.

Anastasiia: So the Instanbul convention is a human rights treaty of the cons of Europe that combats violence against women and domestic violence. Ukraine ratified this treaty in the summer of 2022.

Edward: Now when we have this clearly paved path to European Union, they will have to do it and they will have to give us civil unions or gay marriage. They will have to give us anti-hate crime laws because if no, they will not be accepted, we will not be accepted in the union.

Anastasiia: How do you think then the lives of the Ukraniain Queer community will change if, or not if, but when we do become a part of the European Union?

Edward: I would say that the life of LGBTQ people in Ukraine will not become better, we will make it better. We will have to build this new life like we are already rebuilding destroyed cities. We will have to rebuild this life, we will have to create it. In some places from stretch like from zero, but I know that there are enough people in Ukraine who have strengths, resources, and big will to do it.

Anastasiia: Even during the war, Ukraine has managed to expand civil liberties, embracing new legislation that protects human rights like the Istanbul Convention, and this matters because there are many manifestations of Europe. One of them is that all of this legislation is meant to protect consumers, but also vulnerable groups and minorities. From Message Heard and The Kyiv Independent, you're listening to Power Lines: From Ukraine to the World.

Jakub Parusinski: In this series, we're going to be mapping the undercurrents and global consequences of the war in Ukraine, beginning in Kyiv and following the roads out wherever they may lead. I'm Jakub Parusinski.

Anastasiia: I am Anastasiia Lapatina. This week we're looking at Ukraine's place in Europe to find out where our country sits as both a European and a potential EU nation.

Jakub: Nastya, do you feel European as a Ukrainian, and actually what does feeling European even mean?

Anastasiia: I think being European is definitely a huge part of what being Ukrainian means to me just because when the Revolution of Dignity happened in 2014, we already talked about how that of course was Ukrainians fighting for our European values, and for being a part of the EU. All I know is that my fellow countryman had to die for their European values. So for me and for millions of my fellow Ukrainians, this isn't just about better roads and less corruption, and better economy. For me, this is something much deeper than that.

It's a fundamental part of who I am because my ancestors had to fight for it and had to die for it.

Jakub: I think that's a really important part of what Europe means for Ukrainians, because of the sacrifice that has been made, but Europe is complicated. It's not just one thing, it's you have a Europe that is essentially all of the EU bureaucracy. You have EU, which is based on a Europe of values, you have a Europe of common history. The Revolution of Dignity was called Euromaidan and I think the values that it was fighting for were very clear. I'm not sure that those values are also something that all Europeans would associate with Europe.

Anastasiia: Yes, of course, because for so many people in Europe, their standards of living, their democratic values, the way their bureaucracy and government functions, it's a given for them. They've been born into that system, they didn't have to fight for it necessarily. I'm not blaming them, but I'm just saying that there is this fundamental gap in understanding of what it can really take to get where we are. We see this gap very vividly, I think right now during this war because there is a reason why Ukrainians complain about talking to people in the West about the war.

It is very difficult. It's extremely challenging, getting across the points that there are governments that are much, much worse than some of the corrupt Western governments. People really have to understand that they don't have it perfect, but they have it much, much better than many other countries in the world. They have to continue fighting to make it even better, but they also really have to be very grateful for what they have because we don't have many of the things they do.

Jakub: To delve deeper into this, we wanted to speak to someone who has spent their academic career exploring European politics and analysing the geopolitical repercussions of the evolving situation in Ukraine. We got in touch with Alexander Clarkson, a lecturer for German and European studies at King's College, London. Alex's work specializes in diasporas and how people connect the politics of their country of origin with the broader politics of their adopted EU homes. He's also half Ukrainian, and one of the most prolific commentators on the war, so he was the perfect person to give us some context about Ukraine's place in Europe.

Maybe a very broad opening, why does Ukraine matter to Europe?

Alexander: Oh, there are so many answers to that. People always ask this question in the present tense. Why does Europe matter now? Why does Ukraine matter now? The first thing I would say is, Ukraine mattering to Europe is nothing new. This territorial space, that is now modern Ukrainian state, it has mattered historically. It mattered in terms of a space through which different empires rub up against each other. It's a political space in which the Ottoman Empire and the Ottomans are as important as the Austro-Hungarian Habsburg or the Poles or the Tsarist Empire in shaping Ukrainian identity.

I think the role of the Ottomans needs more discussion. All these four empires that come into contact in this space, they shape the politics outlook, culture, partly of the peoples who live the space who come together. Create a form of Ukrainian nationhood that at times includes different religious and ethnic boundaries, at times does not include them. There are far-right variants of Ukrainian identity, there are leftist variants of Ukrainian identity. This is a space that is one in which different political entities and different ideas of how to organise Europe and European society have both clashed with each other.

In this space, a political culture has emerged, or political cultures have emerged. In response to this that have developed their own ideas and their own models and their own philosophies, and ideologies of how to organize economy, society and culture. Ukraine matters not just in terms of the strategic issues that we've discussed, it's mattered to the very idea of how Europeans think of themselves, position themselves in the world, how they organise themselves. It's the clash of two different understandings of how politics, culture, society, and economy should be organised.

It's a clash between these two through the EU concept idea that Ukraine accepts and want to be a part of and Russian old European. An old imperial model of the 19th and 18th centuries of “Might is Right” and imperial domination of spheres of influence. It's the clash of these two ideas that's played out within Ukrainian society. That Ukraine society has affected influence in the wider world. Plays out in the way in which Ukrainians have largely opted for the EU understanding of how to organize European society, economic, culture.

The way in which that's actually generated this immense tension and conflict with Russia. Ukraine matters, it matters a lot. It's always mattered.

Jakub: Would it be fair to say that to a large extent, the ideas of what Europe is and what modern politics is both in terms of the tools, as well as the ideologies, they have routinely been tested in Ukraine for the last at least two centuries, perhaps three centuries.

Alexander: I think that's a whole set of ideas, a whole set of concepts. Not just the ones that we would assume in terms of the current debate of national identity and nationalism, and how do you construct -- how do you in this space, different peoples come together and classes come together and over time begin to agree that they have this shared language. It's not even a shared language is like a Cossack ethos, the Cossack myth essentially holds everything together.

You don't even have to speak Ukrainian for that you have to buy into a certain understanding of what the Cossack myth is, and how you organise society and identity through it. And the Cossack myth, it's not just a language or a faith, it's an idea of how to organise society. That to be Ukrainian, is to be your own boss. I think from that flows a lot of the way in which this myth because it's also quite mythical flows, this idea of what is to be Ukrainian and how Ukrainians respond to war crisis and opportunities.

If we take that starting point as this really tension between ethnonational and ethnolinguist, or sometimes even racist kind of a nationalism Ukraine, and a kind of concept of civic nationalism, that's from the very start of the Ukrainian nation-building project. Civic nationalism builds on the Cossack ethos, you can speak all kinds of different languages, but you buy into that. This idea between civic and ethno, really that starts, that's really from the start with Ukraine. There's other ideas like beyond the ones that we're debating now, in terms of push.

Of like Modern Trade Unionism, concepts of socialism, anarchism, Zionism. It's one of the European cultural civilizational cradles of a whole range of ideologies like Trade Unionism hits Ukraine and hits Kyiv, and it's all these Jewish in Ukraine scenes. There's a revolutionary ethos that separates from Moscow. Of course, it's hugely influenced by Russia. I'm not someone who's going to go out and say, well, “Ukraine isn't Russian and was never influenced”. Of course, it's hugely influenced by events in Moscow.

It's also hugely influenced by events in Istanbul, Vienna, Berlin, also through the Catholic connection with Rome, Paris. Then you look through the diaspora in North America. There's all these influences flowing in together, but it's also influencing them. Ukraine isn't some peripheral entity. The states, Romania, UNESCO, the whole set of other traditions. These countries are at the very heart of ideas and concepts that West Europeans think they have a monopoly on. And I think one of the things that we need to emphasise is that this isn't a peripheral state over there.

This is a state at the heart of everything that shapes European social, political. culture, security debate. Through that, it's not just a geostrategic issue of what's happening on our borders and our security, and cultural issue. Actually Ukrainians are actually European. They're one of us, which is very much what we saw happen. That shock in February was just realising, no, they are our people, we're going to support them. This is all a product, not just of something that's just happening now. This is a product of Ukrainians, but also Poles, or Russians, Romanians, being at the heart of all of these developments.

[Music]

Jakub: Look, coming into contact with different models and cultures is one of the main ways that new ideas emerge. For centuries in Western Europe, a lot of them came from the colonies, to be frank. Just look at the role of the empire in British literature, The Jungle Book, Livingstone, all of that. But those colonies were far off, and the ideas were distant and took time to arrive. In Ukraine, new ideas, and new models and cultures arrived suddenly, and usually quite violently. But I wanted to turn it today, do you think that's something that is happening again?

What are the new ideas and leaders that are being born out of this war?

Anastasiia: That's a very interesting question because I think it's not that we're getting new ideas. It's that the idea is that one seemed very radical, and were a very close circle, Western Europe group of people that believes in them. This is now a very normal, very mainstream belief. So for example, the fact that we now actively advocate for a reduction of Russian music, Russian language, or Russian literature, or Russian films. Just actively separating ourselves from the Russian cultural sphere, that was once a pretty radical thought.

Right now, it's very mainstream. People with whom I've argued and advocated for what once was radical, and they argued back at me, we've now switched where they believe in this even stronger than I do. And now I see that it's really no longer about where you live, and your past. Now, the absolute majority of the country is on the same page. We want to be as far from Russia as possible. I think it's not that some completely new ideas are emerging. These Ideas have always been here because Russia has always been a threat to us, but some people would see it more clearly than others at various points of time.

Jakub: So what you're saying is sort of throughout history, the fact that Ukraine went through all of these wars and other hardships, it essentially acts as an accelerant. Ideas that would have been at the fringes for a very long time moved to the center very quickly. As whatever group was trying to survive or to build a new reality for itself, accepted more radical ideas. That's something that we saw with anarchism, with Trade Unionism, with Zionism, all of these ideas that came out of Ukraine, or where Ukraine played a large part in forging them.

Anastasiia: Yes, totally, but the war made everything political. Because there was this whole discussion about how before the word, there were many people who would say that they're outside of politics [foreign language], as we would say. We, the people who work in political spheres and who are part of the civil society, we really hated that and would make fun of those people. To us, it was ludicrous because everything about your daily life is inherently political. Especially in a country like ours, where if you don't keep track on your government if you don't keep them accountable, things go south very quickly.

I think this politicisation of our society is a very, very good thing. I just hope that it's going to last for after the war periods, and we're not just going to go back to square one. All right, so where are we going next?

Jakub: Next, I wanted to see how much the political and economic situation in Ukraine during the '90s and the naughts affected its role on the European stage.

If we look at the last 200 years, we have Ukraine as a key scene of the European story. What about the last 30 years?

Alexander: First of all, we have to be -- even if you critique a discourse -- you have to acknowledge that Ukraine in the '90s was pretty screwed up. Nobody's going to argue with that. Ukraine was coming out of a collapsing Soviet economy, an economy that continues to collapse in the course of the 1990s. There are old embedded political elites that either switch sides or change the position, or mix of it.

Many societies in Eastern Europe are inevitably going to go through immense pressure. They have a dysfunctional political-economic model in the 1980s, 1970s.They have corrupt and overpowerful security forces, security services, and police forces that are never properly reformed or correct in Ukraine.

Ukraine has this problem many post-colonial states have after collapsing empire. That the relationships that all the other governments have is still with the imperial master with imperial authorities. Of course, it takes time for Ukraine to make its voice heard on a more European level to be taken seriously, particularly by the Germans and the French over the course of the 1990s and the aughts.

If you're coming in from Berlin to Kyiv, in 1992 or '93, if you're trying to impress Berlin, take us seriously. It's going to be difficult. There's also all kinds of genuine dysfunctions that aren't solved and genuine problems in Ukrainian politics. So the story of the last 30 years has been that Ukraine is underestimated. Ukraine is much more resilient. Ukraine is stronger than people think.

We still have to take the reasons seriously, both negative reasons i.e. this fixation on Moscow, which is very much to Ukraine's disadvantage because Berlin, in particular, is always focused on trying to have a special relationship with Russia, which steamrolls Ukrainian concerns. We also have to understand that that's okay and that's bad but there's also a reason why they struggled to take Ukraine seriously because Ukraine is in a messy state for a lot of this 30-year period.

Jakub: Absolutely. You look at the first couple of decade and a half, let's say and there's this chaos as you mentioned. There's problems all around Europe that are more pressing, more urgent. The Orange Revolution, was that a turning point, or did that happen later?

Alexander: I always make this an important point. I am very connected with Ukraine through family but I'm not Ukrainian Ukrainian because I'm diaspora and diaspora is a different perspective. I very much remember from the diaspora perspective, you could see people getting their hopes up and completely misreading what was happening. Obviously, some of what was happening in the Orange Revolution in 2004-2005 was a genuine civic moment and a genuine attempt to bring a degree of unity but still you have these regional divisions which Yanukovych played on.

A lot of it was an inter-oligarchic power play, and a lot of people felt shafted afterwards. At the time, it seems much more of a popular moment than if you look back than it was. I think that's something that Maidan later on in 2013 struggled with, because people said, "Oh, we've been done away with this Orange Revolution. Come on, it's bullshit or not." It took a month for people to figure out it wasn't bullshit.

Jakub: Maidan was completely different. It had a bottom-up nature of I think, very civic driven versus-- The Orange Revolution, the protesters bust in with the signs and everything. Look, you need some kind of infrastructure behind you to even make that happen. That's something that wasn't present on Maidan in 2013.

Alexander: I think also, it's interesting that Maidan was actually-- over time, it did get a lot of financial support, but there was a sense of whole business networks, new money like IT. The IT sector, for example. People whose business models are built around export to the EU, who were not necessarily naturally going to be pro-Maidan, but they're like, "You know what, we have an opportunity now to be our own guys. Not to listen to some stupid oligarch from somewhere living in Switzerland to tell us what to do. We can be our own business networks, we can operate as groups."

Mikhail Minakov is a smart political scientist, observed this really, really aptly in saying that Maidan is a bottom thing that's crucial but there is a lot of support it gets. Not from the oligarchs, but a lot of people who saw an opportunity to say, "You know what, I can emancipate myself from the system. I can be my--" It was a very Ukrainian instinct. “Screw you, I want to be my own guy.”

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Jakub: From everything that I've known and I've seen Ukraine in the '90s, and the early naughts was a pretty miserable place. You had runaway inflation, the state was falling apart, lots of criminal organisations flourishing.

Anastasiia: This is all I know about the '90s is like poverty and the bandits. That's what everyone constantly talks about.

Jakub: Well but it’s kind of true. The stories to come out of the '90s are crazy, and it was a pretty lawless place.

Anastasiia: I do remember even before the Revolution of Dignity, I was definitely very aware of this almost mystical time of the Orange Revolution. I remember the adults talking about it. I was totally aware of this revolutional spirit. Now that I'm reflecting back, that seemed so natural to me, so normal, even though it's not. Actually, you don't see this very often in Germany or France if at all, and you don't see revolutions. Whereas to me, because this is just what our recent history has been like, it was very normal for me.

I just grew up thinking that all right, when people are unhappy with the government, they take the streets. It was the most natural response in the world to me.

Jakub: That's what Alex is also getting to here. I think one of the quintessentially Ukrainian features or characteristics is this attitude of like, "Screw you, I want to be my own leader. I want to be independent and do what I want." I think no one brings down governments and leaders or topples the powerful like Ukrainians. That is clearly something that is in the blood.

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So for me, one of the things that changed actually after the Orange Revolution that had very little to do with the Orange Revolution is the change in Europe. So 2004, you have the enlargement. I wonder, do you think that made a remarkable change in terms of how Europe approached Ukraine? After 2004, you start to have central Europeans within European power structures.

Alexander: I think there's two levels to this. You got the second level, the accession. That's crucial. I completely agree with that. The first level, unfortunately, we have to wind back a bit to 1992. Any of your listeners who are EU citizens will absolutely know what I'm talking about, and most outside will not. It's called the Treaty of Maastricht. At the very same time, there was something agreed called Schengen. The Schengen accords. Everybody in EU knows what this is. Everybody around the EU knows what this is because this defines our lives.

The foundations of our entire political, economic, social, cultural system in Europe is built around Schengen and Maastricht. I think the issue with this is you've got to understand that what Ukraine is beginning to build a relationship with is the Europe of Maastricht. What Maastricht does is it takes this loosely organised, what was called the European Community, or the European Economic Community.

Beyond that was built around what was known as the single market, which is market integration and realises that if you want a shared economic market, to create peace in Europe, so everybody's so economically interdependent with one another, they won't fight each other anymore. Everybody wants this thing to work because that brings peace, and they realise by the '80s, you know what, this needs a political structure around it. You can't separate the geo-economic from the geopolitical. You can't separate the political from the economic. If you have to have a shared market, you're going to have to have political institutions to run it.

They create the Treaty of Maastricht, which means what Ukraine is getting into isn't some loose NAFTA-style free trade agreement between Canada, US, and Mexico. It's a system. It's a political system with political institutions and a parliament. By the time you get to 2004, a currency, but the whole idea of the EU is benefits also require obligations and a degree of subordination to the centre, which is Brussels. What this means for Ukraine is, by the time you get to the discussion about Ukrainian integration in the system, this isn't just a loose market.

Once you integrate into what is known as the Acquis, which is the foundation of the European EU legal system, it fundamentally rewires all parts of your political system. How your judiciary works, how relationship is between local and national government, how you organise taxation. It influences who you can give your passports to as citizens. It influences how you can control your borders. It increasingly, though, this is the reason why EU is not a full state, it hasn't got its own army, but increasingly has a security dimension.

Which means that when Ukraine faces this decision, you have the slow realisation on Ukrainian elites this isn't just about, “Hey, can we have access to this market, and we'll get all this stuff.” It means that we have to fundamentally reorganise the state at every different level. You do have this tension within the Ukrainian system over the course of the aughts about this question. We can see all the winners from this because they come out on top in 2013. All the people, the agro-oligarchs, they love it because of the export market.

There are other parts of the Ukrainian economy -- steel, coal, particularly concentrated in Donetsk, but not just -- that are going to be losers. They gradually begin to compute that this isn't just some market process, this is going to completely reshape the way the state functions. In the end, for a whole set of reasons, the Ukrainians decide to go for this. The parallel is that at the same time, the Russians are realising this.

And the Russians realise that if you integrate into this EU system, the way Russia exerts power over its neighbouring states, the way in which the Russian Putin system organises power within its system would no longer be possible. The Russians also begin to realise what EU integration means, and that's where it's interesting that you see a shift between 2002 and 2012. Not people not just in Kyiv but all the other major regional centres decide, actually, you know what, we're going to make money off this. This is good and this is an advantage. Actually, it gives us bargaining power to Kyiv. And in Moscow, people realise that if we allow the states around us to join this, we lose power over them, that equates to Brussels.

If we join this, the way we run our system in an authoritarian autocratic way and the way we want to run it, becomes impossible.

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Anastasiia: I think, for Ukrainians being a part of the European Union is more political than economical, although, of course, there is the economics part as well, because Ukraine isn't exactly the most prosperous country on the continent. I do still believe that for us, it's the rule of law and protection of human rights and minimal, if any corruption. It's those things that we've been fighting for so long. That's why we've had the revolutions. It's those things that drive mainly out this instinct of being with the EU. It's freedom.

It's this fundamental belief that each and everyone of us is free and can make their own choices and be protected by the government. Me having the same protection as a member of parliament and not having the amount of corruption that Russia has, for example. That's why we're trying to turn away from it. That's at least what I'm getting from it. What do you think, Jakub?

Jakub: I think you hit the nail on the head. My sense is that for most Ukrainians it's not even that, it's just political. It's also very symbolic. People are fed up to their core with the oligarchy and with the feeling of no consequences. That people can completely abuse the political system, abuse the economic system for their own benefit. That the rule is unequally applied to everyone. That's something that was at its core in Euromaidan.

I remember this one story that just it stuck to me like we were in Mezhyhirya -- that was the president Yanukovych's off-the-books private residence the day it fell -- we're walking through this territory that's the size of Monaco, which has private car collection, a pirate ship, gold fields, you name it.

Anastasiia: A zoo?

Jakub: It's crazy. Actually, it's not a zoo. The territory that you're talking about, basically, it has this separate wall and it's just near the entrance and it's pretty close to the main residence. As you walk through it, you have fields of apples and potatoes and you have a greenhouse, and then you have lots of these exotic animals. There is a road that leads back from this territory through a laboratory from which there is a tunnel that goes to Yanukovych's kitchen. That what people called the zoo was actually his private larder. That was his refrigerator.

Anastasiia: I'm not even vegan, but that just sounds terrible.

Jakub: No, it's really shocking. I remember walking through this territory and there was a middle-aged woman next to me and there was just this feeling in her eyes. It was an anger that was down to the abyss of hell. She was just saying, "We haven't eaten meat for months and he lived like this." It was just complete outrage.

Coming back to this idea, I think when Ukrainians think about the EU, it's about rejecting this system. I don't think there is a consciousness of just how much legislation and how much the shift in the political structures happens with the EU.

But I think that's what Moscow is very aware of. They're aware that once Ukraine integrates into Europe, it's very difficult to mess with it. All of its ways to influence the local situation get diminished or even eliminated. That's why we have this war. It's not about NATO, it's about Ukraine leaving a power, a system, and integrating into a different one in a way that is very difficult to reverse, maybe impossible.

Anastasiia: Yes, I totally agree.

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Jakub: We are now at the point where we have three different Europes or three different European ideas. We have one version of the European idea where it's a pragmatic, almost creature, comfort-driven exchange trade, travel. It's all underpinned by material benefits for the citizens. Then you have the second thing, which is what you described, which is actually a real super state. Then you have something which is-- I would say an ideological Europe. This is the first time that you have a country that is actively bled for Europe. Are these three versions of Europe able to coexist?

Alexander: I think we have to add an additional layer to this. We have to overlay that with the fact that Europe also has liberals and social Democrats and greens and left and far right, and Christian Democrats and a number of other ideologies. The reason why the EU is so resilient and why Ukraine's commitment to the EU increasingly also strong. Part of this model is that in Ukraine, as in the rest of the EU, sorry, it's not a member yet, but as part of wider system, the reason it's resilient is that every ideology has its own answer to these balance between these three factors.

Christian democrats have their understanding of what they want the EU and European integration to be for and so does the far left in much of Europe and so does the far right. The resilience of this model and I think where Ukraine becomes more and more like other states part of the EU system is increasingly-- Of course, there's still Euroscepticism and opposition to have increasingly every ideology in the spectrum finds its own argument to support European integration. Finds its own balance between the two, three factors that you described.

Ukraine becoming the country that bleeds and almost martyrs itself for Europe, which is also a very, very old Ukrainian nationalist theme by the way. Or national identity theme of we martyr ourselves our suffering. It's very Christian. We died for your sins.

Jakub: It is, but that's what has me worried because now I think you have a portion of Europe that understands that or even identifies with that myth. Then you have a portion of Europe that couldn't be further away from that. Is this a conflict that Europe can resolve or is it going to spin the two parts apart?

Alexander: I think what was really interesting is that it was not just the invasion itself. I think there are ways in which Putin could have done this at a lower scale. He could have gotten away with so much more. But by making it about the existential question of the existence of an entire European state and framing it in a kind of attack on not just Ukraine, but everything that EU seems to represent. Everything actually even parts of the European far-right see as part of their identity, it does trigger response not just in central Eastern Europe.

To understand the EU, you need to read Goscinny's read Asterix. You know Asterix’s village where they always fight and argue? But the moment they're threatened, they come together and beat up whoever threatens them. EU is Asterix's village. The one thing you want to do is if you want to split the EU and get your interests and mess up a place the Ukraine, is you don't want them to suddenly think that you're threatening them too.

The moment you do that, the Asterix villagers come together they drink their magic potion, and beat you up. You could totally see how Putin got it completely wrong. He's paying all this money to understand the EU through the SVR and FSB, and they got it completely and utterly wrong as to which Russians you don't push with the EU Europeans.

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Anastasiia: I think every Ukrainian who went to Europe after the war began has had a very similar experience of being just utterly overwhelmed with love and hospitality and solidarity and seeing Ukrainian flags everywhere. When I was in Poland just a week after the war began, I was shocked to see that you just had to show your Ukrainian passport and you got discounts in stores. You got free food, free beverages. You had just all of these amazingly kind things and there were fundraisers in every little coffee shop. There were flags everywhere.

Now we're used to it. I think that's remarkable when we talk about solidarity, those are not just words. I think you really see this immense level of support and it makes you feel less lonely in the face of this huge aggressor that Russia is.

Jakub: It's truly been remarkable to see how many people have participated. As you say just the level of emotional reaction is absolutely crazy. My question though is looking forward, the immediate reaction was incredible. Is there enough magic potion to hold because this war is going to last for a while?

Anastasiia: I think so because Ukrainians are doing everything that's possible and impossible to show that we're worth sticking up for. Remember that image with the key chain of the European flag? For our listeners, for context, in the first whatever month of war, there were an image from Bucha from Irpin, the outskirts of Kiev, where there were a lot of massacres. There was this photo of a woman, her dead body laying on the ground and in her hand, she had a key chain and they had a European flag on them.

Everyone shared their photos saying, "This is our application to join the European Union. This is what we do, we die for it."

Jakub: That's something that has to change. The EU cannot but change as a result of this. Its mythos, its identity has to change because of that. What I'm a little bit concerned about is that there is a lot of Europe for which that will be a very foreign idea. If you look at the willingness to fight for your country in Europe, there's a lot of countries where we're barely past the 20% line. In some cases, I think maybe even below it. This is a very different, almost a civilizational gulf. Now, I think there is an opportunity and Europe has this diversity of experiences that make it stronger and better.

But that is a big step. That is a big jump for Europe. I'm worried about whether it can basically make that leap.

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Anastasiia: On that note, what are we ending with here, Jakub?

Jakub: Finally I wanted to know about the future, both about Russia and Ukraine's future in the context of Europe.

The past 10 years, you have Euromaidan, the decision to break with the association agreement is reversed. Ukraine starts to move towards adopting part of the Acquis, slowly integrating into Europe. That's obviously put on hold now. If we look at the positions of European countries, vis-a-vis Ukraine, do you think we are destined for the next five years to only view it through a military prism? Or can we go back to, let's say economic civic integration?

Alexander: When people speak about Ukraine's European integration path, they always think of full membership. Whereas there's the EU and its member states and there's a core within that. The 22 states that are in the Euro, Schengen, of course, the single market, okay, to explain to Americans it's a travel-free area. We have no passport controls. You can move freely, move goods per people services capital and there's no controls on it. You just get on a plane from-- It's like flying from Cleveland to San Diego.

Then there are states that are not full members of the EU. They don't call the shots in the EU institutions, but for reasons of national pragmatism and the national compromise. Some countries like Norway or Switzerland were not comfortable with political union, but they realise they're fundamentally dependent on the European economy, EU economy. They need to be integrated in the single market because that's so much easier to trade and move people around and you benefit from this.

Now, that third ring, I think Ukraine's already in it. I think Ukraine's already in it because of what we call again the deep comprehensive free trade agreement and a separate agreement which gave Ukraine's limited travel access but no work access. De facto once the war starts, suddenly, there's just a complete drop in trading and quotas. Any vestige of limited access for the Ukrainians, the rest of the single market was dropped to save the Ukrainian economy. That's not coming back.

What we have to do, I think is make sure the institutional frameworks catch up with the defacto reality. I think Ukraine is already in a Norway pathway, a Switzerland pathway. That's like 90% of the walk into the EU system. That final 10% of full membership, that's the biggest and longest process because that final 10% would give Ukrainian's power over other EU citizens through the EU institutions. I think that's where we're going to have a lot of struggle on the EU side to say, "Yes, these are our guys and whatever”.

Do we want to give these really militarised people, this militarised society with its security conflicts-- do we want to give them a full seat on the European Council? Or can we veto the things that we want? Do we want 40-50 Ukrainian MEPs as of MEPs, maybe even in the European Parliament? That's going to be the biggest barrier.

Jakub: Is there appetite in Paris, Berlin, and Brussels to continue this journey?

Alexander: I think that so much prestige and power and influence has been sunken entering the survival of the Ukrainian state, largely in its current form. I think this is when we discuss, has Ukraine won this war. Ukraine has already won that war, Won that war in April. There's enough to ensure that the EU with the front lines as they are now, will invest a lot enormous resources with full Berlin-Paris support. Whether you have an equal level of commitment to ensuring that Ukraine regains all the territory it has lost since 2014, I am less sure of.

That's the war we're in now. Obviously, the Russian and Ukrainian ambitions may be greater. The Russian, but Ukraine ambitions are pretty much like, “Okay, this is now about war of a territory”. We've more or less hopefully secured our state. Now we want to get this land back. Whether the EU has the appetite to keep that going, I am less sure, and the danger about that is if you doesn't do that. Okay. We stop the precedent of wiping out an entire state, good. That state becomes part of the EU system pretty much already.

Are we going to then let the Russians get away with at least holding onto the precedent of redrawing other countries' borders? Because they'll do it again somewhere else. I do worry that if the EU doesn't have the patience to also let Ukraine fight the war to get its territory back beyond Kherson like all of it, then that precedent means Russia just gets bruised and beaten up and decides, "Okay, Ukraine too much trouble. We've also been humiliated, embarrassed by these goddamn Europeans and by these Ukrainians. We need to show that we're still top dog." They'll turn out and beat someone else up.

Jakub: Do you think there will be a quick and easy integration into the EU?

Anastasiia: Of course not. To begin with, because EU is an extremely, extremely bureaucratic organisation. It takes forever to pass anything, do anything. Of course, if we're talking about a country that is in the middle of war or has just won a war, which are the only two options I'm considering here, it's going to take a while. Maybe I'm too positive, but I think it's bound to happen because after all of these discussions about how the nature has to change.

Just frankly, after everything that has happened up to this moment and when we win this war, our cover letter for this application is going to be, "Hey, we just lost hundreds of thousands of people (which is a likely number) and they died. We join you guys and here we are literally going to war and winning it to be a part of the EU. That's why I would deserve to be there." I do not see a world where they say no.

Jakub: I don't want to be pessimistic, but I do a little bit. Here's what I mean. I think it's one thing to ask for aid and support as Ukraine does right now. I think the kind of framing, like you just said, "Look, we've paid such a dear price for this. We have sacrificed so much you owe us this," is something that is not quite as impactful for let's say -- and I don't want to pick on them -- but like the Dutch voters who are very pragmatic and will say, "Well look, we're happy to help but do we actually want to invite another, sorry, but headache from the East?"

Because they have Hungary, which they're in the process of kicking out. I think to Alex's point, offers them the opportunity to make decisions about how we also organise ourselves. It's the final step where they essentially give Ukraine a right to also influence European affairs. I think that's something that will be a harder sell. It will require very tactful diplomacy. Yes, great communications. Ukraine is fantastic at that, but that's not a given. I think that final step will be much trickier and Ukraine is going to need to be very savvy and build a lot of coalitions here within the EU and with different stakeholders across the continent.

Anastasiia: I guess that's a great way to wrap this up.

[music]

Next week we've got a really special episode. As we speak with Radosław Sikorski, the Polish member of European Parliament, journalist and one of the most significant politicians working on policy in Eastern Europe over the past couple of decades. We spoke about his role as the architect of the Eastern Partnership, the EU’s reaction to Russia's full-scale invasion, and much more.

Jakub: In two weeks on Power Lines, we will be speaking to Helen Thompson, a Professor of Political Economy at the University of Cambridge to explore the impact of the war on global resources. 

We’ll be focusing on energy in particular, to see how the current crisis impacts both geopolitics and the lives of ordinary people.

If you liked Power Lines, look up Message Herd wherever you are listening to this podcast for more of our original shows, and find us on our website at messageherd.com or on our Power Lines Twitter @PowerLinesPod, as well as Instagram, and Facebook by looking up @Message Heard.

Anastasiia: You can also follow The Kyiv Independent on Twitter and Facebook @kyivIndependent and Instagram @kyivindependent_official, to get the latest news and stay up to date with our coverage.

You can also support the Kyiv Independent by finding us on our Patreon, to get behind the scenes coverage. Go to patreon.com/kyivindependent to continue helping us report on the most important stories coming out of Ukraine.

Jakub: And please also subscribe and rate Power Lines in your podcast app, as it really helps others find our show.

Anastasiia: Power Lines is a partnership between The Kyiv Independent and Message Heard. It was produced by Bea Duncan, Harry Stott, and Talia Augustidis. The executive producer is Sandra Ferrari. The theme music is by Tom Biddle and Alfie Godfrey.

Bonus Episode 2

Power Lines Season 1 Episode 2 Bonus

[Music playing 00:00:00]

Jakub: Hello Power Lines subscribers. Welcome to your bonus episode of Power Lines: From Ukraine to the World. 

Anastasiia: My name is Anastasiia Lapatina. 

Jakub: And I’m Jakub Parusinski. 

Anastasiia: For this week's bonus episode we wanted to give you an extended version of last week’s interview with Ukrainian historian and writer Olesya Khromeychuk. 

Jakub: We wanted to start our series by exploring Ukraine’s history as a background and foundation. 

Olesya’s interview provided a great view on how Ukraine was shaped, from it’s long period of statelessness, during which the country continued to develop despite the fact that it didn’t have formal borders, to the role that various people from the cultural space and intellectuals and writers played in forging the modern nation of Ukraine. 

Anastasiia: I loved interviewing Olesya because that idea of statelessness that you mentioned, Jakub, is something I never thought before. This idea that statelessness can actually be a strength and not a weakness and that’s something that Olesya brought up, so that was fascinating. 

And for those who don’t know who she is, Olesya is an academic who grew up in Lviv, that’s in Western Ukraine. And has taught the history of East Central Europe at various top universities, including the University of Cambridge and University College London. 

But she has done so much outside of teaching too, of course, she’s currently the director of the Ukrainian institute in London. She’s also been involved in Ukrainian language theatre adaptations, and recently published a fascinating and honestly heartbreaking memoir: The Death of a Soldier Told by his Sister, which came out in September this year.  

In this extended interview, you’ll hear us go deeper into topics like the Cossack myth, the various repressions Ukraine faced under the Soviet Union, and the elements of nationalism that have long fed into Ukrainian culture. 

[Music playing 00:01:45]

[Foreign language 00:02:01]

Anastasiia: Okay now that we’ve asserted our Ukrainianness we can continue doing this in English. 

So, the goal of this episode is to just go through some basic Ukrainian history because the majority of out audience is English speaking from the West and knows very little about Ukraine, which is very understandable. 

So, I wanted to begin with a belief that I’ve encountered a lot when I’ve spoke to people in europe, people in the US, it’s that idea thatbefore 1991, when the Soviet Union collapsed, Ukraine wasn't really a thing. 

No one saw Ukraine as this distinctive state that has actually been trying to assert itself for centuries and decades before that. Is that true?

Olesya: I think if it’s a yes or no answer you know what my answer will be: no it’s not true for sure. But I’d like to start with something slightly different and that’s another misconception that is related to this, which I think we should tackle before we even go to the history side of things. 

And that’s this idea that nations with long traditions of statehood should be taken more seriously than so called “ahistoric” nations. We are used to the fact that somehow statelessness is perceived as weakness. Now I would like to disagree with that, especially in relation to Ukraine. 

It is precisely the lack of statehood, the fact that historically, Ukrainians have lacked statehood and fought for it so much, and the imperialist repression that shaped Ukrainians into the nation that they are today. Into defiant nation, defiant in the face of repressive occupation from the outside, from the occupiers or the imperial centers.

But also, defiant in the face of authoritarian tendencies that might emerge inside the country as well. The nation that is resilient, that knows how to self-organise, and also, the nation that can be united, that comes together, regardless of its differences because they know that they only have themselves to count on.

We should accept the fact that statelessness for Ukrainians is actually a strength, it’s something that shaped us into what we are. 

I mean we could go as far back as we want. We could go back to the fifth century or so when the first mention of the ancestors of Ukrainians, appears.

But I would urge us, when we think of Rus here, of course, we should embrace it as part of our heritage, but we should also remember that we are talking about a polity that is entirely different from a modern nation. And we should resist the temptation of applying modern ideas of national identity to those people of Rus. I'm not sure if it's helpful to read history backwards.

If we talk about the meaning of historical periods then of course the period of Cossacks is very important, especially the mythology around the Cossacks, is very important for Ukrainian understanding of statehood, the traditions of electing your leadership, as opposed to always obeying the Tsar that is imposed on you. The idea of freedoms and rights and so on, that mythology is extremely powerful in the shaping of Ukrainian identity. 

Anastasiia: Could you talk a bit more about who they were and what they were doing in these lands?

Olesya: The really nice way that I heard the Cossacks referred to was by Rory Finnin, he refers to the Cossacks as Ukrainian cowboys. The sort of, in charge of these frontiers, the wild runaway peasants, runaway serfs, in pursuit of freedom.

But also frontiersmen, feared by imperial centres, both the Russians and Poles tried to subjugate them, tried to control them, tried to create alliances with them and so on. 

Of course they are very romanticised in Ukrainian mythology, and that’s not always very helpful. 

But going back to your question, another important thing to mention in terms of this idea of statelessness is something that shapes us is the period when Ukrainians begin to become aware of themselves as Ukrainians. And that's already the 19th century.

And here this idea of national awakening, is developed not by politicians because there isn't a Ukrainian state. But by intellectuals, it’s developed by writers, by poets, by authors. 

I don’t know what it was like in your household but definitely in my household and every household I went to as a child, there were three portraits there: Taras Shevchenko, Ivan Franko and Lesya Ukrainka. And if you think back to the Maidan, those were the three prominent portraits adapted to revolutionary symbols. 

And that’s not surprising. That poets, writers, become those who shape imagination of Ukrainian nation. And then the next generation, based on this imagination, is able to will the nation into being. 

Anastasiia: Which is why it’s so tragic that every time there were waves of repressions, a huge part of the repressed were the writers and the artists and those people who were imagining Ukraine to become what it is. 

Olesya: Because they are the powerful ones. The words create an idea that people hold onto and then shape into political manifestos.

And that's the next stage, the stage when the empires collapse, the stage of what is known in Ukrainian history as Ukrainian Revolution.

Now, that expression is not necessarily something that people in the West are familiar with. And the period between 1917 and 1921 is known in the West, usually as the Russian civil wars.

But of course, things happened outside of Russia too. And a lot happened in Ukraine in that period. State building projects were competing against one another, and they were so diverse, from monarchy to anarchy.

That was the period of Ukrainian Revolution. This was the period of intense state building. Ukrainian People's Republic known by its Ukrainian acronym UNR, emerged in this period. It was short-lived. It didn't last very long.

Anastasiia: And why was that?

Olesya: For very complicated reasons. And one of the reasons I would suggest is, we sometimes think of it, I think unfairly as a failed state. Now, we need to ask ourselves what those leaders were hoping to achieve. Did they fail in our objectives? Perhaps not.

But one of the reasons I think why it didn't last very long is because as is so often the case in Ukrainian history, the territory of Ukraine was perceived as a buffer zone. It was perceived as a buffer zone. And I think Ukrainian state building aspirations was sacrificed to the support of a stronger Poland at the time.

So, the buffer zone between The Red Threat of the Bolsheviks and Europe proper. Europe proper began with Poland essentially. So, that's one of the reasons.

But what I was trying to say was, what it did achieve, The Ukrainian People’s Republic, is I think it achieved an irreversible process. The process where Ukrainians understood that western and eastern lands of Ukraine can be united into one state, and they can perceive themselves as citizens of that state. And that they are very distinct from Russia and from other neighbours as well. That they have their own separate political identity.

And that is something I think that is in place very much today. And eventually, the Bolsheviks defeated the UNR, the Ukrainian People's Republic. But they still had to understand, they had to realise that autonomy is extremely important for Ukrainians. And they had to grant it, and they granted it in the shape of Ukrainian Socialist Republic.

So, Ukraine and Ukrainians did not appear in 1991. 

Anastasiia: It wasn’t created by Lenin, or by Russia, or… 

Olesya: Lenin had to recognise that it existed, and that's why the Ukrainian SSR had to come into existence as well. 

And also, in 1991, I think something else that I think people don't quite realise is that 92% of Ukrainian population supported the Declaration of Independence in the national referendum, 92%, even in Crimea. And 84% of the electorate took part in the vote. And that’s 32 million people. And a week later, the Soviet Union collapsed.

So, you know, it’s obvious that the will of the people to be independent, to no longer stay in this forced union of republics was very clear at that time. 

And I think it's really unsurprising that Putin has spoken about the collapse of the Soviet Union as the greatest tragedy of the 20th century, not the Second World War, which he does like to discuss a lot about, not the Holocaust, but specifically the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Because that was the time when these republics and these nations drifted away from the Imperial Centre, and that was the time when it became absolutely obvious that the power of that imperial centre, of the leadership, collapsed. It was no longer relevant. 

Anastasiia: Another thing that I've encountered while discussing Ukraine with people, and you don’t even need to start these conversions you just hear them on a daily basis, is this idea that Ukraine and Russia are “brotherly nations”. And that this war is like “a messy divorce”. 

I've heard that from academics in the West. You see this all the time. And Ukrainians every single day scream their lungs out, explaining why that's not right. And of course very often we’re just dismissed because we are biased and emotional. 

But, now that we have this completely safe Ukrainian space to discuss this, let's explain to people why exactly we're screaming our lungs out when people say that. What’s wrong with that statement? Why are we not “brotherly nations”?

Olesya: Okay. Let's begin with being emotional because there's absolutely nothing wrong with being emotional when we discuss Russia's war in Ukraine, which is extremely brutal and causing so much pain, devastation, and death.

I think it's odd not to be emotional when we talk about these things. It has been something that I noticed and my colleagues noticed as well. When the Ukrainian voice, whether that's someone who's an expert on Ukraine or you know, a displaced Ukrainian or someone in the military is invited, they are expected to be emotional, and not expected to be rational. 

And their voices are followed by an “objective”, and I'm here pointing to inverted commas, “objective”, non-Ukrainian specialist. Let's just accept the fact that being emotional is absolutely understandable and natural and indeed perfectly normal in this situation.

Now coming back to your question of “brotherly nations”, I don't like family analogies, not least because they tend to be gendered. So, if you look at this messy divorce, who's the wife? My work on gender in wartime really helped me understand a lot of dynamics that are happening.

If we have to use an analogy, I think I would use an analogy of an unruly neighbour that bursts into your house, uninvited, takes your possessions, destroys some of them, threatens your life, and then says that he does all of this out of love. That’s probably a closer analogy.

The portrayal of Russians and Ukrainians as brotherly nations was popularised in the USSR, because the Soviet leadership had to accept the existence of Ukrainians as a separate nation. They could no longer do what the imperialist Russia did, sort of portraying so-called “little Russians” as just another tribe.

They had to accept that they were a separate nation with very separate identity. But at the same time, they tried to manage, control, restrict state building aspirations. They could only go that far.In allowing this expression of separate identity. 

And one way to do that was to present Ukrainians as younger brothers. And of course, what do you have to do with a younger brother? You have to educate him, you have to subjugate them, and you have to manage and control him.

But really, I think the purpose of that claim is really to suggest that we're, somehow, one nation.

And I have heard so many well-meaning journalists over the past six months, ask me, “So, tell me, what is the difference between Russians and Ukrainians?”

I struggle to answer that question in the same way as I would struggle to answer a question if someone asked me, “Tell me what's the difference between France and Germany?”

And more so than say Canada in the US or Scotland and England, because at least the latter, they have a shared language, whereas Ukraine has a different language and when Russians say, “Wow, it's just a variation of the Russian language”- 

Anastasiia: That's not true. 

Olesya: Well, switch to Ukrainian and speak to them in Ukrainian and see if they understand.

I think what I'm trying to emphasise here is that, of course, Ukrainians share cultural traits with Russians, with Poles, with Belarusians, with all of their neighbours. And that's what happens in every country. You have a lot of things in common with your neighbours.

But the crucial thing for Ukraine is that it's always been inherently multilingual and multi-ethnic. And even though Stalin deported the Poles and the Crimean Tatars, vast Jewish population essentially perished in the Shoah during the Second World War.

Ukraine continues to be very diverse, and it continues to be very proud of its diversity. And the Russian government has put a lot of effort into presenting this diversity as division.

And sadly, the international media has picked up on this, adopted this sort of myth of seeing Ukraine as divided rather than diverse, but they've been proved very wrong since the 24th of February. Ukrainians, Tatars, Roma, Greeks, Russians being led by a president of Jewish origin, putting up really fierce resistance. In defence of their civic nation, civic political nation. 

In defence of their right to speak freely in any language that they wish to speak in. And we see that civic patriotism really flourishing at the moment, I think. In the last six months of full scale invasion, people of all nationalities, political affiliations, social backgrounds, they all come together to defend statehood because statehood means protection of rights.

And if you fight to protect your fellow citizens rights, You know that you're also fighting to protect your own rights. 

I also think that what Ukrainians are doing at the moment, essentially making the world reconsider the meaning of nationalism. And it's not surprising that we’re used to thinking about it in very negative terms because the 20th century has presented us with examples of nationalism that were very harmful.

But what we’re seeing now is not nationalism based on ethnic affiliation. It is an appreciation of a civic political nation, and that's one of the lessons I think the world can learn from Ukraine.  

Anastasiia: I would often say that we need a new definition. We need to redefine what nationalism is in this sort of context, because I think it's a completely different phenomenon and it's more of a matter of survival.

Olesya: It'll help us to think differently about what political nation is versus nation based on ideas of shared blood.

Anastasiia: Let's talk a bit more about the repressions that Ukraine has had during the Soviet time. That's probably my favourite part of our history paradoxically, because despite all of these various waves that we have and keep having, we still always persevered.

I even have a tattoo devoted to it. I have a tattoo of the letter Ї. And I got it because I had a period of my time when I was obsessed with the topic of Samvydav. And I remember reading about it and there was this story, this anecdote, that because of course there were no Ukrainian typewriters, our Samvydav authors had to use 1 instead of Ї because there was no other way to write.

And that just seemed so annoying to me. I was like, “This fricking letter, didn't get spotlights.”

Olesya: I know this is no comparison, but I get annoyed daily when Microsoft Word changes or underlines all my text in Ukrainian because it thinks it's Russian. 

Anastasiia: Yeah. Yeah. If you Kyiv or Odessa or any other, or Dnipro, that's gonna try to change it into the Russian spelling. 

Olesya: Actually mine doesn't change it anymore, so there you go. It’s learned something. 

Anastasiia: Yeah. Yeah. But anyway, this was all a lead up to us discussing Holodomor, and then the deportation of Tatars and all of those, really traumatic experiences we've had during the Soviet era.

Olesya: Yeah. I mean, it's really sad that these episodes of trauma that have been so vital for Ukrainians are so poorly understood in the West. 

I mean there’s better and better awareness now. And I think that relates to the fact that Ukrainian voices have not been, not just listened to, but have not been taken seriously.

They've often been so much quieter than the voices coming out of Moscow. And that's not because they haven't tried to be louder, but I think it's also about those who listened, who do we listen to?

Why was it during the Maidan protests that I so often, and at least at the beginning, encountered reporters reporting from Moscow about what's happening in Kyiv and not from Kyiv? And the same was true in the early months, if not years, of Russia's aggression in Donbas.

So, it's this idea of not hearing the stories that come out of Ukraine and not giving them a platform, not trusting Ukrainians with their knowledge of history.

And I have taught the history of East Central Europe and usually, the USSR, for the last 10 years or so in different British universities. I taught two modules on Ukraine. And in both cases, they were in universities that already had provisions for the study of Ukraine.

Otherwise, Ukraine just falls between the cracks. It's not studied when you study Russian history, it's not studied when you study East European history, it's sort of invisible. And for that reason, we don't know about the Holodomor. People around the world, simply don't know what it was. They don't know that millions were killed in man-made famine by Stalin in the 1930s. 

Of course, the same applies to the horrendous deportations of the Crimean Tartars. Very few people, I think, realise that not only were they brutally deported, accused, of one mass collaboration during the Second World War, but they were also not allowed to return to their homeland until the late eighties, early nineties. 

For so long they were not even able to move back. And when they did move back, it was a struggle to stay. 

And of course, after 2014, the same thing started again. They were being targeted by the new occupying authorities. And that's why it's so important to amplify their voices and to speak about these issues and I’m very grateful that you’re doing that. Precisely that. 

Anastasiia: Okay, well, let's talk about a charged topic, which is the topic of language. I grew up in a Russian-speaking family. We're all from Kherson, from the south.

Very few people spoke Ukrainian around me. My distinct memory is being in school in Kyiv, it was a Ukrainian school. That's how I learned Ukrainian. 

Everyone was by default Russian-speaking. And then there was this one girl who only spoke Ukrainian, and everybody knew who she was, because she did.

Now that I think about it, that’s ridiculous. Because this was already during the Maidan time (when Maidan happened, I was a baby, I was like 11 or 12). So, this was during Maidan, and it was still so bad. So, what's behind this kind of peculiar situation we have with language? Why is it the thing that we constantly talk about, constantly fight about? Why?

Olesya: You told me your story, and I'll tell you mine.

I come from Lviv, totally Ukrainian speaking family, and a completely Ukrainian-speaking region. And I went to school in 1991, so I wasn't a baby during the Maidan. Now I'm showing my age.

But in 1991, Ukraine was already independent. And actually, Russian wasn't even taught in my school anymore. 

But I grew up bilingual, because I was surrounded by Russian absolutely everywhere. Russian is widely spoken in Ukraine, all ofUkraine, because of the systematic russification of the population of Ukraine. And this russification happened in the Russian Empire and it continued in the USSR.

It was handled differently: in the Russian Empire, you had laws banning Ukrainian language publications in order to prevent the development of literary life. 

In the USSR, it was done differently, speaking Ukrainian would diminish your career prospects, and for that reason, it’s really not surprising that a lot of people chose to switch to Russian, at least at work, at least professionally, in order to improve their career choices.

And so, Ukrainian language and not Russian language has been threatened historically. 

This started to change, with the Maidan Revolution and onwards, because the Ukrainian state also started to invest more into the development of Ukrainian language: textbooks, books, translations. But also, music, entertainment, dubbing blockbusters into Ukrainian, and not just buying the Russian versions instead.

But as is often the case with Russia, this sort of flourishing of Ukrainian language products has been weaponized by misinformation campaigns. And so rather than acknowledging the damage that's been done to the Ukrainian language by imperialist policies, be it the Russian Empire or the Soviet Union, the Russian leadership started to talk about Russian language being threatened in Ukraine.

Of course, I think it's very important to point out that Russian speakers find it difficult to speak Russian in Russia, not in Ukraine. That's where expression is threatened. Full stop. 

Since we're discussing misconceptions, Russophone speakers are so often assumed to be Russians. And I think that's one of the major misconceptions and something that the Kremlin, I think has tried its very worst to popularise as well.

But as all of these myths propagated by the Kremlin, this one backfired as well. And it backfired when the so-called “Russian world” arrived into russophone cities by shelling civilians, predominantly russophone civilians. Kharkiv, that is predominantly Russian speaking, that has been shelled every single day since the start of full-scale invasion.

So a campaign that pretends to liberate Russian speakers, backfired big time. And for me, the most symbolic moment of that is the Ukrainian soldiers telling the Russian warship where to go, in Russian. 

And I also really appreciated that now, you know that phrase that has become the kind of ubiquitous slogan of Ukrainian defiance, is spelled in Ukrainian, Ukrainian transliteration.

So it's of just a wonderful, typical Ukrainian moment when things merge and conflate and become their own. 

Anastasiia: You said that the campaign backfired. It just also showed the real truth of what it was, and the truth was that this was never about language. 

Olesya: Absolutely. Of course, it revealed more of the lies that were being spread by the Kremlin and this full-scale invasion. 

This misunderstanding of Ukraine as a multilingual nation deprives it of agency, I think, around the world. It's really important for us to keep explaining to people that multilingualism, bilingualism, is a resource that we celebrate and that we use very effectively.

And it's particularly important to explain it to nations that are monolingual.

But we need to keep explaining that. And we need to keep explaining that russophone Ukrainians are not Russians, just as Scotts, Canadians, Australians and other English-speaking nations are not English. And if you said that they were… Oof. I think you’d upset a lot of people. So, yeah, we just have to ensure that Russia stops weaponizing our multilingualism.

Anastasiia: There are some Ukrainians who say this kind of wave of Ukrainianisation that we're going through, that it's kind of, not necessarily fake, but that it's like almost too much because, “Why should we care that much? It's the Kremlin who wants us to care, but we actually should just not care to be defiant” and that, “There's so many Russian speaking soldiers who are dying for this country”. 

And I remember seeing one discussion in which the person who disagreed with that said, “If you are lying in a trench, and someone from the outside addresses you in Russian versus in Ukrainian, your reaction is gonna be extremely different.

So when you are there and when you're fighting, it’s literally one of your defence mechanisms, is surrounding yourself with your language. 

Olesya: Yeah. And also we've seen these memes and jokes about words that are extremely difficult for Russian, Russian speakers to pronounce. And that's one way to weed out potential saboteurs, using our multilingualism to our advantage.

But as a Ukrainian speaker, I don't dare tell russophone Ukrainians what language they should choose. It's up to them to choose the language, and I truly believe that more and more people will choose Ukrainian from now on. 

Anastasiia: And they are, and many of them are doing that out of their own initiative, and that's fantastic.

So, we just celebrated our Independence Day, but it really feels to me like all of these celebrations are just another milestone in this long road to achieving independence because it feels like we aren't truly independent.

It's so, so sad that we've had thousands and thousands of our ancestors die fighting for us to get it. And here we are a hundred years later, still doing the same freaking thing.

Olesya: Yeah. There’s this idea that somehow, we got it easy in 1991. That we didn't have to fight for it in 1991, therefore, we had to fight for it since, and especially now.

I don't agree with that. I don't think it was achieved easily because I think that would be insulting to all those people who did spend decades, if not centuries, fighting for Ukrainian statehood in lots of different ways, from hunger strikes and protests, and being thrown in jail, to singing carols in Ukrainian at Christmas time in secret and passing on that identity to the next generation.

And also the role of the diaspora is so huge. I mean, they continued to pressurise the governments when the Soviet Union was still around, you know, to recognize the abuses of power and mistreatment of the population and the recognition of Ukraine.

Anastasiia: And there was also another revolution before we gained our independence, which I wanted to talk about because even people in Ukraine, not a lot of them know.

Olesya: Exactly the Revolution on Granite you're probably referring to. So, the 1990s, student protests, hunger strikes, but also even episodes that are even less known, such as minor strikes in the nineties and localised demonstrations. 

Essentially Ukrainians are very good at making their voices heard. We’re pretty patient, but when our patience is tested we take to the streets and we stand for our rights. 

But when you say, “We’re just fighting for the same thing again”, I think we have achieved independence. It’s there. And you and your generation are the best proof of that. 

We have this generation of Ukrainians that do not remember firsthand, do not have experience of the Soviet Union. They don't have the habit of keeping their heads down. It’s not part of their nature. They’re free citizens, they're free citizens of a free state. And we see that really prominently now. 

Every time I come back I’m a bit of an outsider, so I can see the changes probably a bit more than people who are inside the country. And these tendencies are getting stronger and stronger, I think all the time, especially now, because the price that we're paying for this freedom is extraordinarily high.

[Music playing 00:28:09]

Jakub: Thank you for subscribing to Power Lines. Your support helps us make this show possible, so we really appreciate it. 

Anastasiia: Power lines is a partnership between the Kyiv Independent and Message Heard. It was produced by Bea Duncan, Harry Stott and Talia Augustidis. The executive producer is Sandra Ferrari. The theme music is by Tom Biddle and Alfie Godfrey. 

Season 1 Episode 2

Speakers: Anastasiia Lapatina & Alyona Zhuk & Jakub Parusinski & Olesya Khromeychuk

[Music playing 00:00:00]

Anastasiia: First of all, I'm really glad you're here just because I love your daughter and so do all your followers.

Alyona: Thank you. Yeah, she's very popular now.

Anastasiia: She is.

Alyona: She sometimes feels even more popular than myself, so-

Anastasiia: Alyona Zhuk, is an evacuated Ukrainian tattoo artist and illustrator, currently living in Berlin. She's also a mother to an eight-year-old girl, Alisa.

Alyona: I live in Kyiv normally, but since the war started, I had to move out with my daughter and with my dog and my cat. And we eventually, came to Germany and now, we are staying in Berlin. And plan to stay here for some time until it's safe to bring my daughter back home.

Anastasiia: A few weeks ago, Alyona overheard Alisa explaining the war in Ukraine to her friend and hit record.

Alisa: [Foreign Language 00:00:54].

Anastasiia: That little video that you posted, can you just give us some context of what that was about? She was sitting in the kitchen with her friend, who's the friend? What were they talking about before that?

Alyona: Well, it's the daughter of my friend. She is Alisa's age, and they are also evacuated to Berlin. I think someone sent (to some channel that one of them is following) a picture, like a joke of Putin and that he is killed or something.

So, it was kind of a drawing and they started talking about whether it's funny to make jokes about death of people, even if it's Putin. Alisa's friend said that Putin is at fault, like that he is the one responsible for what's happening in Ukraine.

And Alisa said, “No, it's not him, himself.” And she started explaining that it was not Putin who was killing all Ukrainian soldiers, and that it's the nation who was ignoring what was happening in Russia for years. That they had a chance to do something about it actually, and to not allow Putin to start whatever is happening now.

Anastasiia: And how does she know that? Did you explain this to her? Did you guys have conversations about what's happening?

Alyona: Yeah, a lot. She's asking a lot of questions and for her, it's still not very clear why we are here and why we're not at home. She misses the home very much. She doesn't know what we are talking about when we're saying war, because she's not familiar with death even.

So, she's trying to cover it with some simpler parts of understanding. And I'm trying to explain to her as easy and understandable as I can, because I understand that it's very important for her to build this world around her and to understand it.

Anastasiia: You mentioned when we were talking a bit before the interview, that you're going to kind of start like teaching her Ukrainian history.

Alyona: History is very weak spot for me, actually, unluckily. And I'm very frustrated about it. That's my plan actually, that I will start reading a lot of it. And so, when she grows, we can talk more about the history and make her realize how important history actually is.

That it's not about numbers, it's not about names, but it's about who we are and how we came to the point where we are and what should we do next.

Anastasiia: This week's episode is all about the history of Ukraine. And one thing that this war has done is really bring that history and the struggles that have come before to the forefront of the minds of many Ukrainians.

The parallels between our past and our present are stark, and like Alyona, we really need to understand our own history, so we can continue to pass it down. Because this war is just another chapter, one that we’ll be telling our children about in the decades to come.

Alyona: The generation of our kids, they will be the ones who will be changing and building our country. They can only do that if they know again, what happened before and who we are actually; what are our past?

And also, since now we are in Germany and I don't know when we will go home, so I very much want for her to understand and remember who she is and who we are and what we stand for, and why it's so important for us to go to the demonstrations that we go to, why it's so important to respect our blue and yellow flag.

[Music playing 00:04:41]

Jakub: From Message Heard and the Kyiv Independent, you're listening to Power Lines: From Ukraine to the World.

Anastasiia: In this series, we're going to be mapping the undercurrents and global consequences of the war in Ukraine, beginning in Kyiv and following the roads out wherever they may lead. I am Anastasiia Lapatina.

Jakub: And I'm Jakub Parusinski. In today's episode, we're talking about the history of Ukraine, to really put everything we'll be covering throughout the series into context.

Anastasiia: I'm actually, extremely, excited for the topic of this episode, because unfortunately, and maybe a bit surprisingly, Ukrainian history is not my strongest suit, because I left Ukraine when I was young. I was 15 when I went to Canada. So, all of the main school Ukrainian history content I've missed. Of course, I've been picking up on it, on my own independently, doing my duty as a Ukrainian citizen.

But I know that Jakub, you actually know a lot of history. I remember when people would describe you to me before we've ever met, that was actually one of the things they mentioned.

Jakub: I think Ukrainian history is really interesting. There's a lot to learn not just about Ukraine, but I think it also has played a pivotal role in actually the development of the surrounding empires, but also Europe itself. And it's very important to understanding the current war.

So, I think what might be helpful for our listeners, especially the ones who aren't versed in East European history, is just to do a quick recap of sort of the thousand years that led to the current day.

Around basically the year 879, we have a kingdom that appears called Kyivan Rus, which grows and takes up a big chunk of Eastern Europe, eventually becoming the biggest country in the whole of Europe, in the whole region.

It encompasses modern day Russia, a big chunk of Poland, a big chunk of Belarus, and is the, I would say, preeminent Orthodox kingdom in Eastern Europe.

Then in 1240, everything comes to an end with the Mongol invasion, which ends up wiping out the kingdom, as well as a big chunk of the population living on those lands. And so, we have this sparsely populated territory at the heart of sort of the East European field, and then comes the era of empires.

So, essentially, you have the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth to the west, the sort of principality of Moscow growing towards the northeast, and you have the Austro-Hungarians in the South, and then the Ottoman Empire across the Black Sea.

And throughout the next, broadly six to seven centuries, all of these empires expand, by taking up bits and pieces of what was once Kyivan Rus.

One of the things that has been repeated throughout the start of the war, in fact, it has been used by Russians almost as a justification, is that Ukraine isn't a real country. It's a young country, doesn't have any history. Ukrainians have refuted that, “No, hey, hey, hey, come on. We've actually been around for over a thousand years.”

But actually, in between that period, there's been this sort of huge expanse of statelessness, when in fact, Ukraine did not exist as a country on the map.

Anastasiia: I guess it just depends on what it is that you're looking for and what are you trying to pinpoint? Are you looking for a Ukrainian state? Because then, yeah, we may have a problem, because nation states originated definitely not a thousand years ago.

But if you're looking for some sort of distinctiveness of our group, or if you're trying to pinpoint the root of certain traditions, those are definitely there. And those are the ones that are way older than Moscow, for example.

Jakub: This is exactly it. On the one hand, yes, you can make the case that there wasn't a Ukrainian state, a Ukrainian country, which was a problem. It's not like not having a state-

Anastasiia: Is a good thing.

Jakub: Yeah, no, it doesn't make things easier, it doesn't make it easy to develop institutions, culture. I think what is resilient and what is important about Ukraine is that it has actually flourished throughout this period of statelessness, or at least persisted.

[Music playing 00:09:00]

Anastasiia: So, for this episode, I spoke with Ukrainian historian and writer; Olesya Khromeychuk.

Olesya: [Foreign Language 00:09:12]

Anastasiia: Olesya has taught the history of East Central Europe in a number of highly respected institutions, including the University of Cambridge and University College London.

She's currently the Director of the Ukrainian Institute in London. And is also the author of multiple books, including The Death of a Soldier Told by His Sister, which was published in September, this year.

When I wanted her to trace back our Ukrainian roots to history, she mentioned how in fact, Ukraine has had to deal with statelessness for so long, and she sees it in fact as our strength.

[Music playing 00:09:51]

So, I wanted to begin with a belief that I've encountered a lot when I spoke to people in Europe, people in the U.S. It's that idea that before 1991, when the Soviet Union collapsed, Ukraine wasn't really a thing. No one saw Ukraine as this distinctive state that has actually been trying to assert itself for centuries and decades before that. Is that true?

Olesya: It is precisely the lack of statehood, the fact that historically, Ukrainians have lacked statehood and fought for it so much, and the imperialist repression that shaped Ukrainians into the nation that they are today. Into defiant nation, defiant in the face of repressive occupation from the outside, from the occupiers or the imperial centers.

But also, defiant in the face of authoritarian tendencies that might emerge inside the country as well. The nation that is resilient, that knows how to self-organize, and also, the nation that can be united, that comes together, regardless of its differences because they know that they only have themselves to count on.

We should accept the fact that statelessness for Ukrainians is actually a strength, is something that shaped us into what we are. We could go back to the fifth century or so when the first mention of the ancestors of Ukrainians, appears.

But I would urge us, when we think of Rus here, I'm speaking about Kyivan Rus, of course, when we speak of this heritage, of course, we should embrace it as part of our heritage.

But we should also remember that we are talking about a polity that is entirely different from a modern nation. And we should resist the temptation of applying modern ideas of national identity to those people of Rus. I'm not sure if it's helpful to read history backwards.

Another important thing to mention in terms of this idea of statelessness is something that shapes us is the period when Ukrainians begin to become aware of themselves as Ukrainians. And that's already the 19th century.

And here this idea of national awakening or national awareness, I suppose, would be a more appropriate term here, is developed not by politicians because there isn't a Ukrainian state. But by intellectuals, it’s developed by writers, by poets, by authors and so on.

[Music playing 00:12:05]

Anastasiia: So, one of the things that came to mind when I was listening to Olesya talk about statelessness, I just generally thought about our civil society and the amazing work that they do, despite all of the hurdles that are in their way, like corruption, the lack of understanding or education, in certain areas, if we're talking about certain progressive issues.

But our Ukrainian civil society has done such incredible work in so many areas, despite all of these hurdles and sort of very often despite a lack of either trust towards the government or help from the government.

And that very much resonated with me when I was listening to Olesya, discussing how the lack of a government and the lack of a strong head is actually in a way our strength because we learned to adapt.

Jakub: Ukraine has this very powerful civil society, and it's been built up over the centuries. As you mentioned, there were lots of intellectuals, cultural workers, and things like that, that were part of this national renaissance.

And at the same time, while there were a lot of uprisings, I think the continual work of the civic society is something that held Ukraine together, even as the nation was split between competing empires.

But there is a downside to that. When your society is built like that, not over decades, but over centuries, you become very good at tearing things down. And I think Ukrainians became experts at bringing systems down, but it becomes much more difficult to build something.

And for me, that's been the blessing and the curse, is that Ukraine has been continuously able to throw off the yolk of foreign domination, of foreign empires that tried to submit the country to their will, but it's struggled to build something in its place.

Anastasiia: That's not a uniquely Ukrainian problem too. We see it in other places. Of course, it's much easier to destroy something than to build something new.

Jakub: What's really clear now and how it contrasts to the past is that there's sort of this growing consensus of, “We need to build a modern country. We need to sort of root out corruption, we need to build functional institutions”.

But that's something that wasn't present there a hundred years ago. But yeah, I think now what is really different is that we have this amazing consensus, although it's taken three revolutions to get here.

[Music playing 00:14:38]

Anastasiia: And a war.

Jakub: And a war.

Olesya: And that's the next stage that I think is important to think about. And that's the stage when the empires collapse, the stage of what is known in Ukrainian history as Ukrainian Revolution.

Now, that expression is not necessarily something that people in the west are familiar with. And the period between 1917 and 1921 is known in the West, usually as the Russian civil wars.

But of course, things happened outside of Russia too. And a lot happened in Ukraine in that period. State building projects were competing against one another, and they were so diverse, from monarchy to anarchy.

That was the period of Ukrainian Revolution. This was the period of intense state building. Ukrainian People's Republic known by its Ukrainian acronym UNR, emerged in this period. It was short-lived. It didn't last very long.

Anastasiia: And why was that?

Olesya: For very complicated reasons. And one of the reasons I would suggest is, we sometimes think of it, I think unfairly as a failed state. Now, we need to ask ourselves what those leaders were hoping to achieve. Did they fail in our objectives? Perhaps not.

But one of the reasons I think why it didn't last very long is because as is so often the case in Ukrainian history, the territory of Ukraine was perceived as a buffer zone. It was perceived as a buffer zone. And I think Ukrainian state building aspirations was sacrificed to the support of a stronger Poland at the time.

So, the buffer zone between The Red Threat of the Bolsheviks and Europe proper. Europe proper began with Poland essentially. So, that's one of the reasons.

But what it did achieve, is I think it achieved an irreversible process. The process where Ukrainians understood that western and eastern lands of Ukraine can be united into one state, and they can perceive themselves as citizens of that state. And that they are very distinct from Russia and from other neighbors as well. That they have their own separate political identity.

And that is something I think that is in place very much today. And eventually, the Bolsheviks defeated the UNR, the Ukrainian People's Republic. But they still had to understand, they had to realize that autonomy is extremely important for Ukrainians. And they had to grant it, and they granted it in the shape of Ukrainian Socialist Republic.

And also, in 1991, I think something else that I think people don't quite realize is that 92% of Ukrainian population supported the Declaration of Independence in the national referendum, 92%, even in Crimea. And 84% of the electorate took part in the vote. And that’s 32 million people. And a week later, the Soviet Union collapsed.

Anastasiia: Another thing that I've encountered while discussing Ukraine with people, is this idea that Ukraine and Russia are “brotherly nations”. And that this war is like “a messy divorce”. I've heard that by academics in the West. And Ukrainians every single day scream their lungs out, explaining why that's not right.

Now that we have this completely safe Ukrainian space to discuss this, let's explain to people why exactly we're screaming our lungs out when people say that. Why are we not “brotherly nations”?

Olesya: I don't like family analogies, not least because they tend to be gendered. So, if you look at this messy divorce, who's the wife? If we have to use an analogy, I think I would use an analogy of an unruly neighbor that bursts into your house, uninvited, takes your possessions, destroys some of them, threatens your life, and then says that he does all of this out of love.

The portrayal of Russians and Ukrainians as brotherly nations was popularized in the USSR, because the Soviet leadership had to accept the existence of Ukrainians as a separate nation. They could no longer do what the imperialist Russia did, sort of portraying so-called little Russians as just another tribe.

They had to accept that they were a separate nation with very separate identity. But at the same time, they tried to manage, control, restrict state building aspirations. They could only go that far.

And one way to do that was to present Ukrainians as younger brothers. And of course, what do you have to do with a younger brother? You have to educate him, you have to subjugate, and you have to manage and control him.

But really, I think the purpose of this, what you've encountered a lot, when people say, “Oh, but you're brotherly nations,” the purpose of that claim is usually to somehow suggest that we're one nation.

And I have heard so many well-meaning journalists over the past six months, ask me, “So, tell me, what is the difference between Russians and Ukrainians?”

I struggle to answer that question in the same way as I would struggle to answer a question if someone asked me, “Tell me what's the difference between France and Germany?”

Of course, Ukrainians share cultural traits with Russians, with Poles, with Belarusians, with all of their neighbors. And that's what happens in every country. You have a lot of things in common with your neighbors.

But the crucial thing for Ukraine is that it's always been inherently multilingual and multi-ethnic. And even though Stalin deported the Poles and the Crimean Tatars and the vast Jewish population essentially perished in the Shoah during the Second World War.

Ukraine continues to be very diverse, and it continues to be very proud of its diversity. And the Russian government has put a lot of effort into presenting this diversity as division.

[Music playing 00:20:05]

Anastasiia: I just think it's so disingenuous, is the word, for people who would discuss imperialism and colonialism with me, to then go on – and they would usually do this from a kind of western point of view, as if anti-western point of view.

Usually, those people either completely ignore or partially ignore what Russia has been doing. And those are the same people who then point out to Bolsheviks and pick up this tiny, tiny little period of Ukrainianization as if that somehow contributed to Ukraine becoming a state that it is right now.

Which I think is a huge misunderstanding of what actually happened. Because if you've ever spoken to any Ukrainian, and if you've ever read a history book by a Ukrainian author, you would know that that's not what actually happened. And these policies were never genuine to help us flourish as a nation.

Jakub: It’s very patronizing to hear people say that, “Look, your colonial benefactors essentially help the development of your culture.”

I remember back in 2014, after the invasion of Crimea, there was a very — actually, it was a quite well-produced Russian propaganda video, and I think it really summed up a lot of this ideology.

It was called Ya Russkiy Okkupant, I'm the Russian occupier. And it essentially shows this kind of, in a very sort of militaristic, alpha male kind of way, showing the Russian occupier, how he went to all these various lands in central Asia, in the Baltics, in the Caucasus, and also, in Ukraine. And there, he brought roads and scientific development; “Without us you wouldn't have built rockets or had nuclear energy.”

Anastasiia: That is such crap.

Jakub: It's the same kind of argument that you hear about, whether it's the French Empire or the Dutch or the British saying like, “Look, you know why there's canals now in Indonesia? It's because of all those Dutch settlers.”

Anastasiia: Why I'm so fascinated by this is that everything you just said makes complete sense for the majority of people of our generation and your generation. Like this is just on everybody's minds right now. Everyone constantly talks about colonialism and its effects.

But for some reason, it just does not translate to the reality of what's happening in Ukraine. People just don't see Russia as big of a threat. And it was, it absolutely was, I don't want to say worse or less bad, but it definitely was a huge imperial colonial giant that just destroyed everything on its way. And now, Russia is doing this again.

So, one of the misconceptions that I hear often in the West, I've had people tell this to my face; that Ukrainians in some way owe to the Bolsheviks the fact that we are an independent state right now.

Because during that era, the Bolsheviks have given us the opportunity to study our language, to speak our language, to have some parts of our culture, et cetera, because there was this spirit of Ukrainianization.

I know, and the absolute majority of Ukrainians know that that’s in fact, not the full story. So, Jakub, do you want to give us a bit of an overview of what the reality of life under the Bolsheviks was actually like?

Jakub: So, it's true that in the 1920s there was this policy of Korenizatsiya, which can be translated as putting down roots or nativization during which the center, Moscow essentially, tried to get the other Soviet Republics to embrace their local languages, some local customs and things like that. And that was essentially a way to sell the Soviet Revolution to nations that hadn't necessarily taken part with it.

I think this is disingenuous for two reasons. One is that the Korenizatsiya policy was a way to get the inteligencia in all of these countries to essentially lift up their heads. So, a lot of people started writing in the local languages, producing plays, speaking, publishing. And that was a great way to understand who were the leaders of these nations, who were the cultural leaders of these nations.

Then, in the 1930s, what you have is you essentially round up all the people who have showed themselves to be civic leaders, and they were almost unanimously executed, or at best case, sent to various Gulag and concentration camps.

Anastasiia: Or were repressed so badly that they just killed themselves, because they could no longer handle it.

Jakub: Absolutely. And so, you then have a reversal to russification. And this was especially painful in Ukraine, where you had a whole generation.

For the first time in many centuries, essentially, Ukrainian culture flourishes. And then all of them are rounded up in what is called the renaissance executed by bullets, where basically, all the big writers, the poets and the playwrights are executed by the Stalinist regime.

This policy is also followed in the case of Ukraine by the Holodomor, which is the purposeful destruction of the Ukrainian nation via famine. It's starting in 1932.

[Music playing 00:25:38]

Olesya: It's really sad that these episodes of trauma that have been so vital for Ukrainians are so poorly understood in the West. And I think that relates to the fact that Ukrainian voices have not been, not just listened to, but have not been taken seriously.

They've often been so much quieter than the voices coming out of Moscow. And that's not because they haven't tried to be louder, but I think it's also about those who listened, who do we listen to?

Why was it during the Maidan protests that I so often, and at least at the beginning, encountered reporters reporting from Moscow about what's happening in Kyiv and not from Kyiv? And the same was true in the early months, if not years, of Russia's aggression in Donbas.

So, it's this idea of not hearing the stories that come out of Ukraine and not giving them platform, not trusting Ukrainians with their knowledge of history.

And I have taught the history of East Central Europe and usually, the USSR, for the last 10 years or so in different British universities. I taught two modules on Ukraine over this period of time. Two, and in both cases, they were in universities that already had provisions for the study of Ukraine.

Otherwise, Ukraine just falls between the cracks. It's not studied when you study Russian history, it's not studied when you study East European history, it's sort of invisible. And for that reason, we don't know about Holodomor. People around the world, apart from those who are in the diaspora who have been talking about the Holodomor a lot, simply don't know what it was.

They don't know that millions were killed in man-made famine by Stalin in the 1930s. And that at the same time, journalists such as Walter Duranty were writing for Western media and praising collectivization and Stalin’s reforms and receiving Pulitzer Prize for that.

Of course, the same applies to the horrendous deportations of the Crimean Tartars. Very few people, I think, realize that not only were they brutally deported, accused, of one mass collaboration during the Second World War, but they were also not allowed to return to the homeland until the late eighties, early nineties.

And when they did move back, it was a struggle to stay. And of course, after 2014, the same thing started again. They were being targeted by the new occupying authorities, Russian occupying authorities. And that's why it's so important to amplify their voices and to speak about these issues and I’m very grateful that you’re doing that.

Anastasiia: So, we just celebrated our Independence Day, but it really feels to me like all of these celebrations are just another milestone in this long road that we haven't yet fully finished walking to achieving independence because it feels like we aren't truly independent.

And I felt that way even before the full-scale invasion. It's so, so sad that we've had thousands and thousands of our ancestors die fighting for us to get it. And here we are a hundred years later, still doing the same freaking thing.

Olesya: There’s this idea that somehow, we got it easy in 1991. That we didn't have to fight for it in 1991, therefore, we had to fight for it since, and especially now.

Now, I don't agree with that. I don't think it was achieved easily because I think that would be insulting to all those people who did spend decades, if not centuries, fighting for Ukrainian statehood in lots of different ways, from hunger strikes and protests, and being thrown in jail, to singing carols in Ukrainian at Christmas time in secret and passing on that identity to the next generation.

Anastasiia: And there was also another revolution before we gained our independence, which I wanted to talk about because even people in Ukraine, not a lot of them know.

Olesya: Exactly the Revolution on Granite you're probably referring to. So, the 1990s, student protests, hunger strikes, but also even episodes that are even less known, such as minor strikes in the nineties.

I think we have achieved independence, and you and your generation are the best proof of that. We have these generation of Ukrainians that do not remember firsthand, do not have experience of the Soviet Union. They don't have the habit of keeping their heads down. They're free citizens of a free state.

Old habits die hard. So, it's not surprising that there’s still a lot of Soviet style corruption in Ukraine. There’s still reliance on, or has been reliance on Moscow by the corrupt elite, political elites.

I've lived outside of Ukraine for over two decades, and every time I come back (obviously, I know what's going on in Ukraine very well) I'm a bit of an outsider. So, I can see the changes probably a bit more than people who are inside the country.

And what I see is, every time, I see less and less tolerance of corruption, I see more and more demand, more and more appetite for protection of one's rights. And these tendencies are getting stronger and stronger, I think all the time, especially now, because the price that we're paying for this freedom is extraordinarily high.

Anastasiia: Okay, well, let's talk about a charged topic, which is the topic of language. I grew up in a Russian-speaking family. I still speak Russian with my mom. We're all from Kherson, from the south.

And I remember when I was a kid, very few people spoke Ukrainian around me. My distinct memory is being in school in Kyiv, it was a Ukrainian school. That's how I learned Ukrainian. And I distinctly remember speaking Russian with my classmates.

But every time, we would have our Ukrainian language class and we would be in that classroom; our teacher, who actually also spoke Russian, as far as I remember, anytime she'd hear anybody speak Russian in the classroom, she would respond to us in French pretending that she doesn't understand Russian.

Everyone was by default Russian-speaking. And then in some instances, or some people, for example, there was this one girl who only spoke Ukrainian, and everybody knew who she was, because she did.

When Maidan happened, I was a baby, I was like 11 or 12. So, this was during Maidan, and it was still so bad. So, what's behind this kind of peculiar situation we have with language? Why is it the thing that we constantly talk about, constantly fight about?

Olesya: Ukrainians are bilingual. They’re multilingual, but they're definitely bilingual and there's a very good reason for it. So, you told me your story, and I'll tell you mine.

I come from Lviv, I come from a totally Ukrainian speaking family, and a completely Ukrainian-speaking region. And I went to school in 1991, so I wasn't a baby during the Maidan. I'm showing my age.

But in 1991, Ukraine was already independent. And actually, Russian wasn't even taught in my school anymore. I think that was the first year when they stopped teaching it as a subject.

But I grew up bilingual, because I was surrounded by Russian absolutely everywhere. Russian is widely spoken in Ukraine because of the systematic russification of the population of Ukraine. And this russification happened in the Russian Empire and it continued in the USSR.

It was handled differently. In the Russian Empire, you had laws banning Ukrainian language publications in order to prevent the development of literary life. We talked about this imagination of Ukrainians as a nation, literature helps you do that.

In the USSR, it was done differently, speaking Ukrainian would diminish your career prospects, and for that reason, it’s really not surprising that a lot of people chose to switch the Russian and adopted Russian as their daily language of communication, at least at work, at least professionally, in order to improve their career choices.

And so, Ukrainian language and not Russian language has been threatened historically in Ukraine. This started to change, I think around about the period that you were talking about, sort of 2014 with the Maidan Revolution and onwards.

And it started to change because the Ukrainian state also started to invest more into the development of Ukrainian language, textbooks, books, translations. But also, entertainment, dubbing blockbusters into Ukrainian, and not just buying the Russian dubbed versions instead.

It also had a profound effect on quite a large number of russophone Ukrainians who are switching en masse to Ukrainian. That tendency really started much, much earlier, maybe during the Orange Revolution, then definitely, during the Maidan. But now, it's increasing and increasing and increasing, and I think we will only see it continue increasing as well.

This misunderstanding of Ukraine as a multilingual nation deprives it of agency, I think, around the world. It's really important for us to keep explaining to people that multilingualism, bilingualism is a resource that we celebrate and that we use very effectively.

And it's particularly important to explain it to nations that are monolingual. Because I think for monolingual cultures, it's kind of hard to get their head around the fact that two people can be speaking to one another and switch halfway through from one language to another, and not even notice that they did that.

But we need to keep explaining that. And we need to keep explaining that russophone Ukrainians are not Russians, just as Scotts, Canadians, Australians and other English-speaking nations are not English. And if you said that they were-

Anastasiia: That would not go well.

Olesya: I think you’d upset a lot of people. So, yeah, we just have to ensure that Russia stops weaponizing our multilingualism.

[Music playing 00:35:39]

Jakub: I would love to hear your thoughts and your experience Nastya, about what that was, especially as somebody who had grown up in the south or was from the part of Ukraine that is a bit more Russian-speaking.

Anastasiia: I still speak Russian with my family. I learned Ukrainian in school like most of the Russian-speaking kids did. My family is from Kherson in the south of Ukraine, which is predominantly Russian-speaking.

At the same time, my grandma, so my mother's mom, was a teacher of Ukrainian language and literature, and I remember her quoting Ukrainian poets to me. I remember her discussing the importance of knowing your national language. And she would explain all of those to me in Russian just because that was more comfortable. There was no political charging to which language she used. She just did.

So, I never remember it being an issue until I grew up and until the revolution happened. And honestly, until maybe a year ago is when I really started noticing that, okay, so people seem to care about this.

And I cared about it. I cared about it more. I started only using Ukrainian publicly. So, all of my social media is either Ukrainian or English, not a word of Russian.

We all just kind of have to let it go a little bit right now, because we do have such huge progress. We do have so many people voluntarily choosing to switch to Ukrainian. No one forced them, no one embarrassed them publicly and said, “You must.” They just chose to, because they want to feel Ukrainian. They want to identify as Ukrainian.

The fact that people still think that language is somehow a matter that actually practically affects Putin's war, is ludicrous. He may say whatever he wants, but then he also entirely destroys predominant Russian speaking cities.

Look at Mariupol, the city of over half a million people, the absolute majority of which spoke Russian. And Mariupol is wiped off the map and tens of thousands of people are killed.

So, I think anyone can use any language, that they want one in their private communications. And I do think that it's great to see so many people switching to Ukrainian. It's a great trend and it shall continue.

Jakub: I always was struck by just how incredibly multilingual and especially bilingual Ukraine is. You know that you are in Ukraine where you are part of the conversation and you've stopped following which language it's happening in, right?

Anastasiia: Totally.

Jakub: Because it just switches between Ukrainian and Russian and it goes left and right and the same-

Anastasiia: And sometimes English if you're somebody who works at the Kyiv Independent.

Jakub: Oh, absolutely. There's more and more English words that are popping into both Ukrainian and Russian. I think “cringe” is one that happens a lot recently. I see that especially when describing various propaganda videos.

But it really is seamless, even though the languages — just to understand how different they are. It's English and Dutch. They're from the same family, but don't think that it's the same language or that you can really understand one just because you understand the other.

At the same time, I look at the experience of… I’ve spent considerable time in Ukraine and Dnipro in the east of the country. My wife's family is from there as well as from Severodenetsk. And it was obviously, very Russian-speaking, and I would say Russia was for many years closer.

Like you would watch Russian movies, you would be up to date in what's happening in Russia, you'd have relatives in Russia. And that's a reality that just tons of people had for decades.

And then after Euromaidan, things changed. And slowly, I noticed that people were talking about how their relatives no longer could understand what they're talking about, that they'd be full of propaganda. Whenever they would call their relatives in Russia, they would be saying like, “Oh, so what's happening? Are you being captured by Nazis?” And all of that stuff would appear.

And then finally, this year, people have started shifting to Ukrainian just because of the threat that speaking Russian ultimately represents.

[Music playing 00:40:11]

Anastasiia: So, I wanted us to end in a really powerful point from Olesya, which I think we’ll definitely keep coming back to throughout this series.

Olesya: I see now, the Ukrainians have this vision of the future, and it's such a powerful vision, and they are prepared to fight for it. And not only they are prepared to fight for it, they have inspired the world. They've woken up so-called old Europe from this sort of slumber of inaction, and they will continue to inspire the world.

And Ukrainians over the last six months have asked the world a really, really important question; what is the price for freedom? What price are we prepared to pay here in the West for our freedom? And that's a huge question to ask.

Anastasiia: Join us in two weeks’ time where we'll be talking to Dr. Alexandra Clarkson, a lecturer for German and European studies at King's College London, about Ukraine's place in Europe, both in the past and the future.

Jakub: If you want to further support us, you can subscribe to our premium podcasting content on Apple and Spotify to get extended interviews and hear more from us, your hosts, while also helping make this show possible.

Anastasiia: You can also support the Kyiv Independent by finding us on our Patreon, to get behind the scenes content. Go to patreon.com/kyivindependent to continue helping us report on the most important stories coming out of Ukraine.

Jakub: If you like Power Lines, look up Message Heard, wherever you are listening to this podcast for more of our original shows. And find us on our website at messageheard.com or on our Power Lines Twitter @PowerLinesPod, as well as Instagram and Facebook by looking up @MessageHeard.

Anastasiia: You can also follow the Kyiv Independent on Twitter and Facebook at Kyiv Independent and Instagram at kyivindependent_official to get the latest news and to stay up to date with our coverage.

Jakub: And please also subscribe and rate Power Lines in your podcast app, as it really helps others find our show.

Anastasiia: Power Lines is a partnership between the Kyiv Independent and Message Heard. It was produced by Bea Duncan, Harry Stott, and Talia Augustidis. The executive producer is Sandra Ferrari. The theme music is by Tom Biddle and Alfie Godfrey.

Bonus Episode 1

Speakers: Anastasiia Lapatina & Jakub Parusinski

[Music Playing 00:00:00]

Jakub:    Hello, dear subscribers, welcome to your bonus episode of Power Lines: From Ukraine to the World.

Anastasiia:    I am Anastasiia Lapatina.

Jakub:    And I'm Jakub Parusinski. In this episode, you'll be hearing an extended interview with journalist and author, Andrea Chalupa.

You'll remember from our main episode, that Andrea is the host of the podcast Gaslit Nation, and wrote the screenplay for Mr. Jones, a biographical thriller about the famine in Ukraine in the 1930s. Let's hear what Andrea has to say.

Hi, Andrea.

Andrea:    Hi, Jakub.

Jakub:    Thanks so much for taking the time. So, I wanted to talk a little bit more about Ukrainian identity. From what I know, your parents are both from Ukraine, but you grew up in California. What was your sort of journey to discover your Ukrainian identity like?

Andrea:    Well, I grew up in a small farm city by the name of Davis, very agricultural. We had fields of sunflowers. So, a lot of it felt very Ukrainian at heart, and we knew like all three Ukrainian families in town.

And if you wanted to go to a Ukrainian Orthodox church, you would go to the capital of California, which is Sacramento, or you'd go to San Francisco if you wanted either a Ukrainian Catholic or Orthodox church. So, you'd have to go to the big cities to get the real Ukrainian flavor.

And the town was very white, but somehow, my family felt like a loud ethnic immigrant family. My parents were born in refugee camps after World War II, but they grew up in New York city in Little Ukraine in the Ukrainian village, which is of course, where Veselka, the famous 24-hour Ukrainian diner is today.

My mom and dad met for the first time in the Ukrainian east village restaurant. So, they had a very typical Ukrainian upbringing, whereas I did not, but my parents tried as much as possible to surround us with Ukrainians.

And our home, growing up in Davis, had beautiful embroidered Ukrainian pillows throughout the living room. We had a giant bowl of Pysanky year-round on display. So, you had all these Ukrainian symbols throughout our home, and that made a big difference.

And then on top of that, I was raised by my grandfather, my dedounya, who was from Donbas, who was born and raised in Donbas. He grew up thinking in Ukrainian, speaking Ukrainian, writing in Ukrainian.

And of course, all of that changed when Stalin came to power and completely transformed Ukraine, unfortunately, through the genocidal famine, the Holodomor of 1932/1933.

But my grandfather spoke Ukrainian and he was a proud Ukrainian patriot. He was a survivor of the Holodomor and therefore, an important witness of the atrocities. And he gave hours of testimony to a researcher for the U.S. Congress on the congressional investigation into the famine.

So, there's recordings of my grandfather's voice telling horrific stories of what that genocide was like, the horrors that he witnessed. And that's an important record today being used by researchers.

In fact, some of my grandfather's testimony in the congressional investigation was cited in Anne Applebaum’s book, Red Famine: Stalin's War on Ukraine.

So, my grandfather was the world to me, and he was really my anchor in life. My anchor of what's morally right, my anchor in what it means to be a decent human being. He was just very lovely and centered and generous.

And before he passed away, he prepared a package for me, which included a framed photograph of himself and a gold necklace of my name, and his memoir typed in Ukrainian, which he left with me.

And when I was old enough, I studied Soviet history with a focus on Ukraine in college. I went to the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute. And then from there, I just showed up in Ukraine, and did all sorts of cultural language programs, and had my grandfather's memoir translated into English, and wrote a book based on excerpts of his story, which show the real events that George Orwell allegorizes in Animal Farm. And that book is called Orwell and the Refugees: The Untold Story of Animal Farm.

And I of course, went on to research and write Mr. Jones, the historical drama, the journalistic thriller about the real-life Welsh journalist that risked his life and career to expose Stalin's genocide famine in Ukraine.

And there's a scene in Mr. Jones taken directly from my grandfather's memoir, which was a heartbreaking scene of Gareth Jones, stumbling upon a body collector, many existed in those days.

And this body collector pulls over to the side of the road and picks up a dead mother on the ground. And the mother's young child, this infant, is pawing at the mother trying to wake her up.

The body collector throws her body in the back of his cart like trash on a pile of other bodies, and throws the still living infant on the pile of bodies as well, and then rides off to bury them in the mass grave. My grandfather witnessed that.

We put it in the film to give people an idea of just how deep this horror ran, how evil this genocide was, just the level of cruelty.

Jakub:    That's an incredible story. And your grandfather sounds like an amazing person. One thing that I'm curious about is the Holodomor was hidden for many years, for decades, in fact.

Even in official Western academia, it's something that wasn't really out in the open up until the nineties. Did you have a feeling that this was something that was very unknown, very sort of, this hidden dark secret?

Andrea:    Oh, without question. I mean, growing up in California, people didn't really understand what Ukraine was or that it was its own country. They kept mentioning, “Oh, you're Russian. Oh, you're Russian.” No, I'm Ukrainian. It's an entirely different country.

So, I don't understand Ukrainians that have come over, who, for convenience sake changed their identity to Russian because it's easier for a westerner. I don't understand that at all. It's the weirdest thing.

I had no problem correcting people all my life, saying, “No I'm from Ukraine, my family's from Ukraine, it's a different country. It's the bread basket of Europe.” All of the discourse now, of all of these Ukraine experts, all of these Ukrainian journalists, Ukrainian analysts, Ukrainian authors, Ukrainian historians.”

What you're seeing them do now, especially on social media where this information war is being waged, is you're seeing all these Ukraine experts saying, “Actually, borscht is Ukrainian. It really did come from Ukraine. Actually, this painting of Ukrainian dancers, that's really what Ukrainian dancers look like. That's actually us, that's Ukrainian.”

And so, what I'm saying is that there's this big pushback reclaiming what's already ours. And it's so refreshing to see that because all my life, it was my mother and father pointing that out to me.

And I always thought, I'm like, are they just exaggerating? Are they kind of like that family in My Big Fat Greek Wedding where they claim everything great is from Greece?

But it's nice to see that it holds up to the scholarly scrutiny, that there are so many things that have been taken from Ukraine to give sort of greater credibility to Russia when it's been Ukrainian all along.

And I think when I first started working on Mr. Jones, it was really for my grandfather first and foremost, to get his story out, to build some greater justice in the world for the millions of victims of Stalin. And it did feel like a tremendous uphill battle.

And the response I would get from producers in the early years, especially, they would write me back and say, “Wow, did this really happen?” Like they were just completely shocked. They'd never heard of this before.

And I think for a story like this, it's a difficult movie to make because it's a genocide film, it's not a Marvel movie. And as much as we have a young strapping hero in the form of Gareth Jones played by James Norton, it's still a difficult sell because of the difficult vile carnage of the mass murder.

It's so gut-wrenching, it just makes you feel helpless watching this. All of that combined, made it a very tough package. And so, I knew inevitably I would have to build the film around a coalition of allies. And that's why I took the project to Poland because I saw what extraordinary allies the Poles were to Ukraine when Putin's invasion first broke out in 2014.

As soon as I did that, the project came together very quickly. My producers in Warsaw basically held me hostage in their office. And they're like, “We're not letting you go until you sign a contract with us. We're going to make this film no matter what,” they just wanted to make the story.

And they felt such an affinity for Ukraine. They felt a sense of anger at what had happened to Ukrainians. Poles, of course, suffered under Soviet occupation, but not as greatly as Ukrainians did. And that was sort of their feeling, of like we need to get justice for what was done. And they were just as angry as I was.

So, all of us came together in this coalition of demanding justice, and one powerful way of reclaiming truth, reclaiming justice is to bear witness, and to say, “This happened, no one did anything about it. Here are the people who were responsible for this happening, and it could happen again.”

And so, all of those years when we were working on this, we never thought that this history would repeat ever. This was never supposed to be what it turned out to be, which is basically a movie about right now.

It was supposed to be a historical monument to pay tribute to the past, to a little known genocide. And then instead, it turned into, unfortunately, a story about today as history is repeating.

Jakub:    Absolutely, history is repeating itself. The war, which absolutely can be described as colonial, as genocidal, as an attempt to erase Ukraine as a nation, and a number of authority figures in Russia have said that very explicitly.

And then when you look at the story of the Holodomor, the genocide, it's something that absolutely surpasses imagination, we’re brought up in a world where the Holocaust was the darkest thing to have happened to humanity. And it seems so overwhelming that nothing could be even comparable, but I think the Holodomor is as big, and it's almost impossible to grasp.

I don't think there's any point in really comparing genocides. Each one is tragic and unique in its own way. But what I mean, is this story is so big that it takes a long time to just understand it.

And it's kind of amazing to see that Ukrainian identity and Ukrainian culture is being built at the same time as people sort of are starting to understand the depths of both the tragic, but also, the positive aspects of it.

Andrea:    I wanted to go back to the Holocaust and the Holodomor because I think it's important for people to understand how those genocides, the links between them.

So, 1932, Stalin gets away with mass murdering millions of Ukrainians. There were German colonies inside Ukraine, and those Germans escaped during the famine, went back to Germany.

And as a result, news of the genocide famine came out in Germany, and the Nazis used it in that election in 1933 to attack their opponents from the Communist party and saying, “Don't vote for the communist, they're killing their own people, vote for us.”

And then when Hitler came to power, one of the very first things he started to do was build his first concentration camp. I don't think people understand how quickly the Holocaust started, as soon as Hitler came to power. He likely got to work on his final solution because he just saw Stalin get away with killing millions.

There were absolutely no repercussions for the Stalin regime for what they did, instead, Stalin was rewarded.

That year in 1933, the U.S. finally granted official recognition to the Soviet Union. And there was a huge banquet between Russian leaders and American leaders at the Waldorf Astoria in Manhattan. We had that scene in my film, Mr. Jones.

So, Stalin essentially got rewarded for his genocide of Ukraine. The world looked the other way, and that gave a green light to Hitler to do what he did. 

It’s just a warning to all of us that when you have a tyrant on the scene who is driven by genocide, he absolutely must be stopped. He must be stopped. We failed to stop Stalin, we failed to stop Hitler. We cannot fail to stop Putin because so many more lives are at stake beyond Ukraine. That's what people have to understand.

He's not going to stop in Ukraine. If he wins there, he's going to keep going. That's what they do. And that's just a lesson for always.

Jakub:    I see that you're very active in mobilizing people. I'm sure that as everyone who's deeply in love with Ukraine, you spent the last six months on Twitter and on social media, trying to mobilize people.

How do you sort of see that Ukrainian identity evolve and what role do you think it's taking on in your life?

Andrea:    I felt personally destabilized when the total war broke out. That turned around very quickly when I saw how Ukrainians were fighting back and how much they've come back. They're now pushing through in Kharkiv, in Kherson, and Donbas, and it's just a testament to the Ukrainian spirit.

And I wish people all over the world could feel that, could really tap into that because it's such an inspiring power.

All of the Ukrainian journalists and the Ukrainian human rights activists, and the Ukrainian anti-corruption reformers that are leading the way on social media that I take leadership from, they represent everything my mom and dad raised me on in terms of understanding how beautiful of a culture Ukraine is, inside and out.

The creativity, the generosity, the love — it's just a really beautiful feeling. It's a country where people argue. If you want to start two clubs in Ukraine or among Ukrainians anywhere, you start one. People can really be at each other's throats.

But when it comes to Russia, everybody unites. It's the most extraordinary organization suddenly. And the patriotism comes out in such a big way, because in Ukraine, patriotism means survival.

Jakub:    One of the big questions that Ukraine and Ukrainians, I think, the world over will have to deal with; how do you live through that trauma? How do you rebuild the society that strives for a sort of normality?

Andrea:    Well, I know that specifically with the Holodomor, the Ukrainian refugees that were stranded in displaced persons camp after World War II, they were given basically anything they needed from the refugee organization, which came out of the United Nations, and that allowed them to flourish in the safety of these refugee camps, where they were no longer under Soviet repression.

They were basically free and they lived and blossomed in freedom, and they were able to bring back their culture, they would have Ukrainian theater, they would have Ukrainian conferences, they would have Ukrainian music recitals, and Ukrainian libraries.

So, the whole point is that you have to support people. You have to allow people a place to reclaim their dignity, reclaim their sense of self, support them in that freedom, in those efforts.

My uncle, he was going to a Ukrainian school in his Ukrainian refugee camp in Germany. And he was old enough when his family was escaping the horrors of World War II and Ukraine. He was old enough to understand and see horrific things, like a soldier getting his head blown off and the body's still dancing and moving.

And so, when they first got to the refugee camp, he spent about nine months or so in the hospital just to deal with his nerves. And that helped him tremendously. And I think we have to treat people's minds and souls and PTSD and trauma. That's an extremely important investment to make.

So, all the aid that's going to Ukraine, it has to deal with mental health. You read about that today, where there's one article that came out about a rape survivor, a woman who her husband was killed by a Russian soldier, and she was raped by a Russian soldier.

And she's now getting her life back because of the therapy that she's undergoing and it's helping her tremendously to function in the world and to reclaim her life. So, I think the important lessons from the last great war, World War II, is that we really need to invest in people's minds, and we really need to invest in people allowing to blossom, give them the cultural freedom to express themselves safely, wherever they are.

Jakub:    It's kind of comforting to hear that this Ukrainian life and culture was reborn within these refugee camps. And that as the anthem says, Ukraine has not perished yet, it will persist. And the only thing we can hope is that it doesn't have to be in refugee camps. It can be in a freed, strong, and independent Ukraine as soon as possible.

Andrea, thank you so much for joining us and for sharing this incredible story. Thank you so much.

Andrea:    Thank you so much for having me, and thank you for all the work of the Kyiv Independent.

[Music Playing 00:18:17]

Jakub:    Thank you for subscribing to Power Lines. Your support helps us make this show possible, so we really appreciate it. See you in two weeks.

Anastasiia:Power Lines is a partnership between the Kyiv Independent and Message Heard. It was produced by Bea Duncan, Harry Stott, and Talia Augustidis. The executive producer is Sandra Ferrari. The theme music is by Tom Biddle and Alfie Godfrey.

Season 1 Episode 1

Speakers: Anastasiia Lapatina & Jakub Parusinski

Alem: My name's Alem. I'm 25-years-old. And when I look out my window, I see my family's front yard, as well as our apple and cherry trees, a persimmon tree that my father planted for my mother decades ago. And to the right, a Ukrainian flag, greeting everybody as they come through the garden, and up our front steps.

[Music playing 00:00:24]

Anastasiia: Jakub: Anastasiia: Jakub:

Anastasiia: Jakub: Anastasiia:

Jakub:

Anastasiia:

What does it mean to be a Ukrainian in 2022?

It means you're the citizen of a country, whose enemies claim has no right to exist.

It means you live in a battleground, where the whole world is watching you fight.

It means the consequences of victory or defeat are not just about your own self-determination.

Because the power lines that run through Ukraine are feeding out to the rest of the world.

From Message Heard and the Kyiv Independent, you're listening to Power Lines: from Ukraine to the world.

Hi everyone, this is the first episode of Power Lines. Each week, we're going to be mapping the undercurrents and global consequences of the war in Ukraine, beginning in Kyiv and following the roads out wherever they may lead. I'm Anastasiia Lapatina.

And I'm Jakub Parusinski, we both work at the Kyiv Independent. Now, for those of you who don't know, the Kyiv Independent is Ukraine's English-language media outlet, formed by journalists who walked out the Kyiv Post. I was part of the Kyiv Post a long time ago, first as a journalist, and then as CEO.

The Kyiv Post was Ukraine's first and only English language newspaper. So, for 26 years, we were the only window into Ukraine for anybody who spoke English. But we were owned by a guy who had some issues with the way we were covering the news. We criticized the government a lot and he didn't like it.

So, then one day, he fired all of us on the spot without a notice, but we were like, “well, this is the worst time for Ukraine to not have an English language outlet”, because that was a few months before the invasion, the buildup of troops was already happening.

So, we all stayed together and launched the Kyiv Independent. And Jakub, you joined us a bit later into our venture.

1

Jakub: Anastasiia:

Jakub: Anastasiia:

So, it was actually a few days after everybody got fired, I got in touch with Olga and the leadership asking if they needed any help.

For those who don't know, Olga Rudenko is our Chief Editor at the Kyiv Independent. And just so people know how amazing she is, she's the fourth Ukrainian to ever be in the cover of Time. Like that's my boss. That's insane.

It's really impressive and cool until you catch her alone in the office, just reading the Time article with herself on the cover.

Yeah, it was a crazy time because roughly 30 of us had no idea what the hell to do. All we knew is that we were really good at our job. And our job was covering the news and writing articles and being good journalists. And that's how we got here.

Well, now that we've got all of that out of the way, in this first episode, we actually wanted to talk about Ukrainian identity, something that's extremely important to us.

So, I'm 21 and I left to study in Canada when I was 15. I went to a boarding school, then got into university there. And I remember when I was leaving Ukraine, when I was 15, I was this young, extremely idealistic kid, which partially I still am. And I really dreamed of this life in the progressive West.

So, when I was leaving, I was really excited and people would ask me, “Oh, do you plan to finish your education and come back to Ukraine?” And I would literally laugh in their faces. It was surreal to me that someone would assume that I'd want to come back.

You made it out. So, why would you?

Exactly. Because that's sort of the goal. The goal is to find a way to get the hell out and some people still believe that.

But then when COVID hit, I came to Kyiv and started kind of poking my head around and I discovered the KyivPride, our amazing NGO, that advocates for LGBTQ rights. I found the Ukrainian office of Amnesty International. I found all of these amazing nonprofits that were doing incredible human rights work.

The more I kept poking my head around, I realized that I was actually so incredibly wrong. We have an incredible community of musicians, artists, writers, our contemporary poets are incredible.

So, yeah, I've kind of fell in love with my country again. I've reinvented it for myself. That's sort of my story. And it means a lot to me because I never grew up being particularly patriotic. So, for me, it was like a completely self-made kind of patriotism.

And what about you Jakub? I'm sure you have an interesting perspective as someone who's not actually Ukrainian, but has lived here and has been around and knows the country so well.

Jakub: Anastasiia:

2

Jakub:

So, I was born in Poland, but I left at the age of five and sort of traveled all over the world. And then I came back to Poland for my studies. And I have to say, I really enjoyed a lot of the countries, but I never really quite felt at home there.

All the time, I had read lots of books and obviously Ukraine plays a big role also in Polish history, literature and things like that. And there was this kind of mythical, mysterious country, just a little bit to the east.

And so, back then, I decided to sort of head over, it was 2009 and it was an absolute crisis in Ukraine. You'd have like blackouts, the streets were not being cleaned from snow, but I really fell in love with the country.

And I think what you said about the creative scene, that's something that I'm consistently blown away by. It's just how much energy and life there is in Ukraine.

Absolutely. And potential; potential, this never-ending feeling of huge potential.

I think Ukraine does realize its potential, but it's also when you walk around Kyiv and especially if you come in the springtime, there's this magical thing when winter stops and it's basically just a couple of days, and then spring hits and life explodes everywhere.

And there's just so much art on the street and music, and people discussing ideas and politics and it's absolutely bursting.

And paradoxically, this is what Kyiv looks like right now as well, despite the possible missile strikes, and despite the constant air-raid sirens. It's full of life.

So, that was what really struck me and why I ended up staying. So, I was supposed to come to Ukraine for just a year. I had met a fantastic Ukrainian woman who I ended up marrying, but it's exactly what you're saying; this was the first place where I felt like I could be fully at home.

Anastasiia: Jakub:

Anastasiia: Jakub:

[Music playing 00:06:59]

Anastasiia: Jakub:

Anastasiia:

So, you are the kind of the generation that never experienced either the Soviet Union or the immediate sort of post-Soviet chaos years, right?

Yeah.

Because like the beginning of the nineties, like that was a complete, I don't know if we're supposed to shit show, but it was a shit show with massive corruption. The country was falling apart. Like I think the turn of the century and then the Orange Revolution.

I was there for that. I was born in 2001, so I have a whole photo album of my parents in orange clothing, standing on Maidan and holding me in orange baby clothing in their hands.

3

Jakub:

Anastasiia:

Jakub: Anastasiia: Jakub: Anastasiia:

Jakub:

Anastasiia: Jakub: Anastasiia: Jakub: Anastasiia: Jakub:

Anastasiia: Jakub:

During Euromaidan, my family was really active. I have a lot of memories from there. Like me drawing posters that said “F Putin.” I must have been 12 for 13 when it happened.

For those who don't know, the Orange Revolution was a popular uprising against a corrupt and rigged election in which the pro-Russian candidate, Viktor Yanukovych tried to reserve power from the pro-Western candidate, Viktor Yushchenko.

In a somewhat surprising twist of events, less than a decade later, Ukraine experienced the either Euromaidan or Revolution of Dignity in which people rose up in protest against Viktor Yanukovych’s decision to abandon an association agreement with the European Union, and instead, take a pro-Russian course for the country.

I'm very short in general, but when I was a baby, even more so. So, I remember my dad like literally pulling me up so–

That happens to a lot of people. Yeah.
Being shorter as babies.

Thank you, Jakub. Thank you. So, I remember my dad literally like pulling me up so I could put a poster on the Kyiv City Council walls. And I remember seeing like provocateurs, Titushky, we call them Titushky. I remember seeing those for the first time, the whole thing.

Oh My God. So, that was on Kreschatyk, the City Council that got kind of occupied very early on. So, I was in the building, on the first floor like-

When Titushky attacked them, I was walking with my parents right near it.
Oh my God. So, like basically, we were hanging out in the same parts of sort of that. Essentially, but how old were you?
Well, I was, yeah, significantly older. I was 30.
Okay.

Yeah. When Euromaidan started and it was kind of a crazy experience. Although, to be honest, I always thought that it was about Europe, but at the end of the day, it was Maidan for me. Like that was–

Which is why we also call it Revolution of Dignity. Because dignity is what it was actually about.

Absolutely. It was incredible to sort of be part of that. Very addictive too. When you were on Maidan, you were in the center of the world in some ways.

4

Anastasiia:

It was extremely addictive. And I can say that as someone who went through that as a 13-year-old, but I remember being in school and when the smoke was rising because protestors were burning tires so snipers couldn't see them, I could see that out of my school window.

And there were days when the smoke got so bad that I couldn't go to school. All of those experiences were insane. And eight years later, me and my friends who also went through the same experience back then, we are reflecting on the fact that for us, it's normal because that's just the reality.

But actually, none of this is normal. No kid is supposed to be reading the news about people shooting other people in their country. No kid should be going with her mom to St Michael's Cathedral because your mom was dropping off medicine for civilians who were shot and injured. None of that is normal.

And I'm not obviously like complaining or anything because I think that it really shaped me into who I am, and it shaped our entire country into what it is because the Revolution of Dignity was a hugely important moment, because it touched everybody.

I think yeah, Maidan was really the moment when the identity, at least for me shifted to the level of the people. Maidan was as bottom up, as you can imagine. It was literally people who came to protest and the police came back out.

And that's the moment when they started to take apart the sidewalks, pick up the bricks and throw them back at the police. And I think anyone who went through it, that it marks you for life, like that kind of thing.

It does. I'm just curious after everything that you've gone through in this country and considering your primarily Polish background, do you feel Ukrainian at all?

So, it's a bit of a complicated question, but I think for me, Ukrainian identity is something that is earned. It's something that you can earn, you can ascribe to these values.

I've always felt at home in Ukraine, and on many of the calls and many of the projects that I've been involved in over this sort of past decade with Ukrainians, whenever I get introduced and as a honorary Ukrainian, or the whole call is sort of in Ukrainian and all of a sudden, this Polish guy shows up and people have to explain that, “No, no, he's one of us,” it's very heartwarming. And I'm proud of that. I definitely ascribe to Ukrainian values.

Jakub:

Anastasiia: Jakub:

[Music playing 00:12:24]

Anastasiia: And as we've discussed that’s sort of all that matters.

Jakub: To get a broader perspective of what being from Ukraine truly means, we did a call out to friends, colleagues, and strangers to understand how they feel about their country.

5

Anastasiia:

Bohdana:

Jakub:

Anastasiia: Jakub:

Anastasiia:

We heard from Ukrainians, living in Odessa, Lviv, Kyiv, even the U.S. who called in to tell us what being Ukrainian means to them, and how this has changed since the invasion.

And as you can imagine, the results were pretty widespread, but there were a few things that kept coming up. For example, the idea of Ukraine being a melting pot, a place for diverse cultures and people. And this came up actually in our first voice note, which is from Bohdana Neborak, a 26-year-old Cultural Manager from Kyiv.

Hi, my name is Bohdana. I'm 26, I'm Ukrainian. And for me, being Ukrainian is to be inclusive. Where different people live in Ukraine, those are people of different contexts, different cultures, religions, beliefs; but they're joined together with their desire for independence.

We want to be independent as individuals, but we also want to be independent as a society. So, for me, being Ukrainian is to see and hear others, to be inclusive. And I like that very much because I feel that it is possible in my country.

What I find really interesting with this is how postmodern in a way this definition is. So, you'd think, okay, like Ukraine has this history of fighting for freedoms. And I would say to a large extent, religious and cultural tolerance, right?

Yeah.

By the measures of the past, it was a fairly tolerant place to be. But at the same time, this identity, it comes in at a moment when the rest of the world is questioning theirs.

So, you look at people let's say of our two generations, especially on the younger side. And it starts to become more important, like what kind of values you ascribe to, what kind of change you want to see in the world? What groups you identify with. The passport and your ethnicity doesn't really play such a huge role.

But I think what Bohdana spoke about is actually very reflective of how a lot of the young Ukrainians feel about their identity, because for us, being Ukrainian means defending those liberal values that so many of our neighbors don't have and especially, Russia.

But the point is that we really are at a point where being progressive starts being a part of being Ukrainian. And it's especially important for us because we're trying to integrate with the EU and subscribing to those values is necessary to be part of the European community. So, it's a whole mix of things. I think it's really interesting.

Okay. So, our next voice note is the one I'm particularly excited about because it's from Nariman Aliev, a Crimean Tatar film director. And his perspective is particularly interesting because as I said, he is Crimean Tatar. So, he really is a part of that melting pot that we spoke about before.

His voice note was in Ukrainian. So, I'll translate it here.

Jakub:

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Anastasiia:

“Hi, my name is Nariman Aliev, I’m 29-years-old. Right now, I’m in Lviv. Outside my window, is a small light shining upon an empty street. It’s already curfew.

I was born and grew up in Crimea, which is already eight years under Russian occupation. My nationality is Crimean Tatar. But right now, I associate myself politically with Ukraine. The fate of me, my family, my fatherland, my nation overall, all depend on the fate of Ukraine.

Most of the answers we look for regarding our identities, we find them in our past, in the histories of our families, because the more I learnt about the stories of Ukrainians, the more I saw the commonalities with those of Crimean Tatars. There were repressions, deportations, torture, prisons, killings, denying the very existence of this people.

Being Ukrainian is not something just given, you have to find it in yourself and grow it. It’s not about ethnic belonging, it’s about culture and traditions, which grew on these lands for centuries. It’s about freedom and fighting for what is yours. That is what being Ukrainian is for me.”

I was especially touched by Nariman's answer to me, not only because I care a lot about the Crimean Tatar community, but also, because it is true that Crimean Tatars have endured way too much than any ethnic group really deserves.

So, first in the 18th century, Crimea was occupied by the Russian Empire and a bunch of Tatars fled towards the Ottoman Empire, towards the Ottomans.

And then much later in 1944, so during the Second World War on Stalin’s orders, at least 200,000 Crimean Tatars were deported from Crimea. The higher estimate is also twice that, it's something around 400,000 Crimean Tatars.

And if you take the higher estimate, it's over 90% of the total Crimean Tatar population in Crimea at the time. And really whichever estimate you take, it's a huge tragedy.

And then as if that wasn't enough, Russia came back again in 2014 when it occupied Crimea, and a bunch of Crimean Tatars had to flee again because their community has always been very, very pro-Ukrainian and very anti-Kremlin. And they've been going through immense repressions ever since.

So, a lot of them had to flee for almost security reasons. So, it's truly tragic. And seeing these parallels between the history of a very specific Ukrainian minority and Ukraine at large, the Ukrainian people at large, it was very interesting to me that he drew those parallels.

So, when we look at the history of the Russian Empire, and then later, the Soviet Union, you kind of see this trend repeat itself, like over and over again, with different nationalities.

The goal was essentially, to wipe out a people from a territory. And when you look at the Crimean Tatars, I think what makes it particularly poignant is that Crimea is such

Jakub:

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Anastasiia: Jakub:

Anastasiia: Jakub:

Anastasiia: Alem:

Anastasiia:

Jakub:

a unique place, and with such a unique sort of culture and history, and also significance from the Russian perspective, both strategically and historically.

And the deportation of the Crimeans was yet another case of the Russian Empire than the Soviet Union, but sort of the same political culture wiping a part of what they believe belongs to them clean.

And when you look at what is happening now in Ukraine, well, it's the same thing over again — by the way, not the first time that it's happening to Ukrainians.

We are on genocide number three here.

Yes. But the thing is, it's just the scale of it is so much bigger. This is 40 plus million people, almost a third of the population of Russia. And once again, trying to sort of completely destroy a nation.

I think that's what makes Ukraine so appealing to so many of the other nations who have suffered from Russia. That's why you have this kinship between the Poles and the Ukrainians. That's why the Georgians come and fight.

The Georgians are incredible.

Yeah. And Ukraine has become this kind of symbol for all of these nations, to paraphrase Lenin; “Russia is the prison of nations.” And Ukraine is sort of the biggest of the oppressed. So, that's the one who is finally punching back.

That actually brings us to our second theme, which is freedom.

My name's Alem. I'm 25-years-old. I think being Ukrainian is the embodiment of freedom. You can taste freedom and the dreams of a better future when you're in Ukraine, it's in the air. I think it emanates off people's skins.

When you get enough people that embody freedom in their choices and their beliefs, you really can achieve anything. And for those that want absolute control and oppression, the entirety of the Ukrainian identity is a threat.

That was so beautiful. That was Alem, and Alem and I actually worked together before because she was a reporter at the Kyiv Post. And I think what she said is exactly right.

It is true that when you walk through the streets of Kyiv, this sense of potential and freedom and a better future, it is in the air. Do you feel that at all, Jakub?

I think so. And I mean this in a positive sense; it's also an extremely desperate need for freedom. So, this isn't in a way a war, like you could imagine a war between civilized European nations, where one side fights the other and somebody gets some province.

It's a war of annihilation. And so, the response can only be a hundred percent. You cannot hold back in any way, because it's a very black and white kind of situation.

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Anastasiia:

And when we look at what's happening in the occupied territories, the level of destruction that Russia is spreading, you can see that there is no choice, but to fight.

And that's something that I think a lot of people from around the world don't really understand, is that it's so much up against the wall, but at the same time, the resistance and this kind of this need for freedom is also absolute.

The calculation is very simple. If we lose this war, there just won't be a Ukraine. So, when we talk about the delivery of weapons, when we talk about Western support, I think Jakub you’ll agree with me, a part of what we want to do here with this podcast is to get it in people's heads, that this calculation is really simple, and that we need all of the support that we can possibly get, because it's a matter of survival for us.

[Music playing 00:22:56]

Jakub:

Andrea:

Next, we're going to hear from a Ukrainian-American friend of mine, Andrea Chalupa. She's a journalist, writer and the host of an amazing podcast, Gaslit Nation. She told us a bit about what it means to be part of the Ukrainian diaspora.

I want to share what it means to be a Ukrainian. I'm extremely proud of where I'm from. My mother's family is from Donbas, my father's family is from the west. And so, I've gotten a sense since I was a child of the history of Russian genocidal colonialism in Ukraine.

I was always somebody that saw myself as Ukrainian, even though around me, growing up in America, people would say, “Oh, you're from Russia. Your family's from Russia. You’re Russian.” And I always correct them and say, “No, I'm Ukrainian.”

I have always felt inspired by the Ukrainian people and Ukraine itself, stepping foot on the land, and living in Ukraine felt like a spiritual homecoming. It is a spiritual feeling that I still tap into when I need to feel connected to something greater in the world, and to really give life meaning.

The resilience and creativity and the innovation of the Ukrainian people that I've watched over the years has been extraordinarily motivational for me.

But my point is that I've learned from Ukrainians and I will always be inspired by Ukrainians. And I have no doubt that what Putin is doing now is just another dark chapter. And that ultimately, Ukraine will remain a strong and vibrant democracy, and Russia will eventually be forced to meet reality and become a democracy as well.

The second she said that, her family's from Donbas, my heart became warm because I love these stories, but especially, when they come from people who are from the east, because there is this terrible, terrible misconception among Ukrainians, but also, even more so, in the west that Ukrainians in the south and in the east are somehow less patriotic because there is more of a Russian speaking population. And there are some people who are ethnic Russians who have moved there or have been settled there.

Anastasiia:

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Jakub:

As if that somehow, changes the overall situation. They're like, “Oh, but you guys have pro-Russian people in the east and the south.” Okay, every country that is a democracy has people with very different views.

But at the end of the day, some of our best writers and poets came from Donbas. Some of our best people came from Donbas. And I know many people who defended Ukrainian values there, who see very clearly what Russia is doing as an Imperial conquest, that it is.

So, I think it's just extremely important to highlight voices from that part of the country, to debunk this misconception that somehow, people out there don't really care or have radically different views.

I agree. I had the same thought that it's actually great to come at it from this perspective, that includes Eastern Ukraine. So, there's this kind of myth that the west is sort of pro-European and then the east is pro-Russian.

Yes, there are some differences in the polling scores, but if you were to sort of do polls across the country today, the overwhelming majority in every single part of Ukraine is very much sort of pro-Ukrainian.

Yeah, I think it's also interesting because she's part of the diaspora and the American diaspora was more heavily based from people who were from Western Ukraine, from the Carpathian regions, from Galichina and those parts of near the Polish border.

And actually, the stories from Eastern Ukraine, which are also very important to the Ukrainian identity and to what it means in the world, that sort of gets lost. So, I think it's really great to have a broader sort of perspective.

Because I think that's the point of why Ukrainian identity is so interesting and a part of what we're doing here on the podcast is picking it apart and seeing what's inside.

Because the fact is the meaning of Ukrainian identity may be slightly different for everybody, but there will still be these overarching themes, which we've been exploring in this episode.

And that's kind of the beauty of it, that it may be something completely different for everybody. But guess what, the one thing that sort of unites all of them is that Russia has been trying to destroy this country for as long as any of us can remember.

And that's just kind of the harsh reality, regardless of whether you live in the west, in the south, in central Ukraine, it doesn't matter. All of us see what Russia is doing and we see it at face value.

Anastasiia:

[Music playing 00:27:46]
Jakub: So, tell me; how does the young generation see this? Anastasiia: Well, actually, like Mariana, an 18-year-old from Lviv.

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Mariana:

Jakub: Anastasiia: Jakub:

Anastasiia: Jakub:

Hi, my name is Mariana. For me, to be Ukrainian means to feel unity with my ancestry wherever I am. It always means to build free, independent and strong Ukraine and to be ready to fight for it. As our anthem says, “Souls and bodies, we will lay down all for our freedom.”

So, here's my take as the old guy here. Bring it on.

I can't feel good about how patriotic and committed the generation of 20-year-olds are in Ukraine because they're dying at such a rate for that patriotism, that it just makes me feel horrible. Like I admire it. But it turns my insides.

People kind of idealize it and call us heroes and such, but this is actually all very terrible and none of us deserve it, I think.

I remember a month ago, you see the news constantly and you see sort of in social media, these incredibly young faces with the black ribbon or in black and white and you know straight away that the news is that they had died.

A couple of years ago, Kyiv Post had this award Top 30 under 30, mentioning important young Ukrainians who had done something spectacular with their lives.

And I remember once I was in Kyiv and they asked me to sort of host a small part of it, and running into this incredibly smart and sharp guy, Andriy Verkhoglyad, who became a major in the Ukrainian army, I think at the age of 22, it was, or 21 even.

And yeah, a couple of weeks ago, same thing. I see the photo and realized that it’s ... and there's so many of them every day and it's devastating.

It is. I keep on thinking about how am I going to explain this to my kids? How am I going to tell these stories? I want to be a parent in the future and I think a huge part of that is passing down all of these stories to them.

And I keep on thinking about how I'm going to have to find the words to explain it. Explain what I was doing, how I was feeling, but also how the entire nation was living through this completely hellish experience.

Of course, for many Ukrainians, this reality is not just something that they've experienced since February 24. It's really been for the past eight years that they have been suffering and dying because of their Ukrainian identity.

My name is Alexander Kherbet, and I'm originally from Donetsk, major city in occupied Donbas. Unfortunately, some of my friends, the close friends died for their Ukrainian beliefs.

Some of them being killed during the pro-Ukrainian rallies and pro-freedom rallies in 2014, something we will never forget about because these people were driving the Ukrainianity, if I can say this word.

Anastasiia:

Jakub:

Alexander:

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Anastasiia:

Jakub:

So, this was Alexander Kherbet, my really good friend and my colleague as well at the Kyiv Independent. He just recently joined us as a reporter and has done some amazing exclusives. So, you guys should definitely check him out.

He is from Donetsk, a major city in Donetsk Oblast, in the occupied territories of Donbas. He really knows the cost of this war, the war that has been going on since 2014.

So, for me, the experience of people living in Donbas and more broadly, sort of Eastern Ukraine is in many ways the most painful.

After Yevromaydan or during Yevromaydan, the Ukraine identity really rose up. A lot of people started speaking Ukrainian, identifying with Ukraine.

But that's also where that led to the bloodiest results. A lot of people were beaten, tortured, imprisoned, and murdered because of identifying with Ukraine. And it's an incredibly painful area.

[Music playing 00:32:02]

Anastasiia: Alexander:

We're going to hear a bit more from Alexander right now. And we thought that what he said was the perfect way to wrap this up.

Being an Ukrainian, speaking the Ukrainian language in major Russian speaking city in Ukraine, back before 2014 was like a freak show. It was a small group of us hanging around speaking Ukrainian.

And we were dreaming one day, everybody will speak Ukrainian. Everybody will see towards the Ukrainian future, disconnected with Russia or Soviet sentiments.

And now, I'm every single week looking to the people, talking to the people. And I see there is this dream we were dreaming about. And being Ukrainian for me right now is living a dream, really living a dream, which came true today.

[Music playing 00:33:04]

Jakub:

Anastasiia: Jakub:

Thanks so much for listening and everyone who sent us their voice notes. Coming up on Power Lines, each week, we’ll be talking to journalists on the ground and the world's leading experts to follow the undercurrents of the war in Ukraine.

We'll be looking at what the war means for global food security, the rise and fall of oligarchies, and what really goes on in the Russian Federal Security Service, and more.

In two weeks, we will be setting the scene of Ukraine's history for you guys, with one of the leading global historians and commentators on Eastern Europe and the war.

Don't forget to subscribe and rate Power Lines wherever you get your podcast, as it really helps others find our show.

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Anastasiia:

Jakub:

Anastasiia:

And if you want to support us further, you can subscribe to our premium podcasting content on Apple and Spotify to get extended interviews and hear more from us, your hosts while also helping make this show possible.

To find more podcasts like Power Lines, look up Message Heard wherever you're listening to this podcast, and find us on our website at messageheard.com or on Twitter, Instagram, and Facebook.

You can also follow the Kyiv Independent on Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram as well to get the latest news and stay up to date with the coverage.

And you can also follow me on Twitter @lapatina_, that’s L-A-P-A-T-I-N-A, underscore.

And me @J_parus, that's J underscore P-A-R-U-S.

You can support the Kyiv Independent on our Patreon. To get more exclusive content from our team, go to patreon.com/kyivindependent to continue helping us report on the most important stories in Ukraine.

Power Lines is a partnership between the Kyiv Independent and Message Heard. It was produced by Bea Duncan, Harry Stott and Talia Augustidis. The executive producer is Sandra Ferrari.

[Music playing 00:34:56]

Trailer Transcript

Kyiv Independent - Trailer

[ Theme music throughout which rises and falls under voices ]

Nastya: What does it mean to be Ukrainian in 2022?

Jakub: It means you’re the citizen of a country whose enemies claim has no right to exist.

Nastya: It means you live in a battleground, where the whole world is watching you fight.

Jakub: It means the consequences of victory or defeat are not just about your own self determination. 

Nastya: Because the power lines that run through Ukraine are feeding out to the rest of the world.

Jakub: My name is Jakub Parusinski

Nastya: And I’m Anastasiia Lapatina

Jakub: We’re from The Kyiv Independent, Ukraine’s English-language media outlet, founded when we walked out of the Kyiv Post to keep Ukrainian journalistic integrity alive.

Nastya: We’ve been used to covering the turbulent ups and downs of politics in our country. But then, overnight our lives changed. 

[ Newsreader archive: “Today Russia has invaded Ukraine” ]

[ Overlapping clips of newscasters in different languages ]

Jakub: On 24th February 2022, Russia began a full scale invasion of our country, Ukraine. The shock waves were felt across the world. 

[ Singing in Ukrainian ]

[ Protest chant: “Stand with Ukraine!” ]

[ Protest chant: “Russia Go Home!” ]

[ Protest chant: “Putin: War criminal!” ]

Nastya: We’ve been mapping the war and its consequences since the start of the invasion. And we want to bring you the bigger picture.

[ Newsreaders overlapping across each other ] 

[ Newsreader “Europe is already bracing for what could be a long cold Winter” ]

[ Newsreader: “What effect will the crisis in Ukraine have on already sky high energy prices?” ]

[ Newsreader: “At the first sign of war, oil prices begin to rise” ]

[ Newsreader: “Russia’s war in Ukraine has created fears of a global food crisis” ]

[ Newsreader: “Earlier today Australia’s sanctions against Russia were signed off on” ]

[ Newsreader: “Refugee numbers could run into the millions as people flee their homes” ]

Jakub: From Message Heard and The Kyiv Independent, this is Power Lines: From Ukraine to the world. 

Nastya: Across 12 episodes we’ll be following the undercurrents of the war from Kyiv to Beijing, and Moscow to DC. 

Jakub: We’ll be talking to journalists on the ground and experts from around the world to explore the impact and influence of the war on geopolitics, global power structures and, of course, the Ukrainian people.

Nastya: Beginning in Kyiv, and following the roads out wherever they may lead.

Jakub: Subscribe and listen to Power Lines wherever you get your podcasts, with new episodes out every fortnight from 22nd September.

[ Theme music rises and fades out on a reverb ]