Power Lines Season 1 Episode 3 Bonus
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Jakub: Hello listeners, welcome to your Bonus episode of Power Lines: from Ukraine to the World
Anastasiia: I'm Anastasiia Lapatina.
Jakub: I'm Jakub Parusinski.
Anastasiia: So this week, as promised, we have a really special episode for you. A couple of weeks ago we got a chance to speak with one of the most significant people working on Eastern European policy, Radosław Sikorski. Jakub, I know you were really excited about doing this interview, so why don't you give us a quick intro?
Jakub: Radosław or as Poles call him Radek Sikorski, is a bit of an eclectic character. Initially, he was one of the student protesters under communism, ended up getting political asylum in the UK, studying at Oxford, and then became a war correspondent in Afghanistan. But he's best known for his political career as Poland's foreign minister, from 2007 to 2014, where he really shaped both Polish and European foreign policy towards Eastern Europe.
He's the co-architect, together with the former Swedish Prime Minister, Carl Bildt, of the Eastern Partnership, that is the EU policy towards six neighbors in the East, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan.
And throughout this time, he was essentially building a format to engage with these countries that I think purposefully, but certainly, from Moscow's perspective, ended up frustrating Russian efforts to reengage these countries in a sort of Neo-Imperial sphere of influence. Sikorski is interesting because he provides us with a view on how the environment was shaped in terms of foreign policy in Ukraine, but across the whole region, and where it might go next.
Anastasiia: He sounds like such a fascinating figure, especially given that in between all of that he managed to be a work respondent in Afghanistan, which just seemed like this very exciting patch of life that doesn't necessarily fit with all of his other pursuits, his experience is extremely impressive.
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Jakub: And nowadays, he's best known as Anne Applebaum's husband.
Anastasiia: Let's get into the interview.
Jakub: Thank you so much for joining us on Power Lines podcast. I would like to jump back in time a little bit back to the mid-2000s. So, you played a huge role in shaping the EU's foreign policy, especially towards the east, as a principal architect of the Eastern Partnership, launching European Endowment for Democracy, amongst many other initiatives. Thinking back to those times and looking at how things have evolved in the past decade, what would you say worked? What should have been done differently? How do you see the evolution of the EU's foreign policy since those times?
Radosław: It was also under the Polish Presidency of the EU that we close the text of the association agreement with Ukraine that included deep and comprehensive free trade area. And one of the things that should have been done much faster was the processing of the text by commission services, by the lawyers, and by the translators. Unfortunately, despite my best efforts, it took something like 18 months, which gave the Russian side a long time to prepare a response.
Another mistake, I think, by the EU was to tie the Ukraine aspiration process with the fate of the Yulia Tymoshenko affair. And the third mistake was that in 2013 when Russia started a trade embargo on Ukraine in response to Ukraine joining the association agreement, the EU, despite again the protestations of Carl Bildt and myself, decided to treat that as a bilateral issue between Ukraine and Russia. Whereas actually, it was a Russian punishment of Ukraine for her European aspirations.
This is not the EU's fault, but perhaps some of the key Western leaders encouraged Ukraine in 2014 not to fight back against the Russian anschluss of Crimea. I'm sure it was well meant; the default position of Western leaders is to try to avoid violence and to seek stability. But I think with hindsight, I would speculate that if Ukraine had fought in Crimea, then the putsch in Donbas and elsewhere, might not have happened, and then things could have gone differently.
Jakub: I mean itt's something that we're painfully aware of now, I guess is that Russia stops pushing at the moment when you start fighting back. There isn't something that might seem reasonable from Brussels' perspective looks very different from Moscow's perspective. If I can go back to this, basically, if I understand that the integration of Ukraine into the European system because it is an integration, even if it isn't integration into the EU, you're still taking gone a lot of EU legislation, European acquis. That should have been done faster. It should have been done quicker, less time for Moscow to react.
Radosław: Yes, but remember that the country principally at fault for the slow process was actually, I have to say this, was Ukraine. Ukraine wasted a quarter of a century. Compare Poland's efforts with Ukraine's efforts, we were absolutely determined to join the West in the 1990s, because we knew that the geostrategic opening would not last forever. Whereas Ukraine played what her leaders thought was some kind of big game between Russia, the United States, and the EU, and choosing some kind of third way between the Soviet system and the free market system.
And all that happened was that Ukraine was drifting, was drifting economically, and was drifting geopolitically. Had Ukraine been more determined, Ukraine might have joined the EU already. So some of the blame has to be apportioned where it lies. Look, when the Soviet Union collapsed, Poland's GDP and Ukraine's were about the same per capita. And 25 years later, Poland is three times richer. That's the scale of Ukraine's failure, I'm afraid.
Jakub: Yes, definitely agree with that. I think there's both a lack of clarity of vision, but I would also argue a lack of bureaucratic capability.
Radosław: There is that, but there is also greed and corruption, let's remember. I talked to people who worked in the Ukrainian administration, and the corruption was just overwhelming. A former finance minister told me that her own secretaries were selling her calendar to oligarchs. Whatever for.
Jakub: That's the first time I've heard of that version, but that doesn't surprise me in the least. So you're absolutely right. Ukraine had a level of corruption that I think few in the West can really fathom for a quarter of a century, as you say.
Radosław: When I visited Kyiv, I would routinely notice that there were more Bentleys and Range Rovers in front of the Rada than in front of the House of Lords, that tells you something, too.
Anastasiia: Maybe the Lords have a different parking space.
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Fast forward to today, we see, at least at the moment right now, it looks like the Russian so-called sphere of influence, the EU, the West, these are irreconcilable blocks. How should we think from the perspective of the EU, from the perspective of the West, think about future politics, future relationships with, let's say, Eurasia?
Radosław: Well, Putin has to lose and Ukraine has to win. And I think Putin bit far more than he can chew. He has already destroyed the reputation of the Russian army and Russia itself, of its defense industry, of its oil and gas industry. We will have a difficult winter, but I think he vastly underestimates the power of democracies to endure. And I think Russia is going into a decade of decline and a possible transition crisis.
At our last meeting with Lavrov in St. Petersburg, I told him, "Look, don't take on the West. We are 18 times bigger economically. If you add Japan, 20 times. You can't win." He seems surprised by this pretty obvious calculation. Unfortunately, Ukraine is paying the price, but the recent successes have convinced the West that this is winnable.
As regards the broader picture, my friend and mentor, Zbig Brzezinski, used to say that the choice for Russia is to be either an ally of the West or a vassal of China. I think you can see now that Putin has made the wrong choice. I think it's because the interests of Putin are actually not aligned with the interests of Russia. The interests of Russia to be an ally is to be an ally of the West. The interest of Putin is to be in an ideological alliance of autocrats.
But hopefully, there will be patriotic Russians who will turn this around because Putin is destroying the future of his country. I think the true victory of the West would be not only the securing of Ukraine but also the transformation of Russia.
Jakub: As you say, for Russia there is an alternative of turning West or turning East, so to speak. It looks like the idea of Russia has great power, has been very significantly damaged, perhaps irreversibly damaged for a long time by the war in Ukraine and the number of failures that have stacked up.
Radosław: I think it started earlier. Obviously, if you construct a system based on pervasive lies and total corruption, it should be no surprise that it's not efficient.
Jakub: Yes.
Radosław: It's just that Putin was maintaining a facade that was credible to us and partly to himself. He has believed in his own lies, that's the fate of dictators, that they believe in their own propaganda. Remember Putin was furious when Barack Obama once said that Russia is a regional power, because Putin was aspiring to parity. With at least one global power centre with China, with the EU, or with the United States.
And now Russia is becoming not just not a super power, it's becoming a large Iran. Putin will be seen not as a restorer of the Russian Empire, but as its a gravedigger.
Jakub: Absolutely. Yet there are many who still think that what we are seeing is a move towards a multipolar world. So I completely agree with your analysis of the situation from a Russian perspective, but then you look at, for example, the meeting that we had in Samarkand, and you see that Modi is there and Erdoğan is there, and a lot of people around the world are cheering for a more multipolar world, despite the horrors that we see of what that world actually looks like.
I think a multipolar world where the big neighbors bully their weaker neighbors is one that is quite terrifying. Yet a lot of people essentially, they just want the table to be overturned and they're tired of this hegemony of America, or whatever you call it.
Radosław: The hegemony has been over for some time. America had its unipolar moment in the 1990s, and then it chose to spend the political, financial, and military capital of that on the ill-conceived Iraq war where it was discredited and its resources were wasted. And look, the United States used to be 50% of world's GDP. Now it's what, 20, 18 in terms of demography the West is with every decade becoming a smaller proportion of global humanity.
But, we should be able to adjust to that. That doesn't mean that we can't still be very prosperous and very powerful as the club of democracies. And we can still be an example to follow, it's still the case that people migrate to the United States and to the European Union rather than vice versa. For some reason, they find our way of life preferable.
And this is what's at stake in the Ukraine, Russia war. The Ukrainian people decided that they didn't want to live under this old-fashioned and inefficient and cruel autocracy, and they want to "level up" to the standards of the Democratic West. And I think that's a great development. And I hope Putin is right in that sense, that if Ukraine becomes successful, the people of Russia will demand the same. That is a threat to Putinism. I just hope Putinism gets defeated.
Jakub: What do you think is the lesson that people in Deli or in Tehran or perhaps in Ankara are taking out of this?
Radosław: Well, the people of Iran, of course, pro-democratic and pro-western, but the regime has now tied itself to Russia. The sight of Putin going cap in hand to Iran to beg for some drones from a country that is an economic basket case and is not famous for the modernity of its military shows the scale of Russia's humiliation.
Jakub: Okay but let me challenge that a little bit because there's a different argument which says, "Look, these various autocracies, or let's say hybrid regimes as well if we zoom out a little bit more, it turns out that they do have some ability to help each other out in difficult times." So if I am running a regional power somewhere around the world, I see that when things are tough, when we get locked out by the West, from finance, from trade, from whatever it is, there are other friendly states that we can turn to for help.
Even after you have been shunned by the world, there is still this country club of mostly dictators that are ready to receive you. Is there now a big enough coalition there to actually pose a real threat?
Radosław: Yes. But the help that they're giving one another is actually resources down the drain. What has Russia benefited from its investments in Venezuela? And so on. Yes, we have a competition of systems. We have the free world and we have the hybrid systems and we shall see a decade or two down the line, which is more efficient. And it will be seen in economic progress, in technological progress, and at the cutting edge, I'm afraid also on the battlefield, we just have to prevail
Jakub: Turning back towards the EU. We now have a country that has bled for the EU like no other. Even if it doesn't become a full member, I think think that story in itself. It can't but not change the nature and what the EU represents, what Europe represents. It's a very powerful political symbol. I think it resonates in Poland. It resonates in the Baltic states. Do you think this is something that can resonate more broadly and will it change the EU?
Radosław: It's already changed the EU. Would you have thought a year ago that the EU would be funding weapons deliveries? Would you have thought that the European Central Bank would be freezing and aggressors' foreign currency reserves? Would you have guessed that the EU would be sending billions of euros in macro-financial assistance?
By its sacrifice and courage and success, Ukraine has got the candidate status, but here I have to tell Ukrainian viewers what I've always told them out of friendship, which is the unvarnished truth. I did it during the Madan where I warned them that Yanukovych was preparing a blood birth and that the agreement was a good tactical move. I told it to the Ukrainian parliamentarians in Munich a week before the war, that the war was indeed coming, which was an outlier view.
And I'll tell you now, just because you are a candidate and just because you are fighting our war, doesn't mean that there will be any lowering of standards for Ukraine before you become a member. Instead of imagining that the EU will make concessions, it will not. Take the realistic view and I'll tell it to you brutally so that it gets through. Okay.
This is not a negotiation because a negotiation suggests a process in which both sides make concessions. And the EU side has existed for decades now, has a body of laws that is an outcome of thousands of compromises. It'll not change that body of laws for the sake of Ukraine. Ukraine has to accept the whole body of European law as is, literally translate it into Ukrainian and pass it in the Rada.
If you waste your time on imagining that the EU will change to suit you, you will just delay the process. So to be even more blunt, I'll say this is not a negotiation, this is voluntary anschluss, and it's hard. It's painful and it's humiliating. We went through it ourselves. I know what I'm talking about. It's worth it in the end. The faster you do it, the quicker you'll get the prize and the less pain you'll inflict on yourself.
Jakub: There's also a lot of back-channel diplomacy that is involved over the war. Ukrainians have proved to be masterful in their communications, I would say to global audiences.
Radosław: I think Ukraine won the information war in the West but drew in the Global South.
Jakub: Why is that?
Radosław: Because the Global South tends to be anti-American, and this is seen as a Ukrainian war with American help, which is what it is. And so the Global South is very skeptical about the United States and therefore somewhat receptive to Russian arguments.
Jakub: On this issue of the information war because I think it's something very important. Last couple of years or last decade even, I think the West started to take it very seriously when it comes to Eastern Europe when it comes to countering Russian influence at home. It has taken it as seriously when it comes to Arabic, when it comes to the Spanish-speaking world. I mean, can the West even win this? It's such a big effort. It took so much effort to try to win it at home. Is it something that can be won abroad?
Radosław: As you say, we accepted the challenge way too late and it's only now that we are beginning to be successful, but look, in the Arab world or in India, you don't feel threatened by Russia or in Latin America. All these arguments are very theoretical until bombs start falling because then it's clear, whose bombs are hitting whose cities and that really clarifies many of the lies and misconceptions. We have this clarity now, unfortunately, because of what's happening in Ukraine, many others don't and probably never will.
Jakub: Thank you so much for your time. It was a real pleasure to speak and if you're ever in the Kyiv, we would be thrilled to host you at Kyiv independent.
Radosław: I actually will be in Kyiv because my wife and I have bought a pickup for the Ukrainian army which I intend to deliver personally. See you in Kyiv.
Jakub: That's amazing. No, it's really highly appreciated. I saw that actually, some friends of mine were helping out with the delivery on the Ukrainian side, so yes, thank you so much for that.
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Radosław: Slava Ukraini.
Jakub: Heroiam slava.
Jakub: Thank you so much for listening to Power Lines. We'll see you next week for our regular episode, where we'll be speaking to Helen Thompson about the impact of the war on global resources.
Anastasiia: Power Lines is a partnership between The Kyiv Independent and Message Heard. It was produced by Bea Duncan, Harry Stott, and Talia Augustidis. The executive producer is Sandra Ferrari. The theme music is by Tom Biddle and Alfie Godfrey.
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