Season 1 Episode 7

Jakub: I’m back in Kyiv for the first time since the summer, and things are a bit different. Even after the full scale invasion began, during the warmer months people were spilling out on the streets: talking, drinking, sharing stories. But when the winter hits in Ukraine, it really hits. 

The temperatures are in the negatives now, there’s a blanket of snow covering everything. Everywhere you hear the hum of generators, producing power amid rolling blackouts. In some parts of the city, the fumes of gas and smoke are thick enough to leave a metallic aftertaste.

Because living in Kyiv now means living without the comforts of the 21st century that we’ve all become accustomed to. It means living without heating, internet, mobile connection, in some cases water. As civilians struggle to continue normal lives, while relying on an infrastructure that has been decimated by Russian attacks.

With the winter setting in, I wanted to go across town and speak to the people being affected, to see how they are getting through the cold and dark.

I started off at our offices at the Kyiv Independent.

Helen: My name is Helen Yoshiko. I'm the newsroom assistant at the Kyiv Independent. I'm very happy to be here. 

Jakub: The last couple of months have been really difficult. for basically working and living in Kyiv. Can you tell me a little bit about what it's been like?

Helen: Yeah, as we know, Russia commits attacks on the critical infrastructure as well as the civilian infrastructure. Not only in Eastern and Southern Ukraine, but also in Kyiv. And the last couple of weeks actually have been pretty hard because after the blackout that happened in late November, we have been out of electricity for almost two days straight in the office. 

We had no electricity, no water, no signs of connection. For example, I couldn't connect to my parents and they didn't know what was happening back home in Dnipro. And so I was running around the city trying to find some connection just to say that I'm alive, that everything's okay, and it has been very hard for us to stay online and to work, and to deliver news. But we have made it, and this has only made us stronger as a team and also as individuals. 

Jakub: The Kyiv Independt offices now often run by candlelight, connecting to the internet using a Starlink - that’s the satellite internet box created and run by Elon Musk’s SpaceX. It’s been a lifeline for communication.

Working here right now, everything has to be pretty ad hoc, but it works. There’s something about living through a war that forces you to be pragmatic.

Helen: So we are now more prepared for the blackouts that could happen because after the blackout happened, we have bought everything that can possibly help us to survive. Starting from power banks that could recharge our phones and laptops, and a Starlink. 

We also have the systems that can recharge everything in the office. We have the lights now. We have food, we have prepared, we have done our best actually to make life in the office bearable and to, to actually, uh, make it comfortable.

Jakub: But comfort isn’t the priority now in Kyiv. It’s about survival. 

Helen: Yeah, so it's been a very interesting story because we started looking for the new office in late August. And since it has been four months, and at the beginning we were looking for a nice office with big windows. But then when the Russian attacks began, the criteria changed drastically. 

So first of all we were looking for an office that had a bomb shelter. We were looking for the office that could have access to a generator and to the roof, so we could put our Starlink system and all the generators. 

This had to be the office with maximum security that is far away from all the governmental blocks. These details, they would not concern us if it was not war, but now we are looking for the office that could be secure, that could be comfortable for our team to stay and to survive this winter, that will be very hard. Probably the hardest winter in our lives. 

Jakub: The Starlinks, the heightened security, the bomb shelter - these are all things which are allowing us to continue reporting on the war. 

But not everyone in Ukraine is so fortunate. With homes ripped apart by bombs and power a scarce commodity, many are facing a bleak winter.

Following the missile attacks on November 23rd, the Ukrainian authorities set up 4,000 places of refuge across the country to combat this. They are called Invincibility Centers, and they are a lifeline for civilians - a place to warm up, to charge their phones so they can connect with loved ones, to get some food, to find solidarity in community. 

Helen and I went to a local invincibility centre in Kyiv. Outside, it looked like a simple tent, but inside you’ll find power, food, a bed, a place to find refuge from the harsh Ukrainian winter.

We spoke to Alexander, who is helping run the centre. We’ve translated the conversation.

Helen: I can see that you are a very popular place, many people come to you. Please tell me how many people come here every day to warm up, charge their phones or some gadgets?

Alexander: Less now. At the peak, I think, at our point, there were about 50 people at the same time who were constantly here. This was on November 23-24-25. Then, as they gave a little more power, people were coming less and less. Now, on average, there are about six people a day who come here to work. It may be cold, but in principle there is light, there is coffee, Wi-Fi, heat, there is also a generator.

Helen: So, you have food and drinks?

Alexander: Yes, there is food, you can take everything on the shelves. There is coffee, there is a cooler with water, there is also hot water. If there is no Wi-Fi, there will be a Starlink, they gave it to us, so we have everything here.

Helen: Thank you so much for your answers. Tell me, are you happy to represent the invincibility centre, to work in such a place?

Alexander: I t gives you interesting experiences, because you do your job, and at the same time people can get what they need. Some to charge their phone - because some women came who had not spoken with their relatives for a long time, and it is important for them to get in touch. So, they said that finally after three days they were able to communicate with their family. So it gives people elevation and strength.

Helen: Thank you very much, you are doing very important work. Thank you so much.

Jakub: Disconnection from family is one of the most difficult parts of war, and it’s hitting Ukrainians hard. A talk on the phone, hearing from a loved one across the country - it’s these vital connections that are keeping morale high.

Helen and the team at the Kyiv Independent feel it too.

Helen: My biggest concern personally is having no connection with my family. But the biggest concern for me as part of the team, as part of the company, I guess, is the moral tiredness that we all have. We don't talk much about it, but every one of us feels it. It's like on the background, and it really can affect our work and our effectiveness. So with all these blackouts and all these massive attacks happening, it is crucially important to stay focused on what we do.

So I really hope that we survive this winter as a company and as a country. 

Jakub: Russian attacks on civilian infrastructure have been consistent throughout the war, but recently it’s a tactic that they have used more and more.

In late November a missile struck an apartment block in Vyshgorod, a northern suburb of Kyiv, killing three people and wounding 15. The WHO has recorded more than 700 strikes on hospitals since the war began. Just this week, attacks from Russian Kamikaze drones on the Ukrainian power grid have left some 1.5 million people without power.

This all amounts to a deliberate and consistent targeting of people who aren’t even on the frontlines. It’s a type of warfare that some have even labelled terrorism for its methodical brutality. 

Helen: First things first, by destabilising civilians, Russia destabilises the military as well. And every time we don't give up, every time we find new ways of invincibility, every time we show the whole world how strong we are. Every time we find new ways to survive these things we humiliate Russians. And we defeat them, and we help the armed forces of Ukraine

We now create our own invincibility without invincibility centres. We also have invincibility inside of us, inside every one of us. 

Jakub: The one thing I was struck by being back in Kyiv was just how exhausting life has become. Getting a hot meal or a warm shower isn’t easy, and that takes its toll.

But this is the point of Russia targeting civilians and civilian infrastructure.

The consistent drumbeat of bombs and blackouts in Ukraine is an attempt to sow fear amongst the population. 

Civilians have always been seen as fair game for Russia in this war, and the recent attacks on Ukraine’s power grid and other infrastructure is just a new way of terrorising them.

But it’s places like Kyiv’s invincibility centres that are safeguarding Ukrainians against this kind of barbarity. The people we spoke to were not cowed by exhaustion and cold, they were resolute. 

Being back in Kyiv was different this time round, but the people’s steadfast commitment to continue their struggle against the Russian invaders remained the same.

Can the same can be said of the Russian military?

Anastasiia: From Message Heard and the Kyiv Independent, you're listening to Power Lines: From Ukraine to the World.

Jakub: In this series, we're going to be mapping the undercurrents and global consequences of the war in Ukraine, beginning in Kyiv and following the roads out wherever they may lead. I'm Jakub Parusinski.

Anastasiia: And I'm Anastasiia Lapatina. Jakub, are you in the office? What is happening there in the background?

Jakub: So, I'm actually in the closet or sort of the meet and groom of the Kyiv Independent office.

Anastasiia: Oh, yeah. Right.

Jakub: The power is off.

Anastasiia: Oh, my God.

Jakub: Something that happens on a daily basis to all the Ukrainians throughout the country. We have a backup internet thanks to Starlink. But it's basically become a fact of life now in Kyiv, that if you want to have access to power, if you want to have access to internet, if you want to have heating and perhaps warm water, you need to either get lucky, be constantly on the move or follow the-

Anastasiia: That's terrible.

Jakub: Schedule of which region, which district of Kyiv is powered down when. And the whole reason is that since Russia has been losing for months now, they have switched from focusing the battle on the military side to very actively targeting civilian infrastructure.

Anastasiia: I feel like it's a bit unfair to say that they've switched from military to civilians because they've been targeting civilians from day one. But for sure recently they've increased their attacks and it's quite obvious what they're trying to do. They're trying to take the power and the heating and the water and the internet and the connection away from us. It's only to scare us off, that's the only goal.

Jakub: You're absolutely right, Nastya. From the beginning of the war, Russia has been targeting civilians. The thing that has changed over the last couple of months is the focus on targeting civilian infrastructure, meaning the power grid, internet, basically the way that the country runs.

And the purpose of it is, of course, to break Ukrainian spirit, or in other words, to terrorise the population.

Anastasiia: Of course.

Jakub: And that's actually the question that we want to ask this week. It's been on the minds of a lot of people now. Can we call Russia a terrorist state? And is that something that's actually helpful for Ukraine?

Anastasiia: It's a very interesting question because a lot of people in Ukraine evoke the term terrorism. But I'm not sure whether it's actually useful to use that term, because in my studies I've focused on terrorism, and in my view, it has always been something that let's say, little men use.

So, the very key part of terrorism is asymmetry. It's a little group that doesn't have enough resources. It doesn't have a state military, because it's not a state. It's usually a non-state actor that uses terrorism as a method.

So, for me, it was kind of a little weird to call Russia a terrorist state because I thought there must be a better term, because this one doesn't fit.

Jakub: The other question that comes to mind is, well, what is the goal of this? How does labelling Russia help? And the thing that I keep coming back to is the level of atrocities that have been perpetrated on the Ukrainian people is absolutely unheard of in Europe in recent decades, at the very least.

And for me, one of the reasons that people are just demanding and clamoring that Russia be labeled as a terrorist state is that there's this fear that they will get away with it.

[Music playing]

Nastya, for this episode, you spoke to someone you already knew, didn't you?

Anastasiia: I did. I was really excited because when we first started making this series, this was one of the first people that I knew we had to speak to, and he's one of the reasons why I even pitched this episode to begin with. And it's Bruce Hoffman.

Bruce is a political analyst whose work on terrorism and counter terrorism is some of the most forward thinking and respected in the field. It's a subject he's been studying for four decades.

And his academic positions include his tenured professorship at Georgetown University, in Washington DC and he's also a visiting professor at St Andrews University in Scotland.

His publications on terrorism include Holy Terror, Inside Terrorism, which is a book that like every expert in the field has. I actually came across Bruce's work because as I already mentioned it, I do terrorism studies in my degree, and Bruce's work is like the cornerstone of the field.

Jakub: Sounds amazing. Let's hear it.

Anastasiia: Hi Bruce. Thank you so much for joining us.

Bruce: Of course, Nastya. Thank you for having me.

Anastasiia: So, before we get into the whole Russian related ordeal of this, let's get some definitions down. What is terrorism to begin with?

Bruce: Well, before I answer what terrorism is, let me observe that you've asked probably the most impossible question imaginable, because over the past half century, literally no one has been able to really agree on the definition of terrorism.

Anastasiia: Okay.

Bruce: About 40 years ago, there was a very prominent academic survey of the leading experts in the 1980s on terrorism, and a hundred experts were pulled what their definitions are, and 104 definitions were provided.

So, even the people offering definitions offered multiple ones. And in the United States, for example, every different governmental agency has its own definition of terrorism.

Anastasiia: But then there is one list of like state sponsors of terrorism, right?

Bruce: Right. There's list of state sponsors of terrorism and everybody agrees on things like the designation of foreign terrorist organizations.

But at least the definition that I use (and it's the definition that has appeared in every addition of my book Inside Terrorism, since it was first published in 1998), is that terrorism is the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence, or equally importantly, the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change.

Anastasiia: Okay. Is there such a thing as a terrorist state?

Bruce: Of course, there's something as a terrorist state, because states throughout history have terrorised their own populations. We only have to go to the Stalinist purchase, for example, which consumed millions of people. Of course, Nazi persecution of Germans whether Jews, LGBTQ, Catholics, communists, socialists and others.

But I think this is an important issue, is that terrorism in its most commonly used and accepted sense, is something that's perpetrated by sub-state or non-state actors. It's clear that states terrorise populations and not only their own.

Often when they engage in war and throughout history, we can cite numerous examples of states terrorizing civilian populations in war. You can go back to ancient times and see that that's been a factor.

But at least in attempting to demarcate what something means in a useful sense, most commonly the word terrorism is reserved for non-state actors.

And then we talk about state terror. And state terror can fold easily into warfare. We just have to think in the United States, of General William Tecumseh Sherman's scorched earth policy has marched to the sea in the South during the Civil War.

Or the terror bombings of Guernica and other Spanish cities by the nationalist forces during the Spanish Civil War. Of course, things like the Nazis Blitzkrieg, the bombing of London, for example, fire-bombing of Dresden by the allies.

Anastasiia: Right.

Bruce: Bombs dropped on Hiroshima, Nagasaki, specifically targeted civilians. But I wouldn't call that terrorism. That still is a unique category. That I think should be reserved for non-state or sub-state actors. When states engage in the terrorizing or the terrorization of civilians, we already have a term to use for that. It's war crimes, and often it includes genocide.

So, we don't need to default to terrorism. But you've kind of hit the nail on the head in the sense that in contemporary times, and certainly over the past 20 years since 9/11, but even before, terrorism is an indisputably, pejorative or negative term.

And it's the go-to term for many people and international organisations and countries, when they really want to express their most fulsome opprobrium of another state or of an act (it doesn't have to be a state) that they don't approve of.

For instance, gosh, back in 2014 or 2015, there was the Sony Pictures hacked by North Korea, for example, that was referred to as terrorism because people were so bored by it. When produce on food shelves have been poisoned, even if it has no political motive, it's been called terrorism.

But it's not correct. It's become a catchphrase that we use for anything that we just want to express our profound moral disapproval of. And it doesn't mean that it's accurate. And I think it's muddied the term and confused the term.

[Music playing]

Jakub: It feels to me like in order for terrorism to work, you need a couple of ingredients. So, you need a population that you can actually terrorise, which means that civilians need to matter in the political process.

So, in a dictatorship, terrorism would not be quite as effective. Like democracy is particularly vulnerable.

The second thing which feels very important is the mass communication. Because if you can't sort of show pictures of people that are terrorised or are suffering or you can't sort of transmit fear, then it also isn't really that effective. Because it seems that terrorism is all about taking a relatively small violence scary act or input and trying to get these sort of out scaled effects through it.

Anastasiia: It's true that actually relatively few people die from terrorist attacks. But the amount of discussion it gets, the wars that are waged in the pursuit of ending this, we use this term with so much emotion with it, that the actual numbers and the actual semantics of what it is don't matter much.

Jakub: It seems that this is actually not the bug, it's the feature. It's exactly the goal of terrorism, which is ultimately in its end, political.

Which makes me feel that it's something that has been employed quite significantly by Russia now and the Soviet Union before, with the goal of sort of scaring the population. And by the way, I'd argue that the Soviet Union used fear as a way to control its own population in the past.

Anastasiia: Definitely.

Jakub: So, this kind of political technique, [Speaking Russian] as they say in Russian, that almost goes towards the same purpose as terrorism.

So, to some extent, 9/11 really was the beginning of the new life of the word terrorism. Right?

Anastasiia: Right, yeah.

Jakub: The U.S. suffers from a horrible terrorist attack, and all of a sudden, it becomes a global thing. And it becomes a global thing, not just for democracies, but lots of dictatorships all of a sudden say, no, no, no, no, no, these activists and whatever that are protesting about free speech or autonomous rights for their province, they're terrorists.

All of a sudden, everyone starts labelling their enemies as terrorists. And actually, in Ukraine, at the beginning when Russia invaded in 2014 and Donbas War started, the initial name of Ukraine's reaction was, an anti-terrorist operation.

Anastasiia: That's true. I've completely forgot about that. That seems like a lifetime ago now.

[Music playing]

Jakub: Where are we headed next?

Anastasiia: Well, now that we sort of know what terrorism is, I wanted to ask Bruce whether Russia's action in Ukraine actually fit into that commonly used definition.

There are a lot of comparisons being made in Ukraine between well-known terrorist acts (even as far as 9/11), and Russian attacks that deliberately target civilians, because I think something like 98% of all Russian missile sell attacks have targeted civilian infrastructure.

Bruce: Absolutely.

Anastasiia: Which is terrible. Are those comparisons fair? And since you already mentioned war crimes, are you just happy with us using the term war crimes to describe these and not terrorism?

Bruce: Well, they're not mutually exclusive, acts of terrorism can be war crimes. But generally speaking, we don't wish to endow terrorists with the credibility or the legitimacy of being an established nation state. And at least in history, we generally regard war crimes as committed by states.

And I think that's part of the issue is firstly, terrorist organizations tend to be at least historically small, non-state actors with a limited capacity for violence. Already that's very different from any state actors where they have established standing militaries to do their work for them in the case of aggressive wars.

Also, don't forget historically, at least for the past 50 years, more than half of all terrorists’ attacks go unclaimed. So, there's often not an address, there's nothing that can really be done.

We may have a suspicion who perpetrated it, but it's very difficult to arrest and then to assemble evidence that could be proven in a court of law. This is why the United States, 20 years ago resorted to the indefinite detentions of the Guantanamo detainees, because there was no evidence.

This is very different in the case of states waging an aggressive unprovoked war, because firstly, we have an international mechanisms through the Genevan Hague Conventions, we have an international Court of Criminal Justice. We have the ability to hold the leaders of states responsible for war crimes.

So, the identity of the perpetrator is almost always completely clear when it's a war crime, when it's terrorism, it's not always as obvious.

Anastasiia: Interesting.

Jakub: And to me that means it's an important distinction. It's not to take away. You said it yourself; terrorism is really a tactic when you come down to it. It's a mode of warfare.

The United States declared a war on terror, which I thought was enormously significant because terror is an emotion. It's something that makes you scared or anxious.

Anastasiia: Right, yeah.

Jakub: The mistake was using an emotion rather than a tactic. But your question goes to the heart of it. You can't declare a war on a tactic. And that's why I think, of course, what's happening in Ukraine are war crimes, and of course it's designed to terrorise the population.

But I would just argue we have other terms, especially legal terms, that we can apply much more effectively to describing those acts and holding the perpetrators responsible, than in the messiness of terrorism.

Anastasiia: There's another comparison that is very interesting to me, so I want to talk about it. The U.S. for example, still uses the terms of terrorism for various sanctions and for various methods of punishment, let's say, because the U.S. State Department does have a list of state sponsors of terrorism.

First of all, is the state sponsor of terrorism somehow different from the terms we've been using, like state terror, et cetera?

Bruce: Well, if Russia, for instance, was going to be named sponsor of state terrorism, I would've said the infiltration of the green little men into the Donbas some years ago, was much more of a justification of our criteria. Because they were clearly surrogate warriors. They were clearly instruments of the state that were being sent to subvert a sovereign state of its own standing and to use violence in the pursuit of those ends.

Once you've got armies and air forces and navies invading another country, honestly, what could be worse than unprovoked warfare? Aggressive warfare? To my mind, it may satisfy a psychological need on the part of people, which I understand completely to label something terrorism, because terrorism is such a negative pejorative word.

But I think genocide war crimes are far worse and far more serious because they're done on a grand scale. Don't forget that inherent in the definition of terrorism is that these sub-state groups have a limited capacity for violence. Even on 9/11, Al-Qaeda was not going to defeat or conquer the United States.

But it's very different when states invade other states, that's exactly what they're out to do. And we don't need a term like terrorism. War crimes and genocide are far more serious.

The fact that Russians have taken Ukrainian children away from their parents and have disappeared them in essence, this (Nicholas Kristof argued, I think very cogently last week in the New York Times), amounts to genocide and certainly conforms to the definition of genocide.

The violence being rained down upon the Ukrainian people that are causing unparalleled casualties, that does amount to a genocide. You're trying to kill off a large section of the population, to cause the government to capitulate. Genocide to me is a far worse term, a far more negative term, a far more serious accusation that can be proven in court than terrorism.

[Music playing]

Anastasiia: So Jakub, you had some sort of brilliant thought about ISIS.

Jakub: Well, that's what I spend most of my day on. What's interesting about the use of terrorism to persecute various wrongdoings is where it wasn't really that widely used, which is the case of ISIS.

So, ISIS perpetrates violent acts on a scale that we have never seen. And it feels to me like no one really spent much time thinking about do we need to call them terrorists? It was almost so obvious, that the question didn't really rise up.

But it feels like there's also another element to it, which is everyone agreed that we need to stop these guys. And when I look at how Ukrainians and other people around the world are sort of lobbying to get Russia described as a terrorist state, it feels to me like the goal is we need to make sure that their crimes are punished.

And when you see people like the French president Emmanuel Macron talking about security guarantees for Russia, and a host of other Western leaders talking about look, now is time to sort of look at negotiations. There is this fear that, oh my God, all of these absolutely horrid, barbaric acts that were perpetrated by Russia, by Russians will not be avenged.

And it feels to me like the fight to label them as terrorists is to make sure that they just don't slip away.

Anastasiia: Yeah. I think that's definitely what it is. Of course, there is the sanctions part of it. We just want to have them sanctioned as much as possible and maybe impossible. But it is also to make them into this group of outcasts whereby it would be so shameful to have any interactions or any negotiations or any trade with them, that it would literally equate to something like trading with ISIS.

Anyway, I think the point is to bring the emotion into it. I think the point is to use the emotional response that terrorism evokes in people to kind of galvanise all of this hatred towards Russia and all of this understanding of just how utterly evil their actions are, to just make it as shameful as possible to have any sort of interaction with them. I think that is probably the goal of the Ukrainian government that is pushing for this designation.

But then the question of justice that he mentioned, I'm not sure that plays that huge of a role because as Bruce already mentioned, there are other terms that can be used and its war crimes and Russia has perpetrated at least 50,000 of them. For our audience, just let that number sink in, at least 50,000 war crimes.

And the only kind of infrastructure we have to prosecute that is the International Criminal Court. And the nuances of how that body works and Russia's involvement and Ukraine's involvement in it, makes it close to impossible that I think Putin, for example, will ever stand trial.

Jakub: So, the EU actually recently designated Russia as a terrorist state.

Anastasiia: Right. But I think it's a bit more complicated than people perceive it to be. And I asked Bruce about these designations both in the UN and the U.S., what they mean, what the practical consequences are and whether they're actually useful.

[Music playing]

The EU, recently passed a resolution that said that Russia was a state sponsor of terrorism and it was pretty interesting because the EU doesn't actually have a legal basis for that. Like that doesn't really (as far as I understand), mean anything.

It's interesting that there is this kind of state infrastructure in the U.S. with the state sponsors of terrorism. Could you talk a bit about the history of those designations? Of course, this is all highly politicised, but I know that some countries that have been taken off the list, those cases were definitely very politicised in the procedures, how that happened.

Bruce: The state sponsorship of terrorism dates back to the 1980s when during the Reagan administration, a number of countries (Syria, Iraq, North Korea, Cuba for a time, Sudan, for example, Iran as well), were designated by the U.S. State Department, state sponsors of terrorism.

You're right to say that it's often political because groups are added and removed for variety of reasons. But the idea was that this would trigger a range of economic and other sanctions on those countries that would have a tangible effect on not only expressing the opposition to them of using terrorist organizations as shadow or covert warriors or surrogate warriors. But this would put some teeth into it.

And that if the United States took the lead, then NATO of course would follow. And then other countries in the United Nations, hopefully it would follow to isolate those countries and get them to change their policies.

So, that in essence is the history of it. What that state-sponsored list is designed to do is change state behaviour. But it's to change state behaviour and not using these surrogate or covert forces as an instrument to foreign policy.

And that's again, when a country then wages war against another country, in my view, it's just gone way beyond using surrogate or covert warriors. It's something that's quite obvious and should trigger a whole range of other sanctions, which it has done.

Anastasiia: Could you describe what are some of the consequences of a state being put on that list?

Bruce: Well, we're already pretty much there with Russia. It's very severe economic sanctions that prevents international commerce. It certainly embargoes on commercial goods, even critical commercial goods nowadays, which would be things like computer chips and things like that.

And also, very restrictive travel imposed on citizens of that country. Not just the leaders who, of course, their assets overseas can be seized, as has been happening. But also, it puts a really heavy burden on the population of the country involved in terms of not just their commercial activities, but just their travel and freedom of movements.

So, all these things are quite serious. As I said, all them are already being implemented. So, we don't gain all that much. It's not that there's additional teeth that would be added to the way Russia's being treated.

Anastasiia: Right. I think in terms of Russia, there's also the interesting case of Wagner, their Wagner military group, which I think there were discussions of the West designating that as a specific terrorist organization of its own.

But then again, I think if Russia just decides to somehow incorporate that within their military structure, for example, like Ukraine has done with Azov, back in the day or something like that. Not to equate the actions of Azov in Wagner, but just saying that to incorporate a private military group within the national military, then again that means that all sorts of terrorist labels are no longer necessary or needed.

Bruce: Well, I think some could argue too that there was discussion in the United States of designating the Azov battalion in years past, or the National Corps as terrorist groups, but they didn't succeed because it was much more ambiguous situation. In that, acts of international terrorism were not sustained.

The Russian Imperial Movement, for instance, wasn't even designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the State Department two years ago. Firstly, that was a very important step forward because it was one of the first far right overseas groups that received that designation.

But it was very selective. And it wasn't even the FTO, the Foreign Terrorist Organization definition, it was a half-step below. It was the specially designated foreign terrorist entity is what it was described. So, even in that case, there was controversy.

I would argue that, at least from what I've gathered in the United States is that Azov and the National Corps became … whatever justification, the arguments for designating them may or may not have had, I think that changes in their structure and in their operations convince people that it was inappropriate. And that's what these designations are designed to do.

Vagner would be I think a much more suitable designation as a terrorist entity and Russia as a state sponsor of terrorism, than to label Russia itself because of the invasion of Ukraine as a state sponsor. As I said, I think that it's much more serious to focus on the war crimes and the genocide.

[Music playing]

Anastasiia: The EU designation, actually, as far as I understand, correct me if I'm wrong, but as far as I understand, it does close to nothing because there isn't actually a legal mechanism for what it is.

It was essentially just a resolution, like a document in which the EU affirmed a particular opinion. It's kind of how they recognise the Holodomor genocide, for example.

But it doesn't have like a string of economic sanctions additionally to it or some sort of cutting and trade or isolating diplomatic ties, nothing of that sort. So, it's just a symbolic gesture, isn't it?

Jakub: You are right, Nastya. It's mostly about the European parliament coming together and making a symbolic gesture. Unlike the U.S. where that kind of designation actually triggers a host of legal consequences, especially in terms of finances and those kinds of things, the EU actually called out on its member states saying that, “Look, we've designated Russia as a state sponsor of terrorism, now whatever that means for you, please act accordingly.”

But at the same time, it's not a completely empty gesture. It does send an important message, and it has a lot to do with how the EU works versus how the U.S. works. And it was also I think, an important point in rallying various stakeholders from across the union together on completing work on the latest 9th sanctions package.

So yeah, more of a consensus measure than a legal trigger. Nastya, have you seen the sledgehammer video? And I genuinely hope you haven’t.

Anastasiia: I have not.

Jakub: I did. It's Vagner executing one of their own for surrendering and then speaking out against them.

Anastasiia: Right.

Jakub: With a sledgehammer.

Anastasiia: I've heard of the incident. I did not see the video. Did you watch it?

Jakub: A portion of it, yes. It's exactly as bad as you think. Everyone who has compared it to ISIS style execution is-

Anastasiia: I was literally on the tip of my tongue just now.

Jakub: It is exactly the same. It is exactly the same atmosphere. It is the same type of organisation. It's hard to sort of distinguish between the two.

Anastasiia: Can you talk a bit about their history? Did they appear in 2014 as like a kind of Russian proxy tool in Donbas, or were they around before?

Jakub: So, Vagner traces its origins to around the time that the Russian invasion of Ukraine started in Donbas, in 2014. And it's been a bit of a shadowy group that sort of operates beyond the laws, beyond the rules.

And sort of, you could very much say beyond the civilised world, it's full of neo-Nazis, far-right extremists, prisoners, criminals. A lot of people have likened it to the Kaminski Brigade or SS RONA, which was this Russian unit that collaborated with the Nazis, that fought with the Nazis, that was composed of basically all kinds of criminals. And anyone that they could pick up was widely seen as one of the most brutal and barbaric organisations.

Anastasiia: But it's also important how global their reach is. Like they're involved in Africa, they're involved in Syria, if I'm not wrong.

Jakub: Yeah.

Anastasiia: They're definitely involved in Ukraine. And during the war, they took part in the brutal siege of Mariupol. There were stories of Wagner guys being in Bucha. Though some of these things are pretty hard to fan check, but the Wagner group is like one of the most brutal and notorious tools that Russia has in terms of manpower.

Jakub: Absolutely. And it's also a tool that's been used quite, I would say, widely to terrorise Russian and various allied troops. Obviously, a very bad bunch of guys, to put it mildly. Terrorists, I think yes, absolutely so. And as Bruce says, like the case for labelling Vagner as a terrorist organization is quite strong. And perhaps that's also one that is more useful.

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Anastasiia: Are these designations, you said that their prime purpose is to change state behaviour. Have they done that? Have they been successful?

Bruce: Yes, but I wouldn't say necessarily in a linear or consistent sense. It did prompt Libya in 2003 or 2004, I think it was 2003, to stop developing chemical and biological weapons, for example, to cease its support of foreign terrorist entities.

At times it has persuaded countries. Syria, for instance, was dropped from the list temporarily when it was cooperating with the United States on the war on terror. It was then reinserted onto the list when the Syrian civil war began.

But again, Syria wasn't put on the list because of what it was doing to its own population. It was put on the list because it was using terrorist groups as surrogates.

International law, the problem is that it always lacks a mechanism of coercive enforcement. There's an enforcement that’s certainly the collective moral opprobrium of states and the economic sanctions.

But there's some countries like Iran, for example, that regard with tremendous pride, the sanctions that are imposed on them, and the fact that they can withstand them. So, it cuts both ways.

Anastasiia: Right. It's just kind of like Ukrainians joke that they take pride of the fact that they're sanctioned by Russia.

Bruce: Right. Yeah, exactly. But we live in an imperfect world.

Anastasiia: Of course.

Bruce: I think what's important is that certainly the entirety of the free world has recognised what is going on in Ukraine as an unprovoked war of aggression, that very quickly has slid into the serial sustained perpetration of war crimes and indeed genocide. That's very important.

But as we know, these things unfold at a very slow pace. The consequences of all them, whether it's the sanctions imposed on state sponsors throughout history, or even the sanctions currently enforced against Russia, take time to have effect. And of course, when civilians are dying, everyone is rightly very impatient.

Anastasiia: I was just thinking that, I think this kind of goes back to something that I think about very often because I study politics. All of these discussions can so often be so non-emotional and people in the fields take pride in being objective and not letting their emotions affect their opinions.

But then the whole ordeal of political decisions, we're all humans who make these decisions. And we have these methods of punishing a state, and we can use the terms terrorism, or we can use the terms war crimes, and we have ways to legally pursue both, but still somehow, we resort to the one that evokes more emotion.

And we do that on a state level too. Like it's the Ukrainian government that's pushing for these designations. It's just very interesting to see that.

Bruce: No, rightly so. And I certainly don't fault the Ukrainian government for pushing in all directions.

Anastasiia: No, totally none. Yeah.

Bruce: It’s just I'm sitting here in Washington DC in a comfortable home that's not being shelled or bombed. And it's easy for me to make all these very academic assertions that sound very reasonable and objective.

But we're talking about people dying and suffering, and indeed not just — as the winter comes, dying and suffering with very … that they'll be cold. They may go hungry. This is like very, very serious means of warfare that we should rightly condemn in the strongest possible terms.

My only argument is that terrorism may be immensely satisfying, emotional to label this type of aggression, but I just don't think it's accurate.

And going back to your point, why with someone like Putin or Russia, they're treated differently like terrorists. The one thing we haven't addressed (and maybe you were getting to this, the elephant in the room), is that I think the United States and the international community is absolutely desperate not to provide Putin with an excuse or an opportunity to use a nuclear weapon, certainly on a tactical level, that would be a game changer and just the whole strategic nuclear issue.

As a child of the Cold War, I remember very clearly ducking underneath desks when there were air raid sirens in my public school in New York City. I remember very clearly the Cuban Missile Crisis. These are things I never thought we'd have to think about again.

But yet we are, and quite seriously. And that I think also shows the desperation of Russia and the fact that at least in its sabre-rattling, it is already crossed the line by threatening these weapons.

And that plays an enormous part, I think, in the calculations, certainly in the United States of not, for instance, labelling it a state sponsor, which might choke off certain diplomatic avenues, not necessarily to resolve this war, because of course president Zelenskyy and the Ukrainian people have declared that there's no compromise and that there's no negotiations.

But to prevent what would really be a disastrous line being crossed in terms of international security.

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Anastasiia: Okay. Bruce, thank you so much for joining us. It was really interesting to listen to you.

Bruce: You're very welcome. Thank you very much for having me.

Anastasiia: Okay. So, I want to read you a resolution that was introduced to the U.S. Congress; “To designate Russia a terrorist state.” And I just thought that the wording here was quite interesting. And to be clear this resolution has not been passed. It's been introduced and it's being reviewed and debated, et cetera.

It says that, “The direction of President Vladimir Putin, the government of the Russian Federation, has and continues to promote acts of international terrorism against political opponents and nation states.

“It also engages in campaign of terror, utilizing brutal force, targeting civilians during the Second Chechen War.”

It also mentions how since 2014, Russia's government has supported the so-called separatists engaging in acts of violence against Ukraine in Donbas.

And then it also mentions Wagner talking about how the Russian Federation spreads terror throughout the world through private military networks and mercenaries such as the Wagner Group, in an effort to project power cheaply and deniably.

So, my point is, first of all, the conversations of Russia being or not being a state sponsor of terrorism or a terrorist state or whichever you want, is a much broader conversation than Ukraine.

And I do think that together with what they did in Chechnya and together with what they did in Syria, I do think it starts looking a bit more convincing.

Jakub: Yeah. Don't get me wrong, I definitely agree that Russia employs terrorism as one of its toolkits in the asymmetrical war that it wages on Ukraine as well as on the West. For me, Bruce's argument’s that war crimes and the crime of genocide are so much bigger, they're persuasive.

Anastasiia: I think I agree with that.

Jakub: Yeah. They are persuasive. But in the end, if sort of the label, if the designation is something that can mobilise Western governments and governments all around the world, by the way, this isn't something that should be uniquely western that we abhor and oppose terrorism, then let's do it. Let's get that label.

But I do somehow feel like it is almost reductive to say that, “Yeah, it's a state sponsor of terrorism.” No, it's actually worse.

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Anastasiia: In two weeks in Power Lines, we're speaking with Lauren Zabierek, the Executive Director of the Cyber Project at Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center, to hear more about the war that is being fought online.

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Anastasiia: Power Lines is a partnership between the Kyiv Independent and Message Heard. It was produced by Bea Duncan, Harry Stott, and Talia Augustidis. The executive producer is Sandra Ferrari. The theme music is by Tom Biddle and Alfie Godfrey.