Conflicted S4 E24 Bonus: Q&A - Airstrikes on Yemen and the Future of the Middle East

Speakers: Thomas Small & Aimen Dean

Thomas: Hello, dear listeners, Thomas Small here coming to you on a cold January morning for a special episode of Conflicted on what has been an eventful and troubling start to 2024.

And as ever, I'm with my wonderful co-host, speaking to me from warmer climes. Aimen Dean, how are you?

Aimen: I'm fine. I just came back from the swimming pool, man.

Thomas: Come on. Don't rub my face in it. Goodness. I'm literally sitting here in my dressing gown. I'm freezing.

Aimen: And I just switched off the AC because it was a little hot actually.

Thomas: Well, Northern Europe meets the Middle East, that's Conflicted for you. At the end of season four, you'll remember, dear listener, we embarked on a grand five-part series looking at the history and politics of Yemen.

From the birth of the modern state in the mid-20th century through dictator Ali Abdullah Saleh’s rule, the Arab Spring, and the Houthis takeover leading to the Civil War, which has engulfed the country since 2014.

Now, unless you've been living under a rock, you'll have seen the dramatic recent developments in Yemen, which have seen the Houthis add their muscle to the spreading conflict in the Middle East.

The Houthis have been hijacking and bombing commercial shipping vessels in the Red Sea, and now they are being bombed in return by a coalition led by the U.S. and the UK. What a time to be alive, Aimen.

Aimen: Indeed, and goodness, it's been very, very busy time, I think for all of us who work in this industry.

Thomas: I'm sure that's the case, Aimen. I have been looking forward to this episode well for weeks, really, because unlike you, my access to information on the Middle East is basically limited to the media.

And in November and December with everything that was happening, I just realised, gosh, I don't know what to trust here, which reports are accurate. The fog of war definitely had descended on my mind.

So frankly, around Christmas time, I sort of withdrew a bit. I focused more on my spiritual life Aimen. Because God knows the mystery of the Holy Trinity is less complicated than Middle Eastern geopolitics at the moment.

So, I'm really looking forward to talking to you. Today, we're doing a special episode to answer listeners' questions on what this all means for the Civil War in Yemen, what the future holds for Israel and Gaza, and whether all this will continue to escalate into a wider regional and even global conflict. Let's jump right in.

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Now, before we start answering your questions dear listener, I want to point you all in the direction of a new Conflicted platform we're launching in the coming weeks. Many of you will have interacted with us on X, formerly Twitter and on our Facebook discussion group. And we've always been blown away by the responses we get and the community that has grown around our show.

So, we want to take that a step further by launching the Conflicted Community, which will be your hub on Discord for all things Conflicted.

What is Discord? I hear you cry. Well, I'm glad you asked. Discord is an app, which is essentially an instant messaging community platform, which will allow you to discuss all things Conflicted with fellow dear listeners, to share resources we mention in the show and to engage in riveting post episode debates.

This is a paid for community and for a small monthly fee, you'll get access to the Discord channel, the opportunity to chat with myself and lucky you, Aimen, exclusive content and bonus episodes and ad free listening as well.

If this sounds up your street (and dear listener, why on earth wouldn't it), then please do register your interest through the link levellr.com/conflicted. That's L-E-V-E-L-L-R.com/conflicted.

You can find that link and more about this in the show notes. We are hugely excited to get the Conflicted Community up and running, and we'll be launching it in the coming weeks. So, watch this space.

Now, Aimen, turning to the Middle East, or really the miserable East, it really is looking like the miserable East at the moment, isn't it, Aimen?

Aimen: Indeed. It's been extremely exhausting both mentally and physically, Thomas. Of course, the events are horrific to see and horrific to experience, not to mention, it's been mentally exhausting and physically exhausting because of my line of work. There isn't a dull moment.

And somehow since I left the UK a year and a half ago and I relocated to the Middle East, I feel like I'm in the middle of it. Where you really live the events, you feel them around you, you can actually tell the effects.

People coming from war zones and telling their stories. You hear about the aid that is going to Gaza. You see a group of Yemenis disgruntled and talking in a cafe somewhere and insulting the country they are living in at the moment.

So, while you were able to switch Thomas off from the events, my clients never let me off the hook. Not a single day, not a single night.

Thomas: Well, you're the guy to talk to. Someone once said, “War is the health of the state,” but it seems that war is the health of Aimen Dean as well.

Now, since we last spoke about the region following the attacks of 7th October, the war in Gaza has been raging. Aimen, how would you describe the situation there on the ground now? I mean, Israel continues to launch error strikes against positions, Hamas positions in Gaza. And civilian casualties in great numbers at times continue.

The Hamas-run Gaza Health Ministry says that the death toll in Gaza is more than 24,100 people. The Israeli defence forces say that 8,000 or so Hamas fighters have been killed. What's your estimation, Aimen, of the situation there on the ground?

Aimen: Horrific, without any shadow of a doubt, it is horrific. What's happening in Gaza would bleed the heart of anyone who's watching it. There is no question about that.

And I always struggle whenever I brief people from either side of the divide or people who are neutral without having to touch on the fact that there is a level of brutality and a level of indiscriminate killing that is happening. But we have to come back, and we say, well, it was inevitable.

Thomas: Yeah. You said in our emergency episode in October, you said that Israel was going to respond with great brutality to the provocation of the 7th of October attacks, and Hamas launched those attacks. Let's be honest.

They certainly would've known surely, Aimen, what was coming, or have even Hamas and its leadership been taken away by the scale of Israel's response?

Aimen: I think they were taken away, not by Israel's level of response. They knew that the Israelis are going to be vicious and brutal in their response. There's no question about that. It was going to happen regardless.

However, I think they were mistaken in believing that they will be aided by the so-called access of resistance members, talking here about Iran, Hezbollah and Lebanon, the Iraqi Shia militias, and the Houthis in Yemen, to some extent.

They thought that they will enter the war with their entire might in order to finally once and for all finish the Israelis. But in fact, they started to believe right now that maybe, maybe there was another agenda here.

Because you see any entity, any governing entity, and by the way, Hamas is not a legitimate governing entity, but it is a de facto governing entity. And so, therefore, their primary responsibility towards those who they govern is the protection of their welfare and their wellbeing.

And therefore, if they feel, we are surrounded, we are besieged, we are this, we are that, no problem. But any action you take must take into account the gains in contrast to the losses. Are you going to gain more than what you would lose? And the answer here is definitely no, no, no.

Thomas: So, what's this other agenda you mentioned?

Aimen: I truly believe that Iran wanted to punish Israel and the West for the killing of Qasem Soleimani.

Thomas: So, this is the former head of the Quds Force who was assassinated in 2020 or 2019. Remind me.

Aimen: Yes. Qasem Soleimani was assassinated by Abu Ivanka, as we call him in the Middle East, known as President Trump.

Thomas: Donald Trump.

Aimen: Yeah. He was assassinated on the 3rd of January in Baghdad in 2020.

Thomas: And of course, dear listener, we did do an emergency episode on that event back in 2020. So, go back and listen if you're not up to date.

Aimen: Indeed. So, there is an issue here also, is the fact that Iran wanted from the beginning to sabotage a Middle East that is heading towards the normalisation of relations between the GCC countries, especially Saudi Arabia and Israel, as well as the solidification of the nation state model, because Iran hate the nation state model. So, they wanted to sabotage it.

Thomas: As you made clear in our emergency episode in October. Now, you say that the Hamas expected the access of resistance to get involved.

Now, we'll talk about the Houthis, one member of that resistance in a second, but the axis of resistance hasn't been completely uninvolved. I mean, there have been missile strikes from Hezbollah, Hezbollah and Israel are fighting each other, assassinations taking place in Beirut.

So, what level of engagement are the other members of the axis of resistance presenting in the field of battle?

Aimen: Well, I mean, of course, basically Hezbollah is exchanging fire with the Israelis in the Southern Lebanese border. And of course, it's a Northern Israeli border, and the exchanges being heavy. And as we speak today, there has been one of the heaviest air strikes by the Israelis against Hezbollah in the South of Lebanon.

But nevertheless, we are not talking about this massive 2006 style war that Hamas was hoping for. Also, they were hoping that the Houthis in Iran would have intervened much earlier than they would have indicated before.

So, in a sense, it feels as if Iran was lining up its children with the Houthis and the Iraqi militias and the Hezbollah and Hamas in their racing track, and they're all ready. And then as soon as Iran pulled the trigger for the starting of the race, Hamas left and started sprinting, but the others stayed put.

Thomas: Well, some analysts say that this is an indication that Iran wasn't the ultimate mastermind behind the 7th of October, and that Hamas kind of carried it out on its own, maybe with a certain amount of coordination from Iran.

But why would Iran lead Hamas down the Primrose path in that way if Iran had masterminded the operation?

Aimen: Well, because they wanted one of their proxies to hurt Israel and the West as much as possible. So, they went to the only Sunni proxy, a disposable one, and they decided that, yeah, that's it.

This is the one that will take our revenge. This is the one that will create massive upheaval for the Israelis to remind the Israelis, okay, Hamas is just 10 times smaller than Hezbollah, and therefore this is what they can do to you in one day, if you ever try to attack us in the future, well we have the bigger one in the north that we can do.

And so, it was multiple birds killed with one stone as far as Iran is concerned. One is revenge for Qasem Soleimani. Two is a reminder to everyone how much Iran can sabotage the Middle East. And a third one also the same time, is that okay, I can use a disposable proxy in the meantime, a Sunni one rather than a Shia one.

But what Iran is forgetting here is the fact that the Israelis know this, and this is why they are egging on, and they are willing to go and destroy the crown jewel of Iran's deterrence in this entire big strategic game, which is Hezbollah.

That is why the Israelis are pushing and pushing and pushing and pushing Hezbollah further and further into accepting the reality. Either you withdraw north of the Litani River in Lebanon away from the Israeli border, or face a total destruction, something that Hezbollah won't accept.

And therefore, the possibility of a massive conflict between Hezbollah and Israel is now almost a certainty. Almost a certainty.

Thomas: How extremely interesting, Aimen. I mean, Iran's gambit certainly has succeeded in terms of shifting the chess pieces on the geopolitical game board of the Middle East on seriously continuing to undermine America's authority in the region. America's prestige globally, Israel's normalisation program with Arabs.

Any idea vague and frankly imaginary as it already was, of a two-state solution, is about as dead as it possibly could be imagined. Iran's gambit in the short-term at least seems to have worked very well.

But let's move to Yemen. In terms of what has been going on in Yemen, our dear listener, PJ Spencer asked us on X “It would be nice,” he asked, “To have an updated understanding of the state of the Civil War in Yemen just prior to the conflict breaking out in Gaza.”

So, he mentions the tenuous ceasefire with Saudi Arabia, et cetera. In our five-part series on Yemen, Baraa, our dear friend, he made it clear that there was a kind of relative calm because of the peace brokered by China, between Saudi and Iran and the Houthis, et cetera.

So, just before the Houthis decided that they had to respond aggressively to the events of October 7th and the Israeli response to those events, what was the situation in Yemen like?

Aimen: Well, I wish Baraa was here. Hi, Baraa, if you're listening. So, I think, in my opinion, the Houthis were stolen for time. They were in a period of endless negotiations with the Saudis. They were having this contentious point between them and the Saudis.

The Saudis insist on being regarded by all parties in Yemen, and that include both the government in Aden and the Houthis in Sana’a as a mediator. The Houthis were refusing for a while and saying, “No, no, no, no, you are a active belligerent participant in this conflict.”

Then they relented just a month before the conflict and said, “Okay, okay-

Thomas: The Houthis relented. Yeah.

Aimen: Yes. They said, “We will grant you the status of a mediator.” However, as soon as the conflict started between the Israelis and Hamas, this is when the Houthis found in this conflict, a new lease of life for their troubled militant movement in Yemen. How?

You see, they found in this conflict a golden opportunity. First of all, Israel's too far away, good. When I was young, someone offend me in the playground in the school, so I pretend as if I'm going to lunge at him. And of course, basically one of my friends would be holding me, and I will say, loudly, “Let me go, let me go.”

And then I would whisper, “Don’t, don't you ever let me go.” So, I have no interest in fighting. So, of course, this is the Houthis, basically, they are firing at Israel knowing basically that the Israelis are too far away. They are 2000 kilometres away.

So, this is when they thought that we have our golden opportunity. We don't have an immediate border. Perfect. We send a token, few ballistic missiles and drones and cruise missiles, which until now did not even cause a single scratch on a single Israeli, whether civilian or military.

And so, therefore, they win the domestic propaganda battle, their battle for the heart and minds, the narratives battle that is going on in Yemen.

Now, when they then invite an aggression by the Americans and by the Brits, everyone will say, “You see.” The Houthis will say, “Look, look, look, look, look, we told you we are against the imperialism. We are against the forces of global arrogance. We are this, we are that.”

The usual slogan soup that we always hear about. In other words, they want to paint their enemies as pro-Israel inside Yemen and outside.

Thomas: Of course, you mean the Houthis enemies inside Yemen, the government in Aden et cetera. If the Houthis can tar their fellow Yemeni antagonists as being pro-Israel, it helps them win the hearts and minds of the people.

Now, you say Aimen, that the ballistic missile attacks, the drone attacks at Israel cause no damage. The Houthis probably knew it would cause no damage. But what about the more recent Houthis engagement with commercial shipping vessels in the Red Sea? That was massively provocative to the whole world.

The calculus there, the Houthis calculus, is surely slightly different. So, we have another question from a dear listener, StrangerinaStrangeMeme on X … what a world we live in, Aimen. Honestly.

Aimen: Love our listeners.

Thomas: This person asks, “What are the Houthis objectives in the Red Sea? And what impact are they likely to have on the Civil War?”

I think probably the answer to that second half of the question is the same as you said, the Houthis aggression is redounding to their benefit within the Civil War calculus there, because the Yemenis are realising that yes, the Houthis are resisting imperial aggression.

But the first half of that question, what are the Houthis objectives in the Red Sea? What are they thinking, Aimen?

Aimen: Well, actually, to answer this question, we have to ask, what is Iran thinking? Because we cannot take the Houthis actions in the Red Sea without taking into account the actions of Iran in the region.

And I'll tell you why. And this is some information that came to me in September. As you know, I was more or less aware of the terms of Iran's agreement with the Saudis. It was brokered by the Chinese in March of 2023.

Thomas: Yes. Which you laid out for us so kindly in our episode last year on Yemen. Yeah.

Aimen: Exactly. So, and one of the terms is that the Iranian experts, Iranian ballistic missiles and cruise missiles and drone experts must leave Yemen, which they did.

But then in September, I've received this information without disclosing the source, or even from which place that information came, in which it says that the Saudis were extremely angry that their intelligence picked up the return of the experts from Iran back to Yemen, as well as the return of Hezbollah experts back into Yemen.

So, when I saw that, and of course I briefed some clients at the time about it, we were worried, and it's like, what does it mean? Is it going to be the presumption of hostilities?

But then October 7th happened two, three weeks later, and we started looking at each other and thinking, “Uh-huh, okay, was Iran unaware of it already? And this is why they placed them there in advance of any potential event.” That's the first thing.

The second thing is that there is an Iranian spy ship that is sailing across from the Southern Red Sea to the Northern Arabian Sea crossing Bab al-Mandab Strait all the time. And that Iranian spy ship has been feeding the Houthis information about the movement of vessels, commercial and military throughout the entire last two and a half months.

Thomas: So, Iran is directly involved in this aggression against Red Sea shipping.

Aimen: Look, Thomas, you and I, we know each other now since 2014. Almost like we are coming to the 10th anniversary, happy 10th anniversary to my, to you my dear-

Thomas: Happy anniversary.

Aimen: So, you remember when we met, we were working on something that is Yemen related, and I sent you a clip of a Lebanese Hezbollah individual related to Hezbollah talking on Iraqi TV, belonging to the Iraqi militias about how the Houthis, their allies are controlling the maritime roots.

That was in 2015. And he said exactly this. He said, “Nahn salatin albahr al'ahmar.” Do you remember this phrase? We are the Sultans of the Red Sea.

So, when people tell me, “Oh Aimen, you're talking conspiracy theories here, you're talking whatever,” guys, there is literally hours of material online with people themselves who are Iranian IRGC officers, who are Hezbollah officials, who are Houthi officials, themselves are saying it, loud and clear that this is their agenda, this is what they want to do.

And so, it is a coordinated effort because Iran wants to send a message to the world, no peace in the Middle East without us being the boss in the region.

Thomas: And that includes no global shipping, unless the whole world just accepts this fact that we are the hegemonic power of the region, not the United States, not Israel, not the Saudis.

Aimen: Exactly.

Thomas: So, Iran's sending that message, let's talk about the message that the U.S. and the UK have sent back in return.

Eliza Gosling, a dear listener on Facebook, asks “I'd like to hear Thomas and Aimen's perspectives on the recent military strikes.” I think she means the UK, US military strikes in Yemen. “Did the UK do the right thing? And where are other European countries in this, the UK has been referred to as a U.S. puppet with their recent military strikes on Yemen. Where do the likes of France and Germany sit in all this?”

So, dear listener, as you I'm sure you know, on Friday the 12th of January, the UK and the U.S. “executed” deliberate strikes on over 60 targets at 16 Iranian backed Houthis militant locations.

The Pentagon described these targets as radar systems, drone storage and launch sites, missile storage and launch facilities, and Houthis command and control nodes. And a Houthi spokesman has said that five of its members were killed and six injured.

Not a tremendously high death count, I must say, but Aimen, as to Eliza's questions, did the UK do the right thing? And what about other European powers? Where do they sit in this?

Aimen: First of all, I believe that the U.S. and the UK did not do the right thing at all. At all. They should have done more.

Thomas: I mean, I must say I've been in touch with Baraa over WhatsApp in the last few days. In fact, he wrote a very strongly worded, I must say, a very powerful message, a letter to the Times of London, which was published in which he argued something very similar.

Aimen: Exactly. Because why? Do you know why the Saudis, the Egyptians and the Emiratis did not join the coalition that the U.S. built? The so-called Guardians of Prosperity, whatever it is.

The reason for these powers not joining, even though many people would think that, hey, it’s Saudi Arabia, hey, it is the UAE, it’s Egypt, they are the ones who, if they joined, that would give legitimacy to this entire exercise.

But because, and this is where many listeners would be surprised of what I'm going to say, because when the Saudis and the Emiratis and the Egyptians asked the Americans, they said, “Okay, perfect coalition with you.

Goodness. Okay, are you going all the way or are they going to be just small surgical strikes, and then you will leave us to our own devices to get slaps by the Houthis once you leave?”

So, the Americans said, “Oh, no, no, no. It's just basically for small strikes here and there,” they said, “Get lost. We're not going to be part of your coalition.”

Thomas: I'm glad you brought that up, Aimen. Because another dear listener, Michael Higgins on Facebook asked why Saudi Arabia hadn't taken any action, hadn't joined in on the UK/U.S. airstrikes, especially as it would've given them, what he suggests would be a PR opportunity to show that they’re policing the region and degrading their enemy.

But you are saying that the Saudis might have been happy to join in if the U.S. and the UK had organised a much more comprehensive response.

Aimen: Exactly.

Thomas: I mean, Baraa was telling me, and I don't think he'll oppose me saying this out loud, he was telling me that the solution, as always, is to work directly with those Yemeni military forces on the ground who could be rallied to fight the Houthis.

Airstrikes alone over the last eight years have not really done much to change the situation. Airstrikes is a tired strategy for shifting political realities when they don't suit you.

Aimen: Exactly. And also, I need to stress that the Saudis told the Americans either go big or go home. Even I remember when Saudi official was telling me that it feels as if the Americans are wearing the fluffiest of all velvet gloves, when it comes to the Houthis for the fear of not spreading the conflict.

He said to me, “Sometimes fear of provoking conflicts, invite conflicts.” This is the problem.

Thomas: It is the problem. But there's a tremendously powerful line of analysis that comes from the United States really saying that beginning with Barack Obama, and continuing now into the administration of President Biden, the United States foreign policy apparatus has had one goal in mind, one preeminent goal not to enter into war against Iran.

No matter how much the ghost of John McCain hovers over the Senate chanting, “Bomb, bomb, bomb, bomb, Iran.”

Aimen: Iran.

Thomas: The foreign policy apparatus and the Pentagon knows, quite frankly, that America cannot win in a war against Iran. Therefore, it does not want to start such a war. So, that's why it has the velvet gloves.

And I say all this Aimen, because our dear listener, Bill Richard on Facebook asks us, “What is the most productive thing the UK and the U.S. could be doing militarily in Yemen or even the region,” he says, “To achieve long-term peace, leave things completely alone, continue with airstrikes in Yemen against the Houthis, or is there more the West could be doing?”

Now, I don't know what you say, Aimen. And we'll get to this at the end of the episode. But I am extremely pessimistic about the West's America's capacity to prosecute war intelligently in the region, in such a way that it would actually solve the problem.

Aimen: Look, I am one of those who will never, ever, ever, ever advocate a direct war with Iran, let me put this out to every single listener here. I do not believe the solution is to have a direct conflict with Iran, because first of all, Iran is uninvadable and a war with them directly unwinnable, and for multiple reasons.

And one of it is just the geography. It's a massive country. It's 1.7 million square kilometres and topography, it is mountainous. It is three times the size of Afghanistan. So, it is three times more difficult than Afghanistan. So, forget it, it's not going to happen.

But here is where I advocate, I still advocate war, I still advocate a massive, overwhelming force, but not against Iran.

Thomas: Against the Houthis.

Aimen: Against every single proxy they have, every single non-state actor that is armed to the teeth. Every illegitimate body of politics or body of military need to be removed, surgically removed from the face of the Middle East in order for the Middle East to go back into normality.

Thomas: It sounds to me, Aimen, that you are in fact, therefore advocating the Israeli policy that you outlined at the beginning of the episode. We'll get back to this. We're going to take a quick break and when we return, we'll be answering more of your questions, dear listeners. A few more on Iran and what all this means for the future of the region. We'll be right back.

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We are back. Now Aimen, before the break, you said that you advocate war, you advocate that the West and presumably an alliance of global powers tactically, but with full force dislodge those non-state actors in the region linked to Iran.

You earlier in the episode said that Israel right now is actually trying to provoke Hezbollah into launching a war against them more than Hezbollah actually wants in order to create the conditions for just such a war, if I've understood you correctly.

Aimen: Yes, yes. I mean, ironically, I don't want to sound pro-Israeli, but in this sense, the Israelis would be doing the world and the region of favour if they get rid of Hezbollah, but they can't on their own, forget it. It's impossible.

So, therefore, they need the might of the U.S. They need the might of the European Union, let me put it this way, for me, and for every rational individual in the Middle East, for the sake of peace. Look, Iran is like a Persian cat that has long claws.

And what you do for your pet, when they have long claws, you come and declaw them basically a little bit, so they don't scratch the sofas, scratch the wires, scratch everything that you hold dear, valuable in your house.

Thomas: Your metaphors and analogies, Aimen. Honestly, you should just be in the meme making business.

Aimen: Who said I'm not. But anyway, so I can tell you that for me, when people say what you want? You want a prolonged war with Iran, I say no, Iran will not engage in direct conflict if we don't engage them in direct conflict.

Therefore, the best way to do it is they are holding guns to the heads of the modern nation states in the Middle East, that is Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, the UAE, they are occupying for Arab capitals, Baghdad, the Damascus, Beirut and Sana’a.

Why? And for what end, and did they could do any good? Just look at the state of the countries where Iran has a prevalent influence there. That is why we need to remove their proxies.

Thomas: Well, you've just invoked your notorious Mexican standoff within a Mexican standoff. We're going to come back to it in a second.

You mentioned the European Union, which reminded me that we missed out answering the second half of Eliza's question about France and Germany. So, where do France and Germany stand geo-strategically in the current struggles in the Middle East?

Obviously as NATO members, obviously as Western countries, they are largely integrated into America's global military umbrella, if you like, but they have foreign policies of their own.

Germany's foreign policy has always been very tricky because it's (especially recently with the Russia-Ukraine conflict), completely undermining Germany's entire political economy.

France's foreign policy has usually been structured to try to create or to sustain a fading glory of France. But what are France and Germany's perspectives, or let's say strategic positions in the Middle East at the moment?

Aimen: Well, actually, the information I have is that both the French and to a lesser extent, the Germans wanted to join that alliance with the Americans, provided that there are two things happen.

The first one is that some regional countries join, including Saudi Arabia, at least, in order to add that legitimacy and credibility to the mission. But second, what put off both the Germans and the French was the American insistence on a complete tight chain of command that is entirely American.

Thomas: I'm sure the French especially did not like that.

Aimen: No, not at all. Not even the Germans. And they said, “No, thank you so much. First of all, this is not what we wanted. And it has to be joint decisions, and the chain of command should be coordinated, a joint chain of command, not everyone under the strict command of the Pentagon.”

And this is why they did not join, really because of the fact that, again, the velvet glove issue here, Thomas, we come back to the issue that what is the end game? There is no end game as far as the Americans are concerned, except just stop harassing the shipping lanes. That's it.

There is no other objective. So, from the point of view of the French and the Germans, what is the end game here? And if you are going to keep the chain command so tight, what if you do something that we don't agree with?

Thomas: Well, this is the big question, America, we'll get to it at the end. Obviously for personal reasons, it's the one that often animates my thinking the most.

Now, the U.S. and the UK have launched these strikes, as you say, velvet strikes to some large extent, and Jos Tector, our dear listener asks us on X, “How do you see the Iranian regime reacting to these strikes? Do they use them to add to the West versus Middle East rhetoric, simply to help manage their own internal affairs a bit like the Houthis are doing? Or do you see Iran feeling compelled to escalate?”

Aimen: Of course, the Iranians are going to escalate. Look at what happened just this morning when Iran launched 17 ballistic missiles against a site in Erbil, they claim to be a Mossad base. It just happened to be an empty building, just very close to the American consulate there in Erbil and KRG and Kurdistan in Iraq.

I mean, it just shows you that for Iran, this is all about the much bigger picture in the geopolitical grand game in the Middle East.

I know for a fact that in Oman, in Muscat, talks are ongoing between the American side and the Iranian side through mediators in order to achieve what they call a comprehensive pan-Middle East settlement, where Iran gets a lot of its desires to be recognized as a nuclear power nation, to be recognized as having influence and sovereignty in Iraq and Syria and Lebanon and Yemen.

As well as, trying to say we want to have some changes in the political outcome in Bahrain, we want a greater rise for the Shia minorities in Kuwait. I mean, they are putting really some ludicrous demands that everyone knows that it's not in the hands of America to give. It's not America's gift to give to begin with.

Thomas: Well, really nor in America's interests to give them.

Aimen: Exactly. So, at the moment, the Iranians are asking for ridiculous demands and saying, well, this is the price for a complete comprehensive settlement for the Middle East, which basically, if you want to have a complete comprehensive settlement without the participation of all the other Middle Eastern parties, you can go home.

Because the Americans tried to ignore the Saudis for two and a half years, it didn't work. So, they can't force the Saudis to accept Iran's terms right now. So, in other words, Iran is talking to people demanding something that they do not own.

Thomas: That sets up the next question, very tidily, Aimen. So, El Goldie on Facebook asks, “If Iran were to activate all four guns pointed at Israel, Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis and the Syrians, the Alawite Syrian regime,” El Goldie says, “To create a broader war in the region, how do you think Saudi Arabia and the broader Sunni world would respond?”

You usually number the Iraqi militias as the fourth member of the resistance, not the Syrian regime, though of course, Bashar al-Assad is not disconnected from Iran's foreign policy apparatus.

So, let's focus first on Saudi. What are the princes and the policymakers in Riyadh thinking right now?

Aimen: The thinking is like this, we will stay the hell out of it, unless if the U.S. is willing along with their allies to put their heart entirely into it.

In other words, either you come, and you dismantle Iran's proxies in the region, and then we will participate with you. We with the Egyptians and the Emiratis, and everyone will participate happily with you.

If you are about to dismantle Iran's cancerous non-state actors, spreading terror, hate, and backward ideology in the region, no problem. We will join you.

But if you don't, if you have no interest, if you just going to treat this with velvet gloves and you don't want any war with Iran or any other person, then why do we have to risk it?

If Israel is being attacked by everyone, none of our business, from the point of view of the Saudis, they will stay the hell out of it. Unless if dragged against their will into it, then they will give everyone a bloody nose and more. So, in other word, basically, they will throw everything they have at it.

Thomas: So, basically, am I hearing you right? They don't want to be defending Israel. They want to be offending Iran's proxies.

Aimen: But only if there is a international alliance led by the United States or NATO, then yes, they will participate because there is a global willingness to get rid of the region infested with the most or the biggest number of non-state actors armed to the teeth, and private armies like the Middle East.

But you cannot do that without an international alliance. If there is no international alliance with a firm objective and a firm end game here of getting rid of these proxies, then what’s the worst the Saudis are going to do? Sorry, leave us out of it. We're not interested in half solutions.

Thomas: What about the Arab man on the street, and the extent to which the Sunni powers must always kind of take a careful, delicate balance, strike a delicate balance, whenever any violence against Israel is in the mix.

So, Adam Osman on Facebook says, or asks, “Do you think as this conflict spreads, that there will be more unity among Arab nations to” (he puts it), “Defend the impact of Israel and allied forces?”

Basically to defend, I think, Palestinians against Israeli aggression in the sense especially as the war arrives on the border of some more developed nations, I guess Saudi, et cetera, and the chance of diplomatic interventions reduces like the normalisation process with Israel.

So, there is broadly speaking now amongst not just the Arab street, but the Muslim street, a renewed sense of solidarity against the Zionist enemy. This is part of Iran's strategy, of course, and governments like the Saudi government must be aware of this, and they must realise that it paralyses them to some extent, or am I exaggerating that, Aimen?

Aimen: Thomas, there is no question that there is an increased sense of solidarity with the Palestinians within the Arab world, whether among Shia or Sunnis, it's across the sectarian divide, no question.

But anyone who think that Iran gained some brownie points out of this is mistaken. The sectarian divide is still deep, in fact, deeper than ever before, because in fact, there is a great deal of blame going on among Sunnis blaming the Iranians for pushing Hamas to do what they've done on October 7th, which provoked the well anticipated, and everyone knew what the Israelis are going to do.

There is a scene in Ender’s Game. It's a movie basically based on a book in which a smaller boy basically pummels another boy into the ground so much just to make sure basically he never get up again, and beat him up. And the Israelis are in this position right now, they have that psychology like, you pummel me, I’ll pummel you.

And so, this is why the anticipated destruction on Gaza, which was already in the mind of every Arab, when they heard about October 7, they realised, oh dear, what's going to happen? Of course, there are rational people who think about it rationally.

Now, if you think about it, Iran is not going to benefit from a divided Arab street because the Arab street is already divided. And even in Bahrain, for example, I mean, you see the Shia are protesting against Israel and the Sunnis are staying home. They don't give a damn.

They have a solidarity with the Palestinian as a people, but not with Hamas. And definitely, they do not support the Israelis. The issue here is the fact that leave us out of it, because this, we do not smell as they say, basically that you are doing it for the right reasons.

You see, the first Hadith in every single book in Islam starts with this Hadith, “Inna ma’al a’maal bin niyya” in that actions are judged against intentions. So, they always ask the question in the Arab world, they ask the question, what is Iran's intention behind all of this? Really loving the Palestinians, really for Jerusalem?

And the majority says, no, it's not. It is to serve Iran hegemony and their plans for mastery of the Middle East, their lips say Jerusalem, but their triggers are towards Mecca and Medina and Riyadh, and Abu Dhabi and Dubai, and Bahrain and Kuwait. Therefore, never trust them.

No, no, no, no. You see, the idea that this will create a solidarity, no, because the intentions are very clear. It's not for the Palestinian sake. There is a much greater in sinister plan behind it.

Thomas: Well, let's talk about the international community. If that's even the right word.

Aimen: Is there something as such, I mean, to begin with?

Thomas: Yeah. The international community's response to October 7th. Initially, there was a lot of sympathy for the Israeli position, although I would say even then less sympathy than would be afforded other states who experienced a similar atrocity.

But still, there was a certain amount of sympathy, a sense that a reprisal is absolutely required. I mean, they have to respond. Hamas is clearly a villain.

That sympathy rapidly changed, in a way that seemed almost coordinated. It was just quite remarkable how quickly huge demonstrations could break out everywhere.

Not just expressing solidarity with Palestinians, really, but expressing something like a political sensibility about the wider question of Israel-Palestine, that's just grown and grown and grown, especially in Western capitals. It's quite remarkable.

Aimen: It became, unfortunately, a victim of the political tribalization. There is a political tribalism. If you are on the left, you are pro-Palestine. If you are on the right, you're pro-Israel, which is complete nonsense.

I mean, one must always look at every conflict separately to understand the facts, why it happened, what is the reason behind it, and then make your own mind.

But this idea that automatically Israel is supported by U.S, U.S. is bad, U.S. is imperialist, U.S. is capitalist. Therefore, I am a left-wing Marxist, therefore I must be with the Palestinians. It's like, come on, grow up. For once in your lives grow up.

Thomas: I have been so depressed really about the situation in the Levant more broadly, I feel — and this is just, really Aimen, I’m just gesturing towards a sense here because who the hell knows?

But I sort of feel like there really is no solution. That the state that the Jews were given by the UN in 1947 was never viable for geostrategic reasons. That the Jews, the Zionists, whatever, the Israelis always knew that.

They always knew that in order for a state in that part of the world to be viable in the long-term, especially given the animosity of their neighbours, they would need to occupy the high ground.

That means that the two states solution was never really viable and that the Likudniks and Benjamin Netanyahu and all the others by rejecting the two-state solution, were just being realistic about the situation that the Israeli state could never seed the high ground to Arabs, frankly.

That the Israelis are never going to give up their state. That the Palestinians now have become pawns in a kind of psychodrama, like a geopolitical psychodrama for so long. I just kind of thought, oh my God, there's no solution. Just no solution. Aimen, what do you think?

Aimen: Well, I said before that I support the two-state solution, but by the two states, I mean, Jordan and Egypt, where Jordan absorb as much as possible of the West Bank from the Israelis, having the enclave exclave convoluted border that they can basically do with, where they can absorb the majority of the Palestinian population inside.

And after all, before anyone start jumping on me and saying, “You are against self-determination.” Well, sorry guys, until 1967, the West Bank was part of Jordan, and the people there were Jordanian citizens, and they were never called Palestinians. So, they were called Jordanians, and the people in Gaza were called Egyptians because they had Egyptian passports until 1967. So-

Thomas: I can understand all this, Aimen-

Aimen: This is why I say, let us just for God's sake, instead of following a KGB lie called Palestine, that was invented basically in Moscow somewhere in order basically to talk about the Arabs, the Egyptians of Gaza and the Jordanians of the West Bank, they should basically be absorbed back into their original countries.

All of Gaza should be absorbed by the Egyptians, all of the West Bank, except basically they can trade off some parts with the Israelis and have the convoluted exclaves enclaves and make it demilitarised. They can have it to the Jordanians, and then that's it.

This is the only viable solution. Any other solution is just not going to be viable whatsoever.

Thomas: Well, I mean, you're the expert, Aimen. But that doesn't seem like a solution to me. That seems like an expression of the lack of a solution. I just don't see that happening. I don't see Israel, frankly, allowing that to happen.

Israel just does not … it's not does not, it's not a question so much of will. It's just the cold, brutal logic of geography and of geostrategy. They cannot give up the high ground. They can't. They will always be vulnerable to aggression if they do so.

Aimen: Look, Thomas, I drove from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, and it's like you drive out of Tel Aviv and 20 minutes, just 20 minutes by car, they tell you, “We are inside the West Bank now.” It's like, what? Yes-

Thomas: I know.

Aimen: And then you start climbing the hills. We have a set of people who's been there now for 75 bloody years and-

Thomas: And many, many, many more for longer. I mean, let's be honest.

Aimen: Of course. We're talking about the age of Israel as a state. I mean, and there are many communities who's been there basically for centuries. But I'm just talking about — and especially whenever I talk to people, when they tell me, and actually even within my own family, some people saying, well …

And I asked them, “Okay, let's say Hamas and Hezbollah and the Houthis and the Jordanians and the Egyptians, they all invaded. They all invaded, they all succeeded in taking over Israel. And we have them, we have all 6 million Jews there. What do we do with them?”

Thomas: Well, I don't even want to think about it. Because I feel actually Aimen, I feel I know what they would do with them, actually, frankly, and it makes me sick.

Aimen: No, basically, apart from the fact that many people would love to cut off their heads and throw them into to sea, at least some people say, “Well, we sort them out. We deport everyone back to their home country.”

And I say, “Aha, perfect, 3 million of them, so 52% of the Israelis are from Arab and Muslim countries. What do we do with them? The Mizrahis, the Sepharden. What do we do with the Sephardic Jews who are from Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya?

What do we do with the Mizrahis who are from Iran and Yemen and even Najran in Saudi Arabia, Iraq, for God's sake, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan, Iran, Turkey, what do we do with them? I mean, they will never be welcome back. So, what do you do with them?

And this is why, unless basically if you have any good solutions, you are advocating for genocide.

And then the other side, you have Israelis also like Ben-Gvir and others who advocated nuclear bombs over Gaza, whatever. And they want to have a genocide of their own.

The language is genocidal before anyone telling me, “Aimen, you are supporting genocide of the people of Gaza.” And I would say, well, I mean let me put it this way. If the situation was reversed, if the Jews basically were concentrated in Gaza and the Palestinians were living in modern day Israel, and let's say Jewish Haganah terrorists basically infiltrated into Palestine, and killed 1200 Palestinians, what would they do?

The answer is that they will do exactly as the Israelis are doing right now, if not even worse. And the reason is because this is the warfare in the Middle East. It is biblical, it is Qur’anic, it is according to the Torah.

It is according to the Hadith. It is according to every single religious text, which is overwhelming force against any population that tries to harm you. And this is why, dear listeners, do not expect merciful wars. And anyone who wants clean war, good war, merciful war, well wake up.

Thomas: Well, Aimen, I started that question depressed, and I've ended it suicidal. So, thank you.

Aimen: I'm so sorry.

Thomas: I texted you in early December, I think a text that was very heartbreaking for me that said — I sent you a text saying, “Aimen, I think Iran is going to win.” And you replied just with a little tear emoji.

Aimen: Yeah.

Thomas: And I'm not talking in the long-term here, looking at the complexity, the geostrategic, the geographical, the cultural complexity of the situation. I am tempted to just say, Iran will win.

Aimen: In the short-term. Yes.

Thomas: That is as it is. But let's finish this special episode by broadening our perspective out to the global order that is emerging at the present moment. We like to talk about the new global order on Conflicted.

Jay Daniel, dear listener on X asks, “Coinciding with some Middle Eastern countries joining the BRICS, does the whole situation” (I guess he means the conflict in the Middle East at the moment), “Mark a shift among regional nations, Middle Eastern countries, to preferring a Chinese market world order?”

And the concomitant question is, is America finished? Because in line with my depressing sense that in the long-term Iran is going to win, is I think America's on the way out. There's a U.S. presidential election coming up. Already, it's a shit show.

Just this morning we wake up to see the results of the Iowa caucuses landing an overwhelming support for Donald Trump, who is more deranged than ever.

The left in the U.S. rapidly putting pressure on Joe Biden once again, not, I think realistically, understanding the role that America actually plays in keeping the globe open for business and wanting some more idealistic foreign policy. I think America's finished.

Aimen: No, I don't think.

Thomas: So, what does this all mean, Aimen?

Aimen: I don't think, I don't think at all, first of all-

Thomas: You don't think, oh, great, cheer me up, Aimen. Cheer me up.

Aimen: Okay, I'll cheer you up. First of all, what's happening actually is more of a balancing of the priorities as far as the Middle East is concerned. Saudi Arabia, UAE, Egypt, Iran, they all joined BRICS, not out of political solidarity. It's purely commercial.

I mean, BRICS is commercial and anyone who thinks otherwise, basically is deluding themselves. Do you really think that Brazil, India, and China have the same agenda in the world? Hell no.

Thomas: Aimen, how is that different from America's global order? It's also just business, my friend.

Aimen: It is purely business. But you see there is a huge difference between what America offers and what China offers. You see the Middle East, especially the GCC, so I'm talking here especially about the two giant engines of the Middle East economy which is UAE and Saudi Arabia.

So, you see here the issue here is the fact that Saudi Arabia and the UAE are industrialising. All of this is happening. But who can help them do that? Not the U.S. The U.S. has abandoned industry long time ago.

U.S. now is a big idea, high tech economy. It's not a mid-level size, mid-industry, mid-stream economy. China is, China can help the UAE, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia and Egypt industrialise on the way that they need in terms of pharmaceuticals, in terms of metals, in terms of aluminium, in terms of minerals.

But the Americans, however, they have the high tech for nuclear energy, blue and green hydrogen, all the other things that the Saudi … and of course cybersecurity and all the other high tech industry that the Saudis need.

So, the Saudis are doubling down now on alliance with the U.S., with UK and with France, the Anglo Franco-American Alliance with Saudi Arabia. There is a doubling down.

Just wait until February. And there will be not one, not two, but three big announcement on defence that will shock the world and that will show that France, UK and America are still present in Saudi geopolitical sphere, still present in UAE geopolitical sphere.

No one and both officials in the UN, in UAE and Saudi Arabia are telling me no one is betting against Uncle Sam, even with Biden in the White House, because the U.S. is still the house and the home, not of the brave.

It is the home of Google, of Meta, of all the high tech Nvidia and the of artificial intelligence. They are the home of BlackRock, of Blackstone, of Vanguard and of State Street, between them $20 trillion of assets under management.

So, this is why I tell anyone who thinks that China or Russia can challenge the might of the U.S. digital economic power, wake up. It's not there yet. We're not there yet. There is 20 to 25 years still of juice in the American engine to keep it propelled towards that domination.

And anyone who thinks that the U.S. is going to allow Iran or any other power, especially the Russians behind them to upset the equilibrium in the energy markets is mistaken.

Yes, America doesn’t import a drop of oil from the Middle East anymore, but they are not free of the global index price. Whatever happened in the Middle East will affect the internal market in the U.S. immediately. Whatever happened in the Red Sea will immediately have implications for the supply chain and the inflation in Europe and America.

That is why in an election year you want to try to challenge the might of the U.S., you will pay the price. This is why I'm seeing echoes of 1914. If you think all of what's happening right now is happening according to a calculated plan, and that everything is measured and calculated, you are deluded. We are one mistake away from this thing getting out of hand.

Thomas: Well, Aimen, I think one day we'll have to do just a whole episode of us just talking and debating and discussing the question of America and its future. If you say America has 25 years left in the gas tank, and based on the analogy you just drew to 1914, well, the British Empire had precisely 25 years left in its gas tank in 1914, but 25 years passes like a flash.

Aimen: Exactly.

Thomas: And so, basically, I feel that you're agreeing with me when I say America's finished, I think, okay, maybe where Britain was in 1914. But where is the America in the wings that's going to come in, in the 40s and reconstitute the global liberal market order?

There isn't a player. We'll have to save that for another conversation. Before we end, just quickly, your thoughts on a potential second Trump term office for the Middle East.

Aimen: Oh my God, it's not going to be good news for Iran. It's going to be very good news for Israel, however, good news in the sense that they will have allies. But the question is, does he have the right policy?

The good thing about Trump, he's unpredictable. And this unpredictability causes Iran to pause generally. This is why I always ask myself the question, if Trump was in office, would Hamas have carried out their attack? And the answer is most likely no.

Thomas: Oh dear, does that mean that we just need to keep Trump in office forever to keep Iran from attacking Israel? It sounds like a really terrible, rather late imperial position for the American voting public to be in.

That's all we have time for today. Thank you, Aimen. Thank you, so much dear listeners, for listening and for all of your questions, we couldn't get to them all, but we really appreciate you sending them in.

Conflicted will be returning soon with another season as we respond to everything that has been happening in the Middle East and beyond. So, keep your eyes and ears peeled for that.

And while you wait, please do sign up to show your interest in our new Conflicted Community. That's the Discord community platform, which is going to be our go-to space to discuss all things Conflicted.

And where you can take part in post episode debates. Chat with us hosts, get exclusive content just like this Q&A, as well as bonus episodes and ad free listening. Honestly, what more could you want?

[Music Playing]

We'll be launching the Conflicted Community very soon. You can find more about it and the link to sign up in the show notes. See you soon.

Conflicted is a Message Heard production. This episode was produced and edited by Harry Stott. Sandra Ferrari is our executive producer. Our theme music is by Matt Huxley.

Conflicted S4 E23: Yemen: From Civil War to World War?

Speakers: Thomas Small, Aimen Dean, & Baraa Shiban

Thomas: Hello and welcome back to Conflicted with, well, you know the drill; me, Thomas Small, my co-host, Aimen Dean. And for the final time, our great friend, the Yemeni political activist, Baraa Shiban. Hello, Baraa. Hello, Aimen.

Aimen: I'm still alive, by the way.

Thomas: Still alive.

Baraa: Glad to see you're still alive, Aimen.

Thomas: Baraa, you're barely alive after all of the talking we've forced you to do. Baraa, this is your last episode with us. We're so sad to see you go.

Baraa: Well, hopefully we're going to have more opportunities in the future. 

Thomas: I hope so. Although that would require Yemen to be in a state of disarray for the …

We are together again here in our studio in London to bring you the final episode of our colossal exploration of the history of Yemen. And sadly, this also brings us to the close of the current series of Conflicted. It's been quite the ride.

We've taken you through all the historical antecedents to modern Salafi Jihadism from Ahmad Bin Hanbal in the eighth century to Sayyid Qutb in the 1960s. We've looked at the Muslim Brotherhood, President Erdogan of Turkey, Iran, and their proxies across the region like Hezbollah.

And as we record this, the conflict between Israel and Hamas in Gaza continues. It's something which has really shined a light on so many of the themes and ideas that we've talked about this series.

Those motivations behind Salafi jihadism and Shia jihadism that we discussed are now being played out in real time with truly tragic consequences, don't you think, Aimen?

Aimen: Indeed. What we are seeing right now in Gaza and the war between Hamas and Israel is impacting the rest of the Middle East in a way that I never thought is going to be possible. But nonetheless, it is happening and unfolding before our own eyes.

Thomas: We'll be returning to this discussion at the end of this episode, but now it is time to race to the end of our series on Yemen.

[Music Playing]

Operation Decisive Storm has seen the intervention of Saudi Arabia and its Arab allies into the civil war that was already tearing Yemen apart. Let's jump right in.

Now Aimen, you've been pretty quiet the last few episodes, allowing Baraa the space he needed to tell his amazing story. But I think in this episode we're going to hear a little bit more from you. And you have been keeping your eye on events in Yemen for a long time. I mean, really from the very beginning of the war there.

Aimen: Absolutely. I mean, for me, I still chasing a BBC journalist, Frank Gardner.

Thomas: Frank Gardner, the famous journalist who sadly was paralyzed when he was the victim of an Al-Qaeda attack in Saudi Arabia.

Aimen: Indeed. So, he and I, we were having lots of shots in the run up to the Yemen conflict, and especially just before the intervention by Saudi Arabia and the rest of the Arab Coalition in Yemen.

12 hours before the whole thing started, before the intervention started, I sent him my text saying, “Heads up, it's about to start just this evening.” So, he said to me, “Aimen, if you are right, I'm going to buy you a cheesecake.” I was right, but I never saw that cheesecake ever.

Thomas: Frank Gardner, if you're listening to this, you owe Aimen Dean a piece of cheesecake.

Aimen: Well, with interest now. It's a big chunk of cheesecake.

Thomas: A whole cheesecake.

Thomas: Well, dear listener we left our story of Yemen history in the last episode with the launch of Operation Decisive Storm. That was in March 2015. So, what are we talking about? That's eight and a half years ago.

It's incredible to think that eight and a half years, I remember it quite clearly, like it was just the other day. Baraa, can you believe it's been eight and a half years?

Baraa: Not at all. I mean, I still remember the details of what happened in 2015, what happened 2016 each and every year. And actually, when I talk about them, I feel like it was just yesterday.

Thomas: I would like to just immediately reassure the listener that though Baraa can remember all of those details, we will not be going into all of those details in this episode.

This episode will be a bit different from the episodes that have come before. It's going to be more conversational. It's going to involve more analysis than straightforward narrative.

But still to get an overview, Operation Decisive Storm launched in March 2015 when a Saudi led coalition of Arab states entered the civil war to counter the Houthis. And their allies who had seized control of the Yemeni government, had conquered the North and were threatening to conquer the important city of Aden.

Having already taken the geo strategically important stronghold of the Bab-el-Mandeb, they were controlling that strait of water through which so much of the world's shipping passes.

Operation Decisive Storm was initially largely an air support kind of operation. The Saudis and their allies provided air support of Yemeni forces on the ground, resisting the Houthis, and those troops loyal to Ali Abdullah Saleh that had allied with the Houthis.

But eventually, that air support was joined with ground support, special forces from the Emirates, I think especially played a big role in that summer's battle for Aden, which was really an incredible proper warfare, which resulted in the coalition recapturing Aden from the Houthis and pushing them up back into the mountains in the direction of Taiz while securing and liberating the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait.

So, immediately in the war, there was this sense of success. The Arab Coalition was making some great steps towards liberating the country from the Houthis.

From that point on, it became a little bit more chequered, a lot of stalemating, some pretty ferocious fighting in and around the city of Taiz in the middle of the country, in and around the city of Marib in the kind of northeast, kind of bit of the middle of the country, where the country enters the desert, which is where the vital oil installations in the country are.

The Arab Coalition land forces waxed and waned. There was a quite a surprise invasion by land over on the kind of Jazan side. At one point the Saudis crossed over by land, didn't really work. They were pushed back.

So, that first phase of the war ended in a sort of stalemate. And those of us in the West kind of remember that phase of the war as a growing outcry against the Arab Coalition because of the way in which the air campaign was resulting in civilian casualties, which would be very helpful to the Houthis.

Baraa: Indeed, they were very helpful because the Houthis actually benefited from the ongoing campaign, mainly done by INGOs, left-wing activists in Western capitals to basically call out the Saudis, mainly trying to mount pressure specifically on Saudi Arabia, not on Iran, not on the Houthis, not on Saleh, just on Saudi Arabia saying basically that the U.S. and the UK are aiding and abetting Saudi Arabia and its campaign against Yemenis.

Aimen: Indeed.

Thomas: And there were civilian casualties.

Aimen: There were civilian casualties. But let me interfere here. And I would like to state something. Anyone who asks for a clean war is naive. There is no such thing as clean war. The motto that every human should live with is never start wars, but my God, you must finish them.

Thomas: Well, that is the story of this episode to some extent, because the war in Yemen was never able to end. And it still hasn't ended.

But staying on the initial air campaign, I mean, strategically, I think Baraa, you think that to some extent the Arab Coalition didn't focus their energies correctly. They could have supported the Yemeni troops, the loyal pro-President Hadi troops better.

Baraa: So, I think two things to focus here. The first thing is, I agree with Aimen. There is nothing as a clean war.

But however, and I know the details of the battles in Yemen. In all of the ground operation, that actually the coalition focused their efforts on the ground operations, the level and the number of civilian casualties was to the minimum compared to that broad air campaign that was just waging, especially in the 2015, intensifying in 2016, and did witness a lot of civilian casualties.

In that sense, I felt what was supposed to happen was to basically prop up the military institution. And even if that means building it from scratch, but that's far less expensive and on the long run, even more productive than waging just a merely air campaign.

Aimen: Exactly. But you see, even, I agree with you that air campaigns never actually succeeded in dislodging any militant group from power. I mean, look at Taliban, look at the Houthis themselves, even Hamas, everyone agrees that a militant organisation cannot be just dislodged from a territory they control just by air campaign.

Another thing about civilian casualties, I want to draw the listeners' attention to is faulty intelligence. And this is something I know a lot about. Baraa, do you remember the bus massacre in September 2018?

Baraa: Yes, I do. I remember it very well.

Aimen: Yeah. The Saudi Air Force came and bombed a school bus. 40 children were killed in one go and many wounded. So, this is now where for the first time ever I can reveal what really happened.

So, on the authority of a source within some Saudi decision-making process, it was the result of faulty intelligence. So, they had a source who helped them before, from within the Houthi circles, target senior Houthi members.

So, the first information, perfect, second information, perfect, third information, perfect. And then it was quiet for a while. And then he sent the fourth information. The fourth piece of information here is that this bus will be carrying senior Houthi leaders to a meeting.

And so, they did, however, it was full of children, and they never heard from that source again, only to find him dead later. The reality is that he was compromised, and the Houthis told him to send the wrong information.

Thomas: Such a great story, Aimen. I mean, again, there's a voice in me that's always like, how do we know that the Saudi dude just didn't tell you that, I don't know, because now we're saying the Houthis killed those children.

Aimen: There is something important you have to understand about the Iranian nexus. It's called mashrue shahid-

Thomas: The project of martyrdom.

Aimen: Yeah, yeah. It's called the project of martyrdom. Martyrdom project is something that it is famous, it is well used, the equivalent of false flag, where they would deliberately let the enemy target their own civilians in order to create the outrage that could maybe stop the war or stop the ammunitions going to the other side.

That would put so much pressure on the other side, that could bring the war to an end. So, they see it as a good return on investment. It's called mashrue shahid and it’s very well-known tactic by Iran.

Thomas: Yeah, tactically, of course that makes a lot of sense. I mean, Baraa, what do you think?

Baraa: Well, I mean, I think this resonates with some of the journalists that actually I knew who were captured by the Houthis in 2015. Some of them, even 2016, the Houthis placed them in weapon depots. They know that the Saudis would bomb those weapon depots.

But actually, for the public in Yemen, who killed them? It's the coalition. It's the Saudis. It's those evil Saudis who don't care about the lives of Yemenis. And I know about the story of two journalists who I knew from 2011 during the revolution, who were placed in a weapon depot. And the Saudi Air Force came and bombed them. Ma

Thomas: Mashrue shahid.

Aimen: Mashrue shahid. And one of the biggest mashrue shahid to be the beginning of the whole process was the cinema that was banned during the uprising against the Shah.

Thomas: Yeah, we talked about it last season in our episodes on the Iranian Revolution. I also meant to remind the listener that in the first season of Conflicted, Aimen and I did an episode on the Yemen war from the geostrategic and geopolitical perspective, mainly the Saudi security perspective.

So, we're not going to talk about that now, really, honestly. You just got to go listen to it if you haven't, then you'll understand Saudi's concerns about its water security and desalination plants, and how threatening it was for the Houthis to get a hold of ab Ali Abdullah Saleh's arsenal of scud missiles and other long-distance missiles.

Now, to go back to the question of how the Arab Coalition campaign was organised, you say there should have been more support of the Yemeni factions on the ground, but it must also be admitted Baraa, that just as had been the case before, and which in the previous episode we called that culture of mistrust, the Yemeni forces opposed to the Houthi Saleh takeover of Yemen were not unified.

Baraa: That's true. Because it was composed of people like Ali Mohsen coming back to the scene.

Thomas: Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, the great military strong man. Yeah.

Baraa: So, they have those military officers who can actually reestablish military units and military camps in the north of Yemen. It's also composed of secessionists.

Thomas: Southern movement secessionists, so people who don't even want to be a part of North Yemen.

Baraa: Exactly. But they are kind of mixed now in the midst of conflict. It's also composed of members of Islah party who are feeling very much threatened by the Houthis, but now they're aligning themselves strongly with Saudi Arabia. And a new player is the Salafis. You remember that Dammaj school?

Thomas: Yeah. The Dammaj school that the Houthis destroyed, that alerted everyone to the ongoing onslaught.

Baraa: So, many of the students from the Dammaj school start to become military men working alongside the coalition. So, you have the emerge of Salafis-

Thomas: Salafi jihadists in a way, I guess.

Baraa: In a way you could say.

Aimen: Yeah. But they are royalists’ jihadists.

Thomas: Oh, so there's jihadists after your own heart, Aimen.

Aimen: Exactly. They are not al-Qaeda basically. They are jihadists on behalf of the nation state, which basically fills my heart with joy.

Thomas: So, there's a culture of mistrust on the ground amongst the anti-Houthi forces. But there is a growing culture of mistrust in the GCC as well. So, the Emiratis are allying themselves more and more with the southern movement fighters.

The Saudis, as you've pointed out, are allying themselves more and more with Islah party sort of members and their fighting groups and Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar and things like that. So, the GCC Arab Coalition wasn't unified either.

Baraa: Not at all. And actually, it culminated when the United Arab Emirates in 2017 funded the creation of the Southern Transitional Council. This is solely a paramilitary group. Their sole mission is to secede from the south, although officially, the Emirati is part of this coalition that is supposed to be backing the internationally recognized government.

And I think this is where I find sometimes challenging and tough arguments with Western diplomats and officials and policy makers, is they say like, “The Yemenis are not unified, in every conflict there's always trade-offs.” You don't have this clean, perfect politician who's going to do everything.

You have to trade off. And if the prize is we're going to reinstate the government of Yemen, then you are going to trade off working with some of the people until you bring things into order, a little bit into order.

Even if that means ditching aside now the secessionist group or some of those militant groups who are actually posing a threat on the main prize, which is reinstating the state of Yemen.

Thomas: So, Aimen, give us a top line explanation of why the GCC is disunited over Yemen in this way.

Aimen: Well, it's not so much as being disunited. It is the difference of opinions between mainly the UAE and Saudi Arabia over the future of Yemen. From the UAE's point of view, the Muslim Brotherhood cannot be trusted.

Yet the Saudis also understand that without the Muslim Brotherhood or Islah generally in Yemen, you can't win against the Houthis. I mean, and this is like-

Thomas: Which is being proved in Marib where the Islahis have fought extremely valiantly.

Aimen: Exactly. But also, it proves the other thing that without al-Amaliqa, the brigade of the STC, the Southern Transitional Council.

Baraa: Mainly Salafis, your friends.

Aimen: And they're mainly Salafis, but they are the Emirati Salafis.

Thomas: Lord have mercy.

Aimen: Yeah. They are Emirati funded Salafis. They also proved to be crucial in the defence of Marib. So, these two actually joined hands together for the defence of Marib. And Marib, in my opinion, is one of the biggest success stories of the coalition.

It grew from a city of 300,000 before the war into a city of 2 million people after the war. Is very well lit, very well supplied. Nice hospitals, nice schools, nice roads, good infrastructure, good administration.

Thomas: I think I might move there actually. It sounds great, compared to England. So, dear listener, you're getting a sense already of how the situation of the war in Yemen is more complicated than you might have gathered.

Now, when we're talking about mistrust between different actors, I think it's important to point out that quite early on, especially in 2017, mistrust grew between the Houthis and Ali Abdullah Saleh, who by backing them in the beginning, had empowered them to take over the country.

So, there was a split there culminating with Ali Abdullah Saleh’s assassination by the Houthis in December of 2017. Two questions Baraa, first, why did the Houthis and Ali Abdullah Saleh fall apart?

Baraa: The thing is because the Houthis eventually started to take on GPC members and trying to occupy the government positions that were basically before that governed by GPC members.

The reality is the state structure in North Yemen was kind of held with the remnants of the GPC. Now, the Houthis were introducing a kind of a new weird system.

Thomas: Which we'll describe a bit later.

Baraa: A bit later. But that kind of meant sometimes killing or assassinating some loyalists of Saleh. And Ali Abdullah Saleh was feeling threatened and saying like, “Okay, I'm losing my aids, I'm losing those officers and military officers who are close to me because of the Houthis.” And the division started to grow until December 2017.

Thomas: I think we need to spare a moment really to think about poor Ali Abdullah Saleh. Because if you remember dear listener, his great plan, I'll back the Houthis, they'll take over half of the country, then the Saudis will have no choice but to back me, to throw them off and put me back in power.

And the Minister of Defence then, eventually Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman sent his son packing and decided instead to join his rival President Hadi to defeat the Houthis.

And then Saleh watches as the Houthis whom he'd empowered, had rather ingeniously taken over the state themselves, dislodging his loyalists from their positions of power. And he met a grizzly end at the wrong side of a missile. Is that right? A rocket?

Aimen: No, no, no, no. It's a bullet to the head.

Baraa: It’s a bullet.

Thomas: A bullet to the head. I thought his house had been bombed.

Baraa: No.

Aimen: No. A bullet to the head. It was a execution style. It was a mafia like, and you know what, this is the moment the Houthis celebrated because finally they got the revenge for Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi.

Thomas: Yes. What a story. Because Saleh had fought them in war after war after war and had assassinated their great martyr.

But Baraa, when you heard that Ali Abdullah Saleh had been killed execution style by the Houthis, what did you feel? I mean, he was the president of Yemen for so long, your enemy, but also your kind of great father figure at the top of Yemeni society.

Baraa: To surprise, despite the protest and despite going out in a revolution and mobilising against him, we mourned him. I was devastated. And I remember I called my fellow revolutionists and activists and politicians, and everyone was in this mourning grieving phase.

And literally we cried. We couldn't believe that actually he was killed. I still, until today, unable to define why were we in this grieving phase.

Aimen: Don't forget that the relationship between Europeans and their leaders is very different from the relations between people in the Middle East and their leaders. Is far more emotional and far more attached.

Thomas: Yeah, clearly.

Aimen: And if, for example, many people who hate Saddam, yet when he died, they mourned him even though he was an evil tyrant by every possible measure. And yet many people mourned him.

Thomas: It's true.

Aimen: And still do.

Thomas: Well, I wonder if anyone will mourn Abdul Malik al-Houthi when he eventually meets his end, grizzly or not. Because now that the Houthis had finally saw the end of Ali Abdullah Saleh, they were firmly in control of most of North Yemen, obviously resisting an Arab coalition attempt to dislodge them.

But more and more they were, as you said, erecting a new form of state to govern and dominate North Yemen. Describe the way in which the Houthis run that part of Yemen that they control.

Baraa: The Houthis run something similar to either a cartel system or a mafia style state. It's called the supervisors system. And what basically it does, they bring their own members to be supervisors on either neighbourhoods or blocks, or even government institutions.

So, even if you would have, let's say a police chief or a police officer in charge of a police station, he doesn't matter. Who's actually in charge is the supervisor. Now the supervisor, this is a chaotic complex web of networks between supervisors and their main sole duty towards the Houthis movement is to A, recruit. They have to be actively engaged in recruitment.

Thomas: And how do they carry out recruitment? What do they target?

Baraa: So, let's say if you are in a neighbourhood and there is a school, you try as much as possible to recruit children from schools or from mosques or from universities. Try and bring as much recruits as you can.

Thomas: Why are the young people always lambs to the slaughter, Baraa?

Baraa: Because they're easy to radicalise from a young age. And that's the second thing, which is the Houthis engage in something called cultural courses. This is indoctrination campaigns to recruit basically new fighters for the movement.

All of it is in the aim of this great cause, fighting for the movement. And indoctrination campaigns happen at a massive scale. Today in Houthi run territory, every Wednesday, all governments institutions are shut down to listen to Abdul Malik al-Houthi speaking, trying to indoctrinate the masses, the public to join the movement.

Thomas: Sounds very entertaining.

Aimen: Actually, I remember that when I was having a conversation with a left-wing activist here in London, and they keep telling, “The war must end, there's so much suffering.”

And then I show them videos of young people who couldn't be older than 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, fighting and dying for the Houthis. And I remember I saw one of them, 14-year-old, and they gave him the rank of a colonel. They give them the rank of a colonel. You are a colonel.

Baraa: And you say that, Aimen. I mean, I know two children from my street in Sana’a, who actually, the Houthis kind of blackmailed the family in order to give them humanitarian aid, which is supposed to be coming to Yemen by the UN.

But because the heavy and restrictive control they have on every aspect of life, if you want to get humanitarian aid, you need to send your children with us. At the beginning, they promised them, he's just going to sit at the checkpoint in Sana’a. We're not going to send them to the battlefronts. But in thousands they come back in coffins back to their families.

Thomas: That’s terrible.

Aimen: Yeah. It's estimated that more than 4,000 people under the age of 16 died in the battlefields of Yemen under the Houthis supervision.

Baraa: And I would urge even the listener to go and search an Associated Press piece that actually a Houthi leader, actually it's Abdul Malik al-Houthi's brother, admitting that they have recruited at least 18,000 children to their militant ranks.

Aimen: And yet those two activists I was talking to in London, and I tried to convince them that this is an evil organisation, their reply because of their left-wing blind bias, they said, “But this is because of what the Saudis did. If the Saudis did intervene in this war, then they wouldn't have recruited children.”

And I said to them, “You idiots. Hezbollah recruit children. Iran recruited children, everywhere recruit. It doesn't matter.”

Thomas: The Houthis recruited children from the very beginning because even in the wars against Saleh, there were accusations at least that there were child soldiers involved on the Houthi side.

Baraa: Exactly. And that comes to the third task that the Houthi supervisor does.

Thomas: Yeah, so the supervisor, it's indoctrination, it's recruitment in the third task.

Baraa: Revenues. The Houthis blackmail and literally it’s shakedown. So basically, if you compare the taxation that is happening in North Yemen, it's five to six times double what they used to pay back in the days when the Yemeni government was in charge.

And it's literally blackmail and shakedown. If you don't, you'll be imprisoned. If you are owner of a small business, even a grocery shop, you have to daily find ways that you can keep funding those supervisors.

Thomas: Why don't the Yemenis rise up and get rid of these supervisors, or at least like kill them if they see them walking down the street.

Baraa: Because the other thing is the strict control that the Houthis have on the possibility of a revolt or even the public starting to mass or gather against them. What they also have is something called the watchers.

Thomas: The watchers. So, they have the supervisors and the watchers.

Baraa: Exactly. The watchers are people who actually, they deploy in large numbers in neighbourhoods, in streets, in mosques, in schools. And their role is to listen and record everything that is said about the Houthis.

Any people who are feeling dissatisfaction, complaining, and they start recording. So basically, it created this environment of everyone is afraid, really afraid.

Aimen: This entire structure of the taxes, of the supervision, and of the intelligence gathering is a textbook Iranian regime style of governing Iran.

Thomas: So, are you saying that the Iranian regime itself is as oppressive as the Houthis or Hezbollah? I mean, it does seem that the Houthis are running an even more totalitarian show there.

Aimen: I mean, because they are at war, but nonetheless, they are running exactly the same textbook. Because even Hezbollah in the southern suburbs and the other areas where they control Baalbek and Al-Biqa Valley, they deploy the same level of policing the thoughts and actions and statements of the people under their control.

Thomas: But Baraa, what about this? Some people would say, yeah, but it is still Yemen. So, Yemen has always been run by oppressive state structures. It's never been like a liberal society. So, what's so different?

Baraa: So, I think this is quite a naive way of putting it, because I do hear these discussions a lot with my liberal friends here in London is, but this is how Yemen is. There is no appreciation of, actually Yemen had a possibility of actually becoming a proper functioning state. There was a level of state institutions.

I used to be going to police stations when there is, let's say a journalist who are being apprehended or arrested, and I can give him a lawyer. We go to court, we actually challenge, there is avenues to challenge this status apparatus.

Aimen: There was a due process basically.

Baraa: Exactly.

Aimen: And now there is no due process.

Baraa: What I'm saying is people think about Yemenis like Bashar al-Assad. They think about those oppressive style of governing. This is not the situation in Yemen.

So, what we were thinking, people were not satisfied because they wanted to be more a plural system, a more opening, a more liberal political environment that governs. So, the simplistic narrative about Yemen has always been there. It's nonsense.

Thomas: Yeah, I mean, that of course is often the case when you hear usually Western descriptions of Middle East political economies. I think there's a sort of sweeping assumption that all those countries are just corrupt, authoritarian dictatorships, basically.

So, they paint them all with one brush and then you don't really understand what's going on. We're going to take a quick break here and keep helping the dear listener to understand what's going on in Yemen, indeed up to the present day, and to see how what's going on in Yemen is linked to what's going on in the Gaza Strip. Stay tuned.

[Music Playing]

We're back. We are rushing to the end of our five-part series on the modern history of Yemen. We're talking about the civil war itself. In 2018, the port city, the vital port city of Hudaydah.

This is on the Red Sea coast of Yemen. And it was very much understood that it was via the Port of Hudaydah that the Houthis were receiving reinforcements in terms of weapons, in terms of cash, in terms of other material from Iran and other allies.

So, retaking the Port of Hudaydah, the city of Hudaydah, was a big Arab coalition goal. And to achieve that goal, they actually used some of those Saleh backed troops who had allied with the Houthis at the beginning of the war. But who after Saleh's assassination at the hands of the Houthis at the end of 2017, decided to defect to the Arab coalition side.

So, the great Hudaydah offensive of 2018 involved land forces commanded by family members of Ali Abdullah Saleh. Naval forces belonging to the Arab Coalition being provided air support by the Air Coalition. And they were really making great progress. They were on the verge of conquering Hudaydah.

Baraa: So, it's called the Joint Forces. It's basically composed of Saleh’s nephew forces who you just explained, and al-Amaliqa, those Salafi brigades funded by the UAE and a local force from Hudaydah called the Tihamah Brigades.

And they kind of combined together and launched a very successful operation. Very quick, very smooth. They actually entered the city of Hudaydah until the international community, mainly led by UN agencies, the UN envoy Yemen at that time, Martin Griffiths and several humanitarian missions put immense, huge, huge pressure on the Arab Coalition, on the Yemeni government to stop the operation.

And broker that they said they're going to broker a deal, and they frame it as because they need to salvage their humanitarian mission in Yemen.

Thomas: This had happened 18 months or so before, after the city of Marib had been successfully liberated or defended from the Houthis and the land forces of the coalition and the local allies were about to push their way up into the mountains, towards Sana’a, possibly to liberate it.

The same sort of thing happened. At that point, the international community came together, said, let's have a ceasefire. Let's have a moratorium on the bombing campaign. Let's protect the civilians. Let's get humanitarian aid.

But in a way, I mean, Aimen, Baraa, this sort of humanitarian global kind of intervention in a war like Yemen makes things worse.

Aimen: Oh, yes.

Thomas: It actually stopped the vital port city of Hudaydah from being conquered for the coalition, which would have prevented the Houthis from getting all of its arms and money from Iran. So, Aimen, why would the international community do this?

Aimen: So, in a sense, the situation here is that the UN gave the nonsensical reason that, “Oh, we don't want Hudaydah to fall, because if it falls, it'll disrupt our aid to the areas under the control of the Houthis.”

Well, excuse me, it doesn't matter changing hands, it wouldn't disrupt anything. In fact, if it is controlled by the coalition, then that will make your operations even more smooth.

Thomas: Especially since the Houthis, it is known they confiscate UN aid and other aid in order to use it to control the Yemenis under their power.

Aimen: And that is where I come to the big C word.

Thomas: Oh my God, don't say it-

Aimen: Corruption.

Thomas: This is a family podcast. Oh, corruption.

Aimen: Corruption. Corruption on two sides here. Corruption on the side of UN managers and staff in Hudaydah, who were making lots of money from selling a lot of that aid to the Houthis.

Thomas: This reminds me of the corruption that you described in the American military fraternity over Afghanistan. It's very similar, if you make money from selling guns to people prosecuting a war, why would you want that war to end?

Aimen: Exactly. So, that's the first part of the corruption. The second part of the corruption is that there are people who were lobbying the UN so hard, pretending to be humanitarians, and pretending to be trying to get the war to stop when in fact they are paid by who? By weapon manufacturers in the West.

Thomas: They're like lobbyists, basically.

Aimen: They're lobbyists who wanted the war to continue, not to end. Because if Hudaydah is taken, then what's going to happen? The Houthis will be starved of their supplies, and it's only a matter of time before they surrender.

Thomas: What's worse about that corruption is that there has been a genuine peace process, an ongoing attempt by all of the parties to come to some political solution to the problem.

I mean, it has resulted in many ceasefires, I think altogether like 18 months since the war broke out, there have been ceasefires and there have been some like formally written agreements. In Stockholm, there was one.

There has been a peace process. That peace process is not aided by this kind of international skullduggery.

Baraa: Well, if you see into all of the UN humanitarian missions that came into Yemen, so compare it starting 2000 and let's say 15 and ‘16, they did the pledging, they wanted 1 billion, and then it increased to 2 billion. In 2018, it was 3 billion. And in 2019, they were requesting 4 billion.

So, you can imagine, it's basically shows that actually your humanitarian mission is not lifting the suffering because the demand and the suffering of the Yemeni people is increasing by every year. This is one important thing.

Thomas: That's very interesting. Yeah.

Baraa: Another important thing, which I come back to what I said, it's always trade-offs. You don't need to fall in love with all of those political factions in Yemen, but actually, if you want to work towards salvaging the Yemeni state, then you work with those actors just to push it a little bit into the right direction.

And the problem I think with a lot of INGOs is how they view Yemen. Yemen, in the entire region actually is not viewed as a place where a prosperous future or prosperous state can actually exist.

It's actually when we feel bad, we have liberal guilt. We need to send humanitarian aid, let's send them more humanitarian aid, let's send them-

Thomas: Treat them like beggars, treat them like-

Baraa: Yeah. Food packages. And actually, what those people actually want is state institutions.

Thomas: Good governance.

Baraa: And good governance.

Thomas: Give us some good governance.

Baraa: Exactly. And we have, especially in Western countries, we are in the process of ditching states in order to salvage humanitarian missions. A very crazy notion of an approach.

Aimen: Exactly. That's exactly the problem. It is encouraging the proliferation of non-state actors.

Baraa: Exactly. And for me, I haven't been a fan of any militants, even when people talk about the Kurds in Syria, the idea is that you're ditching states and the ultimate prize should always been the reinstating and helping the Yemenis to govern, to reinstate the institutions that can deliver to the people, not to give them handouts.

Aimen: And that's why you will see that there is a lot of institutions in the West dedicated towards humanitarian efforts, but far less dedicated to nation building.

Baraa: And not only that, if you see all of the humanitarian mission into Yemen, it's basically giving more and more handouts. They know some of it'll be controlled by the Houthis, it'll be manipulated, it would be stolen, but that doesn't matter as long as this cycle, this vicious cycle is going.

And if you compare into the areas that, as you mentioned, Marib as one of them, let me put a quick example about how the current status in Yemen. You have Marib, you have Hadhramaut — Shabwa and you have Mahrah. The situation there is stable, there is a level of governance.

Yes, there are problems. It's not perfect. But if you want to go to a school and you're a child, you go to those areas. If you want to go to university, you go to those areas. If you want electricity, if you want water, if you want food and you want a paying job, basically, you are far more likely going to get job opportunities in those places.

What do those places have that the rest, especially Aden and Sana’a doesn't have?

Aimen: Good governance.

Baraa: A level of governance, just not even like that perfect. A level of governance. While Sana’a and Aden have militants. The non-state actors, they kind of invest into having this chaos ongoing. They benefit from the presence of chaos. And I think this is what UN missions have forgot when they deal with the Houthis.

Aimen: You know what Littlefinger said in the Game of Thrones, “Chaos is a ladder.”

Thomas: Well, I'm pretty cynical. I just wonder what the pay packets are like for those people who oversee all the NGOs, frankly.

Aimen: Yeah, exactly. And the corruption.

Thomas: Because chaos is good for them as well. Now talking about peace processes, Aimen. Earlier this year, quite spectacularly, it was announced that Saudi Arabia and Iran had reached a new peace deal brokered by, of all people China, which everyone thought at that time meant that the war in Yemen, moves will finally be able to be taken to end that war because Saudi and Iran were renegotiating their relations in the region.

Tell us about how it is that China negotiated peace between Saudi and Iran and what that was intended to do for Yemen before seeing what happened to that peace deal.

Aimen: First of all, we have to understand that China doesn't do anything out of the goodness of its heart. I knew that something was afoot even as early as January and February of 2019. The Chinese had started to put their eye on a very important port in Saudi Arabia.

Thomas: This is the Port of Jazan.

Aimen: Indeed.

Thomas: In this extreme southwest corner of Saudi Arabia.

Aimen: Yeah. Just about 24 miles from the Yemeni border. That port is deport connected by transport and highways and electricity and everything and all of that. And it has a 400,000 barrels per day in a refinery capacity. It is brilliant place.

The Chinese wanted to establish a industrial city and a port where they can cultivate the riches of the Arabian-Nubian Shield. An area struggling the west of Arabia as well as the Nile Valley from the Nile Delta, all the way down to the northeast of the DRC.

Thomas: Underneath the ground, either side of the Red Sea is unimaginable material wealth.

Aimen: Absolutely about $14 trillion worth of minerals. $14 trillion worth of minerals.

Thomas: And Baraa’s moving back, he's just enrolled in this new mineralogy course.

Aimen: So, that port would enable the Chinese to build an industrial city there where you can bring in the upstream products, and then you can then have a downstream industry there that could then produce all of these metals and minerals into finished products which can go into Europe and America and back to China and Europe.

Thomas: Just one problem though, Aimen. That port's pretty close to war torn Yemen.

Aimen: Exactly. So, despite the fact that President Xi Jinping was trying so hard to lobby MBS, especially during the late 2019 visit to Beijing, and I know a lot about the details because I designed the gift actually that the Chinese gave to MBS at that time, so-

Thomas: Wow.

Aimen: Yeah. So, basically, they were trying still to lobby him for it. But he said, “Guys, there is a teeny tiny problem there, there is a war going on there. So, maybe we can postpone the discussion until later.”

The Chinese were planning again to lobby him in the first quarter of 2020. But there was another teeny tiny problem, which was COVID.

Thomas: Then COVID. So, war, COVID. Man, it's two horsemen of the apocalypse.

Aimen: Exactly, yeah. So, it was delayed all the way until the first quarter of 2022. So, fast forward two years, the Chinese felt confident that, okay, in April 2022, there was a ceasefire between the two sides, between the Houthis and the Saudis.

Then this is when the Chinese said, “Okay, we want it,” but the Saudis saying “Well, the time is not right. I mean, the war isn't over. We are just at the truce. It's just a truce.”

But the Chinese kept insisting, and even they postponed the visit of President Xi Jinping, because for him, Jazan is going to be the crown jewel of the BRI, of-

Thomas: The Belt and Road Initiative. Absolutely. So, do you think that already at this time, Xi Jinping is realising what needs to happen for his vision to become successful.

Aimen: Exactly. So, he was asking how do we get it? So, the Saudis one thing to give the Chinese a very difficult answer, or shall we say, okay, the Chinese are not taking no for an answer, so let's give them a yes, but a very impossible yes. Yes, if you manage to convince the Houthis to end the war. The Chinese always love a challenge.

Thomas: And they do already have very close diplomatic, political, and economic links with Iran. So, they're in a good place to negotiate.

Aimen: And with the Houthis too, and with the Houthis they have leverage over them, because all the electric cables, the communication cables-

Thomas: The Houthis depend on Chinese electronics.

Aimen: Exactly. They need them. So, the Chinese went there, and they said to the Houthis, in no uncertain terms, we want this port, we need it. Don't mess this up for us. This is the future of the BRI. Yeah.

Thomas: President Biden can only drool and wish he had that kind of sway over the Houthis.

Aimen: Exactly. So, the Houthis were taken aback first because they can offend any country in the world, even America, but not China.

So, they went to their pay masters in Tehran, and they told them what's going to happen so that the Iranians contacted the Chinese and they said, “Guys, you can't do this without us being involved because the Houthis might control Yemen, but we control the Houthis. So, nothing can go past us.”

And this is when the start of a process in which the Chinese decided that since 40% of their daily energy consumption come from the Gulf area, from Iran, from Iraq, from Kuwait, from Saudi, and from the UAE, and from Qatar, all of these countries combined provide 40% of the daily use of energy for China.

Thomas: And dear listener, if you need to be reminded, there are a lot of people in China.

Aimen: Exactly. Not to mention a lot of products being exported by China. $3.6 trillion a year of goods come out of China. They're the factory of the world.

Thomas: Powered by oil.

Aimen: So, the world can't afford to have China, basically without power or energy. China knows this. So, they went, and they made a deal with Iran and with the Saudis that there should be no shooting war between you two.

The Iranians through the Chinese, extracted from the Saudis, several promises. Two of them are very important here. The first one is for Saudi Arabia not to allow any third-party whatsoever to use their airspace, their air bases, or their territories, to strike Iran, whether the Americans or the Israelis. So, Saudi granted that.

The second concession is for the Saudis not to continue financially funding any Iranian opposition groups. Whether they are violent or nonviolent, doesn't matter, no more. So, the Saudis agreed to that.

From the Iranian side, they committed to total de-escalation in the region, including the Houthis and the supporting of the Houthis peace process. And they have committed themselves not to support any terror organisations that would attack Saudi Arabia.

And they have committed two things. First, not to give the Houthis any new long range offensive weapons that could threaten Saudi Arabia. And the second is to withdraw their experts from Yemen. And this agreement would be evaluated over six months. So, they said in September, we'll come back to it.

Six months, things seem to be fine, and the Chinese are happy. The Saudis are somewhat happy. But even then, the Saudis are saying that with Iran, you have to always remember one hand for the handshake and the other hand behind holding a pistol just in case.

Thomas: Well, on the 10th of March of this year, 2023, the Saudi-Iran Peace plan brokered by China was announced and amidst all the fanfare, a lot of which focused on the ramifications of the peace plan for Yemen.

Baraa, were you encouraged? Were you optimistic? Did you think this is now finally going to pave the way to a peaceful, hopefully politically stable resolution for Yemen?

Baraa: Not really. The thing is because I know how the Houthis are thinking. And-

Thomas: Just like the Saudis, they probably knew how they …

Baraa: So, what happened in 2022 following very quickly in 2020 and 2021, the Houthis had a huge offensive on the city of Marib, but the forces in Marib were able to push them back as Aimen explained, and then with the support of al-Amaliqa forces.

But then in 2022, mainly the Saudis and the Emiratis pushed President Hadi at the time to concede his powers to a presidential council. Formed this time now of all of the faction, including the secessionist, the Southern Transitional Council.

Thomas: Wanting there to be unity amongst the Yemeni forces.

Baraa: The Islah party, the socialist, everyone is in this presidential council. And then there was a period of ceasefire from April 2022 up until today, people don't realise this. There hasn't been any fighting from throughout this whole-

Thomas: 18 months. Yeah.

Baraa: Yeah. 18 months. That's quite a long time, especially in a conflict like Yemen. But the Houthis basically, were stalling because they want an agreement that would push the coalition out of Yemen.

Because if the coalition, the Saudi led coalition is out, they will find it very hard to justify why would they intervene if the Houthis launch an offensive on Marib or in Aden or in other provinces.

The main idea is that if this is what the Saudis want, let us buy time and let us — until we can get the Saudis out of the picture, then they're going to attack. And I know it's quite a cynical way of thinking, but I know how the Houthis think.

Thomas: Well, I mean, we know from history that ceasefires, truces, negotiated peace agreements on the side of the axis of resistance are always just means of biting their time. They don't tend to change their ultimate goals.

This is the problem, and it's the problem that we're seeing in the holy land right now. So, that peace agreement announced on the 10th of March of this year is just abrogated now. I mean, it's torn to pieces.

Aimen: It's torn to pieces because-

Thomas: And here's the point though, Aimen. I mean, we now know quite certainly that Iran was involved in the long-term plotting of the 7th of October Hamas attacks. So, throughout all of that, because in our emergency episode on the attacks, we talked about the peace plan that was being built through diplomatic efforts between Saudi and Israel, which those attacks undermined.

And all along, we said Iran was indicating that they were cool with the plan. Well, they had themselves sign their own peace plan with Saudi Arabia, which had taken 18 months to negotiate through Chinese mediation, saying, we are cool with the peace with Saudi Arabia.

But the whole time, they’re planning with Hamas and Hezbollah, the 7th of October attacks, the whole time they weren't telling the truth.

Aimen: Of course, because we talked about the political taqiyya and the taqiyya siyasiyat, as I called it before.

Thomas: Yeah, of course. So, obviously Iran feels that they can hide their true ambitions in that way. So, the peace plan that was announced in March is abrogated. I mean, formally has Saudi Arabia said, okay, Iran, it's over.

Aimen: Not formally, but they have more or less informed the Chinese that they are intending to withdraw from the agreement. Because first of all, it has been violated in two particular clauses.

The first clause is the commitment to de-escalation. That's not what's happening. And the second is the fact that the Houthis must abide by the ceasefire. And the ceasefire has been broken now, by the fact that five Bahraini soldiers and five Saudi soldiers were killed in clashes in the mountain in Jazan. And so, yeah.

Thomas: And ballistic missiles emanating from Sana’a towards Israel, have been intercepted by American-

Aimen: And Saudi also. Even the Saudis have-

Baraa: Not only that Thomas, do you know where did this ballistic missile fly from?

Thomas: I do not know.

Baraa: Surprise, surprise. Hudaydah.

Thomas: Oh, from Hudaydah. If only the coalition had been able to grab it.

Baraa: That same port where basically the international community had reigned in to prevent the Yemeni forces from liberating.

Aimen: So, if the UN their job, the Houthis wouldn't have been around by now, but nonetheless, they have given the Houthi a lifeline because of why, corruption and because of why, this obsession with ceasefires.

So, now we are hearing a lot this obsession with ceasefire, ceasefire, ceasefire, ceasefire, which is happening in the context of Gaza. Dear listener, it's one of the most heartless things to say, let people fight it out. Just don't interfere.

Thomas: It does sound heartless. I mean, this season of Conflicted, we've talked about the Israeli bombing campaign in South Lebanon in 2006, which failed to achieve its ambition. And Hezbollah is stronger than ever.

We've now spent five episodes talking about the growth of the Houthi movement in Yemen. And the unto now failure of the Arab coalitions, to some extent dominated by an air campaign, failing to dislodge them.

We're seeing images of the IDF in Israel launching a ground invasion of Gaza. Determined to eradicate Hamas, and in the process killing many civilians. So, the full tragedy is playing out. And once again, we hear cries, ceasefire, ceasefire, ceasefire.

And the Israelis are saying, if we stop, Hamas will just have more time to build up again, and they will attack us again. So, it's right before our eyes.

Aimen: Exactly. And this is why I always say to people, like we saw in Yemen, like we saw in Israel Palestine conflict. Sometime you have to let the parties fight it out. Sometime if you see two people fighting, just let them fight it out.

Don't interfere. Let them finish each other off, because this could be merciful than if you try to prolong it. Because that's what's going to happen, is that then each party will try to go and grab a knife and come back. And this time it'll be far more worse.

Thomas: If this was season three of Conflicted still, Aimen, this would be where I raise the question about the relative virtues of the Christian and Islamic moral perspectives. Because I think, and we can't go into it in detail, but I do think that's what underlies this difference.

I think that that global international voice which says ceasefire, peace first, don't kill anyone. Bloodshed is always terrible. Death is terrible. Murder is terrible. War is only evil, is a secularised Christian voice.

And the voice that you just articulated, which actually, and most Western liberals don't know this, most Middle Easterners believe this. They actually understand that sometimes you just got to duke it out. It's a kind of Muslim perspective. Do you think that's fair, guys?

Aimen: It is because-

Thomas: Kind of. Yeah, I would say.

Aimen: Because war is ordained in the Qur’an as a instrument of change. It is evil, but it is necessary, just like forest fires for the revival of-

Thomas: An instrument of divine providence. That God's providence includes war as one of its manifestations. And Christians find this incredibly hard to accept. We think of war as the province of the devil alone.

And right now, that clash of civilizations is playing out. Anyway, that's season three of Conflicted. Season four has been about the radical mind, the fundamentalist mind.

You and I, Aimen, in the first couple of episodes of the season, tried as best we could to be honest with our dear listeners about the extent to which the fundamentalist mentality, OCD tendencies, are striving for purity.

All of that sort of thing has influenced our own lives, especially when we were young men. Baraa, I will not ask you to expose yourself now, but here we reach the end of season four of Conflicted.

And sadly, the Middle East, the miserable east, as you call it, Aimen, is dying, once again, is being ripped apart once again. Torn between those committed to radical transnational solutions. And those committed to the modern nation state, not the liberal modern nation state. That is true. But to the modern nation state.

It's happening, dear listener, you're seeing it happen, it's going to get worse. Right. Aimen?

Aimen: Yeah.

Thomas: The Houthis are going to intervene in this war in Gaza. Hezbollah is going to feel required to intervene. Iranian militias in Iraq are going to feel required to intervene. We are on the verge of regional war.

Aimen: Yeah. We are on the verge of regional war. But you know what, how else we will get out of this stalemate? There has to be a victor and a vanquished. And in the end of it, yes, there will be so much suffering.

It could touch myself and my family personally. It could touch Baraa and his family personally, God forbid. But nonetheless, at some point, we need to have that stalemate between the forces of darkness and the forces of modernity. We need to have that show done.

Thomas: If this were season three of Conflicted, I might now point out that at the end of the First World War, when the Ottoman Empire fell, the mandates were given to France and Britain by the League of Nations to prevent an almighty ethno-religious war in the Middle East.

And instead, enlightened western gentlemen were supposed to create modern nation states for those formerly Ottoman regions. So, maybe this let them fight it out. Idea that you've just articulated Aimen is a hundred years overdue.

Aimen: Yes.

Baraa: Well, what I would say is for all of the Western policymakers who think that they can have influence over the region, or have actually shaped, the process of enabling non-state actors like the Houthis, like Hezbollah, like all of those militant groups have weakened the state and actually made us much closer to a regional conflict than if they actually were able to contain them quite very early at the beginning.

And I'm not an advocate of an actual conflict to happen in the region, but actually the problem is this was enabled, this could have been prevented in the war in Syria if they would've con contained Hezbollah, if they would've contained Hamas and pressured them to actually get into an agreement with Fatah and the Palestinian authority. And prevented the collapse of Yemen in the way it did.

And people in Yemen always talk about this of like, what's going to happen next? When are we going to get out of this? And I think there's multiple things. The first thing is the Yemeni leadership need to subscribe to the, what I've been following Conflicted for several seasons now.

And it's the modern nation state, to prescribe to the ideas that we need simple modern nation state to deliver to its people. And then-

Thomas: The revolution of the 1960s, Baraa.

Baraa: Exactly. And the worst thing that the Houthis did is that they didn't put in mind the main duty as a defacto authority, which is kind of the way that I do regret why Hamas did that was the safety and prosperity of your own people, the people you govern is the utmost priority.

That should put me in your mind first thing and foremost, even if that means making unpleasant compromises.

And then the second thing is that Yemen will need the help of its neighbours and allies and the international community ultimately. But if you think, and I've listened to Aimen mention about the initiative that is happening between India, UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. Where's Yemen in that?

You could think Yemen is literally at the Horn of Africa and the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait. The main problem that I think us as Yemenis and the region need to think, we need to either subscribe to the future or we can be stuck in those militant mindset and say, actually we're going to continue this holy war forever.

Thomas: Well, I think Amen, you would agree with Baraa that a modern nation state is what Yemeni should be focusing their minds on. I think you would say that at the top of that modern nation state should be a Sunni monarch. Let's not go into it. Let's not go into it.

But that dear listener, brings season four of Conflicted to an end. Baraa Shiban, thank you. My heart is so beating with appreciation for everything you've brought to these five episodes.

Dear listener, they've been long, they've been complex, but this is what Conflicted is here to do, to really explain what's really going on.

My dear friend, Aimen, seeing you in the flesh. It's so great. Thank you so much for everything you bring to Conflicted, your extraordinary knowledge and your analytical powers, which is great. Don't say anything positive about me.

Aimen: No, no, no.

Thomas: I'm Christian.

Aimen: I wanted to say thank you so much, Thomas, for your stewardship and for your ability to host a very complex podcast like this. Your place should be in one of the biggest radios in the world.

Thomas: I'm here learning alongside the dear listener, learning, learning, learning from your expertise. Thank you, Aimen. Thank you, dear listener. Stick with us. We will inshallah be back because the Middle East ain't going away.

Baraa: Unfortunately, yeah.

Aimen: Unfortunately, yeah.

[Music Playing]

Thomas: A reminder that you can follow the show over on Facebook and Twitter at MH Conflicted. And for a deeper dive into all the subjects we talk about here on Conflicted, head over to Facebook and search Conflicted Podcast Discussion Group.

There you will find other fans of the show engaging in heated debates, enlightening conversations, and just generally geeking out over Conflicted related topics.

Conflicted is a Message Heard production. This episode was produced and edited by Harry Stott. Sandra Ferrari is our executive producer. Our theme music is by Matt Huxley and Tom Biddle.

Conflicted S4 E22: Yemen: From Revolution to Civil War

Speakers: Thomas Small, Aimen Dean, & Baraa Shiban

Thomas: Welcome back, dear listeners, you are tuned in to another episode of Conflicted with me, Thomas Small.

Aimen: And me, Aimen Dean.

Baraa: And me, Baraa Shiban.

Thomas: Yes, that's right. We are back again with our wonderful guest, the Yemeni political activist, Baraa Shiban, as we continue our long march through the tumultuous history of Yemen.

And for the next two episodes with a bit of a difference. You might not have realised dear listeners, but normally through the magic of audio production, we record Conflicted remotely from different parts of the globe, me in the UK, and Aimen in — I'm not saying.

But today we have a rare treat. Aimen is in London, and we are all here together in the studio. Isn't it great, Aimen, to be in the same room together for the first time in months?

Aimen: Absolutely. So, if you do any mistakes, I can always throw something at you. Perfect.

Thomas: And Baraa, it's lovely to see you in person. It's been a very long time.

Baraa: Indeed, indeed. I mean, I'm glad to see actually both of you.

Thomas: We are now entering the final stretch with two episodes left to go of this epic series. We're now on the cusp of Yemen's Civil War. The Arab Spring has brought a new hope for Baraa, and those like him yearning for democracy in Yemen.

[Music Playing]

But will they be able to found a new constitution outside the reach of Ali Abdullah Saleh and the insurgent Houthis? Or will it all be doomed to failure? Let's find out.

The theme of today's story really is that in Yemen following the Arab Spring, nobody trusted anybody. It was a time of great mistrust and a politics of mistrust. Animated not only Yemen, but the regional geopolitical actors as well.

Baraa, first tell us, put yourself back in late 2011, early 2012, after the Arab Spring. How optimistic were you feeling, at the time?

Baraa: So, I remember at the time there were two conflicting feelings at the same time. The general, I would say, atmosphere in the squares in the protests. And me, one of them, they were very angry about the deal that was brokered by the GCC countries.

Thomas: This deal is known as the GCC Initiative. And we'll describe it in a second. So, the youth wing of the protest movement didn't like the deal.

Baraa: They didn't like the deal. And at the same time, there's a sense of hope because things were starting to look different. This is the first time that Yemen would be coming out, ruling itself without Ali Abdullah Saleh, and kind of a new political arrangement is about to be set.

Thomas: So, a bit of hope, a bit of anger on the streets. Maybe not the best combination of feelings going into a new era, but still things were looking up because of the GCC Initiative.

So, the GCC Initiative, that's the Gulf Cooperation Council Initiative, signed on the 23rd of November 2011. The signatories were on the one side President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who by signing agreed to stand down.

And a group of other Yemeni political figures, some from Ali Abdullah Saleh’s political party, the GPC. Others from the opposition political party, that big basket of parties, the joint meetings parties, the JMP and a kind of co-signatory to the deal was the Secretary General of the GCC himself. It was signed in Riyadh.

Now Aimen, the GCC, that's a group of Gulf countries, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, and Qatar. Describe why the GCC should have been the co-signatory to this Yemeni deal.

Aimen: Several reasons. First of all, the size of the Yemeni expatriate community in the Gulf is huge, so you're talking about three, three and a half million people. So, for them, that is an important thing, the stability of one of the largest foreign expat community living in the region.

And also, the fear that if there is a greater instability, that would reflect badly on the GCC, terrorism, refugees, narcotics, weapons smuggling. I mean, Yemen’s stability is the stability of the GCC. You can't separate the two at all.

Thomas: Yeah, I mean the GCC, and I think probably especially Saudi Arabia stood the most to lose from a Yemen situation that went completely out of control. But it wasn't just a regional deal.

The U.S., the EU and the UN had been very actively involved in the drafting of the GCC Initiative, which as I said, was signed in November of 2011, and was meant to solve a basic problem in Yemen.

So, the Arab Spring had revealed that the state structure that had evolved in Yemen over Saleh’s 33 years as president, was not delivering on the promises of the Yemeni Revolution of the 1960s.

And it was the promises of that earlier revolution that people like you Baraa, were agitating for. We want the Yemen that we had been promised, which Saleh had said he was going to give us, but he didn't give it to us. We want it now.

So, just to explain the initiative, it required Ali Abdullah Saleh to stand down, and a new transitional government was called into being, that was a sort of unity government.

Baraa: So, the government is split 50/50 between the GPC, Saleh’s party, and the joint meeting parties. But the prime minister is chosen by the JMP, the Joint Meeting Party, so the opposition. And the presidency, both parties would agree to nominate Saleh’s deputy as the new president, but they insisted that the public go and elect him.

Thomas: That’s right. So, the long-time vice president of Yemen, Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, from now on President Hadi, he was the one that the GCC initiative said would become president. And the initiative called for new presidential elections with Hadi as sole candidate, simply to give the Yemeni people the opportunity, I mean, to rubber stamp the agreement.

So, a new president, President Hadi, overseeing a new government with ministries, shared equally between all the political sides and with a opposition prime minister. So, there was a sense of balance.

And finally, the third major dimension of the GCC Initiative was that President Hadi was tasked with holding a National Dialogue Conference. This National Dialogue Conference would meet to discuss Yemen's problems, come up with a list of official recommendations for the drafting of a new Yemeni constitution, in general that sets the initiative.

Baraa: Exactly. It's basically political parties and Yemeni social figures. And the wider Yemeni public can come together to negotiate the framework of the new constitution.

Thomas: So, before moving into the politics, President Hadi is a new character in this story, even though throughout everything we've said so far, he was the vice president. Maybe that tells you something already. What kind of a man was Hadi?

I mean, I had the privilege of meeting President Hadi in 2015, and he was incredibly sweet, quite on the ball. Didn't strike me as the sort of guy who would naturally have been able to stand up to a guy like Ali Abdullah Saleh, though.

Aimen: He sounds like his name, Hadi. Hadi means peaceful.

Thomas: Yeah.

Baraa: Exactly.

Aimen: Yeah. Quiet.

Baraa: Quiet. And this is actually what I felt even when I met him later on, it was that he's quiet for a president and in a way that did contribute to people don't feeling that he's that strong figure that they got used to.

Thomas: I mean, I think it's fair to say that Saleh had accepted him, or had chosen him as his vice president, knowing that Hadi was so peaceful of temperament that he wouldn't get in his way.

And so, it's possible that right at the very beginning, the beginning of the GCC Initiative and the new Yemen, it's possible to think that there was already a slight fly in that ointment. Would this man be up to the job? We're not going to answer that question now. We'll find out.

So, the signing of the GCC Initiative in November 2011 and the presidential elections in February 2012 confirming President Hadi as president were sort of the inciting events in a new chapter of Yemeni history. They were like the firing shot in a race to dream up a new Yemen and draw up a new constitution, making that dream a reality.

I don't think it's a major spoiler when I say the Gulf Initiative eventually failed. And in order to understand why, we have to turn our attention briefly, at least to the regional geopolitical scene. We mentioned the GCC, the major players, the real players in this story in terms of the GCC, are Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar. Saudi more than anyone else.

So, Aimen, the GCC wants a stable and secure and peaceful Yemen that will not be a source of trouble to its neighbours, and which will be integrated into the regional economy, more cynically from which wealth can be extracted by powerful countries.

Saudi Arabia at the time, early 2012, what's its political situation like? When it turns its attention to Yemen, what is it doing there?

Aimen: Well, at the time, it was the twilight years of the reign of King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia. So, from 2005 until 2012, we would say that King Abdullah was more or less in charge, but being helped because he was old. By 2012 he was already 91. By the time he dies, he will be ‘94. So, it was a twilight of his years, and so he wasn't in control.

Thomas: When we think of Saudi Arabia now, because the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, the notorious MBS is so young and so energetic and full of ideas, we might forget that for many decades, Saudi Arabia was seen in the exact opposite way, very old men running a state that was not unified, that was divided between rival princely brothers and factions within the state.

And that was certainly the case as King Abdullah was nearing the end of his life in 2012.

Aimen: Indeed. I mean, his son, Prince Mutaib was one of those people in charge. Another son, Prince Abdulaziz bin Abdullah was in charge of foreign policy, especially with the fact that the long-term diplomat of Saudi Arabia, Prince Saud al-Faisal was about to die.

Thomas: And he was also very ill. Yeah.

Aimen: Indeed. So, the foreign policy at the time was neglected and it was weak. And what you see today as the assertive Saudi Arabia was very much a Saudi Arabia in retreat at that time, because of the Arab Spring, they were on the defensive rather than on the offensive.

Thomas: And this is true of Saudi policy in Yemen at the time. So, the kind of general sclerotic, non-unified nature of the Saudi state apparatus and government at the time was apparent in the Yemeni situation, which may have contributed down the line to the failure of the Gulf Initiative.

The one country that had the most to gain from its success simply wasn't powerful enough at the time to ensure that success. That's one way of seeing it.

Now, what about Qatar? I mean, Qatar is a funny country and in terms of Yemen, Baraa, Qatar at this time could be seen as supporting the Islah Party, which if you remember, dear listener, the Islah Party is a political party, very broad based, associated to some extent with the Muslim Brotherhood movement, to another extent with some tribal, very powerful tribal elements in the north of Yemen.

The Islah Party was the sort of the main opposition party. Qatar was backing that party. Why?

Baraa: So, a couple of reasons, mainly because first of all, Qatar, in terms of their foreign policy backed Muslim Brotherhood parties across the region.

Thomas: Especially during the Arab Spring.

Baraa: Especially during the Arab Spring. So, that was one factor. The other factor is Hamid al-Ahmar, the son of … and now he's the brother of the Sheikh of the Hashid Confederation Tribe. I mean, he managed basically to secure ties in terms literally family ties. So basically, he became very close to the royal family in Qatar.

Thomas: I see. I think there's also, with Qatar, a kind of Emirati rivalry always there on the ground. Is that right, Aimen? Where's the rivalry in Yemen at that point?

Aimen: At that time, the contradicting foreign policy objectives between the UAE and Qatar stems from two aspects here, the Arab Spring, which was raging at that time, and the Qataris were absolutely, let me use — I'm trying to make it more polite, but actually they were pissing off the Emiratis so much for their support of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood.

Thomas: Given how angry the Emiratis were. I think that was polite, Aimen.

Aimen: So, that's the first thing. And the second thing is the Emiratis in particular felt that the Qataris are playing with fire. They are being the little arsonist in the Arab Spring going from one country to another, stalking the fires of Islamist revolutionary atmosphere, especially Muslim Brotherhood revolutionary ideas.

And the last thing that the Emiratis wanted is for Yemen to turn into yet another Egypt, where the Islah Party would gain significant hold on power that would then threaten the stability of the GCC, because it'll become a new Turkey as they see it, or a new Egypt, a magnet for Islamist to flock into.

And what could go wrong? I mean, Yemen has a lot of weapons, have a lot of mountains, have a lot of-

Thomas: And a lot of Al-Qaeda members.

Aimen: Al-Qaeda members.

Thomas: So, that's the sort of way in which the GCC was arranged at the time in early 2012. Now, going into the local politics, Baraa, protestors like you at the time, along with the GCC, after the instability of the Arab Spring era, which had seen intense fighting on the street assassinations and attempted assassinations and growing unrest, you wanted Yemen to emerge stronger, stabler more progressive, more socially just.

However, to some extent, as you would find out, standing in the way of that vision, were the same cast of characters from the last episode. The military men, the tribal leaders, and the political parties that had governed Yemen for decades.

So, very, very briefly because dear listener, go back and re-listen to the last episode if you need to know who these people are. Let's just remind everyone, we have Ali Abdullah Saleh, of course, no longer president, and saying he supported the transition.

Baraa: But also, Ali Abdullah Saleh, due to the GCC Initiative, have immunity.

Thomas: So, one massive point of the GCC Initiative was that Ali Abdullah Saleh and his family were immune from any prosecution for any corruption, any crimes from his time in power.

Baraa: From everything. And that didn't basically sat well with the protestors. Ali Abdullah Saleh was making official statements when he meets, for example, the UN envoy when he meets ambassadors, that he supports the transition. Yet when he meets his party members and followers, he's saying, “I'm going to teach them how an opposition works.”

Thomas: Now, in addition to the former President Saleh, there's Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, Ali Mohsen, military man, longtime ally of the president, who had then fallen out spectacularly with the president, fought the president's forces during the Arab Spring. He's definitely around. What did the GCC Initiative give him? What was his political power in early 2012?

Baraa: Well, Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar was viewed as the person who managed to bring Ali Abdullah Saleh down. So, he is an influential figure, although the GCC Initiative did require him to step down from his military post. But he was appointed as the president's military advisor.

Thomas: So, we have Ali Mohsen, we have the former president. And then the third power sort of bloc, the al-Ahmar family in general. This is the head of the Hashid Tribal Confederation, a very complicated family.

And right now, I just want to zero in on one member of that family whom we didn't mention in the previous episode, Husayn al-Ahmar, because there is an amazing story involving Husayn al-Ahmar that just really brings to life what Yemeni politics was like behind the scenes at the time when people like you, Baraa were trying to create a new and democratic Yemen.

So, Husayn al-Ahmar, he was rich, powerful, and also in the North.

Baraa: So, Husayn al-Ahmar is the family member of al-Ahmar, who actually is based in the north. He's based in the highlands between Amran and Sa’dah, kind of like this big figure who can actually pose a counterbalance to the growing influence of the Houthis.

Thomas: So, yeah, this is Houthi country. So, this is the other side. I see.

Baraa: However, at the same time, he was a parliament member, and he is representing the GPC out of all parties. But an important factor about him, Husayn al-Ahmar tried to establish his own political party. That's even before 2011. And in one of his many trips in the region, he went and visited your friend, Gaddafi.

Thomas: Aimen, your best friend Muammar Gaddafi, president of Libya, who was-

Aimen: No, he was the leader of Libya.

Thomas: I beg your pardon.

Aimen: He was the most beloved leader of Libya.

Thomas: Husayn al-Ahmar, who had been bankrolled to some extent by the Saudis for a long time, deciding he wanted to be a political player in his own right, goes to the Saudi archenemy Gaddafi.

Baraa: So, the Saudis quickly find out, Saudi Intelligence quickly find out that actually Husayn al-Ahmar came back from Libya with a plane full of cash.

Thomas: A hundred million dollars.

Baraa: A hundred million dollars, literally. And he told Gaddafi that he would split this money with Saleh. He didn't. And he started to establish his basically own political network, which basically attracted all opportunists, who wanted little bit of cash.

Thomas: When the Saudis found out about the money that Gaddafi had given to Husayn al-Ahmar, they offered him a deal of their own.

Baraa: So, they basically told him, whatever Gaddafi is giving you, we will give you the same, just don't go to Gaddafi again.

Now, he promised them that he wouldn't. However, later on when Gaddafi actually was toppled and the rebels literally stormed into the Libyan Intelligence headquarters, it was revealed that actually the payments and cash continued flying between Gaddafi and Husayn al-Ahmar. And that angered the Saudis.

Thomas: So, Husayn al-Ahmar was taking the Saudi money and the Libyan money, angering the Saudis who cut ties with Husayn al-Ahmar.

Baraa: Exactly.

Thomas: And this is incredibly important to this story, and we're just going to leave it here, but bear this in mind. The man who was the chief sort of muscle on the ground resisting the Houthis, had just been cut out by the Saudis.

Finally, this brings us up to the sort of fourth major power player in Yemeni politics. Although in retrospect, we realise now how powerful they were. At the time, maybe people weren't paying attention. And that's of course the Houthis, the Houthis Baraa, did not sign the GCC Initiative, did not agree to the initiative. Why?

Baraa: So, the Houthis positioned themselves as the new opposition, the kind of the people who generally care about the revolution ideals and goals. And what they said is basically the GCC Initiative is a reflection of the interest of the Imperial West and the neighbouring imperial countries, like especially Saudi Arabia.

Thomas: And the corrupt Yemeni political establishment.

Baraa: Exactly.

Thomas: Which were the signatories to the deal. So, the Houthis could be like, “This is a sellout to the revolution.”

Baraa: So, in exchange, they said, we're not willing now to give up our arms and weapons because this is a stooge government that represents America and the West and the corrupt Gulf countries and does not represent the sole part of the revolution.

Thomas: Classic Hezbollah move, Aimen.

Aimen: Exactly. That's the whole idea. Just say, excuse me, we are anti-imperialist. Death to America, death to everything else.

Thomas: And so, we need our weapons.

Aimen: Yes, exactly.

Thomas: We need our weapons.

Baraa: And they started launching an attack at the end of 2011, literally right after the deal was signed, they attacked that Salafi school that Aimen had mentioned in the previous episodes.

Thomas: Yes. You remember the Dammaj School?

Baraa: The Dammaj school.

Thomas: Up in the very far north of Yemen, a Salafi school founded in the 80s and the 90s and had generated a lot of friction with the local Zaidi community, because they were engaging in proselytising activities and stuff. So, there was a kind of interdenominational struggle there.

Baraa: Exactly. So, despite the brutal fighting that happened in Dammaj and the amount of literally atrocities that the Houthis has committed, it still didn't get much attention inside the squares.

Thomas: And in Sana’a, I suppose, people looked up there and thought, oh, well, this is the same old kind of tribal partisan war going on. It's nothing really to worry about. And in fact, in the end of 2011, early 2012, the Houthis assault on Dammaj kind of failed.

Baraa: It failed due to basically, again, Husayn al-Ahmar, he basically succeeded in mobilising the tribes up north. And literally that forced the Houthis even to recognize him as a mediator, which basically meant that they had to withdraw from Dammaj.

Thomas: So that's Saleh, that's Ali Mohsen, that's the al-Ahmar situation. Those are the Houthis. The last great player was Saleh’s political party, the GPC, the party of power in Yemen. And if you remember dear listener, the GPC during the Arab Spring had split. Some people had stayed loyal to Saleh, other people had decided that he needed to go, and that split remained.

So, the GPC was also embroiled in an inner party dispute, which was not going to create good conditions for a new Yemen to be born. And this is why in that post 2012 political environment in Yemen, nobody trusted anybody.

I mean, Hadi is the president. He's trying to rally the people around him. He has to work closely with Ali Mohsen, who doesn't trust him. So, he doesn't trust him back. Both of them have to work with the al-Ahmars, but nobody trusts them. Nobody trusts Saleh. And the GCC partners don't trust each other.

And in the midst of all of this mistrust, the Houthis are doing stuff up in the north, and no one is really paying attention.

So, Baraa, at this point, you are not so aware of the intensity of the culture of mistrust because you haven't yet been invited into the inner circles of Yemeni politics. You are still down on the street in the square with the youth who were angry about the GCC Initiative. And you yourself were not happy with the GCC Initiative.

Baraa: Well, not just with the youth, with also the Houthis who have now … by this time we've come close to each other. We know they're leaders and they're acting as this, we can be the supporters of this new political movement that is emerging, angry of the establishment and angry of this new deal.

Thomas: Angry because it gave Saleh immunity. Angry because?

Baraa: Angry because it gave Saleh immunity from prosecution. And it's not clear where is Saleh heading to.

Thomas: Yeah, I see. So, you just thought the GCC Initiative is not going to give us what we wanted. When we were chanting those chants during the Arab Spring.

Baraa: And as a result, we started calling to boycott the presidential elections.

Thomas: Alongside the Houthis.

Baraa: Alongside the Houthis.

Thomas: Oh, Baraa.

Aimen: Ah, naughty Baraa.

Thomas: If you're finding yourself a lockstep with the Houthis, you need to question your judgement.

Baraa: So, what happened then, we're talking end of 2011, beginning of 2012, the Houthis are saying, “Okay, listen guys, how about we start hosting a series of workshops and conferences that's going to bring together the youth revolution.” It was called the Youth Revolution Conference. The Yemeni Youth Revolution Conference.

Thomas: Hosted by your friends, the Houthis.

Baraa: Exactly. But the caveat, they said, we will give you tickets to Lebanon, which there is another group emerging, who are going to be the hosts of this conference in Lebanon.

Thomas: Well, that doesn't sound suspicious at all.

Aimen: Absolutely. Of all the wonderful places that one could go to, like in Turkey, Maldives, Malaysia, goodness, Dubai. No, go to Lebanon.

Thomas: And South Lebanon, especially.

Aimen: Yeah. Wonder why, who's there?

Baraa: So, surprise, surprise. Many youth did respond and started to literally go in batches. And I was invited a couple of times, say, okay, you didn't go in the first one. Let's go. You can go in the second one. You didn't go in second. You still have the third, many conferences, many workshops are being organised in Lebanon.

Now in Lebanon, it turned out to be obviously Aimen's best friends, Hezbollah.

Thomas: Hezbollah, yeah.

Aimen: Absolutely.

Baraa: So, Hezbollah operatives were hosting, receiving Yemeni's coming from the revolution. Basically, what was happening was literally a vetting process. They go out and they introduce Yemenis to Hezbollah operatives, and then who's willing to play along with them, who's actually buying into their message of this is an Islamic awakening, similar to the Iranian revolution, the Islamic Revolution.

They go on into the next phase, which is they meet IRDC officers who are also stationed in Lebanon.

Thomas: So, political organisation is happening with the Houthis recruiting other Yemenis and integrating them all politically to Iran's larger kind of regional political nexus. That's happening for sure. And on the ground, eventually this leads to the creation of a specific kind of political party or something in Yemen.

Baraa: So, it's called the political office of the Houthis in Sana’a, they call it the Ansarullah's political office in Sana’a. And it's basically combined, this is what made it interesting and appealing for many Yemenis. It has this diverse group, it has young liberals, it has some women, it has lefties, it has also some Islamists. It has a combination of many different people.

Thomas: But it does not have Baraa Shiban because you smelled a rat. And as you're watching the Houthis organise and sort of peel off some of your liberal colleagues, you're also seeing the other people that you marched alongside during the Arab Spring, who had been affiliated with the more traditional, long standing political parties returned to their partisan affiliations.

And you, Baraa, were worried that independent liberal voices like you were going to be shut out of the conversation going forward in Yemen. So, you changed your view on the GCC Initiative and decided to work with it.

Baraa: So, what I felt strongly was after the elections, that actually despite our protests, we can continue being shouting in the streets. That's not going to work. We need to form a political block and we have to be engaged if we want to influence things.

Thomas: What a mature and rather conservative view, Baraa. So, this is the first time that liberal Baraa’s being mugged by reality and inching towards a more realistic perspective.

So, you thought that President Hadi needed allies. He was invested in the success of the GCC initiative. He was invested in the new constitution that that initiative was meant to result in. So, you thought, I must unite with fellow independents and participate in this process.

Baraa: And we worked closely with a guy who a lot of Yemeni observers and even foreigners who worked on Yemen know now very well. His name is Ahmad bin Mubarak.

Thomas: Ahmad bin Mubarak. Keep that name in your head, dear listener, because at the end of this story, he plays a very key role. There's a moment featuring him. It's very important.

Baraa: And what happened was basically, Hadi decided he's going to form a technical and steering committee to start preparing for the National Dialogue. It has the traditional players and said, okay, so what is missing is the people who do not have a political party.

And we started literally mobilising and meeting people from Sana’a, Taiz, Aden, Hudaydah, and doing many, many trips to try and bring a block of independent youth and women and civil society together.

And then communicating with the technical and steering committee of the National Dialogue that actually we can present representatives that can actually participate in the National Dialogue.

Thomas: Well, at the same time, your confidence in Hadi was growing and this is another aspect of the scene in Yemen at the time that we have to be very quick about, but Al-Qaeda was running rampant at the time. And Hadi had successfully brought together all the different political players, Ali Mohsen and all the others, to crush Al-Qaeda in 2012, which was a mark of success for him.

You thought, well, maybe this guy is more than his reputation says. So, with that kind of success now, that sort of quiver in his bow, President Hadi by the end of 2012 was moving confidently into the National Dialogue.

And because you had so successfully with your allies organized yourselves, you had presented your own names as a list of possible members to the National Dialogue. And through your work with bin Mubarak, your liaison within the Hadi camp, it turned out you were indeed chosen, and you joined the National Dialogue.

Baraa: Yeah. And actually, the National Dialogue is announced. It has 565 candidates. Amongst them, of course, it's all the political parties and representatives of the tribal figures and social figures of Yemen. But within it, a very important component is the youth, the women and civil society, who actually amongst the 565 has 120 seats combined. The youth, which is us, we have 40 seats.

Thomas: That first date, the 18th of March 2013, the National Dialogue begins. It's not an auspicious beginning to this because the Houthis are in the National Dialogue. Now, how the hell did that happen, Baraa. They had not signed the GCC Initiative. They had said they were going to remain pure; they weren't going to sully themselves with the imperialist ambitions of the GCC Initiative.

Baraa: So, it was the political office in Sana’a amongst — there's one important character, and he was in a way, a defacto tribal leader or leading the tribal faction of the Houthis. His name is Saleh Habra.

And he was the head of the Houthi bloc in the National Dialogue. And he went to Abdul-Malik al-Houthi. Abdul-Malik al-Houthi initially refused. He said he's not going to join, because in his words, this is an admission to recognize America and Israel.

Thomas: Which the Houthis did not want to do because remember, death to America, death to Israel, that's their chant.

Baraa: Which is obviously nonsense. But anyway, the Saleh Habra with his kind of tribal wise mindset tells him that you need to join. We cannot be an outcast out of all of the Yemeni factions and tribal groups who are coming together to negotiate the future.

And he tasked him to form alongside the political office in Sana’a the Houthi bloc. And they joined. That in a way, did give some, a huge amount of confidence in the success of the National Dialogue because it actually brought a lot of factions together.

Thomas: Including the Houthis and really, honestly, Baraa, what could go wrong. So, we're going to stop now. We're going to take our first break. This is a long episode, dear listener, but it's a great story.

We're leaving Barra there on the first day of the National Dialogue Conference with everyone sitting around a table, including the Houthis. And as we will find out, the former president Ali Abdullah Saleh behind the scenes dancing on the heads of snakes and forming secret pacts with the Houthis. Stay tuned.

[Music Playing]

We are back. Let's get straight back in. We left you Baraa, a member of the National Dialogue Conference, where you're networking with other politicians, political players, activists inside Yemen, trying to brainstorm a new Yemeni constitution.

Your knowledge of Yemen is expanding not only because of the National Dialogue Conference, but also because of your day job at the time, which was to investigate drone strikes against Al-Qaeda.

I mean, dear listener, honestly, we people in the West, we just don't know what sort of job opportunities there are in the Middle East.

So, as you said, after President Hadi crushed Al-Qaeda earlier in 2012, Al-Qaeda members sort of dissolved, embedded themselves into society, which coincided with a renewed drone campaign against them by the United States.

People might remember that this was very controversial at the time. Many civilians died during the prosecution of these drone attacks. And you were there on the ground visiting strike sites to gather evidence and to advocate, I guess, on behalf of those civilians and their families.

Baraa: Exactly. So, I remember the first drone strike that kind of caught my attention. That was late in 2011, but specifically after Al-Qaeda was crushed in Abyan. I felt like the U.S. has gone mad.

They started conducting numerous number of drone strikes, but this time it's not in remote and very faraway places. It's starting to hit in local communities, in places that we are familiar with in some towns and villages. And this did anger the public and people were very, very angry.

Thomas: Aimen, I mean, I'm not asking you to justify America's drone campaign, really, I'm not asking that. I'm asking for you to explain it from their perspective. So, the Americans at the time, why have they upped their droning against Al-Qaeda in Yemen, even if it meant attacking neighbourhoods and killing civilians?

Aimen: Well, there was the worry that Al-Qaeda is going to take advantage of the Arab Spring, and especially the rising anger over the Syrian war and the civil war that’s happening there.

So, they wanted, and the Obama Administration in particular, they wanted to weaken Al-Qaeda significantly in order to avoid Yemen becoming yet again a safe haven. That led them, of course, to conduct significant number of operations in places that are really full of civilian population.

And sometime kids were killed, women were killed, people bystanders, they have no nothing to do with Al-Qaeda. And as usual, this obsession with Al-Qaeda at the time made them lose sight of other far more threatening realities in Yemen.

Thomas: Oh, gosh. How is that resonant with things happening in the Middle East at the moment?

Aimen: Yes.

Thomas: Honestly guys. But Baraa, back to you. So, the upshot of this work you were doing investigating drone strike sites in Yemen, was that you were actually encountering members of Al-Qaeda.

Baraa: Exactly. So, while I am now a member of the National Dialogue, out of all of the working groups I was working in, I was the repertoire of the Counter-Terrorism working group.

And one of the first thing we did as a group we requested to meet the Yemeni Intelligence, who actually were very cooperative to their credit at the time, and they allowed us to meet members of Al-Qaeda, who were actually sitting in their prisons and had been apprehended in several operations.

Thomas: So, there you are getting to know the reality of Al-Qaeda controlled areas on the ground. You're meeting Al-Qaeda members, you're getting a sense of what kind of a person, an Al-Qaeda member is.

You're also in the National Dialogue working alongside Hadi’s ally, bin Mubarak, to do the National Dialogue work. At this point bin Mubarak asks you to return to your hometowns, if you like your ancestral villages, to hold workshops and to get a sense of what those local communities wanted for Yemen.

Baraa: It was an interesting time. So, what many people kind of tend to forget about those years between 2011 until the beginning of the conflict is for many of us, it was like the golden era of Yemen, we're meeting. There is a dynamic and activist civil society. There are workshops. So, in that general environment, we're still very, very hopeful.

Thomas: This is heartbreaking to hear Baraa. It's heartbreaking. I know what's happening next.

Baraa: And in the midst of that, bin Mubarak asked me to go, and not just me, asked the several members who actually come from Hajjah and Hajjah is this beautiful place in the northern part of Yemen, and it sits literally between Amran and Sa’dah.

Thomas: So, it's right between Houthis country-

Baraa: And al-Ahmar.

Thomas: And Ali Mohsen country. Al-Ahmar country. Poor Hajjah. Okay. That's a shit sandwich, I don't want to be a part of.

Baraa: And we have an interesting discussion with the members of the local community and discussions about transitional justice and so on. Until a young, I would say very brave journalist came to me, and I still wonder where he is until today, I wish I could see him again.

He came to me, and he asked, “Can you stay until tomorrow? Instead of leaving with the convoy, with the whole delegation tonight, can you stay until tomorrow? I would like to show you something very important. It's more important than the superficial discussions that you're having because it actually touches reality on the ground.”

And at the beginning, I was hesitant. Then I said, “Fine, let me stay. It's just one day nothing's going to happen.” And the next day I went to a village with … all Yemenis would later on know it's very, well, it's called Hajur.

Thomas: Hajur.

Baraa: It's a very mountainous area, but literally a very poor tribal village, do not have much resources. And they have been surrounded, they've been fighting the Houthis for many months now, actively being shelled, burned. A lot of their farms had literally been infested, literally with landmines planted by the Houthis.

Thomas: Did you know that the Houthis had proceeded that far towards the south in the Hajjah? Did this come as a surprise to you that they were even there?

Baraa: It was kind of a surprise because they representatives at the National Dialogue were assuring us that they are invested in this process as much as us.

Thomas: The Houthis are telling you down in Sana’a, “We want a big unified happy Yemen.” But then you go to Haja and you're like, “Well, you're laying landmines in farmers' villages.”

Baraa: Exactly. I mean, it was a horrifying image. You see snipers surrounding this literally small tribal village, and people are left with no option. They can either fight or they can hand over their lands, homes and all their properties to the Houthis.

Thomas: But what about the Houthis? Did you manage to meet any Houthis?

Baraa: Of course. So, I walked in and the first thing why we encountered the Houthis is because they're literally besieging this area. And the first thing that struck me when I had the discussions with them is those are not the Houthis we are meeting inside Sana’a.

Those are like Al-Qaeda operatives that I have met and have interviewed inside the Yemeni prisons. Those are jihadists with jihadi mindset, who are actually filled with anger and rage towards anything that is not them.

Thomas: Aimen, it’s that radical mentality that we talked about at the beginning of this season of Conflicted.

Aimen: Indeed.

Thomas: You just immediately notice it when you see it, that these people are not open to compromise.

Baraa: And they are living in this world of prophecies. They have the belief that actually there is something coming in. And the only thing that is preventing this prophecy, this prophecy from happening is those infidels in Sana’a, those people who are meeting at the National Dialogue.

And which was an interesting kind of conflicted narrative because we are discussing the future of Yemen. We are kind of, in a way, in their eyes, the enemies. Yet at the same time they're saying we are part of the National Dialogue, but they're actually fighting against that.

Aimen: Yeah, exactly. You see, again, this is what we said at the beginning of the season, Thomas, when we talk about eschatology and how eschatology and prophecies are the opium of the masses, this is how they drug these people into believing that they are God's instruments for change.

And change could only happen if they are the vanguard to fulfil the prophecies. So, they are God's soldiers and therefore, they set themselves high above everyone else, and they look down on everyone else.

Thomas: God's soldiers. I mean, when the Houthis decided to rebrand themselves, what did they say? Ansar Allah.

Aimen: Yes, God's helpers.

Thomas: The helpers of God. And you saw that playing itself out there on the ground in Hajjah. I mean, and it was proper fighting a real war, wartime conditions there. So, in a way, though we think war broke out in Yemen in March 2015. It was already there.

Baraa: It was already there. And it was a frightening, frightening scene. And I remember I immediately, without hesitation, decided to — I felt it was nonsense to continue discussing and negotiating with those militants up in the mountains of Hajjah. And I decided we need to go and educate the politicians in Sana’a.

Thomas: Yeah. So, you went back down to Sana’a, and you sort of said guys, you won't believe what I just saw.

Baraa: Exactly. And that's not just me. Also, there were other members of the National Dialogue who were saying, actually, this is serious shit.

Thomas: And how was that met? What response did you get? I mean, really from the Houthis in Sana’a?

Baraa: So, the Houthis first thing they accuse me that my trip was funded by Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar.

Thomas: I see, okay.

Baraa: And then they kind of starting to shed doubt and saying like, all of the delegations that have gone to the north, they were saying those that have drank the Kool-Aid of the Islah of al-Ahmar, of Ali Mohsen.

Thomas: Just gaslighting you, classic gaslighting. So, I mean, obviously you must have thought, I mean, the National Dialogue is in peril here we must confront the Houthis. But sadly, as was seen a couple of years earlier during the Arab Spring, the truth is Baraa, that at the time, very powerful political forces in Yemen were benefiting from the Houthis rampaging in the North.

Baraa: Now, not just that. So also, around the same time we have meetings with President Hadi. And the first meeting, as I remember it very well, the first thing he started to mention to us is this shipment of weapons that the Yemeni coastal guards have seized going to the Houthis.

And he talked about five shipments. Three, I think have already managed to go through. But the Yemeni coastal guards with the help even of the U.S. had managed to seize.

Thomas: Wait, so these are boatloads of weapons going to the Houthis. From where?

Baraa: Well, according to Hadi, it was from Iran. And actually, I didn't have any reason to doubt him because I was seeing all of the signs around there. I mean, you don't need to be an expert or some genius to add things together.

Thomas: So, President Hadi knew that the Houthis were a threat and that they were being supported by Iran as early as 2013.

Baraa: I think even before that.

Thomas: So, why didn't he do anything about it?

Baraa: Well, that's the coming back to the environment of mistrust that he was feeling and the environment amongst all of the main traditional political actors in Yemen. In order to do that, he needs to support the quest of guys like Husayn al-Ahmar and the cause of Ali Mohsen that they need to support the military units in the north, which are basically still strongly affiliated with Ali Mohsen, to counter the Houthis.

And while you're doing that, then you are actually also strengthening their influence.

Thomas: I see. So, if President Hadi comes out openly and says the Houthis are a threat, and in order to combat the threat, I must empower Ali Mohsen's brigades, then Ali Mohsen is politically empowered, and then people like President Saleh won't be happy with Hadi. So, he's kind of caught between two stools.

Baraa: And I think also at the same time, it's a harsh way to say it, but I think he thought that he can play the same dance, he can dance on the heads of snakes like Saleh.

Thomas: No. You never embark on a dance off with Ali Abdullah Saleh. There should be a Yemeni Dancing with the Stars, but dancing with the snakes. We should pitch it.

Baraa: Well, that's the thing. If you see someone dancing with the snakes, do not do that.

Thomas: So, you went to President Hadi, but then you must have also gone to Ali Mohsen.

Baraa: When I meet Ali Mohsen, I see him literally conducting the official duties of the state. He is kind of unofficially the vice president. He's doing the stuff that Hadi was supposed to be doing.

Thomas: I see. So, your eyes are opening now to the GCC Initiative era that things aren't exactly as they seem. Ali Mohsen did not have any formal role in the government, but he's performing the duties of a vice president.

Baraa: Exactly. And all of the duties that I think Hadi was supposed to be doing, but for a reason he's not doing, has left it to him. So, he is kind of running those meetings and meeting tribal figures, politicians and so on. And also meeting, including mediations like the one I wanted him to be involved in.

Thomas: But then, eventually you must have brought the conversation around to what you'd seen in Hajjah.

Baraa: Exactly.

Thomas: And your worries about the Houthis. So, what did he say?

Baraa: He said that he was aware of, and he was trying to mobilise Hadi and the people around Hadi, and he was saying if Hadi gets his act together, he will pressure the other factions to join force like he did with Al-Qaeda in the south, but this time against the Houthis.

Thomas: Well, I mean, I guess that the sad truth of the matter is that more or less half of the Yemeni army remained loyal to Ali Abdullah Saleh, the former president of Yemen. And he was working behind the scenes.

Baraa: Exactly. Ali Abdullah Saleh was actually blind by revenge at that time. He didn't want to hear anything about what is the threats of allowing himself with the Houthis would look like and endanger his future.

He wanted to get revenge on all of the military commanders, politicians, tribal leaders who had defected from him in 2011. And he wanted them to pay a heavy, heavy price.

So, the military units that were still affiliated with him were literally handing over their posts and positions in the north to the Houthis.

Thomas: Working on Saleh's orders.

Baraa: Exactly. And mainly trying to counter the 310 military brigades.

Thomas: Which was Ali Mohsen's brigade.

Baraa: This is the kind of the formidable force in the north of Yemen composed of the most professional officers, military officers who are well-trained, well-equipped and know what they're doing. And they've been fighting the Houthis all along.

So, heavy fightings are happening with a 310 brigade, but they're actually losing a lot of the support they're supposed to be having from other military factions.

Thomas: And for the roughly two years before this realisation that you had, that Saleh is really working behind the scenes, Saleh had to play the game very carefully. Obviously, he wants to be president again. He wants to get his revenge; he's going to ally with the Houthis to help him achieve that.

But it was an event in Syria in 2013 that really changed the rules of the game in Yemen when President Obama refused to respond to Bashar al-Assad’s crossing the red line.

Obama had said, if you use chemical weapons, that's a red line. If you do that, Bashar, America will respond. And in 2013, Obama actually didn't, he didn't live up to that threat. And from then on, everything in the Middle East really changed because America was signalling it's not willing to go the whole way.

Baraa: On that day, actually a senior aide of Saleh told me that Saleh said, now I can come back. And that signifies how important the other regional factors are affecting also the transition in Yemen.

Aimen: Exactly. Because why? The problem you see with the Americans during the post 9/11 era, the Republicans in particular, George Bush and his administration was their overcommitment in the Middle East and Obama's problem were their under commitment in the Middle East.

Obama just wanted peace with Iran at any cost. And that involved emboldening Hezbollah to enter into Syria, emboldening the Syrian regime to continue killing their own people, allowing Hamas to continue re-arming. And we can see what is happening.

And even stopping the DEA in America, the Drug Enforcement Agency from pursuing an investigation into Hezbollah, even. All of this signalled to the Iranians that you can do whatever you want in the Middle East.

Thomas: And it didn't only signal it to the Iranians, it signalled it to Ali Abdullah Saleh, who realised, now I can come back. So, to make a long story short, Saleh was playing this game, dear listener, he thought, I'll allow the Houthis to destroy Ali Mohsen and his forces and to destroy the forces of the al-Ahmar tribal family.

And then once the Houthis are so strong, the Saudis will have no choice but to back me and my forces to defeat the Houthis. And I will be president of Yemen again, and my son will be president after me. That's Saleh's game.

And that game began to be played out in the open by the Houthis beginning in the end of 2013, when their forces enter Dammaj again, this is the town, dear listener, where that Salafi school was and which two years before the Houthis had attacked, but the forces of Husayn al-Ahmar had repelled them.

Well, now Husayn al-Ahmar was very weak because the Saudis had been pissed off with him taking money from Gaddafi. And this time the Houthis won. They didn't just win; they demolished his house.

Baraa: So, they went into Dammaj, they blew up the school, that Salafi school, and then they marched, basically embarking on revenge against all of the tribes who did support Husayn al-Ahmar to make an example of anyone who's going to fight them in the future that you are going to meet a similar fate.

And they filmed that, they filmed the blowing up of houses, and that's important and significant for tribal and local communities.

Thomas: So, this continues the Houthis advance southward from Sa’dah, Dammaj, sheikh after sheikh, tribe after tribe, village after village. Fear is spreading throughout the north. More people in Sana’a are thinking what the hell's going on?

More and more people realise the game that Saleh is playing, but those political actors at the top, because of the culture of mistrust, cannot unite against him and his chickenary.

And so, by June 2014, the temperature is very high when the Houthis make the really phenomenal achievement for militarily speaking of conquering Amran, an important military Garrison city not too far from Sana’a.

Baraa: It's only 50 kilometres away from Sana’a. And that's Amran was where the 310 military brigade was stationed. They were the protectors of the Northern Gate of Sana’a.

Thomas: Yeah. So, that's the main point. The brigade in Amran is associated with Ali Mohsen. He was ultimately their commander. And Saleh then must have thought, “Wow, my plan is working brilliantly. The Houthis have just crushed the main force of Ali Mohsen.”

So, now they're heading on their way to Sana’a. That's okay. They'll keep crushing more and more of Ali Mohsen's forces because at the end of the day, I know the Saudis will swoop in, support me to throw off the Houthis.” That's his plan.

That summer, the summer of 2014, the Houthis advance to outside Sana’a where they sit. And then some very interesting politics begin to be played out, politics that resonate with sort of Hassan Nasrallah and Hezbollah style politicking.

Baraa: So, what happened is in summer of 2014, the Yemeni government decides to remove oil subsidies. So, as a result, oil prices, petrol prices gone up in Yemen and Abdul-Malik al-Houthi now posed himself as the voice of the people.

He wants to bring the prices down and saying, this is actually not a result of, because the oil prices worldwide are going up. This is due to the corruption of this government, this stooges American supported and funded government. They're very corrupt and we need to bring them down. We need to bring the prices down and we need to start implementing the National Dialogue outcomes.

Thomas: Abdul-Malik al-Houthi’s reputation was growing in a way, and it wasn't just the Saudis in this case, the U.S. had also contributed to his growing reputation amongst activists, revolutionary liberal activists in Yemen.

Because of that droning campaign, which the Yemeni people were so angry about, and which Abdul-Malik al-Houthi was able to twist and use to his political advantage, saying, “You see the evil Americans, they are evil, death to America.”

And even more of your former sort of colleagues on the squares during the Arab Spring saw Abdul-Malik al-Houthi as a revolutionary in sympathy with them.

Baraa: Exactly. I literally was trying to go and meet them and saying, “You idiots, you don't understand what's happening because I've seen what the Houthis were doing in the north of Yemen.” And in my mind, I was saying, this is just an excuse to conquer Sana’a. The Houthis want to take over Sana’a. They're just using all of this as an excuse.

Thomas: And what about President Hadi? What about other people in the National Dialogue? I guess they're thinking if there's any fighting, it's between the Houthis and Ali Mohsen's people, this can benefit us or still it's just a partisan squabble. It's not an existential threat. You must have been so frustrated, Baraa.

Baraa: I was, it was very strange. I literally, in those final days, I went to meet President Hadi numerous times. Many, many times I go and talk to him, he would tell us something, but he's not willing to say that publicly. He say that Saleh has plotting with the Houthis, but he's not willing to call for the mobilisation.

And I remember in that week before the Houthis conquered Sana’a, I met with a top Islahi leader who was literally just done with his meeting with Hadi. As he's walking out of the presidential palace, I tell him, “What did you guys discuss?”

And he said, “He asked us to basically bring our people to fight the Houthis.” And this Islahi leader asked Hadi to go out on national TV and call for popular mobilisation against the Houthis.

Thomas: And Hadi refused.

Baraa Hadi refused. Unfortunately, I don't know what he was thinking, but I think at that time he thought that actually if they just pressured Ali Mohsen enough, that would weaken his position. They're not actually coming after me.

Thomas: That takes us to 21st of September 2014. This is when probably with less shock really by this stage, but certainly a lot of worry, concern, anxiety, despair. You watched the Houthis conquer Sana’a.

Baraa: One week of fighting. That's all what the fighting did. It did kill many people. A lot of people don't know this. It killed over 300 people, including civilians. And eventually the UN envoy literally flew to Sa’dah to meet Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, took representatives and they flew back into Sana’a. All of this, while the fighting is happening at the outskirts of Sana’a.

Thomas: I mean there on the 21st of September, he, the UN envoys in the presidential palace with some Houthis negotiating an agreement, a peace agreement, while unbeknownst to them the Houthis are conquering the city.

Baraa: It was an unbelievable scene. The Houthis are literally taking government institutions. They're taking the TV station, the military camps in Sana’a, the police stations, while those officials are still negotiating the draft of this article, put this article before that.

And only when the Minister of Defence leaves the Presidential palace and literally his guards tell him, “What are you guys doing? The Houthis have took over the capital.”

Thomas: Well, the Houthis did indeed take over the capital. Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar was extracted from a conquered Sana’a by the Saudis who flew him eventually to the kingdom.

The Houthis signed what's called the Peace and Partnership Agreement (very ironic name, with hindsight), with the UN to help form a new government and said openly, the basic plan hasn't changed the National Dialogue results. We will live up to those results. We will implement those results.

The new constitution, it's on its way, we're going to implement it. They pretended really to be the stewards of the GCC Initiative, but meanwhile, their troops continued to conquer southward from Sana’a.

Baraa: And I remember I went immediately to a province in Central Yemen called Baidhah, and it was a very frightening scene. The Houthis politicians are in Sana’a promising that they will not attack any more village or town.

When you arrive there, I saw literally two villages, it's something out of a movie, thousands of people including women, children, elderly, and literally normal locals, villagers leaving their homes as the Houthis are blowing up their houses and flattening them to the ground.

Thomas: And you're witnessing this with your own eyes.

Baraa: Exactly. It's a very surreal moment and saying what is happening? And from that moment, I decide, actually this is not going to work. The Houthis need to be met by some form of military force that is formed of those national political players to unite themselves, to counter the Houthis because the Houthis ultimate aim is to take control over the whole of Yemen.

Thomas: By this time, I think more and more people were realising what you had already realised, Baraa, because into October, November 2014, the Houthis began changing their message a bit.

I mean, when they conquered Sinai, they'd said, “Don't worry, we'll be the stewards of the Gulf Initiative. We're going to see this new constitution through.” But then more and more they were saying, “This new constitution, this is another U.S. plot to divide and conquer Yemen. We don't like this federal system.”

I mean, we now know that's because they wanted a very unitary system with them in control. So, you and other people realising what was up, you started to protest.

Baraa: We started to arrange protests similar to those of 2011, arranging them, calling university students to mobilise and start protesting. And the Houthis brutally and heavily cracked down on those protestors, literally chasing people down the streets.

I remember they arrested one journalist whom they beat until death, another journalist he literally went missing. And until today we don't know where he is. And the general environment in Sana’a has changed. So, that periods of activism and civil society, that environment is over. It's no more.

Thomas: And what about the Houthis political office that was set up and all those liberal revolutionary fellow travellers of yours who had decided to work with the Houthis inside the Houthis political office in Sana’a? What happened to those guys? I mean, they must have felt like they'd been hoodwinked.

Baraa: So, they actually split. There are the people who then felt like actually they've been betrayed by Abdul-Malik al-Houthi and the others who are saying, actually, it may be a good political move to now aligning ourselves with the Houthis. Now the Houthi ideologues in the political office are now coming up and now it's threatening messages. They are kind of like revealing their true identity.

Thomas: Well, I'm afraid now, dear listener, I'm going to have to zoom over a few months so that we can reach the climax of this very interesting, quite long story. In January of 2015, your old ally in the National Dialogue, Ahmad bin Mubarak, who was close to President Hadi-

Baraa: By that time, he is the president's chief of staff.

Thomas: So, Ahmad bin Mubarak, the president's chief of staff as arranged, is going one day to meet with national dialogue members to approve the new constitution. This was supposed to be a great day of triumph.

Sadly, this didn't happen, on his way bin Mubarak was abducted by the Houthis. The Houthis wanted to prevent the formal kind of ratification of the constitution.

At this point, finally, President Hadi decides to fight back. Sana’a devolves into fighting for three days. There's lots of fighting. Hadi is captured. He's placed under house arrest.

The Houthis now formally take over. It's an actual coup for three and a half, four weeks. Everyone is wondering what's going to happen. Hadi's there in the presidential palace in Sana’a under house arrest until, surprise, surprise, on the 21st of February 2015, Hadi pops up in Aden on the South Coast somehow, some friendly country. I don't know which one, Aimen. Do you?

Had smuggled Hadi out of the presidential palace in Sana’a to the presidential palace in Aiden, where he stated openly, this is now the capital of the real Yemen. I remain the real president of Yemen. And the Houthis say, “Get him.”

And they've already been rampaging down to the south alongside forces loyal to Ali Abdullah Saleh. And that's where, because you always turn up in the most unlucky places, Baraa. You are actually in Aden by this point, when President Hadi says, “I'm here.” And the Houthis say, “We're coming to get you.”

Baraa: And just walking few weeks before this event, first of all, we were in Sana’a, we’re arranging for those protests. But actually, I then meet with other young activists who actually say, actually, we need another move. We need to bring now a national bloc against the Houthis. That its sole purpose is to counter the coup.

We actually managed to bring all of the political parties and we make the official announcement for this national bloc. But actually, we cannot meet in Sana’a, Sana’a is run by the Houthis.

Thomas: So, you went to Aden.

Baraa: We go to Aden. I'm literally, without joking, Thomas, I was smuggled by a tribal leader who was a fellow colleague at the National Dialogue who said, “Don't worry, I'll help you to get into Aden.”

This time, I'm with literally a combination of multiple groups who in normal times would not meet with each other or trust each other. You have secessionists who are now kind of ready because they know that Saleh and Houthis are now aligning themselves for this coming attack on Aden.

You have tribal leaders who are saying let's come together and support Hadi and the traditional political parties, all of us having this meeting in Aden. And quickly, as soon as we arrived, the Houthis arrived right after us. And the fighting starts around the outskirts of Aden Airport.

Thomas: They take the airport, there's fighting in the street. It's proper fighting. And then sort of most shocking of all, there is an extraordinary air force strike on the presidential palace in Aden.

I mean, that must have been very strange. It's like the Houthis are now flying. I mean they suddenly … they have jets, they're Saleh’s jets of course.

Baraa: So, it's now like not an open secret. Everyone knows Saleh is working with the Houthis. He's using the military officers and now the Yemeni Air Force to bomb President Hadi. We actually think on that day that actually Hadi is dead.

Thomas: That’s right. So, the presidential palace in Aden is attacked by the Yemeni Air Force loyal to Saleh, and everyone thinks Hadi's dead. Let's put a pin in it there. Aimen, you've been so quiet listening to this thrilling story from our friend Baraa.

At this point, Ali Abdullah Saleh’s son, Ahmed Saleh goes to Riyadh. Now we have overlooked a very important sort of event that happened in the last two months of this story, which is that King Abdullah died, was replaced by his brother, Salman King Salman, who immediately appointed his relatively little known quite young son, Mohammed bin Salman as Minister of Defence.

Ahmed Saleh goes to visit MBS Minister of Defence because Saleh’s thinking, this is where I cash in. This was my plan. I was going to give the Houthis a lot of power. They've now conquered half the country.

The Saudis will have to intervene on my behalf, helping me to fight the Houthis and put me back in power. So, how did MBS respond to this conversation with Saleh’s son?

Aimen: In a sense, if I want to condense the whole thing, well, we don't do deals with foxes.

Thomas: So, it didn't go well for Ahmed.

Aimen: It didn't go well.

Thomas: What's the word on the street in Yemen about this conversation between Ahmed Saleh and MBS?

Baraa: So, Saleh loyalists are feeling very confident. Their guy is now, soon is going to be back in power. Hadi, no one knows where he is right now. And we are basically left in the streets of Aden.

I remember the fighting's happening from one street to another. Suddenly there is no checkpoints, there is no security officers, no police stations, nothing except Houthis and members of a combination of tribal factions and secessionist group and some Islahis and Salafis and kind of combined together in this weird moment fighting the Houthis in the streets of Aden.

And this is literally from one street to another, a street to street fighting. And Ahmed Salah, in his meeting with MBS feeling very confident, he delivers a very threatening message to MBS.

And at the same time, the Houthis alongside Saleh are deploying a military manoeuvre at the border with Saudi Arabia. And basically, what he was threatening him, he said, either you back us up or we are going to unleash hell on Saudi Arabia.

Thomas: Well, I believe that MBS responded with some pretty saucy language, and told him to go fuck himself frankly, I think that's a good summary of how that meeting went down.

Aimen: Yeah, yeah, yeah. He told them we don't entertain foxes.

Thomas: So, Saleh was sent packing and on the 25th of March 2015, out of the blue Saudi Arabia intervened in the Yemeni Civil War. The important thing to stress is the civil war had then been raging for six months and more.

It was a proper civil war. Ahmed Saleh had threatened Saudi Arabia with attack from the Houthis if he didn't intervene in the war on his behalf. So, Saudi Arabia said, actually, no, we're going to intervene on the side of the UN, supported President Hadi, the official president of Yemen.

Baraa: And as you said, Thomas, I always pop up at the interesting places. I remember very well the airport was shut down for several days. I was stuck because I wanted to fly to London to meet my wife.

And then suddenly I get a call from a friend who was at the airport saying, I can actually book you in. This is the last flight leaving Aden. And when I start to try to negotiate with him, he said, this is it. You are either on this flight or you're stuck.

I go to the airport, and I meet the Yemeni Foreign Minister at the airport, and we have a discussion. He tells me he's now flying to Cairo to the Arab Summit, and he is calling in officially the Arab intervention.

He actually doesn't believe that the Arab countries will respond or actually agree to intervene on the Yemeni government's behalf.

Thomas: Well, he was wrong about that. And as your plane took off from Aden Airport, Saudi planes backed by a large coalition of Arab countries, which would then over the next few days get larger and over the next few weeks would get UN backing, Operation Decisive Storm was launched and another chapter in Yemen's, long and complicated history opened the chapter of the great war in Yemen, which continues to rage to this day.

This is where we're going to stop. Baraa, thank you so much. I mean, I am sure the dear listener knows more about Yemen than he ever thought he would and can make sense now of all of those headlines he's seen off and on for the last eight years.

[Music Playing]

Dear listener, we will be back for one final episode with Baraa and Aimen, for sure this time bringing us up to the present day in Yemen and showing how events in Yemen are linked to the events sadly, tragically ominously playing out on the ground right now in Palestine and Israel. So, stay tuned for that.

A reminder that you can follow the show over on Facebook and Twitter at MH Conflicted. And for a deeper dive into all the subjects we talk about here on Conflicted, head over to Facebook and search Conflicted Podcast Discussion Group.

There you will find other fans of the show engaging in heated debates, enlightening conversations, and just generally geeking out over Conflicted related topics.

Conflicted is a Message Heard production. This episode was produced and edited by Harry Stott. Sandra Ferrari is our executive producer. Our theme music is by Matt Huxley and Tom Biddle.

Conflicted S4 E21: Yemen: The Arab Spring Revolution

Speakers: Thomas Small, Aimen Dean & Baraa Shiban

Thomas: Welcome back to Conflicted with me, Thomas Small, my wonderful co-host, Aimen Dean. And once again, with the now old friend of the show, Baraa Shiban. Baraa, you are almost part of the furniture here now.

Baraa: Yeah, exactly. I don't think I can escape this right now.

Aimen: Oh, yeah. He is part of the furniture right now because we're going to play lots of musical chairs today and he'll be one of the chairs.

Thomas: It's true. In this episode, the third of our ever-growing series on the modern history of Yemen. Dear listener, you can prepare for some pretty complicated games of political musical chairs.

And thankfully we have Baraa here whose first-hand expertise on the subject is really going to come into its own, because today we're talking about the Arab Spring, a momentous event, which we've discussed so many times on Conflicted, but one which had a really acutely destabilising effect on Yemen.

[Music Playing]

Baraa's story is truly thrilling, evocative, an account of the hope and then the tragedy, which befell his country back in 2011, and he was right at the centre of all of it. Let's jump right back in.

Now, normally on Conflicted, we look at grand spans of history skipping through decades and even centuries in a single episode, but today we're going to look at pretty much just one year, 2011, and what a year it was for Yemeni history.

But of course, before we get there, we do have to set the scene, which means we have to go back in time a little bit. In the last episode, we left the Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh, in the year 2010, having fought six wars against the Houthis.

Now, I don't have to remind you who the Houthis are, there are an armed militant millenarian group of Shia persuasion to some extent, allied to Iran and Hezbollah, who beginning in the early noughties, engaged in a series of wars with the Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh, based in Sana’a the Yemeni capital.

Aimen: Those are the Houthis. I thought you were talking about a chain of restaurants in the U.S., the Hooters, where they have these skimpy clad girls-

Thomas: Not Hooters, Aimen. The Houthis.

Aimen: Oh, okay. Okay, okay. Sorry about that.

Thomas: So, yes, thank you dear co-host, thank you for everything you bring to the program. So yeah, we left Saleh sitting at the top of his throne feeling strong.

However, to understand what happens next when the Arab Spring breaks out. We've got to look at the general political scene in Yemen in the years before that happened.

And first of all, we're going to have to lay out for you the cast of characters, especially three main characters, three men who at that time sat at the top of Yemeni politics. And if you don't know who they are, then you won't understand anything that follows.

And the first one, of course, about which we don't need to say that much, is the president himself, Ali Abdullah Saleh. Now Baraa, Ali Abdullah Saleh, president of Yemen after ‘94, had good standing, more or less with his countrymen, but was overseeing a process whereby a greater crony capitalist system was enriching people at the top of society.

So, one of those people at the top of society who was getting very rich indeed, and whom we briefly mentioned in the previous episode, but who we're going to go into a lot in this episode. He's a very important figure. He's the second main character of the episode. His name is Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar.

Now, dear listener, there are a lot of men in this story with the surname, al-Ahmar. So, I'm going to have to ask Baraa and Aimen, if possible, to call Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, Ali Mohsen. Okay, we're going to refer to him as Ali Mohsen, so as not to confuse the dear listener.

As I said, we talked about him in the previous episode when we mentioned that he was an old school friend, really a childhood friend of Ali Abdullah Saleh, the president, had with Ali Abdullah Saleh joined the military, become a military man, and remained his right-hand man throughout.

And during the wars against the Houthis in the noughties, Ali Mohsen was sent by Ali Abdullah Saleh to prosecute that war against his enemies.

And if you remember, we also mentioned that at the end of those six wars, after the Saudis had intervened, beginning an aerial campaign in Northern Yemen to fight the Houthis, Ali Abdullah Saleh asked the Saudis to send their Air Force to bomb the position of Ali Mohsen suggesting to Ali Mohsen who uncovered this plot that his old friend was trying to kill him.

Now, that's where we left him at the end of last episode, but now to get to know him a bit better. Baraa, Ali Mohsen, I mean, he's been around for decades in Yemen, are Yemenis kind of aware of him in a big way?

What would the Yemenis have thought about Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar? Ali Abdullah Saleh’s right-hand man, big military man, the man with the Cartier glasses, classic kind of Arab strong man vibe.

Aimen: Are you saying I'm a strong man? I'm wearing Cartier glasses.

Thomas: Aimen, you know I think you're the strongest of all the men.

Aimen: Thank you. Thank God someone recognizes.

Baraa: So, Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, he came into the public eye following two main events. The first one, if the listener would remember, is the fighting that happened in the 80s between the North Yemen and the Socialists, in which Ali Abdullah Saleh was able to use his basically friends at the time in the military to stabilise a lot of regions and districts in Central Yemen.

And the second time was following the 1994 war. He came out with a good reputation in being a strong military commander, a strong military strategist. And he's seen as a military man.

He first and foremost is a military man who's able, like Ali Abdullah Saleh to establish a web of contacts with tribal figures and political figures. He is more like the Ali Abdullah Saleh, but behind the scenes.

Thomas: Now, another important thing about Ali Mohsen, and it came out of his fight in the eighties against Southern Socialists who were fighting the North, is that in that fight against the socialists, the Muslim Brotherhood in Yemen, in North Yemen was employed with great effect by Ali Mohsen.

So, Ali Abdullah Saleh had asked Ali Mohsen to be his liaison with Muslim Brotherhood elements in the society and the political party that those elements were a part of a political party called Islah.

And I think for this story, now, it's important to know that Ali Mohsen, Ali Abdullah Saleh’s right-hand man was his chief liaison with al-Islah, a very important political party.

Baraa: Unlike what many people would suggest about Ali Mohsen, Ali Mohsen is not a member of the Muslim Brotherhood. And he's not ideologically driven by the relationship that he had established with the Muslim Brotherhood and the wider Islah party members.

He is a military man, more of a person who had the ability to strike tribal deals, but it happened that he was able to get closer and closer by the years to al-Islah in general.

Thomas: Yeah. And Ali Mohsen, therefore, was really an arm of Ali Abdullah Saleh and an arm of the GPC, Ali Abdullah Saleh's party. Although in typical Yemeni political fashion, everyone's dealing with everyone, and that will become clear as we go on.

I mean, Aimen, just to end this little discussion on Ali Mohsen, you said that … because often in the Arab Spring era, Ali Mohsen was considered by some to be a kind of good guy in Yemen.

But you told a funny story. I find it funny about what the Houthis found in time when the Civil War broke out. They stormed Ali Mohsen's headquarters in Sana’a. Well, what did they find? This will just give you a sense that Ali Mohsen is no different from any other Arab strong man playing the game.

Aimen: Indeed, what they found is like the Cave of Aladdin.

Thomas: The Cave of Wonders.

Aimen: Yes, exactly. Open sesame, except what they found, which is what is expected in Aladdin's cave, mounds of gold. A huge room full of gold bars, each one 12 kg, stacked all the way to the ceiling.

And then next to it, you have massive amount of wads of hundred-dollar bill cash and the other side of the cave, huge amount of weapons. And that shows you that he was a man who mastered the art of the stick and the carrot. He would buy loyalty, or he will enforce it.

Thomas: So, that's the second of our two main characters. So far, we have Ali Abdullah Saleh, the president, and Ali Mohsen, his right-hand man, who in time he turns against and develops some kind of rivalry with.

And as we leave Ali Mohsen, the last thing to stress is that at this time in 2008, 2009, Ali Mohsen can command roughly one third of the loyalty of the Yemeni army. So, the third main character, and eventually these three guys are all going to be fighting each other on the streets of Sana’a. That's why we're setting it up.

The third main character whose surname is also al-Ahmar, and we will use his surname when we call him, his name Abdullah al-Ahmar. He, along with his sons form the kind of political leadership of the Hashid Tribal Confederation.

We've mentioned this in previous episodes, the Hashid Tribal Confederation, the largest confederation of tribes in Yemen. And therefore, Abdullah al-Ahmar, the head of this confederation, was very powerful.

And I think maybe it's important at the outset to stress Baraa, that he was seen by Yemenis as a hero of the revolution that had overthrown the Imamate in the 60s. So, he considered himself to be something of like the champion or the defender of the republic, is that right?

Baraa: Yeah. So, Abdullah bin Husayn Al-Ahmar, he came into prominence in the 60s in the wars between the royalists and the republicans. And he decided to side with the republic and fought all the way, even when it was looking that the republic was going to fail.

But then he played a very critical role into making or convincing the Saudi leadership to recognize the new republic. And that's why he became a very, very important influential character, not just in his tribal areas, but even in Yemen in general. He became a very influential political figure as well.

And then he became the speaker of the parliament. So, in recognition to his influence and political stance in the political arena.

Thomas: So, it's key to point out that Abdullah al-Ahmar and the Hashid Tribal Confederation in general was a main means whereby Saudi Arabia was able to exert political influence in Yemen.

Now, before we move on from Abdullah al-Ahmar, I'm afraid — that seemed quite straightforward, didn't it dear listener? I'm afraid it gets a little bit more complicated because he, as Baraa just said, was speaker of the parliament, speaker of the house, if you like.

He was also, and this is weird, the leader of this other party, Islah, the big other party in Yemen, the GPC was Ali Abdullah Saleh’s party. It is the ruling party of Yemen in that period. And Islah was the other party affiliated to some extent with the Muslim Brotherhood.

So, Abdullah al-Ahmar was the leader of that party, the minority party in parliament. And yet because of his prominence was speaker of the house of parliament, very strange arrangement there.

And even stranger, he had a number of sons, or he has a number of sons. In fact, we should be clear, he died in 2008, and when he died, the leadership of the Hashid Tribal Confederation fell to one of his sons Sadiq. But now that son, which political party is he affiliated with Baraa, it's very confusing.

Baraa: Sadiq became the head of Islah.

Thomas: Just like his father. So, he became the head of Islah. I see.

Baraa: Exactly it's like he inherited the seat.

Thomas: The crown.

Baraa: But his sons were basically … he decided, he said, let's basically split the beans between everyone. Some of his sons, half of them went as parliament members on behalf of the GPC, and the other half went as parliament members on behalf of Islah. And that tells you everything you need to know about Abdullah bin Husayn al-Ahmar.

Thomas: Okay, great. So now we've laid out the three main characters, the president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, his right-hand man turned rival, Ali Mohsen, and Abdullah al-Ahmar and his family who lead the Hashid Tribal Confederation, and who is the head of the Islah party.

Baraa: Those three were like the triangle where the central state positioned itself. You have the military, and you have the tribal component and the political institution.

Thomas: And so, the three of them together in an oddly balanced way, while feathering their nests the whole time, were at the top of the Yemeni state.

Now that brings us to the actual history. We're now going to be in 2006. We're going to talk about the presidential elections that happened in 2006. Remember, at this stage, the Houthis wars are still going on, on and off, and yet the constitution of the country calls for a round of presidential elections in 2006.

What is key about this round of presidential elections, however, is it's the first time since he became president that Ali Abdullah Saleh faces an actual opponent, that in fact, the opposition party or parties put an actual viable candidate to stand against him.

Baraa: And not only that Thomas, but it is an alliance of political parties. So, Islah, who had been, if the listener, of course would remember, had fought the socialists in 1994, decided following the 2003 parliamentary elections to strike this joint opposition coalition between Islah from one side, you have the Socialists, and then the Nasserite, and then smaller parties, like including Al-Haq party, the Baathist, and others to come together. And they formed something called the Joint Meeting Parties. The JMP.

Thomas: Yeah, the JMP. Now, I suspect that as this narrative unfolds, we will be talking about Islah more than the JMP and in fact, I want us to just keep talking about Islah to make it easier.

But from that point onwards, from the formation of this JMP, this umbrella party, of which Islah was like the biggest and most important part, Islah is speaking on behalf of a very wide and strange coalition, political coalition, bringing together leftists, Islamists, fascists, nationalists, they're all together, unified, mainly in their antipathy to the GPC and Ali Abdullah Saleh.

Baraa: And it was more looking like it's an opposition to Saleh attempt to concentrate power within his family. But the JMP, the importance of the JMP is that because of this strange coalition, the general message, the message that they were framing, and they were putting forward in the presidential elections in 2006, and the years that followed became very appealing to the public.

It's more of a national identity that Yemenis do recognize. And it doesn't have that either Islamist or just communist vibe to it. It's a more of mixture of Yemeni politics and Yemeni identity and what Yemenis can refer to.

Thomas: There was a sort of tension within Islah between the old guard and the new guard within Islah. So, the old guard more, let's say, whether Muslim Brotherhood or not, more faithful to the original kind of vision of that party, and a new guard led by a woman of all people in a way.

Or she became the most prominent spokesperson for this new guard, Tawakkol Karman, who would go on to win the Nobel Peace Prize during the Arab Spring.

Baraa: Yeah. I mean, Tawakkol Karman rose to prominence strangely around the same time. So, 2006, a very interesting year, you have elections happening, but then you have those new young fresh voices coming into the scene.

If you mention Tawakkol Karman to the public, the first thing they will think about her, she is the representative of the civil society. And then if you dig deeper, then you say, oh, and she's also a member of Islah.

Thomas: So, in that 2006 presidential election, Saleh won sort of handily. He never really was not going to win. But nonetheless, he began to grow a bit nervous because he could see that his opponents, his political opponents were organising, this is not really the way things should work in Ali Abdullah Saleh’s Yemen.

So, he's beginning to feel like, hmm, something might be wrong here. And little did he know that something was going to be become very wrong for him indeed.

So, in the years following the 2006 elections, things become a bit more tricky, both for Yemen and Ali Abdullah Saleh. So, he has this JMP, this coalition, which are more like a national front, really allied against him.

They are appealing more and more to people like a young Baraa Shiban as their Islamist rhetoric is being toned down. They're becoming more moderate. They're like the Tony Blair of Yemen. They're all smiles, and they really want only the best for everyone.

And at the same time, in the south beginning in 2007, protests begin to break out amongst people who are agitating a little bit more and more for something like a southern separatism.

More and more South Yemenis are angry about the situation, about their economic conditions, about the injustice or the economic injustice between North and South as they see it. So, Saleh’s contending with those protests. In fact, he sends the military to crush the protests, and all the while the Houthis wars are continuing.

Oh, not to mention Al-Qaeda marauding in the Hadhramaut in the East, causing terrorist attacks in the centre. His troops are fighting Al-Qaeda in cooperation with the Americans and the Saudis and the Emiratis as they're all working together.

I mean, Aimen, at this time in your professional career, Yemen would've been like an Al-Qaeda hotbed more than anything else.

Aimen: Indeed at that time between 2004, all the way until 2009, there was the period of building up Al-Qaeda in Yemen, because by 2004, the reality is that the failure of Al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia to make any headway, prompted Al-Qaeda to shift a lot of the effort and the funding and all of that from Al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia to Al-Qaeda in Yemen. And between 2006 and 2009, there was a lot of activities.

But this is when Saleh looked at Al-Qaeda and found that the hyphen between Al and the Q is looking like a dollar sign. It's like, hmm, yeah, this is how I can take lots of money, just like the Pakistani military, I can make lots of money just from the so-called War on Terror.

So, he started arresting Al-Qaeda members, put them in jail. And then this is where a musical chair game started with Al-Qaeda, where he will capture some, put them in jail, allow them to escape, only to put others in jail, and then they allow them to escape. And the merry go round started like this.

Thomas: That's happening behind the scenes. In front of the scenes, though, there was a lot of violence to the extent that in early 2010, both America and the UK had to close their embassies in Sana’a, because of Al-Qaeda attacks. It was a very bad period.

Now, I suppose on the upside for Saleh, at that time, the Saudis having intervened in his sixth war with the Houthis, had moved forward efforts to stop those wars. And in June of 2010, the sixth war ended.

And so, maybe Saleh could be like, right, now I can kind of rest easy. The Houthis have been contained. Al-Qaeda is actually my secret card against the Americans. Now I can get back to my first love, myself, and ensure that I can be president of Yemen for life.

And more importantly, that when I die, my son Ahmed Saleh could become president after me. So, he wants to start a proper dynasty, and in 2010, he thinks this is going to happen.

Baraa: I still remember 2010, and I can always say to myself, "Why couldn't he do things differently?” Because in 2010, finally, the GPC leadership, kind of the establishment decide that they need to hold talks with the JMP.

The first idea say we need to get the political house in order. They said, let's arrange for a national dialogue, talks between all of the Yemeni political and tribal factions to set the scene for what does the political parties want, which is to reform both the electoral system and the electoral registry, which Saleh had been playing with.

And it was designed in a way that would make him on the top of the seats every time.

Thomas: So, on paper, this is a perfectly legitimate ambition, both the GPC and the JMP, the opposition coalition, they came together and they're like, let's sort out some of these political problems, these constitutional issues, and Saleh's like, okay, that's cool.

Baraa: So, he sends his top advisor, Dr Abdul Karim Al-Eryani, who was before his foreign minister, and he was the prime minister of Yemen, a very close advisor to him. And he reached a deal with the JMP in which they would rearrange the political arena that would allow for the coming elections to be, let's say, a little bit more fair, no one expected that Saleh would be gone.

But they would expect that everyone would still have a bigger voice, at least in Parliament. They would give more powers to the local authorities. So, to ease the tensions in the southern provinces that are having protests, calling for secession and so on. So, trying to ease the tension that is happening.

Thomas: Sounds very grown up. This is what democratic politics are supposed to be like. Saleh’s representative there, Al-Eryani is like, cool, we'll make a deal. This sounds good. He goes back to his boss Saleh and says, “Hey, good news, dude. I came up with this great deal with the opposition. What do you think?”

Baraa: And Saleh snapped at him. They had an argument. People who were witness said that Salah was cursing to the level that Al-Eryani felt insulted. He had to leave the country. He had to go and stay in Spain, in protest of Saleh, basically humiliating him and not allowing him to honour the deal that he had made with the opposition.

And Saleh out of all times, he picked the end of 2010 as the right moment to introduce constitutional amendments.

Thomas: It's funny, it's clear now from history that Saleh was all the while becoming more dictatorial, more paranoid, more confident, though at the same time alienating all the people closest to him.

And yet he chooses that time above all to overplay his hand in a big way. And looking over at Egypt, where his old sort of buddy Mubarak had just won this sweeping re-election to the presidency forever.

He was like, great, I'm going to announce an early presidential election. Oh, by the way, I'm going to change the constitution, meaning I can be president for life. I'm not ever going to say that my son Ahmed won't follow me. He's feeling super confident.

And then a guy in Tunisia sets himself on fire. And that's where we're going to leave it now. We're going to take a quick break and when we come back, we're going to see how that poor soul in Tunisia lit a political fire that burned its way to Yemen very quickly and would eventually leave Ali Abdullah Saleh himself covered in burns. Stay tuned.

[Music Playing]

We're back. Now 2011, we're in the big year of Baraa's, proper eyewitness of modern history unfolding. It's going to be … I just love this story so much. Dear listener, you're in for a treat.

Baraa, just to give us a sense, before the Arab Spring arrives in Yemen, what are you up to and how politically kind of motivated or interested are you at that time?

Baraa: It's funny because it's a merge of many different things. So, I'm very much politically aware, because if you've been involved in civil society in Yemen, like I was, I started to get engaged in civil society activities really from 2006 while I was starting in university.

So, what happens is you have an active dynamic civil society that are meeting, that are talking, and even if you are doing social activities like myself, you are doing charity work, you cannot escape the political discussion that is happening in Yemen.

And you have those rising stars that are coming to the scene. People like Tawakkol Karman and one of the many sons of Abdullah al-Ahmar, who is the leader of Al-Islah, and the head of the Hashid Confederation Tribes, his name is Hamid al-Ahmar.

He is this rising figure who are backed to the opposition candidate in 2006. And he becomes very openly critical of Ali Abdullah Saleh, calling Ali Abdullah Saleh out on public to step down and to run elections, calling Saleh to actually remove his sons and nephews from the military positions that they are in.

So, he's making headways, he's making a lot of noise at that time.

Thomas: And this is just to make the listener understand that before the Arab Spring came and the months preceding the Arab Spring in Yemen, there was already a political ferment there. Protests were happening. Outspoken, powerful figures were calling on Saleh to change.

And there you were Baraa, finishing your last final exam at university, I think, isn't that right? When in February 2011, you got a message?

Baraa: Exactly. It was literally my final exam. I was handing over my final exam. I was trying actually to go through the paper as fast as I can, and then I suddenly receive a message.

I knew members of the student's union who were by that time organising, but not actually in big numbers, they're organising protests, small protests. But in that day, a friend of mine sends me a message and say, where are you? We need everyone to come to the front gate of Sana’a University right now.

I remember I handed over my paper exam, and I literally came out rushing from college, and he's telling me, we are being surrounded by security forces. The security forces are surrounding us, and we need as much people as you can bring.

And we literally have those group of students moving from one faculty to another, from one college to another, calling on students to come and join, come and join, come and join.

And what started as, maybe it was a hundred, maybe even less than that, by the front gate of Sana’a University. It was literally thousands, thousands of young students in one voice, overwhelming, really, the security forces that have thought that actually they have surrounded those protesters in Sana’a University and amongst them was Tawakkol Karman.

I remember seeing her protesting, but then she was like, kind of relieved that those thousands of students had arrived and made basically what was the beginning of the Arab Spring in Yemen.

Thomas: So, you were among them. How did the security apparatus respond to the sudden arrival of thousands of students to sort of buttress the protesters that were already there?

Baraa: Well, as you can imagine, Thomas security forces in Yemen do not behave. They did two things. They unleashed literally; I would say thugs. I mean, there are literally security members, but in plain clothes to start attacking the protestors. And then they would start shooting.

I remember that day two people died instantly, literally in front of us. And a number of our fellow students got injured, we had to rush them to hospital. But the mood started to change. People were getting angry as they're getting ready for what they would — what they know is now a beginning of an Egypt style, a Tunisian style revolution.

And it's had people from all walks of life, all political streams. It doesn't matter where do you come from or political differences that you had in the past. Everyone was just united in that moment. And I could tell you it was magical to say the least, the feeling that you belong suddenly to something, to a democratic civil movement that is much bigger than just yourself.

Thomas: Much bigger too because quite quickly it spread throughout Yemen. I mean, immediately people heard about what had happened in the Capitol Sana’a, and in other cities, provincial cities, big cities, Taiz, Aden even, the spark is lit.

Baraa: Exactly, exactly. And what ignited it even further is when Hosni Mubarak, the president of Egypt, stepped down from power on the 10th of February 2011, immediately after that, protestors came out in Taiz. This is the central city in Yemen that is kind of the intellectual hub, the cultural capital of Yemen, where has a lot of graduates and very educated population came out and occupied the streets.

Thomas: Now you're a group of young activists, I suppose we could describe you as sort of liberal left activists. You realise, oh my God, revolution is breaking out. How do you sort of organise such a thing? What's the next step that you take?

Baraa: It was a strange, I would say, complicated way of bringing many, many people from different backgrounds together. But eventually it came out to something called the organising committee.

It was those people like Tawakkol Karman and her fellow leftists and lefty activists who have been protesting since 2006 and have been organising and mobilising, saying, we need to come up with this entity that is going to act like it's literally an organising committee for this revolution.

Thomas: And at this point, the higher committee of the revolution makes an absolutely disastrous mistake.

Baraa: I'm usually, Thomas has been asked, usually by my friends, do you regrets going out when I see things and how they unfolded in Yemen? And I usually don't have a lot of regrets because I do feel things would've played out this way anyway, but there is one big regret is one of the members of the organising committee. He's a hardcore left communist, very known to Yemenis. His name is Ahmed Hashid.

Thomas: Now, Aimen, I'm sure you want to tell Baraa, what were you thinking trusting such a man?

Aimen: Yeah. You can never, ever, ever trust a comy. You should know this by now, Baraa.

Baraa: Well, I knew that, Aimen. But it was, it was far too late.

Thomas: So, this communist stands up and he says, I got an idea.

Baraa: He basically said like, listen guys, what we need is something more radical. We need the people who have been fighting the establishment and not only fighting, they have been even picking arms to fight the regime in Sana’a.

This regime needs to collapse to the ground, and no one is better, more fit to do this than the Houthis. Those rebels in the north of Yemen who have been fighting the Yemeni government for six rounds of conflict, and they're not afraid to fight to fight again.

And they go on and meet this guy who basically calls himself. I mean, he was in fact, the representative of Abdul-Malik al-Houthi in Sana’a.

Thomas: Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, the leader of the Houthis, a young man who had taken over the leadership after his brother was assassinated by Ali Abdullah Saleh. Abdul-Malik al-Houthi had a representative in Sana’a. And this is the man that the executive committee goes to get in touch with the Houthis for them.

Baraa: I can only Thomas apologise to my fellow Yemenis because this guy also happens to be a relative of mine. I'm so sorry, dear Yemenis.

And they meet with him, and the Houthis instantly agree, and they say, yeah, this is a good idea. We're going to actually join this revolution. And that the organising committee makes some precursors. They say, well, you're not allowed to carry out weapons in the protest.

You need to basically behave because this is not going to be an armed conflict. This is just going to be a civil movement. And they agree. They say, we are all up for liberal democracy.

Thomas: So, the Houthis join up, you yourself, as you told me, went down, and did some negotiation with the Southern movement. And they sort of agreed in a half and half to participate in the revolution through the organising committee.

Baraa: I did it even without a hesitation. I took myself and it was literally me doing it on a voluntary basis, travelling to Aden and all what I was attempting, saying, let's meet all of those people from all of those squares that have been already protesting against Saleh and let's get them all to agree on what we have come up with in Sana’a which is the charter of the revolution.

This is kind of the main goals and objectives of the revolution. Although the southern movements were like saying like, well, we don't agree with all of this, but we'll join you for now.

Thomas: So, you have the Houthis on side, you sort of have the southern movement on side. Now, as for Islah, as we said before, it was already kind of split into two between a new guard of younger activists of whom Tawwakol Karman was the sort of leader. They were fully on side the revolution. But what about the old guard of Islah?

Baraa: They were still in talks with Saleh. They wanted to get a deal in which he would agree to remove or retract the constitutional amendments that would allow him to run for life.

Thomas: So, the old guard in Islah is in negotiations with Ali Abdullah Saleh, and just like he always would when negotiating with Islah, he sent his right-hand man, even though a year before he had tried to assassinate him, but that's neither here nor there. This is Yemen. He sent Ali Mohsen to deal with Islah and Ali Mohsen goes to a meeting with the old guard.

Baraa: And Ali Mohsen manages to, basically … he succeeds into reaching an form of an agreement. He says, okay, we're going to have elections happen according to a new voter registry and also a new electoral system. And we want Saleh to come out and promise that his son won't run for elections. So, he's not going to be the successor.

And in exchange Islah, but not just Islah, just to be fair, all of the political parties will start calling on their members to remove them from the square. So, he kind of Ali Abdullah Saleh felt the really engine behind this big movement in the streets of Sana’a are the political parties.

So, if I just get them to agree that they remove just their members, all what they would left there would be just a few people like me, who they can deal with, then later on easy. But he needs to remove that component.

Thomas: And what's making Ali Mohsen's job of, of negotiating with the opposition parties easier is that a lot of the old guard establishment in the GPC, in Islah, in the other parties are particularly worried about the involvement of the Houthis in the protests, the Houthis, they had been the big bad guys in Yemeni politics for a decade.

The central government had fought six wars with them. They seemed to be crazy religious fanatics allied to Iran and Hezbollah. So, the political establishment were like, oh my God, the Houthis are involved now in the protests. We really need to do something about it.

And Ali Mohsen came back to the establishment with this plan. Now, Ali Abdullah Saleh’s family, though, like his son Ahmed, who was being primed to succeed him as president, what was their advice to the president?

Baraa: His family members were not thrilled by the plan because they felt it's a plan that is leading them to lose influence in the military and political scene in general. And they basically advised Saleh that you need to exert your dominance.

You need to show these people that you're not afraid to use force when necessary. You need to start banging some heads, show them who’s boss.

Thomas: I love to — imagining the scene. It's like something out of Succession or something. You just imagine the young son being like, “No, no, you can do it, dad, you can do it dad. Be that Arab strong men that you are, kill those bastards who are calling for your overthrow.”

And Ali Mohsen walks into this scene saying, “Hey, I got a deal. I made a deal with everyone. We've got this deal.”

Baraa: So, what I hear from people who were close to Saleh at the time, they said that Ali Abdullah Saleh was kind of split in this scene between those two. He had promised Ali Mohsen that he would stick to this plan, and he would make all the necessary and required announcements to ease the detention.

But at the same time, he's kind of giving a blind eye to, for example, his nephews, his sons of what are their plans to how they're going to deal with those protestors.

And so, he's in this position between those two, let's say. And later on, when I was playing a bigger role, I did meet Ali Mohsen, and he told me that he had managed to get Ali Abdullah Saleh to agree to his plan.

Thomas: So, the plan in which electoral reform would happen and Saleh would promise the public, he would come out and say in no uncertain terms, that he would not anoint his son, Ahmed president. This is the plan that Ali Mohsen had brokered with the opposition and which according to what he told you, Saleh, agreed to.

Baraa: Exactly.

Thomas: Which brings us to the fateful day of dignity as it's known in Yemeni history, the 18th of March 2011.

Baraa: Now, what I want to say is imagine if someone is in my position, so I don't know what's happening in the political scene. We know they're talking, but I'm in the square.

We finish Friday prayers, and we've seen that the security apparatus and the security forces, how they're trying to surround the square, and they've built kind of bricks around the square. They're trying to contain the square from growing even bigger.

And then suddenly after the Friday prayer, a big fire, giant fire, because they've burned tires, basically, we see them go up and a huge black smoke is covering the square. And immediately after the Friday prayer, we hear snipers shooting into the protesters, we don't know from which direction.

Thomas: Haram. Unbelievable. It's Friday just after the prayer.

Baraa: Exactly, exactly. And it was a shocking scene. People are still unable to grasp what's actually happening. And then we see protestors starting to fall mainly from the side where the fire is coming from. So, we see more and more people falling. I still can't take the images from my head even up until today.

Thomas: Because you were there. I mean, you can see gunshots near you. I mean, you're in the thick of it.

Baraa: And I can tell you for anyone, it's a miracle of how you can walk. And then by mere luck that you're not shot on that day. You walk a little bit and then you see someone who is just standing next to you fall, and then you move a little bit, you think you're hiding, and then suddenly the person who's hiding next to you starts to fall.

And then you start seeing people, rushing people into the — what we had in the square called the field hospital. It's basically, the doctors who volunteered to look after the injured protestors and then one after the other, one after the other, the numbers of bodies started tending to pile up in that field hospital.

And I still remember in one place in the square, there was this kind of pool of blood in the middle of the street. It basically had came from the blood of the protestors and coming together with water. And like you could see it's red, it's blood. And people feel, I mean, horrified, but also became very, very angry about what happened.

In that day, we would later figure out that there was instantly 48 people died, and later on the number would go up to 58 and more. Approximately 200 people got injured. Many of them with permanent injuries.

I still remember the kid who I kept on visiting even in the years later, he lost both of his eyes in the shooting that day. Can you imagine a young, young kid losing both of his eyes because he was just at the wrong place at the wrong time?

Thomas: Terrible. I mean, the whole country must have been in shock because Yemen was a democracy. It was a republic. It had had elections, it had had political parties, there was a political process. This sort of thing wasn't really supposed to happen.

Baraa: And that angered the population. What started, I mean, you could easily say maybe tens of thousands of protestors, more and more ordinary now citizens, not just members of parties and civil society activists come to join the protestors.

So, the days that followed, the number of people joining grew significantly. And then you immediately saw people from Saleh's own party, the GPC, starting to resign from his party in protest of what they viewed Saleh was doing, a brutal crackdown on protesters.

Thomas: One of the guys who was particularly angry about what happened was Ali Mohsen, longtime friend of Saleh, his right-hand man, he goes straight to Saleh and confronts him, “What the fuck has just happened? What have you done?”

Baraa: Saleh basically ignored him that day. He said, I don’t know who did this. Everyone around in that room knew who did this, but no one wanted to actually admit to the face of Saleh that actually you screwed up big time.

And Ali Mohsen gave him an ultimatum. You have three days to come up with answers and to actually prosecute the people who did this.

Thomas: He must have thought, “Ugh, I've really overstepped the mark here,” because immediately members of the JPC, his political party began resigning. And then three days later on the 21st of March, the big fish, he also defects.

Baraa: Exactly.

Thomas: To the protest.

Baraa: So, Ali Mohsen makes an announcement saying that following the events of the 18th of March, he can no longer serve with Saleh. And he announced joining the young peaceful protestors.

And with that, at that time, you could say roughly between 20 to 25% of the military is under his command. So, with that, you have also 20 to 25% of the military defecting to decide of the protestors.

Thomas: Anyone who has followed what went on in Syria during the Arab Spring would know that as soon as Ali Mohsen defects to the side of the protestors and takes with him not only his whole like network within the GPC, and all the political power brokers that are loyal to him, but 25% of the army, this really means the army has split.

And when that happens in a revolution, you are hightailing it to civil war. I mean, Aimen. You must have thought, oh God, Ali Mohsen has taken his 25% of the army to the protestors. This can't be good in the long run.

Aimen: There were already fears that Yemen is dissenting into civil war, and that is why there were so much noise within the Gulf capitals, the GCC capitals. And you can tell the nervousness.

I had friends at the time who were advising the Secretary General of the GCC, which is based in Riyadh. And they were talking about millions of refugees pouring into Saudi Arabia and from there into the rest of the GCC, if Yemen descended a civil war.

Thomas: That's foreshadowing another decision just around the corner. Before we get there, though, I just want to briefly say that the third of our three main characters, the Hashed Tribal Confederation.

And at this time, the head of that confederation, the son of Abdullah al-Ahmar, Sadiq al-Ahmar, he's been mediating between all the groups and all the while his brother, the very rich, the very outspoken, the very powerful Hamid, you mentioned him was saying, no, no, we've got to get rid of Saleh.

He must step down, which means that Sadiq and the Hashid Tribal Confederation also choose to join the revolution at the end of March.

Baraa: Yeah. As a whole, I mean, the whole Hashid confederation came to the square with the tribal leaders and then with them also their members. I remember the tribes coming in and then then saying, we're going to put tower offence back at home and join this join this revolution.

Thomas: So, you have communists, other leftists, young liberals like yourself, Muslim Brotherhood members, members of the army loyal to Ali Mohsen, tribal factions loyal to the al-Ahmar family and Houthis.

Now, and this Baraa, is where the story becomes particularly … well, I think, if you have a comic frame of mind, it's almost funny because after fighting the Houthis in six wars, after seeing the Houthis join the protests calling for his overthrow, Ali Abdullah Saleh makes a very, very unexpected decision. Baraa, what was that unexpected decision?

Baraa: Ali Abdullah Saleh decides that he's going to strike a deal with the Houthis in the North. So, Saleh makes the decision of handing over the province of Sa’dah, the northern province that is bordering Saudi Arabia to the Houthis.

Now, it's important for the listener to understand that despite six wars, the Houthis were not in control of the province. They had control of some districts, but they couldn't control the province. The military was still there.

Only in 2011, literally in March 2011, he decides to remove parts of the military from Sa’dah and handed over to the Houthis. The weapon depose the bases all to the Houthis and the Houthis strike a deal with a notorious arms trafficker. I mean, an arms dealer, his name is Fares Manaa.

And they say, listen, we're going to appoint you as our governor in Sa’dah. And Fares Manaa is a notorious figure. He's actually on the UN blacklist for supplying Al-Shabaab in Somalia, with weapons.

Thomas: Oh, no. And meanwhile, the Houthis are just moving in to bases and finding armaments and material, which the Yemeni army have just retreated from handing them over and slowly begin making their way South, coming into conflict with Ali Mohsen's troops. And then the al-Ahmar tribal troops.

Saleh’s enemies in the square in Sana’a are being attacked by the Houthis coming down from the North. And this had been facilitated by Saleh.

Baraa: Exactly. Because what's a better way to make my new enemies now in Sana’a busy is make them involved in another conflict in the North. So, both the Hashid Confederation, the Hashid tribes with al-Ahmar family are fighting now the Houthis, because now they're coming into their own territory, into their own tribal district, and at the same time fighting the military bases and the military camps of Ali Mohsen in the north of Yemen.

Thomas: Now Aimen, do you think it's safe to say at this stage that the Houthis are already receiving advice from Iran, from Hezbollah? I mean, what's interesting about this move is it echoes things that Hezbollah had been doing in Lebanon in the previous five years, ever since the war between Israel and Lebanon in 2006, which dear listener, you'll have heard about in our series on Hezbollah. Do you think that there's a link there?

Aimen: Well, Thomas, as I said in the last episode, there is no doubt in my mind, in the minds of many people who are in the know that all the intelligence indicated that Hezbollah and IRDC operatives were there with the Houthis from 2002 onward.

And by 2014, the scene was set. They have already trained enough people, they have already amassed enough weapons, and the golden opportunity presented itself when the master chess player made the fatal, fatal, fatal move by aligning with them.

So, they decided, okay, Ali Abdullah Saleh, he's the donkey that we are going to ride into Sana’a. And that's exactly what happened.

Baraa: The Houthis then start to present themselves as more of a political entity. They then change their name because people just refer to him as the Houthis. Now they change their name into Ansarullah.

Aimen: Yeah, to copy Hezbollah, basically.

Baraa: Exactly, exactly.

Aimen: Ansarullah means God's helpers or God's supporters, and Hezbollah means God's party.

Baraa: And then, they start to establish their media channel in an attempt to mimic the Al-Manar channel, Hezbollah's channel. And then they start to present themselves to the young protestors as we are a new fresh political entity. And we advise all of you, come and join us. We're going to make something that bring everyone together.

Thomas: Well, at the time that the Houthis are rebranding themselves and making their way slowly but surely, southward with their troops, Sana’a is now split between the forces loyal to Ali Mohsen, the Republican Guard, loyal to Ali Abdullah Saleh, and especially his son Ahmed, and the Hashid Tribal Confederation fighters who were now armed and fighting was breaking out.

Now, you must have known Baraa, that things had got out of control already by that point. You must have thought this revolution has turned into a civil war, and the main partisans in that war are the same old political figures that have been dominating the scene. They're just fighting with each other.

Baraa: So, by that time, we're now talking April 2011, fighting and clashes are erupting in the capitol, but we're still trying to say like, no, this is not a civil war. It still can be contained, and we can still get things in order.

And a mediation happens where Saleh sends a tribal mediation to meet Sadiq al-Ahmar. In that meeting, I still remember suddenly because by the way, the house of Sadiq al-Ahmar wasn't very far from the square. And we hear a huge explosion.

And soon enough we were discover that actually rockets were fired at the house exactly at the same time when people were meeting. So, Saleh just wanted to know, is Sadiq AL-Ahmar and his brothers are in the room?

Are they actually there so he can ensure that actually if then he would claim, oops, a rocket was fired by mistake and happened to kill the tribal leadership of Yemen.

Thomas: Well, luckily, Sadiq al-Ahmar did not die. Saleh failed to kill him, but many other members of the tribal leadership did die, and ordinary tribesmen were killed. This did not dampen the tensions that now exploded really into the open. There was proper fighting now.

Baraa: Yeah, I mean, Sana’a was split between those three factions. You can go from one checkpoint to another, you have to be extremely careful. But we are still trying to go to the square because this is where we think the revolution started and should continue.

And soon enough we start to realize actually the fighting is not just in Sana’a, it's now happening even between Hashid and some members now of Islah in the provinces around Sana’a like Al-Jawf the neighbouring provinces of the capitol.

Thomas: Harder to deny that a civil war was breaking out by that point, I guess Baraa.

Baraa: Actually, we were in denial, Thomas, you would be surprised the level of optimism we had. So, what we did being, I would say the liberal idiots that we are, we say we're going to send the mediation from the youth.

Thomas: Baraa, it's sweet, actually. It's sweet.

Baraa: And we're going to make everyone agree that we need to now focus on the revolution and mainly between the Houthis, because now the Houthis are with us in the square. I know them and we know members of Islah, so we can actually get those guys to agree.

And actually, we succeeded in actually convincing them not to raise their weapons in the square. We can actually convince them not to fight in the deserts of Al-Jawf and in the mountains of Sa’dah.

Thomas: Well, did you convince them?

Baraa: Well, they gave us a lot of sweet talk, and we came back feeling proud as ever. But nothing changed. Fighting would erupt the following day.

Thomas: Nothing changed. Well, one guy who was feeling proud as ever was Ali Abdullah Saleh. That is until the fateful day of the 3rd of June 2011, a Friday, just like the day of dignity, when his troops fired on you, Baraa, and your fellow protestors on the 3rd of June, Saleh was in his palace mosque finishing his prayers when something happened.

Baraa: So, I still remember that Friday, we suddenly heard the news that an explosion had happened in the president's mosque in the presidential palace. And a number of people are dead. No one knows what happens.

But news started and rumours started to fly, that actually not just a number of people are dead, that Saleh himself has been killed in this explosion. And the news quickly fly not just on Yemeni news channels, but also goes to international media outlets. And none of us knew actually if he was still alive or dead.

Thomas: Now Aimen, you're watching the international news, I bet you're thinking, oh wow, president Ali Abdullah Saleh has been killed. And were you aware quite quickly what had actually happened? Did you learn quite quickly what had actually happened?

Aimen: Well, I mean, because of course, I was following in the news like everyone else. So, then I asked my friends at the General Secretariat, I asked what happened? I mean, how was he targeted?

And they said that the early indications that it was a ATGM, ATGM is an anti-tank guided missile, a coordinate. And I was thinking, my God, lots of people must have been burned inside because I'm aware that anti-tank guided missiles have shape charges, basically that concentrate the huge amount of heat into a very small direction in order to melt armour.

And I experienced before, the heat from an RPG that actually hit a Russian built room in Afghanistan that I was in, and it was part of my training. But apart from the dizziness I experienced, the heat inside was really awful.

It's like as if you open an oven when you are cooking a pizza and immediately it comes into your face, all this heat. That's how I felt. And this is just a small rocket from an RPG, that would've been a very bad experience for everyone inside. So, I was wondering how did they survive, and did they survive intact or not?

Thomas: Yeah, I mean, that heat is what enveloped Ali Abdullah Saleh. Well, the question really is who fired the rocket?

Baraa: The real answer is many of us are still asking this question until today, because everyone, and I mean literally mean everyone has denied responsibility. And even the Yemeni prosecutors had failed to convict anyone.

Thomas: But Aimen, you have your suspicions.

Aimen: It's very clear that according to some people in the intelligence agencies in some Gulf countries, without naming anyone that it was Ali Mohsen. Ali Mohsen never forgave and never forgot that Ali Saleh gave his coordinates to the Saudis in the last war with the Houthis, in order for the Saudis to drop a bomb on him thinking he's a Houthis commander. So, the biggest suspicion was on him.

Thomas: So, Ali Mohsen, let us say, was trying to get his revenge, but he failed because despite that extreme heat, Ali Abdullah Saleh survived.

Aimen: Yeah.

Thomas: He was immediately evacuated, airlifted to Riyadh where he was installed at King Faisal Specialist Hospital and was brought back to life.

And I say that quite literally, almost, I mean, a few months later, he appeared finally on television from Saudi, and it was like looking at Frankenstein's monster, the man was covered in black charred flesh. It was a terrifying vision.

Aimen: Indeed.

Baraa: And meanwhile, the protestors are being gunned down by Saleh security apparatus, and let's say mainly his sons and nephews. And kind of the general feeling in Yemen is that Saleh, that old magnanimous figure who's wise, who's always able to trick his way and manoeuvre has lost it

Thomas: To dance on the head of snakes.

Baraa: Exactly, exactly. Had lost it. He's unable to do this. And the people, the public are feeling it's getting bloodier, and more and more innocent victims and innocent young people are being gunned down in the streets of Sana’a and Taiz and Aden and so on.

Thomas: Innocent victims, Baraa, like yourself. There Saleh is in Riyadh recovering, but clearly his followers or his sons and nephews, as you say on the ground, are out to get revenge. They turn with great ferocity on the revolution, on the protesters. And a week after his attempted assassination, you are abducted by Saleh loyalists.

Baraa: Yeah. I was abducted in a checkpoint that belonged to the central security forces; these forces run by his nephew. And I'm still having issues in my shoulder up until today from the beating that I received that night.

I was covered in a black bag, put in a back of a van, and it was, I think around 11:00 PM at night and beaten constantly all the way until the morning.

And then they even, when they dropped me, it's not like they even pretended that it wasn't them. They didn't take any of my belongings, any of the money that I had, nothing. They wanted me to know that actually it was them. We did this to you.

Thomas: Wow, that's just terrible. Those of us in the West who engage in politics, we don't usually have to face that kind of mistreatment from the people we are protesting against.

Okay. That summer of 2011, Saleh is abroad. He's being treated in hospital in Riyadh. Meanwhile, the GCC led by Saudi are trying to cobble together some kind of solution for Yemen. This would be known as the GCC Initiative.

And while on the ground in Yemen, the fighting between the different factions is growing bloodier and to bloodier. And in September, there was a particular three days of tremendous bloodletting, and everyone's incredibly worried that they have another Syria on their hands in Yemen, or another Libya on their hands in Yemen, they need to put a stop to it.

So, the GCC has developed this initiative working with the EU and the U.S. and the UN and they're putting pressure on Saleh, there in hospital in Riyadh to sign it, to step down, to agree to a planned and ordered transition in Yemen.

And he agrees in theory, but then he asks, “Guys, I just need a break, I need a holiday. I want to go to Ethiopia, can I?”

Baraa: And he did. He actually took his plane. And on the way to Ethiopia, he ordered the pilot to redirect the plane all the way back into Sana’a. And that made the GCC countries, especially Saudi Arabia, very, very angry. They felt this is actually going to slip easy into a civil war that is beyond the control of anyone really.

Thomas: I mean, Aimen, how would the Saudi leadership at that time King Abdullah was quite unwell during those years, what would the Saudi leadership, King Abdullah himself, how would they have responded to that kind of trick?

Aimen: What I understood from the assistant of the secretary General of the GCC, that King Abdullah uttered the word khasiis describing what Saleh did. So, he described him as khasiis and khasiis in Arabic is the, imagine the combination of the words bastard, traitor, and contemptible and-

Thomas: Scumbag.

Aimen: Scumbag, yeah. Altogether.

Thomas: Well, so they're on the ground in Yemen amongst the liberal youth protestors, they are getting closer to the Houthis, who they remain convinced will be their allies in the attempt to create a new, more democratic Yemen.

Meanwhile, Saleh back in Sana’a is being pressured more and more by Saudi Arabia and the GCC to sign the GCC Initiative, which finally, that November, he does sign.

Now, that means he's, he agrees to step down from power to hand power over to his Vice President, Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, who will become president. And a new national dialogue conference will be established to create a new constitution for Yemen and to bring all the parties to one big table so that a peaceful and prosperous Yemen can be hashed out.

Now this is where we're going to end this episode, Baraa, on the cusp of a new era, a glorious era of peace for Yemen, in which you yourself would play a role because you were a part of the National Dialogue Conference.

[Music Playing]

Baraa: And I can promise the listener, actually, it's going to even get more thrilling from now onwards.

Thomas: Stay tuned, dear listener, when we're back next time, Baraa will continue his thrilling tale of the insider view of politics in Yemen as Civil War broke out in that country. See you then.

A reminder that you can follow the show over on Facebook and Twitter at MH Conflicted. And for a deeper dive into all the subjects we talk about here on Conflicted, head over to Facebook and search Conflicted Podcast Discussion Group.

There you will find other fans of the show engaging in heated debates, enlightening conversations, and just generally geeking out over Conflicted related topics.

Conflicted is a Message Heard production. This episode was produced and edited by Harry Stott. Sandra Ferrari is our executive producer. Our theme music is by Matt Huxley and Tom Biddle.

Conflicted S4 E20: Yemen: Dancing on the Heads of Snakes

Speakers: Thomas Small, Aimen Dean, & Baraa Shiban

Thomas: Welcome back to Conflicted with me, Thomas Small.

Aimen: And me, Aimen Dean.

Thomas: This is the second episode of our Titanic series, exploring the history of Yemen and to help us on our way. I'm thrilled to say that back again, we have our very special guest and our very good friend, Baraa Shiban. Welcome back, Baraa.

Baraa: So glad to be back and can't wait to explain the rest of how the Titanic hit the iceberg.

Thomas: Yemen, the great Titanic of the Middle East. Now, last time we explored Yemen up to the year 1990, and we looked at, well, the many Yemens, or let's say the two Yemens, the traditionally Zaidi dominated north and the more recently communist dominated south.

When we left them, they had just been joined together under the rule of a man who will be playing a crucial role in today's story, Ali Abdullah Saleh. And this week we're going to see if Ali Abdullah Saleh can hold both Yemens together in the following decades.

How would he do it? Aimen, let’s let Ali Abdullah Saleh’s words speak for themselves. How did he say he was going to keep the two Yemens together?

Aimen: Well, he said he can keep the two Yemens together by perfecting the art of dancing on the heads of snakes.

[Music Playing]

Thomas: Dancing on the heads of snakes. That's the art of governing Yemen. We're going to find out how he did it, how well he did it. Let's jump right back into it.

Baraa, nice to see you again. I'm doubly glad that you're with us on this second episode of our epic series, because now in this episode, we're going to begin to take advantage of your eyewitness experience of many of the important events that have occurred in Yemen over the last, well, 40 years, say.

We're building up a picture of Yemen. We're laying the pieces on the chess board as we sort of move ever closer to the Civil War there. And so, you will be able to provide us some firsthand accounts of things you witnessed in Yemen as the Houthi movement rose. And as the regime of Ali Abdullah Saleh began to be rattled.

Baraa: Yeah, I mean, those are the years that I was in school, but I was pretty much aware of what was happening in the north of Yemen. Me coming from Sana’a and being a member of a Hashemite family, but also having a growing interest in politics and the details of the politics of Yemen.

Thomas: Well, when we last left Yemen, there had been a big political earthquake there when the two countries, North Yemen and South Yemen were finally united. They were unified in 1990.

No doubt it would last forever. I wonder, Baraa, do you think in 1990 that anyone who knew Yemen would've thought that this experiment of unification was going to last?

Baraa: The emotions were very high, mainly, of course, positive emotions. And people in jubilation literally went out to the street celebrating this unification, believing that this is only the beginning of really good times ahead.

So, for the first time, political parties were allowed to be formed. So, we no longer have just a one ruling party. Elections were set to happen in 1993. Newspapers, magazines of all the political stream were allowed to be sold in the street. So, the overall environment was basically an environment of celebration and happiness and people only seeing promising days ahead.

Thomas: Baraa, remind the listener who Ali Abdullah Saleh was, I mean, we know he was the president of Yemen. He, as you told us, kind of modelled himself a little bit on Saddam Hussein in his style, in his presentation.

But what about his personality as a young Yemeni yourself living there? What sort of person was Ali Abdullah Saleh for you? How did he strike you?

Baraa: Ali Abdullah Saleh was a military figure. This is how people remember him. But he also presents himself as the person who understands Yemen. So, he knows all of the tribes. He can bring competing forces together. He can go and meet rivalries at the same time.

And this legacy kind of accumulated with him being able to strike the unification deal. So, it kind of cemented the idea that actually this is the person who can bring all of those rivalries and competing forces together and will be able to hold the country for the future.

Now, in terms of his foreign policy, he wasn't appealing as very, I would say, convincing or very smart in how he was approaching foreign policy.

Thomas: I think that we saw that immediately Saddam Hussein, invades Kuwait, all that business in the first Gulf War. I mean, Aimen, how did you experience the initial unification of Yemen where you were in Saudi Arabia? Because Yemen played a certain role in events in the early 90s in the Gulf.

Aimen: Well, I mean, I celebrated the union of the two Yemens because most of my friends happened to be Hadharem in Khobar. Hadharem of course, I'm sure, Baraa will know they are the people of Hadhramaut from the south of Yemen.

So, they are the old emigres of South Yemen. So, when the two Yemens united, my Hadharem friends were elated, were very happy because now they will join their families in Southern Yemen. So, it was amazing emotions, but it all came crashing down so quickly.

Thomas: Yeah, I think that it's germane to this part of the story that at this time there were something like, was it almost like 2 million Yemeni expatriates living in Saudi Arabia?

Aimen: Four.

Thomas: 4 million. 4 million Yemeni expatriates.

Aimen: Yeah.

Thomas: And that was going to play a big role in what happened next.

Aimen: Well, it did because you see, sometime there are many Yemeni families in Saudi Arabia. They actually the most integrated immigrant community that really truly integrated into the Saudi society.

However, this harmonious integration between the 4 million Yemenis who were living in Saudi Arabia, visa free, freedom of movement, treated like Saudis and the rest of the Saudi community came crashing down in 2nd of August 1990 because the Arab world is full of stupid decisions, as we will see, around us all the time.

Thomas: Here we go. He's not pulling his punches, right away. Okay. Stupid decisions. What was the stupid decision, Aimen?

Aimen: Yeah. So, Ali Abdullah Saleh was torn between two things. His idol, Saddam Hussein, the one that he always aspired to imitate invaded Kuwait. And now he has a choice to make, either stand with Saudi Arabia and the rest of the GCC countries since they are the ones who are the financial backbone of Yemen. Or stand with Saddam, who is his idol, the idol of Arab nationalism, the second coming of Gamal Abdel Nasser.

So, basically, he was torn between his heart and his mind, between his pocket and his principles, and he chose to follow those empty principles over a full pocket and decided, no, I'm going to side with Saddam Hussein.

So, of course, if you side with Saddam Hussein, King Fahd of Saudi Arabia will consider your citizens to be a risk to the national security of the country. You can't have a quarter of the country belonging to a nation whose president is siding with a threatening belligerent nation, which is Iraq.

Thomas: Okay. I'm actually going to do the unthinkable and defend Ali Abdullah Saleh in a second.

Aimen: What?

Thomas: But before I do that, Baraa as a Yemeni yourself, when the Gulf War broke out, I suppose you can remember what were the feelings like on the ground, and were Yemenis broadly in favour of Ali Abdullah's stance to stand with Saddam Hussein.

Baraa: Ali Abdullah Saleh was able quickly, actually to rally the public around him saying that these GCC countries are inviting the Americans to invade the whole region. And we have no choice but to support Saddam.

Now, saying that, there were many, many wise voices, I would say in Yemen, and people don't know this, the biggest financial investor in terms of infrastructure in North Yemen was Kuwait. So, the backing of Saddam Hussein didn't make any sense.

Thomas: It didn't make sense. I mean, there's another dimension though, which I think is important to point out. So, Saleh was in a tricky position to some extent. Yemen, the newly United Yemen had joined this organisation called the Arab Cooperation Council the year before.

So, this was Saddam Hussein's, kind of like his GCC alternative, he was trying to put together something like that. Yemen joined it, and at the time, Ali Abdullah Saleh was locked in a dispute with Saudi Arabia about the border of where the empty quarter, about, basically there was a border dispute between the kingdom in Saudi Arabia that was ongoing.

And oil, which had been recently ish discovered in that part of the country, was involved in this dispute. And Saddam Hussein had guaranteed Saleh financial and diplomatic support in that dispute.

So, he kind of found himself, unfortunately, at the bad time, backed into a bad kind of cooperation corner. I guess he felt he had to do what he had to do. Because he wasn't a complete moron, he must have known it was a tremendous risk to back Saddam Hussein against the world, who had come to defend Saudi Arabia.

And yet, I guess he had to do that. What's interesting, I think, is that when he did that, he invoked Arab nationalist reasons, as you would expect, yay, we Arabs have to stick together. We can't allow America to divide us.

But also, religious reasons. So, early on, there's this sense that Ali Abdullah Saleh is trying to play all the different voices in Yemen at the same time, a bit of Arab nationalism here, a bit of religious revivalism here, trying to sprinkle the rhetoric around to keep everyone on side.

So anyway, Aimen sorry, I tried my best to defend Ali Abdullah Saleh a bit. Nonetheless, Aimen, the fallout was massive. Saudi Arabia expelled 800,000 Yemeni labourers.

Aimen: Oh, no more than that. The number was almost one and a half million Yemenis left.

Thomas: Well, with the loss of the money that was flowing in from Saudi because of all of the Yemeni workers there. And also, after the U.S. cut off all foreign aid to Yemen as a result of Yemen's stance with Saddam Hussein during the war, the Yemeni economy immediately cratered.

It is amazing to think that 20% of Yemen's economy at the time was remittance based, or based on USA, that is a lot of the economy. And so, when these Yemeni labourers were compelled to return home, the unemployment rate inside Yemen shot up to 35%.

It was a massive economic collapse, really, certainly a challenging time to start a new constitutional experiment, a unified Yemen. So, Saleh's decision to back Saddam Hussein immediately put the experiment in keeping Yemen together, keeping the two Yemens united under a lot of pressure.

And sadly, we don't have time to go into this in any great detail, but the upshot of that, a few years later, in 1994, Baraa was essentially a civil war.

Baraa: So, the 1994 Civil War was a result of two main things. The first thing is the dissatisfaction of the course of the unified government established after 1990, the creation of the plural party system in which the Socialist Party, which was the ruling party in the South, lost the 1993 to become third in parliament after the GPC and Islah.

Thomas: So, GPC which is an important sort of acronym, it's Ali Abdullah Saleh’s party. It was like the ruling party of Yemen for decades, the GPC. And then this other party, Islah, we're going to talk about it in a second. It was a newcomer to the political scene and surprised everyone, certainly surprised the socialists of the South for winning the second place in the elections.

So, the socialists, the Southern Yemenis were basically slapped across the face, and they had much less power than they expected.

Baraa: Exactly. And then started the hesitation into going into the unification of the army units between the North and South. The leaders of the Socialist Party started to say that Islah was playing with their internal rivalries.

Now, if the listener would remember in 1986, a faction, an important faction of the Socialist Party, flee from South Yemen and went into the North, the Socialist party accused Saleh that he was playing that rivalry to weaken them.

Thomas: They were right about that.

Baraa: I think in a sense they were right. Yeah.

Thomas: Of course, they were there. There will be many instances in this story that people accuse Saleh of playing sides against each other, and it's always true.

Baraa: The second thing, which provoked tensions was the assassination of a couple of Socialist Party leaders. And it accumulated into an assassination attempt on Ali Salem al-Beidh, who's now the vice president of the unified Yemen, in which al-Beidh accused directly Ali Abdullah Saleh of orchestrating.

Saleh denied that. But the tensions rise to a point where basically both parties can't agree anymore.

Thomas: And in April 1994, Civil War broke out, started with a massive tank battle outside the city of Amran, about 40 miles northwest of Sana’a. And it was a proper war like the South fired scud missiles into the North.

It involved the world, the U.S, supported the North and gave Ali Abdullah Saleh a lot of weapons. This was vital in the rehabilitation of Ali Abdalla Saleh’s relations with the United States following the Gulf War.

Saudi Arabia stood on the sidelines, actually didn't support the North as much as you might think, leading some observers to wonder if they were in fact not so in favour of a unified Yemen as much as they had been.

So, my point here, and we're going to move on, but the point is that there was a civil war in 1994 involving Amran capturing Aden, Southern separatism, the Islah Party, which we'll talk about in a second, and the Saudis and Americans, by which I mean a lot of echoes of the present.

And that's because Yemen is very complex beast. And now we're going to do the unthinkable, my friends, and we're going to try to explain, and I swear to God almighty, we have to do this succinctly, okay? But we are going to explain to the listener, Yemen's complexities, political complexities.

And I want to start by talking about the tribal makeup, specifically in Yemen. There is a family, the al-Ahmar family, who had a tribal confederation that is very important. And that in Ali Abdullah Saleh’s Yemen had an actual constitutional role more or less because a prominent member of that family, Abdullah al-Ahmar, was speaker of the parliament.

So, very briefly Baraa, the al-Ahmar family and this tribal confederation, how is it that there can be a country that's a republic with elections and stuff, but also have a tribal confederation with a semi constitutional role?

Baraa: The Hashid Confederation was very powerful due to the decision of Abdullah bin Husayn al-Ahmar to back the republic in the 1960s.

Thomas: So, back in the 1960s, remember there was the whole Nasserite thing leading to another civil war in the North, where it was a question really whether this tribal federation would continue to support the Imam or not. But Abdullah al-Ahmar was convinced no, to turn against the Imam and support the Republic.

Baraa: Exactly. But Abdullah al-Ahmar did one step further. He was the kind of key figure who convinced Saudi Arabia to recognize the New Republic. So, he had very, very strong ties with Saudi Arabia.

And Saudi Arabia were interested in its national interest to work closely with the Yemeni tribes, because that kind of gives them an ability to have a control over the situation, but also calm any tribal tensions that might occur in their southern border.

Thomas: I'm glad that you mentioned Abdullah al-Ahmar’s links to Saudi Arabia and the important role that Saudi Arabia in the 70s, 80s, 90s, noughties all the way up to now plays in being a party in that weird dance, negotiating dance between all the different factions, particularly in Northern Yemen.

And Aimen, what I'd like you to kind of tell the story of, if you could, is the rise in the 70s and 80s, culminating in the nineties, inside Yemen of a kind of Salafisation to some extent of the Northern tribesmen.

Aimen: First of all, you have to understand, Thomas, that the Salafisation that happened in Northern Yemen wasn't by design, is just an accident of history. Because why, many of these people, as I said to you, came to Saudi Arabia as labourers and professionals, and when they are there, they are going to pray in the mosques in Saudi Arabia.

They are going to study, their kids will study in Saudi schools, the curriculum is Salafi, the mosque preaching is Salafi, and therefore they will end up being converted into Salafi through slow integration.

So, Muqbil bin Hadi al-Wadi'i is a name that every scholar and researcher on modern history of Yemen should know, this name is important.

Thomas: I'm sorry, dear listener. It is a particularly tough Arabic name if you don't speak Arabic, Muqbil bin Hadi al-Wadi'i. This is the guy we're talking about, a Yemeni who was actually born as Zaidi, I think, is that right, Aimen?

Aimen: Indeed, he was Zaidi, most of the North were Zaidis, but many of the people from Dammaj, and in Sa’dah, and in Jawf.

Thomas: These are places in the very high north of Yemen.

Aimen: Yeah. Where Baraa come from. So, these areas started the slow converging towards Salafism because Muqbil bin Hadi al-Wadi'i got a scholarship into the Islamic University of Madinah and the Islamic University of Madinah was a hotbed of Salafism.

But anyway, he went back to Yemen and established with the funding and the blessings of none other than Sheikh Abd al-Aziz Ibn Baz, who would then later become the mufti of Saudi Arabia, the school of Dar al-Hadith. And this is how the Salafist school in Yemen started to appear.

Thomas: Well, what's interesting for the wider story, and I'm going to ask you Baraa, because the Dar al-Hadith School in Dammaj very close to Sa’dah, the capital of the high north of Yemen, the sort of Zaidi capital of Yemen began to implement some, let's call them Wahhabi tendencies, including destroying graves, which was a classic Wahhabi move.

So, there were incidents of the Salafi, let's say, these new Salafi, Yemeni Salafis destroying Zaidi graves in and around Sa’dah, which began to provoke the Zaidis of that area. This is an important dynamic because it will eventually be part of the story that leads to the Houthi movement about 20 years later.

But Baraa, as a young Northern Yemeni of Zaidi ancestry, I think your own personal life story reflects to some extent the switch from a Zaidi to let's say a neo-Salafi kind of orientation. Is that right?

Baraa: Well, two things I was taught when I was very young. The first thing is that my family were very, very afraid of me going to a Salafi Mosque.

The other thing is that the Zaidi scholars decided that they need to double down on their summer camps, their schools, their teachings, because of this new wave of Salafism that they feel is now a real threat to their kind of hardcore base in Sa’dah, in Hajjah, in all of that northern highlands, which have been traditionally Zaidi.

Now from another sense, also from another side, the Zaidi school of thought was being heavily challenged even in school curriculum because what you've been taught is the ideals of the Republic.

So, it's against the Imamate, it very much criticises and demonises the period of the Imamate. So, the Zaidis are feeling basically pressured from all sides. And I remember, like in my upbringings, they say it quietly in our families, is we're being scrutinised, we are being demonised. We are like the traditional Zaidi families. There is a war being waged against us.

And it kind of plays into the idea of actually we need to start sticking together to what we originally are. We are a Zaidi and we have to protect that.

Thomas: So as the Zaidis in the North are beginning to feel more and more set upon by a rising Salafi movement, there's another kind of development going on in the country. Also, Sunni in orientation and Salafi, I suppose, but associated specifically with the Muslim Brotherhood, which began to make big inroads in the country.

And it's extremely complicated because that guy, Abdullah al-Ahmar, the head of that tribal confederation and the speaker of the house, allied to Saudi, was also heavily influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood and worked alongside clerics like Abdul Majeed al-Zindani, this guy who set up a university and Sana’a very much influenced by Muslim Brotherhood ideas to form in 1990, a new political party, a kind of Muslim brotherhood, kind of tribal kind of Salafi political party called Islah.

Now this is that party that in the 1993 elections won second place, surprising everyone. And Islah, the Muslim Brotherhood party, let's call it, of Yemen, will play a big role in the events of the Arab Spring.

And in fact, I don't want to talk about it more at this stage because we have to move on. And something else, Aimen, you particularly I'm sure could tell us all sorts of interesting things, is the rise of Salafi Jihadism in Yemen, at the same time, so many Yemeni fighters participating in the anti-Soviet Jihad coming back and in the 90s, participating in the nascent Al-Qaeda movement, the eventual emergence of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.

Terrorist attacks like the notorious attack on the USS coal in Aden Harbor in 2000, really the first big salvo. And what would become the war on terror. I mean, that is a big part of the Ali Abdullah Saleh era, the Salafi jihadist era in Yemen.

Aimen: The arrival of Salafism in the North ignited that sense of renewed pride in Zaydism. But in Sana’a and Taiz and the urban areas, there is a new kind of Salafism, it was more of a practical Salafism, a Salafism that has been merged with the Muslim Brotherhood and ironically led by Abdul Majeed al-Zindani.

Abdul Majeed al-Zindani is an interesting, absolutely interesting figure. So, Abdul Majeed al-Zindani who was a doctor of all things, he was a medical professional, but nonetheless, he came from a Zaidi family, and he started to delve first into the world of the science of the Qur’an.

And through his research started to get more and more close to Salafist ideals from Saudi Arabia, talking to many Salafist activists and people who were involved with the Muslim Brotherhood also.

So, in the end, he formed al-Islah, which was a big umbrella that was able to encompass the Muslim Brotherhood who were the majority of the followers of the Islah.

But also, it was big enough to have sizable minorities of Salafist activists, politically active Salafists, as well as Zaidis. There were Zaidis actually, who were part of al-Islah. Al-Islah is a bigger umbrella than we think. Whenever we always paint al-Islah as a purely religious Muslim Brotherhood. It is not, it is far more complicated than that.

Baraa: As you said, Aimen, the Islah Party means many different things to many different people in Yemen. So, if you are from the north of Yemen, it's the umbrella, which is basically the political tribal framework of Abdullah bin Husayn al-Ahmar.

If you are in the central part of Yemen, in Taiz and Ibb and that part, it's more of the ideology, the Muslim Brotherhood versus the Salafist versus the socialist ideologies competing in Central Yemen.

In the South, it is this party that is basically an ally of Ali Abdullah Saleh, who helped them to invade the south and get rid of the socialists. So, it depends where you are, it means something.

Thomas: So, yeah, so through figure like Zindani pre-eminently, Salafi jihadism flowed into Yemen. Muslim brotherhood inspired political ideas, flowed into Yemen, a general neo-Salafism spread throughout Yemen.

And I think the main takeaway, at least one of the main takeaways here is that the 80s and 90s and early noughties in Yemen, culturally speaking, were incredibly fervent. There was a lot of change going on.

I mean, the cultural fabric of the country was changing in response to all of these things. And in terms of our main character, Ali Abdullah Saleh, sitting at the top on the throne there, he found himself very deftly dancing on the heads of all these snakes.

And by 9/11, say, U.S. aid was flowing into Yemen because Saleh became a very important partner in the anti-terrorism, global war on terrorism, which increased his power more, even though as everyone knows now, and certainly probably even then knew he was playing all the sides.

And he had relations with Al-Qaeda in Yemen, and he would capture them in order to get some money from America and let them go to get more money from America. So, he was playing all the games, and this was making him feel more and more confident, more and more autocratic.

While at the same time all of this rising Salafism and Saleh's authoritarian approach was putting Yemen on a collision course with a new group of political actors rising in the far north, the Houthis.

And we are now going to take a break, and when we come back, we are going to talk about this new political player who, when it emerged on the scene in the early noughties, no one would've thought in 10 years’ time, they would take over the country and hold it nearly for a decade now.

So, after the break, we'll come back and we're going to hear all about the Houthis. Stay tuned.

[Music Playing]

We are back. In the first half, we set out the Sunni stall of Yemen, if you like, the rise of Salm in, in that country, the way in which the president Ali Abdullah Saleh was able to capitalise on the new religious arrival on the scene to increase his power and stay sitting pretty there in Sana’a dancing on the heads of snakes.

Meanwhile, in the far north, a new movement arose. Now this movement is shrouded in mystery. It's early years are mysterious. I think we just need to admit this much is said about where the Houthis came from. Very little direct evidence is often proffered to support some of these things.

And so, we are going to have to work our way towards the best explanation that we can of where they come from. And I think we need to start Baraa, with this guy, Badruldeen al-Houthi.

He was from the North, he was involved in the early 90s in the formation of a minority Zaidi political party, the Party of Truth, Hizb al-Haqq. So, he was a politician, a Zaidi involved in this growing Zaidi consciousness, political consciousness at the time.

Baraa: So, Badruddin al-Houthi as an important figure amongst Zaidi scholars was against the core principle of the New Republic because he was against political pluralism in its essence.

Thomas: Yeah. So, the new constitution of the United Yemen introduced pluralistic democratic politics, political parties, you have elections, if you win the elections, you get power, et cetera.

The traditional Zaidi ideal was aristocratic, theocratic almost, that there was a kind of, as we discussed in the previous episode, there was that class of Hashemite aristocrats whom God really had granted the right to rule Northern Yemen.

So, the idea of democracy did not sit well with them, or as it happens with one of their number, Badruldeen al-Houthi.

Aimen: And it is important to point out here, Thomas and Baraa, that al-Houthi family comes from the most radical branch of Zaidi Islam which is al-Jarudi sect of Zaidi. They are far more closer to mainstream Shia Islam, rather than the other two prevalent branches of Zaydism in Yemen, which is the Hadawis and the Salehis. And they are far more closer to mainstream Sunni Islam.

Thomas: And even before the unification Baraa, if I'm not mistaken, Badruldeen's elder son Mohammed was involved already in this growing self-consciousness on the part of Zaidis who were feeling threatened on the one hand by rising Salafism, on the other hand, still resenting their loss of inherited power as a result of the Republican movement.

And he founded in probably the late 80s, all of my reading, it wasn't quite clear exactly when this was founded, a movement known in English as The Believing Youth.

Baraa: The Believing Youth started as a Zaidi revivalist movement dedicated to revive Zaidi School of Thought in North Yemen, mainly encouraging Zaidi families to send their children in summer breaks to their schools in North Yemen, mainly in Sa’dah up in the north to get Zaidi teachings.

So, there are a number of important founders, Mohammed al-Houthi and his father Badruldeen. In addition to Mohammed Azzan, this is a highly intellectual, respected religious scholar in North Yemen, and a couple of political figures who all combined to get together to actually say we can do something like this Salafi School in Dammaj.

We can do something which is similar to what the Islah are doing in their summer schools. We can create our own Zaidi revivalist summer camp that will revive the Zaidi School of Thought. Now, Thomas, maybe you don't know this, but Mohammed Azzan, the founder of The Believing Youth, was actually my teacher in high school.

Thomas: I did not know that, Baraa. Amazing. You must have disappointed him so much, in what happened after you graduated.

Baraa: Actually, not. So, Mohammed Azzan I was approached when I was in high school by my friends to say, let's go and in the summer to join the Believing Youth summer camp. And actually, Mohamed Azzan was the one who discouraged me from going, this was later years because there were tensions that are beyond the surface that are rising between him and another important figure who's Hussein al-Houthi?

Thomas: Hussein al-Houthi. So, this is Badruldeen's other son. Mohammed al-Houthi was the older son. And then Hussein al-Houthi, very, very, very important. And in fact, this is the main character, Hussein al-Houthi. He began to turn The Believing Youth movement and this growing Zaidi movement in a new direction really led by him. Is that right?

Baraa: So, what Hussein al-Houthi did is that he got inspired so much following his trips to Iran by the Iranian model and started to aspire more towards a Hezbollah militant model and saying, this is actually the solution to Yemen.

Now, amongst the Zaidi scholars, there's this divide from one side. There is those scholars who formed al-Haqq Party and have been forced to actually come out with a public statement saying that they recognized and you are republic, and they no longer believe in the divine right of rulers that should be tied to the descendants of Prophet Muhammad. In other words, the Hashemites.

Thomas: This is something that I think, I mean, Ali Abdullah Saleh more or less forced them to do this. I mean, he was involved to some extent in this decision to come out and say, no, no, no, no, we do believe in democracy. We are happy with pluralism. He was involved in forcing them to do this. But Hussein al-Houthi did not like that.

Baraa: So, Hussein al-Houthi and his father Badruldeen al-Houthi did not like that, and they kind of accused the Zaidi scholars of being hypocritical and not actually being true to their core beliefs.

Now at the same time, Ali Abdullah Saleh started funding the summer camps of the Believing Youth for one main reason is that after 1994, he started to be wary of the growing influence of Islah in the north of Yemen. So, what better to deter that is to have another religious rivalry that can be the counter or competitor of Islah in North Yemen.

Thomas: I mean, just to make this clear, Ali Abdullah Saleh in 1990 had supported the formation of Islah to help him crush southern separatism. And then four years later realising, Islah is now very popular, they threatened me. He then supported a Zaidi revivalist movement, the Believing Youth in order to counter Islah, which on the surface, he was still the ally of this is giving you a sense of Ali Abdullah Saleh.

Baraa: Exactly, exactly. And then later on, Islah lost the 1997 parliamentary elections, which made Ali Abdullah Saleh’s party the dominant party in parliament. And that kind of created the drift between them even further.

Thomas: Let's stay with the Houthis now. Now you mentioned Iran, you mentioned that Hussein al-Houthi was inspired by the Iranian model. Now this is really where there's a lot of smoke, not a lot of fire, a lot of smoke.

When and how the Houthi family became enamoured or in any way involved with Iran. Some things that I've read in the academic history suggest that during the political squabbles in the mid-90s, Badruldeen al-Houthi and Hussein al-Houthi were sort of exiled by Ali Abdullah Saleh.

And they spent that period in Iran where a zawiyah for the Houthis, a kind of religious school for Houthis opened in Qom in 1994. Does that tally with your intelligence, Aimen?

Aimen: Yeah. Well, you said there is so much smoke and no fire, but I do have the fire, the fire of intelligence. This is where things will get interesting. First of all, there is a picture in which someone high enough in a certain government showed it to me of Hussein Badruldeen al-Houthi wearing a military uniform joining the Badr Brigade in 1988 on the front line, on the Iran Iraq War.

Thomas: As early as 1988 as, as early as 1988. So, during the Iran Iraq War, I mean, dear listener, the Badr Brigades were involved on the side of Iran in the Iran Iraq War. These were Arab Shiites, some of them even Iraqis, who were fighting for Iran against Iraq. It was quite a kind of controversial brigade because it involved a lot of Arabs fighting Arabs, which a lot of other Arabs found to be horrific.

Aimen: Exactly. So actually, the links between Hussein Badruldeen al-Houthi and Iran goes back to the late 1980s. In fact, the first signs that Iran was happy to integrate the Houthis and their followers and supporters, the al-zawiyah al-Jarudiyah of Yemen into the overall program for Iran in the region was in 1992 when actually the al was established in the Hawza. Hawza means the seminary in the holy city of Qom in Iran, just near Tehran.

And there they established scholarship for about 70, and then the scholarship started to rise and rise and rise. And this is when from 1994 onward under the supervision of Hussein and his father, Badruldeen al-Houthi, they started a program for military training.

They realised that there is no point whatsoever in establishing a group like shabāb al-muʾmin movement, the Believing Youth and it doesn't have a military wing. And of course, who is an expert in establishing a military wing for political movement, Iran, and specifically the IRGC, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

So, they help them establish that slowly, gradually, just like they established Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hezbollah in Hijaz and Hezbollah in Kuwait and the Badr Brigade in Iraq, they started the formation.

And from 1994 onward, all the way until 2002, the movement grew steadily richer, bigger, and with far more confidence. And of course, it was arming itself to the teeth.

Thomas: A lot of analysts, a lot of journalists for sure, perhaps let's say more pro Houthi, they do doubt a lot of this narrative. I see no reason to doubt it at all. Aimen obviously, I trust you.

But also, it makes total sense, that the Houthis would realise that if they were to have political power in Yemen, they would need a paramilitary wing is just standard practice. Every political faction in the Middle East has a paramilitary wing by this point, including Islah, the Muslim Brotherhood Party that they considered to be their enemies, so that they should do this makes sense, that they should look towards Iran to help them do it, makes sense.

Iran had such great success with Hezbollah. They were having a new success with Hamas in Gaza. Of course, they would do this. It makes sense to me. Baraa, what do you think?

Baraa: There's a huge difference, though. So, with all of the other political parties, they would encourage their members to join the ranks of the military, and then slowly they become members of the either security apparatus or the military apparatus. And to a sense, they're kind of tied in the structure.

While with this, this was very specific training, a militant group outside the structure of the state. And the second thing, which is very important, which Hussein al-Houthi himself was a parliament member.

But then because he detest so much the ideals of the republic, he decided this actually no longer works for me. So, I'm going to start in this jour journey. And now I can tell you what I witnessed.

So, in high school, you would have active recruitment, people being recruited to go and join the summer camps. So, in 1998, a group of tribal figures, including members of Saleh’s own party, are warning him about the rise of this militant group.

Now, my witness statement is I have my own high school teacher who told me actually that he travelled to Iran. He met Khomeini, he met Khamenei, he travelled to Lebanon. He met Hassan Nasrallah.

But he was basically a collision course with Hussein al-Houthi. He didn't like how Hussein al-Houthi was turning what is supposed to be a summer teaching school into a militant group, until they finally parted away. Because Mohammed Badruddin, who's one of the main founders, sided with his brother.

And when the core ideal of the whole Zaidi School of Thought is that the descendants of Prophet Muhammad do have the upper say. So, eventually its sided with Mohammed al-Houthi and Hussein al-Houthi rather than Mohammed Azzan, because Mohammed Azzan is not a Hashemite.

Thomas: And that's your teacher?

Baraa: That's my teacher, exactly.

Thomas: Now this is straight from the horse's mouth, honestly, Baraa. So, you're saying your teacher, an ally of Mohammed and Hussein al-Houthis, who had helped them set up the Believing Youth Movement, told you that he himself had visited Iran, had met with the Ayatollah there, had visited Lebanon, had met with Hassan Nasrallah, the head of Hezbollah.

So, this is facts. You know this already by ‘98, and they're not hiding it from you at least.

Baraa: No, these are facts that were known even to the security apparatus in Yemen. And that's why later on Mohammed Azzan was immediately arrested by the Yemeni Intelligence, when the war started with the Houthis.

Thomas: It's really interesting.

Baraa: The other thing is also the Houthis were operating in a very isolated region of Yemen. So actually, this is not a place where you would have international spectators, but if you talk to the people of Sa’dah, the sheiks, the tribal leaders, the security officials, all of them were raising warnings, were raising basically red flags to Ali Abdullah Saleh.

There is a militant group being trained and being sponsored by Iran, by Hezbollah and under the supervision of Hussein al-Houthi, under this umbrella called The Believing Youth. And this is, we're talking now about early two 2000s.

Thomas: Well, yes. I mean, I, my understanding is that, so having absorbed all of this Khomeinist Ideas through Iran and having transformed The Believing Youth movement into something more militant in an Iranian model.

Hussein al-Houthi in 1999 went to Sudan to do an MA in Qur’anic studies there, where ironically, he socialised a lot with Muslim Brotherhood members because Sudan at that time was a hotbed of Sunni radicalism. And so, that kind of added to the general mix of his radicalization.

Baraa: Yeah. And he later on even was reported that he got his master's degree from Sudan, but then he destroyed it. He tore its apart because he said he doesn't need master's degree. He's now embarking in this new holy journey of creating this movement that's going to elaborate Yemen and put it in the course where it should belong with the axis of resistance.

Thomas: So, really that sort of combination of Khomeinism and Muslim Brotherhood meant that when he returned to Yemen in 2001, he was poised to launch his new and improved Zaidi militant group in a big way.

And I think we can kind of say that the Houthis, as we know them today, began in January 2002 when, let's say for the first time the mountains of Northern Yemen rang with that notorious and sort of very famous chant of the Houthis, what is it, Baraa?

Baraa: It is “Allāhu ʾakbar, al-mawt li-ʾAmrīkā, al-mawt li-ʾIsrāʾīl, al-laʿnah ʿalā 'l-Yahūd, an-naṣr lil-ʾIslām.” So, this translates into Allāhu ʾakbar, Allah is great. Death to America, death to Israel, damn on the Jews, and victory to Islam, very similar to the Iranian chant.

Hussein al-Houthi actually then capitalised on the Iraq invasion to even encourage his followers to join his militant group and trying to spread the message using the 9/11 events, using what happened in Afghanistan, what happened in Iraq to encourage more and more followers to join him.

Thomas: And at the same time, his oral teaching. So, he basically delivered lectures. He wasn't a great writer, but those lectures were written down, were transcribed and collected into a collection known as the Malazim, is that right?

Baraa: Yeah, exactly. So, Hussein al-Houthi was not scholarly qualified even in according to Zaidi standards.

Aimen: Yeah.

Baraa: What his followers did is that they collected his sermons and put them together in those Malazim. And I mean, if anyone I've read them, they're basically-

Aimen: Ramblings.

Baraa: Exactly, I mean, there are poor words put together. Nothing intellectual, nothing smart, nothing charismatic, nothing similar to what we know about the other religious scholars who actually used to do teachings and sermons.

Thomas: Okay. So, now we've done the Houthis. People now understand what the Houthis are, 2002, 2003, this new movement up in the North, chanting death to America, death to Israel, et cetera.

Let's switch back to thinking about Ali Abdullah Saleh. Now, the funny thing about Ali Abdullah Saleh at this point is he is not opposed to the movement to the Houthis. He still thinks that they are a useful counterbalance to the growing Salafism in the countries and in the north.

He thinks that if he can keep the Houthis fighting the Salafis in the north by the logic of divide and conquer, it will help him control the situation. Now, this finally began to shift after 9/11 when the U.S. begins to put pressure on Saleh to act against the Houthis.

The U.S. government was aware of this movement. They knew it was going on. They certainly felt confident that Hezbollah and Iran were involved, and they were telling Ali Abdullah Saleh that it was extremely dangerous to have an armed Shi’a, essentially militant group on the border of Saudi Arabia causing problems.

And Ali Abdullah Saleh had to do something about this. It was made easier for Saleh when after he began putting pressure on the Houthis, the Houthis themselves kind of began withholding, sending taxes to Sana’a, and they cut off the highway that connected Sana’a the capital with their stronghold of Sa’dah.

So, they were being quite aggressive against the state. And Ali Abdullah Saleh was not the sort of dude to take that kind of behaviour lightly. And so, he basically immediately responded in classic wild west fashion by putting a bounty on the head of Hussein al-Houthi. He said, right, this dude, he's no longer in my favour, let's kill him.

And in the next episode, we're going to go into this in a little bit more detail because it plays out in what happens in the Arab Spring. But he sends his old friend and close political ally, a military commander called Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar to the North, and he tells him, put an end to the Houthi problem.

And this inaugurates six wars, which Ali Abdullah Saleh, the president of Yemen, waged against the Houthis. That's six wars. It always happens, when war breaks out, like when war broke out in Yemen in 2014, 2015, everyone's like, oh, why is war breaking out in Yemen?

But actually, just like when Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, everyone's like, why is war breaking out in Ukraine? War in Ukraine had broken out in 2014 and had been raging. War in Yemen between the Houthis and the country had been going on since 2004.

Baraa: Yeah, exactly. So, the first war happened due to a very literally small incident when a security unit tried to remove a Houthi checkpoint in Sa’dah. And Ali Abdullah Sala was actually at that time coming from Hajj from Saudi Arabia along with a big convoy.

And he saw after the prayer chants the flags of Hezbollah, the flags of Iran. And then he started to realize actually the warnings that he had been receiving from the tribal leaders, from the security officials are real, and he needs to do something.

And that small incident of removing a checkpoint quickly erupted into an open conflict in 2004. And that was the first one.

Thomas: And during that first war, a fairly momentous event occurred for the Houthis, at least when Hussein al-Houthi, who until now has been the big hero of the movement is killed.

Baraa: Yeah, exactly. And his remains were taken to Sana’a, and Saleh actually refused to hand back his remains. It was only after the Arab Spring that the Houthi family were able to get him back and give him burial. And that left a stain amongst the Houthis followers that they have the remains of their founder is being held by Saleh.

Thomas: Each wave of aggression from Sana’s against the Houthis. Each war in the series of six wars increased the fervour of the Houthis, increased their battle hardness, increased their capabilities, increased their appeal to a growing number of people in the North, especially who identified, or who were sympathetic to this Zaidi narrative, which narrative was becoming more and more apparent.

So, the second war was actually kicked off when the father of Hussein al-Houthi, Badreddin gave an interview. You must remember this Baraa, he gave an interview after his son's martyrdom, after Hussein's death very specifically saying that the Imamate was a better period than the present.

It was more Islamic compared to the republic, especially because the republic had ties with America, which meant that Ali Abdullah Saleh was compromised. This kind of thing publicly stated by the grandfather of the Houthi movement, totally enraged Ali Abdullah Saleh. So, he launched another war against them.

Baraa: Exactly. And not only that, he then demanded another public statement by the Zaidi scholars, and which they were very happy to give condemning the Houthis and saying that actually, I remember the saying of one famous one of them who later on joined the Houthis, he's saying, “Crush them, give them hell, burn them until the last one of them. Don't treat them like citizens because they desecrated the citizenship contract with the states.”

Thomas: Now in the midst of this back and forth and following Hussein al-Houthi’s death, a new leader rose to take the reins of power over the Houthi movement. And this was Hussein al-Houthi’s younger brother, and like much younger brother, 20 years younger than him, born in 1979, so the same age as me.

So, we're talking 2004. I was 25-years-old. So, this guy, age 25, becomes the new leader of the movement Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, who is now defacto on the ground, the president of North Yemen, really, if you like. He is controlling North Yemen today. This is the guy Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, the leader of the Houthi movement since 2004.

Now Aimen, what strikes me about Abdul-Malik al-Houthi is the similarities in his persona with Hassan Nasrallah. If we said earlier that Ali Abdullah Saleh modelled himself on Saddam Hussein and the way he carries himself and the way he talks, there's no question in my mind that Abdul-Malik al-Houthi models himself on Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Hezbollah.

Do you see a resonance there between the two figures, Aimen?

Aimen: Indeed. I mean, he fancies himself to be the second coming of Hassan Nasrallah, and he emulate Hassan Nasrallah. But in reality, it's like comparing a small Fiat to a Bentley. There's a huge difference between the two.

Just because you come from the same ideology, from the same school of thought, from the same access of resistance. Yes, you try to imitate him, but you are a poor imitation. He is nowhere near Hasan Nasrallah in Hassan Nasrallah's appeal and clever play on words.

Thomas: But Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, it must be admitted, is at least something like a decent battle strategist, a decent political strategist. He has had a lot of success in Yemen, including in those initial years, when between 2004 and 2010, he led the movement as it fought war after war with the central government in Sana’a, and did not lose, was not crushed in the end.

What about you, Baraa? So, you're coming of age now during the Houthi Sana’a wars, you're a young man. What was your understanding of what was behind the Houthis?

Baraa: There were two things happening at the same time. There is this notion and feeling amongst many, I would say traditionally Hashemite families and Zaidi families, that we are now-

Thomas: Like yours.

Baraa: Like ours, we are the target. And that basically making people to being very sympathetic towards Houthi cause. And there's a growing dissent towards Ali Abdullah Saleh, and his regime being very authoritarian, crushing his opponents and so on.

But another important factor, the leadership of the Yemeni military started to have deep divisions. From one side, there is the newcomers into the military, the new big figures, which are Saleh, his sons and his nephews, and then the old establishment people like Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, and so on.

And actually, more than anything that contributed immensely into the rise of the Houthis, the leadership is divided. They're not actually encouraged to back each other in the battlefield. And to some extent, many, many military Yemeni experts saying, actually Saleh thought it would be a good thing to exhaust them because this was basically will pave the way for his son instead of facing a rivalry within the military.

Thomas: Let's just unpack that a little bit to make it clearer. So, what is often alleged, and I think it's accurate, is that Saleh, deep down was not interested in ending the Houthi movement, he wanted to take advantage of the Houthi militants to neutralize threats within his own military to his sons taking over the presidency of Yemen after him.

Especially this guy, and I mentioned him before, Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar and we will talk about him more in the next episode. Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, who had actually been a childhood friend of Ali Abdullah Saleh’s, was very, very prominent in the military, had been his ally all along.

But who began to indicate that he was turning against Saleh when Saleh was making it plain, that he hoped that his son would succeed him as president. Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar did not like that idea because maybe he wanted to be president because he had different ideas in general.

It's understood that he was a bit Muslim Brotherhood affiliated at times. So, maybe he had different ideas in general. The point being that Al Abdullah Saleh sent Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, his ally up to the north to fight the Houthis in order maybe to just get him killed, to neutralise his power so that he would fail and that he would've egg on his face.

And this is what really underlay Al Abdullah Saleh’s strategy there. And as we reach the end of this episode, we have to, in a way, leave it there. So, by 2009, 2010, Ali Abdullah Saleh reached the final war against the Houthis, a war, in fact, Aimen. In which the Saudis intervened with a bombing campaign because the Houthis had begun to attack them. Isn't that right?

Aimen: Indeed. I mean, the Houthis started to shell the mountains of Al Khobar and Jazan, and that angered the Saudis so much that they started intervening on the side of the Yemeni forces. But it was a short-lived conflict.

Baraa: And this last round of conflict with the Houthis is what basically broke the relationship between Ali Abdullah Saleh and Ali Mohsen. When the Saudis informed Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, that they received intelligence from Sana’a to bomb several Houthi locations in Sa’dah. And actually, one of the locations they received via Ali Abdullah Saleh was the location of Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar.

Thomas: That is a plot twist that would rival any Hollywood screenplay. Honestly, because Ali Mohsen had close relations with the Saudis, so that's probably why they told him. Because Saleh was like, “Guys, I think yeah, the Houthis are here and here. Oh, and could you also bomb this location here, don't look too closely at what's happening there.”

And they look and it's Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar. So, they call him, “Ali Mohsen, you know that your boss and old buddy, the President Saleh in the Yemen, in Sana’a, he's just told us to kill you.”

And so, the fractures within Ali Abdullah Saleh’s regime and his ability to dance on the heads of snakes, to keep the military factions, the tribal factions, the sectarian factions, the geographical factions, and the geopolitical factions all happy, was about to come dramatically unstuck.

[Music Playing]

And that's where we're going to leave it here. We'll be back with our dear friend Baraa, whose eyewitness testimony will only go up in the next episode, I promise.

And of course, as always, my friend, our friend, Aimen Dean, intelligence master extraordinaire, to move the story onwards when Yemen experiences the earthquake known as the Arab Spring, leading really directly to the terrible civil war, which still is rocking that sad country. So, stay with us. We'll be back next time.

A reminder that you can follow the show over on Facebook and Twitter at MH Conflicted. And for a deeper dive into all the subjects we talk about here on Conflicted, head over to Facebook and search Conflicted Podcast Discussion Group.

There you will find other fans of the show engaging in heated debates, enlightening conversations, and just generally geeking out over Conflicted related topics.

Conflicted is a Message Heard production. This episode was produced and edited by Harry Stott. Sandra Ferrari is our executive producer. Our theme music is by Matt Huxley and Tom Biddle.

Conflicted S4 E19: Yemen: In the Shadow of the Imam

Speakers: Thomas Small, Aimen Dean, & Baraa Shiban

Thomas: Welcome back dear listeners, you are tuned in to another episode of Conflicted. I'm Thomas Small, and as ever, I'm joined by my unrivalled co-host, Aimen Dean. Hi, Aimen.

Aimen: Hi, Thomas. Of course, I'm unrivalled because no one will dare to rival me.

Thomas: No one would dare to rival you, Aimen. No one could rival you, at least not in my heart.

Aimen: Good.

Thomas: Except possibly someone else as we'll find out in a bit. But Aimen, I am extremely excited not just about this episode, but the next five episodes of Conflicted.

Aimen: Indeed.

Thomas: All of which return to a subject that we haven't talked about in any detail since our first season, which is Yemen.

Aimen: Oh, Yemen. Happy Yemen.

Thomas: Happy Yemen. Happy Yemen, sad Yemen and everything in between. The story of Yemen is just about the most exciting and complicated story in the world, so let's not waste any time.

Dear listener, do you want to understand the Civil War, which has been tearing Yemen apart since 2014? And do you want to learn about the Houthis? A group who, along with Hamas, are part of Iran's axis of resistance, have recently been firing rockets towards Israel, and could soon join a wider regional conflict in Gaza.

Do you want to know these things? Well, you've come to the right place. We're going back in time to provide as much history as you need to understand what's going on there in the present.

It's a complex spider's web of a country with multiple personalities split geographically, tribally, religiously, politically, north, south, Shia, Sunni, communist, nationally. You name it.

[Music Playing]

Aimen: Calm down. Calm down.

Thomas: Let's jump right in. Now, Aimen, normally I rely on you to give me the on the ground reality of what's been going on in the Middle East, and you do a pretty good job of it.

Aimen: Yeah, of course. I do a pretty good job of it. That's the verdict that I've been handed by so many listeners.

Thomas: But for the next few weeks, we'll be doing something we've never done before on Conflicted, this week, two becomes three. We've got a guest and an old friend of both of ours in the studio with us.

A Yemeni journalist and political activist who was previously an advisor to the Yemeni Embassy in London and has done some amazing work bringing the crisis of the past decade to the world. He's also a dear listener to the show himself.

Baraa Shiban is here with us. Baraa, hello and welcome.

Baraa: Hello, Thomas. Hi, Aimen. I am very, very excited to be on the show today. And actually, I have been tuning in on Conflicted, I think since the beginning. I can't remember the number of times and planes I've taken while I have just the air plug in my ears and just listening again and again to Conflicted. So, I am pretty much excited.

Thomas: Well, we're very excited. Aimen, I mean, you and Baraa have known each other for a while, isn't that, right?

Aimen: Indeed. I still remember those romantic nights in Zanzibar, where we were in that hotel, you and I-

Thomas: Boys, boys, my goodness. Get a room, take it offline.

Aimen: It was such a funny way that we met. I mean, we were such a funny company. So, it was Baraa Shiban, that amazing political activist from Yemen, and we have the former Palestinian Ambassador to London.

And we have with us, the former head of counterterrorism to MI6, and then me, all of us surrounded by so many political figures from Somalia, from Uganda, from Kenya, from Ethiopia, from Tanzania. Goodness. And we were all in a conference trying to bring peace to Somalia. That was-

Thomas: Futile.

Aimen: Absolutely. Because five years ago, and still there is a war in Somalia, so we failed miserably, Baraa. But what we succeeded is that we became friends. I don’t know how, but we did.

Baraa: Well, I'd say that's a remarkable success. So, because actually we remained in touch, and we hope we are going to see peace in Somalia very soon.

Aimen: Inshallah.

Baraa: But at least our friendship will continue to have the peace, we'll see.

Thomas: Whereas I met Baraa eight years ago now when I was working on a film, a documentary film about the Yemen conflict. It had just spilled over into the international consciousness, and I found you an invaluable resource of information. You were a great interviewee, and you became a very good friend. So, we're very happy to have you on the show. Baraa, what is filling your time these days?

Baraa: Well, I'm pretty much still occupied with the ongoing situation in Yemen. I still provide consultancies for different entities. I still continue documenting human rights abuses that occur inside Yemen, and basically trying to continue the work that me and my colleagues from 2013 started, which was the National Dialogue Conference.

That was the convention that brought together all of the political Yemeni factions to negotiate the framework of the new constitution. And we're still trying to meet, trying to discuss, and flying to different parts of the world, trying to see what we can do for Yemen.

Thomas: Well, that's why you are here, to give us a firsthand account of what's still a very live conflict there in Yemen. One, which we've discussed before on Conflicted.

But before we go back to look at Yemen's history, Baraa, let's find out a bit more about your history. We know who you are. Aimen, and I know, but the dear listener doesn't, who are you really? Where do you come from?

Baraa: So, I'm born in Sana'a, the capital of Yemen. And shortly after I was born my parents came to the UK for their studies. My family comes from Hajjah. This is a province in the north of Yemen, up in the highlands.

And I come from a middle-class, I would say regular family, but in a way have been entangled within Yemen's different political Yemeni factions.

Thomas: Well, that's the thing about Yemen. Everything's entangled with everything else there. It's disentangling Yemen that we're going to try to do here. We're going to fail because it's impossible, but we're going to try.

But before we start that out, let's talk about Yemen in the Arab imagination or really even in the world's imagination. I mean, Yemen is for many people quite a romanticised kind of place, I think, especially in the Arab and Middle Eastern world.

I mean, Aimen, what does Yemen mean to you as a kind of Saudi educated, Muslim Arab man? When you think of Yemen, what comes to mind?

Aimen: Well, first of all, that Yemen is a place of beauty, of mystery, of wonderful, unique architecture. These beautiful tower-like houses that are rising above the mountains. Yemen reminds me of the jambiya, that dagger that people basically put on a belt around their waist.

It also tells me coffee. That is one thing that I love about Yemen, coffee. And also, Yemen tells me of the wonderful people that worked in Saudi Arabia side by side, and the fact that they were of different cultures.

You think all Yemenis are the same. No, there are the Yemenis from Taiz, the well-educated. There are the Yemenis from Hadhramaut, the wealthy class who became the bin Ladens, the bin Mahfouz, the Binzagr and all of these wealthy families in Saudi Arabia that we hear about. So, Yemen is a mystery, but at the same time, an open book.

Thomas: Well, just during my reading for these episodes, I was reminded of all the romantic associations that Yemen has. I mean, according to I think Muslim tradition, Noah, the prophet Noah went to Yemen and built the capital city of Sana’a for his son, Shem.

The Queen of Sheba, King Solomon's wife, Yemen. And in the more sort of Roman period Arabia Felix, the land of frankincense and myrrh, the spice trade through Yemen, the caravans coming up the coast from Yemen to the imperial zones of the North.

All of these images populate my imagination when I think of Yemen. Baraa, you're a Yemeni. How true is that romantic vision?

Baraa: Well, I think when you speak to my fellow Yemenis, we speak about the history as if it is today. So, people will talk about the stories of the Queen of Sheba. They will tell the stories of what happened in the mediaeval ages when all of those kingdoms and the fall of kingdoms, and they fought in central Yemen as of it was just yesterday.

So, it's pretty much the history is still present in the imagination. And I think it shapes how they relate to the present and how also they relate to the future. History is very much present with us as Yemenis.

Thomas: That's why Yemen is the perfect subject for Conflicted, Baraa. I'm just so excited. I mean, first of all, I think we need to make clear that Yemen is as old as time itself. But in terms of a modern state in terms of a unitary state, it's extremely young.

And this is one of the interesting contradictions of Yemen, one of the oldest places in the world, but very much still in a state building process, perhaps a process that will never end.

But until 1990, the land today known as Yemen, the country of Yemen has only really infrequently been politically united. Once in the 13th, 14th centuries, there was a Sunni dynasty that united the whole area.

Then in the 17th, 18th centuries, there was a Zadyi dynasty. We'll talk about what these means in a minute.

Before we continue, let's get the lay of the land. And though there are many ways to subdivide that land, I would like us to subdivide that land into five different zones. So, if you're looking at it sort of in your mind's eye, dear listener you have the coastal zone along the West Coast, known in Arabic as al-Tihamah.

It's very flat, it's very fertile, it's very hot. And then that coast sort of bends around the Bab-el-Mandeb strait along the south onto the Arabian Sea in the Indian Ocean. And that's where you have the amazing port city of Aden, the incredibly important city of Aden. And its hinterlands, which is a kind of its own zone historically.

And then further stretching out east, you have the Hadhramaut and the desert of Eastern Yemen, which eventually merges quite sort of indistinctly into the great empty quarter, the great Arabian Desert, the majority of which is in Saudi Arabia.

And that leaves the sort of mountainous strip down the middle, the south half of which you could call Central Yemen. It's where the capital is Sana’a. It's where the other great city Taiz is. It's where the vast majority of the population of Yemen live.

And finally, the fifth zone of Yemen, the northern half of that mountain region, the Highlands, the North, the land of the Zaydis. And so, this is where we have to talk about the Zaydis.

Aimen, how are we going to talk about the Zaydis in a way that's not too complicated? Because you start talking about branches of Shia Islam, and very quickly you're in the weeds. Who's the Imam here? Five Imams, six Imams, seven Imams, 12. It never ends. How Aimen, would you simplify Zaydi Islam for the listener?

Aimen: Okay, so the mainstream Zaydism is described by Shia Muslims as the lighter version of Sunni Islam, while the Sunnis describe the Zaydi branch of Shia light version. So, as you can see, both sides describe the other as a lighter version of what they're supposed to be. So, it's interesting.

Baraa: In a nutshell, it's basically they think that Imam Ali was the rightful successor for the prophet. But while they approve that both Abu Bakr and Umar are rightful leaders of Islam, so they don't have that sense of animosity towards the others.

Thomas: So, this Abu Bakr and Umar, these are the first two caliphs of Islam, of Sunni Islam, which Twelver Shia, the Iranian style Shi’ism, they really do not like. But the Zaydis are cool about them. They don't hate them.

Aimen: However, it's not as simple because Zaydism is divided into many, many different factions. Only three of them survive to this day.

Thomas: Zaydi Islam was introduced to Yemen a long time ago in the ninth century when this guy, Yahya ibn Husayn, the Imam al-Hadi was invited to Yemen. He was living in the Hijaz. He was invited to Yemen by some kind of warring tribes, hoping that he would bring some order to their society.

So, he was the first Zaydi leader in northern Yemen to govern the tribes in the Highlands from which you come, Baraa.

And then from this man, Yahya ibn Husayn descended the Zaydi Imamate of Yemen. This word Imamate is important as we move the story onwards to the Houthi movement and what's going on in Yemen today.

It has been described thus by a scholar, an Imam in the Yemeni context, a central religious authority who oversees local dynamics of tribal federations and alliances. Because the thing about the Imams in Yemen, the Zaydi Imams, is that they, they never had, or only infrequently had really direct political power.

It was a religious office with political overtones. And another thing that made it very interesting is it did not follow a strict dynastic principle. So, the Imamate did not pass from father to son at all.

The Zaydi Imam of Northern Yemen was chosen by a council of Hashemites and religious scholars based on a long, quite detailed list of qualities of attributes that he must have, and potential Imams were subjected to close public scrutiny.

So, unlike say in Twelver Shi’ism, there is no infallible Imamate in Zaydi Islam. But maybe for that very reason, it was not great at cementing a central state power. It was like a man who was trying to coordinate between tribal alliances and allegiances and things like that.

So, Baraa what do you think? Have I done a good job there at describing the Zaydi Imamate?

Baraa: Yes, it is, except with one important caveat. So, the Imam is not subject to public scrutiny. He is monitored by a council of scholars who are also Hashemites. So actually, the normal public, the I would say normal citizens do not have the right to question the Imam because he himself is a descendant of Prophet Muhammad.

Aimen: Well, Baraa, you forgot to tell the dear listeners some teeny tiny minute detail here. And that is that you yourself is a descendant of some of those Hashemites who not only chose the Imams, but they were imams themselves.

Thomas: This is crazy. Once again, I'm the only man out. So, Aimen, he's famously a descendant of the Afghan royal family or whatever. And we might as well take the cat out of the bag. You're related to the Prophet of Islam himself.

Baraa: Yeah, yeah, that's right. So, I am a descendant of al-Imam Al-Mutahhar bin Sharaf ad-Din. He is this famous warlord that fought the Ottomans when they tried to occupy north Yemen.

And the story goes, he was the leader of the army, but he got injured in one of the battles. So, one of the rules to become an Imam, you should be perfect from any physical imperfections. I mean, I'm afraid, not too friendly towards disabled people, but there you go.

And his father told him, well, now you can't be an Imam because you have an injury. So, he said, well, screw you guys, I'm leading the army. He imprisoned his father and his younger brother.

And then he became this basically powerful warlord new Imam who ruled in north Yemen. And he's known to be very, very brutal. One of the famous stories is that he marched his army towards the province of Al-Bayḍā, and that's in Central Yemen to squash a revolt.

And what he did is he killed 1000 tribesmen. And then ordered the remaining 1000 to carry the heads of their fellow fighters and walk all the way, march all the way into Sana’a, the capital. And then once they arrived, he beheaded them. He's remembered to be a person of character.

Thomas: A charming man, Baraa, you must be very proud to be descended from such a man.

Baraa: But the thing is that he's mentioned in Zaydi books, basically glorified as this great warlord who was spreading the message of Zaydism into all parts of Yemen.

Thomas: Well, he may have tried, but he didn't succeed in spreading Zaydism to all parts of Yemen. And that's one of the most important things to understand about Yemen. I mean, there's a kind of narrative out there that like for a thousand years, Zaydi Imams ruled Yemen.

And it's not true. It's an exaggeration of the truth. The Zaydi Imams, your ancestors Baraa, their centre of power was in the north. It was itself often not directly wielded by the Imams themselves, but it was through tribal alliances and things. It only infrequently spread beyond the North. And so, it's not really true that Zaydi Imams ruled Yemen for a thousand years.

So, now moving on, we can just quickly zoom over a few centuries. The Ottomans arrive in Yemen, they fight, they were up the mountains. The Imam pushes them back at one point, they come back.

So, Ottoman power waxes and wanes in Yemen over several hundred years during which time, local Sunni Sultans in the South and El and elsewhere also have power.

And though, as I said, the Imams never maintained political control over the whole of Yemen and even only sometimes over the North. Nonetheless, and this is what we have to really be serious about here, the Imamate period of Yemen plays a very, very important role in the Yemeni imagination up to the present day, for good or for ill.

I mean, some Yemenis romanticise the period of the Imams and others villainize the period of the Imams, but it's still very present to Yemenis. Isn't that right, Baraa?

Baraa: Yeah, exactly. So, people in Yemen, and especially in North Yemen, are quite split about how they feel towards the Imams and the different and the different Imams who ruled Yemen.

They were nevertheless very, very brutal, I would say. And they were able to consolidate power in a handful number of families who also shared the claim that they are descendants of Prophet Muhammad.

But then beyond that it basically, amongst Yemenis, they have different feelings towards was it a good period or rather a bleak period of Yemen.

Aimen: Baraa, don't you find it a bit fascinating that we are talking about the Imamate and the feeling of the Yemenis about the Imamate, which has ceased to exist more than half a century ago.

And it is expected that Abdul-Malik Houthi, the leader of the Houthis movement, is about to declare an Imamate himself.

Baraa: Yeah. That is quite fascinating. Yeah.

Aimen: And dear listeners, you know, by the time this comes out, you may have already heard the news that Yemen has been transformed into an Imamate by the leader of the insurgent group called Houthis.

Thomas: Indeed Aimen, and right now, it's certainly worth watching to see if the Houthis will be emboldened to proclaim their Imamate by the crisis in Israel, which is engulfing the region.

But back to the history, the Ottomans come and then the Ottomans go. And in the meantime, in the south, the British Empire had set up shop in Aden, establishing an imperial protectorate stretching across South Yemen all the way across the Hadhramaut.

But in the north of Yemen, after the Ottoman Empire withdraws, they're replaced by what's called the Mutawakkilite Imamate or Kingdom of Yemen. It's established by the Imam Yahya in 1918 after the Ottomans leave.

Now, it was during this period that modern Yemen begins to come into focus. He was an extremely conservative Imam king of Yemen. He really wanted not only to maintain, but to strengthen the aristocratic very socially stratified nature of Northern Yemeni society with the Imam at the top, and then these aristocratic Hashemite families below him, kind of governing everything.

With, at the very bottom people often treated like serfs, like peasants, indeed like slaves. I mean, is that speaking too harshly Baraa, or is that more or less what Northern Yemen was like during the kingdom phase in the early 20th century?

Baraa: Well, I think you did explain it quite well, but to go into a little bit of a quick summary, following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the Mutawakkilite Kingdom, and the family becomes the undisputed rulers of North Yemen.

And the British were still occupying the south of Yemen, but in the north, they create this social hierarchy system, which basically makes the Imam on the top of the hierarchy along with him or beneath him, is the Hashemite families. Those are also families who claim they are the descendants of Prophet Muhammad.

Thomas: Like your family.

Baraa: Like my family. And beneath those are a group of a class called the Judges, and those are people who have served in the judiciary or have served in disputes and so on.

And then beneath that are the tribes, and those are the majority of Yemenis. Beneath those are basically working-class, people who work in manufacturing butchers, hairdressers. And those are kind of looked down upon. Intermarriages are not usually allowed from this from this class.

And then at the bottom are a community called the marginalised. Those are basically Yemenis who are of much darker skin, and they trace their origins back to Africa. Those are kind of the bottom of the hierarchy.

Along with them, I would say there are other minorities like the Jews and the Baha'is who don't have any rights at all.

Aimen: That sounds like India.

Thomas: I was just going to say Aimen, it has sort of overtones of the Indian caste system.

Aimen: Yeah. Goodness.

Baraa: It is, it is very similar. And it's very important because this socio economic caste system is in a slightly softer version, is slowly being introduced by the Houthis today.

Thomas: That is so interesting.

Baraa: They've been introducing through the last nine years; they've been introducing measures and laws to emphasise this social hierarchy. They're trying to bring it together, but slowly.

Thomas: Well back to the Imam Yahya and the Mutawakkilite Kingdom of Yemen, what's fascinating to me about this is that Imam Yahya, in order to build a modern, a quasi-modern, though he was no moderniser, but a more modern kind of kingdom, he played a huge role in the erection of this story of an unbroken Imamate for 900 years that has governed Yemen by divine right.

And I love this little story, Aimen, which I'm sure you know. So, during his reign, his long reign in the first half of the 20th century, Imam Yahya clashed with the Saudis because there was a fighting over where the border of the expanding Saudi kingdom would be.

And in the end, the Saudis gobbled up a decent chunk of what was until then, always just part of Northern Yemen. And in 1933, King Abdulaziz and Imam Yahya met to discuss this dispute.

And Imam Yahya is recorded as saying to King Abdulaziz, this is some serious cheek, “Who is this Bedouin coming to challenge my family's 900-year rule?”

What a thing to say to King Abdulaziz, honestly. Of course, King Abdulaziz showed him precisely who that Bedouin was before long and having lost a chunk of his kingdom to that Bedouin, the Imam Yahya had no choice but to accept the fact that he needed something like a modern military.

And as a result of this, he sent the famous 40, as they're known, the famous 40. 40 Yemeni military officers were sent abroad to receive modern military training. And ironically, this decision by the arch conservative Imam to modernise his military sowed the seeds of his kingdom's downfall.

Baraa: Well, revolutionary ideas actually started in Yemen in the 1940s. In 1948, a group of officers gathered and assassinated Imam Yahya, and then they introduced a constitutional monarchy that only lasted for literally 26 days before his son was able to mobilise tribes and attack the capital, Sana’a.

And he basically promised the tribes that he would allow them to loot Sana’a if they replace the constitutional monarch with him. And they did, they looted Sana’a. And it's still very much in the imagination of the people in Sana’a today.

People remember very well the looting of Sana’a by the Imam and his followers. And Imam Ahmad, his son, became the ruler of Yemen until 1962, when there was another assassination attempt on his life.

Thomas: Yes, 1962 Baraa, of course, is a very important year in modern Yemeni history, specifically the 26th of September 1962, still remembered by Yemenis today as a most momentous day. What happened?

Baraa: Well, this is for the overwhelming majority of Yemenis is the most important day in their recent history. And the reason is because almost a month before the 26th of September, there was an assassination attempt by those officers, again, by a group of those officers on Imam Ahmad.

He survived the assassination attempt, but he suffered through his injuries until he died on the 19th of September 1962. Now, his son came into power, Imam Al-Badr, and then he ruled for just one week.

His method was basically, I'm going to spread fear. These people need to be afraid of me. And that basically was the trigger point that led the officers to topple him on the 26th of September 1962.

Thomas: So, these officers, these are Yemeni officers who, as you say, Baraa, they attacked the royal palace, overthrowing the Imam on the 26th of September 1962. These officers explicitly modelled themselves on the free officers of Egypt, who precisely 10 years before had overthrown Fat Farouk.

And at this point, this was an invitation for a momentous intervention into Yemen by none other than Aimen's best friend and long-term friend of the show. Who am I talking about, Aimen?

Aimen: Oh, yes indeed. President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt. Thomas, you have to understand that Nasser was already drunk on the euphoria of monarchies falling one after another. He and his comrades, the three offices of Egypt overthrew King Farouk, also known as Fat Farouk, you remember in the operation Fat Fucker, organized by the CIA.

Then of course a few years later, the Iraqi officers overthrew King Faisal II of Iraq, the Hashemite, and someone who I adore so much, and you can hear that in the episode about Iraq from season three.

And then he started to feel that, hey, the monarchies are like dominoes and one falling after another. It's 1962 already, he saw how the fall of the monarchies is benefiting his socialist flavoured Arab nationalism.

And if this could be achieved in Yemen, then the next in the domino will be Roman, will be Saudi Arabia, it will be all the other Western influenced kingdoms. And therefore, he thought that this is his moment to shine and to be the saviour of socialist flavoured Arab nationalism.

Thomas: That's true, Aimen. But you've missed out on one important thing in Nasser's mind. I mean, long-term listeners of Conflicted will know that Nasser's great enemy on the global stage was the British Empire.

And though we've not really mentioned it yet, throughout all of this history, and indeed from 1839 onwards, the British Empire was firmly established in Yemen, in Southern Yemen, based in Aden, the important port city of Aden.

And so, after officers modelling themselves on his free officers movement, overthrow the Imam, when they invited Nasser to come in and help them consolidate their revolution and set up a Nasserist Arab nationalist centralised socialist state in Northern Yemen, he was very happy to oblige.

Aimen: But this has caused significant pain for everyone, for the Egyptians themselves, for the Saudis. But most importantly, it was a devastating seven years of conflict and war in Yemen.

Baraa: Well, actually, for many, many Yemenis, Gamal Abdel Nasser is revered in their eyes. Nasser is remembered across many history books and researchers and journalists, not very fondly, I would say, like Aimen.

But in the eyes of many Yemenis, actually, they do feel that they owe him the gratitude of actually helping them to get rid of the Imam, because without his help, it would've been impossible to defeat the Imam. And Nasser was very committed. He sent troops thousands and thousands of troops into Yemen.

Thomas: 70,000 troops, 70,000 Egyptian troops were sent to Yemen.

Baraa: Yeah, can you imagine that 70,000 to just back up this newborn republic. But more importantly than just those 70,000, the new idea of a modern state, a modern republic started to take shape in north Yemen.

So, the Egyptians also sent thousands of teachers, thousands of doctors. The new Republic started to invest in schools, hospitals, and started to basically send students to study abroad.

So, Yemen, in its more modern forms, started to come together in an area that actually was pretty much very much isolated under the Imamate. And I think the most important thing is that those officers introduced something called the Articles of the Revolution, or the Goals of the Revolution.

But the most important part was the first article, which is they promised the idea of Yemen becoming united, so to get rid of tyranny and colonialism. So, they started to promise that they're going to start a revolt against the British in the South, but also to eradicate all privileges and differences that exist between all social classes.

And that resonated with the wider public. So, what started as a military to takeover became more of a popular uprising, because the wider public felt that this young republic is promising them something that they've been deprived from for decades actually.

Thomas: The revolution of 1962, which then led to at times a very brutal civil war in the North, has a lot of resonances with the present day, which I find fascinating. The last Imam, Imam Al-Badr, he didn't actually die, he escaped north and eventually made his way to Saudi Arabia, who housed him and supported him financially and militarily, along with his tribal confederates from Northern Yemen to resist the Nasserite Republican takeover of the north.

So, very strange echoes with the present, where the Houthis conquered Sana’a and the president of Yemen fled to Saudi Arabia, where they are intervening in order to overthrow the consequences of a coup.

It's a reminder that what's happening in Yemen now has happened before. Yemeni history is full of this repeating kind of dynamics, which we'll bring out.

Anyway, in the end, the revolution succeeded, and the Saudis failed in their attempts to reinstate the Imam, not only did they fail, they changed tack and eventually supported the revolution once it was clear that the Imam was going to fail. But that wasn't the end of Nasser in Yemen. Was it, Baraa?

Baraa: Well, Nasser as if his hands were not full already in North Yemen, he started to encourage the South to revolt against the British and started supporting them as well.

And in his mind, he's going to be this great unifying figure for both North and South Yemen. So, he was pretty much occupied, but Yemeni started to feel a little bit unsatisfied by the way he's handling the situation.

They started intervening more and more in the internal affairs of Yemen. Nasser was basically in the eyes of many even revolutionists, this narcissist, egocentric guy. And actually, in 1966, the Yemeni cabinet travelled to Egypt to meet him, and instead of meeting them, he threw them all in prison.

Aimen: You say 1966, they must have met Sayyid Qutb before he was executed.

Baraa: Well, maybe we need to ask any surviving members of the cabinet. But eventually after the defeat of Nasser in 1967 by Israel, he decided that actually he needs to get them out. And this is because of the initiative led by Saudi Arabia, whom they met with Nasser in Sudan, and the president of Sudan at the time, Muhammad Mahgoub, told Nasser, our information tells us that actually the Yemini cabinet are in your prison.

And he felt that it's time to get them out and start negotiating this new deal in which Saudi Arabia favoured. They favoured this idea of we can reconcile between the different Yemeni factions, but we can keep the Imam.

They gave them basically residency and then citizenship, the Saudi citizenship inside Saudi Arabia. But they reconciled between the two main warring parties in Yemen and formed the New Republic.

Thomas: There's another really tragic story from the Nasserite intervention in Yemen, which I didn't know about. I mean, the Egyptian army in Yemen behaved abominably, they used tear gas against their enemies in the north, and then poison gas, the Egyptian Air Force dropped poison gas bombs on the north in order to root out partisans, Imam partisans from caves in the mountains.

There are some echoes there of the recent bombing campaign in the north of Yemen now as well. So again, history repeats itself in Yemen.

Aimen: Yeah.

Thomas: And anyway, in the end, Nasser withdrew, but the revolution in the north succeeded and a new Yemen, there was being created by a modernising centralising socialist come Arab nationalist regime.

And we're going to take a break now after this very long first half of an episode on Yemen, and when we come back, we're going to throw our attention to the south of Yemen, where the British were facing problems of their own. Stay tuned.

[Music Playing]

We are back, dear listener. We're here with our friend Barra Shiban, a Yemeni helping us work our way through the convoluted and complex history of Yemen. When we left Nasser's attempt to establish an Egyptian satellite in the north of Yemen failed, but the Yemeni Revolution in the north succeeded, and Yemen was put on its path towards modernization, at least in the north.

How about the South? As we mentioned, since 1839, the British had ruled the south of Yemen. It was called the Aden Protectorate. It was a very loose, typically British colonial affair where the British had a light touch in the region, working very closely with a patchwork of tribal leaders across the deserts of Hadhramaut and the hinterlands of Aden.

But like everything British of the 1960s, it began to fall apart. Nasser as soon as he in intervened in the north, started to support anti-colonial factions in the South. And on the 14th of October of 1963, the Aden emergency began. This is when Southern Yemenis mark their national independence. Isn't that right, Baraa?

Baraa: Yeah, exactly. And not only just the Southern Yemenis, actually, they were accompanied by many of those Northern officers who studied and were inspired by revolutionary ideas in Egypt, came to their aid and to support them in their ongoing battle against the British.

Because in the minds and hearts of Yemenis, this is when the idea started to come. This is the moment we're going to unify the country, both North and South Yemen is going to be one.

Thomas: I'm glad you bring that up, Baraa, because that is really where this story is headed towards this sort of sudden, enthusiastic ambition to make Yemen one. As we said in the first half, for many centuries, Yemen had been really not one.

And yet for some reason, somehow in the hearts of the people known as Yemenis, they felt we must be politically one. And having thrown off the Imam in the north, the question was, can we throw off the British in the South and unite?

The war against the British raged for four years and is a very complex affair because South Yemen was after 130 years of British domination, a very different kettle of fish from the North. It had not had an Imam; it was not hierarchically and aristocratically stratified like in the North. There was no caste system there. The British had modernised their part of Yemen to some degree. Isn't that right, Baraa?

Baraa: So, Aden was very much developed. Many of, even the people who were escaping the north of Yemen fearing from the Imam, found refuge in Aden, and people had the access to information, newspapers were being printed. So, Aden looked like a very, very modern city.

The rest of the south, however, was pretty much marginalised, but the British did invest a lot of their effort and money and time on Aden itself. And that's why it looked very different. And the signs of the British are seen until today, you could see the tunnels that they built to the port, many of the inner city of Ma’ala, this modern city that was built in the heart of Aden.

So, this is pretty much the imagination. This cosmopolitan city goes back all the way to the days of the British rule in Aden.

Thomas: British rule in Aden ended in 1967, when facing for three years, this sort of anti-colonial uprising, they decided to cut and run, and they left a power vacuum behind them because the forces that had been fighting them were not in any way themselves united.

And like so many tales around that time of anti-colonial revolution, the revolutionaries immediately turned on each other. And they were divided. Some of them were Nasserists, straightforward Nasserists, but others were hard line Marxist communists.

And three years after the British left, the Marxist won. And throughout the 70s, there was this very strange fact that in the south of the Arabian Peninsula was a fully-fledged Soviet-backed Marxist Leninist state.

Baraa today in Yemen, and you as a Yemeni, what does it mean that for that period there were like actual communists ruling half of Yemen?

Baraa: Well, it was a strange era for Yemen. So, you have communist ideas spreading now, not just in the south, but they're slowly spreading the communist ideas to the north of Yemen. The socialist party became the undisputed ruling party in South Yemen.

But also, that period from the 1970 onwards was a very brutal and dark period for South Yemen. It witnessed presidents being assassinated; people being executed over their opinions. A lot of southerners fleeing the south of Yemen to the north or to other Arab countries.

So, it's a very strange and weird times that happened from the 1970s onwards.

Aimen: Indeed. I mean, I would say that it is ironic that the Southern Yemen established a properly Marxist communist state, and yet those who fled Southern Yemen went into Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

And there they established some of the most successful capitalist enterprises ever, businesses, banks, construction companies. They established food companies. They established businesses that span now generations. It was a testament that communism was so unnatural to Southern Yemen because the people there were capitalists.

Baraa: Well, you say that Aimen, because the new states, the new communist state in South Yemen nationalised all businesses. So, people were not allowed even to have properties. They confiscated lands. Businessmen had to flee if they want to survive with their capital. And that's why they ended up in all of those neighbouring country.

Thomas: It was a properly communist country. I mean, I think the listener just needs to understand that. I mean, maybe there were positive sides to this. For example, like tribalism in South Yemen had been thoroughly discredited because the tribal shakes had worked alongside the British to rule the British protectorate.

And once communism came and took over South Yemen tribalism and tribal symbols were abolished to the extent that that's possible. But there was a very concerted effort to get rid of tribalism in South Yemen. Which of course would continue its move away from North Yemen where tribalism remained extremely powerful.

But also, communist South Yemen was a magnet really for anti-colonial revolutionary and even terrorist movements from everywhere. So, South Yemen became one of these places in the globe where if you were an Irish Republican army dude, or some kind of Algerian, I don't know, some Algerian rebel, you end up in South Yemen for training and for refuge.

South Yemen was weird supported by not just the Soviet Union, but also China right there in what was still a very poor part of the world.

Aimen: Exactly. They caused even trouble for Oman. There was the revolution in Dhofar, which is the most western part of Oman, the mountains of Salalah and Dhofar. These mountains witnessed fierce fighting between those who opposed the sultan of Oman and his forces. And they were supported by the communist government in Aden.

Thomas: And the communist government in South Yemen also supported communist insurrectionists in North Yemen.

Aimen: Indeed.

Thomas: And that's where any attempts that any Yemenis might have made for unification in the 1970s were not successful. In 1972, especially facing communist insurrectionists in the north, supported by the south, the northern government had to fight back.

And there was a brief war between north and south in that year, followed which there was this sort of actual formal, official attempt to unite. And something called the Cairo Declaration was signed to bring the two countries together or to begin a process whereby that could happen.

But it failed. The two sides were just two different ideologically and now socially as well. Very sort of different people living in the same historic land.

Baraa: It was a strange period. I mean, they both sides are aspiring towards unity and unification is kind of occupying the minds of people all the time, yet they're fighting at the same time.

And really brutal fighting occurred and by one, one side is the socialist party, and they feel pretty much now confident that they can take on the north. They cause a lot of instability, a lot of fighting. And as a result, there were many presidents being toppled and even assassinated, both in the north and the south.

Thomas: By the end of the 1970s, the north was in quite a bad way, both politically and economically. And in the midst of this scenario in the north, a man arrived on the scene who at the time no one would have thought stood a chance in hell to become for 33 years the great strong man of Yemen.

And of course, I'm talking about Ali Abdullah Saleh. Baraa, when you hear the name Ali Abdullah Saleh, the president of Yemen from 1978 onwards, the man whom the Arab spring protestors in 2011. And you were among them, Baraa wanted out of office. When you hear this name, Ali Abdullah Saleh, notorious strong man of Yemen, what do you think?

Baraa: Well, what I think about him is this notorious very clever individual. He's a tribal man, but also at the same time, he understands the complicated and structure and mixture of Yemen.

He's able to build alliances, but also destroy alliances. At the same time, he jumps through hoops quite cleverly at different times of his presidency. He's also known in the 70s as the smuggler. He used to smuggle alcohol into North Yemen from the port of Mokha, because he himself was a military officer.

Thomas: Yeah. And no doubt a heavy drinker for that reason.

Aimen: Indeed.

Thomas: Ali Abdullah Saleh was born in 1942 in Beit al-Ahmar, which is what? About 20 miles southeast of Sana’a. Is that right?

Baraa: Yeah, yeah.

Thomas: It was very tribal territory. The tribe, the local subtribe, the Sanhan tribe, which was part and dear listener, sadly, you just have to get to grips with the tribes. This is Yemen.

So, the Sanhan Tribe was part of the Hashid Tribal Federation, or is part of it, an extremely important power block in Northern Yemeni politics. The Hashid Tribal Federation.

And Ali Abdullah Saleh was totally integrated from a young age into this tribal world of Northern Yemen. And actually, I have a question for you. Amen. Are there overtones here of Saddam Hussein's background? Because he was also very tribally integrated, wasn't he?

Aimen: No question, no question. That Saddam Hussein was tribally integrated, but not to the same extent as Ali Abdullah Saleh. Yemen definitely is far more tribal than Iraq, even though Saddam was born in the most tribal part of Iraq, which is Anbar, which has a lot of tribes like al-Jubur and Shammar and …

However, Yemen, you mentioned the Tribal Federation of Hashid. There are the equivalent of Hashid. There is Bakil, which is the other big tribal federation. So, peace in Yemen depended on the leadership of Hashid and Bakil, these two super tribal federations getting on well together.

Baraa: But not only that, Hashid was kind of the more centralise, more organised, I would say, tribal structure. So, Ali Abdullah Saleh was able to understand the politics of tribes very, very well.

So, Hashid is actually much smaller than Bakil, but they're more unified and they're more organised. And that's made the leader of Hashid, which was a very famous sheikh, Sheikh Abdullah bin Hussein al-Ahmar who joined the officers as he made his tribe join also the officers in the 1962 revolution, but made him a very important power broker, if you would say.

And that relationship, he maintained these strong ties with Ali Abdullah Saleh, trying to maintain the peace within the tribes, but also extending that piece with the Bakil confederation, which is another, as you said, important confederation.

Thomas: So, Ali Abdullah Saleh himself was not from a particularly prominent family. His father was a blacksmith. And when he was a teenager, he joined the army, the Imams army. This was before the revolution.

And he participated on the side of the revolutionaries in the revolution. He fought valiantly. He was known as a hero of the revolution. I mean, he claimed he was at least. And his rise through the ranks in the army was pretty quick to the extent that by 1976, he'd become a full colonel in the army overseeing a mechanised brigade.

So, Ali Abdullah Saleh is a military man through and through. The following year in 1977, he's given his first political appointment where he becomes the head of security for Taiz, a city in central Yemen, south of Sana’a.

And in 1978, only one year later, he's appointed president of North Yemen. He's only 35-years-old. His predecessor was assassinated. In fact, two of his predecessors had been assassinated. No one expected him to last. Why was he chosen Baraa, to be president and why did he survive?

Baraa: It was very interesting unique circumstances that put him as the runner for presidency. The presidential council, or you could say the leadership of the military we're meeting, and they decided they need someone to come on temporary basis because we need a president.

And people thought, let's put this guy for a week. There's another suggestion, let's put him for a month. And then they have elections in the council or make what was called back then Majlis Al-Chaab, which is the parliament to decide.

But Ali Abdullah Saleh was a very much well embedded within the military. So, he knows what he was doing. There are rumours that actually he himself participated in the assassination of President Ibrahim al-Hamdi, who ruled Yemen from 1974 until 1978.

And became effectively the deputy of Ahmad al-Ghashmi, who only ruled for nine months before he was assassinated by a bomb that was sent in a diplomatic package from the south by the Socialist Party.

Aimen: Oh God.

Thomas: Oh man. Dear listener, I mean, Yemen, isn't it great? It's great. I love it.

Baraa: Basically, Ali Abdullah Saleh can be brutal. And actually, after he came to power, there was a coup attempt against him by the supporters of Nasser. And then he executed them.

And then again, there was another insurgency attempt against him in the early 80s supported by the Socialist Party. And he did crush them. So, he would, I would say, tend to brutal tactics if he needs to.

Thomas: Well, it was this man, Ali Abdullah Saleh, who in the late 70s, early 80s, was the one who was sort of looked to as the leader of Yemen to possibly broker this long hoped for union between north and south.

But in 1979, for example, unity between north and south seemed as far away as ever that year. There was another war between the two of them, and it looked really bad for the north. At that point, the south was still a Soviet client state. There was a lot of Soviet military advice in the South.

And it was only because the U.S. spooked by the recent Iranian Revolution spooked that it was going to lose another, another Middle Eastern state to the Soviets intervened on Ali Abdullah Saleh’s side sending tanks and anti-tank missiles to the north, that that war ended without the south winning.

So, it was a really tricky time for Yemen. And then almost like, luckily, I don’t know if that's the right word to say. Luckily for Yemen in the 1980s, politics in the south really began to fray at the seams. It was a real communist shit-show there with different kind of partisans of various forms of Marxism fighting each other, leading in the end to a terrible civil war.

Baraa: So, it was 1986, and the Socialist Central committee was basically very much divided. Now they say they were divided among, basically between different Marxist ideologies, but actually in the heart of it, it was very tribal.

Thomas: Tribes, tribes, tribes. It's always tribes.

Baraa: Exactly. And I think it proves what Aimen said in a previous episode, the Arab creature is a tribal creature in his heart.

Aimen: Exactly.

Thomas: You guys can say it. You're Arabs. I'm not allowed to say it.

Baraa: So basically, the central committee of the Socialist Party were split between the supporters of the sitting president, Ali Nasir Muhammad. And his opponent mainly was Abdul Fattah Ismail, who was this big ideologue who was living and studying in Moscow.

And basically, they referred to him as the father of Marxism in Yemen, and he came back to Aden. And that split the socialist party between those two camps. Now, Ali Nasir Muhammad thought actually that Abdul Fattah is going to topple him in a soft coup.

Thomas: So, this is the president Ali Nasir, the sitting president is afraid that his rival is going to overthrow him.

Baraa: Exactly, exactly. Because his rival was the former president and still had a lot of supporters in the military and in the government. So, they elected the, the central Committee of the Socialist Party of 15 members. Now, surprise Abdul Fattah was able to put eight of his supporters, and seven were left to Ali Nasir Muhammad.

Thomas: Somehow the president of South Yemen has fewer members on the politburo, on the committee that runs the country than his rival. This isn't good. And things came to a head on January 13th, 1986.

Baraa: Exactly. Now both sides accuse each other of plotting to assassinate the other. So, Ali Nasir Muhammad. So, he said he was attending this meeting and he thought that actually Abdul Fattah is going to assassinate him just before he entered into the hall.

Abdul Fattah and his supporters say, actually, no, we were just meeting to discuss extending powers of the president and they need to limit his powers. So, Ali Nasir Muhammad did send his bodyguard and his secretary into the meeting, and it looked like the president is arriving.

So, they even put his mug, he had his famous mug that he drinks his tea and brought his papers and bag and everything. So, it looked like the President is about to arrive while everyone was attending. But the interesting thing is that the seven members who are the supporters of Ali Nasir Muhammad, the setting presidents were not there.

So, they were under the illusion that they were about to arrive. The president's bodyguard opens the bag, and he brings out a machine gun and start shooting everyone in the meeting.

And almost everyone were basically killed in the spots except for Ali Salem al Beidh, this other figure who basically pretended that he's dead. And also, Abdul Fattah Ismail, whom there is a lot of rumours on how he died, people say that he escaped, but then was shot on his way out.

But they were all killed except for Ali Salem al Beidh, who basically came out of the meeting. And Ali Nasir Muhammad had a televised speech, but he didn't know that Ali Salem al Beidh had survived. And the Ali Salem al Beidh came out basically seeking revenge, and they enter a brutal fighting inside Aden, leading to the death of more than 10,000 people.

Thomas: Well, more I've read 25,000 people died.

Baraa: It could be because there is no actual exact number, but it could be even more than 20,000, as you said, in just a short period of less than 10 days.

Thomas: So, the sitting president's bodyguard enters the politburo building, pulls out a machine gun, opens fire on the president's opponents.

From what I read, their bodyguards, who are also present. They pull out their guns, and there's a massive live firefight in the room where everyone's killed, except the one guy who manages to escape. Unbeknownst to the president who has manufactured this whole bloodbath and following this South Yemen politics falls apart.

The Communist Party was absolutely unable to keep the show on the road after that. It broke the system, and it was really unsustainable for the South Yemeni communist system to continue it. Especially when, in the midst of all this fighting the president of South Yemen, Ali Nasir Muhammad flees, and he flees to the north.

Baraa: Yeah, exactly. He flees to the north of Yemen and leaving his supporters behind whom many of them were executed. And Ali Salem al Beidh, the guy who survived, the only survivor of that meeting, shootout in Aiden, comes out to become the president of South Yemen.

Thomas: What do we think, guys? Is he the luckiest Arab of the 20th century?

Baraa: I mean, not for too long. I mean, he's going to be …

Thomas: Well, no one's lucky for very long in Yemen except Ali Abdullah Saleh. But even his luck runs out as we'll find out later. But for now, al Beidh, now president of South Yemen, he has to turn his attention to the big geopolitical fact of Aimen, the Soviet Union's collapse.

Aimen: Indeed. I mean, the Soviets were losing in Afghanistan, and the Soviet Union was unable to keep the satellite countries in Eastern Europe under check, and things were falling apart.

The Soviet economy was falling apart, and they were not able to sustain any of their allies, whether it's Cuba or Angola or South Yemen. The writing were on the wall in Cyrillic letters, I would say.

Thomas: Soviet aid to South Yemen was totally drying up in the late 80s. So, in addition to their own internal fighting, South Yemeni politicians were seriously having to reconsider their model. It was not going to work anymore. And funnily enough, something that really shifted the story a bit and focused minds was the discovery of oil in Yemen.

Baraa: So, oil was discovered in the province of Marib, and that oil will remains until today, the richest oil will producing oil for Yemen until, until today. And Marib remains this oil rich province in the north.

Not only that, but President Saleh of North Yemen manages to stabilise the situation in the north. So, the north was looking very stable, economically booming. And elections happen for the first time for the local councils. So, things are in the north looking like they're heading towards basically in the right direction.

Thomas: And so, beginning from this position of strength, Ali Abdullah Saleh is able to open up quite fruitful negotiations with President al Beidh of South Yemen over the oil resources because the oil field as it happens, straddled the border. And this became a kind of, let's say a test case for, hey, maybe actually the two sides can get along.

Baraa: So, the two states were racing towards this idea of unification, but they're very different at the same time. The north of Yemen is very capitalist. The south is very Marxist.

The north of Yemen is very tribal, but in the south, the tribal system has been effectively dismantled. And the north of Yemen overall's economy is looking like it's bigger and is booming while the leadership in the South are feeling constraints and feeling the pressure of the collapse of the economy.

So, it creates an interesting case of can you unify two different systems in this very complicated era of Yemen.

Aimen: And this actually was happening in Europe, in the heart of Europe. The unification of the two Germanys, one German state in the west was capitalist, and the other one in the east was communist. So, how do you unite them? The same question was also animating Arabia and the Gulf in particular.

Thomas: And it's the question that will largely animate the next episode in this series on the modern history of Yemen, because Ali Abdullah Saleh eventually in negotiation with President al Beidh of South Yemen, presented a unification deal quite favourable on the face of it to southern politicians and the southern politicians agreed.

And so, in 1990, the Yemeni Republic was founded, uniting north and south. President Saleh of the north remained president and President al Beidh of the south was vice president. And as we all know, Baraa, it was happily ever after, wasn't it?

Baraa: Oh indeed. I mean, maybe for four years.

[Music Playing]

Thomas: Well, with that, we're going to put a pin in it and we'll be back next time dear listener, to continue this exhaustive and possibly exhausting survey of modern Yemen.

Thank you very much, Baraa. It's been fascinating and fabulous having you here. And we look forward to having you with us again next time. Stay tuned.

A reminder that you can follow the show over on Facebook and Twitter at MH Conflicted. And for a deeper dive into all the subjects we talk about here on Conflicted, head over to Facebook and search Conflicted Podcast Discussion Group.

There you will find other fans of the show engaging in heated debates, enlightening conversations, and just generally geeking out over Conflicted related topics.

Conflicted is a Message Heard production. This episode was produced and edited by Harry Stott. Sandra Ferrari is our executive producer. Our theme music is by Matt Huxley and Tom Biddle.

Conflicted S4 E18: Hezbollah: Israel's Menace or Lebanon's Defender?

Speakers: Thomas Small & Aimen Dean

Thomas: Hello Dear Listeners, Thomas Small here with another quick note before we get into this second episode on Hezbollah. Again, this was recorded before the events of October 7th and the ongoing conflict now taking place between Israel and Hamas in the Gaza Strip.

However, this episode is more topical than at first glance. It narrates the war between Israel and Hezbollah in 2006 — and as you’ll see, that war contains eerie echoes of Israel’s current war with Hamas, and therefore may offer illuminating insights into how the current conflict may evolve over the next few weeks – a conflict which, as of this recording, Hezbollah threatens to join, to some degree at least, from the North.

Oh and Aimen invokes his now famous image of the Mexican standoff within a Mexican standoff — a rather comical image where a four-armed Iran is pointing two guns each at Israel and Saudi Arabia, each of whom in turn are pointing two guns back. One of the guns Iran is pointing at Israel is Hezbollah — and as Israel struggles against Iran’s other gun, Hamas, we hope that our exploration of Hezbollah from the 90s until today will give you vital context to understanding the current conflict as it evolves.

Now, on with the show.

[Music Playing]

Thomas: Welcome back to Conflicted with me, Thomas Small.

Aimen: And me, Aimen Dean.

Thomas: Aimen, we're starting the second episode here on Hezbollah, the Lebanese political movement and militia, who many believe to be a cancer inside the Lebanese body politic, but which no one can deny, holds most of the cards in Lebanon's, endless game of political poker.

Aimen: More like a Russian roulette. They hold not just only the cards, but they hold the bullets.

Thomas: In the second part of our exploration of Hezbollah. We want to understand how this Shia terror group … I think we're calling it a Shia terror group. Are we Aimen?

Aimen: Yeah, of course, because it's been prescribed now by the majority of the international community.

Thomas: How this Shia terror group has come to dominate Lebanon and infect the surrounding region with instability. We'll be looking at their fights with Israel throughout the 90s and noughties.

We'll see yet more assassinations at home and abroad, and we’ll discover just how malign their influence has become under the continued leadership of Hassan Nasrallah. Let's jump right back in.

[Music Playing]

Aimen, when we left off in our previous episode, the Lebanese Civil War had just ended. The Taif Agreement was signed in Saudi Arabia which had controversially allowed Hezbollah to keep its weapons.

But the Israeli occupation of the South in Lebanon continued. And crucially, Hassan Nasrallah had just been elected leader of Hezbollah.

Now, Nasrallah, we discussed last time, but at the outset here, let's restate how important he is. And Aimen, remind the listener, especially what Hassan Nasrallah's personality is like.

I mean, you're an Arab, you've spent now your whole life, basically on and off being subjected to Hassan Nasrallah as a media figure, at the very least. Because he's been in Lebanese politics for so long. What is his personality like?

Aimen: Well, despite his lisp, I could tell you basically that-

Thomas: We love all of our listeners. If you have a lisp, the dear listener, we love you. We love you. But Hassan Nasrallah does have a lisp. It must be admitted, and it does sometimes undercut his performance as a great and evil and malign terrorist.

Aimen: Indeed. But nonetheless, his lisp does not take away from his charisma, from his magnetic personality, the fact that he is a great speaker, orator, and someone who can grab the attention of the audience. He is charismatic.

Thomas: I mean, basically to make his speech impediment understood. In a way, Hassan Nasrallah speaks like Elmer Fudd from Looney Tunes, a wascally wabbit. I'm going to find a wascally wabbit. It's a little bit as if a huge terrorist organisation was being run by Elmer Fudd.

Aimen: Except there is a problem here. You see, if it wasn't for the lisp, he would've been considered one of the greatest orators and public speakers in the 21st century Arab world.

It's just that lisp that basically that takes away a little bit of that charm. But he is charming. There is no questioning this. He has a charming personality. When he speaks sometimes, he does throw in some jokes.

In fact, one of his most famous jokes is when he compared John Bolton, the famous American politician-

Thomas: Yeah. American Ambassador to the UN, yeah.

Aimen: And the National Security advisor of-

Thomas: Donald Trump.

Aimen: President Trump for a while, exactly. He compared him to Angry Sam in the Looney Tunes, also if you remember.

Thomas: That's amazing. Oh, what's his name? Yosemite Sam.

Aimen: Yosemite Sam, yes.

Thomas: Yosemite Sam.

Aimen: Yosemite Sam.

Thomas: Well, who would've thought that the Looney Tunes would come up twice in the space of one minute on Conflicted?

Aimen: Exactly. So, as you can see, he is someone who would crack a joke or two, make everyone laughs. But also at the same time, when he threatened, when he wag his finger, it is unlike when al-Zawahiri wag his finger. Al-Zawahiri wag his finger, no one cares. But when Hassan Nasrallah wags his finger around, Israel listens.

Thomas: We'll see why in this episode, because Hassan Nasrallah, he certainly barks, but he also certainly bites. But let's go back to the year 1992, the year that Hassan Nasrallah became leader of Hezbollah.

Almost straight away, he made his mark felt in Israel, especially, or on Israelis, because on 17 March of that year, Hezbollah launched a terrorist attack, not in Lebanon, but in Buenos Aires targeting the Israeli Embassy there.

Aimen: Yeah. The attack against the Israeli Embassy in Argentina. And this is exactly how Hassan Nasrallah decided that he would avenge the Israeli assassination of his mentor, of his teacher, and the former leader, now the late leader of Hezbollah, Abbas al-Musawi, or as they call him there, Sayed Abbas al-Musawi.

Now, it is a daring attack because this demonstrated two key points between Israel and Hezbollah, and this set in motion, something that is still to this day, being practised, even though 31 years later, it’s called The New Rules of Engagement.

You kill one of our leaders, we are going to target you not in Israel and not Israeli soldiers. We are going to target Israeli and Jewish civilians all over the world. That was the message of Buenos Aires.

Thomas: Well, that tit for tat Rules of Engagement, sort of dynamic with Israel also pertained on the ground in Southern Lebanon. Now, remember, dear listener, Israel remained an occupying power in Southern Lebanon after the end of the Civil War.

And it was their presence there that gave Hezbollah the justification, it felt it needed to maintain its stance as a resistance movement, an armed resistance movement defending Lebanon against an outside invader.

There was constant back and forth military engagement, quite low level, most of the time between both sides. During the 90s, about every three days, one Israeli soldier would be killed. Now, that's actually quite a lot.

And Hezbollah was very adept at provoking them. So much so that in 1996 launching an operation which it called Grapes of Wrath, Israel retaliates quite sort of severely after Hezbollah rockets are fired into Israel itself.

This was considered a violation of the Rules of Engagement. Hezbollah pushed Israel a bit far, and so Israel in 1996 launched Operation Grapes of Wrath leading to the notorious Qana Village Slaughter.

Aimen: That was one of the darkest episodes of the Israeli-Hezbollah conflict, until that point. I mean, goodness, more than a hundred women and children and civilians were killed in that attack. It was an air bombardment, with F-16 and missiles, and it was awful.

Thomas: What made it even worse and most shocking, Aimen, is that these civilians had fled to a UN base for refuge and Israeli planes targeted the UN base killing 106 civilians.

Aimen: Exactly. I mean, this is what made it so shocking. And it drew a lot of international condemnations, even from many states that are friendly to Israel, including the French and other Europeans.

I mean, basically they condemned it utterly. And the irony is that it was happening during the premiership of Prime Minister Shimon Peres, who ironically just three years earlier won the Nobel Peace Prize for his role in the Oslo Accord.

Thomas: Yeah. Israel's occupation of Southern Lebanon was not really working out in Israel's favour. It was causing a lot of blowback, reputational, and also security blowback.

For example, the following year in 1997, Hassan Nasrallah's son, Hadi is killed in a firefight with Israeli forces. And though you might think, oh, that's an Israeli win. They've killed the son of their great enemy, Hasan Nasrallah. But Nasrallah's reaction to the murder of his son, or the death of his son by Israeli forces, his reaction was very stoic.

It was very honourable, if you like, earning him kudos amongst Lebanese and amongst Middle Easterners more generally, increasing his political stature. So again, Israel is realising this constant fighting with Hezbollah because of our occupation of Southern Lebanon, is not working out for us.

Aimen: Exactly. They created the martyr. I mean, of course, they gave Hassan Nasrallah not only a martyr in his family, and they have given him the ultimate credibility. They killed his son.

He was stoic about it. And that showed the level of connection in that relationship between the leader and those who are led. Therefore, the level, the aura of this image being created, the narrative of this selfless, great, brave leader has been born. The legend.

Thomas: Well, public opinion in Israel was turning against the occupation of Southern Lebanon, leading in 1999 to a change of Prime Minister, Ehud Barak comes to power in Israel, actually on a promise to withdraw Israeli forces from Lebanon.

And from the point that he became prime minister, discussions began to be held between Israel and Syria because as we'll see later on in this episode, Syria remained a key player in Lebanon.

But discussions between Israel and Syria brokered by President Clinton resulted in Israel's unilateral withdrawal from Southern Lebanon on the 24th of May 2000.

Aimen: I remember that date, Thomas, so clearly, when I saw in late May the tanks, the Merkavas of the Israeli IDF withdrawing over the Southern Lebanese mountains and valleys into Israel proper, that filled my heart with joy.

I remember I was calling my brother; I was in the UK at the moment. I was of course still working undercover for the UK Intelligence Services. Of course, my brother didn't know, my family didn't know, no one knew except my handlers.

But nonetheless, I gave him a call and I said, “Hey, did you see what happened?” And why I was so full of joy and hope? And I was so happy about the Israeli withdrawal. It's not because I was siding with one side against another or anything. No, it's just because it so happened that my mom comes from a village called Shebaa. It's a very large village, about 13,000 inhabitants. So, can call it a town, actually.

So, I said to my brother, “Can you arrange a visit? Shall we go and visit our uncles there?” Because some of them, actually, all of them never saw me because the village was occupied in March of 1978. I was born September 1978.

And so, my brother immediately arranged things. And it so happened that the MP who represented that area, even though it was occupied, but he represented that area, was a cousin of my mom.

So, we contacted him, he said, “Yes, I will arrange a car to pick you up guys, and it'll bring you there.” Because at the time, even then, the Lebanese army won't let any foreigner to go south of an area called Nahr al-Awalī or the al-Awali River. And the car that came to pick us up from the hotel had Hezbollah flag on it. So, this is the first-

Thomas: Hezbollah were your hosts in your first ever visit to your ancestral village.

Aimen: Exactly. We spent two glorious days there. Goodness, it was an emotional scene for me, because we were there in July, and that was July 2000. Yet in July 1957, my mom and dad had their wedding there in a very beautiful place, right on the Israeli Lebanese border.

And there, there is a waterfall coming from a spring and beautiful area that is so green and full of trees. That's where the wedding was held. It was a romantic place.

Thomas: So, Aimen, while you're in Shebaa enjoying visiting your mother's family for the first time, Hassan Nasrallah and Hezbollah more generally are asking themselves a key question.

Now that Hezbollah's prime reason for being is gone. I mean, the Israelis are gone from Southern Lebanon, and they had always said, “We are here to defend Southern Lebanon from an occupying power.”

So, now that their reason for being is gone, do they disarm and become a normal political party, which represents Shia interests in the Lebanese political system or not?

I mean, basically they have a choice, become a normal political party, or remain an armed militia, an Iranian proxy pursuing the aims of the Islamic Revolution.

They had already faced this question to some extent in 1992, during the first elections in Lebanon following the Civil War. Hezbollah had fielded candidates in those elections, which had followed an intense debate within the ranks of Hezbollah about whether to participate in democracy or not.

Some Hezbollah members were afraid that participating in democracy would undermine Hezbollah's revolutionary credentials. This has echoes dear listener, if you've been paying attention with the Muslim Brotherhood, because in the 90s Muslim Brotherhood parties around the Islamic world had faced the same quandary. Do they participate in elections or not?

And in Hezbollah's case, because they are an Iranian proxy, they took the question to the Ayatollah in Tehran, Khamenei, they asked the supreme leader there what they should do.

Now, Aimen explain why this is the case, because the Ayatollah Khamenei is Hezbollah's official marja, what does that mean?

Aimen: The word marja means authority, I mean, really literally means the religious authority that you follow in Shia Islam.

Thomas: I mean, literally it means reference.

Aimen: Reference, yeah.

Thomas: The person to whom you refer.

Aimen: Yes. So, since the Ayatollah Khamenei is the ultimate religious and political reference point, or reference authority, I would say, before Hezbollah, they went to him and they said, “Look, can we participate in the elections in Lebanon and field political candidates to take up seats in the Lebanese parliament? Because we need people to act as cover and give us political cover for what we do in Lebanon.”

So, Ayatollah Khamenei, of course, the master of political expediency, told them yes, and you should.

Thomas: Yes. And so, Hezbollah did then from ‘92 onwards become a political party as well as a militia movement, a resistance movement in its own self-understanding.

And then in the summer of 2000 following the Israeli withdrawal, they again faced a big question, do we now become just a political party or not? And again, to answer the question, they turned to the Ayatollah Khamenei.

Aimen: Exactly. And this time he told them one answer and one answer only, “Never disarm, find a pretext to remain unarmed group in Lebanon.”

Thomas: Yes. Khamenei gave his blessing if you like, to Nasrallah, to continue being a resistance movement. And the pretext was easily found because Israel, though it had withdrawn from Southern Lebanon, did continue to still patrol where?

Aimen: My mother’s-

Thomas: The village of Shebaa.

Aimen: Exactly.

Thomas: Your mother's village. Aimen, honestly, wherever you walk, world shattering conflict is bound to follow.

Now the reason for this dear listener, is because Shebaa or an adjoining part of Shebaa known as the Shebaa Farms, a farming area, an agricultural area where the villagers of Shebaa would farm, actually technically was part of the Golan Heights, which technically was part of Syria. That technically Israel was occupying based on a UN mandate.

So, the village of Shebaa in Southern Lebanon continued to be patrolled by Israeli forces giving Hezbollah a pretext for maintaining the resistance against an occupying force.

Aimen: Indeed, I mean, I remember when I was there in the year 2000, and then in subsequent years, do you remember that spring I told you where there is a waterfall and the place where my mom and dad got married in 1957?

If I look up, just, I look up almost at 80 degrees up above me, I can see Israeli soldiers just like looking at us with binoculars, because that is the top of the mountain is basically the border. And they placed huge observation points there. Every 500 metres, there is an observation point.

Thomas: Well, between 2000 and 2006, as a result of these Israeli patrols of the village of Shebaa. There was regular continued tit for tat fighting between Hezbollah and Israel in that vicinity.

And it meant that though the Israelis had hoped that their withdrawal would result in some kind of norm normality resuming in the area, that didn't happen. And they were forced to maintain regular air patrols over Lebanese airspace.

And sometimes Hezbollah would take hostages, which they would have to bargain over. And so, to some extent, the dynamics of the 90s continued. Now this would eventually result in a big bust up, down the line.

But before we get there, I want to talk about Hezbollah's political activities. As we said, they faced the question, do we become a normal political party or remain a militia?

The Ayatollah Khamenei in Iran told them remain a militia, a resistance movement. But nonetheless, Hezbollah was a political party as well, and as a political party, they were governing areas that elected its candidates. And Aimen, it must be admitted they were doing so quite well.

Aimen: Oh, yes. I mean, the social services, the roads, the municipal services you expect, especially, when electricity is always a failure in Lebanon. And every Lebanese know that, yet their areas always enjoy whether the Lebanese people always call 24/7 electricity.

Can you believe it that the word 24/7 electricity is the biggest dream of the Lebanese population, yet in the areas that Hezbollah governs, generally excellent telecommunication services, excellent electricity services, excellent water services, and most importantly, they have their own even financial system.

And so, they have, through that enriched their community, the sense of solidarity between the Shia community there is strong thanks to Hezbollah's social, financial and services sector that they have looked after particularly well.

And with whose money though they're doing it, with whose help they are doing it? The poor Iranian citizen.

Thomas: Yes, Iran provided Hezbollah regular funding, huge amounts. The State Department reports that some years they would get up to $700 million of direct Iranian financial support, which helped Hezbollah to provide its constituents with these social services, but also was beginning to create the notorious state within a state.

The conditions whereby Hezbollah was running within the nation state of Lebanon, a little mini state of its own, which pertains to the present day, and which has led to Lebanon being largely an ungovernable country to the great detriment of all the Lebanese, it must be said.

The early noughties were a sort of high watermark for Hezbollah. Its international satellite broadcasting station, Al-Manār, The Lighthouse was a very, very popular, not just in Lebanon, but across the Middle East and the world indeed.

And with the War on Terror and the Iraq war, especially raging in that period, Hassan Nasrallah was increasing his international prestige and appeal as a regular anti-American, anti-Israeli voice.

Listeners, our age and older Aimen, will remember those times as very much polarised between those who supported quite vociferously, America's War on Terror and those everywhere who opposed it.

So, anti-Americanism was quite popular globally because of the horrible Iraq War that was raging. And Hassan Nasrallah for some anti-American voices, became something of a hero.

Aimen: And this is unfortunately, a permanent feature of the left in many European and North American political circles. I mean, anyone who just raise the banner of anti-Americanism and anti so-called imperialism, they will just, hey, cheer for him without understanding that hey, hey, hey, wait a minute, maybe you are cheering for one pack of wolves against another pack of wolves. So, be careful who you cheer for.

Thomas: Well, Hassan Nasrallah’s reputation may have been high amongst some people inside and outside Lebanon, but many Lebanese were opposed to Hezbollah at this time. It must be stated quite clearly.

Even Lebanese Shia, they were arguing that Hezbollah's attacks on Israeli troops in the South was endangering the republic. That Hezbollah's status as an armed militia was undermining the constitution.

And in a 2003 editorial, the Lebanese newspaper on An-Nahar wrote this, it's quite powerful, “Who authorised Nasrallah to represent all the Lebanese, to make decisions for them and to embroil them in something they don't want to be embroiled in? Did Nasrallah appoint himself, Secretary General of all the Lebanese and the whole Arab world?”

Now the divisions over Hezbollah within Lebanon would become very acute from 2005 onwards following the assassination of the former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafic al-Hariri in Central Beirut.

Now, dear listener, the assassination of Rafic al-Hariri is one of the most fascinating, interesting, and revealing episodes in modern Middle Eastern history. It is also one of the most complicated and one day on Conflicted, we will do a whole series telling the whole story.

For now, it is enough to know that he was a Sunni, Saudi-aligned, Lebanese politician who had played a big role in building the country back up after the Civil War, but had created enemies both inside and outside Lebanon, especially with Syria, whose troops remained inside Lebanon and which remained a very, very key political player in Lebanese politics.

And as a result of this, on the 14th of February 2005, Rafic al-Hariri died in an enormous car bomb assassination in Central Beirut.

Aimen: Indeed, that was an event that I would never forget. I remember that as soon as the explosion happened, not a shred of doubt in my mind that this pointed out to two perpetrators immediately, Damascus, and the southern suburb of Beirut, as we always call it, which is the headquarters of Hezbollah.

Thomas: Well, the assassination of Rafic al-Hariri immediately led to mass demonstrations of Lebanese calling for Syria to get out of Lebanon. This movement, this political movement of endless demonstrations is known as the Cedar Revolution.

But in response to the Cedar Revolution, Hezbollah and allies of Hezbollah mounted their own huge counter demonstrations. And throughout the spring of 2005, these two demonstration movements, these two protest movements, the Cedar Revolution on the one hand, and what was called the 8th of March Coalition, on the other hand, kept mounting enormous demonstrations in Beirut.

We're talking demonstrations where up to a million people were present, which eventually forced under immense American pressure as well, Syria to withdraw its forces from Lebanon.

So, the Syrian president Bashar al-Assad withdrew Syria's troops from Lebanon. And in May 2005, elections were held. Now everyone assumed that these elections would sweep Rafic 8th al-Hariri’s son Saad to power, Saad al-Hariri the leader of the Cedar Revolution.

But in fact, that did not happen. And the election results were somewhat inconclusive, leading to various negotiations, which are too complicated to explain. Frankly, they're too complicated even for me to understand.

But in July 2005, Hezbollah joined a new unity government. And for the first time, Hassan Nasrallah's Party of God had seats in the Lebanese cabinet. They were given two ministries, the ministries of labour, and of energy and water.

And so, Hassan Nasrallah, this is a massive achievement for him. His political party, his resistance movement, Hezbollah is now in the cabinet of Lebanon.

Aimen: However, Thomas, in order for Hezbollah to get these two ministries, these two key services ministries, they promised their coalition partners that they would deescalate the military tensions with the Israelis on the southern border. They promised that. And guess what? They lied. They absolutely lied through their teeth.

Thomas: They certainly did lie. As we will see when we get back from this very quick break. Hezbollah now in the cabinet of Lebanon would certainly not deescalate its conflict with Israel. We’ll be back.

[Music Playing]

We are back. When we left, Hezbollah had just achieved a singular political aim and had put two members in the cabinet of Lebanon and immediately began to cause problems for the political system in Lebanon.

Now, these problems initially revolved around the very thorny and interesting question of who assassinated Rafic al-Hariri, a former Lebanese prime minister, because in August of 2005, the very month after the new unity government came to power there with Hezbollah in the cabinet, a UN tribunal investigating the Hariri assassination began to gather evidence. Now, fingers pointed at Syria initially and increasingly Hezbollah.

Aimen: Well, Thomas, just like any criminal mastermind, they will do everything in their power to subvert the course of justice. They joined the government not only because they wanted to protect themselves against any attempt to disarm, but also to protect themselves from any investigation that could lead to the truth.

But Thomas, there was this teeny tiny problem, and it was the fact that Hezbollah did indeed kill Rafic al-Hariri.

Thomas: As would be eventually proved like 15 years later via the tribunal.

Aimen: Exactly, the UN pace, you might as well compare it to a snail. But nonetheless, Hezbollah set out not only to sabotage the investigation, they went out of their way to blame everyone else.

First, they blamed al-Qaeda, they blamed every other terrorist groups they can think of. And then when that wasn't working, they went on to blame the Israelis. They said the Israelis killed him because he was the leader of Lebanon's Renaissance. And coming back to be an important financial and tourist centre.

Come on. And actually, this became the perfect excuse for Hezbollah after every single assassination afterwards, they always say it is the Israelis trying to frame Hezbollah. It is absolutely amazing that every opponent of Hezbollah who died, happened to be killed by mysterious Israeli agents. Amazing how Israel removed all of Hezbollah's enemies out of Lebanon.

Thomas: Well, during this initial phase of Hezbollah trying to subvert the UN tribunal investigating the assassination, in December 2005 when the Lebanese Parliament passed a resolution agreeing to participate in the tribunal, Hezbollah staged a dramatic walkout of the cabinet.

So, their two ministers left the cabinet along with some allies, and this action froze all government business. Without a full cabinet, the Lebanese state cannot function. This would be a tactic used regularly by Hezbollah ever since because they've always had ministers in the cabinet.

And so, they've always been able to effectively paralyse the Lebanese state when the government is seeking to do anything that they don't like.

Now, for two months, there were negotiations between the prime minister and Hezbollah, where the Prime Minister Fouad Siniora was trying to convince them to return to the cabinet.

Though, eventually these two ministers were seduced back into cabinet, but then Hezbollah was able to continue to cause paralysis in the government by entering into another coalition agreement with an opposition party.

And that's where things stood in Lebanese politics. Hezbollah able to paralyse the government in order to prevent any investigation into the assassination of Rafic al-Hariri, all the while posing as the great defenders of Lebanon from Israel.

And yet, ironically, just around the corner, Hezbollah's actions would provoke Israel into launching its biggest attack against Lebanon ever.

Aimen: In May 2006. And in response to the growing noises inside Lebanon about why Hezbollah is the only political movement that is allowed to have a private army. And they always, of course, respond by saying, well, we protect you against Israel.

So, they needed the Israelis to be more aggressive. So, they started firing against Israeli targets inside Israel. First, at the border post, and at the Israeli Northern Command in the Galilee, with few rockets here and there.

The Israelis, of course, always respond, but within the normative Rules of Engagement that the Israelis and Hezbollah came to understand, that military tango that they have been practising for the past 25 years.

So, they had no problem. I mean, the Israelis will shell Hezbollah targets, Hezbollah will shell Israeli targets as long as there are no fatalities, especially on the side of the Israelis.

And therefore, the Hezbollah knew despite the appeals by the Lebanese prime minister, Fouad Siniora at the time. Please exercise caution. And even though Fouad Siniora was calling the White House, the White House was calling Ehud Olmert, the prime minister of Israel at the time, please exercise restraint. Do not depart, beyond the Rules of Engagement when you retaliate.

But Hezbollah knows the Israeli personality quite well. This doesn't go well; we have to go bolder. So, they decided to go much higher in terms of provoking Israel.

Thomas: So, yes, Hassan Nasrallah, in order to flex his muscles a bit to answer his critics inside Lebanon and elsewhere, that no, he needs to remain strong to defend Lebanon from Israel.

On the 12th of July of that year, 2006, Nasrallah ordered his militants to cross the Israeli border where they ambushed an Israeli patrol killing three soldiers and kidnapping two others.

Now, this was very provocative. Israeli forces pursued the attackers and the kidnappers inside Lebanon. But these pursuing Israeli soldiers were also attacked by Hezbollah. And five more Israelis were killed. So, eight Israeli soldiers in total were killed that day. And as you say, Aimen, this was really crossing a line for the Israelis.

Aimen: Yeah, in fact, that day I was actually in a meeting with one of my senior MI6 officials. And at that time, he was extremely sceptical about my reaction. He said, “Why are you so horrified?” I said to him, “By tomorrow, they will bomb the hell out of Lebanon.” He said to me, “No, no, no, no, no, I can tell you that the Israelis will stick to the Rules of Engagement.”

So, even MI6 at the time didn't even know that the Israelis are going to go so strong on Lebanon. I said to him, “Israeli blood was shed on a scale that never happened since the year 2000. So, of course, they were retaliate with all their might.” And so, they did.

Thomas: And indeed, they did. On the 13th of July 2006, Israel launched a huge reprisal strike against Lebanon. They blockaded Lebanon from the sea. They attacked Beirut airport, as you say, Aimen, from the air forcing the airport to close.

And then a huge artillery and air bombing campaign began, which would last 33 days destroying key Lebanese infrastructure, bridges, roads, seaports, and airports demolished. Basically, in the course of a month, almost all the progress that Lebanon had witnessed in terms of infrastructure building since the end of the Civil War was reversed.

Aimen: A senior Lebanese politician in later years would privately tell me that Hezbollah killed Rafic al-Hariri in 2005. And then both Israel and Hezbollah killed all the progress that Rafic al-Hariri did in the 15 years before he died for Lebanon.

Thomas: Israel's strategy was to drive the civilian population out of Southern Lebanon in order to create what the Israelis called a killing box there. So, they wanted to get the civilians to leave so that they could pound the hell out of Southern Lebanon, hopefully destroying Hezbollah once and for all.

So, they targeted gas stations, food shops, things like that. And indeed, 900,000 civilians from Southern Lebanon fled the South and were joined by half a million Lebanese civilians from the north. So, Beirut became sort of crammed with these refugees.

So, now that Southern Lebanon was largely empty of civilians, the Israelis could make good on their war aims. And the Prime Minister Olmert had openly stated that his aims were to eradicate Hezbollah completely. But this was ultimately impossible to achieve for two reasons.

First of all, the beginning of the war, in a shock to Hassan Nasrallah, the Arab world in general tended to support Israel, or at least tended not to support Hezbollah. They were very annoyed with Hezbollah for having provoked this war.

And yet, over the course of the war, the number of Lebanese civilian casualties reached just over a thousand. And this forced the Arab world to turn against supporting or at least sympathising with Israel and back towards supporting Lebanon and Hezbollah. So, that was bad for Israel.

And then despite a month of near constant bombardment, Hezbollah remained intact. Only 200 of its fighters were killed during the war, which is quite a remarkable fact given the bombardment they withstood. And the status of Hezbollah among Lebanese Shia, especially just skyrocketed, again, this blowback for Israel. So, Israel's aims were not being met.

Aimen: The public sentiment in the Middle East, I mean, if we want to take at least an indicator here, which is Egypt. I mean, Egypt is a country that signed a peace treaty with Israel in 1979. And yet, just as the conflict was raging between Israel and Hezbollah in July of 2006, there was an opinion poll, which shows that 9 out of 10 Egyptians were supportive of Hezbollah.

And that indicated that no matter what, if push come to shove Shia or Sunni, I mean Arabs will stick together. I mean, at least that is the idea that this indicator gave at the time.

Thomas: Well certainly, Israel realised that despite its efforts, it was not going to eradicate Hezbollah. And so, in mid-August of 2006, 33 days after the launch of the war, a ceasefire was announced that had been brokered by the United Nations.

Now, quite interestingly, later that month on TV, Hassan Nasrallah himself openly admitted that provoking the Israeli reprisal was a huge mistake. So, Nasrallah was slightly embarrassed, shamed even, that his provocations had resulted in so much destruction for Lebanon.

And yet, over the following two years, Hassan Nasrallah would continue his program of political sabotage in Lebanon of creating political paralysis, leading to just terrible gridlock.

In October of 2006, Nasrallah called for a national unity government. And yet in doing so, he also gave a terrible ultimatum. He said, “Either we reach a new agreement, giving Hezbollah effective veto over the government, or Hezbollah will organise huge demonstrations, seizing key facilities, and effectively putting Lebanon in a political chokehold.”

This is exactly what Hassan Nasrallah did. In December of that year, the March 8th coalition, of which Hezbollah's the largest part, the most powerful part, set up a big encampment in downtown Beirut, which remains in place for well over a year. And added to all of this political paralysis and instability resulting in chaos.

Aimen: Indeed, in fact, not only the paralysis that it caused and scuffles between ordinary Lebanese people was always breaking out around the encampment because of the political opposition and the political polarisation that it was causing. Not to mention the smell. I mean, these people never took a shower, even.

Thomas: Well, I was actually living in Damascus at that time. And I remember quite clearly that everyone knew that Lebanon was not doing well. We would often take hired taxis across the border into Lebanon to Beirut for the weekend, to kind of get out of Damascus and go to Beirut because you can have so much fun in Beirut.

But the journey was very harried. The border was very tense. It was quite clear that things were not well, and things were not well for Hezbollah either. I mean, people were very angry with Hezbollah. The Israelis remained extremely angry with Hezbollah.

Early in 2008, Hezbollah's longtime head of external operations, Imad Mughniyeh, was assassinated in Damascus, almost definitely carried out by the Mossad, Israel's secret service.

And moves were afoot within Lebanon itself, to put an end to Hezbollah's stranglehold over the government. The Lebanese government moves to disrupt Hezbollah's telecommunications network, and the security chief at Beirut Airport, who was a Hezbollah client, was also targeted for removal.

So, Hassan Nasrallah realises in 2008 that he's off too many people, and he is about to be moved against.

Aimen: Nasrallah made it very clear; this is a declaration of war against Hezbollah. I still remember the day, it was May 7th of 2008. Hassan Nasrallah was giving a speech on a podium. He's standing, finger wagging, but this time he's not pointing the finger at Israel or America or any external enemy.

He was pointing that finger at his fellow Lebanese people. He was pointing the finger at al-Hariri. He was pointing the finger at Geagea and at Jumblatt and all the other leaders of the Lebanese factions of the opposing coalition, the Future Movement, and the 14 March Movement, as they call them at that time.

So, he said, any attempt to disrupt our communication services, any attempt to remove the head of security at Beirut Airport, because Beirut Airport became a lifeline for the transfer of weapons and missiles and rockets and drones from Iran to Lebanon, including also cash.

So, of course it goes without saying that the head of security there in Beirut Airport need to be in Hezbollah's pockets firmly. So, any attempt to remove him and to put someone else there is a declaration of war against Hezbollah.

This is no longer Rafic al-Hariri’s International Airport. This is Hasan Nasrallah's International Airport, and everyone must know that. So, at that moment, he gave the ultimatum, and within two hours, his men moved in to occupy West Beirut, where the heart of the Sunni population of Lebanon lives.

And what a three days of fighting that saw nearly 300 people killed, hundreds other wounded. And the peace that followed Lebanon Civil War 18 years earlier was shattered.

And this is when Hezbollah stated, without any doubt, “You try to disarm us. You try even to come close to the idea of disarming. You play with the idea, you dream of it, and we will cut off your head.”

So, he spoke like a darsh leader, no diplomacy, no niceties. He will defend to the death. The principle that Hezbollah is essentially an armed militia and a state within a state.

Thomas: People were wondering is Lebanon once again going to fall into outright civil war? Because the scenes on the ground in Beirut were ominously and worryingly similar to the sort of scenes that people had seen in the 1980s. Proper firefights against different militant factions.

It was a really terrifying moment for Lebanon, but staring into the abyss who would come to their rescue, Aimen?

Aimen: The Emir of Qatar.

Thomas: The Emir of Qatar, Sheik Hamad playing a role, much like the role played by King Fahd of Saudi Arabia. What is it? 18 years earlier during the Taif Accords, this time, the Emir of Qatar invited all the political parties in Lebanon to Doha the capital of Qatar, where they negotiated a new accord to end that political crisis.

And on the 21st of May 2008, an agreement was signed. Now, this agreement was very much in Hezbollah's favour, I would wager, because basically the arrangement gives Hezbollah effective veto over the Lebanese government.

Aimen: What this veto means is that Hezbollah and their other Shia ally, the little sister of Hezbollah, Amal, which now been reduced to being just a Hezbollah's puppet. These two parties will have not four ministers, but they will have six ministers in the cabinet, a cabinet of 18 ministers.

So, this will give them one third. The idea is that any decision in the cabinet must be backed by three quarters of the members of the cabinet. However, if you have six ministers out of 18, it means that you have one third. And this one third can veto anything that the cabinet wants to do.

Therefore, in other word, Hezbollah now will continue to govern Lebanon, either directly or indirectly, directly through participating in the government of unity or indirectly by also having ministers in regardless in the cabinet and vetoing the cabinet agenda. And this is how Hezbollah from 2008 to this day holds Lebanon-

Thomas: 15 years, Aimen. 15 years of Hezbollah holding the Lebanese people to ransom, frankly.

Aimen: Exactly.

Thomas: I mean, it's very distressing and depressing. I mean the story now we've brought it up to where we've covered sort of Hezbollah in the past on Conflicted, because as we've said many times when the Arab Spring broke out in 2010, 2011, Hezbollah was called on by its Iranian taskmasters to intervene on the side of Bashar al-Assad in the Syrian theatre where their fortunes waxed and waned.

But it did strengthen Hezbollah militarily. Its militants have a lot of battlefield experience now, which makes them an even greater threat to the Israelis and makes them even more able to exercise their will over Lebanon.

It also created the conditions whereby they could cooperate with Syrian figures in turning Lebanon into what we've called a narco-terrorist state. Hezbollah along with some members of the Assad regime and family have become fantastically rich by selling drugs openly in the international market.

We've talked about all of this before, and for Lebanon in the end, it means that in addition to many other causative factors like the basic corruption at the very top of Lebanese political society, the sectarian divides which remain endemic and very paralytic on the Lebanese body politic and basic incompetence, which was seen three years ago when that incredible explosion happened in the Port of Beirut.

Aimen: Yeah.

Thomas: Which is down basically to Lebanese governmental and political incompetence, which has inflicted a huge toll on the Lebanese people. But Hezbollah, how did they come to dominate Lebanon? We've told that story.

They've shifted, they've evolved, they've responded to events when necessary. Hassan Nasrallah especially has been very, very agile in bending all events to his favour.

But all of these different causative factors for Lebanon's dysfunction and its suffering are nothing compared to the singular fact of an armed, militant political movement operating as a state within a state there in Lebanon, answering to some extent, at least, to Iran as a proxy of Iran and dedicated to ideologically, at least the Islamic Revolution.

So, Aimen, when it comes to the future of Lebanon, what can we imagine is likely, I mean, given the fact that Hezbollah is there, it is not dislodgeable, not easily. So, what is likely to happen in Lebanon?

Aimen: Well, Thomas, what worried me so much over the past 11, 12 years since the beginning of the Arab Spring is the fact that Hezbollah used the past decade to arm itself to the teeth.

It has amassed more than 200,000 rockets and missiles of different ranges, and added to this arsenal, considerable amount of drones, suicide drones, as well as anti-ship missiles and weapons that could penetrate deep into Israel.

And this is why, I mean, you ask yourself why you arming yourself so much that it means that Lebanon is now going to be taken hostage. Someone will ask, why doesn't Hezbollah just take over all over Lebanon, and just rid itself of all the other political parties?

No, because they need the cover of all the other political parties. They need to keep the veneer that Lebanon is a politically plural society. And therefore, we are just one part, one component of the entire Lebanese mosaic, but it's not the case.

They are in charge, whether the Lebanese people like it or not, and they will take Lebanon into an inevitable war, whether now or 10 years from now.

Thomas: Okay. Let's talk about this inevitable war. Are we talking another civil war, do you think it's ever possible that the rest of Lebanon would ally together and try to fight Hezbollah to the death where they actually win and triumph over Hezbollah?

Aimen: No, there is no way that the rest of Lebanon, even with the help of the Lebanese Army, remember Lebanese Army itself is 40% Shia. So, the Lebanese army will break up immediately. 40% of it will join Hezbollah. That immediately will happen.

So, you'll be left with 60% of the decrepit and ineffective and undertrained and understaffed and underfinanced Lebanese army trying to help few militias here and there with the Christians and the Sunnis who are poorly armed, poorly trained, and they will be fighting a hopeless fight against fighters of Hezbollah.

Only the Druze you can say basically stand the chance, and they are only 5% of the country. So, there is no hope for the rest of Lebanon, militarily speaking.

Thomas: So, then maybe another civil war in which Hezbollah fully triumphs and takes over the whole country properly.

Aimen: Even that might not happen. And the reason for that is simple, because Israel will prevent Hezbollah from taking over Lebanon entirely. They will intervene immediately in order to start shelling and bombing the hell out of Lebanon again in order to dismantle and disable Hezbollah's most sophisticated communication networks in order to prevent it from taking over Lebanon as a whole.

I mean, it's going to be a Mexican standoff. This is basically a Mexican standoff within a bigger Mexican standoff. What is Hezbollah? Hezbollah basically is Iran's hand holding a pistol to Israel's head. Should Israel try to be foolish enough to attack Iran's nuclear sites on its own, then Hezbollah will retaliate immediately.

Thomas: So, then what are we talking about is the likeliest scenario for Lebanon? That Israel and Hezbollah have a fight to the death again? It seems to me actually that given what it experienced in 2006, Israel doesn't really want to fight another war with Hezbollah because it knows it won't win.

Aimen: No.

Thomas: It won't lose exactly, but it won't win.

Aimen: It won't win unless if they really, really have America intervening. I remember in Dallas in 2019, I was speaking to a former senior member, actually, of the Bush Administration, which was in the White House in 2006 during the war between Israel and Hezbollah.

And he said, “You have no idea how perilously we were close to actually coming to the aid of Israel and enter the war.” And he said that if it wasn't for the Iraq War, we would have done it. I mean, the Hezbollah was lucky that America was busy fighting two wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. And for us, the survival of Israel is a must.

Now that America is out of Afghanistan and Iraq, any war between Israel and Lebanon in the future, if it really start to inflict damage on Israel, Hezbollah should know that America will not keep quiet about it.

Thomas: Well, frankly, given everything you've said and everything we've explored over these last two episodes, Aimen, I feel that the status quo, as unhappy as it is, is likely to persist into the future, at least in the short-term and probably the middle-term too.

Aimen: Yeah, I agree.

Thomas: I don't really see war on a big scale breaking out there. It's ultimately in no one's interests. And so, sadly for Lebanon and for the whole region, and really for the whole world, Lebanon will remain a patient, a cancer patient, frankly, with Hezbollah there as a cancer in the Lebanese body politic.

Aimen: Indeed.

Thomas: As long as Hezbollah is there, there can be no strong stable united Lebanon. It's impossible.

Well, with that depressing final note, we come to the end of our two-part series on Hezbollah. We started out talking about Iran and the ideological underpinnings of its regime. We moved on to Hezbollah, Iran's most powerful and longest lasting proxy in the region.

And starting with our next episode, we're going to discuss a country which we covered in the first season of Conflicted all those years ago but haven't really come back to much since.

A country which many analysts for many years now have worried will become another Lebanon with another Iranian proxy, pointing another pistol at another key Western allies head. And by that, I mean of course the country of Yemen and the Iranian proxy of the Houthis.

[Music Playing]

It's going be an epic four-part series, dear listener, where we will go deep into Yemen and try to explain as best we can, everything that you need to know to understand the situation there.

And for that series, we are joined by a brilliant guest for the first time, Aimen. A brilliant guest, an eyewitness to many key events over the last 15 years in Yemen, and one who happens to be a close personal friend of us, both.

Aimen: Indeed.

Thomas: So, you've really got, I think, something to look forward to, dear listener. So, stay with us and when we're back, we will do our very deep dive indeed into Yemen. See you then.

A reminder that you can follow the show over on Facebook and Twitter at MH Conflicted. And for a deeper dive into all the subjects we talk about here on Conflicted, head over to Facebook and search, Conflicted Podcast Discussion Group.

There you will find other fans of the show engaging in heated debates, enlightening conversations, and just generally geeking out over Conflicted related topics.

Conflicted is a Message Heard production. This episode was produced and edited by Harry Stott. Sandra Ferrari is our executive producer. Our theme music is by Matt Huxley and Tom Biddle.

Conflicted S4 E17: Hezbollah: Rise of the Islamic Resistance

Thomas: Hello, and welcome back to Conflicted. I'm Thomas Small, and with me today is my unstoppable co-host, Aimen Dean.

Aimen: Nothing can stop me, Thomas. Nothing.

Thomas: Nothing can stop you, Aimen. Nothing at all. Aimen, today on Conflicted, we're celebrating an important anniversary. Well, not celebrating, really.

It has now been 40-ish years since the formation of the Lebanese Militant Group designated a terrorist group by most international authorities, militants, politicians, resistance fighters. Take your pick of how you want to define them. I'm talking about Hezbollah.

Aimen: Ah, yes. My old frenemies, Hezbollah.

Thomas: After looking at the granddaddy of Shia Islamism last week, Iran, now we are embarking on two episodes looking at their younger sibling, Hezbollah, their proxy on the eastern shores of the Mediterranean in the beautiful but tragic country of Lebanon.

[Music Playing]

How was Hezbollah formed out of the chaos of the Lebanese Civil War? How did it establish itself as a state within a state in Lebanon? And what is its malign influence doing to the country? Let's find out.

So, really Aimen, I think over the next two episodes, we'll be asking the question of how an Islamist Vanguard movement evolves to achieve its power aims, because that's what we're dealing with in Hezbollah.

In our episodes on the Muslim Brotherhood, we talked about Sayyid Qutb’s idea that what was needed to further the aims of a worldwide Islamic revolution was a militant vanguard overcoming all the obstacles put in the revolution's way, obstacles like democracy, obstacles like capitalism, obstacles like secularism, overcoming them all, paving the way, or really forcing the way to an Islamic state.

Do you think that's a fair estimation of Hezbollah as a militant vanguard according to Sayyid Qutb's model?

Aimen: Well, the short answer is yes, and the slightly longer answer, I would let the current leader of Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah answer this in a speech he gave in 1984, so, long time ago.

Thomas: A long time ago, 1984. He wasn't the leader of Hezbollah then. He was the deputy leader. But in 1984, what did Hassan Nasrallah say?

Aimen: He said, “The aim of our movement is not to make Lebanon an Islamic Republic. The aim of our movement is to make Lebanon part of the greater Islamic Republic led by the absent Imam, and until his return by his Deputy Imam Ayatollah Khomeini.”

Thomas: Well, there you have it. I mean, that's pretty clear, isn't it? Hezbollah is part of Iran's larger Islamic revolution and looks to the supreme leader in Tehran as its marja.

Explain Aimen, what a marja is. All Shia are expected to have a marja, and in Hezbollah's case, their marja is the supreme leader of Iran.

Aimen: Yes, indeed. I mean, the Shia faith dictates on its followers that each one must follow a marja. And a marja should be one of a handful of grand Ayatollahs that are spread around the world, especially in Qom in Iran, Najaf in Iraq, and Jabal Amil in Lebanon. So, a marja is basically the ultimate religious authority.

Thomas: Yeah. It literally means something like reference. It's the reference.

Aimen: Yes.

Thomas: The person to whom you refer for religious rulings, for advice, for guidance in religious matters, and certainly following the Islamic Revolution in Iran, you look to the marja for political guidance as well. This is part of the transformation of Shia Islam that the Ayatollah Khomeini and his followers affected.

Aimen: Oh, yeah. I mean this is exactly what happened because actually sometimes they say Sistani in Iraq is the religious marja, but Khamenei in Iran is the political marja.

Thomas: That’s right. And with that in mind, we want to tell the story of Hezbollah as objectively as we can because a lot is said about Hezbollah, even though it's not really that murky of an organisation.

Nonetheless, people don't really know the history of Hezbollah, the true story, where it came out of, how it formed, and also, and most importantly, how it has evolved along with events to maintain the torch of Islamic resistance, the torch of attacking the enemies of the revolution in Lebanon, specifically Israel, but beyond Israel, all other enemies of the Islamic Revolution.

And before we start the story of Hezbollah itself, we have to take the listener back to the world that we covered last season in our episode on Lebanon. And dear listener, we are going to do our best not to repeat ourselves. In fact, we really can't repeat ourselves because we've got too much to cover in these next two episodes.

So, if you haven't listened to our episode on Lebanon, you really just should stop this episode and listen to it.

Here, I'm simply going to give a quick historical recap just so everyone is on the same page. In 1943, Lebanon becomes independent of France. And in the new constitution, all the different sectarian groups in Lebanon received a part of the new Lebanese government.

The Shia got the speakership of parliament, by far a weaker political role than either the presidency, which was given to the Maronite Christians or the premiership, the prime ministership, which was given to the Sunnis.

Now, the Shia were poor and underdeveloped, generally speaking, compared to the other groups in Lebanon. Most of them lived in the south, some lived in the northern Beqaa Valley, but they were more or less a rural impoverished people.

However, in the 50s, 60s and 70s, Shia birth rates exploded along with development of the country, and this coincided with their increasing politicisation.

Aimen: We have to understand, Thomas, that there were multiple factors in the politicisation of the Shia population in Lebanon. Apart, of course, from what you mentioned in terms of the poverty, lack of development and education that they have suffered from, for the previous decades.

There were already about 200,000 Palestinian refugees living in the south of Lebanon, the natural location of where the Shia lived. And add to this, the fact that the Palestinians at that time were mostly leftist, proto-communist, and they were supported by the Soviet Union, as well as many other leftist organisations across Europe and the Middle East.

So, the Shia youth were attracted to these leftist Marxist ideals that were first set up by the Palestinian militias in the south of Lebanon in the 60s. And then when Black September happened in Jordan, and the Palestinians were expelled from Jordan, president Nassar of Egypt did the worst possible thing before he died. He relocated Arafat to PLO and all the worst possible Palestinian fighters to Lebanon.

And that attracted more and more Shia Lebanese to join the militias, to be trained with them in order to fight against Israel. That's the aim, and that's the goal at that time.

Thomas: That's right. So, from a kind of more or less left wing bent, starting in the 60s, the late 60s, the sectarian, which is to say religious politicisation of the Shia in Lebanon, really began in earnest.

And to explain this, we actually have to go to Iraq. Now Aimen, we have to make a pact with ourselves here not to get too bogged down in the inner workings of the Iraqi Lebanese Shia nexus.

And especially not to get too bogged down in the life story of a very important family knowledge of which is key to understanding the genesis of Hezbollah. And of course, Aimen, I'm talking about the family of the al-Sadr.

Aimen: Yes.

Thomas: A very key Shia family with connections initially in Lebanon, but deep in Najaf in Iraq as well. And we'll start the story with one, a very important member of that family, an Iraqi really, although again, his ancestry is Lebanese, Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr.

He was born in 1935. He was one of the founders of an Iraqi political party, which was called the Islamic Dawa Party, the Islamic Message Party, or the Call to Islam party, if you like, which was founded in the late 50s as an alternative to the Communist Party, which was very popular in Iraq, especially again amongst Shia.

So, this sort of communist, anti-communist dimension is part of the story of the beginning of Hezbollah.

Aimen: The Dawa Party, for those who don't understand what it is, is I would say the Iraqi Shia copy of the Fada'iyan-e Iran Movement, that in the previous episode we talked about Navvab Safavi established.

And this movement was designed in order to become a clandestine terror movement that would go on to commit assassinations, carry out kidnappings and some terror activities.

Their aim and their goal is the creation of pan-Shia Islamic state. That's the idea. So, it is the forerunner of so many of the movements that we would see in the Shia Muslim world that would emerge in the 70s and 80s.

Thomas: That’s right. And a branch of the Dawa Party was set up in Lebanon in the early 60s. So, there are so many echoes of the present, really, an Iranian political organisation, the Fada'iyan-e Islam setting up or helping to set up or to inspire a carbon copy in Iraq amongst the Shia there. And then a carbon copy of that being spread in Lebanon, in order to further the goals of a pan-national Shia movement.

It was happening in the 50s and 60s already. Now, back to Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, one of the founders of the Dawa Party. He was an Ayatollah. He lived in Najaf, and he attracted a lot of pious young Lebanese Shia to go and study under him. One of these was Abbas al-Musawi.

So, as a teenager, he was only 18 in 1970, he travelled to Najaf in Iraq to study under Ayatollah Baqir al-Sadr. And he became himself a cleric. He became religiously authorised, if you like, and in time would one day become one of the two co-founders of Hezbollah.

So, let's just put a pin in that. So, we have Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr influencing, teaching students, including one of the two co-founders of Hezbollah, Abbas al-Musawi.

Now tell us Aimen, about another Sadr, also very important in the genesis of Hezbollah, Musa al-Sadr.

Aimen: So, who is Musa al-Sadr. Musa al-Sadr is for all intents and purposes, an Iranian citizen, ironically. He was born in Qom in Iran and grew up there, but his family traces its roots first in Najaf and then to Jabal Amil in Lebanon.

So, his great-great-grandfather Sadr al-Din, the founder of the Sadr clan, left Lebanon in the early 1800s to go to Najaf to get away from the Ottoman authorities in Lebanon.

And then after that, Sadr al-Din moved to Isfahan in Iran. And there he founded the Sadrist clan that we all hear about all the time from Musa al-Sadr, Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, and of course-

Thomas: Muqtada al-Sadr.

Aimen: Muqtada al-Sadr, in Iraq.

Thomas: So many Sadrs.

Aimen: Yeah, yeah. However, Musa here, who is a Persianate-Arab with Iraqi and Lebanese extraction-

Thomas: A man after your own heart really, Aimen.

Aimen: Yeah. Me being half Bahraini, born-

Thomas: Here we go again, dear listener, I know Durrani and Hashemite, and yeah.

Aimen: Yeah. Born in Saudi Arabia, Lebanese mother, all of that. Anyway.

Thomas: Musa al-Sadr.

Aimen: Musa al-Sadr. So, Musa, his mother is Persian, and funny enough, she is the sister of none other than Navvab Safavi.

Thomas: I know, Navvab Safavi. He keeps coming back. My goodness. So, Navvab Safavi, the founder of Fada'iyan-e Islam in Iran, whom we've talked about on and off through many episodes, was Musa al-Sadr's uncle.

Aimen: Yeah. He was Musa al-Sadr's maternal uncle. And that says a lot about the influence of revolutionary Shia, militant Islam in Musa al-Sadr's thinking.

Musa al-Sadr, after he graduated from a seminary in Qom and from Tehran's University, decided that he should go back to the ancestral homeland because he believed that he has a vision, a vision for Lebanon Shia, who were in his mind, and at least in their mind, feeling the Jack boots of the oppressive Christian Sunni Alliance.

Thomas: So yes, he moved to Lebanon, aged only 31 in 1960, and immediately launched into a political career, really, becoming an activist amongst Lebanon's Shia community, helping to form the Lebanese Supreme Islamic Shi’i Council, which he became the head of in 1969.

So, he was a big player amongst the Shia in Lebanon, and was achieving national prominence there through his movement, the Movement of the Dispossessed, which was a political movement. And its militant arm, which was founded in the mid-70s, Amal.

Aimen: So, what is Amal? Amal in Arabic means Hope. However, it is a three-letter abbreviation for the Arabic sentence Afwaj al-Muqawama al-Lubnaniyya, or The Battalions of the Lebanese Resistance.

So, as you can see here, dear listener, there is an absence of the word Islamic so far. And this will play an important role in why there was a need for a Hezbollah.

And as the Lebanese Civil War started in 1975, again, go back to the Lebanon episode and listen to it. Don't be lazy. You will find that some of the Lebanese Shia religious students who were studying in Najaf at the time, returned and joined Amal, the Lebanese militant movement established by Musa al-Sadr.

Among those returned students were a man called Subhi al-Tufayli, who just happened to be an admirer of Musa al-Sadr, and would later become the other co-founder of Hezbollah.

Thomas: That's right. So, the Sadr family, have a lot to answer for. Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr inspired one co-founder of Hezbollah, Abbas al-Musawi, and Musa al-Sadr inspired the other co-founder of Hezbollah, Subhi al-Tufayli.

Now, 1978 is a key year. We covered this in that Lebanon episode. So, we will simply remind the dear listener that in that year, and remember, the Lebanese Civil War is now in full force, Musa al-Sadr disappears, he disappears in of all places, Tripoli in Libya.

And it is believed, though, never firmly proved, that he was assassinated by Muammar Gaddafi. Gosh, there's so many characters in this story already. You remember President Gaddafi, the mad man of Libya.

Aimen: Except he wasn't the president.

Thomas: Oh, no, don't-

Aimen: He was just the citizen leader of the what? The Great Republic Socialist, whatever — one minute, I have to take a breath.

Thomas: Oh, God.

Aimen: And Libyans saw-

Thomas: Not again, I don't want to talk about Gaddafi. It's too depressing. Anyway, Gaddafi assassinated Musa al-Sadr, at which point, Amal sort of split into two camps.

One camp was more secularist leaning. Amal was never wholly hardline, sectarian, religious theocratic. It was a little bit more of a broader tent. It had a secular more, let's say Republican orientation and some hardline more religious radical elements.

After Musa al-Sadr disappeared, these two elements began to kind of fight between each other within the movement. And in general, the less ideologically religious half became prominent.

So, Amal became less religiously radical, leaving many of the radical Shia militants within it unhappy.

Aimen: Yes, because as you know, another player in the Lebanese Civil War was Syria. And President Hafez al-Assad, wanted Amal to remain secular, because he just did not like the idea of a … especially with the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, giving a zeal, giving a more push towards the radical elements within Amal to assert themselves.

So, the Syrians helped the secular side of Amal to take over, and that was represented in Amal's, new leader in 1980, all the way until now, 40 years. And he's still the same leader.

I don't know what is he eating every day to remain alive like this? His name is Nabih Berri, who is now of course, the speaker of the Lebanese Parliament.

Thomas: So, yes, Amal becomes more secular in its orientation. It's upsetting the more militantly religious members within it.

At the same time, dear listener, in 1979, the Islamic Revolution in Iran happens. In 1980, Iran and Iraq start clashing. Saddam Hussein becomes more paranoid about Shia.

He expels more and more Shia. They go to Lebanon. He executes Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr in 1980 after forcing him to watch his sister be raped. What a terrible story that is. Making him a martyr, inspiring even more Shia militancy amongst his partisans in Lebanon.

Now, in the midst of all of this, and forgive us, but hopefully that's clear. In the midst of all of this, Amal began clashing with the PLO. You'd think that this movement, which started out in a kind of broadly speaking pro-Palestinian direction, would remain so.

But actually, Amal was clashing with the PLO. And this meant that when Israel invaded Southern Lebanon to deal with the Palestinian problem there, first in 1978, and then in a big way in 1982, the Amal Movement in Lebanon was not entirely opposed.

So, again, amongst the radical, more radical, Shia militant, religiously inspired militants of the Amal Movement or affiliated with it, the Amal Movement was compromised in its eyes. It didn't take a strong enough stance against Israel. And this was considered a betrayal by the Shia hardliners affiliated with Amal.

Aimen: And two of those who were disappointed, deeply disappointed were Abbas al-Musawi and Subhi al-Tufayli.

Thomas: Abbas al-Musawi and Subhi al-Tufayli, the two co-founders of Hezbollah. And this betrayal in their eyes by Amal really opened up a big opportunity for a new political player to enter the Lebanese theatre of politics, war, terrorism and chaos, Hezbollah. And we're going to take a break right there.

Now, dear listener, I hope that was clear. We needed to give you that foundation so that you can understand out of what Hezbollah was born. And when we come back, we will see what that newborn baby was like. Stay with us.

[Music Playing]

We're back. Hezbollah is about to be born into the theatre of Lebanese Civil War. But before we talk about that, Aimen, let's go back to our old buddy Iran and talk about the Iranian influence in the formation of Hezbollah.

So, as we mentioned in the last part in 1978, or beginning around that time, and continuing for a few years after, Shia clerics in Iraq were executed or expelled by Saddam Hussein. He feared that they were fomenting revolution there, as they were currently doing against the Shah, and then did against the Shah.

And many of these expelled clerics and other Shia political supporters of the revolution went to Lebanon.

The Iranian revolution then took place. Some Shia in Lebanon were definitely inspired by it and by its ideals. And in 1982, the IRGC, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps of Iran, opened a couple of training camps, one in Lebanon and one in Syria.

And that summer, 1500 IRGC soldiers went to these camps under the supervision, in fact, of Iran's ambassador to Damascus, and began to give radical Lebanese Shia militants training, both in the arts of war and in the arts of revolutionary politics.

Aimen: Absolutely. And actually in 1982, it's the same year in which a lot of disaffected Amal Islamist members went all the way to Iran to meet Ayatollah Khomeini. And among them, of course, was Abbas al-Musawi, Subhi al-Tufayli and many others, including by the way, Husayn al-Musawi, a cousin of Abbas al-Musawi, who to this day is still alive, funny enough.

They were all encouraged to disassociate with Amal and to establish a separate Islamic resistance movement in Lebanon. And so, they did.

Thomas: Yes, Abbas al-Musawi is an important character. He's one of the two co-founders of Hezbollah. When he had returned to Lebanon from Najaf, from Iraq, he set up a Hawza, a Shia religious seminary in Baalbek in Lebanon.

And while he was there, he met a very young teenager, a man who would become his protege to some extent, and a man who would certainly change Lebanon forever, and who will become really the main character of this narrative. And I'm talking about Hassan Nasrallah.

Aimen: Oh, yes, indeed. Hassan Nasrallah.

Thomas: Now Aimen, maybe for some of our listeners, Hassan Nasrallah is known as the leader of Hezbollah, but as an Arab, what does that name mean to you? Because he is (love him or hate him), an Arab political superstar. Really, everyone in the Middle East knows this man.

Aimen: Well, first of all, he's charismatic and a good orator and a good speaker. Someone basically who would hold your attention for his long speeches. And at the same time, clever, shrewd, he is a strategist and a political calculator.

Thomas: And of course, we mustn't overlook the fact that he has a notorious lisp. He speaks with a lisp.

Aimen: Indeed.

Thomas: Which makes his speeches slightly comical. Not to make fun of anyone with a lisp, but slightly comical, wouldn't you say, Aimen?

Aimen: Listen, there is no need to be so insensitive about me being a lisp, okay?

Thomas: I mean, dear listener, if you have a lisp, we love you. We honestly do. But at the same time, it must be admitted that when you turn to Al-Manar TV station, Hezbollah's TV station, and you hear Hassan Nasrallah decrying the crimes of Israel, the crimes of the U.S., and calling for Islamic Revolution with a lisp, it's just a bit satirical.

It's almost like — and you can imagine Sacha Baron Cohen, it's almost like a cartoon character of an Islamic radical.

Aimen: Absolutely. But still, yet he commands considerable respect among millions upon millions of the Shia of the Middle East and the Muslim world. You see, Hassan Nasrallah, I saw a speech of his, which was one of the earliest speeches of his in 1984, which I referred to at the beginning of the episode.

And from the beginning, you can see the man had a zeal. And he was always by the side of Abbas al-Musawi, his teacher, his guru, we can call him this way.

Thomas: Yeah. And he was political from a very young age, in the mid-70s when he was only like 15-years-old, he became his village's Amal movement representative. So, he was another one of these Shia affiliated with Amal, who, alongside his mentor, Abbas al-Musawi, became disillusioned with Amal and joined what in 1982, was only called the Islamic Resistance.

It was not yet called Hezbollah. This is very important. It's important because the precise date when Hezbollah was formed is not really known, because at the beginning, the Islamic resistance was very loosely organised, more like a kind of militant cabal than a hard and fast organisation.

Comprised of young militant Shia activists who were self-consciously a revolutionary vanguard of the Islamic Revolution inside Lebanon. They were that Sayyid Qutb Vanguard. And they answered to Iran.

Aimen: Thomas, if some listeners were to ask us what is the difference, what is the difference in the aims between Hezbollah and Amal? I think the best way to answer is simple. It's very simple answer.

Amal wants to protect the political rights of the Shi’ites in Lebanon, Hezbollah, however, wants Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and some other countries with it, Yemen, Bahrain to be part of the greater Islamic Republic, centred in Tehran and led by the grand deputy of the absent Imam, the Ayatollah of the day, whether it is Khomeini in the past and Khamenei right now.

So, this is the deep ideological rift between the two. This is why the two split from each other, and of course, would later clash briefly with each other.

Thomas: As we'll see. And Hezbollah's strategy at the very beginning, or the Islamic resistances strategy, I should say, mirrored Iran's strategy. So, initially its primary targets, and this is kind of interesting, I'd forgotten this, were communists.

Over 100 Communist party members in Lebanon were killed by the Islamic resistance in its first years. The same thing was happening in Iran. Iran was purging communists and other leftists who had participated in the revolution there from society.

The other prong of its initial strategy also echoed Iran. And that is that the Islamic Resistance, if you like, Hezbollah, made life hell for America in Lebanon. America was in Lebanon overseeing an international peacekeeping force, the MNF short for multinational force, since the withdrawal of the PLO, the Palestinian Liberation Organization from Lebanon in 1982.

We talked about this in the Lebanon episode, Yasser Arafat and the other leaders within the PLO left Lebanon went to Tunisia, leaving behind 300,000 Palestinians in camps. And the MNF overseen by America and other countries like Britain and France were there to keep the peace or so they thought.

But the peace was not kept, especially not in October 1983. Let's start by saying when two big bomb explosions went off.

Aimen: October 1983, a date that is so infamous, because on that day, two trucks loaded with huge amount of explosives drove into both simultaneously the French paratroopers headquarters and the U.S. Marines headquarters.

And the explosions were so massive that resulted in the deaths of 240 U.S. Marines and 60 French paratroopers. That is actually the largest number of U.S. military personnel to be killed due to a single act of terrorism to this day.

In 9/11, most of the fatalities were civilians. So, it is the largest terror attack by far. But when we talk about the U.S. military, yes, it is the largest number of fatalities due to a terror attack.

Thomas: And 60 French paratroopers also died in that bomb attack. So, both countries, the U.S. and France, were left bleeding.

Now, the question is, who carried out the attacks? As I said, dear listener, Hezbollah was not yet formerly Hezbollah. It was just the “Islamic Resistance” and its operations were certainly very murky at this time, and no one can say for sure that it was them.

A group claimed responsibility. It called itself the Islamic Jihad Organization. And this group was definitely linked to Iran. And frankly, Aimen, I think was linked to what would become Hezbollah, no question.

Aimen: I mean, it's very clear that Imad Mughniyeh, who would later become the military commander of external operations for Hezbollah, was behind this attack.

And because his fingerprints, in a sense, not literally, but figuratively, were on the same style of attack that would kill 19 elite American U.S. pilots in my hometown, Al Khobar in Saudi Arabia in 1996, in a similar attack, similar style, and he was definitely behind it.

Thomas: Imad Mughniyeh will definitely come up again, dear listener. He is a key player in the history of Hezbollah. The attacks in 1983 led President Reagan at the time of the United States to wind up the MNF the multinational force and withdraw all American forces from Lebanon.

And in fact, in 1987, it got so bad for Americans in Lebanon that the U.S. declared a ban on American citizens from travelling to the country, a ban that lasted a whole decade. Just as a reminder, how chaotic Lebanon was and how impactful Hezbollah's activities were there on the ground.

There were other things that targeted Westerners, Americans, et cetera. There was the notorious hijacking of the TWA Flight 847. Again, Imad Mughniyeh is likely behind that. There were assassinations, lots of hostages were taken, especially foreign journalists who were kidnapped and held hostage, some for years.

Terry Anderson, a particularly famous case, he was held for seven years. He had been kidnapped by Hezbollah. The hostage taking of Hezbollah was a very important factor in the Iran-Contra affair, which we are not going to discuss.

Aimen: Please no.

Thomas: We discussed it last season. I'm not going to discuss it again, but just again, to contextualise it, the Iran-Contra affair largely circled around trying to free American hostages held by Hezbollah.

So, Hezbollah was pursuing this strategy, making life hell for America, and it succeeded. They were like, “Wow, America's pulled out its troops, we're winning.”

It was also, and perhaps primarily aiming at making life hell for Israel. The very first, in fact, the very first attack that the Islamic resistance carried out was in November 1982, when a truck bomb went off at the Israeli intelligence headquarters in Tyre, in southern Lebanon, killing 75 Israeli officers and 14 Arab prisoners.

And this is notable, Aimen, because it was a suicide attack. It was what Hezbollah called a self-martyrdom.

Aimen: This was big, actually, Thomas, because this is the first time that a suicide bombing would be condoned by a theological branch of Islam here, Shia Islam, adopting this method, of course, from left-wing guerillas just like that LTTE, the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, as well as other militants who used that tactic before.

However, for it to be used, for suicide bombing to be used by a religious movement, or by Shia, was something big. And then this, of course, would influence Sunni movements first in the Palestinian Territories. And of course, later in 1997, Al-Qaeda and others,

Thomas: As a result of this first attack, Hezbollah, and the Israeli occupation forces because remember, dear listener, Israel was occupying a huge suede of Lebanese territory at this point, led to a back and forth between both sides for years.

There was the terrible incident in 1983 when an Israeli army patrol in the village of Nabatiye, or the town of Nabatiye in southern Lebanon, opened fire on a crowd of Shia participating in a sacred procession on the Holy Day of Ashura.

It was all a blunder. They hadn't meant to go to the town at all. They'd been told to stay away from the town. They misread the map. They kind of drove into this crowd. They fired on the crowd to disperse them. It led to a terrible riot. The stones being thrown, more people killing.

And this sort of thing was happening back and forth. The Islamic resistance attacking Israeli troops, Israeli troops attacking Shia militants and civilians, and the Islamic resistance was putting such pressure on Israeli troops that it led directly to the decision by Israel in 1985 to withdraw its forces from all of Lebanon, apart from the area south of the Litani River, south Lebanon, the Shia heartlands of Lebanon.

So, they could concentrate their forces where they were being attacked the most, and defend, as they put it Israel proper. Now for the Islamic resistance, for Abbas al-Musawi, for Subhi al-Tufayli, and for young Hassan Nasrallah, this was an immense achievement. They took full credit for liberating most of Lebanon from Israeli forces.

Aimen: So, taking credit for the expulsion of Israeli forces from parts of Lebanon into the south, with some exaggeration, of course. Finally, the so-called Islamic resistance came out finally as Hezbollah and issued that communiqué, that letter, which absolutely looks as if it was written by the Iranian embassy in Damascus.

Thomas: All of the Iranian bogeymen are there, the U.S., Israel of course. The one thing about the letter, though, which is interesting, is it does not openly call for the establishment of an Islamic Republic on the basis of Wilayat al-Faqih in Lebanon.

It does omit that, which I think from the very beginning led many analysts to downplay or even doubt the connection between Iran and Hezbollah. And I think we need to admit that there are lots of people, journalists, academics, who do rather downplay the connection and believe that the Iranian connection is over egged.

I don't know how they can possibly believe it, but it's true. Sometimes you get that.

Aimen: Again, it’s the Taqiyya syndrome, man. It is absolutely the political Taqiyya.

Thomas: Yes, Taqiyya. You remember, dear listener, the ability to hide your true religious allegiance.

Aimen: Exactly. The Taqiyya siyasiyat and Taqiyya diniyat, we talked about it before. The religious concealment of your aims and goals, the political concealment of your aims and goals.

This is practised to the letter. Every time you hear Iran saying, our nuclear program is for peaceful purposes, again, Taqiyya. Every time you hear Hezbollah saying, we are a political party, we are not terrorists. We don't carry out any acts of terror abroad, Taqiyya.

But the problem is the lack of understanding by western journalists, analysts, academics of the concept of Taqiyya, they apply their secular scepticism into religious minds as if you're trying to put an octagonal shape into a circular hole. It's just, it's not going to work.

Thomas: Well, Hezbollah wasn't really hiding its true intentions with that letter. Having declared itself openly now, as a player in Lebanon's continuing civil war, which was actually about to reach its nadir, so horrible was the bloodletting to become.

After Hezbollah openly declared itself, Hezbollah focused its attention first, surprisingly, perhaps on its fellow Shia, and to consolidate its influence over the Shia of Lebanon declared war on Amal.

Aimen: Indeed, they call it actually the War of the Brothers. And it lasted two years and seven months, 5,000 dead, tens of thousands wounded, dispossessed. And so, of course it was absolutely horrendous. But Hezbollah came on top.

Thomas: As we said. Amal's political ideology was less religiously inclined. It had a non-clerical leadership. Hezbollah did not like this. Hezbollah also thought that Amal was too willing to participate in politics.

As a revolutionary vanguard movement in the Sayyid Qutb mode, Hezbollah felt that democracy was one of those obstacles that needed to be overcome on the road to Islamic Revolution.

So, it opposed democracy when it came out in 1985 as Hezbollah. For all these reasons, as you say, the war of the brothers was launched, and it was terrible. Now, Amal was not innocent in this war. Amal was deeply embroiled in Lebanese Civil War politics at the time.

And so, its hands were covered in blood, especially in the notorious War of the Camps in 1985, when Amal launched a campaign to wipe out Palestinian militants in the Palestinian refugee camps, which campaign failed because Hezbollah aided the Palestinians.

Aimen: And this is when the influence of Hezbollah during the 1985, 1987 campaign of the refugee camps led in 1987 to the establishment of a similar organisation in the Palestinian Territories called Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiya HAMAS, the Islamic Resistance Movement in Palestine, HAMAS, to split from what? From the PLO.

Thomas: Yes, it's amazing, but it's all connected, dear listener. It's all connected. You must pay close attention.

Aimen: Indeed.

Thomas: The War of the Brothers sort of reached a climax in 1988, and it's a little bit complicated, but it's a fascinating story. So, an Amal splinter group allied itself with Hezbollah and kidnapped the U.S. Marine Lieutenant Colonel William Higgins, in 1988.

Amal itself at that time was trying to maintain a very cooperative relationship with the United Nations interim force in Lebanon, UNIFIL, another one of these global bodies trying to create the conditions of peace in Lebanon, trying and failing.

Higgins was among the leadership of UNIFIL and Amal, hoping to maintain this cooperative relationship with it, tried to retrieve Higgins from its splinter group who had kidnapped him. A splinter group allied with Hezbollah.

Higgins' kidnappers managed to evade Amal. So, Amal militants targeted the kidnappers who managed to evade them. And this sparked off a ferocious back and forth between Amal and Hezbollah.

Initially, Amal had the upper hand, and at one point it did look as if Hezbollah might be finished, but the tables soon turn. And in the fall of 1988, Beirut’s largely Shia southern suburbs exploded into fighting. And this is really Aimen, what you were talking about.

Aimen: And in the famous largely Shia southern suburbs of Beirut, the war between the brothers erupted, Amal and Hezbollah were fighting for months in the streets, to the point where even the women were coming out to match to beg the cousins and the brothers and the family members who were fighting each other on either side of the political and religious divide, even though they were all Shia to stop.

And even the women were shot and were chased with bullets. But in the end, Hezbollah expelled Amal out of the southern suburbs of Beirut, the heartland of Shia political power in Lebanon.

And since then, and until now, Amal is nothing but a subordinate branch of Shia Lebanese as far as Hezbollah is concerned, Hezbollah is the big brother, and Amal is just a butler.

Thomas: Amidst all the bloodletting of the war of the brothers, poor Lieutenant Colonel Higgins was rather lost sight of, and he was sadly killed. And there's a whole story about the attempts to find out who killed him exactly. And to get justice. That's perhaps meat for another episode. Who knows?

What I think is interesting about it is the bloodletting became so bad in Lebanon that it actually embarrassed Iran. By this time, the Ayatollah Khomeini had died, and President Rafsanjani came to power there.

Rafsanjani was trying, at the very least, to rehabilitate the Islamic revolution's image. Following the Iran Iraq war, Iran was devastated. It was a time of reconsolidation. Rafsanjani was quite brilliant at repackaging the Islamic Revolution in a slightly softer way for public consumption at least.

And the bloodletting in Lebanon was embarrassing. So, he actually publicly denounced the Shia in Lebanon for their killing.

Aimen: Yeah. And this is why in the end, it was a pressure from both Tehran and Damascus, which of course led to the truce and the ending of the war between the two sides.

It did not lead to political unity between the two, but it led to some sort of unity of purpose that the Shia house in Lebanon, that the Shia tent must remain united politically. But there is no doubt Hezbollah is now in the driving seat.

Thomas: Negotiating the end of war was in the air, because of course, around the same time, the Lebanese Civil War itself came to an end, thanks to the 1989 Taif Agreement signed in the city of Taif in Saudi Arabia, brokered by King Fahd of Saudi Arabia.

We don't want to talk about the agreement, it's too complicated. But Hezbollah acquired quite a significant concession during the Taif Agreement negotiations.

Aimen: And what a concession, Thomas, what a concession. In fact, it was a disaster. The most fundamental clause of the Taif Agreement was that all political militias must disarm all of them, no exception in order for the army to be the only armed entity within the Republic so that a Republican life could resume normally.

And there is only one guarantor of peace and security within the Lebanese territory, and that would be the army. However, Hezbollah sneakily insisted on including an exemption for itself because, and under the pretext of fighting the Israeli occupation of a significant part of the Lebanese territory, south of the Litani River.

Thomas: You say pretence Aimen, just before you go on. You say pretence. But it is true. Israeli forces were occupying the Shia heartlands of Southern Lebanon.

Aimen: Indeed, Thomas, the Lebanese territories south of the Litani River were still occupied. And there are something like a few hundred thousand Lebanese living under occupation there under the Israeli occupation.

But there is two issues here. Isn't it the responsibility of the new Lebanese state and the new Lebanese army to liberate these lands and not up to one sectarian militia? That's a very valid question, because if you remember, Israel wasn't the only armed force in Southern Lebanon.

In fact, Israel had a huge army of its own consisting of Christian and Shia Lebanese who were allied with the Israelis. So, if there is a non-sectarian army in South Lebanon, allied with the Israeli occupation force, then it is the responsibility of the non-sectarian Lebanese army to come and free the South.

But this is where a Taif Agreement included a clause, a virus that would actually eat up the future peace of Lebanon by allowing Hezbollah to maintain and retain huge arsenal of weapons.

And when they came out, they came out under the leadership, not of secular figures like Nabih Berri, the leader of Amal. They were not wearing suits. They were wearing turbans, white and black. Subhi al-Tufayli was the leader of Hezbollah and Abbas al-Musawi was the commander of the military wing.

Thomas: So, Hezbollah won these concessions in the Taif Agreement and maintained its resistance stance against Israeli occupation. Resumed its tit for tat attacks against Israeli patrols in the south, Israeli patrols attacking back.

Internally, Hezbollah underwent a change of management. There was a clash or a disagreement between al-Tufayli who was the leader, and Abbas al-Musawi, who was the military commander, his deputy, really.

And Tufayli, and you remember dear listener, these are the two co-founders of Hezbollah. They had studied under the Sadrs, they would've been inspired by the Iranian Revolution. Tufayli was forced out of the leadership position and was replaced by Abbas al-Musawi.

But that wasn't to last for long. In February of 1992, a fleet of Israeli Apache helicopters fired missiles at Musawi’s motorcade in southern Lebanon. And he died. He was assassinated.

His five-year-old son, Hussein was also killed in the attack. This would become a big fodder for Hezbollah propaganda. As you can imagine, especially with a name like Hussein, the most famous martyr in all of Islamic history.

Abbas al-Musawi died and was replaced by his young protege, the man with a lisp, but the man who still commands immense respect across certainly the Shia world, indeed the Muslim world, and to some extent the global anti-American, anti-Western resistance fraternity, Hassan Nasrallah.

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And that's where we're going to leave this first in our two-part series on Hezbollah with Hassan Nasrallah at the very top of the organisation. And in our next episode, we will tell the story of how this man, Hasan Nasrallah, effectively took over Lebanon. Stay tuned.

A reminder that you can follow the show over on Facebook and Twitter at MH Conflicted. And for a deeper dive into all the subjects we talk about here on Conflicted, head over to Facebook and search Conflicted Podcast Discussion Group.

There you will find other fans of the show engaging in heated debates, enlightening conversations, and just generally geeking out over Conflicted related topics.

Conflicted is a Message Heard production. This episode was produced and edited by Harry Stott. Sandra Ferrari is our executive producer. Our theme music is by Matt Huxley and Tom Biddle.

Conflicted S4 E16: What Was Hamas Thinking?

Thomas: Welcome back, dear listeners. This is Thomas Small here with my co-host, Aimen Dean. Hello, Aimen.

Aimen: Hi, Thomas. How are you?

Thomas: I'm well. It's been a rather sad and hugely worrying few days.

Aimen: Indeed.

Thomas: This is an emergency episode that we feel we have to produce as the world is reeling from the tragic events in Israel and Gaza. Conflicted was born to explain why situations like the current one are happening, because it's all connected in the cauldron of events over the past century and beyond in the Middle East.

[Music Playing]

What we want to do today is to give you a bit of context on Hamas, to tell you how we got to this point and with the larger forces at play here to speculate on what the weeks and indeed years to come might hold.

We are recording this on the afternoon of Tuesday, the 10th of October, the previous Saturday. So, three days ago Hamas, the political rulers or if you like, of the Gaza Strip, an Islamist militant group with direct ties to the Muslim Brotherhood, they launched a horrific incursion into Israel across the border there.

As of this recording, the death toll now stands at 900 Israelis, according to Israeli media, and more than 700 Palestinians in Gaza as a result of Israeli reprisals, according to the Palestinian Health Ministry. And just this afternoon, the Israeli military announced that they had killed 1500 Palestinian militants on the Israeli-Gaza border.

So, that's where it stands now, according to at least what the media is telling me. How about you, Aimen? I mean, give me your immediate reaction when you sort of woke up on Saturday or whenever you realised what was going on. What was your immediate reaction? Were you surprised?

Aimen: For me, the moment I woke up and I realised that something like this is happening, I thought to myself, goodness, this is not going to end well. Because the images of Hamas militants on cars and on pickups, going into Sderot and into the southern suburbs of Ashkelon, it's like, wow, how could that happen? How did they break out of that high security, high tech wall that the Israeli military built around Gaza?

And it was like bewilderment, just like the rest of the globe, we were all shocked. And as the day unfolded, the absolute horror of what was happening, car after car, coming back to Gaza, bringing with them alive and dead soldiers and later civilians, young and old. And I was telling myself, this is without doubt, the 9/11, not only of Israel, but of the entire Middle East.

Thomas: The 9/11 in terms of the death count? I mean, I think far more people died on 9/11 than died on Saturday. But I guess if you're talking about the population-

Aimen: Yeah. On Saturdays, the numbers actually are approaching 1,240 as of the latest count from the Israeli side as well as 3000 wounded.

1,240, and still, there are some of the kibbutz and some of the settlements that hasn't yet been fully searched. The death toll for Saturday could reach 1500 Israelis.

This is among a population of 6 million. 9/11 happened of 3000 dead in a population of 330 million. So, you can imagine that the proportion of what happened was tremendous.

Thomas: Yeah.

Aimen: And the problem for me here, Thomas, is that there was nothing happening prior to the events of 7th October of 2023 that prepared us mentally and made us aware that something is about to happen.

Thomas: But did we just take our eyes off the ball, Aimen? I mean, it did come the day after the 50th anniversary of the Yom Kippur War of 1973, when in a surprise attack an Arab coalition led by Egypt did give Israel a big bloody nose.

Were we just kind of lulled into naive quiescence? I mean, how did this happen? You said, Aimen, you just said, how did they cross the border? How the hell did this happen without the Israelis knowing about it, for goodness sake?

I mean, all sorts of reports are coming in left and right about Netanyahu being told in advance by Egyptian intelligence but deciding to ignore the intelligence. Most of the troops were up in the north thinking that maybe the next attack would come from Hezbollah. It's just such a monumental failure.

Aimen: It is, and I can tell you that history will confirm what we talk about in this episode. But the initial reports coming out of Gaza, that reliance on Chinese, Huawei phones and tablets and laptops that are run by in-house Chinese design systems that are unfamiliar to Israeli hackers might have contributed partially to the sense of signal intelligence blindness that the Israelis suffered from, coupled with a high-tech training that Hamas militants received from Iran and other international players.

We don't need to mention their names at the moment. Not to mention the fact that, in this day and age, if you combine cyber security hack with signal intelligence blindness, with an enemy that is sleeping on the wheel, with some jamming equipment, if you bring all of this, you reach what we call the perfect storm. And this is what happened on 7th of October.

And I think it is a monumental intelligence and security failure. And I think heads will roll once this bloody war is over. But for the time being, all I can tell you is that on the first day, Hamas gave Israel the bloodiest nose it had in its entire 75 years of existence.

Thomas: Well, for my sins, I have become knowledgeable about things to do with terrorism and war in the Middle East. I say for my sins, because temperamentally, I hate violence. I hate bloodshed.

I cannot watch these YouTube clips, these TikTok videos that are flying around where Hamas have revealed precisely what they did to those victims of their violence on that day. I can't watch it.

I can read descriptions of it. I can hardly read them, frankly. I mean, I don't even want to repeat the sort of things that we're hearing about and seeing about this attack, the sort of brutality waged against children, against women, against old women. This is beyond unspeakable.

Now, I know that in the wars that have waged on and off almost constantly between Israel and the Palestinians, since 1948, much life has been lost. Many civilians have died. And it's easy possibly to be overtaken by a tremendous sense of moral outrage when one such occasion occurs.

But there does seem to be something, especially callous and brutal and calculated about this attack beyond anything that we've seen before. It seems to me. Also given the fact, Aimen, that the leaders of Hamas and their Iranian overlords who would've given the green light for this attack, must have known that the Israeli state and the Israeli people would never stand for it and would unleash an almighty unholy shit storm of fire upon Gaza in retaliation.

And yet, they still launched the attack knowing that it would result as it is now resulting in many, many hundreds and probably thousands of civilian deaths on their side. Why would they do that?

Aimen: All my life, Thomas, I have condemned stupidity. I condemned utterly with horror, and I stood against what bin Laden did when he unleashed the wrath of America on Afghanistan and Iraq when he smashed those aircraft through his deluded recruits into the World Trade Center Towers and the Pentagon on 9/11.

I completely, on this podcast, condemned the stupidity and utter stupidity of Saddam Hussein when he invaded Kuwait and invited the wrath of the United States and the International Coalition to destroy Iraq and destroy its culture, its heritage, its progress, its institutions. And to bring it back to the Stone Age because of his stupidity.

I am someone who believe that stupid people are far more destructive than shrewdly calculated villains. And this is the problem. You see, when I look at any conflict, and I am unfortunately, Thomas, for my sins, old and new, a graduate of the sad and utterly brutal school of war.

I spent six years of my life in four war zones. One of them was extremely genocidal, the Bosnian conflict. I spent 14 months of my life there from the age of 16 until the age of 17.

And I've seen my fair share of mass graves, charred remains of the old and the young. I've seen young girls’ survivors of rape that lasted for two years in the death camps. And I've seen my fair share of brutality in Afghanistan, my fair share of brutality in the Caucasus and what war does to the mental wellbeing of people in the Southern Philippines.

And I can tell you that I always believed after all the time I spent in the conflict (and I was young at the time between the age of 16 to the age of 22), that war is the ultimate failure of human reason.

And the problem with people who start wars is that they cannot finish them. Once you start it, it's like a fire, like an arsonist. You don't know when you can finish them, because if it gets out of hand, if it gets out of your control, it'll consume everything around you, including possibly those who you love and those who you are supposed to protect.

That is why I even in this podcast when you were telling me about Iran and how much I am condemning Iran all the time, and yet when you ask me what is the solution, I said, no, we can't absolutely wage a war against Iran because wars will have an uncertain outcome, and it will cause death, destruction, suffering, and refugees in the millions and deaths in the hundreds of thousands. War is not preferable.

And on this podcast, I said that if there is a time machine, I would go back and I will warn the Syrian people that it is better to live under Bashar, than to do the uprising, because it's going to lead to a much worse situation.

You see for me, when I look at the conflict, I look at the facts. You and I, Thomas, are students of history, and we love looking at history from an objective point of view.

And the problem with the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is that you can't start talking about it until you start feeling that, like it happened to me before in Bosnia, that you are walking in a minefield. You are walking literally in a minefield.

And actually, it happened before that I stepped in a mine. But thank God, through his divine providence, nothing happened. In fact, there were four mines linked to each other. For them not to have exploded was a divine miracle. Maybe my mother was watching up from there. Thank you, mom.

Nonetheless, what I'm saying is that it is a minefield. You say a wrong word, the left will curse you, you say another wrong word, the right will curse you. You state the fact and the pro-Palestinians, they accuse you of supporting genocide.

And if you say another word, and the pro-Israelis will immediately tell you, you are antisemite. It's like, guys, just calm down. Everyone, please just take a breath and let us examine the facts.

Thomas: I know this very well, Aimen. Because if you remember when we set out last season to record our two episodes on Israel-Palestine, so the first one covering Zionism and the War of Israeli independence, or the Nakba in 1948, and the next one about the two great wars in ‘67 and ‘73 between the Arabs and the Israelis, both of which Israel soundly won, and which left the cause of Arab nationalism, at least in tatters.

So, we've done episodes on those. And if you remember, when we set out to begin recording them, I confessed that I'd sort of postponed doing episodes on Israel and Palestine, because the idea of it terrifies me because I hate upsetting people. And there is no cause on planet earth more divisive than the cause of Israel and Palestine.

And yet, I will say scenes like the ones I saw on the news here in Britain yesterday of pro-Palestinian protestors outside the Israeli embassy in London, justifying the Hamas attack on Saturday.

And I cannot understand how people seeing the tactics of a group like Hamas, a Sayyid Qutb inspired, revolutionary, militant vanguard movement, utterly opposed to anything but the most absolute and radical political goal, how they can see these tactics played out in front of them, and not just totally condemn them regardless of any political — it's beyond politics this.

I don't understand it, and I don't like feeling angry. I try to remain balanced and as you say, fact driven. But this has made me angry. How have we reached this place where the Islamists and the, let's say, broadly speaking, liberal leftist coalition of the world, they can't understand that this is just terrible.

We’ve spent a lot of time this season discussing Islamism, discussing Sayyid Qutb, and discussing the Muslim Brotherhood. And the question of when do moderate means become radical, when the end is radical or which groups employ radical means to achieve radical ends? Whether the Muslim Brotherhood can be considered moderate when it's ends are radical.

And here we see this being played out in real time in front of us because … and sadly, we don't have time to do as we would normally do a proper multi-episode series arc on Hamas, and we will do that, I can tell you that much now. But for now, Hamas is the Muslim Brotherhood in Gaza.

Aimen: Absolutely.

Thomas: And it comes out of the Muslim Brotherhood. But actually, more interestingly, from the point of view of this season of Conflicted, it emerges precisely out of that debate that we talked about in a previous episode, between moderate and radical voices within the Muslim Brotherhood, those voices who opposed Sayyid Qutb's vision and those voices who supported Sayyid Qutb's vision.

This conversation, this debate was going on in the 70s and in the 80s, and it unleashed really explicitly horrible groups like Egyptian Islamic Jihad and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, most importantly, who were just like overtly brutal pursuing jihad against civilians in Israel, overtly.

In contrast to the Muslim Brotherhood, which at that time had explicitly adopted a more moderate, less Sayyid Qutb style position, saying, no, no, the Jihad against Israel must be delayed until the whole Muslim world is united around the Muslim Brotherhood Project and has returned to upstanding personal piety.

So basically, until the Muslim world was Muslim Brotherhood, we shouldn't launch a jihad against Israel. Well, the Qutbist wing were opposed to this. And these extremely radical groups were emerging in the late 70s and the early 80s, launching terrible attacks and just basically advocating direct aggression.

And in response to this, the so-called moderate Muslim Brotherhood felt forced to create its own to semi-radical wing, Hamas, which then in each instance, becomes more radical as it pursues its radical end.

I mean, Aimen, this is right, this is what happened because as you are keen to tell me all the time, at every stage of the way since it's emergence officially in 1988, Hamas has opposed, resisted, undermined, and destroyed any realistic or unrealistic attempt to create something like a peaceful solution between Israel and the Palestinian authority. Every time.

Aimen: Of course, I mean, the whole project for Hamas is to the so-called liberation of Palestine from the river to the sea, the so-called historical Palestine. This is why you hear always the chants of the leftists and the Islamists in the streets of London, New York, Chicago, and in Paris and Berlin, “From the river to the sea, Palestine must be free.”

So, the whole idea is that, okay, fine, I mean, it is really the uprooting of all the Israelis and sending them to Europe and Latin America, wherever, I mean, so it is to some extent genocidal and ethnic cleansing aim and goal.

But Thomas, the problem is not here, apart from the fact that Hamas sabotaged and derailed every single possible attempt at peace, whether it is Oslo in 1993, between ‘93 and ‘96, they launched countless number of suicide bombings against civilians and buses, and in nightclubs and everywhere in Israel.

Thomas: Suicide bombing dear listener, which I might say was a tactic that they learned in training camps in southern Lebanon from Hezbollah. So, when you listen to our two episodes on Hezbollah coming up, just keep that in mind now.

Aimen: Absolutely.

Thomas: Now you can really see what Hezbollah means for the region. They trained those guys to do that.

Aimen: Absolutely. And then you have the fact that after that, when a Barak and Yasser Arafat were finally on the verge in Camp David to have a second Camp David, and that finally we will have 90% of the West Bank with East Jerusalem as the capital of a Palestinian state.

Thomas: This is in 1999. Yeah.

Aimen: Exactly. In Camp David. Hamas went on a spree of suicide bombings. Sharon responded with a visit to the Temple Mount, and the second intifāḍah started, and then from 2000 until 2006, they killed 700 Israelis in suicide bombings.

I mean, they just relished for destruction. They are the ones who brought Ariel Sharon, from being an opposition figure, hated by the majority of Israelis into a national hero again. That is Hamas. They are the divine answer to the Israeli right-wing prayers.

Thomas: Exactly. You understand that. You see the dynamic at play, that their radicalism has caused an in response an increasing right-wing, more paranoid security conscious Israeli state to evolve over the last 30 years. It's endless. And this is only going to get worse now, unimaginably worse.

Aimen: Which brings us, Thomas, now to the last six months. What happened? What are-

Thomas: Yeah. What happened, Aimen?

Aimen: The events that led to the horror that we are seeing today, and again, I am calling upon the listener to be objective and to listen to reason and not to follow one's own prejudices here.

Just relax, don't think that you know everything about the issue. Remember that there are many things that we could talk about among them, the question of Gaza being an open-air prison and everything and all of that.

But you have to remember, Gaza is ruled by Hamas, which has overthrown the Palestinian authority in a military coup 16 years ago. And that led to the blockade of Gaza because Gaza is ruled by a organisation that years prior was prescribed by America, by Canada, by the European Union, by the Arab world, even for God's sake, by many countries, in the Arab world, as a terrorist organisation.

You can't ask the world to deal with a terrorist organisation, even if they were in control of a territory, that is the reason for the blockade.

Hamas could have ended the blockade anytime if they just accepted the authority of the Palestinian government to come back to the territory, and that would have ended the blockade. That is the reason for the blockade. Now we come back to it.

As you know, six months ago, Saudi Arabia embarked on a policy of rapprochement and de-escalation in the entire Middle East, they agreed to a brokered, a Chinese brokered non-aggression pact with Iran to try to de-escalate and to end the war in Yemen.

Thomas: We have an episode on this coming up, dear listener. Yeah.

Aimen: Absolutely. And at the same time, to be able to decrease the tensions that finally, peace can come to Yemen, and tensions can be reduced between Iran and Saudi Arabia.

In the meantime, Saudi Arabia also wanted to pursue a normalisation of relations with Israel.

Thomas: And sorry, Aimen, this is following the historic Abraham Accords in which the UAE and a basket of other Arab states normalised relations with Israel.

So, Saudi Arabia wanted to do the same. And in fact, even when the Abraham Accords were signed a few years ago, everyone knew that that was a kind of test scenario. It was a sort of prologue to the big kahuna, the kingdom normalising relations with Israel.

Aimen: Absolutely. So, for Saudi Arabia, they have two sets of demands, one set of demands that concerns Saudi Arabia and one set of demands that concern in the Palestinians. As far as the demands that are concerning Saudi Arabia, the Saudi is aware, of course, asking the U.S. for certain concessions, one on advanced weaponry, including the F-35 jets, and a military pact.

But the most important among them is for Saudi Arabia to have a nuclear civilian program built and operated by the U.S. according to golden standards of safety that would prevent Saudi Arabia from building their own nuclear weapons using American technology.

So, the whole idea is that Saudi Arabia would receive American nuclear technology built and operated by American engineers with golden standards of safeguards to prevent the nuclear weapons proliferation. Now, why is that?

In the Yemen episode of the first season, and we come full circle again, we talked about water and water desalination and how it is important for Saudi Arabia, a land that has no rivers or lakes to procure water, for its population. And as the population increased-

Thomas: Not just important, in that episode, Aimen, you very powerfully explained that if Saudi Arabia lost its access to clean water, fresh water from desalination plants within three days, it would just collapse. So, we're talking-

Aimen: Yeah, absolutely.

Thomas: Existentially vital question, access to fresh water. Yeah.

Aimen: So, the Saudis made their own presentations to the Americans over the past months, and they asked for the nuclear power to be able in the future, a future that has no fossil fuels, because fossil fuels are a finite, and one day they will run out.

So, how would the Saudis procure and secure drinkable water for their population without power, without energy? And therefore, the nuclear energy is the answer, not solar, not wind, because the solar and wind are not the intense dispatchable source of energy that is needed to operate large water desalination plants.

Thomas: So, the Saudis reached out to the Americans and basically said, look, in exchange for normalising relations with Israel, we would like you to continue to extend your military umbrella over us.

Aimen: Absolutely.

Thomas: We would like you to come to our defence in the case of any war, let's say, with Iran. And then also we would like you to oversee and provide for us civilian nuclear technology in order to run our desalination plants for our drinking water.

Aimen: Not only that, Thomas, not only for water desalination, but also for grand projects that are not yet being announced, in order to push water into the interior of Saudi Arabia, especially into the empty quarter, in order to create basins of water the size of Qatar and beyond, even.

In order to create a new microclimate to alter the weather and to actually create more and more clouds and then rain, and then, alter the cycle of climate and to actually fight climate change and global warming in that region, altering the weather and reducing the temperature up to 10 degrees by 2050.

So, there are projects that are designed in order to do that, but they need nuclear power. So, this is the Saudi set of demands. What are the demands that the Saudis have on behalf of the Palestinians, again, that the majority of the West Bank as well as Gaza with extra land for Gaza to be the basis for a Palestinian state based on the Jared Kushner maps with some alterations with East Jerusalem, especially the holy sites to be part of the Palestinian state and to be it’s capital.

So, the Saudis were very happy with this, and actually about seven months ago, around the time they signed that Accord with the Iranians and the Chinese for the de-escalation, Saudi Arabia released some of the leading Hamas members that were serving time in Saudi jails for financing terrorism.

And they started using them as in a way to negotiate with Hamas to tell them, look, in order for this to work, we need you to start a reconciliation process with the Palestinian authority.

Thomas: The PLO. Yeah. So, yeah, just so everyone understands, Hamas and the PLO have been locked in a terrible struggle since 2006, which sort of climaxed in 2007 with Hamas taking over Gaza completely expelling or killing the PLO's security apparatus there.

And so, since that time, the Palestinian Territories have been totally divided with two separate governments. One, the West Bank with a president who is a PLO member, Mahmoud Abbas, and the other Gaza with a Hamas government, as you stated, Aimen. A radical, militant terrorist organisation governing the state there and inevitably clashing with Israel.

Aimen: Exactly. So, now the Saudis were asking Hamas to start a reconciliation process, and they told them that we cannot achieve a Palestinian state that will encompass both Gaza and the West Bank without the reconciliation and without Hamas accepting to step back, just little, to allow a political and bureaucratic administration to come back into Gaza under the auspices of the Palestinian Authority.

So, the Palestinian Authority comes back to rule in Gaza, and they would allow Hamas to be the security apparatus of Gaza. So, it is a sweet deal to an extent.

Thomas: So, you're saying about seven months ago, the Saudis opened up direct negotiations with Hamas in pursuit of that aim of getting Hamas to allow the Palestinian authority, which was established following the Oslo Accords in 1994, allow it back into Gaza.

And do you have any sense, based on what you've heard, what sort of cooperation the Saudis were receiving from Hamas in this effort? Was Hamas indicating that they were open to that?

Aimen: They indicated they were open, and they were ready, and they are happy to do so all the way until a week before the attacks. Until a week before the attacks, they were assuring the Saudis that their aim and their goal, and it was through Qatari mediation, that their aim and their goal is to actually allow the Palestinian authority to come back.

And that is why the Saudis appointed an ambassador to the Palestinian authority. And called him actually the Ambassador to the State of Palestine. And he went there, met with the President Abbas presented him with Saudi lands and updated him on the Saudi progress for the Palestinian demands.

And there were 24 demands. Some of them I know, some of them I don't, but all I know is that there was a tremendous progress happening to the point where Mohammed bin Salman himself, the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, the one who is going to take this giant leap, went and approved two things.

First, he approved the fact that he's going to talk to the American people through Fox. And he gave that interview where he said, we are closer than ever to a normalisation of relations with Israel.

And the second is that during the G20 meeting, at the beginning of September, countries participating, including the UAE, Saudi Arabia, India, all of them signed an agreement for the IMEC, which is the IMEC, the India Middle East Europe Corridor, this giant amazing, trade route that would link India to the UAE, to Saudi Arabia, to Jordan, to Israel, to Greece and Italy.

In order to create this economic zone that would bring in talent and services and goods and commerce and trade and would generate a lot of opportunities for India and for Greece and will revive the economy of Jordan.

All of this was signed, and everyone was celebrating, and everyone thinking that we are now living the age of the advance of peace.

Thomas: Less than a month ago.

[Music Playing]

Before we go on, I want to know throughout all of this period of negotiation with the Palestinians, what sort of negotiations were going on with the state of Israel and how did the state of Israel greet Mohammad bin Salman's plan for a two-state solution in the Jared Kushner model, et cetera?

Because the state of Israel has its own interests, hasn't always played fair in negotiations with the Palestinians. So, what position was Netanyahu taking during these negotiations?

Aimen: For Netanyahu, a Palestinian state is a price worth paying if it meant a complete economic, commercial, and political alliance and integration with the Saudis, because it is a $1.1 trillion economy next door, and it's growing so rapidly.

It is the leader of the Sunni Muslim world. It is the custodian of the two holy sites. It'll be truly the children of Abraham coming together finally, after 3000 years, and guess what, we were literally six weeks away from a big announcement, almost six weeks away from a big announcement.

However, Iran and their coalition of the forces of darkness decided that this is the time to strike, and this is the time to derail the progress of peace.

You see, I would have sympathised a little bit with Hamas, if the Israelis committed a huge massacre and they retaliated in kind, I would've said, “Oh God, the Israelis, they've done it again. They killed a bunch of Palestinian kids. Now look what's going to happen.”

But that wasn't the case. There was nothing immediately preceding the events of seven October to justify, the levels-

Thomas: Yes, no provocation of any kind. It was totally out of the blue.

Aimen: Exactly. It's completely out of the blue. And when you learn about the motive to derail a peace that would have brought decent living standards to tens of millions of people from India all the way to Rome, including to the Palestinians themselves.

And finally, finally, we have a Palestinian state like every time, and this is the problem with Hamas, every time there is a Palestinian state about to happen, ‘93, ‘94, ‘96, ‘99, every time there is a progress, they come and derail everything.

Thomas: Well, I mean, we have to make it clear to the listener that Hamas is against a two-state solution. They are opposed to the existence of Israel. That is important.

Aimen: Exactly.

Thomas: They do not accept a two-state solution. They have always rejected it. Now, you mentioned Iran. I want to talk more about Iran because two things.

First, Iran and Saudi, all those months ago, sign an agreement, a kind of peace deal, if you like, explicitly about Yemen, but in general, everyone thought, “Oh, thank God, Iran is seeing reason, and the Saudis are slightly dampening down their own nationalist sort of rhetoric, and everything's going to be fine.”

Well, now, Iran has gone, if what you're saying is true, Iran has gone and knifed the Saudis in the back by green lighting, if not explicitly helping Hamas achieve this terrible atrocity, derailing the Saudi's peace plan with Israel. Is that right?

Aimen: Exactly. I mean, this is why-

Thomas: Does this mean that the peace between Saudi and Iran is just ripped up now, that we can assume that that's done now?

Aimen: They are hurt. I mean, the Saudis, from their part, they are deeply hurt, and they feel that they have been played. And also, at the same time, it is clear that Iran wanted to sideline Saudi Arabia while they were preparing for a showdown with the Israelis.

You see, Thomas, the issue here is that the motives, I always ask people, “Oh, Gaza is an open air-prison. Oh, Gaza.” First of all, Gaza is not under occupation. The Israelis left Gaza in 2005 and dismantled the settlements inside Gaza and left because of the terrible security situation.

It wasn't blockaded even; it was only blockaded that two years later when Hamas killed and exiled the Palestinian authority officials and security apparatus. And where did they flee, these Palestinians who they were expelled, where did they go? They went to Israel, funny enough. It was Israelis who received them.

So, we have to talk about the fact that they are brutal organisation oppose to the peace process completely. And they never accept the right of Israel to exist.

So, now I will ask you a question. Forget everything, even if some people on the left always question Israel's right to exist. I will say this, any group in an Islamic theology point, in a cultural point, in a human point, in a DCC point, from the point of view of all of the verticals I mentioned, your responsibility as a leader is the welfare and the wellbeing of the people that you lead.

So, you Hamas, as a leader in the Gaza Strip, your responsibility is the welfare of the people that you lead. The fact that Hamas kept a tight hold on power is the reason why Gaza is blockaded because they are a prescribed terrorist organisation.

Legally, any organization uses suicide bombings more than 150 times, in its history is a terrorist organization by any … imagination. So, you cannot be legally recognized as a responsible political entity entrusted with the welfare of the people that you lead, or you rule.

Therefore, you have to make way for the Palestinian authority, which is recognized by the international community, by the United Nations, to come back and to take place. And the blockade will go.

You didn't do that. Okay, fine. At least can you stop building missiles and acquiring explosives and training in tens of thousands of young men and indoctrinate them into death cults.

Can you stop that and actually concern yourself with the welfare of your own people in terms of education, in terms of infrastructure, in terms of food, in terms of medicine?

Thomas: I want to go back to what — you raised the question of Iran's motive here, and this is what I'd like to press you on, because in the last season of Conflicted, we did an episode on, weirdly enough, the Nagorno-Karabakh crisis.

Aimen: Yeah.

Thomas: And in that episode, you illumined all of us, me and all the dear listeners to this salient and rather surprising fact that the Azerbaijani states, military intelligence, and security capacity, which has grown so remarkably in the last 20 years and has enabled them now to have the upper hand in their ongoing dispute with Armenia, which had the upper hand in the early 90s.

We told this whole story, you made it clear that that has happened largely because at some point in the past, the Azerbaijani government reached a very close accord with the Israelis who have been helping them militarily and in terms of intelligence, giving them advanced drone technology and creating on Iran's doorstep, a little Israeli foothold.

Much like the larger foothold that Iran has to the north of Israel with Hezbollah and to some extent off and on, but usually to the south of Israel in Gaza.

So, is that dynamic at play here, because we've all seen at present the Azerbaijani actions in Nagorno-Karabakh and the scenes of humanitarian sadness there, et cetera.

So, is this something that the Iranians are saying, “Look, you're building a foothold on our doorstep. Well, we can push a button and we can threaten you from the doorsteps that we've already erected.” Is that there?

Aimen: It is partially part of there, but what is happening right now, Thomas in the Middle East is what I call the rearranging of the Mexican standoff within the Mexican standoff. At the moment there is-

Thomas: How confusing.

Aimen: Yeah, seriously. Yeah. So, what is happening right now is that Iran was holding two guns to the head of Israel, one from the north, which is Hezbollah, and one from the South, which is Hamas and the Gaza Strip.

So, what happened is that Israel then turned on Iran and created a two guns to the head of Iran, one in Azerbaijan and one in the KRG, in the Kurdish Regional Government in a Iraq where the Mossad and the Israelis have a presence there also.

So, they turned two guns to the north and the northeast of Iran from there. At the same time, Iran, this is the other Mexican standoff, Iran pulled two guns on Saudi Arabia's head, one from Iraq from the north with Iraqi militias backed up and trained by Iran and with the Houthis from North Yemen, threatening the southwest of Saudi Arabia.

So, Saudi Arabia, through many geopolitical moves made it favourable for them to have the Taliban in Afghanistan. And through a lot of engineering and political machinations, they were able to oust Imran Khan, the prime minister of Pakistan, or the former prime minister of Pakistan now, who was more pro-Iranian.

And they managed to get a pro-Saudi, anti-Iranian government, and even more pro-Saudi and anti-Iranian head of the military, General Asim Munir. So, they are now pointing two guns at Iran’s back from the East, which is Pakistan, and Taliban in Afghanistan.

Thomas: Aimen, you weren't supposed to make me laugh like this during this most serious episode of Conflicted. We're talking about serious, serious war here, but you have just painted quite a comical picture of four handed men pointing guns at each other, from every corner.

Okay, so, I understand the two standoffs now. So, what's the move? So, Iran has pulled one of the triggers.

Aimen: Yes. They pulled one of the triggers, which is Hamas and Gaza, but they don't want to pull the two, which is the other one, which is Hezbollah. And this is where we have to look forward. What's going to happen?

Thomas: Yeah. What is going to happen? I would've thought Israel is already bombing the hell out of Gaza. They've amassed, I think something like 170,000 troops along the border now.

Aimen: Indeed.

Thomas: They have said that we should be preparing for a ground invasion. They will reclaim Gaza, that the withdrawal that they affected in 2005 is now going to be undone. They're going to conquer Gaza again. Is this the case? I mean, Hezbollah can't stand by and allow that to happen without attacking.

Aimen: Yeah. Because you see, there could be the miscalculation here that Israel will not dare invade Gaza by land. And the answer is, I think the Israelis will say, try me. You just killed 1,250 of my citizens in one day, and the number could be rising, and you expect me — and especially with the discovery of beheaded babies today.

That I think was the final straw as far as the Israelis were concerned. The optics were so against Hamas here.

Again, as I said to you, Hamas failed its own people because this was unnecessary provocation. So, Israel will go in by land. Hezbollah will be given the instructions by Iran. You can't let one of my pistols, that pistol pointing to Israel's southern flank to be demolished.

I don't think Hamas expected that there will be a massive invasion. They expected massive bombardment. I don't expect they expected a massive invasion.

Thomas: But do you think Iran expected that kind of action from Hamas, that degree of brutal, barbaric attacking civilians in that brutal way? Or do you think even the Iranians are thinking, “Holy fuck, what have we made? These are monsters.”

Aimen: No, I think they expected, because today's speech by Ayatollah Khamenei at the Iranian military college was very clear. He said, “For everything they have done, I kissed their heads, and I kissed their hands.”

So, he blessed everything they've done. And this is an indication that something big is about to happen. Even the Houthis in Yemen could be engaging with their long-range ballistic missiles and drones.

And this is why the Saudi military is on high alert, the Jordanian military on high alert, the Egyptian military on high alert-

Thomas: Well, and the U.S. they've sent an aircraft carrier to the Eastern Mediterranean.

Aimen: Exactly the U.S.’s Gerald Ford task force. It's a fleet of 12 large vessels armed with destroyers and submarines with missiles and tomahawks and the cruise missiles. I mean, 75 fighter jets, including the F-35 and the F-18 super hornets.

I mean, we are now on the brink of a regional war, and it's an 80% probability, I give it that Hezbollah will intervene and that will drag in possibly Syria into the conflict too.

All I'm saying, Thomas, is that those who were cheering for Hamas must understand that you do not poke the dragon unless if you have a plan B, plan C and plan Z. And unfortunately, Iran and Hezbollah and Assad of Syria, the butcher of children, I think they taught Hamas well, too well, in fact, for them to go and butcher children for no good reason. Just pure vengeance.

And remember that you are dealing in Israel with a Jewish population that still remember the horrors 75 years ago of the Holocaust. And the fact that the Jewish population of the world until now, until 2023 did not yet recover to the 1939 population.

There were 15 million Jews in the world in 1939, and today there are only 14 million. It shows you that these people are going to get hysterical and absolutely bloody and vicious and savage in the defence of their race and their religion and their culture, do not test them.

Thomas: So, right now, I can imagine having sent an aircraft carrier to the Eastern mid, President Biden is telling Netanyahu, basically, please exercise restraint. I mean, I'm not saying that that will happen. I'm not even saying that that should happen. I don't know. I think that if the Israelis want to invade Gaza and put some authority down there in the face of what just happened, it makes sense to me.

The question is that how — I mean, it's not going to happen, as you say, Israel will sort out Gaza now, they can't not. Netanyahu's whole persona is strong on security, strong, strong. He can't not.

So, I mean, Hezbollah will attack. So, Israel will fight back. Now, it might be that Israel has the capabilities more or less to defend itself from attackers both north and south, without it spilling over into a massive war.

But if you're saying Iran thinks, oh, we're going to lose Hamas and we're going to lose Hezbollah, then the Houthis fire into Saudi Arabia. And then what, the Pakistani military invades Iran from the East? What is the possible game here?

Aimen: Well, all I can tell you is that I can't see that far into the future because this reminds me of the book, The Guns of August, published in 1954, which showed how each general during the 1914 preparation for the World War I, thought it's going to be short war. And each one was second guessing the other general, and then it dragged on, it became the biggest slaughter in human history until then.

All I can tell you, Thomas, is that I have a feeling that the Israelis are going to push as many people of the population of Gaza into Egypt, into Sinai, and they will pressure the Egyptian government, which is strapped for cash and burdened with heavy debt that need to be serviced. I mean, there is $27 billion of debt that need to be paid over the next 10 months, and the Egyptian government doesn't have the cash for it.

Imagine if Western powers and Gulf powers are coming to Egypt and say, well, here it is, debt, forgiveness, lots of cash, take these people in. It is ironically, in order to protest against what they call ethnic cleansing, they achieved what they always were complaining about, which wasn't actually happening ethnic cleansing.

And you end up with the irony that after 3300 years of the Israelites leaving Egypt through Sinai, wondering in the desert, 40 years hoping to get into the holy land, and finally they get onto it, that the Philistines who were preventing them from coming into the holy land were to be expelled by the same people who came from Egypt and sending them into Sinai, well into Egypt through Sinai.

The irony of history, all I'm saying is Hamas did not carry out the duty of care and carry out its most sacred task of looking after the people they were governing.

The priority is not to take your population into a conflict they cannot withstand. And you know what the consequences are going to be. And this is why I condemn Hamas and I condemn what Hamas did, and I condemn what Hamas stood for.

Someone will say, “Well, what about the Israelis? The Israelis are killing people and doing and doing and doing.” And I would say, what did you expect them to do? Yes, they might be on the wrong side of history. Yes, they might be occupiers in the eyes of so many. Yes, they might be an illegal entity in the eyes of many, but what do you want them to do? To stand like sitting ducks and just take the bullets in the head one by one?

Well, they tried that in the 1930s and the 1940s, it didn't end well for them, and they are not going to repeat this again. That's why they always have that annual remembrance where they say, “Never again.” And you don't mess with people who always say, “Never again.”

And Hamas, while I bleed for the children and women and the innocent people of Gaza, I look at what happening to them. And I feel that they were killed by the Israeli bombs. But the ones who pulled the trigger on this were the people who they should have trusted, which is their leaders, Hamas.

Thomas: And people that they should not have voted for in 2006.

Aimen: Absolutely. It's a lesson to the rest of the Muslim world and the Arab world. Do not trust the Islamists. Do not trust people who believe in transnational ideologies.

Give your vote, give your backing, give your support only to those who support the model of the nation state, the modern nation state that care about the human, that want to create life that does not bitterly and utterly create death cults.

Thomas: Well, I'm the American in this conversation, and for me, this almighty tragedy is yet another nail in the coffin of 20 years, 22 years, 21 years of American foreign policy in the region being really one president after another, foolishly pursuing bad policies based on bad analysis of the situation, beginning with the response to 9/11, especially the invasion of Iraq, which empowered Iran.

And then proceeding with Barack Obama's absolutely idiotic idea of triangulating between Israelis, Iranians and Saudis through the Iran nuclear deal, thinking that if we could bring Iran in from the cold, all will be well. To Donald Trump's rather erratic pursuit of politics in general.

And now with Biden, Lord have mercy on us all. And we see where this ends, that this is just terrible. For the first time on this podcast, Aimen, I'm not conflicted. This is just terrible. Hamas is just terrible. And they must be destroyed. They cannot be allowed to remain.

Aimen: Exactly. But unfortunately, how do we achieve that without hurting civilians? And the problem is you can't. I mean, I'm not condoning-

Thomas: No, that's true. I understand that.

Aimen: Collective punishment.

Thomas: No.

Aimen: I’m not condoning collective punishment. I'm not condoning the mass killing of civilians. But how do you deal with a group like that? Even if you say, okay, I give them their state.

They were a state, they were a de facto state for 16 years. What have they done with the piece of land and the 2 million population they were given? They were behaving like ISIS. They were suffocating freedoms. They were not exactly the model that people want to.

But let's say for argument's sake, that Israel is totally wrong, and Hamas is totally right, which is impossible. Then I ask people, what is the perfect solution? For me, the perfect solution is for Jordan to take back the West Bank and for Egypt to take back Gaza. And we go back to 1967. That's it, to May 1967. Let us go back to those days is better.

Thomas: But Aimen, you're as naive as the leftists who support Hamas, with that. I do not think that exactly the King Abdullah of Jordan is clamouring to take back-

Aimen: No, no, no. He doesn't want them. And funny thing is that even the Egyptians don't want the Palestinians.

Thomas: Of course, they don’t.

Aimen: And neither with the Jordanians. And this is why, for those who support, support the Palestinian cause. But please do not support Hamas.

Thomas: Well, we're going to wrap it up there, dear listener. We were meant to be releasing two episodes on the history of Hezbollah beginning this week, but instead of this week, that will start next week.

And it'll be weird because that episode was recorded before this one. And you'd think we might mention the fact that there's a massive war going on, possibly even a war involving Hezbollah. So, you'll have to just bear with us.

But if there is a war going on involving Hezbollah, those episodes will give you a much more detailed explanation of where that movement came from, who its backers are, what its ideological commitments are.

Thank you for putting up with this rather quickly assembled emergency podcast episode on the latest outbreak of Arab-Israeli conflict in the Middle East. It shocked everyone. It shocked me. We weren't ready for it. We had a vague plan, and we even know more or less when we were going to do it, a plan to do a series on Hamas.

But if we'd known that this was going to happen, we might have moved that forward. Anyway, I hope it has helped to clarify the situation. Thank you, dear friend, Aimen, for providing us with so much context and so much interesting intelligence that only those who are in the know, know about. And you are one of those, dear friend.

Aimen: Thank you.

Thomas: And if I may just say, as a non-Middle Easterner, but one with a great love in his heart for all of the Middle East, Aimen, I'm sorry, that war and strife and terror and bloodshed has come again to that part of the world.

Aimen: Indeed.

Thomas: I know that you fight what must seem sometimes like a lost cause.

Aimen: Yeah.

Thomas: To keep peace and prosperity on the up there. Anyway, we can't lose hope.

Aimen: Yeah. This is why I always say my cause is the nation state, and now people understand why transnational ideologies should be crushed.

[Music Playing]

Thomas: Well, I think that those 170,000 Israeli troops amassing on the Gaza border would agree with you in this instance, Aimen.

Aimen: Yeah, exactly.

Thomas: Right. Well, that's it. We'll be back next week, dear listener, with the first of our two-part episode on the history of Hezbollah. Stay tuned.

A reminder that you can follow the show over on Facebook and Twitter at MH Conflicted. And for a deeper dive into all the subjects we talk about here on Conflicted, head over to Facebook and search Conflicted Podcast Discussion Group.

There you will find other fans of the show engaging in heated debates, enlightening conversations, and just generally geeking out over Conflicted related topics.

Conflicted is a Message Heard production. This episode was produced and edited by Harry Stott. Sandra Ferrari is our executive producer. Our theme music is by Matt Huxley and Tom Biddle.

Conflicted S4 E15: How Iran Works

Thomas: Welcome back to Conflicted with me, Thomas Small, alongside my irrepressible co-host, Aimen Dean. Hello, Aimen?

Aimen: Hello, everyone.

Thomas: Now, dear listeners, today we are embarking on a subject which gets Aimen animated like nothing else. In our preparation for this episode, my gosh, I wish you could have seen it. There were some grand tirades, fingers pointed in the air, wild gesticulation. No doubt we'll be getting more of that in the next hour.

Aimen: Don't worry, Thomas. Today I had my yoga, I had my zen in anticipation of this episode, which will boil my blood.

Thomas: After weeks and weeks of looking into the past, the present, and indeed the future of Sunni Islamism, for the next few weeks, we're going to be returning to their great Muslim rivals and our old friends, the Shia Islamists.

Aimen: Hooray.

Thomas: That's right. Over the next few episodes, we'll be looking at the Iranian nexus of terror in the Middle East, specifically looking at the growth and consolidation of Hezbollah in Lebanon.

But first, we're starting with the granddaddy of Shia Islamism, the Islamic Republic of Iran. What's the state of play in Persia? How is this diverse and divisive state constituted? And is there an Iranian future outside the revolutionary regime? Let's find out.

[Music Playing]

Aimen, Iran today, we're going to leave history aside for a little while and talk about Iran today. What's going on with Iran? About a year ago, the protests began over the murder, can we say murder of Mahsa Amini by the regime’s forces sparking a huge nationwide wave of protests, which once again led some people to say the regime is about to fall.

But one year later, it's still there. So, what can we say about Iran today, Aimen?

Aimen: Well, I wasn't one of those people who were optimistic when the protests started over the death of poor Mahsa Amini. We have to understand that the death of Mahsa Amini happened at the hands of the so-called morality police.

If you think about it, in Iran, there is a strict dress code that all women who appear in public must cover their head, whether partially or entirely. There must be some covering.

Mahsa Amini who was young. She was a teenager at the time did not abide by that dress code. However, to her surprise and the surprise of the entire nation, the morality police were over eager when they were arresting her, they were beating her up so badly that she got a concussion and died in hospital later.

Thomas: I suppose this is something that happens semi-regularly in Iran, that some people opposed to the regime or who simply wish to live life in a more liberal fashion might test the rules a little bit to see what kind of response they will get.

They've only been let down until now, because when push comes to shove, the Iranian regime slaps back and says, no, no, we mustn't compromise the goals of the revolution.

Aimen: Absolutely. And so, her death sparked a major backlash from the nation's women. Many women, of course, removed their head scarfs. They started to chant, “Death to the regime.” Many young boys joined, many angry families who felt that their daughters could be next.

And then the caravan of young female martyrs joined Mahsa Amini. There were many young teenagers, 17s and 18s and 19s who were also chased, killed, thrown from buildings. And the death toll kept rising.

Thomas: The figures are in the 100s, around 500. You never know for sure. Of course, thousands were certainly arrested. Some executed by the government. Some died in the course of violent clashes with the police.

Aimen: Exactly. And at the time when I was looking at all of this, and I have many friends as you know, in the analytical community who kept saying, “This could be it, this could be it.” And I'm saying, “Guys, just shut up. Seriously.”

Thomas: Well, certainly since February this year, the protests have gone quiet. Never really gone away, I feel. I do think, though, of course I hear what you say, I don't think these protests or any protests like it will bring down the regime, but I do think the cat is a bit more out of the bag than before, maybe because of modern technology, smartphone technology, maybe because it's just been, what, like 44 years now since the revolution.

And a whole generation is firmly now of age, who did not live through the Shah, did not live through the optimistic years of the revolution. They have just lived in a more or less repressive, moralistic, theocratic regime, and they want change.

So, I think the cat is out of the bag, and the protests will probably just continue more or less forever. Do you agree, Aimen?

Aimen: The problem is Thomas, yes, the cat is out of the bag, but this cat is a very fluffy Persian cat. Is not going to be that kind of a cat that will scratch and yell and absolutely fight back ferociously.

No, no, no, no. This is a cat that will purr and meow, and it's not going to do anything. Look, the reality is that for the Iranian regime to fall, there is only one and one outcome, armed uprising, and a civil war.

Apart from that, there is no hope whatsoever for the regime to fall. And why, you ask me? Is because of one organisation that is there to guard the regime to the death, the IRGC. An ideological army, fanatical army that is going to defend to the last man, the Ayatollah and his office, and the constitution of Iran that is supposed to be paving the way for the return of the eschatological Messiah, the Imam Mahdi.

The entire complex apparatus of the Iranian regime in terms of military security and intelligence, is designed to prevent even the slightest idea of a coup from happening. That's how the Iranian state is structured.

So, no matter how many slogans and how many placards, and how many shouts and how many headscarf you throw at the regime and their forces, the end of the day, the one who will rule Iran is the one with the gun. And that's it.

Thomas: Well, before we talk about that very complex apparatus, and we will talk about it, dear listener, let's go back to our old friend Sayyid Qutb and talk about the connection that Sayyid Qutb has to this very complex regime that is keeping the Iranian people under its boot.

We've talked about Qutb's enduring influence across the Sunni world through the Muslim Brotherhood and other groups that were inspired by his writings.

But despite the fact that Iran is a Shia country largely, and therefore often diametrically opposed to much of the Sunni world, the regime there and the ideology of the regime is imbued with Sayyid Qutb's teachings and the teachings of the Muslim Brotherhood to some extent, and this is explicit.

So, in 1984, the Islamic Republic of Iran issued a postage stamp commemorating the 18th anniversary of Qutb’s so-called martyrdom in 1966, at the hands of Nassar. The postage stamp showed an image of Sayyid Qutb behind bars. It's quite a famous image, really.

So, right from the beginning, that's only five years after the revolution, Iran is saying we support Sayyid Qutb quite clearly.

In August 2012, so the flash forward almost 30 years, Mohamed Morsi, the Muslim Brotherhood president of Egypt, becomes the first Egyptian president to pay the Islamic Republic a state visit. I think that means something.

The scholar Yusuf Ünal has said Persian language, translations of Sayyid Qutb’s works played an instrumental role in helping to shape the political and ideological discourses of Islamism in pre-revolutionary Iran. But Aimen, Qutb was Sunni.

Aimen: Okay, you have to-

Thomas: I love it. I love your okay. Okay, let me sort this out. I love it.

Aimen: Look, if you think about Sayyid Qutb being a Sunni, it doesn't mean that it'll prevent the Shia philosophers and scholars from looking for ways to find a political framework for their upcoming revolutionary plans.

To give you an example, remember that the Shia generally refrained from engaging in the political machinations of the Muslim world for almost a millennium.

Thomas: Yeah, I just want to remind the listener, Aimen, that we talked about this a lot last season in our episode on Iran, in our episode on Ayatollah Khomeini and the movements throughout the centuries really that led up to the revolution. So, go back and listen to that episode for that context.

But yes, you're right. For most of its history, the Shia were politically quietest.

Aimen: Indeed, yes. Because they were in the status of waiting and waiting and waiting and waiting and waiting for the return, the long-awaited return of the Imam Mahdi. A millennium passed and he didn't show up, maybe his Uber’s too late.

Thomas: I think this Imam from wherever he lives in occultation is enjoying his stay there. I don't think he wants to come back.

Aimen: Well, if these were my followers, I don't want to emerge whatsoever. So, but anyway.

Thomas: Aimen.

Aimen: Sorry, I couldn't resist.

Thomas: Following the Second World War, and this is important, I think, there was throughout the Muslim world a movement towards Sunni Shia rapprochement in general. There were several attempts by intellectuals, scholars on both sides of the sectarian divide in Islam to iron out some of their differences, or at least to deemphasize their differences in the name of Muslim unity.

Sayyid Qutb was in a way, part of this wider movement because in his own writings, he tended to downplay a bit of the hardline Sunni anti-Shia perspective.

Aimen: I think what attracted some Shia scholars to Sayyid Qutb’s writings is the fact that he actually adopted some of the Shia narratives when it comes to the historical grievances that they possess against major Sunni figures, whether it is Umayyad Dynasty or the third caliph Uthman.

In fact, he went as far as describing Uthman as corrupt in his book In the Shades of the Qur’an, and even went as far as saying that the revolt against Uthman was misjudged by later Muslim historians and scholars and they should revisit that revolt as a revolt for social justice. It wasn't a conspiracy against a noble ruler.

Thomas: I mean, that perspective is very Shia friendly. A lot of Shia would've been like, “Hey, hey, this is what we've been saying for a thousand years.”

Aimen: Indeed. And I think this is what attracted many Shia scholars and philosophers to Sayyid Qutb’s writings.

Thomas: I think it's also interesting to ponder the possibility that the influence went the other way, and that Qutb could have been inspired by some Shia ideas directly.

So, for example, in 1953, so this is before, obviously before he was arrested, Sayyid Qutb received Navvab Safavi in Cairo. Now, long-term listeners will remember Navvab Safavi, he was the founder of Fada'iyan-e Islam, a revolutionary Shia Islamist group in Iran that was attacking figures within the Shah's regime.

He was executed in 1956 by the regime. We've talked a lot about him on Conflicted, like so many figures, he pops up throughout these stories because he's so important.

Well, in 1953, he visited Cairo and Sayyid Qutb received him at his home. The following year, Safavi attended a conference in Jordan, which had been organised by Qutb. So, this was a conference on the Palestinian question, a Muslim Brotherhood sponsored conference where Safavi mingled widely with Muslim Brotherhood members, and Sayyid Qutb again chatted with him.

At the end of that conference, Safavi wrote, “Whoever wants to be a real Shi’i should follow the Muslim Brotherhood.” That's a pretty strong statement, but it also suggests that in his conversations with Safavi, maybe Qutb was influenced by him as well.

Aimen: Indeed, because you see the influence goes both ways. I tell you why, because first of all the Shia were full of revolutionary zeal against a royalist. You see, remember, Egypt already overthrow a king in 1952.

Thomas: Fat Farouk.

Aimen: Exactly. However, the Shah in Iran overthrew the government, it’s the other way around.

Thomas: Yeah.

Aimen: In 1953. So, at that time, the Shia revolutionaries were looking for a political framework. And people like Sayyid Qutb with their books like al-hukm al-Islami, which means the Islamic government, with their books like al-Mustaqbal li-hadha al-din, the future is for this faith. He means Islam. And of course, later Milestones. They provided a ready packaged vision and a manual to how to start a Islamic government.

Thomas: Well, in his autobiography, the Ayatollah Khamenei, the current supreme leader of Iran, wrote that he entered politics first through the writings of Navvab Safavi and second through the writings of Sayyid Qutb.

So, there we have a direct link between Sayyid Qutb and the Iranian regime today, the supreme leader of Iran, Ali Khamenei was inspired by a Qutb and Muslim Brotherhood ideas, and he does not pretend otherwise.

As early as the 1950s translations of Qutb works into Persian began appearing, so In the Shade of the Qur’an, began appearing in Persian soon after its first volumes appeared in 1954.

Social Justice in Islam, the first really sort of great Islamist work by Qutb was translated as early as 1959 by Hadi Khosroshahi, who would later become the Islamic Republic's first ambassador to the Vatican, just to give you a sense of how deep these influences go.

And in 1966, Khamenei then aged only 27, founded a publishing house and began publishing Islamist works. And he, along with his brother Mohammad and other prominent Shia radical intellectuals, translated more of Sayyid Qutb books.

Aimen: Indeed. And one of the books they have translated is called al-hukm al-Islami.

Thomas: The Islamic government.

Aimen: Yeah, absolutely. It's a book by Sayyid Qutb which is providing a framework how a Muslim, or shall I say, Islamic government should look like, should act, and should enforce the laws on its citizens and how it should guard itself from enemies without and within.

Thomas: Khamenei himself translated The Future of this Religion. And in that book, Qutb explicitly states that through jihad, all of humanity will eventually be forced to submit to Islam, and he calls on Muslims to fight against imperial powers.

Now, if you're a 27-year-old, Ali Khamenei, these revolutionary ideas pop, don't they, Aimen? He must have just said, “This is it; this is it; this is what we need.”

Aimen: Absolutely. The reason is because of the absence of a political framework, a political radical ideas, the Shia were shunning politics for a thousand years. And then when they decided, well, the time is right now.

Thomas: Khamenei and the others in his revolutionary circle, who had been influenced by Sayyid Qutb's writings and had indeed translated those writings and thereby inflamed Persian sentiment in the direction of Sayyid Qutb, those intellectuals, those radicals blended the ideas of Sayyid Qutb with the ideas of the Ayatollah Khomeini.

The Ayatollah Khomeini himself was probably not so directly influenced by Sayyid Qutb. His ideas were rooted in 19th century radical Shia ideas. And we covered this last season.

Even his interpretation of Wilayat al-Faqih, the guardianship of the jurist comes from radical kind of political thought from the 19th century. It was his followers who blended those ideas with Sayyid Qutb's ideas to make the potent ideological mix that led to the revolution, and which remains key to Iran.

When Ali Khamenei became supreme leader in 1989, after Khomeini's death, he made Sayyid Qutb's works required reading for all new recruits to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to the IRGC. So, that just goes to show you how important Sayyid Qutb is to the revolution.

Aimen: Thomas, there is a question, though I have in mind, and this question was asked 24 years ago, exactly in the winter of 1999 in a massive palatial villa in Wazir Akbar Khan in Kabul, which was the headquarters of Al-Qaeda there in Afghanistan.

And I remember I was there at dinner and people gathered, this big place where we always gather for the supper before we go to sleep and present there was Ayman al-Zawahiri and Abu Musab al-Suri. Abu Musab al-Suri for some of the dear listeners who don't know who he is, he was one of the most brilliant strategic minds that the jihadist movement ever produced.

An interesting point were raised during the discussions between Ayman al-Zawahiri and Abu Musab al-Suri over that dinner that night.

And the point was, why was the revolution in Iran, which was primarily based on political ideals produced by a Sunni organisation, which is the Muslim Brotherhood, and the writings of Koob was successful in Iran, but yet not a single Sunni Muslim country was successful in establishing the Islamic government as envisioned by Hassan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb.

I mean, they mentioned that Ali Khamenei, the Ayatollah of Iran at the time, and still until now, translated Sayyid Qutb’s ideas, incorporated them into the political framework of the Islamic Revolution in Iran. And voila, you have a proper Islamic government as envisioned by Sayyid Qutb and by Hassan al-Banna.

And this is in the only Shia majority country at that time, yet 55 more other Sunni countries, and not a single one of them, and not a single Islamic movement, based on the ideals of Sayyid Qutb and Hassan al-Banna, were able to establish a successful revolution to install an Islamic government.

Thomas: And what's the answer? Why are Sunni radical ideas only successfully implemented in a Shia country?

Aimen: Ah, this is where Abu Musab al-Suri answered by saying is simple really, the Shia faith is a highly structured faith with hierarchy of religion, and therefore, it's a centralised, organised religion with a chain of command, which unfortunately we chaotic, divided Sunnis don't have.

We have a disorganised religion with no hierarchy, no central authority, and therefore, if you have a chaotic religious organisation, you will have a chaotic revolution, which means failure.

Thomas: Well, there's only one answer, Aimen. All Sunni Islamists need to become Shia.

Aimen: No, of course not. Heavens forbid. However, I can tell you this, the reality is that he was right. Abu Musab al-Suri was right, because ironically this became very evident in his home country, Syria, because in later years, a Syrian of all people asked me the question in 2019, he said to me, “Aimen, you spent years and years of your life in four different war zones. You've been in these conflicts; you've seen the dynamics of conflicts. You spent time in Bosnia, Afghanistan.

You've seen conflicts all over the place. And so, you know the dynamics, how could that at the beginning of the uprising in Syria, that the numerical superiority was on the side of the rebels, and yet Assad in the end won.”

I said, because Assad was one entity supported that under his command by Iranians, by Lebanese Hezbollah, by Iraqi militias, by Pakistani and Afghan Shia, all of them came together and they were united under the effort of Assad and Qasem Soleimani, that's it.

They were all under one umbrella, one goal, one unit, and they were fighting as one unit. However, you guys split into 80 different factions, 80 plus actually different factions. So, Assad and Soleimani picked you off one by one.

Thomas: You're not convincing me that Sunni Islamists shouldn't become Shia if they want to win the game that they're playing. But we're going to stop now for a break.

Aimen: No, they should become more disciplined. They should become more disciplined.

Thomas: Aimen, do you want the Sunni Islamists to win? My goodness.

Aimen: No, no, no. I didn't say that. Actually, Thomas, the reality is that if the Shia have their grand Ayatollah, what we need to have is a grand king, and that's it.

Thomas: A grand king, or perhaps a supreme guide in Cairo.

Aimen: No.

Thomas: But let's stop here. We'll take a quick break and we'll be back to explain how the Iranian revolution implemented Sayyid Qutb's ideas in Milestones, particularly to erect a very complex political organism. Stay tuned.

[Music Playing]

We're back. We're talking about how the Iranian revolution was inspired by Sayyid Qutb, and we're going to start by talking about Sayyid Qutb's let's say, most popular book Milestones. We talked a lot about Milestones in our episodes on Sayyid Qutb this season.

And interesting, Aimen, it is often said, and I've seen it said again and again in many books that Ali Khamenei himself translated Milestones.

Now, I can find no actual evidence of this. I actually spent a lot of time looking for evidence. The only translation into Persian I can find of Milestones was done in 1998. And all of these books that allege, that Khamenei himself translated it never provide a footnote.

What do you think, Aimen? Can you verify that Ali Khamenei did translate Milestones? And if it wasn't translated until 1998, which seems possible, might there be a reason for it? Is there possibly something in Milestones that the Shia revolutionaries of Iran didn't particularly agree with?

Aimen: It is understood within certain intelligence circles that Sayyid Qutb's book Milestones was in fact translated though not in its entirety by Ali Khamenei, and it was intended for private distribution, not for general publication.

And it was mainly for those who were part of the radical revolutionary circles that surrounded Khamenei and Khomeini at that time. And the reason is because there were two chapters in particular that were contradictory of Shia faith, especially the Qur’anic generation, talking about the disciples of the Prophet Muhammad and all of that.

Thomas: A very Salafi chapter.

Aimen: Indeed, because it was of course, the end of Sayyid Qutb’s life, his ideas matured so much into Sunni Salafism and by then, basically he abandoned a lot of the Islamic unity that he was calling for by the mid-60s.

Thomas: So, if we can say then that with the exception of those two chapters or so, that Ali Khamenei translated Milestones, can we also say that Milestones, Sayyid Qutb's detailed plan for the erection of an Islamic state was successfully implemented in Iran? And if so, how exactly, Aimen?

Aimen: Well, because that's exactly what both Ayman al-Zawahiri and Abu Musab al-Suri, two of the grand titans of the jihadist movement in the 20 and 21st centuries, I mean stated that they were successful based on the ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood and Sayyid Qutb.

And I can walk the listener through the steps. First it was always about say it as it is, you have to shout it from the rooftops. What is the message? Then you have to say that this figure of the Shah is the representation of Jahiliyyah, is the representation of the pre-Islamic age of ignorance, and only Islam is the solution. Al-Islam huwa al-hâl, that's what Sayyid Qutb advocated.

Thomas: Yeah. Islam is the solution.

Aimen: Exactly. And then you have to make the emperor naked. The emperor has no clothes. You have to make him naked. So, you talk about his alliance with Israel, his big party for the two and a half thousand years of the Persian Empire.

And then after that, you go into building the individual, then you move into building the family and how to build a proper Muslim family to resist the advancement of Western immorality that is being imported by the Shah and the elite around him.

And then after that, of course, the question of how do you confront an unjust government? And how do you establish the government of God on earth, the kingdom of God on earth, you have to have a violent confrontation. What did Khomeini always call for?

And you remember in the episode on the fall of the Shah, I told you about the story of Khomeini visiting Ayatollah al-Khoei in Negev and saying, “I'm ready to sacrifice hundreds of thousands of Iranians in order to bring down the Shah and to bring about an Islamic government,” to the point where Ayatollah al-Khoei was completely stunned and silent, and he couldn't even look Khomeini in the eye because of what he said.

Aimen: So actually, already he was imbued with revolutionary zeal that let us confront violently the regime that is the only violence to bring it down. And violence did take place.

Thomas: It sure did. Well, Sayyid Qutb inspired, Sayyid Qutb paved the way with his writings, and the Ayatollah Khomeini and all of the figures surrounding him, erected the Islamic Republic of Iran, which is, as we've said a few times already, a very complicated beast.

Let's talk about this complicated beast. Let's talk about what a theocratic, Islamist state actually looks like. And dear listener, I can promise you this, it is very weird.

Aimen: It is.

Thomas: At the very top of this weird, complicated beast sits the supreme leader. And the first thing to point out is the supreme leader, the murshid, it's the same word that the Muslim Brotherhood uses to describe its leader. So, there's a similarity already quite apparent.

There is a difference however, in Iran, that supreme leader is an Ayatollah, a grand Ayatollah. He stands in for the missing Imam. He is an absolute illuminated ruler whose word cannot be gain said, it's a very, very strong position. And basically, it dominates everything.

Aimen: Indeed, it's a position akin to the pope … but the pope is Christ's representative on earth. I know basically when I say this, I more or less upset your Orthodox sensitivities, but nonetheless.

Thomas: No, I'm perfectly aware that the Roman Catholics are wrong about that, but-

Aimen: Yeah, exactly. But from the point of view of the Iranian constitution, especially Article five, the absent Imam is God's representative on earth. The supreme leader is the representative of that representative and therefore, he is by extension God's representative. Though indirectly twice removed on earth.

Thomas: Already very complicated. Well, according to the constitution of Iran, the supreme leader is responsible for defining and supervising the general policies of the Islamic Republic.

And just to give you a sense of his powers, he is the commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces. He directly controls the intelligence and security operations of the government. He is the only one who can declare war or declare peace, if the country is in war.

He appoints the supreme commander of the IRGC. He has the power both to appoint and dismiss the leaders of the judiciary, the leaders of the state radio and television networks. He appoints half of the 12 members of the Council of Guardians, which we'll get to.

And I think this is the most important thing, about 2000 official representatives of the supreme leader are scattered across all the other branches of government and state institutions. And these representatives can invoke his authority to do pretty much whatever they like, often making them more powerful than even government ministers.

So, the supreme leader has agents all throughout the Islamic Republic, basically getting in the way of the other branches of government exercising any autonomy. This is key.

Now, below the supreme leader is the president, the second highest ranking post in Iran. But that's like saying Adam, the first man is second compared to God.

Thomas: Yeah, exactly.

Aimen: And I think you've been generous to Adam here anyway.

Thomas: I mean, sometimes it seems like the president of Iran is just a public profile position, like he's just a kind of a spokesperson. So much of his power is diluted.

Aimen: Well, some people ask me the question, what does the president do? And I always used to say the president is really, really, really the prime minister of a great executive king.

Thomas: Yeah. And the president, of course oversees a cabinet of 20, 25 ministers, but they must be approved by parliament. Yes, the Islamic Republic of Iran has a parliament. Tell us about the parliament, Aimen.

Aimen: Indeed, this is a parliament which is elected, but before you say hooray for the democracy I can tell you that everyone who is there sitting in parliament right now was elected because he went through a rigorous selection after which another body, we will talk about it later, but another body would have removed a lot of the candidates and just left, I would say one out of 10 of the candidates standing.

Thomas: Yeah, yeah. I mean, the parliament has 290 ish members at any given point. They're elected every four years. Formally the parliament gets to draft legislation, vote on legislation like most parliaments everywhere.

But and this dear listener is where it gets weird, there are some other branches of the Islamic government that have a lot of power and are very, very difficult to keep straight. There is first the Council of Guardians, the Council of Guardians. It sounds like something out of Star Wars.

The Council of Guardians has the power to veto any legislation that is not in line with the Sharia or with the revolution. A very broad remit there. And it's comprised of 12 religious jurists, half of whom are appointed by the supreme leader, and half of whom are appointed by the judiciary, which is in turn controlled by the supreme leader.

Aimen: Exactly.

Thomas: So, the Council of Guardians is very much under the control of the supreme leader. And through that council, he can veto parliamentary legislation, more or less, as he likes.

In addition to the Council of Guardians, there's the Assembly of Experts. I just love it so much. I mean, technocrats everywhere are probably drooling at all these different committees that get in the way of democracy.

So, the Assembly of Experts, this is quite remarkable, it elects the supreme leader. And every now and then, reconfirms, that election, formally and the Assembly of Experts itself is elected by the public every eight years. So again, democracy.

So, the public every eight years gets to elect the Assembly of Experts that elect the supreme leader, except one thing the Council of Guardians decides who can run for elections to the Assembly of Experts.

Aimen: Which is appointed by the supreme leaders.

Thomas: So, I think you're seeing the circular and complex nature of the Islamic Republic. So, we have the Council of Guardians, the Assembly of Experts, and then, and this is the weirdest of all, we have the Expediency Discernment Council of the system.

Aimen: Exactly.

Thomas: Let's just call it the Expediency Council for short. Now, this council was founded late ish long after the revolution in 1987, founded by the first Ayatollah Khomeini himself, when the Council of Guardians and the parliament weren't really getting on. The parliament was trying to kind of get out a bit from under the thumb of the Council of Guardians. So, the supreme leader at the time said, “Guys, I have a solution.”

Aimen: Another committee.

Thomas: “I'm going to create the Expediency Council to resolve disputes between the Council of Guardians and the parliament. It's officially advisory, but I'm on it, the supreme leader. I'm on the council, and I will directly choose the other members of the council and it will advise me to do whatever I want to do.”

And there you have the system. The only state apparatus that is more complicated and difficult to understand is the apparatus of the European Union. I think some of the European Union founders were looking at the Islamic Republic thinking, “Hmm, I quite like this.”

And I'm afraid, Aimen, that we're going to have to confuse the dear listener a little bit more because we haven't even begun to talk about the armed forces and all of the various security apparatuses in Iran, especially the IRGC.

Now we talk about the IRGC a lot. It always comes up. It's very important. We haven't really just explained it clearly. So, what is the IRGC? The Sepāh-e Pāsdārān-e Enqelâb-e Eslâmī.

Aimen: No, please don't say it first, please.

Thomas: Alright. You do it.

Aimen: You just killed it.

Thomas: Sepāh-e Pāsdārān-e Enqelâb-e Eslâmī. I'm trying to be Persian.

Aimen: It's okay. So, it is Sepāh-e Pāsdārān-e Enqelâb-e Eslâmī.

Thomas: Sepāh-e Pāsdārān-e Enqelâb-e Eslâmī.

Aimen: Yes. Perfect. Afarin, as they say in Persia. Afarin.

Thomas: Okay. What is the IRGC? It was founded in May 1979 by the big man himself, the Ayatollah Khomeini. He passed a decree in that month, 1979. The goal was to maintain domestic security. The revolution had just happened, and the whole country was by no means on board.

So, domestic security was of primary importance. The IRGC was there to maintain it and to keep an eye on the regular army, which was not loyal to the revolution.

So, the first thing about the IRGC is that it is an explicitly political institution. In Iran to this day, the regular armed forces are apolitical like most armed forces, but the IRGC is political. It “defends” the revolution.

And to that extent, the Iranian constitution explicitly gives the IRGC the responsibility of maintaining Iran's religious spirit. Now Aimen, that's a very weird thing to give an armed body responsibility over.

Aimen: Well, their mission is to make sure that Iran's Islamic Revolution lives on, not only within Iran, but also outside. It is the arm of the regime first to protect itself from coups by the regular army, to protect itself from uprisings by the people, to protect itself also, from threats by minorities and separatist aspirations, whether it is the Kurds, the Baluchis, the Azeris, or the Ahwazi Arabs.

The whole idea is that the Revolutionary Guard is there to protect the regime and the revolution.

Thomas: And to that extent, initially, the IRGC was placed under the supervision of a cleric, the Ayatollah Lahouti. Now, the man in charge of training from the very beginning is a very key figure. We've talked about him on and off before throughout Conflicted, Hashemi Rafsanjani, an incredibly important man in the history of modern Iran.

He received help in the training of the IRGC from men who had been training with the ML Movement in Lebanon. So, listeners of last season will remember the ML Movement coming out of the Lebanese Civil War there. We'll talk about it in the next episode, of course.

So, after the revolution in Iran, the regular army was under the command of the president. The IRGC was under the command of the clerics. So, already you have quite an unusual situation. And recruitment to the IRGC was very carefully undertaken to screen out, especially leftists. They were terrified of communist infiltration into the IRGC.

New recruits, carefully screened, were thoroughly indoctrinated. And loyalty to the supreme leader was paramount. And this is key. The IRGC is the supreme leader's army.

Aimen: Actually, their usefulness during the Iran/Iraq war, especially during the counteroffensive, which started 1983, all the way until the end of the war proved to be decisive in making them acquire more funding, more recruits.

They started to have their own air force. They started to have their own navy. They started to become, again, yet a parallel army to the army, starting this fashion where Iran is a country that is in parallel to itself.

Thomas: To the extent that some voices were concerned that having two armies is not the best way to go. And after Khomeini's death in 1989, Rafsanjani became president. So, Ali Khamenei became supreme leader, and Rafsanjani became president.

When Rafsanjani became president, there was some debate, should we combine the regular army and the IRGC, but in the end, no, the decision was taken. We won't do that.

Instead, a joint armed forces general staff was created to coordinate between the two bodies, but they remained separate. And in fact, the general staff was overseen by guess who the supreme leader. And so, the IRGC's power went up.

Aimen: In 1989 after the death of Khomeini, the elevation of Ayatollah Khamenei into the position of supreme leader. And the elevation of Rafsanjani into the position of president. Rafsanjani is generally considered to be not from the religious clergy class. He is more from the Bazaari class.

For people who understand Iran politics, the Bazaari, we are talking here about the commercial class, the class of the merchants. Being from the merchant class, he decided to liberalise, well, to be honest, part liberalise the Iranian economy and to offer some partial privatisation of state assets.

In the meantime, given that the IRGC did quite well for its size and its funding during the war with a Iraq between ‘80 and ‘88, the Iranian government gave the IRGC veterans a lot of benefits and preferential treatment when it come to having economic incentives within the country in return for what they did during the war.

The privatisation of parts of the state sectors in Iran went immediately to the heads of the IRGC leaders, and they started to acquire a lot of the state assets, especially in telecommunications, construction, the ports, especially three ports in particular that they were eyeing Chabahar, Bandar Abbas and Bandar Imam Khomeini.

These three ports, almost 40% of the docks there are owned by the IRGC, which is exactly almost the same percentage by now of the entire Iranian economy, that the IRGC control, just one company alone, control assets worth more than 250 billion U.S. dollars and over 800 subsidiaries within Iran.

It is an army; it is a welfare organisation. It is a religious organisation, and it is a commercial operation.

Thomas: And it is a political power, especially since 1997 when Khatami became president. President Khatami was a reformist president. He sought to introduce liberalising, if you like, reforms. And he mobilised the young generation in Iran, especially students to support these efforts. And emboldened by this, students began a certain amount of peaceful political activism and organisation.

Now, in the late 90s when this was happening, the IRGC wrote to the president's office and explicitly said that unless this activity stopped, it would overthrow the government. It threatened a coup.

Khatami backed down which severely compromised his authority. His whole reform program was largely wrecked, and the IRGC had proved their political power. They realised, aha, we can use this to our advantage.

Aimen: Well, of course, they flexed their muscles so much during Khatami's presidency. And in fact, during that time actually in 2003, Bush invaded Iraq, Saddam Hussein fell. And there were some questions, that the old enemy is gone. So, what is the point of the IRGC being around?

And the IRGC said, “Oh, no, no, no, no. Wait, wait, wait. Now this is our moment. The great Satan is on our doorstep. Now we need to double our budget, double our effort, get more funding, get more recruit, increase our spending, get more missiles, more weapons, more training, more recruits, and embolden the Kurds force division within the IRGC.”

To the point where they were not only adamant that they will bend the government to their will, they decided to become the government, even. So, they fielded a candidate of their own, a former officer of the IRGC and a former mayor of Tehran, Ahmadinejad who some Iranians like to call him Ahmaq Nejad which means stupid Nejad.

So, they fielded that candidate in 2005 elections, and he won. And the first thing he did, half of his cabinet were former IRGC offices. There is no question that now is the time to absolutely take advantage of this situation that has risen in Iraq next door, that we now have the enemy at our doorstep.

So, they solve the Iranian people this idea that first it was Iraq, second it'll be Tehran. You know, if we don't embolden and strengthen and build up the IRGC to be a much greater power than it is, then the Americans will get their tanks rolling in Tehran.

And this is how the complete takeover of the Iranian state with the blessings of the Ayatollah Khamenei himself, happened by the IRGC.

Thomas: Yeah, that's the point. As supreme leader, the IRGC is ultimately under Khamenei's authority. And in the early teens, when President Ahmadinejad tried to increase the power of the presidency at the expense of the supreme leader, the IRGC actually backed the supreme leader.

They didn't even back their former boy Ahmadinejad. It shows just how deeply ingrained in the IRGC, loyalty to the supreme leader is.

At that time, Khamenei’s representative inside the IRGC said, “The authority of the grand jurist is the same as that of the Shiite Imam, and the obligation to obey him is the same.” That's saying something.

Aimen: Absolutely.

Thomas: So, Aimen, are the IRGC now, the most significant political and military body in Iran?

Aimen: Well, let me put it this way, in a commercial sense, I get asked by corporations around the world who want to enter into the Iranian market, and they'll ask the question, “What is the chance that when we do business there that we'll end up directly or indirectly doing business with the IRGC?”

I will say to them, “Well, the chances is between 105 to 107%,” and they get the message that there is no way that you can do any deal in Iran, and you can be in Iran to invest in Iran to actually have an office in Iran, and that you will not come across the IRGC and do business with them in any way, shape or form, whether directly or indirectly. In other words, Iran is IRGC and IRGC is Iran.

Thomas: It's like doing business in Sicily in the old days when eventually you're going to have to do business with the mafia.

Aimen: Oh, yes, absolutely. And the IRGC itself is a parallel army to the army. They control Hezbollah in Lebanon. They control the Shia militias in Iraq. They control the Shia militias in Syria, and they control, of course, the Houthis in Yemen.

So, they have between 300 and 400,000 fighters. And this is just only one branch inside the IRGC, which itself already doesn't have more than 250,000 fighters.

Thomas: Well, to some extent, Aimen, you're setting up the next few episodes of Conflicted when we are going to talk about Iran's terror nexus, as we're calling it around the region.

But as we reach the end of this episode, I want to ask you, what in your view is the smallest change that would need to happen inside Iran to transform Iran into a functioning country at peace with its neighbours and integrated into the world properly?

I mean, we are always talking about when is the change going to come and when is the coup going to happen? When is the revolution going to occur there? It overthrows the regime.

And we all know that if that were to happen, or God forbid when that happens, it's going to be a total bloodbath. So, nobody wants that. What would have to happen? What is the least that would have to happen to make Iran, in your view, a normal functioning cooperative, globally responsible country?

Aimen: First of all, I must state that I do not whatsoever support a violent overthrow of the regime because it'll lead to a civil war. And a civil war is what I hate to see Iran go through. The Iranian people are so sweet, so lovely, they don't deserve any of this whatsoever. They deserve a better outcome.

Coming back to this, I would say that if the Iranian decision makers and leaders, let's say in a post Khamenei world, if he were to die tomorrow and they decide that rationality should replace superstition, then the thing they should do is to abolish Article five of the Iranian constitution, which means abolishing completely the office of the Ayatollah and replace that with the president.

You don't have to replace anything else. You don't need to get rid of all the other councils, whether it is the Council of Expediency or the council of experts or guardians or whatever. Keep it, keep it all.

The whole idea is that remove this idea that Iran is a country in waiting for someone who is a saviour, a messiah, to come to lead Iran into conquering the rest of the world. This ain't going to happen, my dear friends, it ain’t going to happen.

So therefore, it is better if Iran would just return to the brilliant rationality that always characterize the Iranian personality over two and a half thousand years of civilization.

The civilization that gave us Al-Khwarizmi, the civilization that gave us Omar Khayyam, the civilization that gave us Ibn Sina, Jabbar Nahayan, goodness, and I could go on and on about how much scientific advancement that came out of the civilization.

Just return to rationality, return to reason, and abolish Article five, and just have a president and don't change anything else. That's it. That's all we need.

And then Iran would become a less belligerent, less ideologically driven, more rationally driven country that would seek its benefit rather than the fulfilment of fairytales that will never materialise.

Thomas: Well, it's funny because on the surface, it doesn't seem like abolishing Article five should be the hardest thing in the world to achieve. But as we've seen throughout this episode, the revolutionary complex that has been erected in Iran is very, very complicated indeed, and I fear very secure. I don't think Article five will be abolished anytime soon.

Now, people who followed the news of late know that there have been geopolitical changes afoot in the Middle Eastern region over the last few months regarding Iran and its rivals, especially Saudi Arabia, movements towards more peaceful and normative relations have been occurring.

We will talk about all of this in an episode that's coming up soon. We wanted to use this episode to just give a kind of lay of the land of Iran, describe the regime, how it works, describe where it came from, where it might be going.

[Music Playing]

And in the next episode, we're going to talk about the most notorious, well established and most potent arm of the Iranian regime's external activities. We've talked about it before here and there, but we've never devoted a whole episode to it. So, coming up, Conflicted does Hezbollah. Stay tuned.

A reminder that you can follow the show over on Facebook and Twitter at MH Conflicted. And for a deeper dive into all the subjects we talk about here on Conflicted, head over to Facebook and search Conflicted Podcast Discussion Group.

There you will find other fans of the show engaging in heated debates, enlightening conversations, and just generally geeking out over Conflicted related topics.

Conflicted is a Message Heard production. This episode was produced and edited by Harry Stott. Sandra Ferrari is our executive producer. Our theme music is by Matt Huxley and Tom Biddle.

Conflicted S4 E13: President Erdogan: The Rise to Power

Speakers: Thomas Small & Aimen Dean

Thomas: Aimen, I have a dad joke for you today.

Aimen: Unbelievable.

Thomas: What does President Erdogan have in common with Little Miss Muffet?

Aimen: What exactly?

Thomas: They both have Kurds in their way.

Aimen: Nice one.

Thomas: I hope that I'm not banned forever from visiting Turkey, a country that I totally love. And as it happens, we're not going to be speaking about Kurds really at all in this episode on President Erdogan, a man who has dominated Middle Eastern politics for three decades.

Erdogan is an enigma whose ties to the Muslim Brotherhood have long been alleged, but how strong are they and how did he cement his power in his homeland, the geo-strategically unique and vital country of Turkey? Let's find out.

[Music Playing]

Aimen, is Erdogan a member of the Muslim Brotherhood? We've just spent two episodes talking about the Muslim Brotherhood, a bit about its history, a lot about its ideology. We ended up deciding that it's ambitions are certainly totalitarian, even if its methods are sometimes moderate.

But President Erdogan of Turkey, it's often said that he is one of the great leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood. Is he in the Muslim Brotherhood? What's the story there, Aimen?

Aimen: Well, Thomas, if it quacks like a duck, if it walks like a duck, or in this instance, we'll say if it walks like a turkey and sounds like a turkey.

Thomas: Oh man, you just had to get a dad joke in, of your own, didn't you?

Aimen: Indeed.

Thomas: You can't stand not having one. If it walks like a turkey, if it quacks like a turkey, it's an Islamist. That's what you're saying.

Aimen: Well, I mean, his history definitely would show as we would go further and further into his life that the question that puzzled many analysts across the world, is he or is he not? Well, we are going to unpack this for sure in this episode.

Thomas: In preparation for this episode, Aimen, I read Soner Cagaptay’s book, The New Sultan: Erdogan and the Crisis of Modern Turkey. It only takes the story just a little bit beyond the attempted coup in 2016, which almost saw Erdogan thrown out of office.

And that's really where we'll be taking our story over the next two episodes, we'll discuss recent years a little bit at the end, but what we want to do is ground the present in the past. And we'll start at the beginning with Erdogan's birth the 26th of February 1954.

And already we are locked in an enigma. Was he born in Istanbul as some historical sources say, or was he born in a small village near Reza on the Black Sea Coast near Georgia. Already, just to know where the man was born, it's not clear.

Aimen: Well, for all intents and purposes, when he submitted his papers for the candidacy to become the mayor of Istanbul in the 1990s, his birth certificate says Istanbul.

Thomas: Ah, that's very interesting. You must be some sort of spy, Aimen.

Aimen: Yes. Who would've thought of that? Anyway, so. However, he himself says that after birth, his family moved back to that tiny little village on the Georgian border on the Black Sea until he was 13. Then he returned back to Istanbul.

Thomas: It's a fascinating part of Turkey that coast, extremely ancient, deeply, deeply entrenched in all sorts of wonderful historical eras, and traditionally ethnically very diverse.

It was an area of Armenian, Greek, and Georgian settlement over many, many millennia, really, until the early 20th century. And this of course, we talked about last season in our episodes on Turkey and Anatolia, and the change in population that occurred as Turkey transitioned from the Ottoman Empire into the modern Turkish nation state. When that part of the world became much more Turkified and Erdogan's own family definitely reflects this change.

Aimen: Indeed, he is not even a Turk. Many people don't understand that he actually come from a family of Georgian origin. In fact, three generations ago, or possibly four generations, they were Christians.

So, they converted to Islam about three generations ago. And therefore, if we were to do a DNA test of Erdogan, we might find that he is more Caucasian than a Turk.

Thomas: Yeah, that part of the Turkey was the last part of Turkey to be Islamified, the last part of Turkey to convert to Islam. And scholars suggest that for that very reason, it is a hotbed of strict conservative Islam, kind of like how converts tend to be more zealous and serious than cradle religious people.

I know this for a fact, I am a convert after all. That part of Turkey, the Reza Province, is notoriously one of the most conservative in all of Turkey.

Aimen: Absolutely.

Thomas: And as you say, he never lost his links with Istanbul, where it seems he was born. He went back and forth throughout his childhood between Istanbul and Reza. He would spend the summers in Reza a lot where he helped to harvest the tea that his family grew in their little plot there.

And he would also in the summers attend religious schools for children. So, he had a very old-fashioned, quite traditional childhood coming from a poor family from the hinterlands of Anatolia.

Aimen: Like many historical figures who came from poverty, it's the same story with Erdogan. His father went back from Reza to Istanbul to work as a ferry skipper. As you know, and many people know, Istanbul is divided by many waterways.

Erdogan was 12, 13 at that time, according to his biography. And while his father was ferrying people around many waterways of Istanbul, he used to sell lemon cakes that his mom used to make in order to help the family.

So, it's not exactly a silver spoon, not even a wooden spoon, I would say. He is definitely coming from a humble background.

Thomas: They lived in the neighbourhood of Kasım Pasha on the Golden Horn, a seafront address. It was a poor neighbourhood filled with migrants from Anatolia, from the Turkish hinterland.

In the Ottoman period, it was an industrial district. It was the most polluted district in all of Turkey. And according to Cagaptay, in Turkish, there's a word today, it's Kasım Pashali, if I'm pronouncing it correctly. And it's a word to refer to an honour obsessed Turk, a straight-talking Turk, quick to humiliate his rivals.

Now, Erdogan fondly remembers in speeches and in interviews the social solidarity of this neighbourhood that he grew up in. And he often mourns that its values, its virtues have been lost as Turkey has modernised, which is ironic because he has been a principal agent of Turkish modernization.

But the idea of Erdogan growing up poor in the shadow of the richer districts all around in Galata, that picture reminds me a lot of Donald Trump. Not because he was poor, Donald Trump wasn't poor, but Donald Trump grew up on the other side of the Hudson River from Manhattan and was always looking across at the glittering lights of the Manhattan skyline.

And throughout his life, felt like he didn't belong, and he kind of resented the wealthy and the powerful and the social, those in Manhattan with the high social status. Erdogan has a bit of this in his character, doesn't he?

Aimen: Indeed. There is no question about it. And funny enough, I mean, his life would have taken a very boring traditional path if he just stuck to it. He went actually to join a school for imams and preachers.

So, by 1973, he was supposed to graduate as an imam and a preacher, but somehow after graduation, he decided not to take that path and instead wanted to go further and further into politics.

Thomas: We first have to set the historical scene because in order to understand not only Erdogan, but also the political party he leads, the Justice and Development Party, the AKP. We have to understand modern Turkish political history. All those decades we're talking the 40s, 50s, and 60s. Those decades loom large in the memories of all Turks. To this day, it's very contested history. It's very formative.

It also will carry on the story from the episode we recorded last season on Turkey called Turkquake. We ended our survey of modern Turkish history. In 1938, the death of Atatürk, the founder of the modern Turkish Republic.

After Atatürk's death, his regime continued under his successor İnönü. Modernization, which he had absolutely spearheaded, continued unchecked. And the goal was to transform Turkey's largely agrarian society into something industrial.

And Aimen, this was true everywhere, Iran, even Russia at the time. It was the period, the 30s, the 40s, the 50s, the period of modernization.

Aimen: We have to understand that Ismet İnönü, the Turkish leader at the time, he wanted to double down even on Kemalism, because for him, Kemalism was the only way forward in order to modernise Turkey.

Thomas: Kemalism meaning the ideology of Kemal Atatürk, the founder.

Aimen: Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, he established a nation that was Turkified because the predecessor of Turkey was the Ottoman Empire, and the Ottoman Empire claimed to be a pan-Islamic pan-ethnic empire. And now the Turks need to find an identity of their own.

So, the first thing he did was to start a process of a de-Islamification of Turkey. And the first thing is to divorce the Turkish language from Arabic prior to Kemalism and prior to Atatürk taking the position of leadership in Turkey and abolishing the Ottoman caliphate, the Turkish language was written in the Arabic script.

He completely replaced the script with the Latin script and started the process of even interfering in the acts of worship, where he started to force acts of worship to be recited in Turkish rather than Arabic, which was-

Thomas: Well, he purged the Turkish language in Turkey of Arabic and to some extent Persian rooted words. He wanted a language that was purely Turkish. And along the way, he drew on a grab bag of European templates of state buildings.

So, he adopted a civil code from Switzerland. His criminal laws came from Italy. The commercial laws came from Germany, and he adopted French centralised administration and secularism. And this is what you're talking about, he was determined to make modern Turkey a secular nation.

Aimen: Indeed, it was an attempt by him to make Turkey into a secular nation by force. He was dragging Turkey into secularism, screaming, and kicking. But he did, nonetheless.

And by 1938, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk died, but his ideology did not. I mean, his ideology known as Kemalism continued to be strong. And in fact, his successor Ismet İnönü doubled down on this, enforcing this ideology on the Turkish Republic.

Thomas: Erdogan would end up creating a new political ideology to challenge Kemalism. This is why it's important not only to wrap your head around Kemalism, dear listener, but also to remember, and I think Aimen, this is a point you wanted to stress, that Kemalism never actually commanded the hearts and minds of a huge chunk of the Turkish population.

Aimen: I mean, Kemalism is elitism. You will find it more in places like Ankara, Istanbul, İzmir, Anatolia. So, you will find it along the Aegean Coast, the Mediterranean, as well as the major urban towns.

And even in Istanbul, you wouldn't find Kemalism very popular in Fatih or Zeytinburnu, whatever. You will find it more popular in Galata or in Bebek, in the very high-end neighbourhoods. So, Kemalism was always synonymous with elitism.

Thomas: During Atatürk's reign, and immediately after, Turkey was a one-party state. It was controlled by Atatürk's Republican People's Party, the CHP, as it's known in Turkish.

However, after the Second World War, Turkey yoked its fortunes to the West, to America, to the UN and to the growing free world in the Cold War. And because it did that, because it aligned with the West and signed the UN charter, Turkey was placed on the course to democracy.

Four CHP members split off and formed their own party, the Democratic Party, which advocated greater democratic and liberal rights. And that began the process of something like party politics in Turkey.

In 1950, this new party, the Democrats swept the field and threw the CHP, the old one-party state into the opposition. İnönü was replaced as Prime Minister by Adnan Menderes, the champion of the rural land-owning class.

So, this was a class of people that had felt excluded by the CHP and its elitist politics. The two men, İnönü and Menderes would be fierce political opponents for the next decade.

Aimen: Again, we see here the divide between the coast and the heartland. While the CHP, the Kemalist party will always rely on the votes coming from the coastal regions and the people who regard themselves as a secular elite there.

However, Adnan Menderes’ party and the Democrats, who even though they were liberals, the heartland voters would vote for them, not because of their conservatism, but despite of their liberalism, because they really wanted to have some semblance of religious freedom.

That is why I remember one Turkish political commentator who I spoke to in the 1990s, was talking to me. He said, politics in Turkey is very strange. There is no way you could have a true conservative party coming in because the army will immediately intervene to prevent it.

That is why we always say in America, you have a government of the people, by the people, for the people. However, in Turkey, we have a government for the people, despite the people.

Thomas: Well, Erdogan would go on to challenge what that analyst told you in the 90s. That's kind of the whole story of his time in power.

But back in the 50s, yes, for sure the Democrats, this new party, it definitely wooed the religious vote, and in general came to power on the back of a broad-based kind of centre rural voter base. And Erdogan's own political party, the AKP is rooted in this voter base.

It's an Islamist party as we'll find out. But even so, the AKP owes a lot to the success of the Democrat Party in the 50s. And in 2010, Erdogan actually said in a speech, “The torch of democracy that Menderes and his friends lit has been passed from hand to hand and carried to our party today.”

So, Menderes and this movement in the 50s still lives on in the memory, certainly of Erdogan.

Aimen: Indeed. In fact, Erdogan built one of the best and most modern airports in Turkey, in Izmir. Of course, Izmir is not a city that is traditionally voting for the AKP. But nonetheless, he built that airport there, 25 million passenger capacity, and he named it Alshahid Adnan Menderes Airport, which means the martyr Adnan Menderes.

Thomas: There you go, given the game away. We'll get to that in a second. The Democrats did give their religious voters something. So, for example, they allowed for the Adhan, the call to prayer to be said in Arabic again after it had been outlawed for the previous 22 years.

However, as the 50s proceeded, the Democrats program of economic liberalisation and political liberalisation, as they saw it, began to be characterised by the CHP, their rivals as authoritarian and the CHP were able to rally their supporters against their rivals in response to which the Prime Minister Menderes began being authoritarian.

It has happened so often, actually, especially in the 50s. We covered it last year. People like Mosaddegh in Iran, liberals becoming authoritarian to impose their liberalism and then end up becoming their enemies. It's all very confusing.

Aimen: Yes of course, Mosaddegh in the 1950s, Adnan Menderes in the 1950s, Justin Trudeau in the 2020s, oh sorry.

Thomas: Oh, man. Menderes banned political activism, suspended political parties, declared martial law, and then he turned against his religious allies. He outlawed the Millet Party, as it was called a religious party, on the grounds that it was religious. And it revealed that Menderes was never anti-Kemalist. Not at all.

This is certainly how he differs from Erdogan. Menderes remained Kemalist. He just had a slightly different, a slightly more liberal view economically, especially of what Kemalism meant.

And this movement towards an increasingly authoritarian style was irritating everyone, on top of which, by the end of the 50s, an economic boom, which the country had experienced after the Second World War ended as external investment began to dry up, and the economy suffered a massive downturn.

And so, in 1960, Menderes, who was now moving openly towards the reestablishment of a one-party state, he was controlling the press. He was organising attacks against the opposition, including the former Prime Minister İnönü, which was leading to student protests and all sorts of unrest.

This paved the way for a huge event in modern Turkish history. And in order to understand that event, we have to introduce a major player in Turkey, the army.

Aimen: We have to understand that one pillar of Kemalism is that the army must always be purely Kemalist. If you display any sign of religiosity in the army, then you are out. Whether you are a general or a corporal, it doesn't matter. That is why the army has remained a fiercely secular Kemalist institution for a very long time.

Then, of course, Turkey during the Second World War remained neutral all the way until the end when they declared war in Germany, that enabled them to get access to the Marshall Plan finances. The Americans were very keen actually to strengthen Turkey to make sure that the Turkish strategic position remain anti-Soviet, especially the straits of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles.

Not to mention that Turkey even gained a membership into NATO, and the U.S. placed its nuclear weapons actually in Turkey in order to deter the Soviet Union from any attempt to invade Turkey. So, Turkey was very important.

However, the majority of the American aid went to strengthen the Turkish Army that enhanced the power, the prestige, the personnel, and all of this meant that the army always had the final say when it comes to guarding the legacy of Atatürk and Kemalism.

Thomas: The Turkish Army was very strong, very pro-western, very anti-communist and very secular. And they were very upset in 1960 at Menderes’ overtures towards the Soviets. And they were very upset in 1960 at the unrest that Menderes’ policies were causing, including the fact that when that external investment from the West dried up, he turned towards the Soviets.

So, in May of that year, on the 27th of May 1960, the army staged a coup. Now armies staging a coup is the light motif of modern Turkish politics. And now, Erdogan in 1960 was four-years-old. The military took over completely. Adnan Menderes, the prime minister was hanged alongside his foreign minister and his finance minister.

Erdogan's whole childhood and young adulthood would be overshadowed by a regular series of semi coups and outright coups by the army. And it's incredibly important to understanding him as a politician this idea that the army in Turkey is not to be trusted. The army in Turkey intervenes to overthrow the will of the Turkish people again and again.

Erdogan and his party, the AKP, regularly invoked the names of Menderes and the other men who were hanged following the 1960 coup as martyrs. Including as you mentioned, by naming that airport Martyr Menderes Airport, he often refers to menders his execution as a symbol of the ruthlessness of the Kemalist deep state.

These are themes which we will cover, especially in the next episode when Erdogan is in power. But I cannot stress enough, armies interfering in the politics of Turkey is Erdogan's political obsession.

Aimen: He always regarded the role of the army in intervening in politics as the biggest threat to the democratic will of the people. And he himself would be a subject of an almost successful coup.

Thomas: In 1965, now he's 11-years-old. He began attending an Imam Hatip school, as you said before, Aimen, this was a religious school that was set up during one of those periods when secularism was a little bit lessened by the state, set up to train clerics.

And a teacher had noticed how much Erdogan enjoyed what little religious material there was in the normal school he was attending and suggested to his father that Erdogan receive a religious education.

So, he went to an Imam Hatip school, a state sector religious school, free of charge, which is a sign of the family's poverty to some extent, but also a sign of Erdogan's family's religious conviction.

Erdogan boarded at the school because it was across the Golden Horn in Sultanahmet, the sort of classical heart of ancient Constantinople, of old Istanbul. And he was extremely devoted to his religious studies.

He became expert in reciting the Qur’an. He learned Arabic to a high level, and in addition to Arabic became especially expert in the use of the Turkish language. To this day, he is considered a great orator in the Turkish language.

But he did have one guilty pleasure, one pastime he loved so much that despite his father hating it, he sneaked out and made sure that he always played. And what was that Aimen?

Aimen: Dancing. He was a very keen footballer.

Thomas: Yes. And he would end up being semi-professional as a young man. He loved football. He loved the whole world of the Imam Hatip school. He thrived there. And the network of Imam Hatip schools around Turkey provided a magnet for Turkey's conservatives to gather around.

They gathered there for social events, poetry, recitals, Qur’anic recitations, lectures, things like that. The Imam Hatip schools became a kind of social network for the conservatives, the Muslim conservatives, the pious conservatives, who in the end would sweep Erdogan to power.

Erdogan thrived in them, as did a new arrival on the Turkish scene, Islamism. And when we get back after the short break, we will discuss the arrival into Turkish politics of a new brand of ideas growing up in the Muslim world, to some extent, articulated by a thinker by the name of Sayyid Qutb. We'll be back.

[Music Playing]

We are back, dear listener. We're in the middle of our first episode in a two-part series on the life of President Erdogan of Turkey.

When we left him, he was in school enjoying his time at the Imam Hatip school, the religious school in Istanbul, around which the country's conservatives were circulating and feeling heard, feeling seen.

And in that environment, Erdogan's desire to join politics was born. And as a teenager, he joined the National Turkish Student Union, a right-wing anti-communist group, to which he soon became president of his high school's branch.

So, he was clearly bound for glory. He was extremely adept from a young age of achieving political office. And his ambition was to be a politician.

As such was this ambition, Aimen, and this was interesting, I didn't know this, that because at the time, due to Turkey's secularism laws, an Imam Hatip diploma would not allow you to go to university. Universities in Turkey at that time did not accept those diplomas.

And so, Erdogan, knowing that if he wanted to be a politician, he definitely needed to graduate from university, he switched out of the Imam Hatip School into a secular high school, just in time for graduation. And at the same time, his political leanings were being pulled towards a new player on the political scene in Turkey, Islamism.

Aimen: We have to understand that Kemalism did not get rid of Islam in Turkey whatsoever. And Islam remained to be the faith of the people. The people still were to some extent, especially in the heartland of Turkey, conservative.

However, Islamism as such, did not come to Turkey until the late 1960s, and it came through the writings of none other than our old friend, Sayyid Qutb.

So, Sayyid Qutb's writing, of course, after his execution in 1966. And even though it did not have the same resonance in Turkey, as in the Arab world, of course, the defeat in 1967 and the defeat of Arab nationalism by the Israelis, yet that defeat was a vindication of Sayyid Qutb's ideas.

So, through the Israeli defeat of the Arabs, and through the writings Sayyid Qutb, some of the Turkish translators believed that Sayyid Qutb's ideas were vindicated by that defeat.

And so, it started to appeal now to a sense of the injustice that the Turkish conservative Muslims were feeling under the rather somewhat militant secular state apparatus of Kemalism.

Thomas: And what's funny now is that at the time in Turkey, the authorities, the police, the military, the government, they were focused on left-wing and right-wing militant activists, not Islamists.

So, at the time in the early 70s, Turkish politics was really fraying. There was a lot of unhappiness at the failure of the Kemalist regime to maintain economic standards and to respond to the growing needs of a rapidly urbanising population.

This was resulting in extreme left-wing and right-wing activism that was violent, we're talking paramilitary in some cases. And the Islamists were very smart, and they kept their heads down.

They did not pursue any violent activism at the time, and they were being guided by an extremely important figure in the history of modern Turkey, Necmettin Erbakan, really the man who brought Islamism to Turkey.

He was Turkish, he was a middle-class man, a respectable engineer. He had a PhD, but he wanted to get into politics. And rejected by all the mainstream parties, in 1969, he was elected as an independent by the voters of Konya, which led the next year to him founding his own party, the National Order Party, Turkey's first Islamist party.

Aimen: For Necmettin Erbakan, who of course, I have read many of his writings and many of his interviews. He was clearly influenced by Hassan al-Banna, Abdul Qadir Audah and in particular also Sayyid Qutb.

He definitely saw that the time was right for Islamism as a force to be introduced into Turkey. After the rejection of the mainstream parties of him, he went to Konya of all places to be elected by the people there.

And why Konya in particular? Because remember, Konya is the home of Islam and Islamic conservatism in Turkey, it is the resting place of Jalāl al-Dīn Rumi, the early Muslim philosopher who many people quote in order to cry over their ex-boyfriends. But anyway.

Thomas: Alright, Rumi is a great Sufi and a wonderful man. He can inspire all manner of Valentine's Day cards.

Aimen: Indeed, yes. However, he was elected, he established the National Order Party and among his first students, among his first admirers, and among the people who really followed him was none other than our dear friend, Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

Thomas: So, at that time, Erdogan was attending the Iskender Pasha Mosque in the conservative Fatih district of Istanbul. This is the district named after Mehmed, the conqueror, the great villain of Greek Orthodox everywhere, who conquered Constantinople in 1453.

Aimen: Sorry, sorry, the Great Conqueror of Islam. Yeah.

Thomas: In fact, Erdogan was part of a Sufi circle there and it's probably there where he first fell into Erbakan's orbit because Erbakan was also affiliated with the mosque and with that Sufi circle, and clearly Erbakan had a tremendous influence, had a tremendous effect on Erdogan.

It's a shame, dear listener, that their names sound so similar, but you're just going to have to distinguish between Erbakan and Erdogan. Erdogan would go on to name his firstborn son after Erbakan. This shows just how much he was influenced by him.

Now through many winding pathways, the National Order Party, which three years after its founding, would be rebranded as the National Salvation Party, and then later rebranded as the Welfare Party, and then later rebranded as the Virtue Party always rebranding as Turkey's constitutional court, which was the guarantor of Kemalism for the state, would have an anti-Islamist freakout shut down the party. And it would reemerge shortly thereafter, under a new name.

Through a very winding pathway, that party would eventually become the AKP, Erdogan's Party. So, it's founding in 1970 by an Islamist, inspired by Sayyid Qutb, who in the 90s would become the prime minister of the country, is very important to the story of Erdogan's life.

Aimen: Remember, 1973 is a tumultuous year. I mean, you have the year of the Yom Kippur War. The year in which the oil embargo happened, and it was really tumultuous here. And yet Erbakan's party, the Islamist won the second place in Parliament just after the CHP.

And so, they entered into an alliance, which was very strange, Kemalist and Islamist, together the same government. But because the head of the CHP at the time was Buland Ajawid and Buland Ajawid was pragmatist, and the two ministries that Erbakan demanded of the PM Buland Ajawid to give him was justice and interior. So, he wanted to control the law and the police. And this is classic-

Thomas: That's a very Islamist thing to do, Aimen.

Aimen: Exactly. Classic Islamist move, always moving in order to begin the process of right-wing Islamization of the police and the judges and the lawyers in order to start a counterweight within the deep state against the army.

Thomas: But how's this, Aimen, for Machiavellianism the next year, Erbakan having talked to the Kemalist Party into entering into a coalition with him the next year, he abandoned that coalition and entered into a coalition with their enemies, a coalition of right-wing nationalist parties, the nationalist front. Clearly Aimen, Erbakan was a very calculating political operator.

Aimen: Of course, he was, after all he was an engineer.

Thomas: Why are so many Islamists engineers, Aimen?

Aimen: Can I tell you something? Osama bin Laden was an engineer. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar was an engineer. Ahmad Shah Massoud was an engineer. And what is his name? Morsi, the president of Egypt was engineer.

Thomas: You can't trust them. You can't trust Islamists. You can't trust engineers.

Aimen: In a lecture I was given to agents from my five and my six, I was saying, really, it's not the religious schools we have to close. It is the engineering faculties in all the Muslim universities that we have to close in order to get rid of extremism once and for all.

Thomas: Well, Erbakan now having reached positions of power in the government, he was able to get change to happen in the country's secularist kind of constitution. So, the government agreed to open more Imam Hatip schools across the country, and they were now admitting women too. This was one of the moves that Erbakan wanted to happen.

Now that is to me, a sign of Islamism as opposed to traditional Islam, that he wanted women to start going to the Imam Hatip schools and be indoctrinated into Islam or into Islamism.

Because traditionally, of course, women would not have gone to schools designed to create clerics. But Islamism is often progressive in some respects relative to traditional Islam. And there's a sign of the Islamism. Would you agree, Aimen?

Aimen: Yes. Because of course what Hassan al-Banna said, “Without teaching our women, how can we raise the next generation to be part of our movement?”

Thomas: Exactly. Well, Erdogan has been watching from the sidelines this man Erbakan move up the power ladder in Turkey. Erdogan's still extremely young, he's only 19, 20, 21 during all this time.

And in 1976, aged 22 and he's now in university in a school that would go on to be rebranded the University of Marmara, studying business administration and economics. Very important point given what he would do later when he was in power. And he was chosen at this young age of 22, chosen to be president of the National Salvation Party Youth branch in Istanbul's Beyoglu district.

So, this included the neighbourhood that he grew up in, and the next year he became the president of the youth branch for all of Istanbul. He was very much in Islamist circles at the time.

In 1978, he met his wife at an Islamist event. They married. So, we have to understand that Erdogan is really connected now. I mean, he's linked directly to these Islamist political circles in Istanbul.

Aimen: Oh, how romantic of Recep Erdogan to marry in 1978, because he got married in the same year I was born. That's a good thing actually, in my opinion.

Anyway, so in 1978 until 1980, there are some beginnings, telltale signs of his infatuation with the Muslim Brotherhood. There was a conference organised by WAMI. WAMI for those who don't know what it is, it stands for the World Association of Muslim Youth, an organisation that was founded in Saudi Arabia by the Muslim Brotherhood when the Muslim Brotherhood were tolerated in Saudi Arabia.

And he seemed to have attended. And at that time, he met none other than one of the great founders of the Muslim Brotherhood Organization, an Egyptian called Kamal El-Helbawy, which indicates that Erdogan was already more or less close to Muslim Brotherhood circles to be invited to such conference.

Thomas: Yeah, absolutely. The 70s in Turkey were horrible. By the late 70s, Turkey's economy was in full blown crisis, which was part of the global crisis that was happening as a result of the increased oil price of that decade. If you remember in the 70s, everywhere was suffering. Certainly, Turkey was.

Left and right politics were becoming ever more extreme, ever more violent. All the parties had paramilitary wings, including starting in that year, 1978, the National Salvation Party. It got its own paramilitary wing.

And this all culminated in 1980 with yet another military coup, a very brutal coup, a total military takeover. 122,000 people were arrested within a year. And by the end of the decade, by 1990 500,000 Turks had been arrested.

There was widespread torture in Turkish prisons. All civil societies were banned. And the National Salvation Front along with lots of other parties and all Islamist parties was shut down.

Erbakan, Erdogan's idol was banned from politics. Erdogan himself lost his role as head of the Istanbul youth branch of the party. And it seemed like everything was really smashed to bits.

And yet unexpectedly, I think for the coup leaders following the coup in line, really with what was going out throughout the Sunni world, Turkey began to embrace its Sunni Islamic identity more, which the coup leaders supported to some extent.

I mean, they were primarily anti-communist in their orientation, and they were also trying to rejig Kemalism a bit to include greater respect for Turkey's Muslim Ottoman past. This was designed to combat the growing Islamist movement.

So, the Kemalists were like, “Well, if we can include Islam a little bit in our ideology, then it will dampen Islamism, which is on the rise.”

But of course, it only worked to strengthen Islamism. You give them an inch; they'll take a mile. Erdogan would of course end up benefiting enormously from this development.

In 1981, he graduated from university, he did his year of military service and then joined the private sector. At this point, Aimen, his association with Islamists would really grow because in his capacity working in the private sector, he would travel around the Muslim world to some large degree.

Aimen: Erdogan of the 1980s is very different. This is where we see Erdogan, the internationalist Islamist. He's travelling to Afghanistan, to Pakistan, he's travelling to Egypt. He is travelling to Saudi Arabia, to Jordan where he is meeting with many different pillars of the Muslim Brotherhood.

He met with Abdullah Azzam, he met with Hekmatyar, he met with Burhānuddīn Rabbānī in Afghanistan. He met with Ahmad Shah Massoud. He met with Khaled Mashaal of Hamas. He met with Abdul Majeed al-Zindani in Yemen.

We could go on and on about the many people he met. And we're not talking about speculation or hearsay. These are all documented by photos that were taken at that time.

Thomas: You sent me the photos, Aimen. You sent me the photos. That's unmistakable. There is Erdogan standing next to Qaradawi. There is Erdogan standing with Hekmatyar. I mean, it's there. You can't deny it.

Aimen: Absolutely. So, and there is with Mashaal and there is with Zindani. And so, the man was definitely part of this international effort to support the Afghan jihad. He was part of the international effort to connect with like-minded Muslims at that time, who really felt the duty towards supporting the Afghan jihad.

And the Afghan jihad was supported mostly by the Muslim Brotherhood. And also, there was a photo of him meeting with Qazi Hussain Ahmad, the head of Jamaat-e-Islami, which is the Muslim Brotherhood branch of Pakistan.

There is no mistaking that he was avidly a Muslim Brotherhood influenced person. Can we say he is a member of the global organisation? There is no hard evidence of that. But his associations are just too much to ignore.

Thomas: These Islamist credentials were going to serve Erdogan in very good stead, when in 1983, military rule formally ended in Turkey and Erbakan was able to reopen his political party. This time as the Welfare Party. Erdogan immediately joins it and soon becomes chairman of the party in Istanbul.

And so, in 1987, when a ban on Islamist parties is lifted, the Welfare Party is able to join party politics again in full force. And Erdogan goes for it.

In 1989, he ran for mayor of Beyoglu, that large Istanbul district in which he grew up. And immediately he proved himself a very able campaigner. He had a popular touch.

He only narrowly lost. And this is interesting. It was so narrow, his loss, that he went to court to contest it. And during the trial, he called the judge drunk. He was arrested and detained for a week.

This is postmodern politics, Aimen. This is Trumpist politics. This is very able politicking by a man who's trying to get the people behind him. I'm going to stand up for you against the corrupt elites. He's doing it. He's doing it before Trump. He's the original master.

Aimen: Indeed. And that's why he and Trump got along very well.

Thomas: They would, wouldn't they? So, flash forward to the early 90s. There's another massive economic crisis in Turkey. In the midst of the chaos, Erbakan's voice is growing louder.

He's decrying the whole system in Turkey, he's claiming to offer Turks what he called a just order, where there will be no corruption, there will be no exploitation of the poor. His was an extremely Islamist vision of order, including increasing antisemitic rhetoric where the Jews and world Zionism is being blamed for Turkey's ills.

And yet, at the same time, the party is somewhat progressive. It's showing uncovered women in their ads. It's allowing uncovered women to have positions of power in the party.

And as a result of all of this, the Welfare Party's popularity is exploding. The membership numbers are reaching into the millions. And on the back of this, in 1994, Erdogan runs for and wins the mayorship of Istanbul. This is what begins his inexorable rise to absolute power in Turkey.

Aimen: Remember Thomas, from season three on our episode in Algeria, we talked about classic textbook Islamism. First get the positions of power and municipalities, fix the day-to-day lives of people. And this is how you prove your competence as an administrator.

Erdogan did exactly the same. He followed exactly the textbook Islamism, which is go for a position of power that would touch people's everyday lives. So, he immediately went to the jugular.

First, he started by combating corruption within the municipalities of Istanbul. Second, he started to interfere in the police work and make sure that they do not take bribes from the people. Third, he cleaned the streets. Fourth, he started by improving the sewage and water treatment systems.

And furthermore, he started to improve the air quality. He started to improve the roads and the metro system. The man just went to work and made sure that the streets are cleaned, crime is reduced, tourism has improved.

He made sure that services has improved significantly. This is how you win over the people. You build a macrocosm of what greater Turkey would experience if you elect me and my party in the future as the steward of the Turkey state. It worked.

Thomas: It certainly did. It's how he got elected to the mayorship in the first place. The city had been facing enormous problems. It was riddled with corruption and was filthy. And yes, as you say, he did all those good things.

The one thing I will counter, the one thing is that I don't think it's true to say that he tackled corruption exactly. Certainly, his detractors would say that yes, he took non-Welfare Party cronies out of the system, but he replaced them with Welfare Party cronies. He could say, I'm attacking corruption, but this is a classic Islamist move as well.

Aimen: Look Thomas, I'm not saying that he tackled corruption entirely. I'm saying that before him corruption was so unsustainable. People were taking exuberant bribes.

However, he replaced the corrupt people with less corrupt people. So, we moved from unsustainable corruption to sustainable corruption, man.

Thomas: That is the Islamist way, Aimen. From unsustainable to sustainable corruption. And that's where we're going to leave Erdogan now, he's mayor of Istanbul. He's doing a bang-up job proving his competence as the leader of that city, improving everything, and using democratic party politics to his advantage.

The question is, how much did he really believe in democracy? And Aimen, you told me about an interview that Mayor Erdogan gave in 1996 to a journalist, which rather shines a light on this question. How much of a believer in democracy was Erdogan? Can you remember, Aimen, what he said?

Aimen: Oh yeah. He said, “Democracy is like a tram, once you reach your station, you get off.”

[Music Playing]

Thomas: Well, that's the Islamist way I think. You use democracy to gain power, and once you have it, you keep it. And that's what we will see in the next episode in this history of President Erdogan of Turkey having attained power, what steps he takes to keep it. Stay tuned.

A reminder that you can follow the show over on Facebook and Twitter at MH Conflicted. And for a deeper dive into all the subjects we talk about here on Conflicted, head over to Facebook and search Conflicted Podcast Discussion Group.

There you will find other fans of the show engaging in heated debates, enlightening conversations, and just generally geeking out over Conflicted related topics.

Conflicted is a Message Heard production. This episode was produced and edited by Harry Stott. Sandra Ferrari is our executive producer. Our theme music is by Matt Huxley and Tom Biddle.

Conflicted S4 E14: President Erdogan: The Mask Slips

Speakers: Aimen Dean & Thomas Small

Aimen: Hello, dear listener, Aimen Dean here, your host and-

Thomas: Aimen. I love it. Alright, the new Conflicted is shaking things up.

Aimen: As usual, I am with my co-host, the great Thomas Small.

Thomas: Hello. I'm still alive.

Aimen: Glad you're still alive. You know what, Thomas, I have a great quote for you from our dear friend, President Erdogan.

Thomas: President Erdogan of Turkey. Go for it. What's the quote?

Aimen: Yeah, he said to a Kuwaiti politician who I met in 2010, who's an Islamist, was asking him, “Prime Minister Erdogan, when will you fully impose Islamic Sharia on the Turkish Republic and finally get rid of Kemalism and its secular legacy?”

He answered by saying, “Secularism and Kemalism had 70 years to corrupt the minds of the Turkish people. Therefore, it'll take 70 years work on our part to cleanse the minds of the Turkish people. Therefore, we must prepare our own generation in order to be worthy of an Islamic state in Turkey.”

Thomas: Well, my goodness, Aimen, you've taught me not to trust what Islamists say. So, who knows if your friend was telling the truth. But if what your friend is saying is true, then it suggests an answer to the question we've been asking in this two-part series on President Erdogan. Is Erdogan an Islamist?

[Music Playing]

Aimen: Is the Pope a Catholic?

Thomas: Well, these days some people have their doubts. Let's get right back into it. Dear listener, we left President Erdogan as mayor of Istanbul in the late 90s. And just to get us back into the story, in 1995, the Islamist Welfare Party run by Necmettin Erbakan won a plurality of votes in national elections.

But the Army stepped in cajoling a number of smaller parties to create an anti-Welfare Party coalition. This coalition broke down. There was another election the following year. That time the Welfare Party in coalition with another party won a majority and Erbakan, Erdogan's great idol became the country's first Islamist prime minister.

Aimen: When Necmettin Erbakan became the prime minister, I think power went into his head straight away. I mean, he went to visit Gaddafi. I mean, come on, Gaddafi of all people, I think Gaddafi infected him with Gaddafism or Gaddefitis, I would say, basically the disease of making outlandish suggestions and outlandish statements.

And then suggested some sort of an anti-western alliance. And started to have some sort of an anti-Semitic policies towards the Israelis. I mean, all of this caused within nine months the army to intervene again and to force the government to resign and to ban the party again. And this is when a fallout between the student and the master happened.

Thomas: That's right. Yeah. In ‘97, the military launches another crackdown on Islamists, civil society groups, liberal civil society groups launch rallies against Erbakan and his party. There were big demonstrations, and another coup is threatened.

And at that point, the Welfare Party actually relinquishes power. So, there wasn't a coup in ‘97, it was threatened, but Erbakan said, okay let's step back. He relinquishes his power. He's ousted as prime minister. It was a sort of soft coup, let's say.

But more importantly from the point of view of Erdogan is that the U.S. and the EU both openly supported it. They openly came out and said, well, it's not ideal that the military threatened a coup and it's changed the government, but we're okay with it because they didn't like Islamists.

And from his position as mayor of Istanbul, Erdogan watched all of this unfold, and it taught him if he needed to learn it again, that the Turkish army could not be trusted, but also that the West could not be trusted. And finally, that if you were going to be an Islamist politician in Turkey, you needed to be subtle. You couldn't be overt.

Aimen: I am now going to introduce to the dear listener, a concept that is well known within the Muslim world, but hardly ever known outside of it. We are talking now about a concept that is both religious and political. It's called Taqiyah. Taqiyah is to conceal. Basically, it is concealment.

The first people to practise Taqiyah were the Shia. As a minority religious group, some of their beliefs would be offensive to Sunnis, and therefore they would attempt to hide them and conceal them under the guise of Taqiyah.

But also, the Muslim brotherhood adopted what we call in the 20th and the 21st century, the political Taqiyah, a Taqiyah siyasiyat. And Erdogan and his new circle, Abdullah Gül, Daoud Ahmet Oglu, Binali Yıldırım and many of their advisors and thinkers went into this mode.

The idea that let us conceal our religious aims for now, let us practise Taqiyah siyasiyat, which is political Taqiyah in order to reach what we need to reach, power first, then ideology second.

Thomas: Yeah. Erdogan would never forget the soft coup of 1997. And analysts really believe that much that has transpired in Turkey over the past 20 years is all about Erdogan getting revenge on the forces he blamed for that soft coup. Because he blamed the whole establishment, the military, the judiciary, the civil service, the media, big business, the whole show.

And despite being banned from politics that very year for reading an incendiary poem, which the constitutional court said, attacked Turkey's secular constitution, Erdogan was poised to rise.

So yes, as you say, following the soft coup, Aimen, there was a debate within the Islamists of Turkey between moderation and radicalization. This was a debate that was going on throughout Muslim Brotherhood, affiliated political parties everywhere.

They had watched the Algerian Civil War play out, as we talked about last season, extremely brutal, very bloody, really gave radical Islamist politics a bad name. They had watched the Bosnian jihad and everything that had followed. They had watched the rise of voices like Osama bin Laden’s, antagonising the West and causing blowback.

So, Erdogan joined those voices, which were calling for moderate Islamist tactics. And in August 2001, hardline Erbakan followers founded the Felicity Party. But Erdogan at this point broke with Erbakan and co-founded the AKP, the Justice and Development Party with another moderate Islamist politician, Abdullah Gül.

Erdogan openly described this new party as conservative. He did not use the term Islamist; he did not use the term Islamic. It was officially a centre right party. It positioned itself as pro-democracy, pro-West, pro-free market, pro moderate secularism, even.

If we go back, dear listener to Autumn 2001, we will probably remember that it was not the time to be an openly Islamist party.

Aimen: Indeed, the autumn of 2001. How could anyone forget the events of 9/11?

Thomas: Yeah, 9/11, just the month after this new party was founded the American invasion of Afghanistan, the launch of the global war on terror. It was not a time to be an open Islamist political party.

And that pivot to the centre right, especially given the economic crisis that Turkey was yet again undergoing in the early years of the century, meant that the AKP, this newly founded party had a lot of appeal and immediately became an election winner.

The very next year, the AKP becomes the largest party, and Abdullah Gül becomes prime minister immediately being in a position now to lift the ban on Erdogan practising politics, allowing him to run for parliament, which he duly achieves. And in 2003, Gül steps down from prime minister in order that Erdogan could become prime minister. Gül becomes his deputy.

So, very quickly, in a series of extremely agile moves, Erdogan goes from being a band former mayor of Istanbul to the prime minister of Turkey. Boom. Just like that.

Aimen: Just like that because the Turkish parliament prior to dissolving itself decided that they cannot continue with the insane system that any small party could become member of the parliament, three seats here, four seats there, 10 seats here, he will end up with 21/22 parties represented in the parliament. With eight of them forming a government.

You can't have an unsustainable way of governance. So, they said only parties that would achieve 10% in the proportional representation system in the election will get the proportional seats accordingly.

So, what happened is that only two parties managed to get above the 10%. The old, grand Kemalist party, the CHP won 15%, and the AKP won 34%, which meant that under the proportional representation and the fact that only parties that gain over 10% will enter parliament, that two thirds majority of the parliamentarian seats will go towards the AKP, which means they are the first party in 70 years to form a government alone with a majority enough to change the constitution.

Thomas: And there is Erdogan sitting at the top of it. Amazing. And so, now for the next few minutes, Aimen, I just want to discuss that first few years of Erdogan as prime minister of Turkey.

It's really marked by liberalising reforms, economic reforms to some large degree. And as you once told us in the second series of Conflicted, Erdogan’s stewardship of the Turkish economy, especially in that first 10 years of his time in power, was very adept. And he was very well advised in that regard.

Aimen: Indeed, there is no question that Erdogan's stewardship of the Turkish economy between 2002 and 2012/13 were to some extent good. I mean, he instituted a lot of reforms that enabled really to harness the power of what they would later be known as the Anatolian Tigers.

He industrialised the heartland from just being in a farming into food industry, into the weapons industry, into some extent mid tech industry. And coupled with massive mega infrastructure projects in terms of transportation, in terms of power, in terms of energy.

So, by 2012, 2013, you can say that Turkey has become a regional powerhouse, for sure.

Thomas: Erdogan was committed to a free market economy. I mean, he had benefited from some tough austerity measures that his predecessors in government had introduced earlier in the decade when Turkey was going through a real financial and economic crisis.

But this had caused inflation to come down, which allowed Erdogan to take … I remember this actually quite clearly. He took that powerfully symbolic move you mentioned of slashing six zeros from the Turkish lira.

I remember I visited Turkey for the first time in 2001, and you'd be paying for everything in the millions, and then when I went back in 2006, suddenly you're paying for everything in normal numbers.

It was quite pronounced, but it was powerful symbol that the Turkish economy was no longer a basket case. But the Turkish public really thanked him for this. In 2007, and again, in 2011, the AKP and Erdogan won ever increasing majorities in elections.

The Turks wanted what he had to offer, but interestingly, they were also voting overwhelmingly for pro-EU parties. And this is another part of the story of that first decade of Erdogan in power, the weird dance between Turkey and the EU, over the possibility of EU accession.

The EU at the beginning of this period was, let us say open to the idea, but they were always worried about Turkey's human rights record. They would make a big deal about it. And in response, given that so many of his countrymen wanted to join the EU, Erdogan did launch some human rights reforms.

Aimen: Many of the reforms that took place between 2002 and 2014 were quite astonishing. I mean, one of them in particular, and especially it's a big for Muslim country, is to abolish the death penalty.

The fact that Erdogan's party got rid of the death penalty, despite the fact it is a essential part of Sharia, was a very pragmatic move on their part because they wanted to align their laws with the EU laws, which prohibited the implementation of the death penalty.

Also, there were freedom of speech provisions initially, at least, and there were other reforms in terms of countering corruption, reforms in terms of trade standards and customs. Many things that were done in order to align the Turkish values, both commercially and politically and societally with EU values in these fields.

Thomas: Yeah, the EU accession plans that were drawn up for Turkey explicitly helped Erdogan and the AKP achieve these aims. So, he could always say, well, we have to do this because the EU is telling us to do it if we want to be a member of the EU.

And according to many, many measures, at that time, Turkey was certainly improving in terms of human rights. All the NGOs were saying that there was more freedom of speech, more rule of law, more political pluralism in Turkey.

But Erdogan was soon to clash with the EU over another pillar of the EU’s kind of system, and that was secularisation. So, in the 1980s, the Turkish government, so this was following the coup of 1980, and the discomfort that the government at the time felt with rising Islamism.

So, in the 80s, the Turkish government banned the headscarf, the hijab in Turkish government buildings, in schools, in universities. So, civil servants couldn't wear the headscarf, teachers couldn't wear the headscarf, students couldn't either.

And in 2004, a Turkish woman who felt that her religious freedom was being compromised by the ban on heads scarfs in Turkey, took the case all the way to the European Court of Human Rights. And in a way, this is kind of surprising, given the EUs liberal credentials.

But nonetheless, in 2004, the ECHR upheld Turkey's headscarf ban, which gave room in 2005 for Erdogan openly to criticise the European court, claiming that Turkish law on religious matters was up to the Turkish ulama, the Turkish religious scholars, not European judges.

And this was a kind of salvo in a move away from the EU, and from aligning Turkey with the EU’s political liberal values, obviously Erdogan's opponents called his commitment to democracy into question, they were claiming that Erdogan never really intended to align Turkey with the EU’s political liberal values.

He was just using the EU accession plans as an excuse to increase the AKP’s power at the expense of the establishment in Turkey, the secular establishment. And it is sort of true, I think now looking back on it, that the AKP had been aiming at increasing the religious freedoms of pious Muslims for sure, but not of secular liberal Turks, and certainly not of Turkey's ethnic minorities.

So, in the name of liberalisation, the AKP and Erdogan was really just continuing the process towards an Islamist state there. What do you think about that, Aimen.

Aimen: Look, this was considered by Erdogan at that time, and the AKP parties as a whole, the members and the supporters as a slap on the face from the EU because how could the police force in the UK accommodate female Muslim officers by giving them hijab with the same colours of the police uniforms, while at the same time in Turkey, they cannot, which is a Muslim majority country, and yet the EU finds nothing wrong with either.

And this is, I think when Erdogan also felt that this was a attempted deliberate sabotage by European secular elite who wants to conserve the EU as a largely Christian club, and that Muslim Turkey has no place in it.

So, how do you antagonise the Turks? Tell them basically, actually Muslim women can wear hijab everywhere in Europe, except you guys, you can't.

Thomas: This was also the mid noughties. And let's say there was a lot of paranoia in the air about Islam and about Islamism. And Erdogan had kind of run afoul by this point, not only of the EU, but of the United States over the Iraq war.

And it's a kind of a tricky story. Initially, the AKP did move to support the war. Erdogan said, when America came to him and said, “We'll give you $30 billion for our land forces to have access to Turkish territory, we'll give you $30 billion in exchange for that access.”

Erdogan supported it. He sent a bill to parliament to rubber stamp it, but parliament actually rejected it, forcing Erdogan to renegotiate with the Americans. And he, in the end, accepted $9 billion in exchange for giving America access to Turkish Air Force bases and airspace.

Nonetheless, it put a huge strain on U.S.-Turkish relations for the time. And in Washington, some officials were spoken and only really veiled contempt of Turkey in the context of the war on terror. And it didn't help that. At the same time, the AKP’s rhetoric inside Turkey was turning increasingly anti west and anti-U.S.

So, let's say to be generous to Erdogan, he was trying to straddle two worlds. He wanted to maintain Turkey's traditional NATO alliance foreign policy. He also was the head of an Islamist political party, or at least a veiled Islamist political party, increasingly, openly so.

On which side of the balance was Erdogan kind of, let's say, pretending it seems from that rhetoric that he was on the side of the Islamists?

Aimen: No, definitely not. And I will tell you why, because at that time, as you know, I used to work for the UK intelligence services. Turkey was a target of multiple Al-Qaeda led terrorist acts, the bombing of the British Embassy, the bombing of a synagogue, the bombing of the bank that I would later go to work for HSBC in Istanbul, 128 people were wounded, three were killed. The entire building was destroyed, and multiple other acts of terrorism actually took place in Turkey at the hands of Islamists.

So, what happened here is that Erdogan decided, you know what? I have something that the West need more than anything else, and I will help them with that, and they will help me with something else.

Guess what? He decided to go for the absolute Machiavellian pragmatism. He would use his excellent intelligence apparatus, the MIT, the military intelligence in Turkey to gather a lot of intelligence on jihadists.

So, actually Erdogan was clever, absolutely clever. Between 2003 until 2011, he played both sides to some extent. The Turks and Erdogan were getting rid of one enemy, which is the extremist Islamist.

And also at the same time, you appease another enemy, which is the West. So, this way you play both sides here, and you come out of the game winning.

Thomas: Well, that reflects really Erdogan's foreign policy position in general, which was to achieve strategic depth in the region to reclaim Turkey's poll position in Middle Eastern geopolitics. So, Erdogan is prosecuting Turkey's alliance in NATO and helping America and building up its credentials as an Islamist power. Is that fair, Aimen?

Aimen: Indeed. And this would actually become far more prevalent when the Arab Spring comes.

Thomas: Oh, of course, yes. We've talked about Turkey and the Arab Spring on Conflicted before.

Aimen: For me, the Arab Spring exposed Erdogan true foreign policy until then, until 2011, 2012, you wouldn't really guess where Erdogan's political compass pointed towards.

However, his support for the overthrow of Mubarak, his support of the overthrow of Binali in Tunisia, his support of the overthrow of Gaddafi in Libya, and his enthusiastic support, of course, for the overthrow of Assad in Syria, which never happened of course.

All of these indicated that he was truly supportive of Muslim Brotherhood ideals because some of these uprisings were having the stamp of the Muslim Brotherhood all over them. And suddenly Erdogan the pragmatist became Erdogan the ideologist.

Thomas: Our exploration of Erdogan's life is really focusing more on Turkish domestic politics. It's definitely true that in his geopolitics at the time of the Arab Spring, his Islamist sympathies came to the fore.

It's also true that he hates coups. Remember, it's the thing he hates more than anything else. He's certainly experienced a few of his own and would go on to experience an attempted coup just around the corner.

And that's where we are going to come back after this brief break. We're going to return to the domestic scene where we will stay until the end of this episode, and we will explore the very mysterious and quite exciting story of the attempted coup against Erdogan in 2016. Stay with us. We'll be back.

[Music Playing]

We're back. We've been telling the life story of President Erdogan of Turkey. When we last left him, he was unmasked. His Muslim Brotherhood sympathies were there for the whole world to see during the Arab Spring.

But now, in the final half of the second episode of his life, we are going to focus back on the domestic scene and Erdogan's growing paranoia about his worst fear. Remind the listener, Aimen. What is President Erdogan's worst fear?

Aimen: The army, of course, Thomas, the army, he's always afraid of the army because he, in his lifetime, witnessed multiple military coups and military interventions in politics where governments were ousted prime ministers, sometime not only being arrested, but also executed.

So, for him, he saw the army as not only the guardian of the Kemalism that he hates so much, but also as the enemy of the people's choice, especially when it come to political Islam.

Thomas: So, before the Arab Spring, that's where we left him at the end of the last half. But before the Arab spring, by a few years as early as 2007, then Prime Minister Erdogan saw direct evidence that the Turkish army was already looking for some kind of attempt to intervene.

They didn't like the AKP, they didn't like its soft Islamist, increasingly hard Islamist rhetoric. They felt threatened. And in 2007, they tried to intervene. They gave indications that they were ready to do something. This is known as the e-coup because in the end, Erdogan stood up to them and they backed down.

But then the following year, 2008, again, his enemies amongst that Kamal secular establishment in Turkey, they rallied again. And the Turkish constitutional court opened a case against the AKP accusing it of unconstitutional moves in an attempt to shut the party down.

So, Erdogan wasn't just paranoid, there were genuine, powerful enemies that were looking to bring him down. There's no question about that.

Erdogan needed an ally, and he found one. Now, this is where we introduce the very strange character of Fethullah Gülen, a Turkish Sufi born in 1941, so older than Erdogan, born in Erzurum, in the east of Turkey. So, like Erdogan from the hinterlands of Turkey, and from a very young age, he became attracted to a Sufi movement in Turkey that was targeted by the army.

Aimen: If we talk about Fethullah Gülen, I mean, we are talking about someone who resemble an evangelical Christian leader in America, someone like Jerry Falwell or Pat Robertson, someone who can call upon the faithful population of the Bible Belt in order to rally them to vote for a particular party or a candidate.

But to which school he belonged to? So, in order to understand Fethullah Gülen, we must understand the founder of his Sufi tariqa, of his Sufi school. So, we're talking about a man who came just before him, someone who was born in the 1870s and died in 1960.

A figure that is so important for the story of the destruction of Kemalism. If we are talking about duan and Gülen as the two edges of a sword that is stabbing Kemalism in the heart, so we need to understand who is the blacksmith who forged that sword?

Thomas: That's a great metaphor, Aimen. My God, you're not a podcaster, you're a poet. Okay.

Aimen: Thank you. So, we have to talk about Bediuzzaman Said Nursi.

Thomas: Bediuzzaman Said Nursi, the founder of the Nursi Sufi tariqa.

Aimen: Absolutely. And this man, of course, he witnessed the fall of the Ottoman Empire the establishment of Kemalism. And he was opposed to it from the beginning. And he dedicated himself completely to the destruction of Kemalism.

Thomas: And Fethullah Gülen was one of his disciples.

Aimen: Absolutely. Fethullah Gülen joined the movement, the moment he died. Fethullah Gülen, a 19-year-old took up the banner and he became one of the greatest leaders of Nursia.

Now, the army wanted to destroy Nursia, Fethullah Gülen and his colleagues, his supporters started a program specifically to target the villages and the towns and the areas and the neighbourhoods where the army send their kids to schools and where they go to some of the mosques.

So, they started infiltrating these areas, spreading in Nursia, and worked on a 20 years plan from the 1980s onward in order to infiltrate the army and to convert as many people within the armed forces, especially in the higher ranks into Nursia.

Thomas: That's right. And so, 20 years into this secret mission to subvert the army from within by converting its sons and daughters to Sufism. It's like a James Bond plot. You wouldn't believe it. The army certainly got wise to this.

And so, in 1999, Gülen fled Turkey to the United States set up shop in Pennsylvania, where he still lives and grew the movement. From there. His global educational and charitable network called Hizmet is now in more than 180 countries.

It's a huge movement, a huge network of people who think of him like their Sufi leader. And initially starting in 2002, Erdogan and Gülen were like best mates. Gülen himself was a huge supporter of Erdogan when Erdogan first became prime minister, his network praised Erdogan praised the AKP.

And knowing very well that Gülen had managed to infiltrate the army to infiltrate to some extent what Erdogan calls and what people call the deep state in Turkey, Erdogan used Gülen’s supporters in the police, in the civil service and the military to go after the elite, to go after the deep state.

Other military people, secularist liberals and Gülen’s network helped Erdogan purge the secular opponents of Erdogan's regime, especially after that 2007 e-coup.

So, the following year, while the Turkish constitutional court is lodging complaints against the AKP, the AKP and Erdogan are using Gulen's network of supporters inside the deep state to round up those alleged members of the e-coup, rounding up military officers. And in general, a McCarthyite mood begins to settle over the country.

Gülenists were expert wire tappers, for example, through the police. They were bugging army officers’ phones, allowing the government, allowing Erdogan to round up more of them, more military officers.

And this was all sort of ironic, it seems to me, Aimen, because in order to fight this deep state, Erdogan was employing a Gülenist deep state that actually existed. It's very weird. Turkish politics from the inside is very strange and murky. It is like a James Bond movie.

Aimen: Indeed, having purged many of his enemies in 2007 and 8, it paved the way for him to win a big majority again in 2011 elections. Post 2011 elections in the two years between 2011 and 2013, he started the program that is so ambitious.

He used his buddies in the financial sector to finance many of the supporters and the key business people that are loyal to the AKP, to buy and acquire many of the media companies in Turkey.

Thomas: He was brilliant. He used legal loopholes to accuse other media owners of tax evasion, forcing them to sell their companies to his allies. He was brilliant. And at the end of it, he's basically in control of the Turkish media.

Aimen: Exactly. So, in reality, his takeover of the media took only about 19, 20 months, and it was all financed by banks that were benefiting from his financial policies. This is why his ability to control the media meant that he will be able to control the narrative. That did not please the liberals of Turkey, the CHP, and their allies, and they started rallying against him.

Thomas: Absolutely. The election itself in 2011 was full of much more openly populist Islamist rhetoric. The AKP became less centre right, more right Islamist. And in line with this, ethnic minorities were being slurred, secularists were being slurred, liberals were being slurred.

And on the ground, the AKP were introducing more explicitly Islamist measures. There was a huge mosque building program. The education curriculum was changed to make Islamic education mandatory, and in some areas more stringent alcohol regulations and even some bans were passed.

So, clearly the program was moving forward, and as you say, Aimen, the liberals were upset. And in 2013, this reached a kind of crisis point over the famous Gezi Park rallies in Istanbul.

We don't have time to go into the details. It was sort of a Turkish occupy Wall Street or a Turkish extinction rebellion, kind of broad-based pro liberal leftist movement of protests that occupied a square near Taksim in the centre of Istanbul, which led to clashes with the police.

There was a certain amount of police brutality rallying more protestors causing the movement to spread. It was a big anti-Erdogan movement. But in the end, thanks to a violent crackdown and many thousands of arrests, the movement was crushed. And in 2014, having gone through all of this, Erdogan becomes president.

Aimen: As I have explained to you before, Thomas, the Turkish electoral rules meant that there are minimum threshold for parties to overcome, to be admitted into parliament.

And this PR voting system meant that the AKP since 2002, all the way until now, would ensure that the party would win parliamentary majorities because of the — even if they don't win the majority of the votes, they still win the bigger share of the seats, and sometimes big enough to reach two thirds majority of the parliamentary seats enough to change the constitution.

Now, changing the constitution is important here, because just prior to 2014, the AKP party changed the constitution in favour of transforming Turkey from a parliamentary governmental system of democracy into a presidential system of democracy.

In the past, the president's role was ceremonial, and the prime minister was really in charge of running the country. He changed the constitution with the aid of his party.

So, Erdogan could be elected as a president, but for the first time, an executive president, just like France, there is an executive president, but also there is a prime minister. So, in 2014, he got his wish, and he became the president of Turkey, the first executive president.

Thomas: Now, you've always told me, Aimen, that you think Erdogan should have stepped away from politics at that point in 2014, that he had achieved a lot, he'd governed Turkey more or less well, but he should have left when he was on top.

Aimen: Yeah, I mean, if he just left the presidential position as a ceremonial one and got himself elected as a president, as a reward for an end of a successful premiership, a retirement gig, let's call it this way, this would have been a fitting end for his achievement. But no.

Thomas: Well, Erdogan did not adopt a merely symbolic presidential role. He became Turkey's first executive president in decades. Ever since that 1960/61 coup, the original coup changed the presidency and made it less executive, obviously, Atatürk had been president and had ruled Turkey with an iron fist.

But in the intervening decades, the presidency had become less executive in power. But Erdogan changed that. He's now standing tall at the summit of Turkish power.

And that brings us to July 2016, which is the month when the now notorious attempted coup against Erdogan was launched. I'd actually been in Turkey the weekend before the attempted coup visiting a friend and I visited the Mediterranean Coast.

Aimen: Excuse me, visiting a friend only or-

Thomas: Planning a coup?

Aimen: Yeah, extremely coincidental. Very interesting. A Greek Orthodox, activist with a dream of retaking Ayasofya, and all of that.

Thomas: Aimen, you're not supposed to tell anyone. Anyway, so a week before the coup, I'd been in Turkey visiting a friend on the Mediterranean Coast. And I was initially struck really by how much change had happened in the 10 years since I'd last been there.

The coast remained extremely liberal, and people were regularly denouncing Erdogan to me. And yet, clearly the country had become much richer. The roads were newly paved and were really, really high quality. There were clear signs that Erdogan's time in power had had its benefits for the country.

And yet he had enemies. And actually, Aimen, as you know, by this point, in fact, his biggest enemy, in a way, had become his former ally, that Fethullah Gülen character, still in Pennsylvania, still in control of a huge network of Sufis, very loyal to him, including inside the army.

Aimen: Do you remember I told you about how Erdogan in 2011 started the takeover of the media financed by the banks and held by his rich cronies? Well, there was another secretive takeover that not many people knew about.

As you know, Gülen established a massive network of schools, of colleges, of charities, mosques. And Erdogan looked at that massive network and thought, “Hmm, I want that because this is power.”

He looked at what Gülen was able to do in 2007, 2008, and he thought, this is power, and it shouldn't be in the hands of someone who lives in America. It shouldn't be in the hand of someone who lives in the shadows. No, no, no, no, no. This should be ours.

And so, he instructed in each city, in each town, in each province, the AKP officials, to start the process of acquiring all of this network, slowly, surely, gradually. And to take control of it.

Gülen in 2013 started to feel that the network is slipping from his hands. He started to feel that if this continues, then Erdogan and his party would actually swallow and completely incorporate Gülenism into the AKP to the point where many, in many cities and many towns and many districts, the lines between the AKP and the Gülenists became so blurred.

And this is when Gülen in 2013 struck back and he decided to ally himself with some of Turkey's liberals and disaffected generals and decided, you know what? We could remove this man from power. He is authoritarian. He is also taking over and grabbing my power base from me.

So, there were some ulterior motives as well as some public good motives. Let's put it this way.

Thomas: Yeah, maybe. I mean, remember, ultimately Gülen's whole movement is built on the back of that Sufi movement that was founded in order to overthrow the Kemalist State and take control of it.

So, Fethullah Gülen is a player, a power player in Turkey. He wants to have the position that Erdogan has, frankly, and Erdogan knew it. So, the two of them were a high tail in it to a conflict. And that conflict came to a head on the 15th of July 2016, when really Erdogan's biggest nightmare unfolded in front of him.

Aimen: Indeed.

Thomas: The army launched a coup against him.

Aimen: Except the amazing thing happened is that when army units loyal to Fethullah Gülen began the coup and detained the head of the army and the head of the Air Force, and they started the process of launching the coup, what they did not anticipate is that the army had been castrated and completely divided and almost leaderless.

Thomas: And the thing is that as a result of this, the coup was very shambolic. The plotters actually had been forced to move their plans forward by five hours when they realised that national intelligence in Turkey had uncovered the plot.

So, they had initially planned to launch at 3:00 AM which is a good time to launch a coup, people would be sleeping. But instead, panicking, they launched at 10:00 PM. I mean, 10:00 PM in the summer in Turkey. Everyone was up. Everyone's awake, out and enjoying themselves on the streets. That's not a time to launch a coup. And it immediately showed they just couldn't really get it off the ground.

Now, Erdogan himself was on vacation. He was vacationing on the Turkish Coast when he was informed about the coup reports are that he did initially freak out. He was very scared. This stands to reason; this was his worst nightmare coming true.

A couple of hours later. I suppose, because by then he'd realised things weren't as bad as he'd first suspected. Erdogan went on CNN, CNN Turk via FaceTime. And in a now famous interview with the newsman, he urged his supporters to take to the streets. And my God, did they ever.

Aimen: Well, hundreds of thousands of Turkish supporters of the AKP of President Erdogan went to the streets and immediately clashed with the military units that were basically trying to control Istanbul, Ankara, and many other cities.

And in fact, the clashes became so legendary in the Turkish folklore that even some of Erdogan's opponents went into the streets to protest against the principle of military coups again.

And the fact that hundreds were killed. And in some of the instances, people were blocking the path of tanks with their own cars, sometime with their own bodies. And what some people would call it, the heroism of so many people showed that Turkey changed. The people are not going to take any BS from the military anymore. Either you go to the ballot and change things there or that's it.

And also, this is when I remember I said based on my tour of Turkey, which was extremely extensive in 2013, I went from east to west, from north to south. I spent months there at the time, and I said, the AKP and Erdogan will always win elections because they have now achieved a electoral base of 40%. That's it.

That level of 40% will always be there. They have managed to position themselves as the only party of faith in Turkey. And that faith brought those people into the streets. And that's why they are always called Shaheed, the martyrs.

Thomas: Well, you said at the beginning of this episode, Aimen, that Erdogan believes it will take 70 years to wash the brains of Turks from the brainwashing of Atatürk. So, from what you're saying, he's done a good job of creating the foundations for that brainwashing plan.

Aimen: Indeed.

Thomas: Following the failed coup in 2016, tens of thousands of civil servants and military personnel were purged from the Turkish state and the Turkish army, only increasing Erdogan's power further, only increasing the hegemony of the AKP.

And in the years since that centralization of power in Erdogan's hands has just continued. I mean, Turkey is still a democracy. Some liberal critics of the country would say that democracy is more or less only a sham now because Erdogan still controls the media by and large. AKP supporters now comprise much of the civil service. The army, as you say, has been castrated as a “protector” of Turkish democracy.

And yet just earlier in the summer there was an election in Turkey and many analysts in the run-up to that election thought that maybe the AKP would get a beating. That did not prove to be the case in the end.

Aimen: Indeed, because of two factors, Thomas. The first one is the 40% electoral base. The old Kemalist guards, the CHP and their liberal and secular allies will always rely on a solid base of 30%.

However, the AKP and their allies will always rely on a 40% religiously inspired political voting bloc. That's it. So, it's always an upheld battle for the secularists from now on to actually achieve that majority.

Thomas: And not only that religious voting bloc, but in recent years, the AKP has entered into alliance with a far right nationalist movement,

Aimen: The MHP. Absolutely.

Thomas: So, sort of morphing the AKP ideology into something like a weird mishmash. It's like an increasingly hard-line Islamist nationalist party. And maybe it's showing you where turkey's going. Erdogan's foreign policy adventures, as we hinted at in the last part of this episode, haven't really gone to plan.

In a way Erdogan is more isolated regionally than he would've liked. He has to sort of stand alone, but he has increased Turkey's overall power. He has leveraged Turkey's, geostrategic and geopolitical position to make Turkey as it's always been throughout history, a very important power broker in the region. We see this now in the Russia/Ukraine situation. We see this in the continuing negotiations over the settlement in Syria and other things.

So, the question I leave you with Aimen really is, is there something that we could call Erdoganism to replace Atatürkism? Is Erdogan now the new Atatürk? And is this strange Islamist nationalist blend in Turkey going to really be the light motif of Turkish politics for the next several decades?

Aimen: Look, in my opinion, Erdoganism in the end will triumph over Kemalism. Kemalism was putting a saddle on a cow. Trying as hard as they did, the communists could not turn the devout polish Catholics into atheist communists. They couldn't.

And try as hard as they could, the Kemalists could not convert the majority of Turks into ardent secularists who oppose the role of religion in life. It was just a project that was destined to fail.

The reality is, and I always have said that secularism in the Western liberal sense will always fail in Muslim societies because the meaning of secularism there need to change. We have to change the definition from separation between state and religion to separation between state and clergy.

And if we achieve that in the Muslim world, then we are safe from the tyranny at least of the religious totalitarianism.

Thomas: Well, Aimen, and that just sort of leaves us where we started this two-part series on Erdogan. We asked at the beginning, is Erdogan a Muslim Brotherhood leader? Is he a member of the Muslim Brotherhood? Does he govern as a member of the Muslim Brotherhood? Does he have Muslim Brotherhood influenced designs, not just on Turkey, but on the Muslim world?

And I feel like it's harder than ever to answer that question. As we've seen, he has got total control over Turkey itself and his political party, the AKP is as much Turkish nationalist these days as it is Islamist, isn't it?

So, is Erdogan furthering the worldwide Muslim Brotherhood movements, aims or not?

Aimen: Well, his foreign policy, his priorities in governing, his alliances and the fact that Turkey, since the so-called Arab Spring in 2011, hosted many of the Muslim Brotherhood leaders who escaped from Egypt, Algeria, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, UAE, all of these figures who sought shelter in Egypt.

In fact, the biggest foreign backer of the Muslim Brotherhood in Yemen is Turkey and the AKP Party. So, Istanbul became known as the new Muslim Brotherhood capital.

This is where if you go to any lobby of any hotel there, you will find a lot of those Muslim Brotherhood people wearing their nice suits, nice clothes or turbans sitting down together and plotting their own coups, their own revolutions, their own ideas of change back in their home countries.

So yes, he did work to further the aims, the goals of the Muslim Brotherhood globally. But does that make him a member of the organisation? Again, I say, if it walks like a turkey and if it quacks like a turkey, then it must be a turkey.

Thomas: Well, Aimen, that's it for President Erdogan for now. We will no doubt return to Erdogan at some point in Conflicted. He's too powerful, he's too important and his life has been too action packed for us to leave him there. But we will leave him there for now.

And in fact, we're going to turn our sights away from Sunni Islamism, which we've been exploring now for 14 episodes, and refocus our attention on the other side of the Islamic confessional divide onto Shia Islamism, starting with, of course, the granddaddy of all Islamic revolutionary regimes, Iran, asking the question, what's up with the Iranian regime now?

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We've heard a lot about the protests that have rocked the regime for well over a year now. We understand at the same time that there have been successful peace negotiations with some of Iran's regional rivals.

So, what's going on with the Iranian regime? What is the likelihood of that regime survival into the future? These are some of the questions we will be exploring in our next episode of Conflicted. Stay tuned.

A reminder that you can follow the show over on Facebook and Twitter at MH Conflicted. And for a deeper dive into all the subjects we talk about here on Conflicted, head over to Facebook and search Conflicted Podcast Discussion Group.

There you will find other fans of the show engaging in heated debates, enlightening conversations, and just generally geeking out over conflicted related topics.

Conflicted is a Message Heard production. This episode was produced and edited by Harry Stott. Sandra Ferrari is our executive producer. Our theme music is by Matt Huxley and Tom Biddle.

Conflicted S4 E12: The Muslim Brotherhood: What do they want?

Speakers: Thomas Small & Aimen Dean

Thomas: Welcome back to Conflicted dear listeners, you are here with me, Thomas Small and my co-host, Aimen Dean, for the second part of our deep dive into the Muslim Brotherhood.

Aimen, I want to start off today with a quote. Let's see if you recognize it. Here it goes: “God is our objective. The prophet is our leader. The Qur’an is our law. Jihad is our way. Dying in the way of God is our highest hope. Islam is the solution.” What am I quoting?

Aimen: Of course, you are quoting Hassan al-Banna, and you are quoting the mantra and the slogan of the Muslim Brotherhood.

Thomas: The slogan of the Muslim Brotherhood. Islam is the solution. Aimen, you're a Muslim. Isn't Islam the solution? You're always telling me I should become a Muslim. Surely, you're telling me that because it's the solution.

Aimen: Yeah. Solution to what exactly?

Thomas: To everything.

Aimen: Yeah, to everything in what sense? You see, every time someone says to me Islam is a solution, and I will say, first, what problem are you trying to fix? And second, which Islam are you talking about?

Thomas: What problem are you trying to fix, and which Islam are you talking about? That's a great way of bringing up the question of the ideology that underpins the Muslim Brotherhood. I think for most listeners, the Muslim Brotherhood's ideology will feel pretty radical, pretty aggressive, pretty expansionist.

But I left the last episode raising the possibility that the Muslim brotherhood's ideology is a moderate and indeed rational response to the challenges that the Muslim world has been facing for the last hundred years or so.

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This is what we're going to explore in this episode of Conflicted. What is the Muslim Brotherhood's ideology, and can it sit alongside the multidimensional nature of politics in the modern world? Let's find out.

In the last episode, Aimen, we framed the question, are the Muslim brotherhood radical or not? Are they radical or moderate? And to reestablish that question, let's discuss an interesting recent episode in the history of Saudi Arabia.

Last time you told us about Hassan al-Banna's trip to Saudi Arabia in the 30s, where he asked the King Abdulaziz if he could establish a national branch of the Muslim Brotherhood there. And King Abdulaziz answered, “But we're all Muslim brothers here, aren't we, Sheikh Hassan?” Meaning we don't need your organisation. Thanks very much.

Aimen: Indeed.

Thomas: Despite that fact, as we've said before on Conflicted, as the Muslim Brotherhood Organization was subject to repression in Egypt, Syria, and elsewhere, Muslim brothers would often find refuge in Saudi Arabia, where they over time infiltrated, if you want to use that word, infiltrated the education system, the university system, the legal system, and other such institutions and such networks within Saudi Arabia to spread their ideology.

So, the Muslim Brotherhood organisation did not exist in any formal sense in Saudi Arabia, but the Muslim Brotherhood ideology did through the presence there of many, many thousands of Muslim brothers.

How would you characterise Aimen, let's say across the 90s, the noughties and the early teens? How would you characterise the role that Muslim brothers and their acolytes in Saudi Arabia played in the kingdom's politics?

Aimen: First of all, Thomas, it wasn't just only the repression that they were subjected to in Egypt and Syria, which drove many of the Muslim Brotherhood professionals to migrate to the oil rich Gulf countries such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and UAE and Qatar.

But also, the fact that the Muslim Brotherhood championed among their members the virtue and value of education. So, many of them graduated as engineers, teachers, lawyers, writers, and therefore they were able to find work in the new markets of the rich countries of the GCC.

Now, the fact that they were there also enabled them to immediately have great access to infiltrate the education system, the legal system, the health system, and enable them to reach people of power.

And through their idea of what Shura is in Islam, they were able to whisper into the ears of many people within power, not just only in Saudi Arabia, but even in neighbouring countries such as-

Thomas: I just want to point out, there's nothing essentially nefarious about this. This is how politics happens in a country like Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia is a traditional patrimonial monarchy where power is invested wholly in the monarch, and then through a series of subsidiary princes and bodies ultimately answerable to the monarch that power diffuses downwards.

But ordinary people, non-royal people, do have power and influence in a country like the Kingdom by becoming close to those with power. This is the classic monarchical way of doing business.

If you're ambitious, but you're not royal, well, you've got to get close to a royal. And many Muslim Brotherhood members or influenced people did get close to many Saudi royals in the 90s, the noughties and the teens.

Aimen: Indeed. And that enabled them to lobby, to advocate their cause and to advocate for a cooperative relationship between the Saudi state and the Muslim Brotherhood. And it was a bit attractive for the Saudi state at that time because communism was on the rise. These Muslim Brotherhood were anti-communist.

Thomas: The Iranian revolution had occurred, which was threatening to the Saudi state's own self-understanding as a powerful Islamist or Islamic polity.

Aimen: Indeed. And already the Muslim brotherhood globally were divided over the Iranian Revolution, whether they support it or not, despite the sectarian differences.

And also, at the same time, there were the issue of the Afghan-Jihad and whether to support it or not. And of course, the Muslim Brotherhood in Pakistan and Afghanistan, the chapters there, especially the Afghan one led by none other than Ahmad Shah Massoud, who was a Muslim Brotherhood himself.

Thomas: The great lion of the Tajiks. He was himself a Muslim brother?

Aimen: Yes, he was. In fact, he, and his mentor Burhanuddin Rabbani, who would become the president of Afghanistan later were among the first to start the mujahedeen movement. Gobadin Hekmachar himself was also a Muslim Brotherhood. So, many of the Afghan-Jihad leaders were Muslim Brotherhood. And this is why Abdullah Azzam himself-

Thomas: The Palestinian genius who conceived of the great Afghan-Jihad.

Aimen: Indeed, was a Muslim brotherhood from Jordan and Palestine went there to fight the jihad. So, actually there was an alliance there between not only Saudi Arabia and the Muslim Brotherhood, but also the White House of Reagan and the Muslim Brotherhood.

Thomas: Yeah, of course. Yeah. Now this is getting us down that terrible rabbit hole of 1980s international politics, but back to Saudi Arabia.

The fact remains that Saudi Arabia, the king of which is the custodian of the two holy mosques, and who, especially in the 80s and 90s, was projecting itself as the foremost Islamic state of the world that was there to defend the interests of Muslims globally tended to adopt a cooperative, sometimes a bit thorny, but a cooperative relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood, which it believed to be more or less a moderate alternative to radical Islamist groups like Al-Qaeda.

And together Saudi with the Muslim Brotherhood, inflected kind of voices could continue to develop the kingdom and the Muslim world in a modern direction that remained true to the principles of Islam. That was the governing consensus of Saudi Arabia. Am I right?

Aimen: Yes. However, not everyone in the Saudi royal family agreed with this assessment. In fact, the majority, so that the Muslim Brotherhood are snakes who would change their skin whenever that suit them.

Thomas: And as we've said before on Conflicted, the context for this is the Arab Spring, during which the Muslim Brotherhood tended to back and advocate the more radical revolutionary Islamist actors in those different national revolutionary theatres, which was very threatening and worrying for Saudi Arabia.

And so, more and more voices inside the kingdom were turning against the Muslim Brotherhood. And as the Arab Spring unfolded and attitudes towards the Muslim Brotherhood were beginning to shift amongst certain power centres in Saudi Arabia with the accession of the new King in 2015, King Salman, the current king, the tensions within the royal family and the governing bodies that rule the kingdom.

The tensions between voices that sought to continue to cooperate with the Muslim Brotherhood and louder voices that were saying, no, we must cut all ties with the Muslim Brotherhood, came out in the open quite dramatically.

Aimen: Do you remember, dear listener, that we talked about a man called Saad Aljabri in the last episode where we described him as someone who joined the ranks of the Muslim Brotherhood through a organisation called al Jewala, which is the Boy Scouts when he was at King Fahd University for Petroleum and Minerals.

This man would rise in the ranks of the Ministry of Interior until he not only became Assistant Minister of Interior to the new Crown Prince Muhammad bin Nayef, who was also the Minister of Interior responsible for security and counterterrorism, but also, he became a minister on his own within the cabinet responsible for security affairs in the kingdom.

Thomas: This is a Muslim brother now in the cabinet of Saudi Arabia.

Aimen: Absolutely. And from the beginning, neither the king nor his son the future Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, the man in charge right now in Saudi Arabia, would trust Saad Aljabri because they believe that his counter-terrorism policy in Saudi Arabia relied heavily on empowering the so-called non-violent extremists in order to take on the violent extremists.

So, using a more cooperative wolf pack to chase away the more troublesome wolf packs.

Thomas: So, you see right there, the question is hanging in the air around the cabinet of the Saudi kingdom is the Muslim Brotherhood, radical or moderate.

Aimen: Indeed. And in the end, by 2016/2017, the answer came very sharp. No, they are not moderate, they are absolutely radical. They were even designated as a terrorist organisation. And that minister Saad Aljabri fled the country into exile with some clouds hanging over him, that he stole some billions of dollars. But that's neither here or there.

Thomas: Yes. And then Crown Prince Muhammad bin Nayef was removed from his position and replaced by the current Crown Prince MBS, Mohammed bin Salman, who runs the country.

So, there is an example of a debate occurring right at the heart of Saudi Power is the Muslim Brotherhood radical or moderate? And the government there said it is radical, and they totally cut off any cooperative ties with the Muslim Brotherhood, ties that they had maintained for decades, really in a way since that conversation in 1936 between Hassan al-Banna and King Abdulaziz.

So, in recent years, the Muslim Brotherhood has been increasingly seen by powerful actors as radical, although the book I read in preparation for these episodes, Joas Wagemakers, The Muslim Brotherhood: Ideology, History, Descendants, which I recommend everyone read for a sweeping survey of the history and ideological underpinnings of the movement.

That book Wagemaker himself clearly is arguing that this is not fair, that the Muslim Brotherhood is not a radical organisation, that it is unfairly tarnished with the brush of radicalism that attaches to groups like Al-Qaeda, Islamic jihad and others, ISIS of course.

So, scholars, thinkers, activists are divided about this question, and this is what we want to explore. And that question really came into the open, as we said during the Arab Spring because it was during the Arab Spring that the Muslim Brotherhood saw for the first time in a long time, a real opportunity to achieve its political goals because so many Islamic or Arab states were being destabilised by the protests rocking those countries.

And in 2012, this came to a head when after elections, a political party attached to the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt came to power there. And a Muslim brother, Mohammed Morsi, was declared president of the country.

Almost immediately, Aimen, the Morsi administration were being accused of pursuing a secret Islamist and totalitarian objective, hiding behind a commitment to pluralist democratic politics. Immediately people were like, we can't trust this guy and his political party. Right?

Aimen: I remember I used to work for a global bank at the time, and I was asked to put together a report talking about the first a hundred days of Morsi's government and the first a hundred days of the Muslim Brotherhood in power in Egypt. The first time they have been in power in their birth nation ever since they were established 90 years prior.

So, I put together a report, and I still remember some of the sentences I used there. I said, it seems to me after observing the first hundred days of Morsi and his Muslim Brotherhood government in Egypt, that they are struggling to move from being a clandestine organisation into a governing responsible party.

The secretive nature of their meetings, the secretive nature of their communications, the fact of the matter that they are keeping the institutions of the Egyptian state in the dark about what they want to implement and what plans that they have. Even for things that don't need to be secret about what foreign investments they want to bring, the negotiations with the IMF and many other aspects.

They were deliberately keeping stuff from the Civil Service in the dark above them. And this used to infuriate both the Army and the Civil Service.

So, what the accusation that the Muslim Brotherhood had against the Civil Service, oh, you are the deep state, and you are conspiring to undermine us. And the Civil Service replied back and saying, well, how can we govern if you don't tell us what you want to do and how you want to do it?

So, this is why I said in that report, talking about the first a hundred days of the Muslim Brotherhood government in Egypt, that they are struggling to move from being a clandestine organisation into a responsible governing party.

Thomas: But of course, it might just be in their DNA. I mean, we talked about in the previous episode the problem that Arab monarchs have with the Muslim Brotherhood because any Muslim brother that swears allegiance to the Monarch has also sweared allegiance to the murshid al am in Cairo, the supreme guide of the Muslim Brotherhood.

Well, that was also true within Egypt itself, when Mohammad Morsi became president because Egyptians knew that he was not the head of the Muslim Brotherhood.

Aimen: Exactly.

Thomas: He had sworn allegiance to someone else who was above him. And the Army especially must have been like, well, what the hell are we supposed to do about this? Because we are the protectors of the Egyptian state. We are meant to intervene when we feel that there's any seditious activity going on that's going to overthrow the state.

And here we have as president of the state, a man who has sworn allegiance to the leader of a global organisation that actually seeks to undermine the underpinnings of the secular state of Egypt.

So, what are they supposed to do? Especially then at the same time, they felt that the Morsi government and the Muslim Brotherhood in general were seeking to replace within the intelligence and security apparatus of Egypt, replace sitting members of that apparatus with Muslim Brotherhood members.

So, this was going to end in a clash and a mighty clash it did end, indeed. I mean, really a slaughter.

Aimen: Well, it came in the end to a terrible clash between the Army and the Muslim Brotherhood. President Morsi was deposed in July of 2013, put under house arrested and arrested and charged with treason.

And of course, the Muslim Brotherhood supporters did not take it lightly. They went to the streets, they protested. They were angry at what the army did. The army waited for a month, but then of course, the army moved in with a mighty crackdown that resulted in anywhere between 800 and 2,000 fatalities. Not to mention those injured, those who were imprisoned.

So again, another chapter of the Muslim Brotherhood attempts to reach power in Egypt, ended up in a blood bath for them.

Thomas: Poor Muslim Brotherhood, honestly, they're always at the receiving end of a fist in Egypt.

Aimen: Yes. And in Syria, and other places. But nonetheless, I'm always confronted by this question by friends and by people when they tell me, do you support what happened in Rabaa? The square where the massacre happened?

And the answer is definitely not. And no sane person could ever advocate such oppression that would lead to fatalities on such grand scale. I wouldn't advocate that whatsoever.

Someone would say, okay, but how do you break up the protest? Well, there are other methods to break up a protest without having to kill people. The fact of the matter is that this show of force by the army would stain its reputation for decades to come.

And Rabaa is still a symbol of Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood story of perpetual martyrdom on the altar of so-called democratic rights. But in fact, we have to ask ourselves, were they really fighting for democracy or Islamic supremacy?

Thomas: We do have to ask ourselves that. That's what we're asking. Is the Muslim Brotherhood radical or moderate?

Now we're going to take a quick break, but when we come back, I think it'll be worth drilling into that a little further by looking closer at how that radical, moderate dichotomy is transposed onto the term Islamism itself, especially in the context of the Muslim Brotherhood and their ideology. We'll be right back.

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We are back. We're finishing our exploration of the Muslim Brotherhood. And at the end of the first half, I restated our main question, is the Muslim Brotherhood radical or moderate?

The question actually goes beyond the Muslim Brotherhood itself and extends to the question of Islamism more generally. We use the word Islamism a lot on this podcast. The word Islamism is used a lot in the world, especially in the world of security, counterterrorism, intelligence, all that stuff.

Islamism, what is Islamism? It's so hard to define. The Muslim brothers themselves refer to themselves as Islamyun, which is the word Islamist in Arabic.

So, the Muslim brothers are happy to call themselves Islamists, but what does it mean? Wagemaker, the writer of this book on the Muslim Brotherhood that I read, he wrote this, “The term Islamism refers to the idea that Islam, apart from being a religion of rituals, beliefs, and texts, is also a politically and societally relevant ideology that forms the basis for political activism.

In practice this is expressed in the idea that Islam should not just be applied in the religious sphere, but also in the political and societal spheres, mostly by implementing the Sharia. So, whereas Islam can be limited to the private sphere, Islamism is something that is by definition also related to the public sphere.”

Now Aimen, frankly, I find that definition of Islamism ridiculous. Because Islam is not ever relegated simply to the private sphere. How is Islamism different from Islam? Can we just reach a consensus on this? 

Because sometimes I think Islamism is a woolly word that modern liberally inclined people use to disguise the fact that their real problem is that Islam is simply illiberal. It cannot be anything but illiberal.

Aimen: I would say I'm one of those people who feel sad that the term Islamism has been hijacked by political activists and politically ambitious people in order to cloak their political ambition with religion in order to attract as much support for their cause as possible.

Thomas: So, you're saying that much that goes by the name of Islamist isn't religious at all?

Aimen: It is religious, but we come back to the fact that Islam as a whole is a way of life. And therefore, by any stretch of the imagination, if you have a Muslim country, by definition, the state is Muslim and the people lead their lives according to the broad spectrum of Islamic principles, manners, guidance, and laws and regulations, whether it is in penal code, whether it is in the dressing code, whether it is in the dietary code, marriage, inheritance, all of that.

I mean, even in secular nations in Egypt and Iraq and Pakistan even, because even Pakistan is a secular country, yet the marriages and divorces and inheritance, all the family laws is based on Islamic law.

So, the reality is that for me, when someone says Islamist, I believe that someone want to impose their version of how a Muslim state in a modern time should look like. That is a bastardised version, that is a hybrid between communist superstate structure and flavoured with Islamist phraseology and terminologies.

This is why I'm opposed to the idea of Islamists, because they have hijacked the term in order to advance their power grabbing ambitions.

Thomas: So, if I understand you correctly, you're saying that Islamists are those who seek political power in order to impose their view of what correct Islam is on all of society.

Aimen: Yes.

Thomas: But are you saying then that there is no way to determine what correct Islam is? I don't think you believe that you are to some extent a Salafi. You describe yourself as a Salafi. Salafism in its very essence is about saying this is what Islam truly is. And much that has passed under the name of Islam throughout history is not Islam. So, what's the difference?

Aimen: I will repeat again what I have said. That is my conviction, and this is what I hold dear to my heart, that Islam is divided into two distinct aspects. The acts of worship and transactions, the acts of worship, mandatory, the acts of transactions are voluntary.

And dear listener, the biggest lie ever perpetrated in the 20th and the 21st centuries on Muslims by Islamists, was the idea that establishing the caliphate was a mandatory obligation. And that if the Muslims don't do it, then they are sinners.

Thomas: Aimen, I love it when you get excited. And I'm glad you bring this up because that was Hassan al-Banna's view. So, Hassan al-Banna, Aimen, believed that the Muslim world's problems stemmed from having deviated from true Islam.

And in the Muslim Brotherhood's minds to this day, true Islam is identical with the Muslim Brotherhood. Is that a fair assessment of the situation?

Aimen: From his point of view, yes, of course, for him, Hassan al-Banna in his message to the fifth conference of the Muslim Brotherhood, what he defined Islam, he defined Islam as a creed, worship, a homeland, a nationality, a faith, a state, spirituality, activism, a Qur’an and a sword.

Thomas: That's a very expansive definition of Islam.

Aimen: But that was his definition.

Thomas: But we spent several weeks discussing the founding thinkers of the Salafi Jihadist movement in general, Hanbalis and Sayyid Qutb. And I think there are echoes of Muhammad Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab’s sensibility in Hassan al-Banna's definition.

Certainly, the idea that something had gone very wrong, that Muslims had deviated from true Islam, that he knew what true Islam was. That that true Islam is co-terminus with his movement, his Dawah, the Najdi mission.

So, there's something similar there. And that's not surprising since Hassan al-Banna's ideas come out of that late 19th century, early 20th century anti-colonial, anti-modern foment that transfixed the Islamic world at the time, especially someone like Rashid Rida, for example. The Lebanese ideologue, a Salafi who had studied Ibn Taymiyyah very deeply, had also been inspired by non-Salafi reformers like Muhammad Abduh, for example, from Egypt.

Aimen: And Jamal al-Din al-Afghani.

Thomas: Yes, who stressed Muslim unity. All Muslims are one, and that must be reflected politically who then would gravitate towards that Wahhabi tradition of Saudi Arabia. So, grafting that onto his worldview.

And then after the caliphate was abolished in 1924, he began openly discussing how Muslims should respond to this, the lack of the caliphate, and began advocating for its reestablishment.

So, Hassan al-Banna is growing up in the same world, and he's listening to these voices. I mean, he didn't make this up. He's responding to the conditions of his time in this way that we've always had a caliphate. We need to have a caliphate. We must have a caliphate.

Aimen: Exactly. But did anyone, did really anyone study history objectively? This is the problem with ideologues is that their understanding of history is romantic. They look at history through rosy spectacles, that our history is so noble that we were always the righteous against the hordes of the evil devils who try to corrupt and destroy Islam.

But the reality was far from that, we were never united as a political entity for almost 1200 years.

Thomas: It's not only though that they have a romantic notion of history, their very orientation is that what has been passing itself off as Islam has not been Islam.

So, one problem that let's say traditional, moderate, “Muslims” have when combating Islamists, is that the Muslims will say like yourself, in fact, Aimen. You'll like say, well, according to this line of jurisprudence, X, Y, and Z are true. The jurists said that this is the case.

Well, the Islamists say, and the Salafists to some extent say, but we don't care what the jurists said. They had deviated from Islam. We reject Islamic jurisprudence, we go back to the sources, we decide what Islam is.

So, it's not only that they have a rosy view of history. They have, and as a Christian, I can say this, a kind of Protestant view of history, which is that at some point, true Islam was extinguished, and we must bring it back.

Aimen: And I come back again to the deep question of the division in Islam between worship and transactions. You see the Muslim societies that existed throughout history, based on their interpretation of Islam right now would be sinners.

Would be sinners, because none of them were part of a caliphate, most of them basically lived separate from a caliph. They were always different entities. They had the caliphate in Cairo, they had the caliphate in Baghdad, and they had the caliphate in Cordoba and Lucia. So, which caliphate do you want to choose?

Thomas: But it's true Aimen, that many Salafists do believe that most Muslims have only been Muslims in name and not in reality. That is part of the Salafi movement. It's just a problem. It's right there at the heart.

And you're right, Hassan al-Banna was one of those voices. He believed that the caliphate understood, not just ideally, but really like as a real political institution that really governed directly every Muslim on earth. The caliphate was an obligation, a duty for all Muslims to pursue that. Lacking a caliphate rendered all Muslims somehow guilty, and they had a duty to establish it.

Wagemaker quotes another early Muslim brotherhood thinker, Abd al-Qadir 'Auda, who says, “Islam is not just a religion. On the contrary, it is a religion and a state, and it is in the nature of Islam that it has a state, an Islamic state,” that that is what Islam is. Islam is an Islamic state.

Aimen: I remember I was listening to a lecture by none other than the master of Ahl-i-Hadith in the 20th century, Nasiruddin al-Albani, an Albanian scholar who lived all his life in Damascus, in Syria, and lived in Jordan in Saudi Arabia. But he is considered to be the master of all Ahl-i-Hadith when we talked about them before in Ahmad bin Hanbal-

Thomas: These are the successors, really, of Ahmad bin Hanbal's way of approaching the Hadith. You memorised the Hadith, you make the Hadith the centre of your spirituality, and all of your reflection on God's law and what God expects of you comes from the Hadith.

Aimen: Exactly. So, I remember, I heard he was in Jordan, and I heard in that lecture in the cassette, someone is asking him, and he was in his 80s, he was an old man, and someone asked him, “But sheikh how do we establish an Islamic state?” Because of course, he was saying, “Jihad against the rulers is forbidden. And there is no such thing as a jihad against the rulers.”

Because of course, he was being confronted with Sayyid Qutb's idea of a jihad to remove the obstacles, meaning the leaders of the Arab and Muslim people to establish Islam as a sovereign ideology.

So, he said, “First, establish the Islamic state in your hearts, and it'll become reality in your world. But if you are not following the right path in your heart, it'll never be a reality in your world.

And remember, brothers, God did not ask us to worship him through the establishment of his governance on earth. God made it very clear in the Qur’an that sovereignty is to God, and he gives it to whoever he wills.

He never said, go and seek power and seek sovereignty. It is a conditional sentence in the Qur’an, those who if we ground them power on earth, they will establish prayers and spread charity.” That's it.

Thomas: A more Christian word has never been uttered, Aimen. This is the thing. Christians think that Islam is all about establishing one totalitarian state.

This is what Christians, they say, unlike us, they say, we who focus on the God in our hearts and becoming receptacles of his divine grace, et cetera, and we are otherworldly, and we don't pursue power, and we turn the other cheek and stuff.

Muslims are obsessed with political power. That's their religion. They just want to create a state to dominate the world. And Islamists play into that Christian narrative by saying, oh, that's true. That's what we are.

Aimen: Exactly. But you see, again, even the Qur’an never asked us as Muslims to go and establish God's kingdom. God's kingdom is given by him to those who he wills.

And the idea is that kings in Islam, and by the way, the first King, funny enough, was a caliph. Muʿāwiyah, the founder of the Umayyad dynasty, when he was given the allegiance after the previous five caliphs before him, Abū Bakr, Umar, Uthman, Ali and al-Ḥasan ibn ʿAlī.

After he was given the allegiance, he said, “Ana 'awal almuluk.” I am the first of the kings. Because he realised that he's not one of the rightist caliphs, but at least he is a king because he is founding a dynasty.

And do you know what happened when a king is dead in Saudi Arabia or in Jordan or Morocco or any of the Muslim world before? They never said the king is dead, long live the king. For example, when Abdulaziz became king, they were shouting that kingdom is God's and to Abdulaziz.

So, this is how a kingdom is announced. First of all, we admit that God is sovereign, but someone has to act on behalf of God on earth in order to impose God's laws, but without basically making it into a funk killing, kill joy in a cesspool of radicals. Sorry, I didn't mean to preach.

Thomas: No. Well, the Muslim Brotherhood disagrees with you, Aimen. They want to erect a caliphate. That's what they want. They want to pursue through moderate or immoderate means. And this is where we come down to are they radical or are they moderate?

And I would say the Muslim Brotherhood is an organisation that pursues radical ends through moderate means. They are more patient than Al-Qaeda and certainly than ISIS. They are more sensible. Their strategy is more and likelier to succeed than someone like ISIS's strategy.

But their goal is a radical one to create a totalitarian caliphate that spans the globe. I mean, Hassan al-Banna stated it very clearly in 1948 in a speech he gave to the assembly of Muslim youths. Is that what it was called?

Aimen: Yes.

Thomas: And well, he stated this, and I paraphrase, we can't go into it in detail, “Nowadays,” he says, “The disturbed world is in a state of confusion and all its own organisational systems have failed to resolve its problems.” Adolf Hitler probably said the same thing.

“The only cure is Islam. We need to redeem the Islamic individual. We need to establish the Islamic family. We need to establish the Islamic nation. We need to establish the Islamic government that leads this nation to the mosque.

We need to regain every part of our Islamic nation that has been usurped by western nations policies. We seek to make the banner of Islam rise high and wave over those lands.

And finally, we want to make our call to Islam, reach to the whole world, propagate it to all nations, spread it to the remotest parts of the earth, and subjugate every unjust ruler to its command.” I mean, that's pretty radical.

Aimen: Finally, finally, you are convinced. Finally.

Thomas: It's a bit like hyper liberalism too, if you asked me.

Aimen: Indeed, yes.

Thomas: Which is turning out to be more radical than either of us believed.

Aimen: Indeed.

Thomas: Well, dear listener, you really put up with a lot of rambling from us, don't you. I hope you enjoyed this two-part series on the Muslim Brotherhood.

As I said at the outset, we didn't do it justice. We were never going to do it justice. It's too big, it's too complex, and it's too secretive because in the end, it is a radical, revolutionary organisation bent on world domination.

And with that in mind, we can set up our next couple of episodes, which are going to be about a man who currently governs a very powerful and strategically important country, not just of the Muslim world, but of the entire world.

A man whose ties with the Muslim Brotherhood have also been suspect and open throughout time. A man who has been considered by some, an agent by others upon of the Muslim Brotherhood whose own past in the Muslim Brotherhood, is shrouded in secretive mystery, giving rise to endless conspiracy theories and conjecture.

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The truth about that is hard to determine, but what is clear to everyone is that this man is a force to be reckoned with on the world stage. And I'm talking about President Erdogan of Turkey. He will be our topic in the next couple of episodes of Conflicted. Stay tuned.

A reminder that you can follow the show over on Facebook and Twitter at MH Conflicted. And for a deeper dive into all the subjects we talk about here on Conflicted, head over to Facebook and search Conflicted Podcast Discussion Group.

There you will find other fans of the show engaging in heated debates, enlightening conversations, and just generally geeking out over Conflicted related topics.

Conflicted is a Message Heard production. This episode was produced and edited by Harry Stott. Sandra Ferrari is our executive producer. Our theme music is by Matt Huxley and Tom Biddle.

Conflicted S4 E11: The Muslim Brotherhood: Who Are They?

Speakers: Thomas Small & Aimen Dean

Thomas: Hello, dear listeners, you've tuned in for another episode of Conflicted with me, Thomas Small.

Aimen: And me, the great yet humble, Aimen Dean.

Thomas: Aimen, I am about as nervous about doing these episodes as I was when we embarked on our episodes on the Israeli-Palestinian crisis, if you remember from last season.

In the next couple of weeks, we're going to be talking about a very divisive, rather nebulous organisation, our old Egyptian friends, the Muslim Brotherhood.

Aimen: Well, it's a minefield, and I mean it in the figurative sense, not in the literal sense here.

But it is a minefield of course, because every time I had a discussion about the Muslim Brotherhood since the Arab Spring in particular, there are people, and I mean it, at least two of them were no longer on speaking terms with me, because I was criticising the Muslim Brotherhood rise to power in Egypt. And I believe basically that these people are going to ruin Egypt.

Thomas: Well, the Muslim Brotherhood sure is divisive. And after our exploration into the historical figures who in many ways set up modern Salafi jihadism, we are now going to have a look at an organisation who, some say prop up Salafi jihadism in the modern era.

Others say they're a force for peace and charity in the Muslim world, and yet others say they're a clandestine puppet master of various Islamic governments. Who are the Muslim Brotherhood? Moderates, radicals. Let's jump right into it.

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So, Aimen quickly, and really, we have to do this quickly because we have, in a way told the story of the foundation of the Muslim Brotherhood directly and indirectly, many times across Conflicted, because it's all rooted in that ferment, that fomenting political maelstrom that preceded and then followed the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire.

And when we're talking about the Muslim Brotherhood, we're talking about Egypt. Now, Egypt, which was part of the British Empire, and then in 1922, achieved partial independence from that empire, thanks to some nationalist activism oriented around a kind of secular liberal party known as the Wafd Party.

We talked about this in our previous two episodes about Sayyid Qutb. He was coming of age during this time, as was someone else whom we've talked about a lot on Conflicted, Hassan al-Banna.

Aimen: Hassan al-Banna, as we have discussed before, is the product of his day. He was a teacher, a graduate of Dar al-Ulum, the same school that Sayyid Qutb went to, to complete his education. And also at the same time, he was a preacher, a religious scholar, though a minor one.

In 1922, Egypt achieved what would someone call a window-dressing independence from Britain. Really, the British gave independence to the Kingdom of Egypt, newly established at that time, however, they were still in charge, especially in the strategic Suez Canal zone.

And they really run the economy. They ran the banks, and they ran more or less the military especially in Egypt. Hassan al-Banna therefore came into the scene in 1928, 4 years after Turkey abolished the caliphate and the Ottoman Empire was no longer existing. The office of the caliphate has been abolished, and with it the fact that Egypt was still under a significant British control.

So, Hassan al-Banna was an anti-colonialist, to some extent anti-monarchy, but because the monarchy was under the control of the British, and he was pro nationalist Islamist ideals, and he wanted to put all of this in a politically organised movement that would harness the power of two elements in Egypt, which were in abundance, faith, and youth.

Thomas: That's a great way of putting it, Aimen, honestly. I think to be fair to Hassan al-Banna, his political ambitions grew from 1928 onwards. The organisation that would become known as the Muslim Brotherhood started out with slightly simpler ambitions.

It was largely involved in preaching. Hassan al-Banna would preach in cafes and Ismailia, where he lived. And the movement spread, he emphasised increasing the individual's Islamic faith and piety.

But yes, for sure, underlying this and growing over time, his political ambitions would expand. Feeding into that was this ongoing unrest, not just in Egypt, but in Palestine, especially from the 30s onwards.

As we also talked about in the last season of Conflicted, the 1930s was the period when Zionism was clashing with nascent Arab nationalism, Islamic nationalism in Palestine leading to more and more conflict between Jews and Muslims there overseen at that time by the British who were losing control of the situation.

Hassan al-Banna was animated to defend Muslim interests in Palestine. And so, this movement that he founded, the Muslim Brotherhood, took on. In fact, in 1936, a sub-organization was created within it dedicated to Palestine, took on the further ambition of extending beyond Egypt really, more widely into the Muslim world.

Aimen: Indeed, in fact, 'Izz al-Din al-Qassam, the Syrian clerk, who was leading the militant resistance against the Jewish Zionist migrations in the Palestinian mandate of the UK at that time, as well as against the British forces.

He had a lot of help support financial and otherwise from Hassan al-Banna and his organisation to the point where 'Izz al-Din al-Qassam was thought of as an honorary member of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. Even though he was not Egyptian, he'd never been there, except in the 1920s.

Thomas: Loyal listeners of the podcast will know what happened next. In 1949, as a result of continuing unrest in Egypt, which had become violent, and the Muslim Brotherhood had participated in this widespread political violence. The British operating through the Egyptian monarchy, assassinated Hassan al-Banna in February 1949.

Three years later, Egypt undergoes a revolution. The King Fat Farouk is toppled. Eventually, President Gamal Abdel Nasser rises to power, turns against the Muslim Brotherhood, and begins waves of suppressing it violently inside Egypt.

This history is tied to the life of the character we discussed in our previous two episodes, Sayyid Qutb, who was arrested by Nasser because he had, by that point, joined the Muslim Brotherhood and become its top ideologue.

In prison Sayyid Qutb had written a number of very influential books, advocating an increasingly more radical position in terms of the strategy that Islamists and the Muslim Brotherhood specifically should be following to achieve its aims.

And as we said in the previous episode, he was eventually released from prison, following a heart attack, then was re-imprisoned, and at a show trial was condemned to death and hanged.

But Aimen, we have to admit that we left out an important detail from our story of Sayyid Qutb's life, especially at the end of his life. And it's about the Muslim Brotherhood, and specifically about a very important person in the Muslim Brotherhood at that time called Hassan al-Hudaybi.

Aimen: Hassan al-Hudaybi, born in the late 19th century, he came from a poor background. His family were not a well-to-do family, but nonetheless, they were able to send their kid to a good secular school.

He graduated, went to law school, and graduated as a lawyer. And from there, he started to rise in the ranks all the way until he actually achieved one of Egypt's highest judicial office in the land, which is the Office of the Chancellor of the Court of Appeal. It's more or less really the top judicial authority in the country.

Thomas: Despite his status there at the top of the establishment in the late 30s and early 40s al-Hudaybi formed a friendship with Hassan al-Banna, and by the mid-40s, he had joined the Muslim Brotherhood.

Following Hassan al-Banna's assassination in 1949, the Muslim Brotherhood appointed al-Hudaybi, his successor as al murshid al am, the Supreme Guide of the organisation. We're going to talk more about that role later, but for now al-Hudaybi was at the top of the Muslim Brotherhood.

Now, the brotherhood hoped that appointing him to that position would help relieve pressure on them from the government because he was so establishment, he was so respectable, and they didn't necessarily expect him actually to govern the organisation because his views, as it turned out, were quite moderate.

Aimen: It was obvious that a lawyer and then a judge would have a moderating effect on the Muslim Brotherhood. After all, everything has to be by the book. And as a judge, he wanted to do everything by the book.

And what angered many members of the Muslim Brotherhood at that time was for Hassan al-Hudaybi to call for the dissolution of the secret apparatus of the Muslim Brotherhood.

What is that? Basically, it is a paramilitary intelligence organisation that we're ready to collect information as well as deploy violence whenever necessary to protect and defend the interest of the organisation.

And so, it wasn't out of the question for many parties in Egypt at the time, during the chaos of the 1940s, to have paramilitary arms. I mean, this is what even leftist and right-wing political parties were doing in countries like Germany and Italy and other parts of Europe.

Thomas: Yeah, the 30s and 40s were when political parties were violent.

Aimen: Indeed. And Egypt did not escape that phenomenon. And so, the fact that al-Hudaybi wanted to dissolve that organisation, he wanted to send a signal that the Muslim Brotherhood is genuinely a political party and genuinely a social welfare organisation that is trying to better the welfare of the society.

Thomas: That would in time put al-Hudaybi on a collision course with Sayyid Qutb. Remember Sayyid Qutb was imprisoned in the mid-50s, and he stayed there more or less for the rest of his life apart from a brief sort of year out of prison.

But from prison, Qutb was advocating going beyond even Hassan al-Banna’s emphasis on preaching and began stressing for the need for a violent vanguard, a minority of Muslim Brotherhood members who through violence and in the name of self-defence but would actively seek to overthrow the established powers and expand the movement that way.

His rhetoric and his writing was increasingly advocating this approach and the clash between Sayyid Qutb in prison, a Muslim brother and a chief ideologue of the organisation, and Hassan al-Hudaybi, the head of the Muslim Brotherhood, that clash between these two men can act as a symbol of an ongoing question, really at the heart of the Muslim Brotherhood.

Are they radical or are they moderate? This is the question that everyone has to ask himself when he is looking at the Muslim Brotherhood and trying to understand it.

I don't want, Aimen, you to rush to answer that question right now because I know you know the answer, but I want to get there slowly. I want to ease the listener in to Aimen Dean's pronouncement upon the Muslim Brotherhood.

So, as an opening gambit here, let's say the moderate dimension of the Muslim Brotherhood is a real thing. It exists. There are members of the Muslim Brotherhood who advocate moderation in their tactics at the very least. For example, Hassan al-Hudaybi, perhaps the sort of archetype of this tendency.

So, when Qutb was publishing his books, which were advocating violence, Hudaybi published his own book. It was called Preachers, not Judges, a very telling title. This title was obliquely, directly critiquing Qutb's hard-line views.

And al-Hudaybi taught that the Muslim Brotherhood should continue preaching, should continue advocating righteous Islamic living, but not condemn people who failed to live that way.

And it is arguable that most Muslim brothers across history have advocated that approach. Would you agree, Aimen?

Aimen: Of course, they have advocated that approach to some extent. It's not that I agree or disagree with whatever approach. We are not disagreeing or agreeing on means, we are talking about ends, if you see what I mean.

Thomas: I do know what you mean. And when you talk about ends, in a way, you're talking about ideology.

Aimen: Yeah.

Thomas: And I want to postpone our discussion of the Muslim Brotherhood's ideology until the next episode in this two-part series on the Muslim Brotherhood. I think it might become one of our classic clash statement, I don't know, maybe we'll agree. We'll agree and skip off into a lovely sunset together. I don't know. Sometimes it doesn't happen.

In this episode, I really want to focus on, let's say concrete reality, the Muslim Brotherhood as an actual organisation actually embedded in the world.

Often that part of the Muslim Brotherhood is neglected in discussions of the brotherhood. And you can leave whole articles, indeed books about the Muslim Brotherhood wondering, okay, fine, but what is it? What is this organisation? So, how do we begin?

I can tell you, Aimen, to prepare for this episode, I read a recently published book by Joas Wagemakers, at least, I think that's how that name is pronounced, The Muslim Brotherhood: Ideology, History, Descendants, quite a good book. Clearly inclined towards seeing the Muslim Brotherhood as essentially a moderate organisation that has been more sinned against than sinning in terms of its reputation.

So, as I was reading it, I realised this person might have an agenda. But it was very informative and yet reading it, I was constantly reminded of Monty Python's film, the Life of Brian and the endless debates happening between all the different Jewish revolutionary movements in Jerusalem as depicted in that film.

The Judean people's front, or the people's front of Judea clashing with other — this constant evermore microscopic splitting of political tendencies into different branches and sub-branches and everyone fighting with each other.

Reading a sweeping history of the Muslim Brotherhood leaves you with that impression. Like, it's not one thing. They're always arguing, and splinter groups are splintering off, and then political parties are founded and they break off and they come back and change their name and different this and different that.

So, the question is like, is it even appropriate Aimen, to talk about the Muslim Brotherhood? Are we not better off talking about Muslim brotherhoods?

Aimen: Okay, if you are talking about a political organisation, there are plenty of them. If you are talking about an ideology, there is only one.

Thomas: Well, let's talk about the organisation then.

Aimen: Yeah. The Muslim Brotherhood is, if I could borrow a Christian phraseology here, is a broad church. And this church encompasses so many different chapters, strands, different schools of thoughts.

You have from the so moderate to the so radical, from the violent extremist all the way to the doves and the pragmatic technocrats. You have of course, local chapters who organise according to the needs of their prospective countries.

They always differ with the mother organisation. When I say the mother organisation, I'm talking here about the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, also known as at al-ikhwan al-muslimīn, in which means the international organisation of the Muslim Brotherhood.

Thomas: So, it is true that the mothership of the Muslim brothers is still in Cairo. It is essentially an Egyptian organisation to this day.

Aimen: Exactly. I mean, to this day, because how do I prove that there is a mother organisation, and the other chapters belong to it somehow? I would say that the fact that not a single other chapter, not in Iraq, not in Yemen, not in Libya, not in Algeria, not in Morocco, not in Turkey, and not in Syria, these were the Muslim Brotherhood organisations were present. And even in Pakistan known as Jamaat-e-Islami, none of them elected a rival supreme guide.

Thomas: Al murshid al am, the supreme guide who is always in Cairo.

Aimen: Exactly. Or an Egyptian in exile sometime. But there is always an Egyptian murshid al am, general guide or supreme guide to the Muslim Brotherhood. And this is why whenever someone try to argue with me, “Yes, Aimen. But there are separate Muslim Brotherhood here and separate Muslim Brotherhood there, and there is no evidence yet of an organisational link between the two.”

I say, “Okay, let them elect a supreme guide of their own then, what is stopping them?”

Thomas: Yeah. I mean, this gets to the heart of the confusion about the Muslim Brotherhood, that on the one hand it is wrong, I think to say that there is a strong, centralised global organisation that controls everything that the Muslim Brotherhood does, because as you've said, the Muslim Brotherhood is internally divided, very fragmented, and with many local and national chapters across the world, including in the West.

But all those chapters do, in some sense, answer to a central body overseen by one man, always an Egyptian and usually in Egypt.

So, my question to you, Aimen, as we continue this conversation is why has the Muslim Brotherhood, which began in Egypt as an organisation, largely concerned with Egyptian affairs, how has it been so successful in being copied in this way across not just the Muslim world, but the whole world? Why is that?

Aimen: Well, I'll answer this from a corporate mindset. I would say it's the brand first because it's clever. It's a Muslim and brotherhood. And after abolishing the office of the caliphate, which by then it was completely symbolic, irrelevant, and powerless, and just ceremonial.

Yet the symbolism in having a caliph more or less was not lost on many other Muslims because there was an attempt to reestablish the caliphate in the Hejaz in 1925 unsuccessfully by the Sharifs before they were chased out of the Hejaz by-

Thomas: As we discussed last season. Absolutely.

Aimen: Yeah. By King Abdulaziz, the founding king of Saudi Arabia. So, the khulafā was just gone, the caliph it was gone. So, they wanted to emulate it. So, remember, it's the word brotherhood and the word Muslim. Therefore, the brand itself is signifying a pan-Islamic solidarity, Muslim and brotherhood.

Thomas: I'm raising my finger as I sometimes to telling Aimen. Save it for later, because this is leaning back into ideology. Let's talk about the organisation.

Now, it started in Egypt. It started out of a kind of context of achieving Egyptian independence from the British, while at the same time calling for the reestablishment of the recently abolished caliphate, which gave it automatically a pan-Islamic dimension as well, which then resonated strongly with Muslims elsewhere, who were also largely trying to throw off colonial domination at the time, and also wanted to reestablish the caliphate in many instances.

So, this strange mixture, it's a kind of mixture of nationalism, pan-Islamic solidarity, anti-colonialism. It's a mixture allied with Salafism, with this idea that modern Islam has somehow gone astray. And we must look to the sources of the religion to renew it, to purify it.

It's a mixture. And this mixture, this powerful mixture was definitely bound to clash with the prevailing form of state organisation in the modern era, the nation state.

So, what would you say, and be honest now in terms of its organisational structure, what is the Muslim brotherhoods relationship with the nation state? It does often work cooperatively with established nation states.

Aimen: Of course, they have to because it's means to an end. The Muslim brotherhood structure, at least in Egypt at the beginning, was really looking like a government in waiting, ready to supplant the existing government and to take over the government of Egypt.

They had intelligence, they had paramilitary, they had a powerful educational and welfare programs, absolutely. They were a state within a state.

So, when they finally take over, let's say in Egypt, they would look at supporting the other chapters in other Arab countries with the aim of establishing the same structure that would take over the governance of these countries, with the aim in the future to have the communist equivalent of the superstructure, the pan-socialist, pan-communist.

But of course, here we are talking about pan-Islamist dream of reestablishing the caliphate because that's the only way you can do it.

Thomas: Okay, I hear you. It makes sense to me. And by invoking the spectra of communism, you're resurrecting ghosts, like wicked ghosts from the past, ah, communism.

But to play devil's advocate, how is the Muslim Brotherhood's ambitions in that regard, different from the ambitions of liberals? So, liberals have organised in different nation states have created within those states, organisations, chapters, groups, cooperative organisations.

They've reached out through business partners and in the charity sector to build up para state organisations seeking to expand the frontiers of liberalism globally. They have established massive institutions like the United Nations, but even more so like the World Trade Organization to expand the dictates of liberalism everywhere.

And let's say in Europe, so like the European Union is very much that thing, the nation states are there, and yet within the nation states, the European Commission embeds technocrats loyal to it, to kind of transform those states from within that they would conform their legislation and their constitutions to the European union's vision of a liberal capitalist paradise.

So, how is the Muslim brotherhood different from that, from the liberal attempt to create a globalised liberal free market world?

Aimen: There are a lot of similarities, but also there are a lot of differences. Everything you said can truly apply to the Muslim Brotherhood in terms of their methodology of how to achieve power in order to preach their vision of what the Muslim world should be.

But also at the same time, don't forget that from their point of view, unlike the liberals, their aim, and the goal is first the individual, second, the family, third, the society, fourth, the government, and the fifth, the whole Ummah. So, these are the five steps towards that. So, first you have-

Thomas: Well, you've missed six and seven, which ends with the world.

Aimen: Exactly. There will be the mastery of the world. And I will come to that in the ideology one when we talk about-

Thomas: Okay Aimen, forgive me, I'm going to interrupt you, but it still doesn't sound that different. I mean, don't liberals take control of the education systems? And first they turn individuals liberal through pumping them TV shows and pop music and they read magazines that are all about spreading the virtues of radical liberalism.

And that through that reason, the children put pressure on the families and the families become liberal, and then the neighbourhoods become liberal, and then they vote for liberal political parties. And how is it different?

Aimen: It is similar, extremely similar, yet it is extremely different because liberalism is in the end about liberalism, and the ultimate aim is to achieve that liberal utopia.

For the Muslim Brotherhood is about power in order to impose what they see as Islamic conservative utopia.

But the difference is the Muslim Brotherhood is completely against the nation state. They want to abolish the nation state completely. While liberalism still at least on the face of it, does not want to unite countries in terms of dissolving completely the national identities of everyone and joining them in one complete superstructure. Come to think of it actually-

Thomas: Yeah, I have some Brexiteer friends, Aimen, who would disagree with you about certain institutions.

Aimen: Actually, now I'm talking, and I started to feel like, hey what am I talking about? I mean, actually liberalism does seek that too.

Thomas: I mean, so the truth is it does come down to ideology in the end, and we will get there, dear listener.

Aimen: It just hit me.

Thomas: Aimen and I are going to talk about it. So, the question is, eventually it'll come down to Islamism versus liberalism, which is a kind of subsection of right wing versus left-wing.

Anyway, we'll get there. Let's take a break and when we get back, we'll continue to discuss and debate the Muslim Brotherhood and describe the way it functions in the real world. Stay with us.

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We're back. We're talking about the Muslim Brotherhood, and I achieved a great ambition. I got Aimen Dean to admit that maybe there's something similar between the ambition of liberal globalists that dominate the world economy today and the Muslim Brotherhood.

Aimen: Absolutely. I think this is why lots of liberals have some sympathies with the Muslim Brotherhood. I mean, they see-

Thomas: That's funny. That's true. They do.

Aimen: Themselves in the mirror.

Thomas: That's true. How interesting. I said at the beginning that it's difficult to wrap your head around the Muslim Brotherhood because it's so complex. So many chapters, so many different tendencies within it, et cetera.

But there's another reason and maybe an even bigger reason for why it's so difficult to understand the Muslim Brotherhood. And that's because at heart, the Muslim Brotherhood is a clandestine organisation. It possesses an essential secretiveness that means you never know for sure whether you can trust anything it says about itself.

It's a big problem. It's certainly the reason why there are so many conspiracy theories about it. A lot of people do talk about the Muslim Brotherhood like they're in a cave somewhere, for example, the way right-wing antisemites will talk about the Jews controlling the world, living in a cave somewhere in Switzerland, drinking the blood of children, babies, and controlling the world through machines.

People sometimes talk about the Muslim Brotherhood like that. And though obviously that's not accurate, the secretiveness of the Muslim Brotherhood does lend itself to that kind of paranoid interpretation, right?

Aimen: Well, yes, in a sense, because they are a clandestine organisation. And when I remember someone told me “Yes, Aimen, but they became clandestine because of the repression by multiple governments against them, especially Nasser.”

Thomas: Which is true. The Muslim Brotherhood has been at the receiving end of much repression from Egypt, Syria, Yemen at times, you name it.

Aimen: And yet Thomas, they established their secretive apparatus in the 1940s, a decade before any oppression would really reign upon them.

Thomas: Yes, you're right. The thing Aimen, why can't the Muslim Brotherhood just be a political party? Why can't it be like say the British Labor Party, a more or less transparent organisation with more or less transparent aims, subject to scrutiny by journalists and having membership that vote openly on the political party's platform.

Why can't it be like that? Because it's not like that. There is no political party anywhere called the Muslim Brotherhood. In each country that the Muslim Brotherhood operates, to the extent that that country involves any party politics at all, the Muslim Brotherhood will form as a separate organisation, a political party, or more than one political party to advocate its ambitions politically.

But the organisation itself is never and not a political party. Why can't it just be a political party?

Aimen: Because it's resembles more an order than a party. It feels to me sometime as if they are mirroring the Masonic lodges where you have the grandmaster, the murshid and then you have the Masonic Brotherhood all over the place.

They come from different parties, they can advocate for national or local interests, but in the end, they are all working towards one aim and one goal.

Thomas: The Freemasons. Aimen, you're brilliant. And you know why you're brilliant? Because it further justifies my belief that the aims of the Muslim Brotherhood are quite similar to the aims of global liberalism because that's what the Freemasons were.

They are a chief engine for the liberalisation of the world through this secret organisation that created networks across borders and worked with politics, when necessary, but also didn't, and were often brutally repressed by authoritarian governments like the Czar in Russia. Isn't that interesting?

Aimen: Exactly. And also, because don't forget that the Muslim Brotherhood, they have a system and they have their own meeting rituals. They have their own organisational structure, which-

Thomas: Initiation as well. You have to work hard to be initiated through some kind of secret. I think there's secret rituals, as you say, involved because Hassan al-Banna had come to some extent from a Sufi background, and there's a slight Sufi element in the Muslim Brotherhood in that regard involving rituals and chains of initiation of ever increasing sort of authority over everyone.

Aimen: Exactly, a pyramid. Again, we come back to that symbol from Egypt. There is a pyramid where the top of the pyramid, you have al murshid the grand master of the order of the Muslim Brotherhood. And then you have all the council below him, and then the Shura, and then you have the young masters, the teachers, the engineers, the lawyers, the judges, the army offices.

So, you have actually a pyramid shaped organisation just like the Freemasons. However, while the Freemasons are trying to establish, for example, or at least to make it easy for the establishment of a liberal order around the world, the Muslim Brotherhood is looking for a pious religious Islamic order based on the caliphate system within the Muslim world.

Thomas: You mentioned the murshid, the supreme guide who lives in Cairo, let us say. And if we're talking about rituals, one key ritual around the murshid, around the Supreme Guide is the swearing of allegiance to him. Why don't you tell us more about that? Because it's another one of these slightly secretive aspects of the Muslim Brotherhood that does make people uneasy. Let us say.

Aimen: First of all, all members of the Muslim Brotherhood at rank and above must swear an oath of allegiance to the al murshid al am, whether they are in Pakistan or in Morocco, whether they are in Turkey or in Bosnia, or in Albania or in Somalia

Thomas: Or in London.

Aimen: Or in London or in Houston, Texas. It doesn't matter. The reality is that they must swear an allegiance to al murshid because I remember a hymn, I used to sing when I was young, it talks about the 10 pillars of the allegiance. It's called the 10 Pillars of the Allegiance, which contains many things like jihad, patience, honesty, loyalty, understanding, sincerity.

So, there are 10, these are the 10 pillars of the bay’ah. I remember the nasheed exactly when I used to sing it when I was young, [Speaking Foreign language] these brother, are the pillars of our bay’ah, that our Imam, our murshid, has called upon us to swear.

Thomas: I think you told us about this before in a previous episode, but I can't remember why in God's name were you chanting a Muslim Brotherhood hymn? Were you a member of the Muslim Brotherhood as a child?

Aimen: No, but some of my teachers were.

Thomas: And they were trying to influence you in this way.

Aimen: Not only me, everyone around me. So, the Muslim Brotherhood were very strong in Saudi Arabia in terms of their organisation of something called Al Jawala. In fact, they have infiltrated several universities in Saudi Arabia, including the King Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals. They had a chapter there called Al Jawala.

And they have infiltrated also the King Abdulaziz University in Jeddah. Al Jawala means the Boy Scouts, but at the university level, they infiltrated the education system in Saudi Arabia quite successfully.

And they were in particular good at organising desert outings, trips to the mountains, boy scout stuff like, and absolutely, and this is how it all started.

Thomas: Yeah, maybe like the Boy Scouts, that other clandestine organisation that is spreading godless liberalism across the planet.

Aimen: Goodness, you and the Boy Scouts. But in fact, one of those actually who was a member of the Jawala in King Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals would become later a minister of the cabinet in Saudi Arabia. This, just to show you the level of infiltration, his name was Saad al-Jabri, who would later-

Thomas: We’re going to talk about him next episode, yeah, Saad al-Jabri.

Aimen: Exactly. So, actually the infiltration of the Muslim Brotherhood into each society, whether it is in the UAE at some point in the past, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia.

I mean, just look at Turkey, look at Morocco. For a while there was a government run by the Muslim Brotherhood in Morocco. There is a government run by the Muslim Brotherhood in Turkey for the past 20 years.

Thomas: Oh, now you're really giving the game away because this whole series on the Muslim Brotherhood is setting up a series on President Erdogan of Turkey and his political party, we're trying to lay the foundations for understanding President Erdogan. That's really what this is all about.

So, I'm glad you mentioned it, but I want to stick with not Saudi Arabia specifically, but I'm glad you brought up Saudi Arabia because it reminds us that the Muslim world all divided now into modern nation states, more or less functional can be divided into two types, the republics like Egypt, and of course the monarchies.

And you're always talking about how the monarchies in the Arab world, the monarchies in the Muslim world, are more stable and more effective means of transforming their societies in accordance with modern ways.

And in fact, the Muslim Brotherhood has an interesting relationship with the monarchies. It has tended to succeed more in monarchical states like Morocco, for example, where under the influence, I suppose, of the good governance of monarchies.

The Muslim Brotherhood has tended to adopt more pragmatic down to earth moderate means than in the places the republics like Egypt, where they were so violently repressed and suffered so much deprivation and imprisonment and torture and execution, that they tended to be more radical there.

So, what is this thing that the Muslim Brotherhood is more moderate in monarchies, and yet the Muslim Brotherhood is not pro monarchy, is it?

Aimen: Yeah. I mean, there is this contradiction because again, we come back to the means and ends. So, within the means, they are more than happy to work under a monarchy in order to prove themselves to be competent at governing.

So, for example, in Morocco, they were happy to contest elections under the king of Morocco, and they had the prime ministerial ship. They had the majority of the cabinet positions, and they did fairly well.

Thomas: Yeah, just to give the listener an idea of the history here, Morocco has its own fascinating history. I swear one day we will do an episode or two on it. It's a magnificent country.

And because it is a monarchy and it has its kind of own flavour of Islam, a kind of Moroccan Islam that is tied to the monarchy and the monarch’s descent from the prophet. And there's a lot of Sufi movements in Morocco. Morocco has its own thing going. A very attractive thing if you ask me.

But it's politics, maybe because it was for some time a French protectorate are very complicated. But throughout that complicated political sort of chaos in the 1998, a political party emerged, the Justice and Development Party, which reminds me of another party maybe in Turkey. Anyway, the Justice and Development Party that eventually did achieve power there and ran the government for a while.

Aimen: Indeed. And you see the relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood, the monarchies was okay for a while, for a reason, because no matter what, the king acted as a ceiling against the ambitions of the Muslim Brotherhood to have a total governance.

And in fact, the king in Morocco played a very good moderating role on the Muslim Brotherhood governing and governance style in Morocco. That mix succeeded.

And in fact, when it was time for them to concede defeat in elections, they did so because why? They have no other choice. The king is the supreme commander of the armed forces, whether they like it or not, if they lose an election, they should hand over peacefully that power, and they did.

Thomas: So, for that reason, the Muslim Brotherhood finds it less easy to contest power against monarchs because monarchs rise above ideology. Whereas in an ideological state like Nasser's Egypt, they were confronting a rival ideology that was in inimical to their own. So, they must fight it.

Aimen: Actually, Thomas, when in 1936, Hassan al-Banna travelled to Saudi Arabia, the newly established kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and there he met King Abdulaziz during the Hajj season.

And there he actually asked King Abdulaziz to establish a chapter of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, an office. So, King Abdulaziz looked at him rather bewildered and he said, “But Sheikh Hassan, we're all Muslim brothers here.”

And that's when al-Banna decided not to basically encroach on Saudi Arabia at that time. But just to show you that a monarchy behave in a very different way. It wasn't ideological. It's like, it's obvious, aren't we all Muslim brothers? The same thing will be answered by every single monarch in the Arab world.

Thomas: But because the monarchies of the Arab world are themselves based on a very complicated system of bay’ah, where the individual swears allegiance to his clan leader who swears allegiance to a sheikh of a subtribe who swears allegiance to a tribe, all the way up to the monarch, I can imagine that the monarchs of the Muslim world find the bay’ah system within the Muslim Brotherhood very problematic.

Because if you come to me even as the leader of a political party that is affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood, and you've been elected to run the government, and you go to the king and you say, yes, I swear allegiance to you to govern, to head up your government according to the law of the land, et cetera, et cetera, I swear allegiance to you.

The monarch's going to be thinking, well, you also swore allegiance to this murshid guy in Cairo, whose allegiance is your priority?

Aimen: Exactly. And in fact, the later clash between the Arab monarchies and the Muslim Brotherhood would be primarily upon this question of who do you serve?

Thomas: Yes, we're going to talk about that in the next episode. But having talked about the monarchies, let's go back to talk about the republics. Syria is a very prototypical case of the Muslim Brotherhood clashing with Republican government in a country.

It was established there in the 40s, 1945, 1946, several Islamist activist groups that were already there inspired by Hassan al-Banna merged to form an official Syrian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood.

And initially they had great success in politics there. It was a different environment from the environment of Egypt. And in 1949, they were already sending members to Parliament in Damascus.

But then listeners from last season will remember that the 50s and 60s in Syria were incredibly chaotic. All political parties went through periods of being banned as dictatorship emerged in the country, and then they were brought back in when dictatorship went down.

And then eventually the Baʿth Party came to power, and the Muslim Brotherhood would really clash with the Baʿth Party. And throughout the 70s, the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, as a result of the oppression from the secular, you know nationalist Baʿth Party became extremely radicalised.

And this led in 1982 to the notorious Hama Massacre when tens of thousands of Muslim brothers were surrounded by Syrian forces, and Hama was absolutely destroyed over a series of some months, I think.

This Hama Massacre really kind of redons into the present in the memory of the Muslim brothers.

Aimen: Again, we come back to the question, the Muslim Brotherhood set up themselves as the champions of what I would describe as Islamic flavoured democracy.

Thomas: Yeah, eventually there was a great debate within the Muslim Brotherhood about whether they should participate in democratic politics or not.

But on the whole, in the end, by the 1980s for sure, most chapters of the Muslim Brotherhood had agreed that participating in democracy was not in itself against the Sharia.

Aimen: And this opened the flood to the participation in elections, even in Egypt during the Mubarak era under different parties and even in Turkey, which banned religious parties, several parties were established winning some seats, then being dissolved and winning seats again, then being dissolved in a game of cat and mouse with the secular authorities in Turkey.

The story of the Muslim Brotherhood chapters in many different countries is littered with failures and successes, with tragedies, with triumphs, with ups and downs. I mean, it's a rollercoaster.

Thomas: Like any political movement, honestly.

Aimen: Yes. They were championing what they advocated as an Islamic flavoured democracy, as Rached Ghannouchi himself, the leader of Ennahda Party, the Muslim Brotherhood Party in Tunisia once said in a lecture I attended actually in 1999 in London, where he said that democracy is originally an Islamic idea, and we must reclaim it. That's what he said. And so, reclaim it he did.

Thomas: But a lot of radical Muslim brothers and other groups outside the Muslim Brotherhood really, really disagreed with him when he said that.

Aimen: Oh, of course. I remember even jihadist clerics such as Abu Qatada in London made takfir against him, excommunicated him straight away.

Thomas: Because the real hardliners say democracy and Islam are polar opposites. There is no democracy in Islam. But the Muslim Brotherhood largely disagrees with that and says, no, no, there is scope for democracy in Islam, in the Muslim Brotherhood.

Aimen: Yeah. But it has to be a Islamically flavoured. But again, we come back to what do they really want and what do they mean?

Thomas: Yes, exactly. We come back to what do they really want. So, speaking again organizationally, let's imagine that the Muslim Brotherhood achieves its goal of erecting a global caliphate. I mean, it's impossible to imagine this happening but if they did it, what would that regime be like, Aimen?

Aimen: I don't have to imagine it. In fact, I will let one of their leading thinkers and statesmen actually of the Muslim Brotherhood answer this question. It is none other than Hassan Al-Turabi.

Thomas: The Sudanese ideologue and politician.

Aimen: Exactly. He is the one who was the real puppet master at the beginning behind the coup led by General Omar al-Bashir in Sudan in 1989. And all the way until the late 1990s, he was the puppet master. And of course, the puppet was Omar al-Bashir.

Thomas: And a member of the Muslim Brotherhood that is undoubted.

Aimen: Yes. Yeah, absolutely Hassan Al-Turabi is a Muslim Brotherhood through and through. He's the one who invited to Osama Bin Laden to come from Afghanistan to Sudan, to shelter him in the early 1990s. He sheltered the Egyptian Islamic jihad in the 1990s in Sudan and many other different unsavoury jihadist groups.

So, Hassan Al-Turabi, I was listening to a lecture on a cassette of his, ironically, when I was in Azerbaijan of all places in 1996, just after I left Bosnia. And I was in Baku, and I was listening to that lecture where he talks about the vision for a caliphate, what would a caliphate look like under the new order of a Muslim Brotherhood, reaching the power, whether by force or by elections or by peace or by consensus in different Muslim countries and uniting them together.

So, there will be a meeting of the Muslim Brotherhood leaders, he called them the people of authority. So, people who speak in authority on behalf of Islam. He meant the real leaders of the various different chapters and Muslim Brotherhood organisations.

They would elect from among them a khalifa, a caliph. And under the caliph there will be the council of ministers and of course the council of governors of the different states.

And then under that would be a 314 member Shura council. This Shura council would be in the future, responsible for the election of a new caliph every time there is the need to do so, whether by death or incapacitation or deposition. So, it sounds like China, Ismalist.

Thomas: I was going to think that it's like there's a people's Congress and also Soviet Union like a bureau headed up by the general secretary, but yet, presumably then just like in Communist China, there will be like caliphate offices in every major city.

And then in order to be a teacher, say, you have to be a member of the Muslim Brotherhood and then be authorised by the party, let us call it the party, to be a teacher or to be a banker.

And then the Muslim Brotherhood will just achieve power like that, like the Communist party of China operates.

Well, I think that is where we'll bring this episode to a close. Aimen, I hope we did the Muslim Brotherhood justice, as I said at the outset, dear listener, it's a complicated organisation, quite secretive in many respects.

We've ended up with an imagined but quite realistic depiction of a global caliphate, as the Muslim Brotherhood would wish to erect and saw that in its structures at least it's quite totalitarian a bit like Communist China.

But whereas Communist China has been pursuing in various guises, a radical leftist Marxist inflicted ideological path, the question remains, what is the ideological path and the ideological ambition of the Muslim Brotherhood?

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Is it as radical as people say? Could it justifiably be considered a moderate response to the challenges of modernity, to the challenges of an Islamic world that was somewhat conquered by European states that threw off those states that were then influenced by radical left-wing, radical right-wing movements of a secular nature?

Is the Muslim Brotherhood's ideology possibly a moderate response to all of those challenges? That's what we will try to discuss and perhaps reach some consensus about in the next episode of Conflicted. Stay tuned for that.

A reminder that you can follow the show over on Facebook and Twitter at MH Conflicted. And for a deeper dive into all the subjects we talk about here on Conflicted, head over to Facebook and search Conflicted Podcast Discussion Group.

There you will find other fans of the show engaging in heated debates, enlightening conversations, and just generally geeking out over Conflicted related topics.

Conflicted is a Message Heard production. This episode was produced and edited by Harry Stott. Sandra Ferrari is our executive producer. Our theme music is by Matt Huxley and Tom Biddle.

Conflicted S4 E10: Sayyid Qutb: Poet, Reactionary, Islamist (Part 2)

Speakers: Thomas Small & Aimen Dean

Thomas: Welcome back, dear listeners, to another episode of Conflicted. I'm Thomas Small and Aimen Dean is alongside me once again.

Now, Aimen, I'm always throwing out quotes at you at the start of these episodes, but do you have one for me, this time about today's subject, Sayyid Qutb?

Aimen: Indeed, Thomas. It is one of Sayyid Qutb's most famous quotes, always referenced by jihadists, by theologians, and by activists all over the Muslim world. He said, “Our words are lifeless, unlit candles until we die for them. And once we die for them, these candles will be lit and will live forever.”

Thomas: Those are the words of a martyr, aren't they, Aimen?

Aimen: Indeed.

Thomas: Of a man drawn to martyrdom. Sayyid Qutb was certainly drawn to martyrdom by the end of his life, as we will find out in the second episode in our two-part series on the life of Sayyid Qutb.

So, without further ado, today, we are completing our long journey, looking at the Islamic thinkers who have dominated the thoughts of Salafi jihadists. We discussed poets, scholars, warriors, invasions from Byzantines, invasions from Mongols, from Ottomans.

We've been from Baghdad to Damascus to the Najd in Saudi Arabia, and now we're ending in Egypt with Sayyid Qutb, the radical romantic turned idealist, Islamist firebrand. Let's jump right in.

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We didn't talk in the first episode in this series on Sayyid Qutb about your own real personal interaction with his writing. So, how much of Sayyid Qutb’s oeuvre have you read?

Aimen: I would say maybe about two thirds of whatever he written. And that's a lot.

Thomas: Two thirds. That's a lot. Given what he wrote. That's a lot. So, I mean, when did you start reading Sayyid Qutb?

Aimen: I started reading Sayyid Qutb at a vulnerable moment in my life, I would say. My mother just died. I was 12. And I remember I went to see one of my teachers, one of my theology tutors, and I've asked him about what should I read that would correspond with coping with grief in Islam.

And I remember him saying, “Really, if you want to read something that would really deeply touch you at this moment, then read Fi Dhilal Al Qur'an.” In the Shade of the Qur'an written by Sayyid Qutb. He said to me that Sayyid Qutb wrote this book over nine years period when he was in and out of prison in the 1950s and early 60s.

It is a 4,000 plus pages commentary on every single verse of the Qur’an. It's not a theological book, it is a book of literary commentary on the Qur’an to extract lessons, to extract meanings, to understand the Qur’an's beauty, elegance, eloquence, while at the same time understanding the intended lessons that God wanted to teach us through the trials and through the difficulties and through the sadness that the prophet himself experienced throughout his life.

He himself was orphaned. I'm talking about the Prophet Muhammad, was orphaned at a very young age. I remember, basically when I was reading Fi Dhilal Al Qur'an, there was one particular passage that broke my heart completely and actually healed me, healed me completely at that moment.

Because he was talking about Prophet Muhammad who was fatherless at the age of six, coming back with his mother from Medina. And when they were with the caravan, his mother got ill. So, she decided to stay behind next to a well with her son until she recovers. But hours later she died.

So, there he is, a six-year-old boy alone in the desert, completely alone next to a dead mother, until another caravan came, helped him to bury his mother, and then took him to Mecca.

This six-year-old boy would then change the world and be entrusted with a divine message, a message of love, a message of morality, a message of societal cohesion, and a message of law, order safety and mercantile prosperity, words that were so powerful.

And when I saw it, I cried so much. I was 12 at the time, but I cried because I thought that I'm 12 and I felt the grief. Yet it's nothing compared to what the prophet went through.

And who actually taught me that? Sayyid Qutb, through the beauty of his prose, the language that he used to transform me to that moment, as if I was seeing a young six-year-old boy alone with his dead mother.

And I was thinking, I am in a better situation and that man is my saviour. So, he saved me at that moment.

Thomas: Well, you've done a very good job of describing the softer side of Sayyid Qutb as reflected in his great work of Qur’anic exegesis in the shade of the Qur’an.

But that's not the only side of Sayyid Qutb in that work. There's a harder, more defiant, more angry side. What about that side? Didn't that have an impact on the young Aimen Dean as well?

Aimen: Now that Sayyid Qutb has consoled me. When I started to dive deeper and deeper into his interpretations, into his commentary on the Qur’an, he start to comment on battles, on the everlasting struggle between good and evil, between light and darkness, between ignorance and enlightenment.

Wow, goodness. This is when he ignited these revolutionary fires within me. I felt that, yes, this is what I wanted to read. I wanted to have purpose in life, and this man was giving it to me.

Now, I understand that he wrote these words while he was under the lash, while he was being tortured, while he was being persecuted for his faith. And I really started to feel when he interpreted and commented on verses about jihad, he felt as if he wanted to be there on the front lines, fighting alongside those who wanted to sacrifice their lives for the faith.

When he talked about martyrdom, I felt as if he longed to it, as if he was longing to be with a beautiful woman. I mean, I saw his thirst for a Islamic empire, empire that would protect a subject, that it would subjugate the rest of the world to worship at the altar of morality and to actually finally achieve a just society for everyone without having to undermine everyone stationed in society.

Thomas: Aimen. Aimen. Aimen. Where do I sign up for this crusade? Wow, this sounds great. Let's do it. You and I, Aimen, against the world. Come on.

Aimen: So, you see, I finished reading all of this when I was 14 and a half, and a year and a half later I was in Bosnia joining the jihad there because Sayyid Qutb showed me the way.

Thomas: I was watching Jurassic Park on repeat at the time. This was very different kind of 14-year-old, I think.

Okay, well, that's it. Thank you, dear listeners. That's the end of our series on Sayyid Qutb. Aimen's taken us right to the end and to Sayyid Qutb’s, let's say his post-mortem state as the tutelary spirit of all young would be jihadist martyrs.

But we're going to have to roll the timeline back to where we left him at the end of the last episode. Just as World War II was breaking out in the world and the new post-war world was going to emerge. And the American dominated post-war world was going to emerge out of the ashes of the ruin of European empires everywhere.

In Egypt, most Egyptian political activists favoured Germany in the war, not because they were Nazis, or not necessarily because they were Nazis, but because they wanted Britain out of Egypt. So, they supported Britain's enemies. The enemy of my enemy is my friend.

And though in this episode, we will draw some links between Sayyid Qutb’s thought and Nazi thought at the outset. I want to be fair to him.

Sayyid Qutb was horrified by German war atrocities. He actually found the concentration camps. He found the blitzkrieg; he found the remorseless, merciless conquest of the Nazi movement to be a symbol of what he hated most about modern technical machine oriented European civilization.

So, he did not fetishize Nazism wholly at all. And he very much as a result of what he was seeing, playing out on the battlefields of Europe and elsewhere, looked forward to that post-war future where Egypt could remain unattached from the West entirely and join with fellow eastern countries dedicated to the spiritual renewal of mankind.

So, Aimen. Just you agree, right? We're not calling Sayyid Qutb a Nazi.

Aimen: No, I don't think he was a Nazi sympathiser in the classical sense. However, he did dabble with that idea because of Haj Amin al-Husseini, the Mufti of Jerusalem. And we talked about it before in the Israel-Palestine episode in season three, because there was the feeling that the anti-Semitic feelings of the Nazis, and of course don't forget the concentration camps were not yet known about in the Middle East.

So, the idea that Hitler's anti-Zionism would be of use to the movements that wanted to stop the Jewish migration to Palestine, which was under British mandate at that time.

So, there were many in Iraq and Egypt and in the Levant who were sympathetic to the Germans at the beginning of the World War II. But that sympathy started, of course, to decrease slowly as the atrocities started to emerge and people started to know about them.

So, do we call him a Nazi? No. Do we call him someone who was influenced by Nazis? Yes, definitely.

Thomas: Yeah. And we mentioned in the previous episode that he had read the French right wing reactionary thinker, Alexis Carrel. And he also in the 30s read Mein Kampf. He was reading these ideas.

And I tried to stress in the last episode that Sayyid Qutb was a very modern figure, very recognizable as a member of that reactionary romantic class of thinkers who valorised nation, blood, culture, spirit over liberal technocratic, utilitarian, industrial society.

So, to that extent there was a lot of overlap with right wing reactionary Nazi fascist ideas in the 1930s. There's no question. And he would, as you say, to some extent, take that milieu of ideas, Islamisize those ideas, and create Islamism.

But where we left him off and where we're taking up the story again, now, he hadn't yet fully made his Islamist turn. He was on the verge of beginning that turn.

And that turn began in the midst of the Second World War, initially through literary criticism of the Qur’an, literary criticism we have to point out. Again, he was not a theologian. He had not received a traditional religious education.

And his initial return to Islam, came through poetry, through the imagination, through aesthetics, through an appreciation of the Qur’an's beauty in a book that he published in 1944, Artistic Depiction in the Qur’an.

In this book, he argued that the Qur’an's real power was aesthetic, was its beauty. He argues that Qur’anic images, imagery within the words, would impress themselves on your imagination, revealing truths. He called this way of appreciating the Qur’an as opposed to Taswir, as opposed to Tafsir.

Aimen: Yes. And also at the same time, I remember when I was reading it when I was young, I was thinking that once you read that book, you will never look at the Qur’an the same way before, because suddenly you start to become more or less interested in what does this verse mean?

You really start to transfer yourself and your mind and your imagination into that event. There is a colour, there are faces, there are buildings. It's as if a drama is playing in front of you. So actually, once you read that book, you never read the Qur’an the same way ever again.

Thomas: I am feeling that in this regard, unlike the other figures we've been studying in this series, Sayyid Qutb was not a mere literalist. I don't think it would be fair to call him a literalist in the same way that Ahmad bin Hanbal and Ibn Taymiyyah and ibn Abd al-Wahhab were.

Because Sayyid Qutb is like a poet, assuming that the literal images, the literal words of the Qur’an, which create in the imagination, these powerful images are inclining in the direction of something beyond the mere words.

But for the time being, let's go back to the story. It's the Second World War and then the war ends. We're in that period, the 1940s, the mid-40s. Egypt is in political turmoil. There are riots, there are assassinations.

The Muslim Brotherhood, which was founded as we said in the last episode in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna is a big player on the scene. It has already established its so-called secret apparatus, the sort of vaguely paramilitary wing of the brotherhood, which was oriented towards overthrowing the government.

Now, we're going to actually do two episodes on the Muslim Brotherhood after this episode. So, I don't want to go too much into the Muslim Brotherhood and its workings.

The point that I want to make now is that Qutb, throughout this period is turning more and more anti-western. He's writing that Westerners simply lack conscience. His language is becoming more and more extreme.

It's around this time that he's writing that quote that I quoted at the beginning of the last episode about how much he hates Westerners. And it is at this time that for the first time in his career, he begins openly to call for a comprehensive social and political program that would solve Egypt's problems and create social justice.

Now, I want to talk about this because this kind of a call for a comprehensive social program is totally modern. This call for a comprehensive social program is explicitly totalitarian alongside all sorts of totalitarianisms that were in the air, including Soviet totalitarianism, including Nazi totalitarianism.

He used the word Nidham. He called for the establishment of an Islamic Nidham, an integrated system, a regime encompassing every dimension of life, society, and politics.

It's a modern word that Sayyid Qutb is employing to achieve a modern end, a totalitarian solution to the world's problems.

Aimen: It became very clear to Sayyid as we are going into the year 1948, that he couldn't find the solution to Egypt’s ills and problems through poetry, through literature. There was no denying it.

At the time, the Egyptian society was torn between extremes, whether extreme left, with the communists gaining ground, whether with the nationalists who wanted to have purely nationalist Arab, Egyptian government.

And of course, the Islamist represented in the Muslim Brotherhood who wanted a political salvation through Islamic regime.

Sayyid, when he started reengaging with the Qur’an in the 1940s, he started to come to that conclusion that only through Islam we could find a solution to Egypt's problems.

Thomas: He articulated this growing conviction in a new journal that he founded at that time called New Thought. But it was in this journal that he first began to invoke Islam as the underpinning, as the foundation of the comprehensive social solution that he was yearning for.

Now, the government noticed his new tone and the journal New Thought was shut down after only 12 issues, because it was included amongst a list of banned publications, subversive publications, the government called them. Which brings us to the pivotal year, which listeners of the last season we'll know, is very pivotal indeed of 1948.

Aimen: Year 1948. It is the year of the partition between the Jews and the Arabs, and what was known there as the mandate of Palestine which was of course controlled by the British.

The United Nations announced the independence of Israel in 1948, and immediately seven Arab armies invaded. Against the odds the Israelis fought back, and there was a massive humiliation against all the seven Arab armies, including the Egyptian army.

The Egyptian army in particular suffered significant casualties and a significant defeat. And that humiliation was felt throughout all of Egypt, including by Sayyid Qutb, which of course propelled him to write that book Ma'rakatuna ma 'a al-Yahud, our battle with the Jews. And that formed some of his ideas that are yet to come.

Thomas: Just to remind the listener, the Muslim Brotherhood participated in the Arab-Israeli War alongside Egyptian troops in the war. And this gained the initial respect of young army officers in the Egyptian army, including a very key figure in the rest of this story. And a key figure in last season of Conflicted, President Nasser, or soon to be President Nasser, Gamal Abdel Nasser.

Let's just bracket that for now. Because in fact, Sayyid, weirdly Sayyid Qutb is going to leave Egypt precisely at this time. At the end of the summer of 1948. He takes up the opportunity that the Egyptian government gave him to travel to of all places, the United States, where he goes on to spend 21 months travelling around the country, learning, and studying the United States' education system.

Well, two things I want to say about this, Aimen. First of all, a lot of people think that Sayyid Qutb became an Islamist because when he went to the United States, he saw American culture and hated it. And so, turned to Islamism.

This is not true. This is a myth. He had already made his Islamist turn as we've just said, before he left. So, it's simply not true.

Aimen: Absolutely. And this is a problem with simplistic easy takes on Sayyid’s life for sure.

Thomas: And just before he left, and this is proof again, that he had already made his Islamist turn, he completed the manuscript for the first of his three great and most influential works called Social Justice in Islam.

So, you see, he was already an Islamist. Social Justice in Islam is calling for an Islamist solution to the world's problems.

Aimen: There’s an anecdote here where he was travelling to the U.S. of course, an ocean liner and across the Atlantic. And one night, one lady who wasn't dressing modestly and clearly drunk, knocked on his door in the middle of the night. And she really threw herself at him and just wanted to be in his company.

And the shock, how he was shocked. He just threw her out of the room. He threw her out across the galley and just go away. And of course, this would have been a traumatic experience for him, and he just doesn't realise, hey, I'm far away from the Gentil gentleman saloons of Cairo, where even among the Effendi classes, the segregation between genders were still being practised.

Thomas: Yeah, it's good that you bring up that anecdote of this poor drunk woman trying to get into his bed. But it also raises the question of Sayyid Qutb and sex. We didn't talk about sex in the first episode, but I want to talk about sex and Sayyid Qutb. That's like Sex and the City, but sex and Sayyid Qutb, maybe we could make a new TV show.

Aimen: No, no, no. We should call it sexless in the city.

Thomas: Sexless in the city. That's right. Sayyid Qutb like ibn Taymiyyah in fact, never married. And most scholars of his life think that it's extremely likely that he never had sex, that he died a virgin.

He is only on record of having fallen in love one time. He actually wrote a novel, a schwak, it's called about this experience, about him falling passionately in love with a woman and yet having to break off the love affair because she wasn't pure enough for him.

There's something very telling in this fact about him, a squeamishness about female sexuality, a squeamishness about male sexual desire and an antipathy to that side of life, to sex.

Being afraid of sex does overlap quite nicely, as we discussed before with the fundamentalist or the radical or the literalist frame of mind and Sayyid Qutb had it in spades.

Aimen: In fact, there is an anecdote from his life where when he was at the University of North Colorado, of all places, I mean North Colorado, for God's sake. I recall you are a Coloradon yourself, Thomas.

Thomas: I did spend five years of my childhood in Colorado. It is the middle of nowhere. It is true. Yep.

Aimen: More like the middle of nowhere in the middle of nowhere. Anyway, so when he was in the middle of nowhere, in the middle of nowhere, he attended a church dance.

And he was commenting that I saw the men hugging the women so tight, putting their hands at the bottom of their backs. So, he found that to be scandalous, and oh my God, I'm just reading this and I'm thinking, oh, poor Sayyid, poor, poor, poor Sayyid, if he was alive today, he will have a heart attack.

Thomas: That story of the church dance in Greeley, Colorado includes the detail of the song that he found particularly offensive. It's the classic Christmas song, Baby it's Cold Outside. This has gone down in history. Sayyid Qutb hates that song. He found it to be utterly provocative. We've sort of got off track here.

So, he lands in New York, he's walking down Broadway, Kiss Me Kate is in the theatres. This is the kind of world we're in. This is America in its glorious post-war apotheosis. This is the America that Americans today in a nostalgic wave praise to the skies.

And Sayyid Qutb is walking in this America hating everything he sees thinking that it's all just the pits. He was writing letters and essays detailing his trip back home, constantly seeing everything through an anti-western lens that he had already largely sort of built up in his mind over the previous 15 years.

After New York, he went to Washington DC where he was hospitalised for an illness that he never made clear about what it was. And while he was in hospital, a very momentous event happened back home in Egypt.

And that's that on the 12th of February of that year, 1949, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hassan Al-Banna was assassinated. And Sayyid Qutb found out about this while recuperating in hospital in Washington DC.

How is the death of Hassan Al-Banna likely to have impacted him, Aimen? He wasn't a member of the Muslim Brotherhood yet, but he must have respected greatly already by this time, Al-Banna's anti colonialist pro-Muslim stance.

Aimen: Given what he wrote about Hassan Al-Banna later, you could tell that he admired the man considerably. And there was no question that he felt that the death of Hassan Al-Banna was a great loss to Egypt and to the cause of Islamist nationalism.

Thomas: Yeah, he was aware at the time that members of the American foreign policy establishment whom he was socialising with in Washington DC as a representative of the Egyptian government, were very aware of Hassan Al-Banna's significance.

And he was disturbed by the glee that he felt he sensed in their descriptions of Hassan Al-Banna's assassination. And it planted the seeds of something that would definitely continue to grow of a kind of paranoid, conspiratorial way of thinking about America and British foreign policy and foreign agents and intelligence.

He always saw the American British kind of alliance as secretly working to undermine Islam. And in that, again, he shared that with so many Muslim activists at the time.

So, after his period in Washington DC he crossed the country and landed up in Greeley, Colorado, as we said, Greeley, Colorado, you can imagine this is classic Americana, classic mid-20th century Americana.

Again, a world that Americans, especially conservative Americans fetishized today. But for Sayyid Qutb it was like he was in hell.

Aimen: Because for him, it lacked the spirituality of what he was feeling back home. And for him, it felt as if it was detached from God in the moral sense, the desegregation of the genders. And also, at the same time what he saw as the real sin of racism. Because he experienced it himself.

Thomas: He did, yes, he went with an Egyptian friend while he was in Colorado, he went to the cinema. And initially they were denied entry because the cinema manager misidentified them as black.

Now, when he was told that, in fact, no, they’re Egyptians, the manager was very apologetic, but Sayyid Qutb refused his apology and stormed off. So, he was very offended by being at the receiving end of America's racism.

And yet there's something slightly subtle in his offence, because I think what really offended him was that he had been lumped in with black people.

One of the things that he wrote about obsessively during his time in America was how disgusting he found jazz music because he believed that jazz music expressed the “primitive” inclinations of black people.

So, he's not really offended at America's racism, as much as he was offended at America's considering him to be black.

Aimen: Indeed.

Thomas: From Colorado, he then travelled to California, my native stomping ground. He lived in San Francisco and San Diego, and that's where he drew his 21 months in the U.S. to a close.

Now, Sayyid Qutb's experience of America was not unlike that of many intellectuals at the time, especially European intellectuals of a radical or reactionary persuasion. So, from left or right.

They found America to be crass, materialistic, consumeristic, et cetera. All of the things that in fact, right thinking intellectuals today still think of America. And he left America absolutely convinced that western society was decadent and corrupt, and that the solution for the Muslim world lay in Islam.

We're going to take a break now. When we come back, he returns to Egypt and he launches on his full-throated career as an Islamist ideologue, which will quickly land him in very hot water indeed, with the new growing power at the centre of Egyptian politics, Nasser. We'll be back.

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We are back. We are rushing to the end of the great Sayyid Qutb's life. When we left him, he was just returning to Egypt from his 21 months in America. Upon returning home to Egypt, he immediately went on Hajj.

While he was away in America, his book, Social Justice in Islam, had been published and was warmly embraced across the Muslim world.

So, on Hajj, he met up with other Muslim thinkers who were praising him for this work. During the trip in conversation with an Indian pilgrim, he was first introduced to Abul A'la al-Maududi's idea, key idea.

So, this is another key, key modern Islamist thinker, al-Maududi. He was introduced to his idea that the Muslim world had fallen back into Jāhiliyyah. This was absolutely formative for Sayyid Qutb.

It kind of was like the capstone to all of his thinking, and he realised that yes, and in this he was a bit like Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab. Yes, that is what's happening here. The Muslim world is no longer properly Muslim. It has fallen back into Jāhiliyyah. This is it. This is when he becomes the Islamist that we know him as. Is that right, Aimen?

Aimen: Indeed. Because now more than ever, you have this formative thinking in his mind that the Muslim world has abandoned Islam as the basis of governance, and that Muslim societies are no longer Muslim societies. They are now experiencing what he calls Jāhiliyyah. And Jāhiliyyah means the pre-Islamic era when people lived in ignorance.

Thomas: The age of ignorance. Yeah.

Aimen: Yes, absolutely. And you see from his point of view, how could a mosque be sandwiched in Egypt between a bank and a nightclub? He opposed that. And he said, either we live fully as Muslims, or the society as a whole has abandoned Islam. For him, it's all or nothing.

Thomas: So, now convinced of this, he returns to Egypt. He writes a book, The Battle of Islam and Capitalism. He also writes a book, Our Struggle with the Jews. You've mentioned that book already, Aimen.

His writing becomes increasingly paranoid. He sees conspiracies everywhere. He starts writing against what he calls American Islam, a watered-down form of Islam. This is now Sayyid Qutb, the revolutionary radical firebrand. And he is warmly embraced by a growing revolutionary ferment that is overwhelming Egypt at the time.

This is the ferment that would result in July 1952 with the overthrow of Fat Farouk and the coming to power in time of Gamal Abdel Nasser initially not as president, eventually as President.

Sayyid Qutb was intimately and directly involved in that July revolution. Four days before the revolution, Nasser and the other officers who would overthrow the king met in Sayyid Qutb’s house in Cairo.

Sayyid Qutb knew some of the other officers. He was there. Sayyid Qutb was there with some members of the Muslim Brotherhood, to which Sayyid Qutb was now much more directly linked, although not yet a member.

The officers told them all of the coup plan. The Muslim Brotherhood was asked to take control of the streets when the coup would be launched four days later. And Sayyid Qutb was tasked with coordinating between the brothers and the officers.

And after the revolution, Nasser, still not president. The president was a man called Mohamed Naguib, would consult with Sayyid Qutb on the progress of the revolution regularly. Sayyid Qutb would claim that sometimes he and Nasser would meet for 12 hours a day.

This relationship, Aimen, between Nasser and Sayyid Qutb is one of the great dramatic relationships of the 20th century, honestly.

Aimen: It's worthy of an Egyptian, Roman Greek drama. I would say that. The fact that Nasser was ardent student of Sayyid Qutb and his writings, he was influenced by these writings even before they met when Nasser was on the front lines of the 1948 war against the fledgling state of Israel.

There is no question that Nasser admired Sayyid Qutb's writings, and in particular his anti-colonialist writings. Nonetheless, Nasser in the end is a military man, a pragmatic man, and someone who already had a slight leaning towards socialism, more likely communism Soviet style.

Thomas: And more importantly, I think from Sayyid Qutb's point of view, Nasser's ideology would become fully fledged Pan-Arabism. Nasser wished to see himself at the head of a Pan-Arab state organised in a collectivist pseudo socialist way.

Whereas Sayyid Qutb was more and more advocating for a Pan Islamist policy overseen really by the Muslim Brotherhood. This would inevitably lead to a clash between them, despite the fact that for the first months after the revolution, Nasser was begging Qutb to come on board the regime in some official capacity.

But it never happened. Qutb quickly realised that Nasser was only using the Muslim Brotherhood to take advantage of the Muslim brotherhood's political organisation. And when he realized this, that Nasser had no intention whatsoever of adopting an Islamist policy for Egypt, Qutb refused to meet with him anymore.

And even after Nasser offered him his pick of political position, basically Nasser said, you can't be president, you can't be vice president, but you can be anything else in this new regime. And yet he refused.

And it is in this context in February 1953, and it was partly out of his disappointment with the new Nasser dominated revolutionary regime that Sayyid Qutb momentously joined the Muslim Brotherhood. Only now in 1953, aged 47, did Sayyid Qutb join the Muslim Brotherhood.

Aimen: The Muslim Brotherhood thought that no one could ever replace Hassan al-Banna after his assassination in 1949. However, 1953 Christmas came early for them. Sayyid Qutb joined them.

And when he joined them, he gave them that much needed boost. They straight away appointed them at the very top of the leadership. He was added as a member of the guidance council, and he was given the task of being the chief propagandist of the movement.

So, in a way, the Muslim Brotherhood got that momentum that they never had before. And this scared the Nasserites in the new government.

Thomas: It sure did, especially since Sayyid Qutb was travelling on Muslim Brotherhood business from this time forward, travelling to places like Syria and elsewhere, meeting other Islamists, coordinating the Muslim brotherhood's relations with other Islamist, Pan-Islamist groups. All of this was very provocative.

And through a series of very complicated political moves, which we covered to some extent in last season of Conflicted, moves which brought Nasser to power in Egypt as the president following an attempted Muslim Brotherhood coordinated assassination of him, a thousand Muslim Brotherhood members were arrested, including Sayyid Qutb.

Now, this is in October 1954. The following January, Sayyid Qutb appeared before a show trial. I mean, that he was going to be found guilty had already been decided, I'm sure. And yet the court sentenced him to 15 years hard labour.

So, this is really where Sayyid Qutb will spend, weirdly enough, the most important years of his life in prison. And I say weirdly enough because it is due to the books he wrote in prison, books we've already mentioned: In the Shade of the Qur’an and Milestones, that Sayyid Qutb would leave his most lasting mark on the world.

Aimen: It is important for the dear listener to know that Nasser's prisons in the 1950s and 60s were no picnic at all. In fact, he was aided by East German Stasi agents to help him invent new ways of persuading prisoners to talk, let's call them torture, torture methods.

So, you can imagine here that one of the methods at which Sayyid Qutb himself mentioned is that they would douse him with animal fat and then they would let German Shepherds on him.

Thomas: Unbelievable.

Aimen: Hungry German Shepherds. So, you can imagine, what would that do to him. Also, at the same time, they would sometime take him into a room along with another one or two fellow prisoners, and they will find in the room there will be 3, 4, 5 snakes poisonous. And now it's either them who kill the snakes or the snakes will kill them.

And of course, this kind of extreme physical and psychological torture would take its toll on the most sane of people. And so, what do you expect the outcome of his mind would be when he is commenting on the Qur’an under severe stress from all of the torture, both physical and mental.

Thomas: After an initial period of extreme deprivation and indeed torture, the authorities did allow him the freedom to write. And it was during this period as I said that he wrote In the Shade of the Qur’an and this very important book Milestones, which you've mentioned, Aimen.

And which I'd like to talk about here now in some greater detail, because Milestones, you've described it to me, Aimen, as basically the kind of constitution of the Salafi jihadist movement. It's the book that all Salafi jihadists read. They don't memorise it, but they cherish it. It is the blueprint for the Salafi jihadist movement and for all of their aims and ambitions.

Aimen: Not only the Salafits, but many other groups and all of those armed groups Taliban, Hamas, Al-Qaeda, Al-Shabaab in Somalia. Not to mention even the Islamic Revolution in Iran. I mean even Ayatollah Khomeini translated and his brother Mohammed translated Milestones into Farsi because it is a ready-made constitution for any Islamist movement that want to take over a society and turn it into an Islamic state.

I'm sure many of our dear listeners would be wondering, what is the nature of Milestones, the book that led to the execution of Sayyid Qutb, his grand manifesto, which then became the ultimate constitution for many jihadist and radical organisations around the world.

Well, it's easy to summarise it. The first chapter of Milestones talk about, well milestones. He is talking about the milestones on the journey towards the ultimate aim, an Islamic state, an Islamic society, the kingdom of God on earth as he envisioned it.

The second chapter there talks about a unique Qur’anic generation. So, we of course, declaring his Salafism.

The third chapter explains the nature of the Qur’anic struggle and where we are heading as a society if we want to embrace Qur’an as the constitution for everyday life.

That is why in the fourth chapter, he goes on to talk about the foundation of the Islamic society and its special character. Then he goes on to say, how do we establish this Islamic society? Is it just by preaching?

In fact, in this chapter, he talks about the fact that you cannot preach your way into power, where he is talking about jihad as an important instrument to remove the obstacles to the establishment of a Islamic society, the kingdom of God on earth.

Then the following chapter talks about the statement of faith, la 'iilah 'iilaa allah there is no God, but God as a way of life. Because once you establish the state through jihad, then la 'iilah 'iilaa allah will reign supreme.

And that is through what? In the next chapter, he talks about universal sharia. He is talking about sharia not being only applicable to Islamic societies, but to all societies.

And that is why in the following chapter, after that, talks about the fact that Islam itself is a civilization. And then he talks about culture within Islam. Then he talks about the fact that the nationality of a Muslim is his faith. That's it.

All other identities should be abolished based on the modern nation state. And that's why he called it in the next chapter a giant leap. And that is why in his second to last chapter, he called it the Mastery of Faith.

Echoing what Hasan Al-Banna said about the mastery of the world as the final outcome of the Muslim Brotherhood creed, aim, and goal.

And the final chapter in Milestones, something that our dear listeners who are fans of Star Wars and the Mandalorian series would love it. It's called, This is the Way.

Thomas: Well, you can see why Milestones is called the Jihadist constitution. You can see why it has inspired Islamists of every stripe since its release in the 1960s.

It is a comprehensive plan, a comprehensive ideological plan on how to frame thinking about returning society to its Quranic roots and establishing a modern Islamist society, which he calls interestingly, the kingdom of God on earth. Very interesting. That is not a traditionally Muslim formulation. That is a Christian formulation, the kingdom of God on earth. Very interesting.

Why do you think he chose that term, the kingdom of God on earth as the goal to which Islamists should be aspiring?

Aimen: Because he wanted to convince the masses, down with all this Republican nonsense Down with the republics of this and the Soviet this and the socialist this and democratic that. There is nothing than a godly kingdom to establish God's rule on earth. Sovereignty is to the king and the king is God.

Thomas: Well, if his great work Milestones ends with a call to martyrdom, Sayyid Qutb would get it. Just after he finished writing the book, he had a heart attack in prison. When word of this got out, various figures, including the president of Iraq, who by this time along with many other millions of people, had learned to very much revere Sayyid Qutb because of his writings, the president of Iraq personally requested from Nasser that he released him from prison.

Nasser did. Sayyid Qutb immediately returned to the brotherhood, began helping the brotherhood reorganise its secret organisation to set up paramilitary groups to strategize for the coming revolution, which Sayyid Qutb and other brotherhood members were determined to bring about.

Milestones was published, was read by the government. The government said, “Hey, this is a comprehensive program for overthrowing us.”

And so, not long after being released from prison in August 1965, Sayyid Qutb was arrested again. This was the biggest and most brutal crackdown against the Muslim Brotherhood that Nasser would launch during his time as president of Egypt.

Sayyid Qutb was sent to a military prison. He was put in solitary confinement. At another show trial, he was accused of subversion of attempting to assassinate Nasser and overthrow the government.

Despite that many people counselled Nasser to show mercy, including, interestingly enough, King Faisal of Saudi Arabia asking him to show clemency to this great thinker, Sayyid Qutb but Nasser refused.

In a final letter facing his execution Sayyid Qutb wrote, “I have been able to discover God in a wonderful new way. I understand his path and way more clearly and perfectly than before. My confidence in his protection and promise to the believers is stronger than ever before. Moreover, I maintain my resolution to raise my head and not to bend it to anyone except God.”

There are echoes there, Aimen, of Ibn Taymiyyah who died in prison. There are echoes there of Ahmad bin Hanbal who spent time in prison, fewer echoes there of ibn Abd al-Wahhab.

But in that note of determination of total conviction of political idealism based in Islam, ibn Abd al-Wahhab is present.

On the 29th of August 1966 Sayyid Qutb was hanged. He died a martyr according to many, many, many millions of people. So, this leaves us, Aimen, discussing not only Sayyid Qutb's legacy, which is really unparalleled in modern Salafi jihadism and modern Islamism in general.

But the legacy of all the figures that we've explored now, those three Hanbalis and the one modern Hanafi, Sufi, Nazi poet, romantic, reactionary, dreamer Sayyid Qutb.

Aimen: So, imagine if Wahhabism and Salafism was an egg, then Sayyid was a sperm that came in, fertilised it with a political framework, with an ideological bent in order to propel it forward as a movement, to create that embryonic stage towards a proper militant Islamic revolutionary movement.

Thomas: I loved that metaphor because it helps to explain the relationship between the three Hanbalis that we discussed in this series and Sayyid Qutb in the generation of modern radical Islamism.

Sayyid Qutb took already existing Salafism and breathed ideological fire into it, forming it into a political framework giving it a political goal. The kingdom of God on earth that inspired not only Al-Qaeda, not only the Egyptian Islamic jihad, not only al-Shabaab, but also the Ayatollah Khomeini and the Iranian Revolution.

But also take your pick, they’ve all been influenced by Sayyid Qutb. He gave Salafism, he gave that psychological spiritual temperament that we've been exploring. The temperament towards literalism, the temperament towards purity, the temperament towards nostalgia, the temperament towards withdrawing from the world, which is perceived as corrupt and corrupting.

Infuse that temperament with an ideological superstructure. The combination of which gave birth to something very powerful indeed. That thing which we have been exploring in different ways for five years now, Aimen. And which we call Islamism, that brings to an end.

Oh, it makes me depressed actually because I just think of all the things we could have talked about, including what you told me, Aimen, you pointed out his little Hitler moustache. Do you remember?

Aimen: Indeed.

Thomas: You had this whole thing of Sayyid Qutb was entirely not a Nazi. You said, look at his little Hitler moustache.

Aimen: Indeed.

Thomas: Also, all the modern day of resonances with Sayyid Qutb's mind, even outside of Islam, because this is very important that the reactionary mentality does not exist only inside Islam. Far, far from it.

My God. People like Aleksandr Dugin, the current Russian ideologue who sort of hangs over the war in Ukraine. Figures like Andrew Tate, a recent convert to Islamic, must be said. Incels all around the world who also are very resentful at their inability to have sex with women. All sorts of reactionary movements resonate with Sayyid Qutb’s mentality.

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Anyway, Aimen, as I say, there's so much that I wanted to discuss. Luckily Conflicted will go on yes, and on and on, and no doubt we'll have many opportunities to talk about all of these things.

As it stands, our series on these four seminal thinkers that gave birth to Islamism has come to an end, but that doesn't mean Conflicted comes to an end. And when we come back next week, we are really going to continue this line of exploration when we devote two episodes to that organisation which Sayyid Qutb provided the much-needed ideological structure, the Muslim Brotherhood. Stay tuned.

A reminder that you can follow the show over on Facebook and Twitter at MH Conflicted. And for a deeper dive into all the subjects we talk about here on Conflicted, head over to Facebook and search Conflicted Podcast Discussion Group.

There you will find other fans of the show engaging in heated debates, enlightening conversations, and just generally geeking out over Conflicted related topics.

Conflicted is a Message Heard production. This episode was produced and edited by Harry Stott. Sandra Ferrari is our executive producer. Our theme music is by Matt Huxley and Tom Biddle.


Conflicted S4 E9: Sayyid Qutb: Poet, Reactionary, Islamist (Part 1)

Speakers: Thomas Small & Aimen Dean

Thomas: Welcome back to Conflicted with me, Thomas Small and my illustrious co-host, Aimen Dean. Aimen, I've got a pretty hefty quote from today's subject to start things off for you. Hopefully this will set the tone for these next two episodes.

Here's the quote, “All Western nations take their bearings from one source, and that is the materialistic civilization that has no heart and no moral conscience. It is a civilization that does not hear anything except the sound of machines and does not speak of anything but commerce. How I hate and disdain those westerners, all of them, without exception.”

What do you reckon, Aimen? Coming in a bit strong, don't you think?

Aimen: That sounds very familiar to things that you would have believed a while ago, Thomas.

Thomas: As I was reading it, I thought, hmm, did I think maybe in the last season of Conflicted, I said things like that.

But in fact, that quote was from the 20th century Egyptian scholar, educator, and martyr, who many view as the real inspiration behind Salafi jihadism, Sayyid Qutb.

He was a poet, a writer, an aesthete, but also dogmatic, sexually repressed, and obsessed with the purity of his religion.

Aimen: For me, he is the Voltaire that the Muslim world craved in during the time of colonisation.

[Music Playing]

Thomas: He's the final stop in this journey we've been taking through the Islamic thinkers who have shaped Salafi jihadism today, a truly modern, truly radical romantic. Let's get into it.

So, Aimen, how is Sayyid Qutb different from those Hanbali figures that we've been exploring in this series? He was not a Hanbali, I think we need to make that clear from the start. Ahmad bin Hanbal, Ibn Taymiyyah, Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab are firmly in the Hanbali tradition.

But Sayyid Qutb is not, and yet he's equally, if not more important to the phenomenon of Salafi Jihadism and in general Islamist radicalism today. So, how is Qutb different from that tradition, Aimen?

Aimen: Oh, he is different. So different from all the other three figures that we have discussed earlier, Ibn Hanbal, Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn Abd al-Wahhab.

And why? Because he differs from them in several areas. When he is not a theologian, he is a writer, a poet, a thinker, a philosopher, and most importantly, an ideologue who put together a political and an ideological and a philosophical framework for radical Islam in the 20th and 21st century.

Thomas: He was a political visionary, really, a political visionary in a way that maybe bin Abd al-Wahhab was obviously in Abd al-Wahhab's relationship with Muhammad bin Saud in the creation of a state to further the Da’wa Wahhabiya, the Wahhabi mission. But Sayyid Qutb was a modern political ideal ideologue.

Aimen: Indeed. He was the product of his time, but also, we have to state that he comes from a Sufi family. He was never a Hanbali or a Salafi. Nonetheless, this man, the most unlikely of people, would have the greatest impact on Salafism and Hanbali Salafism to be more precise in the 20th and the 21st century.

Thomas: So, as I've said, unlike the others in this series, Sayyid Qutb was a modern man. Unlike the others in this series, he received no traditional religious education apart from memorising the Qur’an as a child.

This is typical of many modern Islamist ideologues. They do not come out of the traditional Madrasas of Islam. They do not receive the classical Muslim formation. They receive a modern education and based on that education bring modern categories of thinking to Islam, to erect a new form of Islam, which is often called Islamism.

Sayyid Qutb was a voluminous writer. That's something he has in common with many of our figures, especially Ibn Taymiyyah. His main books, Social Justice in Islam, Milestones, and In the Shade of the Qur’an we’ll come to as we unfold his life story.

But these books have had an enormous impact on Salafi jihadism, especially I imagine, Aimen, that when you were a young jihadist yourself in the Salafi jihadist movement inside Al-Qaeda, Sayyid Qutb was in the air, to put it lightly.

Aimen: Sayyid Qutb was in my life before even I joined the jihadist movement in 1994 when I went to Bosnia.

Thomas: He probably influenced your decision to join that movement.

Aimen: Absolutely. I mean, the man was there in our house on the bookshelf because his books were an essential reading for many young men and women growing up in the Gulf and in Egypt and in Iraq and in many other Muslim nations across the world.

Thomas: So, what about inside the Jihadist movement once you were there? What was Sayyid Qutb's ghostly presence in the movement?

Aimen: His book Milestones, which is an Arabic called Ma'alim fi al-Tariq, was considered the constitution of the modern jihadist movement.

Thomas: We'll get to Milestones in our second episode on Sayyid Qutb. But you're saying that literally there were copies of the book around, people would quote from the book. I mean, what about Osama bin Laden people like that? Were they clearly influenced by Sayyid Qutb?

Aimen: It was impossible not to see the fingerprints of Sayyid Qutb's writings and ideology influencing their sermons, influencing their strategy, influencing their tactics and recruitment and literature. He was there. I mean, he is the ever-present ideologue as if he was the man behind the curtain, the Wizard of Oz.

I remember that one of our theology instructors from Al-Qaeda in one of the camps, he used to say that, you see, we have thousands of scholars that we could quote on matters of theology and jurisprudence, but there is only one true philosopher and an ideologue that we could rely on for the political and strategic framework of our movement. And that would be Sayyid Qutb.

Thomas: Sayyid Qutb. Well, let's get right into his life. My reading in preparation for this episode focused on John Calvert's classic book, now, Sayyid Qutb and the Origins of Radical Islamism as well as Sayyid Qutb's own writings, which as I said, are voluminous.

So, it would've been impossible for me to read it all, but I certainly had a good dive into it. My goodness, what a great writer he was as we'll see.

So, as you mentioned, Aimen, he was born in 1906 in a small village, the village of Musha in Upper Egypt. So, that means Southern Egypt. It lay on the West Bank of the Nile, along that narrow strip of cultivated land that makes Egypt so distinctive when viewed from above.

Aimen: Indeed, yeah.

Thomas: A world of farmers, a relatively prosperous, relatively egalitarian village. I like the little detail that there was a Coptic monastery nearby. There was also the domed tomb of a Sufi saint, Shaykh Abdul Fattah, his name was.

So, Sayyid Qutb's childhood was really immersed in something like age old, traditional Egyptian pastoral peasant Islam.

Aimen: Indeed. The other thing is that Sayyid Qutb's birthplace is called also in Arabic a Sa`id, which also means a plateau, a higher land. And the Egyptian listeners would feel some affinity when I tell them that it is the tradition in Egypt to make jokes about the people of Sa`id.

Sa`id and Sa`idis as they are called, are the butt of the jokes in Egypt because they're always described as those tough yet dim people, conservative and simple. But Sayyid Qutb was anything but dim.

Thomas: No, he was certainly not dim. He was maybe a diamond in the rough in that sense if his fellow Sa`idis were physically tough, but dim-witted people.

His father was a farmer. By that I mean a landowner, a small holding landowner. The family had once been rich, but its fortunes had declined in the previous generations. Again, like many revolutionaries, like many radical thinkers, Sayyid Qutb grew up with a family memory of past prosperity.

I think this kind of sense of resentment coming from a poorer background, it may have sowed the seeds for what would definitely be a common refrain in his adult life of contempt for the bourgeoisie contempt for rich people.

Aimen: Sayyid Qutb did indeed hate the massive inequality that was happening in Egypt. The stratification of the society in Egypt was so vast that the top was so far from the bottom, and the bottom was resembling really Egypt's pyramids.

I mean, really, just like the pyramids in Egypt, the society was so stratified, and the inequality was so outrageous. So, he hated the bourgeoisies of Egypt. He hated that wealth concentration at the top, but that did not make him a communist. He was never a communist, unlike what some academics in later years would have described him as.

Thomas: That's right, Qutbism, if you could call it that and Salafi jihadism in general is often conflated with revolutionary communism, with like the Bolshevik Revolution. There's these sorts of ideas, and of course there's some overlap because it's all radicalism in the end of the day.

But you are right. Sayyid Qutb was not a communist. He would have agreed with communists about some of the problems facing society, but his solutions to those problems were not communistic, as we will see down the line.

One important thing I think about his childhood and about the environment in which he grew up that left a lifelong sort of stamp on him, was the superstition, if you like, that saturated his village.

Now, you mentioned that he came from a Sufi family. There's no indication that he himself was ever initiated into a Sufi order, but Sufism, by which I really mean that traditional pre-Salafi, pre reformed Islam of the classical Islamic world was powerfully present in his childhood.

Demons, ghosts revelatory dreams were everywhere. There were dishevelled dervishes around playing the fool whom the peasants considered holy men. And Sayyid Qutb believed intensely in this universe, in this enchanted religious universe as a child.

Aimen: Well, the society around him was superstitious. There is no question about it. In fact, he himself when he was young, practised exorcism. Of course, please dear listener, don't think it is the same as you see in some horror movies about what exorcism in Catholic sense feels like. It is a bit different.

But nonetheless, he did practise exorcism as a young man to cast away demons who possess humans.

Thomas: Sayyid Qutb would eventually, as we'll see, shortly have a modern education. And as he emerged into adulthood, he would begin to dismiss the superstitions of his childhood as ignorant.

But he would always romanticise this peasant way of seeing the world. Like many reactionaries today, and I think this is really key, who talk about the “disenchantment” of the world.

Sayyid Qutb mourned that disenchantment in the modern world around him, and then eventually he would see that peasant superstitious faith, let's say, driven imaginative way of seeing the world as Qur’anically grounded. He would go full circle and return to affirming, quite powerfully that way of seeing the world, the enchanted way.

But we'll get to that in the next episode. For now, as a child, Qutb craved education, he really wanted to learn. Two of his uncles had studied at Al-Azhar, the great centre of Muslim learning in Cairo. And Al-Azhar scholars visited the village of Musha when he was a child, and he would attend lectures by them on Tafsir, on Quranic interpretation. He loved education.

Aimen: At age six, just like many children in Egypt at that time, he enrolled into a state-run primary school that was generally secular, but with some Qur’anic instructions there and Arabic as well.

However, two years into his education in that state school there were rumours that the state is going to stop altogether Qur’anic instructions in the schools that they run.

So, of course, his father, who was deeply religious, thought, “Ah, no, no, no, no, no.” So, he withdraw him from that school and enrolled him into a proper Qur’anic school.

Thomas: It's an early hint of that kind of paranoia that would haunt Sayyid Qutb all his life, that modern westernised or westernizing institutions were always on the verge of attacking Islam.

His father must have felt that, the people of Musha definitely felt that. And so, yes, he was pulled out of the state school, enrolled in a traditional Qur’an school, which Sayyid Qutb absolutely hated.

Aimen: Well, he did enrol into the Qur’anic School, but unlike the state-run school, the Qur’anic School wasn't properly funded, wasn't properly run, it was dirty, it was makeshift, and he just wasn't happy there. He wanted to go back to the rigorous, well-run, well-funded school, and his father in the end agreed with him.

Thomas: And again, there you see, there's hints of that puritanistic kind of OCD tendency when he liked the ordered, clean, hygienic world of modernity, while at the same time hating that world for spoiling or polluting the ideological and idealistic purity of his mind.

It's a very confused, kind of dualistic way of approaching things, very common to lots and lots of radicals. So, yes, he begged his father to send him back to the state school, his father capitulated.

And yet, Sayyid Qutb didn't want to neglect Qur’anic studies. And in fact, in the state school, he organised pupils to memorise the Qur’an by themselves. And by the time he was 10-years-old, he had memorised the Qur’an.

Later on, he would claim that this Qur’anic memorization was what planted the seeds of what was going to soon emerge as an intensely creative side to his character.

Aimen: To be honest, I've seen a lot of my friends and that actually include myself, those young boys who embarked on memorising the Qur’an from a young age. I started when I was nine, and I finished when I was 12.

I can relate to his experience, because really the memorization of the Qur’an opened the mind so much to many other possibilities. So actually, my love for poetry, when I was young, my love for reading, all sparked because of the memorization of the Qur’an. His experience was ours. Exactly. So, I can relate.

Thomas: He definitely loved reading. He would eagerly collect books going to travelling booksellers and buying whatever they had to sell. According to Calvert, he collected 25 books over his childhood, books that straddled the divide between traditional subjects and modern subjects.

So, he loved Sherlock Holmes stories, for example, which I love. That's hilarious. But he also read books on astrology and magic, as you said. He began performing exorcisms.

And then as a teenager, he began to become politically aware. I think we need to kind of remind the listener, especially the listener who followed last season of Conflicted when we talked about Egypt in great detail, that he grew up in a world that was living in the shadow of Muhammad Ali's reforms to Egypt's political economy.

You're going to have to go back listener to episode six of the last season, to learn all about Muhammad Ali, who beginning in the early 19th century radically transformed Egypt.

So, a strong centralised state had emerged. It had abolished tax farming, and instead introduced a modern tax gathering bureaucracy. This had forced the peasants to grow cash crops for export in order to generate cash, to pay the state. This is all very modern sort of thing.

This had led to what is like the equivalent of the British enclosures. So, the land had become a commodity, and the central government had been dispensing parcels of land to members of the aristocracy, creating this wealthy new overclass.

So, in a way, the process that sort of England had undergone in the 16th and 17th centuries, Egypt had undergone in the 19th century, law had been somewhat secularised. The Sharia had been limited to domestic affairs only.

So, though we said before that Qutb grew up in a world that was traditional in terms of its worldview, in fact, that world was modern, and it was a village world that was in profound flux. He was living in a world that had been radically transformed, and perhaps, unsurprisingly, it led to political agitation on the ground.

Aimen: Egypt was going through turmoil when he was born. The year he was born, 1906, there was an incident in Egypt. It's called the Denshawai incident. Denshawai actually was a massacre, which happened when a clash happened between villages, farmers in the village of Denshawai in the West Nile Delta when they clashed with British soldiers.

So, the British opened fire. Many people were killed, including women, and that, of course led to administrations across Egypt. And the calls for the British to leave, of course, that never happened.

But nonetheless, this is the same year that Sayyid Qutb was born. And then of course, Egypt remained under direct British mandate all the way until 1922. So, by that time, Sayyid was a 16-year-old, the teenager, he was, of course aware of all the agitation, the riots, the demonstrations, the clashes with the British authorities.

To the point where the king of Egypt at that time, who was known as a sultan, decided that you know what? The British need to grant some independence, at least, even if it is superficial, just to please the masses. And this is exactly what happened.

So, this is the society, the agitated Egypt that Sayyid Qutb was living in at that time.

Thomas: And not to mention, of course during his childhood, the First World War broke out, and the two of the parties in that war were the British against the Ottomans. And Egypt was sort of technically still part of the Ottoman Empire, even if the British, in fact, dominated it entirely.

And families like Sayyid Qutb’s tended to support the Ottomans against the British in that war. And Sayyid Qutb’s father was no different. His father became a political activist at that time, and Sayyid Qutb would join in his father's meetings and would be asked to read out nationalistic articles to the largely illiterate activists.

So, that's an important point to stress. Nationalism was in the air. Now, some nationalists in Egypt wanted Egyptian nationalism to be modelled on European norms.

Others were already inclining toward a more Islamic conception of Egyptian national identity, as Sayyid Qutb would have been caught in the middle of this sort of swirling nationalist discourse.

But at that time, he became animated in his fervour against the British. And this was given even greater impetus in 1919 during the nationwide uprising against the British that occurred following the First World War. When Egypt was refused an independent place at the Paris Peace Conference, the British wanted to negotiate on their behalf.

Again, 13-year-old Sayyid gave nationalist speeches in mosques, and already in these nationalistic speeches, he was praising the caliphate. He was praising Islam. So, the seeds of his later ideology were already being sewn.

Aimen: Again, Thomas, I feel like his childhood mirrors a lot of my childhood, feeling the sense of endangerment to identity, to faith, to the Pan Islamic bond that bonded many of the world's Muslims together.

Now, Sayyid in his speeches, because don't forget, many of them are not his, but he was reading the articles, he was borrowing from all of these writers. But at the same time, he is not forgetting his Islamic education, that the caliphate is still there, even though it is as Western as it could be.

I mean, the caliphs were living a western lifestyle. I mean, they were wearing Western uniforms. They were drinking Western wines and whiskeys. They were absolutely as detached from proper Islamic way as it could be.

And yet he felt it. He felt that impact because of Pan Islamism, which shows that even in the late 1910s, the feeling of Pan Islamic solidarity was still strong, even in the remote parts of the former Ottoman Empire.

So, the caliphate sadly for Sayyid Qutb would be abolished just few years later by Kemal Atatürk. And of course, we talked about it in the Turkey episode of season, season three. Please, dear listener, go and listen to it.

Thomas: By that time, Sayyid was already in Cairo. In fact, he moved aged 15 in 1921 to Cairo to finish his education there. So, that must have been a huge shock to him. Cairo was a divided city. It had a very modern European half and a very mediaeval Islamic half.

In a way, it still has that to this day. The population of Cairo had only recently reached 1 million, which these days doesn't sound like a lot to us, but in the early 20th century was a lot indeed.

Compared to his village upbringing, the young Sayyid Qutb’s experience of Cairo must have been incredibly shocking, especially this division that it manifested between the modern west and the mediaeval Islamic world. He finished his education in Cairo at a state secondary school.

And then a few years later, age 23, he was admitted to the Dar al-Ulum, which was a sort of teacher training institution. And would, after graduating from there, begin his career inside Egypt's Ministry of Public Instruction, and then he would move later to the Ministry of Education.

And that's where we'll leave him while we take this break. We'll leave him freshly minted young educationalist working inside the Ministry of Education inside Cairo. And when we get back, we'll see that he's just on the verge of a new chapter in his life as he joins the glittering, a high society world of Cairo's burgeoning literary elite. We'll be right back.

[Music Playing]

We are back, dear listener, Sayyid Qutb is our subject. He is now, what is he, 27-years-old. The year is 1933. He's living in Cairo. He is working inside the Ministry of Education. And his father dies.

Now Aimen, I don't know, you can perhaps speak to this from a Middle Eastern point of view. I think it would've been expected at that time for him to then go home to take up the sort of family business of farming. But he didn't.

Aimen: Well, of course he didn't, because how could you expect someone who experienced modern life and modern education to go back and take up farming? I mean, it would be way beneath him.

It is the literary circles of Cairo, those beautiful cafes where intellectuals would meet and debate and talk about the latest issues of politics. War is brewing in Europe, and it is the 1930s, in fact, 1933, the year in which one of Qutb's possible influencers, I would say would take power in Germany, Hitler.

Europe is going through political turmoil again. And therefore, why would Sayyid Qutb leave Cairo where he is in touch with the rest of the world and go back to the backwater village where he come from? No, no, no, no. That's not Sayyid Qutb’s destiny.

Thomas: For seven years, he'd been a primary school teacher in various places across Egypt. But yes, Cairo was always sort of beckoning him back. He eventually settled in the well to do and modern suburb of Helwan. He bought a house and invited his mother and his siblings to join him there.

So, he's going to become the anti-western, anti-modern ideologue, but he quite likes the comforts of modern life as well. This is not unusual.

Aimen: Isn’t that all radicals, Thomas? I mean, have you noticed many hate preachers and many of these Islamist jihadists living in London and Paris and Berlin and Munich, and preaching from there, sending people to die, but they and their kids stay in the comforts of these places. I mean, come on, he’s as old as the beginning of this century.

Thomas: Calm down, calm down. We have to do Sayyid Qutb justice. He was not yet an Islamist firebrand. In fact, he was a poet, a novelist, a literary critic. He was part of a very vibrant, a very dynamic literary scene in Cairo.

In fact, it was his literary criticism, which he was publishing in journals up and down the country that brought Naguib Mahfouz to the public's attention. For example, I mean, Sayyid Qutb can be attributed with sort of discovering that man who would go on to win the Nobel Prize for literature and is inarguably the greatest writer of modern Egypt.

Aimen: Incredible.

Thomas: Sayyid Qutb adopted a modernist literary style. Now, again, a bit of an irony. He loved modernist writing. Its clarity, its straightforward means of expression.

He didn't like the classical Arabic style at all. He thought that it was too complicated. He thought that it was too elite, it was too formal. He liked the rigorous, but sort of direct expressiveness of modernism.

And at this point in his career, he was laying the foundations for a literary style that I think Aimen, you would agree, became extremely powerful.

Aimen: In fact, it became the standard. I mean, Sayyid Qutb can be partially accredited with modernising the modern Arabic writing that is easily accessible to the new generations of Arabs in the 20th century.

Before that, most Arabic writing was theological and formal, and to some extent really inaccessible to the vast majority of people. So, the way he made modern writing seem so eloquent, elegant, with deep, beautiful prose that would enchant those who read them.

You see, this is his magic, not the demon's magic, not the exorcism magic, but the magic of the pen. And he will wield this magic so powerfully in the next decades.

Thomas: I mean, not only prose, as I say, he was a poet. And Sayyid Qutb’s poetry is very similar to the romantic existentialist poetry of Europe of that time.

But more than just the poetry itself, it was like the philosophy, the literary philosophy of the time he found very appealing. He believed that poetry appealed to the emotions, not the intellect. And he began to develop a theory of the imagination as the primary means, whereby the mind knows things.

So, there was a bit of an anti-rationalist bent to his understanding of the human mind. He was much more of an aesthete; he was much more of an artist than a true philosopher in that sense.

And in this way, he found himself a fellow traveller amongst a whole generation of reactionary right-leaning literary figures in Europe, people who valued the imagination.

Someone like D.H. Lawrence in England, someone who believed in things like the blood, things like the instinctive engagement with the world, things like how natural forms, trees, dirt, ocean, sky impinged themselves on the imagination and revealed truths that transcended the reason.

This kind of world is the one that Sayyid Qutb was swimming in. And I think it would influence his Islamist ideology down the line, profoundly.

Aimen: Indeed. But remember, Thomas, that Sayyid Qutb, in fact, was the quintessential Egyptian bureaucrat. He is precisely similar to the people who would wear a bowler hat in England and be the typical quintessentially English civil servant.

Thomas: It's true that he had a dual character. He had this inner self of imaginative fire, but an external self of a kind of technocratic bureaucrat, as you say, they were known as effendis.

Aimen: Yeah. You see, Egypt was a very class-oriented society. In fact, that class divided society in Egypt of the first half of the 20th century is still influencing Egypt to this day. Can you believe it? So, he was an effendi, and they are given that respect. So, he was a respected upper middle-class gentleman, civil servant.

Thomas: And in his work as a bureaucrat within the Ministry of Education, he, for example, opposed religious conformism and called for the teaching of secular subjects alongside religious subjects.

Again, you might be surprised by this dear listener because he is the great anti-western, anti-modern ideologue of Salafi jihadism. But he actually hated and was rather embarrassed by the traditional superstitious Islam of the peasant world.

And he wanted the state to transform Egyptians into modern, let's say, efficient people, people who could stand shoulder to shoulder with modern Westerners.

Aimen: Indeed, because don't forget, he is not a traditional theologian. He wasn't a theologian. He was, at the end of the day, the product of a modern education in Egypt. And he wanted Egyptians to master engineering, medicine, architecture, and the ability to start industry.

He really envisioned the industrial Egypt at some point in the future. And therefore, how can you have an industrial Egypt without industrious minds that are graduated from industrious schools? You can't do that from Al-Azhar. You have to have a proper education that is based on modern science.

Thomas: Romantic poet, utilitarian technocrat, that Sayyid Qutb at this time in his career, kind of seems to us a contradiction. But at the time, it was not a contradiction. There were a lot of such people around, as the new modern world was being forged out of the Great Depression and all the swirling political, geopolitical, economic and cultural chaos of the 1930s, which did not leave Egypt untouched.

And it is in that swirling Great Depression, inflicted chaos. That friend of the show, Fat Farouk arrived on the scene. Dear listeners, you remember Operation Fat Fucker from series three when Fat Farouk was ousted by the colonels, including Nasser, who would overthrow the monarchy in Egypt. That's down the line.

In 1936, aged only 16, a Fat Farouk became the king of Egypt. And at the time, nationalists, including people like Sayyid Qutb, I think at this time, he would still have considered himself a nationalist, had big hopes for Fat Farouk.

They thought that his father, King Fuad had capitulated too much to the British during his reign. And so, they hoped that King Farouk, who actually was not yet that fat, would tilt the balance back in favour of Egyptian sovereignty.

That very year, 1936, he did sign the Anglo Egyptian Treaty, which was seen as a step forward by Egyptian nationalists as it relegated British troops to the Suez Canal zone only.

But their high hopes for good old Fat Farouk didn't last long. They were particularly upset, especially I think the more conservative among them like Sayyid Qutb. They were particularly upset by King Farouk's notorious moral turpitude, if you could put it that way.

Aimen: Well Thomas, whatever fat hope that those nationalists had in Fat Farouk, unfortunately, that fat hope didn't materialise. You see, Farouk was a gluttonous, lecherous individual with a incredible appetite for oysters and women.

But nonetheless, of course, if you are going to do that in Egypt in the 1930s and 40s, remember that Egypt was at the time extremely stratified. I likened it to a pyramid, the Egypt of the 1930s and 40s, that many Egyptians right now romanticise as the age of the Cadillacs cars and the Mercedes-Benz, and the parties and all of this opulence.

This was only experienced by less than 2, 3% of the society. The rest of society was nothing but peasants. And this is why the anger towards Farouk's reinforcement of this stereotype of the detached elite, and the fact that he has immersed himself so indulgent in all of these vices has more or less disappointed his subjects who are growing weary with the fact that the world around them is changing.

There is a war, a world war about to happen. Just three years into his reign, King Farouk would see Egypt even being more controlled by the British to prevent the Suez Canal from falling into the Italians and the Germans. And with the world falling around them, the Egyptians didn't have that much confidence in their king. And his ability to rule.

Thomas: Qutb was certainly among those Egyptians. His thinking, which was appearing more and more often as essays in journals, he was becoming more well known as a writer, as a thinker. And in addition to his work as a poet and a novelist.

His thinking focused more and more on Turath, on heritage. And in his thinking about Egypt's Turath, its heritage, he characterised Egypt as having something uniquely spiritual and ethical about it.

And again, in this vein of thinking, he was not unlike a lot of continental European, especially thinkers at the time, thinkers who talked about how the spirit of a nation is a kind of metaphysical substance. And each nation has its own spirit that the nation must live truly by.

And especially in places like Germany, this kind of thinking was widespread. And in the same way that some thinkers at the time were talking about the German nation, Qutb was talking about the Egyptian nation.

Now, the difference, of course, is that Sayyid Qutb was a Muslim, and Islam can easily cut against European style ethnic nationalism because of the concept of the Ummah.

So, there's a tension at this time in Sayyid Qutb's thought. He's always talking about Egypt, Egypt's particularity, it's especially spiritual nature. He's also talking about the Islamic Ummah, the loss of the caliph and how Islam in general has this unique spirit against which the West is corruptive and corrosive.

So, there's a tension there that is going to be tipping more and more in the more Islamic direction as his life unfolds, especially thanks to a new movement that just at this time was gaining speed in Egypt. What movement, Aimen, am I talking about?

Aimen: Well, of course, since 1928, Egypt was going through a steady and well-organised spiritual transformation, especially among the middle classes and the upper middle classes, led by a man called Hassan al-Banna, who founded the Muslim Brotherhood.

Thomas: Hassan al-Banna. Again, dear listener, you'll recall that in the last series of Conflicted, we talked about Hassan al-Banna at some length. For now, I think Aimen, you'll agree, Hassan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb have a lot in common.

Like Qutb, for example, al-Banna was also a village boy who left the village to become a school teacher. He also attended the Dar al-Ulum in Cairo, the teacher training college.

He was also somewhat mystically inclined, but the differences are as vast as the similarities, because unlike Sayyid Qutb, Banna was always intensely pious. He didn't go through a similar phase of being a kind of literary figure, an aesthete hobnobbing with the new intellectual elite within Cairo.

He was always an intensely pious Muslim. And instead of becoming a man of letters, Banna became a preacher activist from a young age.

Aimen: Indeed. And this is why, while the two never met, you know that?

Thomas: Well, wait, I think we need to point out Aimen, Sayyid Qutb didn't join the Muslim Brotherhood until 1953. Much down the line. So, we're at least saying that the Muslim Brotherhood was in the air.

Aimen: So, while Hassan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb never met yet, when Sayyid Qutb would write about Hassan al-Banna in the future, he would write about him with reverence. And as if the two had met in real life.

Thomas: When Banna moved the Muslim Brotherhood Organization to Cairo in 1932, he adopted the full range of modern political means of spreading his movement.

Now, like Qutb, he had an almost populist admiration for the Egyptian people. Hassan al-Banna would talk a lot about the Egyptian people and their unique character as well.

And so, the means, the propaganda means, if you want to call them that, that he adopted did dovetail quite neatly with Nazi strategy to some extent.

And I think Aimen, there's even some indications that Hassan al-Banna would've been influenced by the example of the growing National Socialist Movement in Germany.

So, for example, Hassan al-Banna established the Rover Scout units instilling in young male recruits a sense of chivalry, Futuwwah, but very much along a kind of modern disciplined lines.

Aimen: It was there because you see, remember that it was the 1920s and 1930s, the political movements in Egypt and in Turkey and many other places when they see the success of Mussolini's fascists, and then later with Hitler's Nazis. To benefit from the experience of other movement, doesn't necessarily mean that you emulate them entirely. You just emulate the tactics.

I mean, just like Al-Qaeda used to teach us about the successful takeover of Cuba by Castro and Guevara, it doesn't mean basically that they lack these communists, of course, far from it. I mean, they would've killed them on the spot if they meet them. But it's just how to emulate in a successful strategy when you see it.

Thomas: And don't forget, Hassan al-Banna was not an ideologue. He really wasn't. He was a moral campaigner. He was a good political organiser. But his ideas, his religious ideas were more or less traditionally, fundamentalist Salafi ideas with some Sufi inflections, but he wasn't a brilliant ideologue.

And in fact, the Muslim Brotherhood at first didn't really possess an ideological program. This is something that people often don't quite get. The Muslim Brotherhood lacked an ideological superstructure until a bit later in its development when a certain Sayyid Qutb joined it.

Now, as I said, that's not going to happen until 1953. And at the time in the 1930s, we're still in the 30s. The Second World War is on the horizon. Sayyid Qutb was not attracted to the Muslim Brotherhood. He was still an aesthete. He was a literature.

He thought that writers and thinkers like himself would be able through their work, to organically influence the Egyptian nation, to embrace their ideas. He was not writing about politics per se, he was writing about cultural identity.

Aimen: His writings were more in defence of the Egyptian Muslim culture against what he sees as the European and Western decadence, and lack of morality, and the fact that such influences are corrupting the Egyptian society.

Remember, it was all written, not from a political point of view. It was all written from the perspective of culture, not from the perspective of politics.

And of course, was all written during the time when King Farouk, of course, was known for his extravagant, over the top, partying and drinking and famous gluttonous indulgence.

And I think it was more of an attack on the Western influences on the local culture, not necessarily, because basically he wanted to declare jihad against the West or anything like that.

Thomas: No, not at all. I mean, he was a cultural figure still, but within this sort of thinking about culture, spiritual things were creeping more and more into his writing. In fact, in the early 40s, he came under the influence of a French reactionary thinker called Alexis Carrell, who was actually a eugenicist. He had views that we would now consider to be really beyond the pale.

But at the time, he was a respected thinker, and he influenced Qutb, who began to argue that Western modernity was like the worship of the machine. He became obsessed with this idea that the western world worshipped machines and elevated machines over the spirit. Unlike Egypt, unlike Islam, unlike the East in general.

Aimen: Considering the technology that was existing in the 1930s and 40s. And he said that the West is worshipping machines. What would he say right now with AI? I mean, what would he say?

Thomas: But see, the thing, Aimen, is that this kind of talk about modernity is the worship of the machine against the human spirit is still very much with us. As we bring this episode towards its conclusion, I think that's where we should kind of be leaving it.

That Sayyid Qutb’s thinking, especially at this point in his career (before his Islamist turn), is still so powerfully persuasive to people. I mean, even to like people like me when I read what he has to say, criticising modernity, criticizing the Western modern civilization, it just resonates.

As you said at the beginning of this episode, the quote that I quoted could've been me at the end of last season, and it's true. You look around and you do think that the modern world does worship the machine. It is highly utilitarian. It is highly materialistic, and it does tend to gobble up, absorb, destroy, and neutralise all other cultures.

I mean, that just is true. Qutb isn't wrong. The question is he an asshole?

Aimen: Well, unfortunately it falls to me Thomas to defend the world and the modern world against fundamentalists like you, yeah.

Thomas: How do you defend it? I'm not saying I want to burn the world down. Not at all. I believe in God's providence. I believe that ultimately all will be well, and all manner of thing will be well.

But it's still kind of dispiriting living in this modern world, isn't it? I mean, it's a bit of a disappointment.

Aimen: Not necessarily seeing how many people lifted out of poverty, how many diseases has been cured, how many people no longer having to succumb to natural disasters because of a modern world. I mean, I would say the modern world is a blessing.

Thomas: Well, Aimen, honestly, you and I, we're never going to completely agree on this. How is it that I am being schooled in embracing the modern world by a former member of Al-Qaeda. The modern world will never, ever cease to amaze me.

Well, let's bring this episode to a close, Aimen. This first half of the life of Sayyid Qutb, this is the story of Sayyid Qutb before his Islamist turn. We're leaving him on the brink of the Second World War.

We're leaving him a fully paid-up member of Egypt's effendi class of bureaucrats. And its growing and powerful literary elite, its poets, its novelists, its literary critics, its thinkers.

He's firmly opposed to Western culture now because it seems to him to be undermining Egyptian culture. And he's about to link that complex of ideas to the complex of ideas that is emerging, and which is called Islamism, and which he will do more than anyone else to firmly and fully define.

[Music Playing]

So, that's where we'll leave him, a very much a 20th century figure. Very much a 1930s style reactionary figure. And when we come back to the next episode, we'll take up the story from the Second World War onwards as Sayyid Qutb will find himself propelled really into global and certainly Muslim superstardom as the chief ideologue of the Muslim Brotherhood. We'll see you next week. Stay tuned.

A reminder that you can follow the show over on Facebook and Twitter at MH Conflicted, and for a deeper dive into all the subjects we talk about here on Conflicted, head over to Facebook and search Conflicted Podcast Discussion Group.

There you will find other fans of the show engaging in heated debates, enlightening conversations, and just generally geeking out over Conflicted related topics.

Conflicted is a Message Heard production. This episode was produced and edited by Harry Stott. Sandra Ferrari is our executive producer. Our theme music is by Matt Huxley and Tom Biddle.

Conflicted S4 E8: Ibn Abdul Wahhab's Militant Mission (Part 2)

Speakers: Thomas Small & Aimen Dean

Thomas: Hey, Aimen. I've got a Hadith for you. Here it goes:

“Oh, God, bestow your blessings on Syria. Oh, God, bestow your blessings on Yemen. The people said, ‘Oh, messenger of God, what about Najd?’ The prophet replied, ‘There in Najd will occur earthquakes, trials, tribulations, and from there will appear the horn of Satan.”

This is a very popular Hadith amongst those who do not like the legacy of Muhammad Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab, Aimen. What do you think about that Hadith? I know what you're going to say, “It's fake.”

Aimen: Yeah, of course, Thomas. It was fake. You know why? Because neither Syria nor Yemen were part of the Muslim community at that time. So, why the prophet was blessing of places that are Christian, at that time.

Thomas: Well, that's true. As I say, people who do not like the legacy of Muhammad Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab, the subject of today's episode, the second in our two-part series on Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab. People who don't like his legacy, they love quoting this Hadith.

And they say, “You see, it was all foretold a prophecy from the prophet that from Najd would come the horn of Satan and would spread his evil influence across the land.”

[Music Playing]

In today's episode, we will be talking about earthquakes, trials, and tribulations, ones both caused and suffered by Muhammad Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab. Let's finish our story about the great and notorious Muslim thinker.

Aimen, where did we leave off? Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab had been in his hometown of al-Uyaynah, where he had initially won the support of its ruler, Uthmān ibn Muʿammar until the overlord of the Najd, the Emir of Al-Ahsa told ibn Muʿammar, “Get rid of that guy.”

After some notorious events, the burning down and destruction of the tomb of the second caliph, Umar's brother in Najd, the chopping down of a sacred grove of trees and the stoning to death of an adulterous who may have been the ruler of Al-Ahsa's own relative.

So, there we left him Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab, without that political protector that he thought he had found, seeking someone to rescue him from his distress. And who answered his call? Who, but the ruler of the tiny town of Dariyya, on the outskirts of another small town, slightly larger, Ar Riyad, Muhammad bin Saud.

I have a soft spot for Muhammad bin Saud. I don't know why. He was clearly a political visionary, or at least a very ambitious person.

Tell us, Aimen, you as a Saudi growing up there, what does the name Muhammad bin Saud the founder of the House of Saud, what does that name mean to you?

Aimen: Muhammad bin Saud, the founder of the first Saudi Kingdom, the founder of the Dynasty. And most importantly, without him, the mission of Muhammad Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab would have been a very invisible footnote in history.

Thomas: Oh dear. Suddenly, I don't like Muhammad bin Saud.

Aimen: Are you sure you're travelling to Saudi Arabia soon, Thomas?

Thomas: Oh, no, no. Shoot. Don't tell them. Don't tell them. I love Saudi Arabia. I have such a soft spot for the kingdom. And I also love Scotland. But when I think about their Puritan reformers, I think poor people, really, honestly.

Aimen: Indeed. When I think of Muhammad bin Saud in his town of Dariyya, a town of 40 houses, can you believe it? At the time, there were only 40 houses. That's it.

But then in 1744 when Muhammad Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab was expelled from Uyaynah, little did he know that his trip to Dariyya, that town of only 40 houses, and their Emir, Muhammad bin Saud in 1744, this journey would change the face of the Middle East forever.

Thomas: Absolutely.

Aimen: And would eventually lead to the restoration of Arabia into the centre of Islamic affairs after almost 14 centuries of absence.

Thomas: Absolutely. And it's true. Muhammad bin Saud, he must have been politically ambitious because Dariyya, despite being only 40 houses, was the second most powerful town in that part of the Najd, the part known as Al-ʿĀriḍ.

He probably would've relished the idea of unseating his great rival al-Uyaynah. So, when Uthmān ibn Muʿammar, the ruler of al-Uyaynah, expelled this “troublemaker” Muhammad Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab, Muhammad bin Saud thought, aha, here's my opportunity. I'll take him in, will provoke my rival in al-Uyaynah.

And it will perhaps help me to realise my ambition of becoming the chief of the Najd to unseat Uthmān ibn Muʿammar as chief of the Najd.

So, he agreed to lend Muhammad Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab his support. And as you say, yes, in 1744, Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab moved to Dariyya, and with him came several of his followers from al-Uyaynah.

They made what in their own minds was a Hijrah from al-Uyaynah to Dariyya. Because in the early stages now of ʿAbd al-Wahhab’s movement, his mission, he was really thinking of himself in terms of the Prophet Muhammad's own life. He thought that his life was mirroring Muhammad's life.

And this move from al-Uyaynah to Dariyya in his mind mirrored the prophet's Hijrah from Mecca to Medina back in the seventh century when the prophet finally received that political support he needed against his enemies all around in Arabia.

This is very much in Muhammad Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab's mind. Wouldn't you agree, Aimen?

Aimen: Indeed. This Hijrah, this migration, of course, just like the Hijrah of the Prophet Muhammad, from Mecca to Medina, would shape history. The same thing happened here. And the fact that Muhammad bin Saud offered Muhammad al-Wahhab his support, it also meant that this would strengthen Dariyya so much in extremely short space of time.

Because within months, the houses of Dariyya swelled from 40 to 70 to 100 to 200. Why? Because of the migration of so many of people who were supportive of this new movement, of this new mission, who were sympathetic to the teachings of Muhammad Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab. And this would inevitably lead to a clash with the other Emirates of Najd.

Thomas: That's true. It was going to provoke a reaction. But before we get to the reaction, let's remind the listener of Muhammad Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab’s teaching. Bin ʿAbd al-Wahhab himself summarised his teaching in a … well, I don’t know, they call it a letter, an epistle, an essay, whatever, a bit later on.

And I think it's a good summary. It's in Bunzel’s book Wahhabism. Again, I recommend it. And this is it in Bunzel's own translation, Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab wrote, “The Foundation of Islam and its principle are two commands. The first is the command to worship God alone, with no partner, to agitate for this, to show loyalty for the sake of it, and to pronounce Takfir on those who do not practise it.

The second command is to warn against associating other beings with God, to be harsh in this, to show enmity for the sake of it, and to pronounce Takfir on those who practise it.”

That emphasis on pronouncing Takfir is to some extent the theme of this episode. Takfir, calling someone a kafir, calling someone an unbeliever, and therefore laying them open to conquest, to forcibly submitting them to follow Islam.

This becomes the light motif of this half of Muhammad Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab’s life, which was devoted to jihad.

Aimen: One of the things we learned is that Tawheed-

Thomas: Monotheism.

Aimen: Yeah.

Thomas: The Declaration of God's unity. Yeah.

Aimen: Exactly. Tawheed is … bil- Jinan, I believe in the heart and a statement with words-

Thomas: On the lips.

Aimen: Yeah. On the lips. And an action with your limbs. So, your heart, your tongue, your limbs must all coordinate in order to show and to act and to believe.

Thomas: And part of that action is pronouncing Takfir upon those who do not pronounce or do not act in accordance with monotheism. But more than that, in Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab's mind, pronouncing Takfir upon those who refuse to pronounce Takfir on other people.

It's a cascading form of Takfir. Did you encounter this in the circles of Salafi Jihadists when you were with them? This Takfir, Takfir, and eventually you start pronouncing Takfir everywhere where you're left with yourself. There's just one none kafir, yourself.

Aimen: Goodness, I've seen it myself. This happened in Afghanistan. I remember that there was this person from Yemen who kept pronouncing Takfir against everyone and anything.

And to the point where basically says, “Look, I haven't yet pronounced Takfir on every kafir in this world, and until I pronounce Takfir against every kafir in this world, I am myself a kafir.”

So, he made Takfir against himself in the end, and it became reminiscent of schizophrenic paranoia. I mean, to be honest. And I think there was a relation to mental illness here.

But if you look at it from the point of view of Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab, he wanted to use Takfir as an instrument in order to herd the scholars of Najd into choosing a camp. Either you are on the side of those who want to enforce Tawheed, the unity of the divine, or you are on the part of those who want to spread shirk.

There can no longer be a peaceful coexistence between our side, which is the Tawheed and their side, which is the idolatry.

Thomas: Now, I'm going to be fair to Muhammad Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab here. Now, this is the only time I'm going to be fair to him.

Aimen: Surprise, surprise.

Thomas: So, it has to be said that though his preaching was very provocative, and his preaching inclined always in the direction of calling for jihad against people who would've thought themselves as Muslims already, he never explicitly called for jihad against them until they called for jihad against him.

So, to be fair to Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab, initially jihad for his mission and his movement and his followers was in self-defence because the scholars of Najd and beyond, they called for jihad against his mission first.

So, a great scholar in Mecca, according to Bunzel's translation, said, “It is incumbent on those Muslim rulers who are capable of doing so to restrain him, to hinder him until he repents of this horrific act.”

Another scholar in Mecca said, “He should be imprisoned, beaten, treated with medication for insanity. He is a misled misleader who should be killed and publicly denounced. If my hands could reach him, I would kill him, myself.”

And a scholar in Medina said, “It is a duty incumbent upon all who are able without delay to wage jihad against this sinner, and to do whatever it takes to kill him and free all people from his gross error.”

That's pretty provocative language. So, to this day, those scholars called Wahhabi, those Salafis who follow the teachings of Muhammad Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab say, “They started it. We didn't start it. They did.”

Aimen: Indeed. I mean, at the end of the day, if you look at the fact that when Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab was marching from Uyaynah to Dariyya, I don't think he had any ambitions to actually aid Ibn Saud to start a war of unification of Arabia. I don't think it came even close to his mind.

Because all he wanted is a place where his followers can congregate together and spread through preaching, the principles of Tawheed. However, war was waged against them because it was inevitable that there would be a clash.

Thomas: You're right, that the initial expansion of the Emirate of Dariyya under Muhammad bin Saud, after Muhammad Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab came there, was through preaching. So, Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab, now free to preach openly did so, and several settlements in the vicinity of Dariyya turned toward him.

They accepted his preaching and accepted Islam, if you like, from him, and therefore came under the rulership of his protector Muhammad bin Saud.

But as you say, because Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab’s teaching was inherently polarising, you're either with Tawheed, as I understand it, or you're against it. It led to Najdi politics initially to be polarised.

And taking a step back from the religious side of things and thinking it just in terms of politics, this is very interesting, because the Najd had never been unified. It hadn't even been polarised. It had been totally fragmented. It was a fractured polity.

So, in a way, looking just through a secular lens of political science, a fractured, fragmented area went from multiplicity of rule to duality of rule. So, in a way, you needed the pressure of something like Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab’s preaching to create a duality within this fragmented universe.

And then out of that duality, the clash of two could emerge, one unity and a state could emerge for the first time in 700 years.

Don't you find that dynamic quite interesting. It took a genius, if you like, like Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab and his religious preaching to motivate the political state building project in the Najd that it had long lacked.

Aimen: Indeed, there is no question. And it is murdering again, the life of the prophet Muhammad. Prophet Muhammad was born into blood bath Arabia in the year 570.

And the reality is that Arabia as a landmass was never, ever, ever incorporated or unified as a political entity at all. It was fragmented into 400 tribes and a few fiefdoms and kingdoms here and there, but that's it.

By the time of his death, he had both polarised and then unified Arabia under the banner of the new religion, Islam.

Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab also caused the same to happen in Najd. However, it didn't take one Muhammad, it took two Muhammads to do it: Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab, Ibn Saud.

Thomas: So, after the preaching began from Dariyya, after some of these settlements joined the movement and fell under the overlordship of Muhammad bin Saud, the first Emir in the Najd to oppose this movement was. And this is kind of ironic, given where history would end up going, the Emir of Riyadh.

Aimen: Daham bin Dawas.

Thomas: Yes, Daham bin Dawas, who’s actually funny. He was the most strenuous opponent to bin Saud, bin ʿAbd al-Wahhab and their movement. For 30 years war would rage between Riyadh and Dariyya, and they're right next to each other.

And it really does shed a light on the political nature of this process, because this is a rivalry between two Emirs who want to have overlordship in their region. And Daham bin Dawas fought really, really ruthlessly, remorselessly, endlessly to escape the ever-spreading power of bin ʿAbd al-Wahhab's mission.

So, he started it in a way by attacking one of the recently Wahhabized, if you like, towns, Manfuha. He attacked it in 1746. This elicited an immediate response from bin Saud and bin ʿAbd al-Wahhab fighting back against bin Dawas in the means of this fight back, which in their minds, they're now waging jihad in self-defence.

The mission spreads by the sword for the first time, and some nearby towns are forced to submit to bin Saud’s newly Wahhabized rule, including Huraymila, the town where bin ʿAbd al-Wahhab narrowly escaped an assassination attempt and was forced to flee from. And in that same year, al-Uyaynah.

Right away bin Saud, Muhammad bin Saud achieved his ambition of knocking his rival, Uthmān ibn Muʿammar, off his perch by conquering al-Uyaynah and forcing Uthmān ibn Muʿammar to submit to him and to Muhammad bin ʿAbd al-Wahhab.

Aimen: Indeed, although there was some reconciliation, as you know Abdulaziz bin Muhammad bin Saud married the daughter of Uthmān ibn Muʿammar.

Thomas: That’s right. Just like bin ʿAbd al-Wahhab himself had married Uthmān's aunt as a way of cementing a political alliance, the House of Saud and the House of Muʿammar, if you like. They cemented this new alliance through marriage.

And it raises the question of the unique partnership that Muhammad bin Saud and Muhammad bin ʿAbd al-Wahhab had. In the historical sources, when a town would submit to the mission, they would actually give the bay'ah to both men, both Muhammad bin Saud and Muhammad bin ʿAbd al-Wahhab.

So, there was an idea that the mission and the political polity that was spreading as a result of the mission was a duopoly, if you like, between political and a religious leader. The bay'ah was given to both of them, by which I mean the swearing of allegiance.

And traditionally in Islam, you give your bay'ah to the political power to the Emir. But at the beginning of the mission, at the beginning of the Najdi mission, the Wahhabi mission, the bay'ah was sworn to both men. And that is unique, and I think kind of revealing about the sense that this mission had of its religious, political destiny.

Aimen: To this day, this dynamic of having the political leadership on one side and the religious leadership on the other side, coexisting and working together for one mission still exists to this day among jihadi groups, whether it is Al-Qaeda or ISIS or any of the other, in even Hamas and the Taliban.

So, you will see that the overall command of the organisation is given to people who are competent in the fields of military and administration.

However, their religious command is given to those who are competent in the theological science. And this is where the two coexist sometime easily, sometime not so easily. And I think it's always tricky sometimes.

Thomas: In the runup to 9/11, in Al-Qaeda, there's something like a dynamic between Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab and Muhammad bin Saud, in the dynamic between Osama Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri and those Egyptians.

We talked about the tension within Al-Qaeda, between the Arabian and the Egyptian rulers, leadership. And I just sort of think there's a slight echo. Because Osama bin Laden, yes, he was a competent man of action. He performed to some extent in a military capacity in the jihad against the Soviets in Afghanistan.

But he was also a very persuasive and charismatic religious thinker and preacher. And so, he kind of had the leadership in a way which he shared with the Shura Council and the others who were more operationally inclined, more militarily inclined.

Is there some echo there, maybe, of what it would've been like inside the Wahhabi mission, the Najdi mission at the beginning as it began to expand?

Aimen: Well, of course, from the point of view of Muhammad ʿAbd al-Wahhab, the mission is about to purify Islam from the residue of idolatry, from the point of view of Ibn Saud, yes, he's doing that, but in the process, he is getting the divine reward of having to unify Najd for the first time in 700 years under his command.

So basically, he is getting the reward in the afterlife and in this life at the same time. He's getting a very good deal.

Thomas: Yeah, it is a win-win for him. It wasn't a win-win for poor Uthmān ibn Muʿammar, though he may have felt by submitting to Muhammad bin Saud in 1746 that he was going to save his skin.

But sadly, in 1750, Uthmān ibn Muʿammar was assassinated by a Wahhabi, by a follower of bin ʿAbd al-Wahhab. Now, the claim was that Uthmān ibn Muʿammar was planning a rebellion against the mission. It's possible.

According to the Western Scholars, there's no actual proof of this. And because Uthman had initially responded so favourably to bin ʿAbd al-Wahhab preaching, it strikes me as maybe unlikely. And that maybe this is just a question of politics.

If it's the case that Muhammad bin Saud was seeking to expand his authority over the Najd, Uthmān ibn Muʿammar was a problem, he would've stood in his way. He had been the foremost Emir of the area.

So, maybe that's why Uthmān ibn Muʿammar was assassinated in 1750. Nonetheless, he was assassinated.

And again, it's telling that after he was assassinated, the man who came to al-Uyanah to install a new political leader, there was not Muhammad bin Saud, it was Muhammad bin ʿAbd al-Wahhab. He came, he selected the leader, he put that leader in place.

Again, showing how the relationship between the religious and the political power at the beginning of the mission was a bit mixed.

Aimen: The line was very blurred, for sure.

Thomas: I wish I could say that the mission spread, unimpeded, unopposed. It's not the case. The very next year in 1751, Huraymila rebels. In the words of bin ʿAbd al-Wahhab, it apostatizes.

And this returns us to the fascinating character of Muhammad bin ʿAbd al-Wahhab’s brother Sulayman, because he was the chief jurist of Huraymila at the time.

And in the memory, Aimen, of Saudis today, of those who are Salafis in the tradition of Muhammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab, what does his brother Sulayman bin ʿAbd al-Wahhab, what sort of memory does he have in that tradition?

Aimen: If Muhammad bin ʿAbd al-Wahhab was a symbol of the light, Sulayman is a symbol of darkness. If Muhammad ʿAbd al-Wahhab was a symbol of purity, Sulayman is a symbol of apostasy, of selfishness and of putting his own jealousy and self-ambition above that of the good of the community.

Thomas: In 1753, Sulayman writes a number of letters to al-Uyaynah explaining where his brother Muhammad had gone wrong, had gone astray inviting them to join Huraymila in the rebellion against Muhammad bin Saud and Dariyya.

But the reason we even have these letters is because the men delivering the letters were apprehended by Dariyya agents, and on Muhammad bin ʿAbd al-Wahhab orders these men were executed. 

So, we see there's already a fierce war going on between the brothers. And at this point, from a self-defensive form of jihad, Muhammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab’s movement becomes an offensive jihad.

He explicitly calls the people of Huraymila, idolaters, mushrikeen, and even apostates, murtadeen. This is a very strong language, and it suggests that in his own mind, Muhammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab is about to wage a Ridda War like the early generation of Muslims.

So, he's still in that mentality that he is fighting the same fight that the early Muslims fought, and now it's Huraymila that must be brought to heal.

Aimen: As far as ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab was concerned, Huraymila under his brother's kind of command, Sulayman, rebelled and became an apostate settlement, and therefore it needed to be brought back to heal and brought back into the fold of Islam as he saw it.

So, he went with a thousand of Dariyya men. By the way, when we say a thousand, at that time, it was a big number in Najd. So, they went to Huraymila. And of course, there was a big battle between the two sides.

The people of Huraymila lost a hundred of their warriors to only seven. The Dariyya people lost only seven. That shows what formidable warriors they were.

Thomas: Yeah, no doubt. Huraymilah was outnumbered, but still animated by the zeal for the mission. Bin ʿAbd al-Wahhab, bin Saud’s warriors must have been very ferocious, very formidable.

Aimen: Exactly. And that resulted at the end of Sulayman, fleeing all the way to Al Zulfi. Al Zulfi is somewhere between Najd and Kuwait at the moment.

Thomas: In the north, yeah.

Aimen: In the north, yeah. The war waged between the two brothers for a bit. But then they tracked him all the way to Al Zulfi. Sulayman was track to Al Zulfi, and there he was captured, brought back to Dariyya, placed under house arrest for the rest of his life.

Thomas: Yeah. So, Muhammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab wasn't messing around. And I like the story of the war between the two brothers. It makes it very dramatic, very personal. It slightly reminds me of the story we told briefly a few episodes ago about the battle of the brothers, Amin and Ma’mun in the Abbasid period.

In this case Sulayman lost out. He was captured, he was placed under house arrest. He outlived his brother in the end, but he never emerged a free man again. That's what you got for opposing the mission of Muhammad Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab. And that brings us to the end of the first half of this episode.

When we come back, we'll tell the story of the continuing expansion of the Emirate of Dariyya, which didn't proceed as smoothly as you might think, and ended up really clashing with the big, bad guy of the Middle East, the Ottomans. Stay tuned for that.

[Music Playing]

We're back. We're racing on to the climax of our sweeping history of Muhammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab and his mission. When we left him, he had just tracked down his brother Sulayman and placed him under house arrest.

That effort actually took several decades during the period of time when the Emirate of Dariyya under the command of Muhammad bin Saud, and his descendants was spreading and meeting resistance initially amongst those towns in the Najd that they were incorporating into the mission.

So, in 1756, an area called Mehmal is conquered, and then different towns would apostatize. In the minds of Muhammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab towns would try to throw off Dariyya's rule, and therefore they would become apostates.

So, the Ridda Wars, the wars of apostasy were continuing, and in the midst of this, outside powers were going to get involved.

So, for example, in 1758, the greater power of Al Ahsa on the east, on the Persian Gulf Coast invaded, this helped to inspire the Emir of Riyadh, who was constantly fighting back and forth with Dariyya to continue his struggle.

This would go back and forth for decades. Thousands of lives would be lost in the course of these wars. But slowly, slowly, the Wahhabi mission, the Najdi mission, was spreading.

Aimen: Indeed, every time the Saudi — now we can call them the Saudi.

Thomas: Let's call them the Saudi. Yeah, exactly.

Aimen: Yeah. The Saudi forces would conquer a city or a settlement, the first thing that Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab would do is to assign one of his students, to be the scholar of the region in order to teach the people there the principles of Tawheed, the principles of the faith, and the creed as he saw fit.

Also, Dariyya in itself became the centre of learning, the new centre of learning for Najd. So, Najdi would be, scholars would be flocking into Dariyya in order to learn Islamic theology based on the purity of the faith as Muhammad bin ʿAbd al-Wahhab would have envisioned.

Thomas: In addition to inward migration of those who were attracted to bin ʿAbd al-Wahhab message, there was outward migration of those who were not attracted to it, and they left.

So, his campaign of purity was taking place. Najd was becoming a place purely in accordance with his mission.

Outsiders tried to do something about this. In 1764, there was a great invasion of the Najd from Najran, which is in the south of the current Saudi Arabia, sort of just above north of the mountains, separating Saudi Arabia from Yemen, Najran.

At that time, Najran was being led by an Ismaili Shia leader. And Najran has always been a little bit funny in Arabia, even at the time of the prophet, it was Christian, for example. So, Najran remained a little bit of had some outsider status.

At this time, it was Ismaili Shia. They invaded Najd and in a big battle south of Riyadh. The Saudis were decisively defeated. It was their first big experience of defeat. And this encouraged the leader in Al Ahsa in the East to invade, to take advantage of that moment of weakness to invade.

So, the leader of the Beni Khalled in Al Ahsa, who still considered themselves nominal overlords of Najd, they invaded. And during the course of their invasion, most of the Najdi towns that had joined the Saudi movement had joined the Wahhabi mission lent their support to Al Ahsa. So, it was a period of great setback for Dariyya.

Aimen: Muhammad bin Saud, in his great wisdom foresaw that by being the incubator of this new movement, Dariyya would be attacked no matter what. And therefore, he built walls around Dariyya. He made sure that Dariyya would become a fortress, a fortress that later in this episode, we'll explain, would withstand the test of time.

However, when the people of Najran, the Benu Yam, as we call them, when they defeated the Saudis in that battle south of Riyadh, and of course, the people of Al Ahsa and Beni Khalled decided to invade, they realised that as soon as they went to do to besiege it, that, oh, there is a wall. There is a wall that is very difficult to breach.

And therefore, what ensued after that was the siege of Dariyya and the siege eventually failed since these forces did not have the means or the know-how to breach the walls, and therefore, they retreated.

Thomas: They did retreat. It was the last great sort of event in Muhammad bin Saud’s life. He died the following year, and the leadership of the Emirate of Dariyya passed to his son Abdulaziz, who acquired the title of Imam.

So, the historical sources give him this title for the first time. Muhammad bin Saud is not known as Imam in the historical sources, but his son Abdulaziz is, and this is an indication of a development that's occurring within the movement.

We said that before the religious and political sides were existing in some kind of harmony, or maybe at times, who knows, behind the scenes a bit of tension. But with Abdulaziz's ascent to the throne, if you like, and especially with his son's later, ascent, a little while later, Saud, the political half of the relationship is asserting itself as preeminent.

They're calling themselves Imams. They are the leaders of the mission and Muhammad bin ʿAbd al-Wahhab and his followers, especially his sons and grandsons, the Al ash-Sheik, as they would be known, are supporting the House of Saud.

And this dynamic crystallises at this time, following Muhammad bin Saud’s death, where at the top is the House of Saud, and they're being supported by the House of the Sheikh. Is that about getting it right, Aimen, would you say?

Aimen: Indeed. I mean, there is no question that Abdulaziz bin Saud became the first one to be called Imam among the leaders of the Saudi dynasty.

And in fact, to this day, the Saudis believe that the founding day of their dynasty is 1727, not 1744 when the pact happened between Muhammad bin Saud and Muhammad bin ʿAbd al-Wahhab. No, they believe that the founding of their dynasty started when Muhammad bin Saud became the Emir of Dariyya in 1727.

Thomas: That is in itself a fascinating story. The recent reframing of Saudi history for grounding Muhammad bin Saud in giving Muhammad bin ʿAbd al-Wahhab, a supporting role is a fascinating story that says a lot about the way in which Saudi Arabia is going today. That's for another episode.

Back to Muhammad Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab and his story. When Abdulaziz becomes a mirror of Dariyya and becomes the Imam of the movement, the movement begins to really spread. And this is because, I would say for two reasons.

First of all, accepting Wahhabism, accepting the movement meant that you had to provide troops to the ongoing jihad. So, the dynamism of the movement and the inspiration that it inspired amongst the warriors was such that it gave them zeal, it gave them power.

But also, Imam Abdulaziz’s son Saud, was a great warrior. There's no question. One of the great warriors of the 18th century, and it would be under his first military and then political and military leadership that the Emirate of Dariyya would expand to encompass most of the peninsula, which would of course be very provocative to the great powers of the age.

First, between 1767 and 1786, ‘87, the whole of the Najd is finally and fully conquered when all the way up to Al-Ahl in the north, falls under the rule of the House of Saud.

And during that final campaign to unite the Najd around Dariyya’s rule, Qassim in the north was also conquered. And you get a sense from reading the sources that the warriors in the mission, the warriors who were inspired by Muhammad Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab, they saw themselves almost I think like avenging angels.

They were going out there to purify, to act as God's avengers. Maybe they're the original Avengers.

Aimen: Avengers assemble.

Thomas: Exactly. The Avengers of Dariyya are assembling and purifying Arabia from shirk, from idolatry, even though these were all Muslims. It's a very strange, strange thing. We've lost sight a little bit now of Muhammad Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab himself.

And I'd like to spend five minutes or so just chatting about him. At times, in his writings, he suggests that he was the recipient of, let's call it divine inspiration. I wouldn't want to say revelation, that would perhaps take it too far.

But there are moments where Muhammad Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab thinks of himself as the recipient of divine inspiration.

And we've said that he felt very strongly that he was following not just in the footsteps of the prophet, all Muslims are meant to follow in the prophet's footsteps. But that his life was a mirror of the prophet's life, that he was in fact, recapitulating the same dynamic of converting the world to Islam that the prophet had done a thousand and more years before.

What do you think about this? Try to put us, if you can, Aimen, into Muhammad Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab's own mind and describe his spirituality. What is his spirituality like? Because he clearly thinks that he's receiving some kind of guidance directly from God.

Aimen: Remember he believed himself to be, and still to this day many of the Salafi Najdi scholars believe this to be the case that he was the Mujaddid, the renewer.

Thomas: The renewer of the religion. Yeah.

Aimen: Indeed. There is a Hadith. It is disputed whether it is authentic or not, but there is a Hadith that every hundred years there is someone who God will guide and inspire to be their renewer of the faith.

Everyone believed Umar ibn Abd al-Aziz, one of the Umayyad caliphs to be the first one. Ahmad bin Hanbal was believed to be the second one. And Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab was believed to be one of the later ones. Even Ibn Taymiyyah was believed to be a Mujaddid because in a sense, they all coincided with the turn of a new Islamic century.

And therefore, Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab must have believed himself to be an inspired Mujaddid, an inspired renewer of the faith, because for him, he was always talking about the age of ignorance, the age of darkness, the fact that Najd and the rest of the Muslim world was plunged into the darkness of heresy.

And that the light of the pure faith is going to cast away all of these demons, and we will live again under a pure faith that is not polluted by all the heresies that has been imported from other religions and other sects.

Thomas: Now, this is a provocative question, Aimen. But when I'm thinking about the Dariyya mission at that time, and this rhetoric of purity and impurity, this rhetoric of Takfir against people who may think that they're Muslims but actually aren't because they don't understand Islam properly, they don't understand monotheism properly.

This invitation to people to come to Dariyya, to join the jihad there, it does remind me of ISIS. It's a provocative question, because I don't want to reduce the first Saudi state and the Emirate of Dariyya to ISIS. It's not true.

Because in fact, Dariyya witnessed a flowering of culture and learning at that time. The library in Dariyya became famed. Books were resourced from Yemen and elsewhere, and there's a lot more about the Emirate of Dariyya than just jihad.

But in some respects, the rhetoric, the self-identity of it reminds me of ISIS.

Aimen: It reminds you of ISIS because ISIS borrowed heavily from the legacy of Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab. They borrowed, however, the political side of it, they didn't borrow the religious side of it, because if they were really following exactly the footsteps of the religion, they will understand that there are guidelines and safeguards against pronouncing Takfir so randomly like this.

The pronunciation of Takfir, as far as Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab was concerned, was against the population in general, but not against the individuals in particular.

ISIS took it to the extreme where they pronounced Takfir against the population and the individuals, and therefore, every single individual within the population is treated as a kafir.

While with Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab, the Takfir wasn't designed in order to subjugate. The Takfir was designed in order to tell the people that you are in a way of error. You are outside the zone, please come back into the zone. While in ISIS case, you are outside the zone. I'm going to shoot you.

Thomas: That foreshadows in a way the next figure we're going to cover in this series of radical Muslim figures Sayyid Qutb. Because his influence on modern jihadism, and generally speaking, the Muslim brotherhood's influence is the other side.

Today we're talking about the Wahhabi dimension of radical Islam today. Next two episodes, we're going to talk about that Muslim brotherhood, Sayyid Qutb’s side. And that's really where ISIS's religious ideology comes from. I think you would agree.

As for Muhammad Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab the last recorded political act of his life is in 1787. So, he's seen the unification of the Najd under the Emirate of Dariyya. He doesn't know it, but just around the corner that Emirate is going to expand to include most of the Arabian Peninsula.

The last thing he did was he ordered his followers to swear allegiance, to give the bay’ah to Saud bin Abdulaziz, meaning that he would become the Imam after his father Abdulaziz's death.

And in 1792, Muhammad Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab died. It's funny, because we've been telling these stories of figures. I know. Ahmad bin Hanbal, Ibn Taymiyyah, they sort of died in tragic circumstances, both of them with a cloud over them of being — well, bin Hanbal had reconciled with the political authority, but he felt like he had compromised himself a bit. Ibn Taymiyyah died in prison.

But Muhammad Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab, his life was different. He died in glory in a way. At the moment of his death, the Emirate of Dariyya was strong, was going to get even stronger. This series is really about Muhammad Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab. He's now dead.

But I think it's important because though he died, let's say in his glory, within 20 years, the Emirate of Dariyya was going to experience tremendous catastrophe that followed upon an expansion.

So, in 1793, Al Ahsa in the East was annexed after decades of raiding parties from the Wahabi warriors. So, Al Ahsa would be routinely raided and subject to certain despoliation by the Najdi warriors.

But it was only in 1793, finally, that it was incorporated into the Emirate. At that point, the Emirate spreads north, or tries to, and begins attacking Iraq. Most notoriously in 1802, when the Najdi warriors raided the Shia Holy City of Karbala, they cause a lot of destruction there.

This event of the Wahhabi, if you like, despoliation of Karbala redounds to this day in the memory of the Shia, the Imam Saud was utterly unrepentant.

And then in 1803, the next year, Saud becomes Imam which is going to lend even more sort of force to the movement.

But tell the story, Aimen, of how his father Imam Abdulaziz died. It's directly related to the raid in Karbala.

Aimen: Well, of course, he was assassinated by a Shia from Iraq, who came all the way to Dariyya in order to avenge the sacking of Karbala and the destruction of the shrine of has Husayn.

And therefore, from the point of view of the followers of Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab, this echoes the assassination of the second caliph, Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb at the hand of a Persian, was avenging the conquest of the Persian Empire.

It's as if history is repeating itself again, and again, and again and again in the Middle East.

Thomas: And Imam Saud, he looked north at the Ottoman Empire especially, and he called them the room. He thought they were the Byzantines. He was back in the eighth century, the seventh and eighth centuries.

He was like Muhammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab had felt, I am living again, the early Salaf, the sort of the experience of the early Salaf. We are going to take the Romans, we're going to conquer the Ottomans in the north.

When he becomes Imam, the conquest of the Hejaz and the west of the peninsula where the holy cities are, was already being carried out in earnest. Saud entered Mecca later that year, 1803, he began destroying tombs.

He couldn't hold the city though, and they set their sights instead on Medina in 1805, they conquered Medina, destroyed tombs there. These are sending profound shockwaves of concern across the Muslim world. These are holy places in the minds of most Muslims at the time that the Wahhabis, the Saudis are destroying.

And then in 1806 Imam Saud conquered Mecca for good. And incorporated Mecca into the first Saudi state, the Emirate of Dariyya.

Well, tell us Aimen, how the Sultan in Istanbul would've greeted that piece of news. Very, very provocative.

Aimen: He wasn't happy about it at all. Of course, the Sultan in Istanbul was also carrying the title caliph. And therefore, how could you be the caliph and the custodian of the two holy mosques if the two holy mosques are not under your control?

And especially from their point of view, of course, remember that the Ottomans were Sufi Bektashis, which makes them idolaters in the eyes of the Wahhabi. But nonetheless the Sultan send a stern letter to Muhammad Ali Pasha.

Thomas: Yes. Our friend, the khedive of Egypt.

Aimen: The khudaywī of Egypt.

Thomas: Muhammad Ali. We talked about him a lot last season. This is the modernising leader of Egypt. A nominally under the Sultan's control, but very much a renegade doing his own thing. But still, the Sultan said, “Look, dude, you've got to help me out.”

Aimen: Indeed. So, Muhammad Ali Pasha mastered two armies, one under his son Ibrahim Pasha, and one under his other son, Pasha. So, he sent them to the Hejaz to rest it back in the 1810s, they arrested back from the Wahhabis.

Of course, there were so many battles, the Battle of Wadi Al-Safra, the Battle … goodness, there's so many battles happening there. And then after that, they moved to Al-Qassim.

Thomas: In the meantime, Imam Saud dies. So, the Emirate of Dariyya loses its military genius. His son Abdullah takes over. Not much is known about Abdullah. I think he's probably less of a military genius.

Aimen: I think it wasn't about being a military genius, it's the fact that he was facing an overwhelming force. I mean, the Ottomans came with roughly 50 pieces of artillery. And of course, with the modern muskets and rifles.

Thomas: That's right. All of the Ottoman generals by this point under Muhammad Ali had been trained by French generals of seasoned in the Napoleonic Wars. Napoleon himself had conquered Egypt and had begun that process of modernization, which we talked about in the last season. So, this is the force that the Wahhabis are now facing, a proper modernised military.

Aimen: Indeed, it was the battle between the old world and the new world. In 1818, Ibrahim Pasha and his army made it all the way with about 15,000 fighters to Dariyya. That's it. Now, they have been pushed all the way back to the beginning to where it all started.

But the walls of Dariyya withstood the artillery. Can you believe it? Dariyya withstood for six months.

However, with more Ottoman forces coming from Basrah, Imam Abdullah bin Saud saw the writing on the same walls that his great-grandfather built and decided to surrender.

Abdullah bin Saud surrendered, seeking good terms that the people of Dariyya would be allowed to leave unharmed to other settlements in Najd, including Riyadh.

And Ibrahim Pasha more or less honoured that, but as soon as they were out of Dariyya, Dariyya was raised to the ground, and the ruins of Dariyya to this day can be seen a testament to a small village of 40 houses that really conquered all of Arabia. The power of faith, the power of ideology, the power of one man's vision.

Thomas: Yes. Abdullah, the last Emir of the first Saudi state was taken to Istanbul and beheaded. And you would've thought that the story of Muhammad Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab and his mission would end there. It seemed pretty dark.

But as we know, that wasn't to be. Eventually the torch of the mission would be taken up again by the House of Saud, especially its greatest leader of all, King Abdulaziz in the early 20th century where the modern state of Saudi Arabia was reconstituted, really in the model of that first state, but with much greater, in my view, much greater wisdom, worldly wisdom, and even I would say religious wisdom than the first Saudi state.

So, Aimen, Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab’s legacy, it's mixed. But his predilection for pronouncing Takfir has left its mark, surely. It's left its mark on extremist movements today, on Salafi Jihadism today. I mean, in a way we can track that back to him.

Aimen: Indeed. I mean, in my opinion, while I revere the man, and I believe that the man more or less used the threat of Takfir and the threat of the pronunciation of Takfir, which is the excommunication against certain societies and settlements. He used it as a deterrence. He used it as a means to an end, not as an end in itself.

However, for me, why I'm uneasy about it is because while he might have had good intentions, in doing so, he might have been handing over grenades to toddlers like candy.

Because remember, Fatwa in Islam, Thomas, is a weapon with two edges, a two-edged sword. Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab should have known that what whatever he's writing would stay on forever, and that future generations could misuse whatever he is writing.

And therefore, the ease through which you can pronounce Takfir against the community, someone else down the line could come and use, not only in general, but in particular an order not to just threaten to excommunicate, but to excommunicate and then proceed on to commit atrocities.

Thomas: For me, I started these two episodes saying that for me, Mohammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab is a bad guy, and that I find it hard to like him. And it's true. I don't like him.

It's actually quite personal, because as I read about him and read some of his writings, I realised that Muhammad Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab hated me. Not just because I'm a Christian, really, in fact, he hated a lot of his fellow Muslims.

It's because he thought that the sort of spirituality that I practise every day of my life was idolatry. And for that reason, laid me open justly to murder.

I know in my heart that he was wrong about Tawheed. The oneness of God is not something that radically separates God from everything else. It is a oneness that he communicates to everything else. Granting us our unity as individual objects and uniting us all with each other.

And that there's a sort of cascading grace emanating from the divine that incorporates everything in its bounteous merciful bosom, and sometimes incorporates particularly holy figures and even places.

This is a Christian view. And every day I pray to saints, I and I go to church, and I participate in rituals in which material reality is saturated with divine, and yet God is one.

So, that's my beef with Muhammad Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab. He hates me. He is telling me that my spirituality is false, but he's wrong about that. I promise you, Aimen.

Aimen: Hallelujah. Hallelujah. Anyway, however, look, I will give you my solemn promise that he hated his fellow Muslims more than he hated you.

Thomas: That's good. That makes me feel a lot better.

Aimen: I tell you why. Because basically, for him, you are Ahl al-Kitāb, you are a Kitabi, you are someone who follow the book. But he would be classifying fellow Muslims who were practising idolatry in his eyes as below Jews and Christians. You are not someone who's trying to defile Islam and the faith. You are a fellow Kitabi, ironically.

Thomas: Even so, my sympathy goes out to the Muslims at that time who he did consider to be apostates. And despite the theological differences I have with such Muslims, the underlying metaphysical kind of conception of the divine and its oneness, that that underlies the spirituality is the same. It's shared.

And to that extent, my heart goes out to all those Muslims who found themselves on the other side of Muhammad Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab's fiery preaching.

Aimen: Indeed.

Thomas: Well, that is certainly a pregnant way to finish this telling of the life of Muhammad Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab. His legacy is, we can say, divided. On the one hand, it resulted in the kingdom of Saudi Arabia as it is today.

But on the other side, the legacy of Muhammad Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab became mixed and mingled with other modern reformist movements within Islam, specifically that known as the Muslim Brotherhood.

And so, in our next episode, we're going to tell the story of a great Muslim thinker from the 20th century, who's the one who mixed a bit of Mohammad Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab’s teaching with a bit of Muslim brotherhood teaching to create that very potent, very powerful ideological mix known as Salafi Jihadism.

[Music Playing]

I'm talking about Sayyid Qutb. It's going to be another really great history lesson, but a great story. Stay tuned. See you next time.

A reminder that you can follow the show over on Facebook and Twitter at MH Conflicted. And for a deeper dive into all the subjects we talk about here on Conflicted, head over to Facebook and search, Conflicted Podcast Discussion Group.

There you'll find other fans of the show engaging in heated debates, enlightening conversations, and just generally geeking out over Conflicted related topics.

Conflicted is a Message Heard production. This episode was produced and edited by Harry Stott. Sandra Ferrari is our executive producer. Our theme music is by Matt Huxley and Tom Biddle.

Conflicted S4 E7: Ibn Abdul Wahhab's Militant Mission (Part 1)

Speakers: Thomas Small & Aimen Dean

Thomas: Welcome back, dear listeners, Thomas Small here with another episode of Conflicted alongside my old friend, Aimen Dean.

Now, Aimen I want you to cast your mind back, if you will, to the early 18th century, to a small village in the desolate Najd Mountains desert of your home country, Saudi Arabia, to find a man whose radical preaching alienated many, but has stood the test of time.

A man who laid the theological foundation for the rise of the all-powerful House of Saud, a man whose vitriolic pronouncements against anyone who disagreed with his interpretation of Islam, continue to influence fundamentalist Muslims to this day. Aimen, I'm talking of course about?

Aimen: Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab.

Thomas: Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab, a controversial figure, Aimen. I hope you and I don't come to blows in this conversation. We have different views on the man. In the spirit of Christian charity, I'll start with you. In brief summary, what does the name Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab mean to you?

Aimen: For me, he's not controversial, Thomas. For me, he is someone who made my faith so simple.

Thomas: A simplifier, a purifier, if you will, of Islam.

Aimen: Exactly.

Thomas: Well, we're going to tell the life story of this man, Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab. And yet, the way that Aimen and I are going to tell the story is kind of diametrically opposed.

For Aimen, who reveres the man, ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab is a good guy. He's the hero of the story.

The way I'm going to tell the story is a little bit less positive. I sort of think of ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab as the bad guy. Our friendship will, Aimen, survive it, I'm sure. But it's going to be-

Aimen: Absolutely. No question.

[Music Playing]

Thomas: So, just continuing our exploration into the people who have set the historical template for fundamentalist Muslims today, this is the first of another pair of episodes on Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab. Let's jump right in.

Aimen: You know what, Thomas, in 2009, I was addressing a counter-terrorism conference where lots of those experts or pseudo experts, most of them, to be honest, but anyway, they were coming to listen to me talking about Al-Qaeda and terrorism at that time, and the election of Barack Obama and all of these things.

So, after the event, and after I gave my speech, one of those ladies who work in this space in counter-terrorism and counter violent extremism came to me while I was having Coke with some friends.

And she told me, “You know what, Mr. Dean, I really think that the greatest problem in the Sunni Muslim world are those wasabis.” And for me, it's like, excuse me, what?

Thomas: Sort of Samurai fundamentalists.

Aimen: Yeah. For me, it conjured into my mind the image of ninja Salafists. So, I said to her, “Excuse me, who?” “Wasabis, those who believe in Wasabism.” And I like, “Okay, you mean Wahhabis?” She said, “Oh, yeah, yeah, yeah, Wahhabis, sorry about that.”

But anyway, I think it brought to my attention at the time that really, I mean, in the minds of many people, even if they don't know what Wahhabism is or who the founder of the movement is, or when was it, or where was it? And yet the narrative among the industry experts at that time is that Wahhabism is at the core of the problem with extremism in the Muslim world that was driving terrorism.

Thomas: To prepare for this episode, I read Cole Bunzel’s excellent, recently released book called Wahhābism: The History of a Militant Islamic Movement.

And in it, he actually writes this. He says, “Wahhabism has become the Jihadi movement, ideological backbone, Wahhabi texts abound on Jihadi websites, and are frequently quoted by Jihadi scholars and leaders who see themselves as the proper heirs of the Wahhabi tradition.

There is, of course, more to Jihadi ideology than the pre-modern Wahhabi tradition. The influence of certain Muslim brotherhood ideas remains key. However, Wahhabism forms a crucial part of the ideology of modern Sunni Jihadism.”

That is true. It must be admitted, Aimen. I mean, when you were a young Jihadist, Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab was prevalent in the circles you were frequenting.

Aimen: Of course. No question. He was as prevalent as Ibn Taymiyyah, the scholar who we discussed in the previous episodes.

And this is why, for me, Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab was ever so present even in my childhood. My fellow friends from Saudi Arabia will remember that when you go into the middle school, The Book of Tawheed was part of the curriculum, a book, which was written by Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab as a statement of faith.

And it is really a small text, but memorising it was part of the curriculum in Saudi Arabia at that time.

Thomas: Yes. So, obviously ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab’s ideas were formative for you. And you mentioned Ibn Taymiyyah, whom as you said, yes, we've just covered in a couple of episodes.

So, dear listener, if you've been following along, we started this series with Ibn Hanbal, Ahmad ibn Hanbal, then we moved on to Ahmad ibn Taymiyyah, and today, Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab, a story really of kind of ever increasing radicalism and even militancy.

This isn't to criticise or castigate, it's just sort of objectively the case. Each scholar built on the one before him and moved the dial a little bit further in the direction of fundamentalism.

And in addition to their ideas, it's a story of progressive Jihad. In Ibn Hanbal’s time, the Jihad was against the Byzantine Empire. In ibn Taymiyyah’s time, the Jihad was against the Mongols, who at times were Sunni at times were Shia, so fellow Muslims in a way, but very much the other.

And as we'll see in ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab's, time, the Jihad took a further dimension, and it became, to some extent a Jihad against fellow Muslims, which is part of that dialling up of fundamentalism.

Aimen: Indeed. And as we progress through the episode, I want to offer in advance an apology to all my fellow Salafists that I am going to use the term Wahhabi and Wahhabism, not as a derogatory term, but as an academic term that has become more the mainstream way of referring to Salafists who follow Da'wah Najdiyah or the Najd mission as the followers of Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab would have called it at that time.

Thomas: I’m glad you brought that up. It is important to point out that that term Wahhabi was levelled against Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab and his followers at the time, by his enemies.

So, it began as a term, a derogatory term. In the eyes of Salafis today, it remains so. I will try as best I can to avoid the term, and I will use the term, the mission if I can. So, it's the mission. That's how they understood it.

So, to begin his story, Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab was born in 1703 in Al-Uyaynah, a very small town really at the time in what's called the Najd. We probably Aimen, should tell the listeners or remind the listeners about the Najd, this area in Central Arabia, part of the great Central Arabian Plateau.

I mean, we're talking about really a backwater in the early 18th century. No question.

Aimen: Indeed, it was a backwater. But you see, the Najd is a large area, almost as big as Egypt, as modern-day Egypt. It's huge. It is a plateau. I think the average elevation there is about 400 metres above sea level. So, it is dry, it is a desert with multiple oases appearing here and there.

Now, Najd because of its harsh environment, is sparsely populated. However, it used to be always at the beginning of Islam, let's say, about the fourth, fifth and sixth and seventh century Arabia used to be the home of some of the most notable tribes in Arabia, the tribes which give birth to legends in the fields of poetry, in the fields of knighthood and chivalry.

It was really the place of Banu Hanifa, Banu Tamim, Ghatafan, and many other of the tribes that we hear about. And this is why I would say that Najd just like the Hejaz were always part of the Arabian legend and folklore, and the lure where people always hear about these knights on their white horses and the beautiful Arabian horses, straddling the desert. Yes. That is Najd.

Thomas: That’s right. And at the start of the 18th century, when ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab was born, the Najd lay on the fringes of the Ottoman world. The Ottoman Empire was the great hegemonic power at the time.

But the Najd, and this is incredibly important to remember, the Najd was never conquered by the Ottomans, was never incorporated into the Ottoman state. And in fact, at the time, ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab was born, the Najd hadn't been properly incorporated into any larger imperial state structure since the 11th century.

So, not for 700 years had the Najd been part of a larger state structure. This, I think, is key to understanding the political and social and cultural dynamics of the Najd. It was very riven; it was very politically unstable. It was quite tribal. It just did not have the benefits of a state.

Aimen: Just imagine Frank Herbert's dune, Arrakis, this desert planet.

Thomas: The dune planet, yeah.

Aimen: The dune planet where Arrakis is such a desolate place. But the reality is that Najd was politically fractured and decentralised, and that's why they depended a lot on trading with the Ottoman Empire outposts such as Basra, Mecca, Medina, these places.

Thomas: So, what can we say about Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab himself? Let's talk about his ancestry. He was from the tribe, the Banu Tamim.

Aimen: Yes. He was from the clan of al wahhaba, from the tribe of Banu Tamim. So, he was a Tamimi. He comes from a good line of noble Arab tribes.

Thomas: The Al-Musharaf was his family line. And it was a scholarly family. H

Aimen: His father actually was a judge of al-Uyaynah. And his grandfather was a well-known Hanbali scholar in Najd.

Thomas: Yes. Like Ahmad bin Hanbal, like ibn Taymiyyah, Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab came from a good, established religious family with an exalted role in society.

And if you remember dear listener, back to last season, early on in last season, amen. And I discussed the difference within Arabia, between Al Hadara and Al Badawi.

So, if you remember this … we think quite popularly of Arabia as populated only by nomadic tribes living in the desert, moving around with camels and stuff. But that's not true. That's Al Badawi. That's one half of that society, Bedouin society.

The other half Al Hadara were settled in towns like al-Uyaynah and Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab and his family definitely come from that Al Hadara side of Arabia.

His mission, when it begins, was initially targeting the Hadara side of Arabia. So, it's actually not a Bedouin phenomenon, it's a civilised, settled phenomenon. That's the world that ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab grew up in.

Aimen: Indeed. He was an urbanist. He wasn't a nomad for sure.

Thomas: As you said, Aimen, his father, Abd al-Wahhab, was the chief jurist of al-Uyaynah, and he was a Hanbali, just like ibn Taymiyyah, just like to some extent, obviously Ahmad bin Hanbal.

So, we're still in the same line of Hanbali scholarship of the world of Islamic Hanbalism. Tell us Aimen, what ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab's education would've been like as a child.

Aimen: Well, he was lucky in the sense that his father was a judge. Therefore, his father was a learned man who taught him how to read and write from a young age.

And then a child like that, in a town like al-Uyaynah, they will have the grand mosque of the town. And in the grand mosque, they will have a zawi as they call it, basically.

Thomas: A corner.

Aimen: A corner. And in that corner, young kids will come to study how to read or write, how to recite the Quran, to learn about Islamic history, theology, the Hadith. So, the education was completely religious. There is no concept at the time of any form of secular education.

Thomas: And this is in line, not just with its education, but with its entire world. I mean, the Najd and the Islamic world, more generally was totally saturated with religion. It was a religious world.

So, when they read the Quran, when they read the Hadith, when they heard about angels, when they heard about jinn, when they heard about destiny and prophecy, when they heard about the threat of hell, the promise of heaven, the reality of the divine judgement, these things are concrete. They're real, in addition to the commands of God.

These aren't sort of like pieces of advice, that God says, if you'd like to follow this, feel free. Not at all. God's commands are absolute, total, and the failure to fulfil them is pretty disastrous for people. So, we're really in a religious world.

Now, Aimen why was the Hanbali School so dominant in the Najd? As we've said before, at that time, the Hanbali School was the minority school within Islam, the other schools of law, the Hanafis, the Malikis, the Shafi’is, they were much more prevalent.

The Hanbali School was a minority in Islam in general, but in the Najd, it was by far the majority school. Why was that?

Aimen: The prevalence of one particular school of jurisprudence over others was always subject to the prejudice of the leaders or the rulers of a specific territory.

So, for example, if in the great Indian subcontinent, the Mughals were partial towards Hanafi would become the prevalent school of jurisprudence.

In North Africa, the Moravids, or the al-Murabitun, Yusuf bin Tashfin and their founders, I mean, they became more partial towards Maliki School of Jurisprudence. So, the North Africa now is Maliki.

If you look at Saudi Arabia right now is Hanbali, but next door, Bahrain and next door, Abu Dhabi, which is part of the Emirates actually is Maliki.

So, that is why it is important to understand that it's according to the persuasion, the persuasion of the rulers of the day.

Najd more or less became Hanbali because it was adopted by nearby schools IN Basra and other centres of learning such as Al-Ahsa. And as a result, the Hanbali School of Jurisprudence became the dominant in Najd, not by design, but by accident.

Thomas: A salient point here is that there were no schools of higher education in the Najd. Najdi scholars, if they wanted really to get the highest, if they wanted their authority to be stamped with proper authority, they'd have to leave the Najd and travel abroad. Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab did the same thing.

Aimen: Indeed. First of all, we have to understand that from young age, he showed promise. He was sharp, definitely. He had a clear mind. He had a photographic memory and was able to memorise the Quran by the age of 16, and lots of the books of Hadith.

And also, at the same time, he started to impress with his debating skills and his fire-brand argumentative skills.

Thomas: Yeah, I can imagine that as a teenager, he must have had some pretty formative debates and conversations with his brother, Sulayman. This is to foreshadow an episode in his life down the line.

But Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab had a brother Sulayman, who like him, became a jurist, received a first-class education.

So, Muhammad and Sulayman together were growing up in these schools, and then Muhammad launched out into the great unknown. What cities did he go visit to learn the higher sciences?

Aimen: One of the cities he did travel to was Mecca in order to perform the Hajj, and also to learn at the hands of great scholars, including Muhammad Hayyat Sindhi. Muhammad Hayyat Sindhi was a Hanafi and was a Sufi to some extent.

And Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab would have studied alongside some other scholars like San’ani and al-Shami, who would later become Zaydis and would have been preaching, and judging according to Zaydi, kind of mild Shia persuasion in Yemen.

So, this is just to show basically the fact that he wasn't against the idea of learning from scholars who might have different persuasion from him. He just was someone who just wanted to learn. He had the thirst for learning and knowledge.

And then he went to Medina, where in Medina, this is where the influence of ibn Taymiyyah comes in handy.

Thomas: Ibn Taymiyyah.

Aimen: Absolutely. So, he studied with Shaykh Ali Effendi ad-Daghistani Al-Dimashqi.

Thomas: Al-Dimashqi, now dear listener, that means this guy is from Damascus.

Aimen: Absolutely.

Thomas: Where ibn Taymiyyah lived and died.

Aimen: Absolutely. So, ad-Daghistani Al-Dimashqi was pretty much influenced heavily by ibn Taymiyyah’s brand of Salafism. And he imparted that and imprinted that on his young, brand-new student, Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab. Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab spent considerable time with ad-Daghistani Al-Dimashqi in Medina. And then after that he travelled to Basra.

Thomas: Yeah, in Basra. So, I want to ask you about Basra. So, he spent most of his, let's say study abroad period in Basra. And in addition to the Sunni Hanbali schools there, Basra was of course, a great and important centre of Shia Islam.

And a lot of the sources suggest that it was there while he was living there, that he first, in a real way, came face-to-face with the practice of Shia Islam, which to him as an Najdi growing up in a Hanbali environment, would've seemed very foreign and in fact, very troubling.

Do you think Aimen, that that exposure to Shia Islam, their practices, especially of praying for intercession at the grave of descendants of the Prophet Muhammad, and in general, the Shia predilection for the bestowing sainthood upon their Imams and other such people and invoking them, would have really influenced Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab as he developed as a thinker?

Aimen: There is no question. It was Basra where he absolutely started this thinking of, well, this is not what I was taught that Islam was about. He encountered what he believed to be heresies. This is when he started to think that this is not Islam. This is shirk.

Thomas: Shirk, yeah. Sort of idolatry as the association of others, apart from God with divinity.

Aimen: Exactly.

Thomas: Idolatry. Let's call it idolatry.

Aimen: Idolatry, yeah. So, he believed that Shia Islam is just another form of idolatry being given Islamic wrapping.

Thomas: You’ll like this, Aimen. Bunzel in his book, Wahhabism, he quotes ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab from his sort of memoirs. And he says this about his time in Basra, ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab said, “Some of the idolaters of Basra would come to me,” now, he means Shia, “And relate their specious arguments to me.

As they were seated before me, I would say worship in its entirety is not valid, but to God alone. All of them would be astonished, and not a mouth would make a sound.”

I like that anecdote, because you have to ask yourself, why were they astonished? Were they astonished because of the power of his preaching? Or were they astonished because they thought, “Oh my God, we disagree, we don’t know what to say.” But certainly this preaching was provocative in Basra.

Aimen: His preaching was provocative. In fact, it became so provocative that they complained to the governor of Basra about him. And they went to the governor of Basra and told him, “You have to kick him out. You have to get rid of him.”

The governor of Basra, as well as the judge of Basra, both of them were Sunnis and were appointed by the Ottomans. So, they were-

Thomas: Yeah, the Basra was in the Ottoman Empire. So, it was part of the empire.

Aimen: Indeed. And they didn't give a damn really about what the Shia of Basra were thinking. He remained for few years after that incident with the Shia.

But however, the governor and the judge were changed. There is a new governor and judge, and at the same time, Najdi traders came to Basra. They recognized him. They warned the new governor, “Be careful, this guy will start to destroy your shrines and will call for the destruction of the holy shrines.”

So, they kicked him out. In fact, he was warned by the people in Basra that if you don't leave today, you will be dead. He left with his own clothes, and only by a kind shepherd, basically who took him in al-Zubair. And from there gave him enough food to go all the way to al-Ahsa.

Thomas: It's not clear exactly from the sources when ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab left Basra and returned home to the Najd. Probably when he was in his early 30S, he returned to the Najd specifically to the town of Huraimila, where his father, was now Chief Kadhi. So, his father in the meantime, had moved to Huraimila, became the chief judge of the town, and his son Muhammad joined him there.

At first ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab kept his head down. It's likely that he didn't want to upset his father or provoke his father, given what would happen down the line with his brother Sulayman, it's possible that Muhammad's father would not have appreciated Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab’s interpretation of Islam.

Nonetheless, for some reason, he didn't preach openly again until his father died. And his father died in 1741, when ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab was 38. And at that point, ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab again, began to preach openly.

And it is at this point that he wrote what would be his most influential text? The book you mentioned earlier, Aimen. The one that was part of your own education as a child in Saudi Arabia, Kitab at-Tawheed, the book of monotheism, the book of declaring God's unity, Tawheed.

Tell us a bit more about this book. I actually read it this morning, Aimen to prepare for this chat. It's not a long book. You can read it in a single sitting. And it's a weird book.

It doesn't contain arguments. It doesn't argue its case. It just presents passages from the scripture and the Hadith, put in a certain order, followed by bullet points, really, of pronouncements, or of topics, or of affirmations.

These are things we must affirm. There is no rational argument involved however, it just states it. Is that a fair way of characterising the book, Aimen?

Aimen: Exactly. Because at the end of the day, it is a statement, Kitab at-Tawheed, the book of divine unity is in itself a statement. A statement doesn't have to be that rational, but because from his point of view, this is the equivalent of stating the bleeding obvious. That there is only one God, and that he is a supreme being, and that this is what we need to know about him, so-

Thomas: Well, I don't know if anyone's ever perused Twitter, Islamic or even Christian Twitter. There are people who believe that the straightforward literal declaration of truth, the bleeding obvious is the religious way. I think it's part of that fundamentalist mentality that we talked about.

And reading the book of monotheism, Kitab at-Tawheed, ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab’s book, you get the sense that he definitely had that character trait.

But you also feel that it's not really a book that's meant simply to be read. I mean, I feel, and a lot of modern scholars agree with this, that it's more like a textbook. It's sort of a book that someone is meant to carry with them to a kind of a lesson.

And the topics in the lesson would be expanded upon by ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab himself. So, it's almost like saying, well, we'll talk about this, we'll talk about this, we'll talk about this.

So, presumably in his actual teaching, ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab did engage in argumentation and some sort of rational proof or whatever of his teachings. He can't simply have just stated things like that.

Aimen: Well, I tell you something, the reason why it was written this way, because he was dealing with Najdis at the time, Najd, the prevalent condition was illiteracy, not literacy.

And therefore, he needed a book that was easily read to people in bullet points in statements, littered with supporting texts from the Quran and the Hadith, that is easy to memorise.

Remember, I memorised it when I was young, and all of my fellow classmates memorised it, and it's easy to memorise. And so, the whole idea is that he wrote this book deliberately to be short, precise, concise statement of divine unity. That's it. And to be easily remembered.

Thomas: From the very beginning, we see how ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab was different from ibn Taymiyyah. So, ibn Taymiyyah was an incredibly verbose writer. He never tried to write succinctly in this way to appeal to the average person, to kind of indoctrinate them or to convince them to join a cause in that way.

Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab was much more, really much cleverer in launching a mission that would appeal to the masses by appealing to them directly in this simple, straightforward, easily memorisable way.

Now, he didn't initially have a huge amount of success, not in Huraimila in any rate. While he was there, he survived an assassination attempt. It's not clear what exactly happened.

Huraimila was notoriously politically unstable, ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab may have got enmeshed in that in some way. It definitely proved to him to be the wrong place to launch his mission.

And what he needed, and I'm sure you'll agree with this, Aimen. What he really needed and knew he needed was political backing.

So, having survived an assassination attempt in Huraimila, he moved back home to his hometown of al-Uyaynah.

And this is where we're going to take a quick break, having survived as an assassination attempt, Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab returns to his hometown of al-Uyaynah and is going to try to find a political backer to support his mission. We'll be right back.

[Music Playing]

We're back. We're telling the life story of Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab, that the time that we left him, he just survived an assassination attempt and therefore decided to up stakes and leave Huraimila and move to al-Uyaynah, where he grew up.

His reputation was already spreading. He'd written his book of monotheism. He'd written a number of letters, epistles, which were circulating around the Najd. Some of them had made their way to Basra, where Hanbali scholars, there were reading them, most of them at this point, with some alarm.

And he began to attract a certain amount of criticism from his fellow scholars. In fact, the scholars in Basra, having read his letters now, and this is important, not just the book of monotheism, which as we said before, his was brief and concise, and possibly, more or less uncontroversial, a straightforward statement of Islamic monotheism.

But his letters, in his essays that were also circulating, were much more detailed and much more sort of, let's say, severe. And the scholars in Basra called him Caliphate Iblis, Satan's Deputy.

And this is because in their mind, at least, ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab was denouncing in his letters, really normative Islamic practices. The same things that ibn Taymiyyah was complaining about in his day. Things like praying to the dead, frequenting shrines in order to pray to the dead, invoking saints.

All of this was shirk. All of this was idolatry in ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab's mind. But in the mind of his fellow scholars, including Hanbali scholars, this was not shirk, or at least not shirk, to the degree that ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab believed it.

So, Aimen, why do you feel that ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab felt so strongly as he did, that the Muslim world had descended into shirk?

Aimen: Okay, I will argue from his point of view, and I will be the devil's advocates here. So, I'm going to play the devil's advocate.

From his mind, is that “I am reading the Quran. I've learned the Quran by heart as a young Muslim growing up in Najd. And the Quran tells me, worship none, but God. You don't read anything about saints. It says to you, pray only to God.

I don't see anything about graves or shrines. It tells you that the dead cannot help you. That's what the Quran says very clearly. And yet, people go and seek help from the dead.”

So, for him, he sees a big contradiction between what he's reading in the text and what he's seeing outside.

And then he realised that he's reading the story of the golden calf and the Israelites, after they have been saved from Pharaoh and his army, and they are there in Sinai still seeking to some extent a manifestation, a worldly manifestation of the divine in the calf.

So, he says, “Again, we are back to the days of jāhiliyya,” or what he calls it, the age of ignorance.

Thomas: Yeah. Later on, he would write in a letter. This is ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab wrote this “What most people of the earth profess from east to west is idolatry, is shirk. That which is being performed in the Hijaz, in Basra, in Iraq, and in Yemen. This is shirk.”

He became convinced that he was living in a time like the prophet's own time, where everyone around him was an idolater. And he needed to launch a mission, inviting them to join Islam. A very weird position for a Sunni Muslim to adopt in a world in which everyone around him was a Muslim.

Aimen: And a Sunni at the time, especially in Najd. While ibn Taymiyyah would pronounce takfir on certain acts, not on people. He would describe an act as a shirk, but he wouldn't call the people idolaters.

So, he would basically call, this is an act of idolatry. But he wouldn't describe the people as pagans or idolaters. He will call them sinful Muslims. That's it. He wouldn't excommunicate them from the zone of Islam.

However, for some reason, ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab took this to a greater extent where he started to pronounce takfir not on the act, but on the general population that were practising this act.

Thomas: I'm glad you brought up ibn Taymiyyah, because ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab’s detractors amongst the Sunni scholars who began to argue against him, they brought up ibn Taymiyyah a lot. Even the Hanbali ones for whom ibn Taymiyyah was not a hated figure, they accepted him as a revered thinker.

Though they were always slightly cautious about him because they knew the power of his preaching, the power of his rhetoric could incline people towards radicalism.

But the scholars who encountered ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab teaching and were rather shocked by it, they kept saying, “This man is following in the footsteps of IBN Taymiyyah. He is slavishly adopting the perverted doctrines of ibn Taymiyyah.”

So, ibn Taymiyyah in their minds had mostly good things to say, but some bad things to say all about shirk, all about what constitutes shirk and how to respond to shirk and ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab took it even to the next level.

Now, when we left him, he'd just survived an assassination attempt. He'd moved to al-Uyaynah, and he was in pursuit of political backing. Explain in general, Aimen, why someone like ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab would seek a political backer.

Aimen: Well, he would be following in the same footsteps of the Prophet Muhammad. Because at the end of the day, when the Prophet Muhammad found that he was prevented from fulfilling his mission by his tribe, Quraysh in Mecca, he started to seek the protection of other tribes.

He started with Taif, they rejected him, but then the people of Medina accepted him. And so, the whole issue is that I am on a mission, Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab, just like his namesake, the Prophet Muhammad, basically he believed that he is on a mission.

And I can't fulfil my mission if I am to be hounded, persecuted, and possibly killed by assassins, I need someone to protect me. And only with that power, I could actually achieve the goals of my mission.

Thomas: I'm so glad that you brought up the Prophet Muhammad in his life, because in the next episode, we're going to talk at length about the ways in which Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab felt that his life mirrored the prophet's life, and how important that was to ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab.

And yes, you're totally right. Like the prophet who was forced to flee from his hometown of Mecca to Medina to receive sanctuary, ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab, would find himself forced to flee to find sanctuary.

Ironically, he first hoped he might find it in his hometown, al-Uyaynah. And the man who he first hoped might offer him the political backing and protection he needed was a man called Uthmān ibn Muʿammar.

He was the ruler of al-Uyaynah, which was the chief town in the Najd at the time. So, he was the strongest ruler in the Najd. So, ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab was like, great, this is exactly what I need.

And even better, quite quickly, ibn Muʿammar, the leader of al-Uyaynah, lent ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab his support to the extent that ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab, even married Uthmān ibn Muʿammar's aunt.

So, in the Najd, that would've been a sign of a very close political alliance. So, Uthmān ibn Muʿammar must have really thought, “Okay, I've got what I need here, a political backer who's supporting my mission.”

And indeed, he did support his mission, and he lent his mission, sort of real support, which led to an initial, quite notorious event in the minds and memories of Muslims. And at the time, a shocking event when Uthmān ibn Muʿammar and ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab together, they destroyed a tomb, a tomb that at the time was considered to be very sacred.

The tomb of Zayd ibn al-Khaṭṭāb, the brother of the second Caliph of Islam, Umar. Now, Aimen tell us this story and explain why this would've been shocking to Muslims at the time and remains so in the memories of the people who don't like Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab to this day.

Aimen: Zayd ibn al-Khaṭṭāb is one of the prophet's, early disciples. His brother would later become the second Caliph, Umar ibn al-Khattab.

And Zayd was killed during the wars of the apostasy in Najd, which happened just months after the Prophet Muhammad's death.

Thomas: Yes, these are known as the Ridda Wars. The wars of apostasy.

Aimen: Absolutely. And so, therefore, this is why his tomb is in Najd. In later years, it became a place of reverence, of worship. And people were coming to seek blessings. Sick people were coming, seeking healing, women coming to seek divine help to get married and pregnant.

And of course, there were some shrine servants who would basically get the donations from the people and all of that. So, for Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab, for him, this is idolatry. This is not exactly a place of worship that was ordained by God. Therefore, it must go. Not ordained, must go. That's it. This is the attitude that he adopted.

When Uthmān ibn Muʿammar, the chief of Uyaynah, when he showed up at the shrine of Zayd ibn al-Khaṭṭāb with his men, and of course with them, Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab himself, and they announced their intention to destroy the shrine. They were evacuating everyone from inside, and they were telling them to stand back.

So, those caretakers, the priests, those who are serving the shrine, they were warning everyone there, ibn Muʿammar and ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab, they were warning them, “God will smite your hands. God will strike you down, will paralyse you if you dare to do anything.”

Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab noticed that ibn Muʿammar's men were hesitant. However, he took the shovel and started attacking the shrine, and started with the dome. He climbed to the dome and started destroying it from the top.

And of course, the ibn Muʿammar men, when they saw that nothing was happening to the guy, he was just looking and laughing at the priests of the shrine, they joined in and in no time, it was levelled to the ground.

And they made sure that the original grave would be according to what ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab described as the Sunnah, as the Hadith. Just two hands, if you look at your own palm, two palms above the ground, that's it. This is how a grave should be raised above the ground. That's it. This is the Sunnah.

And of course, this sent a shockwave across all of Najd and beyond, all the way to Mecca and Medina and the Hijaz, the shrine of Zayd ibn al-Khaṭṭāb was destroyed. And they didn't stop at that, the trees.

Thomas: Yeah, that's true. There was also a grove of sacred trees in the area that they chopped down, trees where women just like to the grave that they destroyed, women would go hang little strips of paper or whatever, strips of things on the tree, pray to the tree, the spirit of the tree in order to get them pregnant and stuff.

This is a very much more straightforward form of maybe pre-Islamic superstition, that they were still practising there. And Uthmān ibn Muʿammar and ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab chopped down the grove of trees.

And again, there was no divine retribution from heaven. So, they must have felt buoyed up by conviction that they were on the right path.

It reminds me, this story reminds me of stories from the Protestant Reformation in Europe when men like John Knox, in Scotland, for example, were going around inveighing against statues in cathedrals, inveighing against bishops, inveighing against the cult of saints, and knocking down statues, knocking down whole cathedrals, digging up the relics of saints, burning them, destroying them.

So, it brings to mind that early modern movement in Europe. And I'm an orthodox Christian, as you know, Aimen. That kind of stuff rather upsets me, I don't like the idea of it at all, as it would've upset a lot of the locals in the Najd in the early 18th century, or more the mid-18th century.

Aimen: Actually, it's beyond Najd, actually. That news reached all the way to the ruler of al-Ahsa.

Thomas: Which is on the east coast of the current Saudi Arabia, along the Persian or Arabian Gulf.

Aimen: Yeah, indeed.

Thomas: The great region of al-Ahsa, which at that time claimed some over lordship, over Najd, very, very loosely organised, but they claimed to have over lordship, over the nudged, and to be able to dictate terms to the Umara, the emirs of the Najd.

So yes, as you say in al-Ahsa, they were like, what the hell is going on? The tomb of the brother of the second caliph has been destroyed by these maniacs.

Aimen: Indeed, even Emir al-Ahsa, the powerful leader of that huge oasis, Emirate, sent a very strong worded letter to Uthmān ibn Muʿammar saying that, if you don't kick Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab and get rid of him, I'm going to cut your trade revenues from al-Ahsa.

At the beginning Uthmān ibn Muʿammar refused, he would stood his ground and said, no, I'm not going to kick Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab. However, a delegation from Najd went again to al-Ahsa and asked its powerful ruler to send another letter and another threat. And this time it worked.

Thomas: It did. This is all wrapped up in another story from that time in ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab's life when confessed adulterous, so a woman who committed adultery, confessed to it, was stoned in al-Uyaynah.

This also sent shockwaves around the Najd and beyond, because obviously, the execution method of stoning to this day is very controversial in Islam. You yourself, Aimen, have said on this podcast that stoning is not part of the Sharia. It's a misinterpretation of spurious Hadith.

And yet, in Uyaynah this happened, this woman who confessed to adultery and in a way must have known that she was going to be at the receiving end of some pretty harsh discipline, was stoned.

And as a result of this, in addition to the previous destruction of the tomb and the trees and the basic tenor of ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab’s preaching, the leader of al-Ahsa, the leader of the Béni Khalled tribe, there ordered ibn Muʿammar to expel him from al-Uyaynah. And he did.

One funny thing is that later on, Salafi historians in the Najd those who followed ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab, the Wahhabis, let us say, they actually said that the leader of al-Ahsa was offended by the story of the stoning of the adulterers because he himself was a notorious fornicator.

And he felt personally offended that such an extreme punishment was meted out to someone accused of fornication.

Aimen: However, there is actually another reason. Historians, later historians actually realised that she was related to him.

Thomas: She was related to the leader of al-Ahsa.

Aimen: Yes.

Thomas: Oh, even worse. Oh, ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab chose the wrong woman to stone.

Aimen: Indeed, indeed. Maybe he was stoned when he did it, but nonetheless.

Thomas: Haram, how dare you cast such calumny across such a wonderful man.

Aimen: It's an innocent joke. But nonetheless, I would reiterate here again, my own personal belief that the Quran from cover to cover does not contain one single verse that says that there is a stoning for any crime whatsoever.

Thomas: It goes to show you that ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab’s mentality, his ideas were not informed strictly by a literal interpretation of the Quran. There was something else underlying it, the Hadith, but also a mentality.

He was making what we would think of as moderate Islam tantamount to apostasy. This wasn't entirely new, as we've said, ibn Taymiyyah had argued something similar, but ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab was expanding its scope.

As a result, he was kicked out of al-Uyaynah. The question is, where would he go? We're going to leave this episode there, because there's a huge turning point around the corner in ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab’s life, and not just his life, but in the history of the world, which we will of course discuss in our next episode.

But before we go, I do want to just discuss with you, Aimen, this question. So, in Bunzel's book, this great book, it's recently released. It's called Wahhabism. You really should read it, everyone. It's a great book.

He writes, “Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab’s ambition was revolutionary. He was seeking to demolish the religious status quo in Najd and re-establish in its place a commitment to true Islam as he understood it.”

And Bunzel calling ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab, a revolutionary made me think about this idea that we've been discussing, the radical mentality, the fundamentalist mentality, because moving our view to the present day, and actually away from the Muslim world and towards the West, we see movements around animated by a similar spirit, looking around and seeing that everything about Western society is tainted by things like, racism, colonialism.

All of these, a kind of resurgence of radical left-wing, certainly not religious, quite secular ideology, but animated by a revolutionary spirit that seeks to destroy the status quo and replace something pure in its place.

It's funny because it gets back to personality, to mentality. I feel that ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab had this personality in spades. And if we return to the Lebowski principle of exegesis, you're not wrong, you're an asshole. To me, ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab inclines towards you're not right, you're just an asshole. But I know Aimen, that you disagree with that.

Aimen: I disagree to the sense that I believe he was misunderstood and that he was the product of his time. He was brilliant, but unfortunately, just like a knife, he had two edges.

[Music Playing]

Thomas: Well, we are going out here all about the two edges of the knife called Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab in our next episode, when out of the blue, a knight in shining armour comes to his rescue. And of course, I'm talking about the founder of the notorious and all-powerful dynasty, the House of Saud. In our next episode, stay tuned.

A reminder that you can follow the show over on Facebook and Twitter at MH Conflicted and for a deeper dive into all the subjects we talk about here on Conflicted, head over to Facebook and search Conflicted Podcast Discussion Group.

There you'll find other fans of the show engaging in heated debates, enlightening conversations, and just generally geeking out over Conflicted related topics.

Conflicted is a Message Heard production. This episode was produced and edited by Harry Stott. Sandra Ferrari is our executive producer. Our theme music is by Matt Huxley and Tom Biddle.

Conflicted S4 E6: The Firebrand from Damascus (Part 2)

Speakers: Thomas Small & Aimen Dean

Thomas: Welcome back to Conflicted. Thomas Small, here with you, alongside my ever-present co-host, Aimen Dean.

Aimen: Hello, everyone.

Thomas: Now, this is the second part of our exploration into the thrilling life of one of the most significant historical antecedents to modern day Salafi Jihadists, Ibn Taymiyyah.

Like Middle Easterners today, Ibn Taymiyyah lived in a time of change, upheaval and chaos. Mongols invading from the outside and from within, heretics and charlatans preying on the faithful.

Aimen: And into the rescue, here comes Martin Luther, who will purify, oh, sorry, Ibn Taymiyyah who will purify Islam from all the polluted evil.

Thomas: Yeah, it's true. Ibn Taymiyyah, he's a sort of Muslim Protestant like so many Salafists, I think.

[Music Playing]

Last time we left Ibn Taymiyyah with yet another Mongol Invasion poised to begin. So, without further ado, let's get right back into it.

Right, Aimen. So, one of Ibn Taymiyyah’s many disciples, a man called al-Dhahabi, someone who in the end turned against the master, he decided that Ibn Taymiyyah was a bit too extreme for his liking.

He wrote this, and I like it, “To one group of scholars, Ibn Taymiyyah was a devil, a liar, and an unbeliever. To other learned and esteemed men, he was an excellent and skilled innovator.

To yet others, he was a dark and sinister figure. And yet, to the great majority of his followers, he was the guardian of the religion, the bearer of the banner of Islam and the protector of the prophetic Sunnah.”

I think that's quite succinct. It shows you how controversial Ibn Taymiyyah was, even in his own day. Some thought he was the devil. Some thought he was the great protector of the religion.

Aimen: Well, I mean, it shows you, you can't please all the people all the time. And I don't think Ibn Taymiyyah was a crowd pleaser or people's pleaser.

The man spoke his mind and his mind was sharp, as was his tongue, as was his pen for that matter. And this is why he used to earn as many enemies as friends. While some people might say his mind was in the right place, his heart wasn't.

Thomas: As you say, he may not have set out to please the people, but he certainly became adept at whipping up the masses into something like a radical frenzy. The mature Ibn Taymiyyah in the full force of his power as a rhetorician, as a thinker, as a writer, has been described as animated by a zeal against irreligion, zeal against irreligion.

I think that's a great way of describing Ibn Taymiyyah at this phase of his life, when he is confident, when he is absolutely determined to resist the Mongol onslaught from without, and to purge wickedness, heresy, innovation from within.

He was a formidable figure, wouldn't you say, Aimen?

Aimen: He was a formidable figure because he was a genius. And no matter what we think about him, he was a genius. And I suspect he was either ASD or OCD, in a way, there was something there about him that could be more of a savant.

The man was a genius in the sense that he was able to master many arts apart from theology, mathematics, philosophy, as well as astronomy.

Many listeners would be amazed by the fact that in his book, Ar-Risalah he in fact was able to calculate the timings of the next eclipses of the sun and the moon to prove a point not only that the earth is round, and it actually orbits the sun and the moon is orbiting the earth in order to prove that this is how the sun and the moon eclipses take place.

So, you can see his brilliance, but unfortunately, brilliance wasted on endless battles that were pointless.

Thomas: We're going to cover lots of those battles in this episode. You call him a genius. A genius, he certainly was. Often, Ibn Taymiyyah’s writing seem like they contradict each other or that they can somehow come across as quite incoherent.

Ibn Taymiyyah wasn't a great systematic thinker. He was a responsive, instinctive, reactionary thinker, very brilliant, quick to summon arguments in favour of whatever he was advocating.

But for that reason, nowadays, people can cherry pick quite easily bits and pieces from Ibn Taymiyyah's writings to justify their own beliefs. Because Ibn Taymiyyah in a way, can be used to justify anything because he was such a voluminous, kind of contradictory genius mind. Does that make sense, Aimen?

Aimen: He was, Thomas. Ibn Taymiyyah’s genius, and the contradictions that are contained within this genius are not surprising because basically Ibn Taymiyyah mastered the art of writing essays.

Now, because these essays span his life, his adult life, and span many different political and military upheavals that were taking place, they are bound to contain a lot of contradictions.

Thomas: Well, genius minds like Ibn Taymiyyah’s, like yours, Aimen. Maybe like mine, we often contradict each other. We get so excited; we just start spewing forth whatever comes to our heads.

Aimen: Indeed. I mean goodness, Thomas, no one will find two more modest people like us. We ooze modesty.

Thomas: No, I think I'm the most humble. I should get an award for being so humble.

Aimen: Indeed.

Thomas: Let's get back into the story of Ibn Taymiyyah. So, we left him in 1301. The Mongols are about to invade Syria again, like before Armenian Christians are among the ranks, but this time Crusaders from Cyprus are also in the Mongol army. This is a real bad situation.

Ibn Taymiyyah, once again, he mounts the pulpit in Damascus. He preaches Jihad again, and he writes the second of his three notorious anti-Mongol fatwas.

But this time he takes things a bit further. He travels to Cairo the capital of the Mamluk Empire, and he meets with a Mamluk Sultan himself, Al-Nasir Muhammad the Sultan is only 16-years-old, mind you.

And according to the historical sources, he confronts the Sultan directly. And he says this, “If you turn away from Syria and its protection, we will raise up a Sultan for it who will care for it, who will protect it, and who will develop it securely.”

I find that really fascinating, Aimen. Because if it's true, then it's an indication Ibn Taymiyyah would have considered rebellion against the sitting ruler.

Now, he never actually openly advocated anything like that, but Salafi Jihadists today, certainly do. And this is not in keeping with Sharia as it is classically understood, to rebel against a sitting ruler.

Aimen: In fact, Thomas, this particular incident between Ibn Taymiyyah and Sultan Al-Nasir Muhammad is always taken as a clear evidential text from Ibn Taymiyyah's life that if the Sultan or the head of the state of Muslims were to abandon their duty of waging Jihad against the enemy, then it is up to the scholars and the ordinary people to actually depose that Sultan and remove him from power and install someone else in his place who will do the duty.

In fact, I remember that Osama bin Laden in one of his Friday prayers in Afghanistan when he was preaching, he said this incident between Ibn Taymiyyah and Sultan Al-Nasir Muhammad, where he told him, either you do your duty of Jihad or we will find someone else who will do, this proves that the older outdated Sunni principle that there is no Jihad without an Imam, in other words, only the Imam can sanction Jihad is outdated.

In fact, Ibn Taymiyyah’s position is that there is no Imam without Jihad.

Thomas: Well, Ibn Taymiyyah’s intervention in this case and his fatwas must have worked. So, when a diplomatic mission from the Mongol leader, Ghazan Khan arrived in Cairo that summer, the summer of 1301, demanding the Mamluks surrender, they refused.

Aimen: Not only did the Mamluks refuse the Mongols demands, they in fact insulted them in the same way with the same language that Ibn Taymiyyah used against them in his fatwas. They called them heretics, they called them Zandik, which means a heretical innovator. And so, it showed that Ibn Taymiyyah's rhetoric and fatwas worked magic on the Mamluks.

Thomas: What follows this is a very exciting war, but remarkably, we have to just kind of briefly summarise it because it will take us away from exploring Ibn Taymiyyah himself.

In the summer of 1302, local Syrian troops suddenly rise up against the Mongols and repel the invaders, the Mongol invaders outside Aleppo. And this causes a kind of flurry of enthusiasm, a flurry of morale amongst the Mamluks in Egypt.

And they launch a big counterattack, which results in the Mamluks finally dislodging the last Crusader outpost in the Levant, the Knight's Templars sort of headquarters in …

The following year, the Mongols invade again. It was the month of Ramadan. You can imagine, Aimen, Ibn Taymiyyah thinking these people are not Muslims. They're invading during Ramadan, a month of peace.

And this time he himself joins the army. He takes up arms, joins the Mamluk army to resist them. And the 20th of April that year, that's my birthday as it happens, the 20th of April that year the Mongols are repelled at the Battle of Marj al-Saffar and the Mamluks kind of, at least for a time, push them out.

And the pressure that they'd been exerting upon the Mamluk Empire is relieved even further the following year when Ghazan Khan, their leader dies.

And this kind of brings to an end a chapter in Ibn Taymiyyah’s life, a very important chapter where he was animated primarily by fighting the Mongols, resisting Mongol invasion, attacking the Christian allies, the heretical allies of the Mongols, who were attacking from without.

And it opens the next chapter in his life where he focuses his attention, not on outsiders, but on insiders, on the people that he felt from within the Mamluk Empire, from within the Sunni community that were causing Islam to decay from within.

Aimen: Just like all radicals, Thomas, even after all the victories, military and otherwise, you would think that Ibn Taymiyyah would go home, sit on his comfortable sofa, read some books, sip some pina colada, Damascus way, and just enjoy life, man.

However, radicals need enemies. And so, in the absence of the Mongols attacking from outside, he focused his attention on the enemies inside the Mamluk Empire, particularly two groups of people who he believed corrupted the Mamluk Empire and opened it for outside invasions as a punishment from God for the transgressions of these two groups.

These two groups are first those who promote bogus philosophical doctrine as far as he was concerned. And the second are the jurists, the Muslim scholars, who were neglecting and were complacent in their application of Sharia laws and principles.

Thomas: That’s great. And I want to focus on the second of those two. Those whom Ibn Taymiyyah believed were neglecting the law, the jurists. For the rest of his life, Ibn Taymiyyah would increasingly exercise Ijtihad.

We talked about this in the previous episode, Ijtihad, the independent exercise of juristic reasoning on original sources of revelation, the Quran, the Hadith, the Sunnah of the prophet, and the early generations of Muslims, the Salaf.

So, Ibn Taymiyyah would increasingly take the initiative, would read the Quran, read the Hadith, and come to his own conclusions about them. This is called Ijtihad. He thought that his fellow jurists had too slavishly mimicked, sort of the precedents within their own schools of law.

And he thought that that had created a stultified legal environment that was not able to resist or respond to the challenges of the day.

In fact, in his zeal, he would be accused, at least by his enemies of taking the law into his own hands. He would order floggings and other forms of corporal punishment, often outside the normal institutional sort of practices of the state. And that just gives you a sense of how serious he was.

Aimen: Thomas, we may even say that this almost amount of vigilantism, more or less what some people, and you see them sometime, not only in Muslim societies, but even when they live within Muslim communities, in western societies, those who would go around and order their women to dress modestly.

It really echoes Ibn Taymiyyah’s stepping out of the bound, within a society ignoring, I'm not saying challenging, but ignoring state institutions that are supposed to reign him in. And at the same time, basically tell him that it is not up to you to impose the law?

Thomas: There’s an example of this sort of vigilantism in a story by the historian Ibn Kathīr who was a follower of Ibn Taymiyyah. So, presumably this story is favourable to Ibn Taymiyyah's memory.

And this is a story that shows how Ibn Taymiyyah began attacking the other group that he accused of creating innovations and corruptions within Islam, namely the Sufis.

So, in this story as related by Ibn Kathīr, a Sufi Sheikh arrived in Damascus wearing a big and luxurious garment, a kind of extraordinary looking like a wizard or something but making himself out to look like some kind of mystic incarnation of the divine or something as some Sufis have done in history.

Ibn Taymiyyah ordered his followers to cut the garment up. So, they basically attacked this Sufi with knives. I don’t know if they had scissors back then, but anyway, they shredded the garment into pieces, then they shaved his head because he had long hair, which Ibn Taymiyyah thought was against the Sharia.

They cut his fingernails because they were too long, as far as Ibn Taymiyyah was concerned. His moustache, which was too long as well, was drooping down. They shaved it off, they trimmed it.

This sort of activity, it goes back to the Lebowski exegetical principle. You're not wrong, you're just an asshole to treat this man like this. Maybe the Sufi was corrupt, but still to order your followers to cut up his garment, to shave off his head. It's a bit extreme.

Aimen: Well, not just a bit extreme, it was extreme. I have some sympathy with people who want to expose charlatans, especially charlatan gurus who prey on people's superstitions to enrich themselves. That's it.

Thomas: I mean, so clearly there were charlatans among the Sufis. And yes, as you say, the Sufis, they did have some practices, which for outsiders, at least hearing about them might have caused concern, but maybe the practices themselves were pretty, pretty wacky.

So, in Arabic, these practices are called Sameeh, and especially Nazar. So, these words mean hearing and seeing.

The Nazar ceremonies, the seeing ceremonies in particular are pretty weird. I mean, they would involve often the stripping of a young boy to be naked in front of a circle of Sufis who would contemplate his naked body, and they believe enter into ecstasy and union with God through that vision.

And no judgement, I'm not going to judge anyone, but it does sound … you can imagine someone especially of Ibn Taymiyyah’s temperament thinking what?

Aimen: Oh, yes. I mean, goodness. There is a Sufi obsession as far as Ibn Taymiyyah was concerned with young boys. It was unhealthy among the Sufis. Well, some Sufis and he condemned it.

And he believed that this sort, which in today's age, we call it paedophilia, was a disease that is eating at the heart of what was supposed to be a movement that is supposed to be divorcing itself from any worldly pleasure.

Whether it is a pleasure of the flesh, or the pleasure of the food, or the pleasure of the skin in terms of basically wearing the silk and the cotton and other, I mean, beautiful garments. I mean, how could you do that?

Thomas: In general, Ibn Taymiyyah believed that all heightened states of spiritual experience were satanic. He just didn't really trust that, that sense, that feeling that these Sufis had in their ecstasy of union with God was authentic.

But this indicates one of those infamous contradictions about Ibn Taymiyyah, because I wouldn't want anyone to think that Ibn Taymiyyah was strictly anti-Sufi. It's not true.

Aimen: He was Sufi himself.

Thomas: I know, in fact, he was a Sufi until the year 1311, until he was quite old. He had a Sufi as the spiritual guide of his group of scholars, this Sufi, his name was ʿImād al-Dīn al-Wāsiṭī. He was both a Sufi Sheikh and a Hanbali jurist.

So, just to make sure that everyone understands, we're not saying that there's this strict dividing line, Sufi, anti-Sufi, Hanbali and the others. There was a mixture going on.

And so, as part of this kind of rich contradiction in Ibn Taymiyyah’s character, it wasn't Sufism exactly that he opposed, it was excesses within Sufism as he saw them, that he opposed.

Aimen: The irony, Thomas, is that Salafi Jihadists, especially in places like Bosnia, Afghanistan, and Chechnya where there is a huge population of Sufis living there. Naqshbandis, Qadiris, Rifaʽis, Jilanis, they looked down upon them. They believed that they were practising shirk and heresy.

I mean, they truly believed that this is not the righteous way. They believed the only true Jihadists are the Salafi Jihadists because these people are backward. They are cowards. They are just using Sufism to shirk away their duty of Jihad.

But the reality wasn't true. In fact, the Taliban were Sufis. I remember we were walking on one of the streets of Jalalabad, and from a building on the second floor from the windows, we can see, and we can hear a Sufi Haḍra like basically when they have the drums and the dancing, and we see the men of the Taliban with their turbans, and they were doing that Sufi dance in a circle, and we were hearing the drums.

For me, I lack the sound of the drums. I mean, basically it was so hypnotic. But for my fellow Jihadists, it's like, they were saying, oh my God, what is this? This is awful. This is Haram, this is shirk, this is heresy.

They were so against it. However, all I see is that the vast majority of Jihad activity and Jihadism was actually undertaken by Sufis. In Afghanistan, it was the Taliban, and the other Mujahideen parties.

In Chechnya it was the Chechnya Mujahideen who were mostly Sufis. In Bosnia they were Sufis. So, how on earth, Al-Qaeda would look down on their allies like this? I have no idea.

I mean, you call them heretics, and then they are your allies, and they are your incubator community. They are your protectors. It was just like Ibn Taymiyyah, one of the contradictions that are contained within the Jihadist movement.

Thomas: Now, Ibn Taymiyyah in addition to kind of hating Sufi, let's say ecstasy, Sufi extravagance in worship, Ibn Taymiyyah also had basic theological problems with Sufism, especially the Sufism of an extremely important Sufi, historically speaking, possibly the most important one, the man who is known as the greatest Sheikh, and this is Ibn Arabi.

Ibn Arabi who died in Damascus. He was an Andalusian from Spain, but he died in Damascus in 1240. So, not too long before Ibn Taymiyyah was around, his tomb is still there in Damascus. I used to visit it regularly when I lived in Damascus, because I love Ibn Arabi.

My first interest in Islam was inspired by Ibn Arabi. My desire to learn the Arabic language was implanted in me out of a desire to read Ibn Arabi in the original.

Aimen: Typical heretic, typical heretic.

Thomas: Exactly. Just a Christian to the end. Now, Ibn Arabi's followers were not known for extravagant ceremonies for things like taking drugs like some Sufis were accused of doing, for dancing.

Ibn Arabi's followers were sober on the whole, but they were, in terms of their religious personality, their religious mentality, just totally opposite from Ibn Taymiyyah.

So, if we go and we take the Shahadah, the Islamic Declaration of Faith, the first half of that declaration, la 'iilah 'iilaa allah, there is no God, but God, there is no God but Allah.

This can be interpreted in many ways, let's say in two basic ways. Ibn Taymiyyah interpreted it to mean there is only one proper object of worship, Allah. And in Ibn Taymiyyah 's mind and heart, this was a way of loving God. God was an object of worship, divine worship. You loved him by obeying him.

Do you think that's a fair way, Aimen, of describing the Salafi interpretation of the Shahadah?

Aimen: I think this is mainstream Islam.

Thomas: Okay. But people like Ibn Arabi and others on the less Salafi, less even sometimes let's say Sunni Maximalist spectrum, but Muslims interpret it differently. Ibn Arabi would've interpreted that la 'iilah 'iilaa allah, there is no God, but God to mean something like everything in the end, in the final analysis, when you boil it down, everything is nothing other than God.

He's telling his followers something about reality, that even though we can't see it, everything is actually God.

Now, this is very provocative to someone of lbn Taymiyyah’s mentality, I would say, and certainly did provoke him. The Ibn Arabi view, known as Wahdat al-wujūd, the oneness of being, that all of creation is a mirror of the creator. This kind of way of being religious was antithetical to Ibn Taymiyyah’s way.

Aimen: Oh, yes. Because you remember the text from Ibn Arabi's writings when he said that, when the Israelites worshipped the golden calf, they were actually, without knowing it, worshipping God.

Well, we could say this about any pagans, any people who worshipped the sun, moon, the ancestors, worship the trees, worship nature. So, at the end of the day, who's a believer and who's not?

So, from Ibn Taymiyyah’s point of view, you have just absolved all humanity of any duty towards God. And that's it, whether you are aware of him or not, you are actually worshipping him.

Thomas: You could say it about a Christian, Aimen. You could say it about a Christian who worships Jesus Christ. And in fact, Ibn Taymiyyah explicitly accuses Ibn Arabi and his followers by their idea of divine indwelling, of union with God, of God becoming one with the person, of being similar to Christianity, of being too Christian.

So, it's true with an Ibn Arabi’s view that the boundaries of where Islam starts and stops becomes blurred. Ibn Taymiyyah did not like blurred boundaries.

Aimen: Exactly. He is a sober, rational thinker who basically said, no, no, no, no, no. And then he accused Ibn Arabi of heresy.

Thomas: Well, not just Ibn Arabi. Ibn Taymiyyah was going to go on to accuse a lot of people of heresy, and it was going to piss a lot of people off.

In 1305, this led to a clash with Cairo, with the Mamluk capital. Ibn Taymiyyah writes two letters to Cairo, one to the chief Sufi Sheikh of the Mamluk Empire, and the other to the spiritual director himself of the chief steward of the Sultan. And he says that Ibn Arabi is a greater threat to Islam than the Mongols.

Aimen: In fact, Thomas, Ibn Taymiyyah went far further than that. He accused Ibn Arabi and his followers of causing the Mongol Invasion with their heresy, that they are the ones who, with their spiritual deviancy have weakened the foundations of the Muslim empire, that the Mongols came and stormed the gates because of them.

This is now the shrill screams of a puritan mind that is abandoning reason, and actually seeing enemies everywhere.

Thomas: Well, unsurprisingly, the recipients of these two letters from Ibn Taymiyyah were greatly offended. They took the letters to the chief judge in Cairo who was a Maliki, as it happens.

And the judge convinced the Sultan to write to Damascus to the governor, there in demand that Ibn Taymiyyah be put on trial.

So now, for the first time, this is 1306, Ibn Taymiyyah is accused, is charged with a crime. This is the first of several trials that Ibn Taymiyyah would be subject to for the rest of his life.

Aimen: You have to understand, Thomas, that in these trials, Ibn Taymiyyah’s opponents found him extremely annoying, because he was of course, always referring back to the texts. They were, of course, always referring to the jurist of their schools, whether they are Malikis or Hanafis or Shafi'is.

But Ibn Taymiyyah as you know, and as we have already said, is someone who wanted to follow … well, he was Hanbali but he wanted to always go outside the box and follow the text and follow the literal interpretation of the Quran and Sunnah and the practices of the early generations as he saw fit. That used to infuriate his opponents.

And nonetheless, in the end, these trials actually more or less improved and increased Ibn Taymiyyah’s popularity because he was seen as a maverick. And goodness people love mavericks.

Thomas: In the end, all of this landed Ibn Taymiyyah in jail. In April of 1306, he was thrown into prison in Cairo, officially accused of various heretical doctrines.

18 months later, he was released when he agreed to sign a document confessing to orthodoxy.

But immediately upon being released, he resumed his public attacks on Sufism. He didn't wait any time he started to attack Sufism again.

And six months later, six months after being released from prison, he was banged up in prison again in Cairo.

Well, there he was in prison, converting prisoners to his cause. And all the while outside of prison, there was great political change happening in the Mamluk Empire.

The Sultan, Al-Nasir Muhammad, who had been a minor until now enters into his majority. He turns 18, and then this leads to some explosive political wrangling between different factions who are trying to hold onto power, but they lose, he wins. The Sultan finally achieves full power.

And little did Ibn Taymiyyah know, but Sultan Al-Nasir Muhammad was a great fan of his. So, as soon as he achieves full power, he orders Ibn Taymiyyah released from prison.

Aimen: Yes. Al-Nasir Muhammad was a fan of Ibn Taymiyyah. And he offered him actually the chance to actually punish his enemies with death which Ibn Taymiyyah refuses immediately. He does not want any vengeance. He just wants to go home and preach what he believed to be the right form of Islam.

Thomas: Yeah. We've been pretty hard on Ibn Taymiyyah, but clearly amongst the other qualities, there was a sweetie in there somewhere. He didn't want to condemn his enemies to death, but little did he know right around the corner, his old enemy would return new and improved, the Mongols, this time they’re Shia.

Aimen: Horror, horror.

Thomas: Stay tuned. We'll be right back after this break.

[Music Playing]

We are back. And so, too are the Mongols. Just imagine that, Aimen, Ibn Taymiyyah thinking he's sitting pretty fresh out of prison, ready to live his life, and there his old enemy, the Mongols are back to bother him and the Mamluk Empire.

Aimen: Hooray.

Thomas: So, the backstory is in 1309, Ghazan Khan's successor as Ilkhanate ruler, Öljaitü Khan, I think I got that right. Öljaitü Khan.

Aimen: Öljaitü, Öljaitü.

Thomas: Öljaitü Khan, he converts from Sunni to Shia Islam.

Aimen: Shame, absolute shame. This guy Öljaitü, he actually went through three conversions. I mean, he was originally a Shamanist. And then after that converted to Buddhism, then he converted to Sunni Islam. Okay, that fits. But then the weirdest thing is that he converted then to Shia Islam. Yeah, what a hippie.

Thomas: Ibn Taymiyyah was clearly not wrong to doubt the sincerity of these Mongol leaders’ faith.

And in fact, as a response to Öljaitü Khan's conversion to Shi’ism, and the renewed threat from a newly Shia Mongol horde on the Mamluk Empire's borders, he wrote a book that really is one of his most influential books called the Siyāsa Sharʿiyya, Sharia Based Politics, or a Law Guided Politics, however you want to translate that title, the Siyāsa Sharʿiyya, a book which has inspired a lot of Islamist political thought.

Aimen: Oh, indeed. I mean, the Siyāsa Sharʿiyya is considered to be the book upon which a lot of later scholars and ideologues would base their framework of what a Islamic state, a proper Islamic state, and a proper Islamic society should be governed.

Thomas: And his book is a particular example of how modern interpreters of Ibn Taymiyyah, especially radical ones, pick and choose quotes from his writings. Because in this book, Siyāsa Sharʿiyya, Ibn Taymiyyah is actually very pragmatic.

At no point does he outline a systematic, comprehensive Islamist state system, and he makes it clear that everything must be done for the public good and for the avoidance of Fitna, the avoidance of any social or civil unrest.

And yet, at times, the book adopts certain maximalist views about politics and Islam, and some of his later interpreters have cherry picked those quotes in order to build up totalitarian or totalizing political programs for themselves.

Öljaitü Khan, newly Shia, had already proved his ruthlessness and was determined to consolidate the Ilkhanate Empire, which had gone through a period of civil unrest, of fragmentation after his brother's death.

And the recent political instability inside the Mamluk Empire, which we mentioned in the previous part, which brought the young Sultan Nasir al Muhammad to the top of the heap, that recent instability had convinced some Syrian emirs to defect from the Sultan in Cairo and throw in their lot with the Ilkhanate Emperor.

Encouraged by this, at the end of the year, 1312 Öljaitü and his Mongol hordes invade Syria.

And it is in this context, still in Cairo, but no longer in prison, that Ibn Taymiyyah pens his third anti-Mongol fatwa, the longest and the most notorious of his three anti-Mongol fatwas. In this fatwa, he calls the invaders not only unbelievers, but apostates, Murtaddeen.

Aimen: And of course, Thomas, a scholar of the calibre of Ibn Taymiyyah, when he brands a group of people Murtaddeen, it would have significant legal ramifications for these people.

When you fight against an army of apostates, which is exactly what the word Murtaddeen is, the plural for Murtadd, which means apostate, when you fight against an army of apostates, you are supposed to take prisoners. It's nothing short of total annihilation to anyone, and for everyone who will fall into your hands.

This is why this fatwa was considered to be harsh, but nonetheless, it wasn't a fatwa that seemed to be out of place among the mainstream Sunnis of that time, because they were horrified by the fact that this time the threat seems to have encompassed not only the Mongols, who of course, their memories are still fresh from the sack of Baghdad because Öljaitü raised red banners written upon them, [Speaking Foreign language] which means in Arabic, we will avenge Hussein.

And what is so significant about this fatwa is the fact that there wasn't that much opposition from other mainstream Muslim scholars against this fatwa. And I think it's because of the fact that they were all horrified of what's going to happen at the hands of this invading army.

Thomas: Yeah, I don't think any of his fellow clerics were defending the Mongol Invasion, but this fatwa has really resonated down to the present. And in our own day, many Sunni Islamist groups use this fatwa, especially to justify calling all Shia apostates and legitimising violence against them, because Ibn Taymiyyah takes such a strong line against the Shia conversion of the Mongols.

Aimen: Indeed. And of course, this particular fatwa is what Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, an Al-Qaeda in Iraq at that time and the precursors of ISIS in Iraq would use in order to justify the indiscriminate attacks on Shia Muslims in Iraq.

And of course, basically that led to Shia reprisals from the other side on Sunnis. Of course, it's not rosy on the other side just to be fair. I mean, both sides carry a lot of theological hatred for each other, enough to justify killing each other.

Thomas: Yeah, absolutely. Now, like before Ibn Taymiyyah joins the Sultans army, and with all the Mamluk forces marches out of Cairo early in the year 1313, on an expedition against the Mongols.

And my goodness don't I wish that I could say what happened was this amazing epic clash, but in fact, the Mongols retreated without a fight. So, the Mamluks must have really been quite a formidable force, honestly.

We're always painting the Mongols as this fearsome invading force, but the Mamluks must have given as good as they get because the Mongols retreated without a fight. And in fact, this is the end of any great Mamluk/Mongol competition.

A few years later, a long lasting peace treaty was signed between both sides in Aleppo. And from that point on, Ibn Taymiyyah no longer had to worry about any Mongol threats.

He could just get back to his favourite pastime, of writing strongly worded refutations of all his Sunni enemies whom he thought were destroying Islam.

In 1314, he writes his notorious refutation, a big essay against rationalist theology and Aristotelian philosophy. And according to modern scholars, I've read, Ibn Taymiyyah from that work demonstrates that he didn't really quite understand Aristotle as well as he might've thought he did.

And nonetheless, he wrote that work against philosophy. He writes a book called The Correct Answer, the Longest Refutation of Christian Doctrine in the Islamic Tradition.

Aimen: Six volumes. Can you believe it?

Thomas: I should read this, I think.

Aimen: It’s called Al Jawaab As-Saheeh Liman Baddala Deen Al-Maseeh, which means the correct answer to those who falsified Christ's religion.

The funny thing is that it is six volumes, and I read some of it, and between you and me, basically, I mean, I was wondering, I don't know what Bible he read. He seemed to be reading from secondary sources. It doesn't seem to be-

Thomas: Aimen, my friend, whenever I have a debate with a Muslim about religion, I wonder if the Muslim has read anything that a Christian has ever written at all.

Aimen: Well, I did read the Bible, though. I did read the Bible.

Thomas: Oh, no, not you. Not you, dear friend. I know you are very well read into Christianity.

So, he wrote that book against Christians. In 1318, two years later, he writes three notorious fatwas against Alawite group called the Nusaris on the North Syrian Coast, who had revolted against the Mamluks.

In those fatwas, he calls them apostates. He also calls the Druze apostates that he says they can be killed, their property seized.

As you know, Aimen, in the Syrian Civil War, these fatwas were invoked regularly to justify the struggle against the Assad regime, which is an Alawite dominated regime.

Aimen: Indeed, I mean, basically, sectarianism returned to Syria with force. And the irony is that some of these Jihadist groups formed in 2012, 2013, just a year or two after the breakout of the Syrian Civil War.

Some of them would actually have a battalion within the group called the battalion of Ibn Taymiyyah, so as to reinforce the fact that Ibn Taymiyyah is so ever present.

Why? Because they wanted to remind the Alawites, to tone them that, look, we are going to attack you with the same man who 600 years ago waged Jihad against you.

However, again, as usual, I have to caveat this, it's not also rosy at the Alawite side. The Alawites committed a lot of massacres also on the Sunnis in modern time as well.

Thomas: It's a shit show from all directions, frankly.

Aimen: Absolutely.

Thomas: There's a great story from around this time of Ibn Taymiyyah attending an execution of a heretic. So, a man accused of heresy by Ibn Taymiyyah and his followers, hauled before the courts, condemned to death. And just before the heretic was beheaded, Ibn Taymiyyah walked up to him and struck him across the face.

It's a sort of strong image of the kind of man Ibn Taymiyyah had become. He was determined to root out heresy and to ensure that the Mamluk Empire was preserved from the dire effects of heresy.

And it brings to mind, all of the heresy hunters in early modern Italy, early modern Spain, inquisitors, all those sorts of people, witch burners during the Reformation and Counter Reformation.

It was a similar age of unrest, of conflict, of chaos, of social economic civil disorder. And in the midst of it, a voice like Ibn Taymiyyah really can speak very persuasively, smacking the heretics down and indeed cutting off their heads.

Aimen: You see, Thomas, this is the zeal that Ibn Taymiyyah possessed against irreligion. I've seen it on both sides of the sectarian divide in Islam. You will see Shias and Alawites taking a Sunni and burying him alive because basically they say you are a heretic; you are an infidel.

And I see Sunnis taking a Shia and basically cutting him pieces to pieces or burning him alive because he is a heretic and an infidel.

The two sides are engaged in the ugliest forms of violence. And then this is when I realised that the ugliest forms of violence is what is practised by zealot, religious fanatics from any religion or sectarian persuasion.

Thomas: In the end, zealous religious fanatics would prove Ibn Taymiyyah’s downfall. And I'm speaking specifically of his own followers. Ibn Taymiyyah had spent another couple of years in prison in the meantime, for entering into theological disputes or legal disputes, really with his fellow clerics.

But then at the very end of his life in 1326, a couple of incidents occurred outside of Damascus, where followers of his, very close followers of his, acted in such let's say inappropriate ways, in such radical ways that Ibn Taymiyyah couldn't escape censure for it.

So, one of his disciples in Cairo openly criticised visitation to graves, the graves of holy men, the graves of prophets, including the Prophet Muhammad himself, which was becoming a common refrain by Ibn Taymiyyah himself.

He found what's called Ziyarat visitation, visiting graves. He found it to become increasingly problematic because he felt that though it was okay to go to graves to pray for the dead man, he thought it was inappropriate to go and pray to the dead holy man or prophet which a lot of Muslims were doing this sin against his radical monotheism. Remember, all worship is directed only to God. There are no intermediaries at all.

Aimen: Of course, Thomas, this question will remain extremely divisive among Muslims all the way to the days of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab in the Arabian Peninsula, who would come half a millennium later, and we will be covering his life story in following episodes.

However, for Ibn Taymiyyah, just like for his followers down the centuries, the question of are the dead able to listen and able to help? This question is going to tear apart the Muslim world to the point where it is still resonating to this day.

Thomas: Well, as I say, one hot-headed disciple in Cairo openly criticised these grave visitations. He was arrested, beaten, banished from Cairo. He went to join his master in Damascus.

Then another disciple, equally hot-headed, this one in Jerusalem. He also preached against journeying simply to visit the graves of prophets or of Muslim holy people, including the grave of Abraham nearby Hebron.

This also got people very upset because the grave of Abraham, like the grave of the prophet in Medina, were extremely popular sites of pilgrimage, where many pious Muslims would come and offer their intercessory prayers praying for intercession from these holy people.

So, this was extremely offensive to a lot of Muslims. So much so that that year, 1326, Ibn Taymiyyah’s, old clerical enemies in Damascus jumped into action. They accused him before the governor there again, of spreading false teachings.

And the governor, I think by this point, must have been sick to death of Ibn Taymiyyah, frankly. He appealed to the Sultan in Cairo, Ibn Taymiyyah's old ally, the Sultan Al-Nasir Muhammad.

Now, the Sultan had defended Taymiyyah 16 years earlier. Remember, he called him the most pious man he'd ever met.

Now, however, he just couldn't defend him any longer, and he turned against him. The Sultan decreed that Ibn Taymiyyah should be imprisoned again. And this time he revoked Ibn Taymiyyah’s right to issue fatwas.

Aimen: It became obvious to Sultan Al-Nasir Muhammad that Ibn Taymiyyah’s fatwas and ideas and essays were trickling down through his disciples to the general public, to the ordinary people, and that it started to tear apart neighbour against neighbour, family members against each other. Mosque congregations split down the middle between those who support him, those who opposed him.

He cannot have religious strife. He need religious conformity to be more prevalent in his society. He's already having to contend with outside enemies. He doesn't want to have his country split over a question of theology that doesn't seem to be that big.

I mean, for Sultan Al-Nasir Muhammad this question was trivial, absolutely trivial. But for zealots like Ibn Taymiyyah no, no, no, no, no. It is not trivial.

Now, I salute Ibn Taymiyyah for actually thinking it's not trivial. And I salute his steadfastness in his faith. It was just the manner in which he preached it and the manner through which his disciples preached it.

Thomas: You're not wrong, you're just an asshole.

Aimen: Exactly.

Thomas: Remember, it's the Lebowski exegetical principle. Ibn Taymiyyah still in Damascus, was imprisoned there. Several of his followers were also imprisoned, interrogated, whipped.

One of his most notoriously hard line disciples, Ibn al-Qayyim who was put in prison with him, was paraded around the city on a donkey.

So, there was a big turn by the elite against this whole movement, which would remain more or less the case as the movement echoed down the centuries until men like Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab in the 18th century revived it in a big way.

Ibn Taymiyyah, despite being in prison, he still spoke out loudly defending himself. He published a work against the chief judge in Cairo, and he basically in that work said that his entire life had been a Jihad, a Jihad against both external and internal enemies.

I find this quote weirdly moving. He said, “Jihad is the greatest blessing, but people don't know it.” And more than anyone else, Aimen, that quote reminds me of Sayyid Qutb, who was also in prison, also wrote about Jihad and whom we'll also be covering over two episodes, just down the line after our episodes on Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab.

But a lot of Salafi, Jihadists, a lot of Salafists in prison probably have that same feeling. Don't people understand that Jihad is the greatest blessing? We must pursue it.

Aimen: Absolutely. And in fact, Thomas, this is why when I used to be in the camps in Afghanistan and Bosnia, I used to hear people say, Sheikh ul-Islam and Sheikh ul-Jihad Ibn Taymiyyah because for them, he is a man who fulfilled the two duties of Jihad, the military Jihad, and the theological Jihad.

For them, they always quoted his most memorable quote ever when he was in prison and about to die, he said, “What do my enemies think they are doing to me? My paradise is inside my heart. Wherever I go, it’s with me. My imprisonment is solitude. My exile is tourism, and my death is martyrdom.”

Thomas: Well, in 1328, after a short illness, Ibn Taymiyyah died in his Damascus prison cell. An eyewitness historian writing not very long after, reported that 75,000 people lined the streets of Damascus for his funeral.

I actually believe that figure, that sounds realistic, more realistic than the 2 million that lined the streets of Baghdad for Ahmad bin Hanbal.

One final contradiction, the great enemy of the Sufis was buried in a Sufi graveyard. And that's it.

Ibn Taymiyyah. I mean, what a man, what a legacy. And that's really the most important takeaway. This genius of righteous anger. This genius of clear, uncompromising literalism and legal obedience, writing hundreds and hundreds and hundreds and hundreds of thousands of words over the course of his long life, his influence would go on, would outlast him well, as we've been saying to the present day.

Not just within the Hanbali School of Jurisprudence, but in fact across all the four schools of jurisprudence, Muslims would find his writings and be inspired by them, and would sort of keep the flame alive of the Ibn Taymiyyah way of understanding the religion.

All the way up until the 1730s, the 1740s, in a real backwards part of the Muslim world, the Nejd in the Central Arabian Peninsula where a man would arise, whom we're going to talk about beginning in our next episode, a man whose legacy is perhaps as notorious as Ibn Taymiyyah’s. Who am I talking about, Aimen?

Aimen: Of course, it is Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab, the Mujaddid as they call him, the renewer.

[Music Playing]

Thomas: Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab, founder of the so-called Wahhabis, the renewer of his age. Stay tuned dear listener, we'll be back at you with another amazing story about another amazing and controversial Muslim thinker.

A reminder that you can follow the show over on Facebook and Twitter at MH Conflicted. And for a deeper dive into all the subjects we talk about here on Conflicted, head over to Facebook and search Conflicted Podcast Discussion Group.

There you will find other fans of the show engaging in heated debates, enlightening conversations, and just generally geeking out over Conflicted related topics.

Conflicted is a Message Heard production. This episode was produced and edited by Harry Stott. Sandra Ferrari is our executive producer. Our theme music is by Matt Huxley and Tom Biddle.

Conflicted S4 E5: The Firebrand from Damascus (Part 1)

Speakers: Thomas Small & Aimen Dean

Thomas: When it comes to the main historical antecedent for many modern jihadis, one man stands head and shoulders above the rest. One scholar writes, “Advocates of violent jihad from the late 1970s to the present quote him more than any other mediaeval scholar.”

Another one claims that Shiis and many Sunnis blame him for introducing excessive intolerance and theological error into their religion.

This is a man whose thrilling life foreshadows many of the issues with the radicalism that Islam is facing today. A man who baked in an uncompromising, even brutal zeal to the religion still felt 700 years later.

I'm talking of course about the 13th, 14th century scholar, theologian, warrior, Ibn Taymiyyah, the Sheikh of Islam, as he was called by his admirers. Now, Aimen Dean, Ibn Taymiyyah is a pretty controversial character. What does he mean to you?

Aimen: For me, he is the ultimate jurisprudent and pioneer, I would say, of political and militant Sunni Islam.

Thomas: Pioneer. I like that word. Ibn Taymiyyah was a pioneer. And part of our ongoing series looking at the historical thinkers who have influenced modern jihadism, this is the first of two episodes on Ibn Taymiyyah, exploring his life, his many contradictions, and his quest for jihad. I'm Thomas Small and welcome back to Conflicted.

[Music Playing]

Aimen, why are we talking about Ibn Taymiyyah? In my view, going through his life, going through his works, going through his influence, he really is the prototype of a Salafi, meaning a Muslim who goes back to the original sources of the religion, the Quran, the Hadith, the extent to which they expressed the Sunnah of the prophet and his companions, the way of life of the Salaf, the original Muslims. That's why they're called Salafis.

And Ibn Taymiyyah, in my view, is a prototypical Salafi. In fact, he sort of foreshadows that movement.

Aimen: You know what, Thomas, when I was young, the most quoted theologian of old was always Ibn Taymiyyah. When I was learning the basics of Islamic sharia and theology, no one was mentioned more than Ibn Taymiyyah.

Why? Because he is not only the ultimate authority on all matters of creed and faith, he is also the ultimate authority on matters of politics and statecraft from the point of view of Sharia.

Thomas: What really interests me about Ibn Taymiyyah 's role amongst Salafis today is how a group which says we want to go back to the original generations of Muslims, actually bases so much of their thought on a Muslim from the seventh and eight centuries of Islam. So 7, 800 years after those early Muslims. It reminds me of some Protestants in Christianity who also bang on about being the original Christians, going back to the origins, the beginning.

But in fact, those that inspire them intellectually are based in the 16th and 17th century. So many, many hundreds of years after the religion was founded.

Aimen: Oh, Thomas, you and your anti-Protestant rants as usual, you pious orthodox priest. Anyway, so well, I agree. I mean, it is one of those rather strange. But why, because for Sunni Muslims, it is important that we mention this, is that they have the concept of a Mujaddid, that based on a Hadith, they believe in that every hundred years there is someone who will emerge, who would reform and revive the old ways of Islam.

Thomas: Yes.

Aimen: And cleanse it from the pollution and additions that were added to it. So, they believe that-

Thomas: Yes. The Mujaddid, meaning renewer in Arabic, someone who makes it new again. Yeah.

Aimen: Exactly. So, they believe that the first Mujaddid was the eighth Umayyad Caliph, Umar bin Abdul Aziz. And then after that they say the second Mujaddid was Ahmad bin Hanbal.

Thomas: Oh, Ahmad bin Hanbal-

Aimen: Who we talked about before.

Thomas: Our friend.

Aimen: Exactly. And so and so. And then they come to Ibn Taymiyyah and they say that he is also a Mujaddid.

Thomas: I’m glad you brought up Ahmad bin Hanbal. We did just finish a two-part series on him. And Ibn Taymiyyah stands in a direct line of dissent from him.

So, as we said at the end of that series, following Ahmad bin Hanbal's death in the ninth century, a school of Islamic jurisprudence, one of the four legal schools of Islam today, the Hanbali School was founded in his name. It remained always the minority school in Islam until recent centuries.

But in the Middle Ages, it was a minority school, and yet an influential school founded in the memory of Ahmad bin Hanbal and enshrining his fidelity to the original sources, his antipathy to philosophising, to analogical reasoning, to anything that goes against the literal interpretation of the text.

And Ibn Taymiyyah is born into a family of Hanbali scholars. He is directly related to that line of tradition within Islam.

Aimen: I agree. However, while Ahmad ibn Taymiyyah was born in a Hanbali house, his father and grandfather were definitely Hanbali jurisprudence themselves. But there is a huge difference between Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn Hanbal.

While Ibn Hanbal was more of a stoic and magnanimous and austere, cleric and jurisprudent, and a scholar-

Thomas: A very spiritual person at the end of the day.

Aimen: Indeed. However, Ahmad ibn Taymiyyah was the product of his day, was confrontational, was a firebrand orator, and was far more prolific writer than Ahmad bin Hanbal. And his writings were more in defence of Islam, but in a very offensive way.

Thomas: We're going to get into all of this as we proceed. I think that what I'd like to stress here at the outset before we launch into the amazing story of Ibn Taymiyyah's life, is the familiarity of his world. The world in which he grew up in, even more than Ahmad bin Hanbal.

All the factions, the voices, the views that are rocking the Muslim world today are in evidence then, back then, when Ibn Taymiyyah was living, writing, and really becoming the firebrand that he is today remembered as.

Now, Ibn Taymiyyah was born on the 22nd of January, 1263 in the city of Harran, today that's in Southeastern Turkey. At that point, it was part of the Mamluk Empire.

Now, we can quickly Aimen explain what the Mamluk Empire is. It's a successor state to Saladin’s Ayyubid Sultanate, it's capital was in Cairo.

And at the time of Ibn Taymiyyah's birth, the empire was very young. It had been established only 13 years earlier in 1250, when Mamluk soldiers, and remember long-term listeners know this, Mamluk is literally the Arabic word for owned because these soldiers had originally been Turkic slave soldiers of the Ayyubid Sultans.

Well, in 1250, they overthrew the last Ayyubid and established their own Sultanate on top of the Ayyubid Sultanate. I mean, there's a certain amount of continuity there. But in 1250, the Mamluk Empire is born, and 13 years later, Ibn Taymiyyah is born within it.

Aimen: Indeed. I mean, the Mamluks were mostly central Asian Kazakhs, as well as some of them actually were Caucasians. I mean, some of them were Caucasians from the Caucasus, from Chechnya and Dagestan, it was a mix of the two. And these two will form the two pillars of the Mamluk Empire.

Thomas: The Mamluk Empire is known, I think by historians or maybe more generally in the public consciousness for the dramatic battle in 1260 of Ain Jalut against the Mongol hordes.

Often the Mamluks are praised, lauded, congratulated by historians for resisting the Mongol hordes, as if in 1260 at the Battle of Ain Jalut, finally the Mongol advance was arrested by the Mamluks.

As we will see, this is not exactly true. Ain Jalut is absolutely a vital battle. It did arrest the Mongol advance, but for several decades after that battle, and really throughout all of Ibn Taymiyyah 's life, the Mongol threat against the Mamluks would be real and ever present.

So, it's not that in 1260, the Mamluks just stopped the Mongols. In fact, it's not true. Really, from 1260 onward, there was like a Cold War that often waged hot between both sides along the border.

Aimen: Sometime I'm glad that Genghis Khan decided to adopt the name Genghis Khan, because it sounds threatening, unlike his birth name which sounds so cute, Temüjin. So, I mean, his birth name is Temüjin. I mean, it sounds like a Pokémon kind of character.

Temüjin Yesukhei Baghatur, that's his name. Unfortunately, this Temüjin turned out to be anything but cute. I mean, he did nothing but unleash the wrath of God on humanity. And he described himself actually as the wrath of God on humanity.

He began his conquest of Muslim Central Asia in the early 1200s. And what a conquest was that Thomas, millions, and this is not an exaggeration, millions of people were put to the slaughter from Narsapur, Samarkand, Bukhara, Tashkent, Otrar.

All of these cities that were the bastion of Islamic civilization and science were erased to the ground. It actually culminated in the destruction of the empire that gave us a lot of scientific advances, such as algorithms and optical science. This was the Khwarezmid Empire, and it was destroyed and torn asunder by none other than Genghis Khan.

Thomas: Yeah. And Ibn Taymiyyah's birth in 1263 was overshadowed absolutely by this advance because only five years earlier …

And honestly, we have to put ourselves in the kind of thought world, the imaginative thought world of a Sunni Muslim, especially at that time, five years before Ibn Taymiyyah was born, the most catastrophic event up to that point in Muslim history had happened when a Mongol general called Hulagu, conquered Baghdad itself, raised it to the ground and murdered the Abbasid Caliph, Musta'sim.

Aimen: Hulagu, who incidentally is Genghis Khan's grandson showed up with a massive army, hordes of Mongols at the gate of Baghdad. Baghdad at the time, the largest city humanity has seen by then, more than a million people congregated within that city.

It’s library, Dar Al-Hekma, contained 5 million titles of human knowledge from China all the way to North Africa. And Dar Al-Hekma means house of wisdom. What happened, the Caliph, along with a thousand people of his household ministers, generals, they thought they could treat with the Mongols.

They went to see Hulagu and how Hulagu treated the Caliph, he just took him and cuffed him and put him inside that carpet, rolled him inside that carpet, and ordered all of his soldiers to trample and kick the Caliph inside that carpet until actually he died.

Now, it sounded to the Arabs as the ultimate humiliation to be rolled in the carpet and kicked to death like this.

For the Mongols, they believe that if they spill the blood of a great leader, they will taste defeat. So, that's why he needed to be rolled in the carpet and kicked to death, so no blood will be spilled. He will be killed by internal bleeding.

Charming, absolutely charming. And the most charming thing that the Mongols did after that is that when they sacked Baghdad and put hundreds of thousands of people there to death, which coloured the Tigris  River red from the blood, they then coloured the Tigris River black from the ink of all the books that they found in the library of Dar Al-Hekma to build a bridge over which their horses could basically just cross the river.

Whether it is apocryphal or not, the fact of the matter is that after that Dar Al-Hekma was set on fire, and 500 years depository of knowledge, human knowledge was lost forever.

Thomas: Yes, and as I said, we can't imagine how catastrophic the sack of Baghdad, the destruction of the Abbasid Caliphate was. And there, five years later, Ibn Taymiyyah is born into this world, a broken world, a world of great uncertainty, a religiously smashed world.

The whole ideology of a Muslim at the time, an ideology of God's chosen empire that will continue to expand forever and will bring illumination and truth and piety to every corner of the world. That empire had been smashed to smithereens.

And I think it's interesting to compare that situation to the situation that Muslims, especially in the Middle East, have been living under in the last hundred years.

I think the colonial period in the Middle East, the abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate in the 1920s, everything that's followed on from that, all of the instability and the political wrangling and the rise of neo-Salafism invoking Ibn Taymiyyah's memory. It's so similar to that world, Ibn Taymiyyah’s world, wouldn't you say?

Aimen: Not only Salafists, Thomas, but even ordinary Muslims find that there are similarities between the time of Ibn Taymiyyah, the time of invasions, and hunger, and fear and collapse of the dynasties, the collapse of the law and order, and the nation states that existed.

They feel that it was so similar to the last 150 years in the Muslim world, where many Mongol empires were actually in invading the peripheries as well as the heart of the Muslim world.

Look at, for example, the Russian Empire, and then the Soviet Union after that, invading the Central Asian Republics, the Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Pakistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan. These were the same areas which the Mongols invaded in the 1200s.

Then you have the French invading North Africa. You have Napoleon going into Egypt and invading it. You have, of course, above all the British Empire who actually removed the descendants of the Mongols, the Muslim Mughals from India, and they took over as the new emperors of India, and of course, removed Islam from the position of power that it was enjoying for hundreds of years there.

You see the feeling of being under siege, invaded, and at the same time, controlled and colonised, this is the same feeling that the people at the time of Ibn Taymiyyah were going through, possibly even more.

Thomas: You've just succinctly summarised season three of Conflicted, Aimen. Any new listeners who haven't enjoyed our massive sweeping history of the colonial period and the Cold War in the Middle East? Go back. Listen to season three. I promise you, you'll learn a lot.

You're absolutely right, Aimen. The time of Ibn Taymiyyah was very resonant with our own times, which is why so many Muslims today draw on his thought when conceiving of their own responses to their present predicaments.

So, back to Ibn Taymiyyah's life, as we said, he was born in Harran in modern Turkey, and in 1269, so this is what, he's six-years-old now, that city Harran is conquered by the Mongols and he is forced with his family to flee. The family flee to Damascus.

Aimen: As if the burning of the library of Dar al-Hekma, the house of wisdom in Baghdad was a reminder to Ibn Taymiyyah's family, the first thing they rescued from their house as they were fleeing Harran towards the Damascus, was their precious books.

It shows the mentality of that household. They knew that the Mongols are not going to treat the books very nicely. So, the first thing they rescued was the books. They put all of their precious books on the cart as they were dragging it all the way to Damascus. The most precious thing they had.

Thomas: Taymiyyah's father was a Hanbali scholar, and when they got to Damascus, he became the headmaster of the Sukariya Madrasa, a Hanbali Madrasa in Damascus, and the family lived there as well.

So, Ibn Taymiyyah actually grew up inside a Hanbali School, and I think that must have played a huge influence on his personality later, on his formation as a thinker and as a Muslim.

But what a tremendous trauma. You're six-years-old. Your city is conquered by the Mongols. You escape with your family to a new city. The whole world was smashed to smithereens.

And I think in this context, it's important to really emphasise that the religious system that had prevailed at the high water period of the Abbasid Caliphate, the religious system, was very much under pressure as a result of all of these stresses and shocks to it.

And that whole period is known as an age of drought when it comes to religious inspiration, especially when it comes to the legal structure that dominated Muslims lives.

And as Ibn Taymiyyah is growing up in that Hanbali School, I think it's fair to say that he became convinced of this, which is that the prevailing religious system of the day was not capable of responding forcefully to the challenges that the Muslim world was facing as a result of the Mongol conquests.

Aimen: Exactly. Because as far as he was concerned, Islam, more or less was to some extent, from a theological and jurisprudence point of view, became static and less dynamic in responding to ever evolving political and scientific and social developments in the Muslim world.

He felt that what we call Ijtihad, the exercise of one's initiative in matters of faith, this Ijtihad, its gate has been closed. So, he was always dreaming about the idea that this need to be reopened, and that there need to be new interpretation of Islam in order to deal with the challenges that has risen with the Mongol invasions.

Thomas: The closing of the gates of Ijtihad. This is a proverbial phase in the history of Islam. You'll hear a lot of times Western people, Western thinkers, accusing Islam very early on in its development of basically turning its back on reason.

And they used this idea that Ibn Taymiyyah himself evoked of the closing of the gates of Ijtihad to justify this idea that the Muslim world was anti-rational. And I just want to make it clear to the listener now that that is not true.

What the closing of the gates of Ijtihad means is that within Islamic law, the use of independent reason had been de-emphasized in favour of following strict precedents within the school of law that you were a part of. That's what the closing of the gates of Ijtihad means.

It does not mean that the Muslim world became suddenly anti rational. It does not mean that the Muslim world stopped engaging in science or philosophy.

Quite the contrary, there was a lot of great scholarship and great learning and philosophising and science going on, but within the law, a certain stultification had set in according to Ibn Taymiyyah and that's what he meant by the closing of the gates of Ijtihad.

Aimen: Well, in my opinion, I don't think there was any great harm done throughout this period. The period of when the Ijtihad was closed, according to Ibn Taymiyyah although I very much doubted there were so many great scholars appearing at the time, including Ibn al-Jawzi.

But from Ibn Taymiyyah's point of view, the need to reopen the gate of Ijtihad was a necessity in order to respond to these new catastrophic developments that happened, namely the Mongol invasions.

Thomas: So, Ibn Taymiyyah is growing up inside this madrasa in Damascus, a madrasa, which his father is the headmaster of.

But then in 1284, when he's 21-years-old, Ibn Taymiyyah's father dies, and he himself takes over the headmastership of the madrasa. So, he suddenly occupies this very prominent position. He's the head of the Hanbali Madrasa of Damascus.

And in that capacity, he begins lecturing on the Quran in the great Umayyad Mosque of Damascus. And his fame begins to spread.

Ibn Taymiyyah was clearly a great preacher, a very effective orator. And as we'll see, throughout his life, he used preaching as well as writing to further his interpretation of how Muslims are meant to engage with the sources of their revelation.

He created this sort of, what was at the time, a new way of explaining this, that Islam is founded on the law. The law is founded in the Quran and the Hadith and the practices of the Salaf.

Today, we take this for granted that this is what Islam is, because Salafi Islam today is so prevalent in the world, in the atmosphere of Islam.

But at the time, this succinct way of describing Islam was not so, let's say common and Ibn Taymiyyah’s power as an orator, and a preacher, and a writer laid the foundations for this way of understanding Islam. It is the practices of the Salaf.

Aimen: That's very interesting, Thomas, because this actually exposes one of the many contradictions that would characterise his life and personality. Ibn Taymiyyah never married, ever.

Thomas: It's amazing-

Aimen: All the way until he died. And many people speculated on why, but regardless of why, the reality is that the Prophet Muhammad himself stated that marriage is his Sunnah. And whoever decide to follow a monkish way and abstain from marriage, then he is abstaining from the Sunnah of the prophet. That's what the prophet himself said.

Thomas: I can't say that Ibn Taymiyyah's personality is very attractive to me, Aimen, I have to say, but this is one way in which he is quite attractive to me, his monkishness of spirit. A contradiction at the heart of Ibn Taymiyyah, and as you say, there's going to be many as we continue our story.

Now we’re going to go for a break here. But when we come back, Ibn Taymiyyah, who is preaching with great zeal in Damascus, is going to encounter the first major controversy of his life. And it’s all down to a pesky Christian, Aimen. One who allegedly insulted the Prophet Muhhamed. As we’ll see, Ibn Taymiyyah did not take it well. Stay tuned.

[Music Playing]

We are back. We're talking about Ibn Taymiyyah, the great 13th, 14th century Muslim scholar that is the primary influence today on the global Salafi movement.

When we last left him, he was in Damascus preaching in the Umayyad Mosque, leading the Hanbali Madrasa there.

And then in 1294, he gets embroiled in really, let's say, the first controversy of his life, the first of many controversies in Ibn Taymiyyah's life, a story that really is quite resonant with modern day events as well.

So, in 1294, villagers near to Damascus came to the governor there and accused a Christian scribe from their village of insulting the prophet Muhammad. Already you might think, hmm, this sounds familiar.

Now, the governor in Damascus, ignored them. The Christian scribe worked for a local Emir. He didn't want to upset the Emir. He just tried to sort of, well, if I ignore these villagers, maybe they'll go away.

He didn't reckon on Ibn Taymiyyah, though. So, Ibn Taymiyyah hearing about this, he went into overdrive. He had one of his periodic freak-outs, I guess, and he whipped up a crowd at the Umayyad Mosque to do something about this great injustice, this great calumny against their prophet.

So, half of the crowd followed him to the governor's palace, where they demanded that the Christian be put to death. And the other half of the crowd tracked down the Emir, for whom this Christian scribe worked and attacked him, threw stones at him.

So, Ibn Taymiyyah is proving himself early on to be very good at whipping up the masses in this sort of radical way.

Well, the governor, first of all, he says to Ibn Taymiyyah, “You can't do this.” He throws him into prison. He beats him and his followers but he realises he can't just ignore this situation.

So, he finds the Christian, the accused Christian, and he prevails upon him to convert to Islam. So, the Christian becomes a Muslim to save his own skin. And the governor obviously hoped that this would placate Ibn Taymiyyah and the other radicals calling for his death.

Well, that's not what happened. Ibn Taymiyyah said, “No, no, no, no, no. Even conversion to Islam cannot help someone escape a penalty of death for insulting the prophet.”

Now, in the end, because conversion wasn't able to save this man, the governor arranged for him to escape Damascus under the cover of night, and he fled into safety.

But what does this tell us about Ibn Taymiyyah, Aimen? And actually, what does it tell us about this possibility within Islam that we see, even today, maybe most notoriously in 2005 in the episode of the Danish cartoons satirising the Prophet Muhammad, which resulted in mob violence in various places of the Muslim world.

Why does this happen? And what does it tell us about someone like Ibn Taymiyyah that he might wish to foment this kind of mob reaction?

Aimen: Well, it was the time of mob rule to some extent. And the reason for that is because just like the time of Ibn Taymiyyah, the time of Ibn Taymiyyah was a time where religious minorities were always viewed with suspicion. Why? We have to go back to the sack of Baghdad, which happened, of course, just five years before Ibn Taymiyyah's birth.

During the sack of Baghdad there is this story, whether it's true or not, as far as Sunni historians and scholars, they believe it is absolutely true. They believe that the grand minister of the Abbasid Caliph, when Baghdad was sacked, who was a Shia, by the way, arranged with the Mongol, general Hulagu, who was of course massing his troops just outside of the walls of Baghdad.

He arranged with him that he will be happy to assist the invasion of Baghdad by tricking the Caliph into visiting him, by dismissing the Abbasid armies into other parts of Iraq away from Baghdad.

And what is the price is that the Shia and the Christian minorities within Baghdad will be saved from the slaughter that will take place. All they have to do is to put either black crosses or black flags on their houses. And of course, basically the rest of the population will be put to the death who are Sunnis.

This story, whether it is true or not … of course, by the way, even Saddam Hussein himself used that on the 9th of April, 2003, when he said on a radio message to his people, he said, “Baghdad has been betrayed by another Ibn al-Alqami.” He referred to the minister who was known as Ibn al-Alqami.

So, even in the psyche of Sunnis and the psyche of Iraqis and Muslims, this name Ibn al-Alqami is synonymous to betrayal by a minority upstart. This has always been there.

And so, can you imagine if Saddam, after 800 years of that incident, was recalling it during the sack of Baghdad by another Mongol, President Bush and the Americans.

So, you can imagine that the suspicion that is surrounding the religious minorities, the Christians and the Shia in Damascus, they always viewed as the agents of the Crusaders.

You remember the Crusaders are still there, they are still in Ikar, they are still in Tripoli, they are still in Tyre, and they are an alliance with the Mongol. So, of course, the suspicion is always there is ever present, the Mongol Christian Crusader Alliance that they're always afraid of.

And the minorities are just waiting, biting their time to stab them in the back. That was always the ever present thinking at the back of every Sunni's mind at the time. Ibn Taymiyyah has no exception.

Thomas: I think that's really important to keep in mind. And there's another thing about the Mongol Empire that's quite interesting is that, I mean, no one would call them liberals, exactly, but the Mongols definitely had a different attitude towards religion from the attitude that the Abbasid Caliphate in Sunnis in general had.

So Hulagu, the Emperor Hulagu, like most Mongol generals, he practiced shamanism. But despite that, he, and the Mongols in general treated all religions as sort of equal, they didn't really have this sense of hierarchy of religions in the way that Muslims and Christians have.

He was just like, well, your religion is your business. Religion is not really what we're about. And it does seem to be true that at the sack of Baghdad, Christians were left unharmed.

And Hulagu's wife was a Christian, that might have had something to do with that. And the Mongol Empire, compared to the Muslim Empire that it conquered, adopted a much more egalitarian attitude towards religion.

And this would've offended as well, someone like Ibn Taymiyyah's understanding of the right ordering of the world where Muslims were meant to be on top, especially Sunni Muslims. They're meant to be on top with gradations of sort of religious rank below him. This would've made him mistrustful of religious minorities.

Aimen: Indeed. Just basically to comment on something here that I find interesting, is that the Mongols were so tolerant of religious minorities that they always either hated them equally, slaughtered them equally, and incorporated them equally.

Thomas: But to be fair to the Mongols, I mean, I never thought I'd say that, after the period of slaughter and state formation, they did end up having a state that functioned pretty well, and they had a legal system and everything.

And in that system, religion was not treated in the same way that it was treated under the Muslim systems. So yeah, Ibn Taymiyyah felt he had reason to distrust the religious minorities of the Mamluk Empire.

He certainly had reason to distrust the Mongol Empire and its alliances with Christians in order to pursue its own objectives. And that distrust was going to become frighteningly real to Ibn Taymiyyah just around the corner when the Mongols would be at the gates, the very gates of Damascus.

Very quick scene setting here in 1295, a man called Ghazan Khan ascends the throne of the Ilkhanid Empire, the original great world straddling empire of Genghis Khan, cracked into four during a period of civil war amongst Mongol generals.

One of the four successor states of Genghis Khan's great state is known as the Ilkhanid Sultanate. In 1295, when Ghazan Khan becomes the head of that Sultanate, which is with its capital in Iran, he converts to Sunni Islam.

So, from a shaman to a Sunni, and from that position of being a Sunni, Ghazan Khan demands that the Mamluks in Cairo submit to his over lordship, but the Mamluks refuse.

So, in 1299, Ghazan Khan and his Mongol army invades Syria, and that army importantly includes Christian allies, primarily Armenians and Georgians. And very quickly they conquer Aleppo, the great capital of Northern Syria, about 200 miles north of Damascus.

Panic broke out in Damascus. And already for the year before this Ibn Taymiyyah sensing the Mongol threat had been preaching jihad. And I think it's important at this stage that we explain Ibn Taymiyyah’s doctrine of jihad because in some ways it went further than the classical doctrine of jihad.

Aimen: Ah yes, Thomas, the Mardin Fatwa, in which Ibn Taymiyyah declares jihad in a way that really is unprecedented and foreshadow what is going to really happen in our modern time in the second half of 20th century and the first miserable quarter of the new 21st century.

The fact is that prior to this, jihad was always understood to be coming in two forms, and is always against the enemies of Islam. The first is the offensive jihad, the jihad of conquest that was practised by the Rashidun Caliphate and the Umayyads, and the Abbasid.

And then you have the defensive jihad in which any sultan or governor or a dynasty would declare jihad to repel an invader, a foreign non-Muslim invader who is invading your lands. This is where you can declare jihad.

However, in the case of the Sultan Mahmud Ghazan and his Mongol army, they were overall a Muslim army and a Sunni army for that matter.

However, even though the Mongol armies of Sultan Mahmud Ghazan were Sunnis and Muslims, however, Ibn Taymiyyah did not believe they were proper Muslims to begin with. Why? Because in his opinion and his mind, they did not rule purely by Sharia laws and principles. They just incorporated parts of Sharia into the Mongol codified law that is called the Yassa.

And in his mind, the Yassa is nothing short of Shirk or Kufur, as far as he was concerned, which means polytheism. And of course, heresy.

So, he viewed that army as heretical army that is worthy to wage jihad against. That was unprecedented that you call for jihad, not only against a Muslim army, but a fellow Muslim Sunni army, just because you disagree on the form of law that they practise.

Thomas: Yeah. And with the Mongols on the march, as you say, he releases the first of three anti-Mongol Fatwas. And in the first one he admits that these Mongols are Muslims, but because as you say, they don't follow all the laws of the Sharia, and they have Christian allies, this is important to him. Their religion is defective, they're not really proper Muslims, and they should be fought. And this is cool. This is interesting.

When Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in 1990, and when King Fahd of Saudi Arabia invited an international coalition of armies to expel Saddam Hussein from Kuwait, a certain Osama bin Laden wrote a strongly worded letter condemning this action, inviting Christian armies onto the Arabian Peninsula to expel a Muslim invader.

And he quotes Ibn Taymiyyah's first anti-Mongol Fatwa, Osama bin Laden, when he's attacking King Fahd's decision to ally with Christians, he quotes Ibn Taymiyyah's first anti-Mongol Fatwa. It's an example of how Ibn Taymiyyah in his life resonates to the present day.

Aimen: Indeed, because at the end of the day Ibn Taymiyyah paved the way for this defective form of the practice of state craft, at the end of the day, the decision of war and peace and how it is conducted is up to the head of the state, the head of the dynasty, the king of the day, the Emir of the day.

And that's why I think that with Ibn Taymiyyah usurping the role of the state in terms of determining how it defend itself and in what manner it does, it really did open the door for other young upstart clerics to practise this sort of militant Islam outside of the jurisdiction of the state.

And this unfortunately became the dangerous President, which many, many, many other clerics later would follow in his footsteps.

Thomas: Well, with the Mongol armies advancing south from Aleppo towards Damascus, the Mamluk armies emerge from Egypt to confront them, but the Mongols defeat them. And before long the Mongols are at the gates of Damascus.

If there was panic before, there's even more panic now. Some residents flee to Egypt, the governor barricades himself and all of his troops inside Damascus's vast citadel.

And for 10 days, the Mongols lay siege to the city, which on the 2nd of January, 1300 falls to Ghazan Khan and his hordes. The second time that Ibn Taymiyyah home has been conquered by a Mongol army.

Aimen: And exactly what Ibn Taymiyyah feared happened. I mean the Christian allies of the Mongols, those Georgians and Armenians, I mean, they were running a mock in the countryside of Damascus. They were capturing men and women and children, selling them as slaves to the crusaders, whether it is in the Crusader kingdoms nearby or to Cyprus.

And at the same time, they were opening taverns not far away from the Umayyad Mosque. I mean, not exactly a pretty picture that Ibn Taymiyyah was happy with. And of course, that enforced his hatred towards Christians and minorities.

Thomas: Absolutely, it was Ibn Taymiyyah's worst nightmare. But unlike when he was six-years-old, this time, he does not flee. He stands his ground. And in fact, he's a part of a number of notables who are sent to Ghazan Khan to negotiate the terms of peace.

And according to the historical sources that are very favourable to Ibn Taymiyyah’s memory, he confronted Ghazan Khan openly and said this, “You claim to be a Muslim. You have a judge, a prayer leader, a teacher, and a prayer caller with you, yet you have invaded us. Your father and your grandfather, Hulagu were unbelievers. And yet they did not do what you have done.”

So, there you have, there's that echo of you call yourself a Muslim, but you're not really a Muslim. Even unbelievers behaved better than you.

Now, I, as I say, this story is popular with Ibn Taymiyyah’s admirers today. I mean, it's hard for me to believe that that could have actually happened. I mean, surely Ghazan Khan would've responded, rather violently.

Aimen: Most likely. Yeah. I mean, a Mongol leader like Ghazan, he would have basically made Ibn Taymiyyah a head shorter and six feet under, no question about it. I mean, this is why just like a lot of the stories around many great Muslim scholars of the past, most of the stories after their death were really apocryphal.

Thomas: Well, either way, Ghazan Khan does not kill Ibn Taymiyyah. But what he does do is he returns home. Suddenly, he goes back to the centre of his empire in Iran with his army to repel an invader, a fellow Mongol invader from the East, leaving behind him, his Christian allies and their armies.

And for a few months there, they managed to maintain some kind of chaotic control of the city and its environments. They continue to misbehave as Ibn Taymiyyah considers it.

But in April of that year, the Mamluks are able to retake Damascus and Aleppo. There was a brief six months of tremendous panic, but in the end, things returned to normal, at least for a time.

In response, Ibn Taymiyyah goes on a sort of crusade, if you can put it that way, to purify Damascus and purify Syria of all of this Mongol, all of this Christian pollution. He closes the taverns; he prosecutes Christian allies of the Mongols. He accompanied the new Mamluk governor of Damascus on reprisal raids against Christians and Shia in Lebanon, who they accused of aiding the Mongols.

So, as I say, this sudden paroxysm of purification to purify a land that had been sullied by heresy, by pseudo Sunni invasion, by Christian heretical collaboration. But now we're coming to the close of this first half of our exploration of Ibn Taymiyyah’s life.

And after all of this, when I think of Ibn Taymiyyah, you know Aimen, what comes to mind more than anything else?

Aimen: What?

Thomas: What comes to mind is the great exegetical principle that I call the Lebowski Principle. That's The Big Lebowski, the Coen Brothers movie with Jeff Bridges playing The Dude. John Goodman's in it, Steve Buscemi. Go see it. If you haven't.

Well, in that movie, you get the line, which The Dude says to his friend, Walter, “You're not wrong, you are just an asshole.”

So, I think for me, the Lebowski Principle helps explain a lot in the world, especially amongst those radically inclined, you're not wrong, you're just an asshole. Obviously Ibn Taymiyyah had a point in everything that he said, the Mongols were not really fully Sunni. The Mongols had allied with Christians, et cetera, et cetera.

Just like as we'll find in the next episode, all the sort of enemies of Sunni Islam that Ibn Taymiyyah was going to go on and persecute and prosecute for the rest of his life. He often had a point, but he was just an asshole.

And in this way, I feel, and I don't want to offend anyone, but I do feel that he is a sort of proto Salafi. And it returns back to that exploration we had earlier of the fundamentalist mentality, the radical mentality. Why are they all such assholes? Why Aimen, are you and I sometimes such assholes?

Aimen: I tell you why Thomas, because Ibn Taymiyyah was the product of his time. He and his fellow Sunnis felt under siege. They were attacked from everywhere. Their world was shattered to pieces by outside enemies as well as inside enemies, whether real or perceived.

And that is why they behave in the way they do. It is the world of kill or be killed. The survival of the fittest, unite or die, basically. This is the world that he was growing up in.

Now mix in the Absolutist Salafism and you have a powder keg about to explode and this is what's going to happen.

Thomas: Yeah, it sure is. Ibn Taymiyyah's enemies, Aimen, as you say, real or imagined are the same enemies that modern Salafi jihadists see all around them. Philosophical, theological Muslims, Ash’aris, Sufis, Shia, of course Christians, Jews and Sunni leaders who are fake Muslims in their eyes.

They were there all around Ibn Taymiyyah and modern day Salafi jihadists had to see them all around them themselves.

Aimen: Not only Salafi jihadists Thomas, even politically active Safalis, those who are present in Egypt and Kuwait and many parts of the Arabian Peninsula in Iraq. I mean, they are also seeing all of those who you listed as also their enemies.

[Music Playing]

Thomas: Well, we're going to come back and finish our survey of the dramatic life story of Ibn Taymiyyah. He might think he's sitting pretty. The Mongols have been dispatched by the Mamluks, but in fact, little did he know, just around the corner, the Mongols will be back. Stay tuned for part two of Ibn Taymiyyah.

A reminder that you can follow the show over on Facebook and Twitter at MH Conflicted. And for a deeper dive into all the subjects we talk about here on Conflicted, head over to Facebook and search Conflicted Podcast Discussion Group.

There you will find other fans of the show in engaging in heated debates, enlightening conversations, and just generally geeking out over Conflicted related topics.

Conflicted is a Message Heard production. This episode was produced and edited by Harry Stott. Sandra Ferrari is our executive producer. Our theme music is by Matt Huxley and Tom Biddle.

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