Conflicted S4 E15: How Iran Works

Thomas: Welcome back to Conflicted with me, Thomas Small, alongside my irrepressible co-host, Aimen Dean. Hello, Aimen?

Aimen: Hello, everyone.

Thomas: Now, dear listeners, today we are embarking on a subject which gets Aimen animated like nothing else. In our preparation for this episode, my gosh, I wish you could have seen it. There were some grand tirades, fingers pointed in the air, wild gesticulation. No doubt we'll be getting more of that in the next hour.

Aimen: Don't worry, Thomas. Today I had my yoga, I had my zen in anticipation of this episode, which will boil my blood.

Thomas: After weeks and weeks of looking into the past, the present, and indeed the future of Sunni Islamism, for the next few weeks, we're going to be returning to their great Muslim rivals and our old friends, the Shia Islamists.

Aimen: Hooray.

Thomas: That's right. Over the next few episodes, we'll be looking at the Iranian nexus of terror in the Middle East, specifically looking at the growth and consolidation of Hezbollah in Lebanon.

But first, we're starting with the granddaddy of Shia Islamism, the Islamic Republic of Iran. What's the state of play in Persia? How is this diverse and divisive state constituted? And is there an Iranian future outside the revolutionary regime? Let's find out.

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Aimen, Iran today, we're going to leave history aside for a little while and talk about Iran today. What's going on with Iran? About a year ago, the protests began over the murder, can we say murder of Mahsa Amini by the regime’s forces sparking a huge nationwide wave of protests, which once again led some people to say the regime is about to fall.

But one year later, it's still there. So, what can we say about Iran today, Aimen?

Aimen: Well, I wasn't one of those people who were optimistic when the protests started over the death of poor Mahsa Amini. We have to understand that the death of Mahsa Amini happened at the hands of the so-called morality police.

If you think about it, in Iran, there is a strict dress code that all women who appear in public must cover their head, whether partially or entirely. There must be some covering.

Mahsa Amini who was young. She was a teenager at the time did not abide by that dress code. However, to her surprise and the surprise of the entire nation, the morality police were over eager when they were arresting her, they were beating her up so badly that she got a concussion and died in hospital later.

Thomas: I suppose this is something that happens semi-regularly in Iran, that some people opposed to the regime or who simply wish to live life in a more liberal fashion might test the rules a little bit to see what kind of response they will get.

They've only been let down until now, because when push comes to shove, the Iranian regime slaps back and says, no, no, we mustn't compromise the goals of the revolution.

Aimen: Absolutely. And so, her death sparked a major backlash from the nation's women. Many women, of course, removed their head scarfs. They started to chant, “Death to the regime.” Many young boys joined, many angry families who felt that their daughters could be next.

And then the caravan of young female martyrs joined Mahsa Amini. There were many young teenagers, 17s and 18s and 19s who were also chased, killed, thrown from buildings. And the death toll kept rising.

Thomas: The figures are in the 100s, around 500. You never know for sure. Of course, thousands were certainly arrested. Some executed by the government. Some died in the course of violent clashes with the police.

Aimen: Exactly. And at the time when I was looking at all of this, and I have many friends as you know, in the analytical community who kept saying, “This could be it, this could be it.” And I'm saying, “Guys, just shut up. Seriously.”

Thomas: Well, certainly since February this year, the protests have gone quiet. Never really gone away, I feel. I do think, though, of course I hear what you say, I don't think these protests or any protests like it will bring down the regime, but I do think the cat is a bit more out of the bag than before, maybe because of modern technology, smartphone technology, maybe because it's just been, what, like 44 years now since the revolution.

And a whole generation is firmly now of age, who did not live through the Shah, did not live through the optimistic years of the revolution. They have just lived in a more or less repressive, moralistic, theocratic regime, and they want change.

So, I think the cat is out of the bag, and the protests will probably just continue more or less forever. Do you agree, Aimen?

Aimen: The problem is Thomas, yes, the cat is out of the bag, but this cat is a very fluffy Persian cat. Is not going to be that kind of a cat that will scratch and yell and absolutely fight back ferociously.

No, no, no, no. This is a cat that will purr and meow, and it's not going to do anything. Look, the reality is that for the Iranian regime to fall, there is only one and one outcome, armed uprising, and a civil war.

Apart from that, there is no hope whatsoever for the regime to fall. And why, you ask me? Is because of one organisation that is there to guard the regime to the death, the IRGC. An ideological army, fanatical army that is going to defend to the last man, the Ayatollah and his office, and the constitution of Iran that is supposed to be paving the way for the return of the eschatological Messiah, the Imam Mahdi.

The entire complex apparatus of the Iranian regime in terms of military security and intelligence, is designed to prevent even the slightest idea of a coup from happening. That's how the Iranian state is structured.

So, no matter how many slogans and how many placards, and how many shouts and how many headscarf you throw at the regime and their forces, the end of the day, the one who will rule Iran is the one with the gun. And that's it.

Thomas: Well, before we talk about that very complex apparatus, and we will talk about it, dear listener, let's go back to our old friend Sayyid Qutb and talk about the connection that Sayyid Qutb has to this very complex regime that is keeping the Iranian people under its boot.

We've talked about Qutb's enduring influence across the Sunni world through the Muslim Brotherhood and other groups that were inspired by his writings.

But despite the fact that Iran is a Shia country largely, and therefore often diametrically opposed to much of the Sunni world, the regime there and the ideology of the regime is imbued with Sayyid Qutb's teachings and the teachings of the Muslim Brotherhood to some extent, and this is explicit.

So, in 1984, the Islamic Republic of Iran issued a postage stamp commemorating the 18th anniversary of Qutb’s so-called martyrdom in 1966, at the hands of Nassar. The postage stamp showed an image of Sayyid Qutb behind bars. It's quite a famous image, really.

So, right from the beginning, that's only five years after the revolution, Iran is saying we support Sayyid Qutb quite clearly.

In August 2012, so the flash forward almost 30 years, Mohamed Morsi, the Muslim Brotherhood president of Egypt, becomes the first Egyptian president to pay the Islamic Republic a state visit. I think that means something.

The scholar Yusuf Ünal has said Persian language, translations of Sayyid Qutb’s works played an instrumental role in helping to shape the political and ideological discourses of Islamism in pre-revolutionary Iran. But Aimen, Qutb was Sunni.

Aimen: Okay, you have to-

Thomas: I love it. I love your okay. Okay, let me sort this out. I love it.

Aimen: Look, if you think about Sayyid Qutb being a Sunni, it doesn't mean that it'll prevent the Shia philosophers and scholars from looking for ways to find a political framework for their upcoming revolutionary plans.

To give you an example, remember that the Shia generally refrained from engaging in the political machinations of the Muslim world for almost a millennium.

Thomas: Yeah, I just want to remind the listener, Aimen, that we talked about this a lot last season in our episode on Iran, in our episode on Ayatollah Khomeini and the movements throughout the centuries really that led up to the revolution. So, go back and listen to that episode for that context.

But yes, you're right. For most of its history, the Shia were politically quietest.

Aimen: Indeed, yes. Because they were in the status of waiting and waiting and waiting and waiting and waiting for the return, the long-awaited return of the Imam Mahdi. A millennium passed and he didn't show up, maybe his Uber’s too late.

Thomas: I think this Imam from wherever he lives in occultation is enjoying his stay there. I don't think he wants to come back.

Aimen: Well, if these were my followers, I don't want to emerge whatsoever. So, but anyway.

Thomas: Aimen.

Aimen: Sorry, I couldn't resist.

Thomas: Following the Second World War, and this is important, I think, there was throughout the Muslim world a movement towards Sunni Shia rapprochement in general. There were several attempts by intellectuals, scholars on both sides of the sectarian divide in Islam to iron out some of their differences, or at least to deemphasize their differences in the name of Muslim unity.

Sayyid Qutb was in a way, part of this wider movement because in his own writings, he tended to downplay a bit of the hardline Sunni anti-Shia perspective.

Aimen: I think what attracted some Shia scholars to Sayyid Qutb’s writings is the fact that he actually adopted some of the Shia narratives when it comes to the historical grievances that they possess against major Sunni figures, whether it is Umayyad Dynasty or the third caliph Uthman.

In fact, he went as far as describing Uthman as corrupt in his book In the Shades of the Qur’an, and even went as far as saying that the revolt against Uthman was misjudged by later Muslim historians and scholars and they should revisit that revolt as a revolt for social justice. It wasn't a conspiracy against a noble ruler.

Thomas: I mean, that perspective is very Shia friendly. A lot of Shia would've been like, “Hey, hey, this is what we've been saying for a thousand years.”

Aimen: Indeed. And I think this is what attracted many Shia scholars and philosophers to Sayyid Qutb’s writings.

Thomas: I think it's also interesting to ponder the possibility that the influence went the other way, and that Qutb could have been inspired by some Shia ideas directly.

So, for example, in 1953, so this is before, obviously before he was arrested, Sayyid Qutb received Navvab Safavi in Cairo. Now, long-term listeners will remember Navvab Safavi, he was the founder of Fada'iyan-e Islam, a revolutionary Shia Islamist group in Iran that was attacking figures within the Shah's regime.

He was executed in 1956 by the regime. We've talked a lot about him on Conflicted, like so many figures, he pops up throughout these stories because he's so important.

Well, in 1953, he visited Cairo and Sayyid Qutb received him at his home. The following year, Safavi attended a conference in Jordan, which had been organised by Qutb. So, this was a conference on the Palestinian question, a Muslim Brotherhood sponsored conference where Safavi mingled widely with Muslim Brotherhood members, and Sayyid Qutb again chatted with him.

At the end of that conference, Safavi wrote, “Whoever wants to be a real Shi’i should follow the Muslim Brotherhood.” That's a pretty strong statement, but it also suggests that in his conversations with Safavi, maybe Qutb was influenced by him as well.

Aimen: Indeed, because you see the influence goes both ways. I tell you why, because first of all the Shia were full of revolutionary zeal against a royalist. You see, remember, Egypt already overthrow a king in 1952.

Thomas: Fat Farouk.

Aimen: Exactly. However, the Shah in Iran overthrew the government, it’s the other way around.

Thomas: Yeah.

Aimen: In 1953. So, at that time, the Shia revolutionaries were looking for a political framework. And people like Sayyid Qutb with their books like al-hukm al-Islami, which means the Islamic government, with their books like al-Mustaqbal li-hadha al-din, the future is for this faith. He means Islam. And of course, later Milestones. They provided a ready packaged vision and a manual to how to start a Islamic government.

Thomas: Well, in his autobiography, the Ayatollah Khamenei, the current supreme leader of Iran, wrote that he entered politics first through the writings of Navvab Safavi and second through the writings of Sayyid Qutb.

So, there we have a direct link between Sayyid Qutb and the Iranian regime today, the supreme leader of Iran, Ali Khamenei was inspired by a Qutb and Muslim Brotherhood ideas, and he does not pretend otherwise.

As early as the 1950s translations of Qutb works into Persian began appearing, so In the Shade of the Qur’an, began appearing in Persian soon after its first volumes appeared in 1954.

Social Justice in Islam, the first really sort of great Islamist work by Qutb was translated as early as 1959 by Hadi Khosroshahi, who would later become the Islamic Republic's first ambassador to the Vatican, just to give you a sense of how deep these influences go.

And in 1966, Khamenei then aged only 27, founded a publishing house and began publishing Islamist works. And he, along with his brother Mohammad and other prominent Shia radical intellectuals, translated more of Sayyid Qutb books.

Aimen: Indeed. And one of the books they have translated is called al-hukm al-Islami.

Thomas: The Islamic government.

Aimen: Yeah, absolutely. It's a book by Sayyid Qutb which is providing a framework how a Muslim, or shall I say, Islamic government should look like, should act, and should enforce the laws on its citizens and how it should guard itself from enemies without and within.

Thomas: Khamenei himself translated The Future of this Religion. And in that book, Qutb explicitly states that through jihad, all of humanity will eventually be forced to submit to Islam, and he calls on Muslims to fight against imperial powers.

Now, if you're a 27-year-old, Ali Khamenei, these revolutionary ideas pop, don't they, Aimen? He must have just said, “This is it; this is it; this is what we need.”

Aimen: Absolutely. The reason is because of the absence of a political framework, a political radical ideas, the Shia were shunning politics for a thousand years. And then when they decided, well, the time is right now.

Thomas: Khamenei and the others in his revolutionary circle, who had been influenced by Sayyid Qutb's writings and had indeed translated those writings and thereby inflamed Persian sentiment in the direction of Sayyid Qutb, those intellectuals, those radicals blended the ideas of Sayyid Qutb with the ideas of the Ayatollah Khomeini.

The Ayatollah Khomeini himself was probably not so directly influenced by Sayyid Qutb. His ideas were rooted in 19th century radical Shia ideas. And we covered this last season.

Even his interpretation of Wilayat al-Faqih, the guardianship of the jurist comes from radical kind of political thought from the 19th century. It was his followers who blended those ideas with Sayyid Qutb's ideas to make the potent ideological mix that led to the revolution, and which remains key to Iran.

When Ali Khamenei became supreme leader in 1989, after Khomeini's death, he made Sayyid Qutb's works required reading for all new recruits to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to the IRGC. So, that just goes to show you how important Sayyid Qutb is to the revolution.

Aimen: Thomas, there is a question, though I have in mind, and this question was asked 24 years ago, exactly in the winter of 1999 in a massive palatial villa in Wazir Akbar Khan in Kabul, which was the headquarters of Al-Qaeda there in Afghanistan.

And I remember I was there at dinner and people gathered, this big place where we always gather for the supper before we go to sleep and present there was Ayman al-Zawahiri and Abu Musab al-Suri. Abu Musab al-Suri for some of the dear listeners who don't know who he is, he was one of the most brilliant strategic minds that the jihadist movement ever produced.

An interesting point were raised during the discussions between Ayman al-Zawahiri and Abu Musab al-Suri over that dinner that night.

And the point was, why was the revolution in Iran, which was primarily based on political ideals produced by a Sunni organisation, which is the Muslim Brotherhood, and the writings of Koob was successful in Iran, but yet not a single Sunni Muslim country was successful in establishing the Islamic government as envisioned by Hassan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb.

I mean, they mentioned that Ali Khamenei, the Ayatollah of Iran at the time, and still until now, translated Sayyid Qutb’s ideas, incorporated them into the political framework of the Islamic Revolution in Iran. And voila, you have a proper Islamic government as envisioned by Sayyid Qutb and by Hassan al-Banna.

And this is in the only Shia majority country at that time, yet 55 more other Sunni countries, and not a single one of them, and not a single Islamic movement, based on the ideals of Sayyid Qutb and Hassan al-Banna, were able to establish a successful revolution to install an Islamic government.

Thomas: And what's the answer? Why are Sunni radical ideas only successfully implemented in a Shia country?

Aimen: Ah, this is where Abu Musab al-Suri answered by saying is simple really, the Shia faith is a highly structured faith with hierarchy of religion, and therefore, it's a centralised, organised religion with a chain of command, which unfortunately we chaotic, divided Sunnis don't have.

We have a disorganised religion with no hierarchy, no central authority, and therefore, if you have a chaotic religious organisation, you will have a chaotic revolution, which means failure.

Thomas: Well, there's only one answer, Aimen. All Sunni Islamists need to become Shia.

Aimen: No, of course not. Heavens forbid. However, I can tell you this, the reality is that he was right. Abu Musab al-Suri was right, because ironically this became very evident in his home country, Syria, because in later years, a Syrian of all people asked me the question in 2019, he said to me, “Aimen, you spent years and years of your life in four different war zones. You've been in these conflicts; you've seen the dynamics of conflicts. You spent time in Bosnia, Afghanistan.

You've seen conflicts all over the place. And so, you know the dynamics, how could that at the beginning of the uprising in Syria, that the numerical superiority was on the side of the rebels, and yet Assad in the end won.”

I said, because Assad was one entity supported that under his command by Iranians, by Lebanese Hezbollah, by Iraqi militias, by Pakistani and Afghan Shia, all of them came together and they were united under the effort of Assad and Qasem Soleimani, that's it.

They were all under one umbrella, one goal, one unit, and they were fighting as one unit. However, you guys split into 80 different factions, 80 plus actually different factions. So, Assad and Soleimani picked you off one by one.

Thomas: You're not convincing me that Sunni Islamists shouldn't become Shia if they want to win the game that they're playing. But we're going to stop now for a break.

Aimen: No, they should become more disciplined. They should become more disciplined.

Thomas: Aimen, do you want the Sunni Islamists to win? My goodness.

Aimen: No, no, no. I didn't say that. Actually, Thomas, the reality is that if the Shia have their grand Ayatollah, what we need to have is a grand king, and that's it.

Thomas: A grand king, or perhaps a supreme guide in Cairo.

Aimen: No.

Thomas: But let's stop here. We'll take a quick break and we'll be back to explain how the Iranian revolution implemented Sayyid Qutb's ideas in Milestones, particularly to erect a very complex political organism. Stay tuned.

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We're back. We're talking about how the Iranian revolution was inspired by Sayyid Qutb, and we're going to start by talking about Sayyid Qutb's let's say, most popular book Milestones. We talked a lot about Milestones in our episodes on Sayyid Qutb this season.

And interesting, Aimen, it is often said, and I've seen it said again and again in many books that Ali Khamenei himself translated Milestones.

Now, I can find no actual evidence of this. I actually spent a lot of time looking for evidence. The only translation into Persian I can find of Milestones was done in 1998. And all of these books that allege, that Khamenei himself translated it never provide a footnote.

What do you think, Aimen? Can you verify that Ali Khamenei did translate Milestones? And if it wasn't translated until 1998, which seems possible, might there be a reason for it? Is there possibly something in Milestones that the Shia revolutionaries of Iran didn't particularly agree with?

Aimen: It is understood within certain intelligence circles that Sayyid Qutb's book Milestones was in fact translated though not in its entirety by Ali Khamenei, and it was intended for private distribution, not for general publication.

And it was mainly for those who were part of the radical revolutionary circles that surrounded Khamenei and Khomeini at that time. And the reason is because there were two chapters in particular that were contradictory of Shia faith, especially the Qur’anic generation, talking about the disciples of the Prophet Muhammad and all of that.

Thomas: A very Salafi chapter.

Aimen: Indeed, because it was of course, the end of Sayyid Qutb’s life, his ideas matured so much into Sunni Salafism and by then, basically he abandoned a lot of the Islamic unity that he was calling for by the mid-60s.

Thomas: So, if we can say then that with the exception of those two chapters or so, that Ali Khamenei translated Milestones, can we also say that Milestones, Sayyid Qutb's detailed plan for the erection of an Islamic state was successfully implemented in Iran? And if so, how exactly, Aimen?

Aimen: Well, because that's exactly what both Ayman al-Zawahiri and Abu Musab al-Suri, two of the grand titans of the jihadist movement in the 20 and 21st centuries, I mean stated that they were successful based on the ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood and Sayyid Qutb.

And I can walk the listener through the steps. First it was always about say it as it is, you have to shout it from the rooftops. What is the message? Then you have to say that this figure of the Shah is the representation of Jahiliyyah, is the representation of the pre-Islamic age of ignorance, and only Islam is the solution. Al-Islam huwa al-hâl, that's what Sayyid Qutb advocated.

Thomas: Yeah. Islam is the solution.

Aimen: Exactly. And then you have to make the emperor naked. The emperor has no clothes. You have to make him naked. So, you talk about his alliance with Israel, his big party for the two and a half thousand years of the Persian Empire.

And then after that, you go into building the individual, then you move into building the family and how to build a proper Muslim family to resist the advancement of Western immorality that is being imported by the Shah and the elite around him.

And then after that, of course, the question of how do you confront an unjust government? And how do you establish the government of God on earth, the kingdom of God on earth, you have to have a violent confrontation. What did Khomeini always call for?

And you remember in the episode on the fall of the Shah, I told you about the story of Khomeini visiting Ayatollah al-Khoei in Negev and saying, “I'm ready to sacrifice hundreds of thousands of Iranians in order to bring down the Shah and to bring about an Islamic government,” to the point where Ayatollah al-Khoei was completely stunned and silent, and he couldn't even look Khomeini in the eye because of what he said.

Aimen: So actually, already he was imbued with revolutionary zeal that let us confront violently the regime that is the only violence to bring it down. And violence did take place.

Thomas: It sure did. Well, Sayyid Qutb inspired, Sayyid Qutb paved the way with his writings, and the Ayatollah Khomeini and all of the figures surrounding him, erected the Islamic Republic of Iran, which is, as we've said a few times already, a very complicated beast.

Let's talk about this complicated beast. Let's talk about what a theocratic, Islamist state actually looks like. And dear listener, I can promise you this, it is very weird.

Aimen: It is.

Thomas: At the very top of this weird, complicated beast sits the supreme leader. And the first thing to point out is the supreme leader, the murshid, it's the same word that the Muslim Brotherhood uses to describe its leader. So, there's a similarity already quite apparent.

There is a difference however, in Iran, that supreme leader is an Ayatollah, a grand Ayatollah. He stands in for the missing Imam. He is an absolute illuminated ruler whose word cannot be gain said, it's a very, very strong position. And basically, it dominates everything.

Aimen: Indeed, it's a position akin to the pope … but the pope is Christ's representative on earth. I know basically when I say this, I more or less upset your Orthodox sensitivities, but nonetheless.

Thomas: No, I'm perfectly aware that the Roman Catholics are wrong about that, but-

Aimen: Yeah, exactly. But from the point of view of the Iranian constitution, especially Article five, the absent Imam is God's representative on earth. The supreme leader is the representative of that representative and therefore, he is by extension God's representative. Though indirectly twice removed on earth.

Thomas: Already very complicated. Well, according to the constitution of Iran, the supreme leader is responsible for defining and supervising the general policies of the Islamic Republic.

And just to give you a sense of his powers, he is the commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces. He directly controls the intelligence and security operations of the government. He is the only one who can declare war or declare peace, if the country is in war.

He appoints the supreme commander of the IRGC. He has the power both to appoint and dismiss the leaders of the judiciary, the leaders of the state radio and television networks. He appoints half of the 12 members of the Council of Guardians, which we'll get to.

And I think this is the most important thing, about 2000 official representatives of the supreme leader are scattered across all the other branches of government and state institutions. And these representatives can invoke his authority to do pretty much whatever they like, often making them more powerful than even government ministers.

So, the supreme leader has agents all throughout the Islamic Republic, basically getting in the way of the other branches of government exercising any autonomy. This is key.

Now, below the supreme leader is the president, the second highest ranking post in Iran. But that's like saying Adam, the first man is second compared to God.

Thomas: Yeah, exactly.

Aimen: And I think you've been generous to Adam here anyway.

Thomas: I mean, sometimes it seems like the president of Iran is just a public profile position, like he's just a kind of a spokesperson. So much of his power is diluted.

Aimen: Well, some people ask me the question, what does the president do? And I always used to say the president is really, really, really the prime minister of a great executive king.

Thomas: Yeah. And the president, of course oversees a cabinet of 20, 25 ministers, but they must be approved by parliament. Yes, the Islamic Republic of Iran has a parliament. Tell us about the parliament, Aimen.

Aimen: Indeed, this is a parliament which is elected, but before you say hooray for the democracy I can tell you that everyone who is there sitting in parliament right now was elected because he went through a rigorous selection after which another body, we will talk about it later, but another body would have removed a lot of the candidates and just left, I would say one out of 10 of the candidates standing.

Thomas: Yeah, yeah. I mean, the parliament has 290 ish members at any given point. They're elected every four years. Formally the parliament gets to draft legislation, vote on legislation like most parliaments everywhere.

But and this dear listener is where it gets weird, there are some other branches of the Islamic government that have a lot of power and are very, very difficult to keep straight. There is first the Council of Guardians, the Council of Guardians. It sounds like something out of Star Wars.

The Council of Guardians has the power to veto any legislation that is not in line with the Sharia or with the revolution. A very broad remit there. And it's comprised of 12 religious jurists, half of whom are appointed by the supreme leader, and half of whom are appointed by the judiciary, which is in turn controlled by the supreme leader.

Aimen: Exactly.

Thomas: So, the Council of Guardians is very much under the control of the supreme leader. And through that council, he can veto parliamentary legislation, more or less, as he likes.

In addition to the Council of Guardians, there's the Assembly of Experts. I just love it so much. I mean, technocrats everywhere are probably drooling at all these different committees that get in the way of democracy.

So, the Assembly of Experts, this is quite remarkable, it elects the supreme leader. And every now and then, reconfirms, that election, formally and the Assembly of Experts itself is elected by the public every eight years. So again, democracy.

So, the public every eight years gets to elect the Assembly of Experts that elect the supreme leader, except one thing the Council of Guardians decides who can run for elections to the Assembly of Experts.

Aimen: Which is appointed by the supreme leaders.

Thomas: So, I think you're seeing the circular and complex nature of the Islamic Republic. So, we have the Council of Guardians, the Assembly of Experts, and then, and this is the weirdest of all, we have the Expediency Discernment Council of the system.

Aimen: Exactly.

Thomas: Let's just call it the Expediency Council for short. Now, this council was founded late ish long after the revolution in 1987, founded by the first Ayatollah Khomeini himself, when the Council of Guardians and the parliament weren't really getting on. The parliament was trying to kind of get out a bit from under the thumb of the Council of Guardians. So, the supreme leader at the time said, “Guys, I have a solution.”

Aimen: Another committee.

Thomas: “I'm going to create the Expediency Council to resolve disputes between the Council of Guardians and the parliament. It's officially advisory, but I'm on it, the supreme leader. I'm on the council, and I will directly choose the other members of the council and it will advise me to do whatever I want to do.”

And there you have the system. The only state apparatus that is more complicated and difficult to understand is the apparatus of the European Union. I think some of the European Union founders were looking at the Islamic Republic thinking, “Hmm, I quite like this.”

And I'm afraid, Aimen, that we're going to have to confuse the dear listener a little bit more because we haven't even begun to talk about the armed forces and all of the various security apparatuses in Iran, especially the IRGC.

Now we talk about the IRGC a lot. It always comes up. It's very important. We haven't really just explained it clearly. So, what is the IRGC? The Sepāh-e Pāsdārān-e Enqelâb-e Eslâmī.

Aimen: No, please don't say it first, please.

Thomas: Alright. You do it.

Aimen: You just killed it.

Thomas: Sepāh-e Pāsdārān-e Enqelâb-e Eslâmī. I'm trying to be Persian.

Aimen: It's okay. So, it is Sepāh-e Pāsdārān-e Enqelâb-e Eslâmī.

Thomas: Sepāh-e Pāsdārān-e Enqelâb-e Eslâmī.

Aimen: Yes. Perfect. Afarin, as they say in Persia. Afarin.

Thomas: Okay. What is the IRGC? It was founded in May 1979 by the big man himself, the Ayatollah Khomeini. He passed a decree in that month, 1979. The goal was to maintain domestic security. The revolution had just happened, and the whole country was by no means on board.

So, domestic security was of primary importance. The IRGC was there to maintain it and to keep an eye on the regular army, which was not loyal to the revolution.

So, the first thing about the IRGC is that it is an explicitly political institution. In Iran to this day, the regular armed forces are apolitical like most armed forces, but the IRGC is political. It “defends” the revolution.

And to that extent, the Iranian constitution explicitly gives the IRGC the responsibility of maintaining Iran's religious spirit. Now Aimen, that's a very weird thing to give an armed body responsibility over.

Aimen: Well, their mission is to make sure that Iran's Islamic Revolution lives on, not only within Iran, but also outside. It is the arm of the regime first to protect itself from coups by the regular army, to protect itself from uprisings by the people, to protect itself also, from threats by minorities and separatist aspirations, whether it is the Kurds, the Baluchis, the Azeris, or the Ahwazi Arabs.

The whole idea is that the Revolutionary Guard is there to protect the regime and the revolution.

Thomas: And to that extent, initially, the IRGC was placed under the supervision of a cleric, the Ayatollah Lahouti. Now, the man in charge of training from the very beginning is a very key figure. We've talked about him on and off before throughout Conflicted, Hashemi Rafsanjani, an incredibly important man in the history of modern Iran.

He received help in the training of the IRGC from men who had been training with the ML Movement in Lebanon. So, listeners of last season will remember the ML Movement coming out of the Lebanese Civil War there. We'll talk about it in the next episode, of course.

So, after the revolution in Iran, the regular army was under the command of the president. The IRGC was under the command of the clerics. So, already you have quite an unusual situation. And recruitment to the IRGC was very carefully undertaken to screen out, especially leftists. They were terrified of communist infiltration into the IRGC.

New recruits, carefully screened, were thoroughly indoctrinated. And loyalty to the supreme leader was paramount. And this is key. The IRGC is the supreme leader's army.

Aimen: Actually, their usefulness during the Iran/Iraq war, especially during the counteroffensive, which started 1983, all the way until the end of the war proved to be decisive in making them acquire more funding, more recruits.

They started to have their own air force. They started to have their own navy. They started to become, again, yet a parallel army to the army, starting this fashion where Iran is a country that is in parallel to itself.

Thomas: To the extent that some voices were concerned that having two armies is not the best way to go. And after Khomeini's death in 1989, Rafsanjani became president. So, Ali Khamenei became supreme leader, and Rafsanjani became president.

When Rafsanjani became president, there was some debate, should we combine the regular army and the IRGC, but in the end, no, the decision was taken. We won't do that.

Instead, a joint armed forces general staff was created to coordinate between the two bodies, but they remained separate. And in fact, the general staff was overseen by guess who the supreme leader. And so, the IRGC's power went up.

Aimen: In 1989 after the death of Khomeini, the elevation of Ayatollah Khamenei into the position of supreme leader. And the elevation of Rafsanjani into the position of president. Rafsanjani is generally considered to be not from the religious clergy class. He is more from the Bazaari class.

For people who understand Iran politics, the Bazaari, we are talking here about the commercial class, the class of the merchants. Being from the merchant class, he decided to liberalise, well, to be honest, part liberalise the Iranian economy and to offer some partial privatisation of state assets.

In the meantime, given that the IRGC did quite well for its size and its funding during the war with a Iraq between ‘80 and ‘88, the Iranian government gave the IRGC veterans a lot of benefits and preferential treatment when it come to having economic incentives within the country in return for what they did during the war.

The privatisation of parts of the state sectors in Iran went immediately to the heads of the IRGC leaders, and they started to acquire a lot of the state assets, especially in telecommunications, construction, the ports, especially three ports in particular that they were eyeing Chabahar, Bandar Abbas and Bandar Imam Khomeini.

These three ports, almost 40% of the docks there are owned by the IRGC, which is exactly almost the same percentage by now of the entire Iranian economy, that the IRGC control, just one company alone, control assets worth more than 250 billion U.S. dollars and over 800 subsidiaries within Iran.

It is an army; it is a welfare organisation. It is a religious organisation, and it is a commercial operation.

Thomas: And it is a political power, especially since 1997 when Khatami became president. President Khatami was a reformist president. He sought to introduce liberalising, if you like, reforms. And he mobilised the young generation in Iran, especially students to support these efforts. And emboldened by this, students began a certain amount of peaceful political activism and organisation.

Now, in the late 90s when this was happening, the IRGC wrote to the president's office and explicitly said that unless this activity stopped, it would overthrow the government. It threatened a coup.

Khatami backed down which severely compromised his authority. His whole reform program was largely wrecked, and the IRGC had proved their political power. They realised, aha, we can use this to our advantage.

Aimen: Well, of course, they flexed their muscles so much during Khatami's presidency. And in fact, during that time actually in 2003, Bush invaded Iraq, Saddam Hussein fell. And there were some questions, that the old enemy is gone. So, what is the point of the IRGC being around?

And the IRGC said, “Oh, no, no, no, no. Wait, wait, wait. Now this is our moment. The great Satan is on our doorstep. Now we need to double our budget, double our effort, get more funding, get more recruit, increase our spending, get more missiles, more weapons, more training, more recruits, and embolden the Kurds force division within the IRGC.”

To the point where they were not only adamant that they will bend the government to their will, they decided to become the government, even. So, they fielded a candidate of their own, a former officer of the IRGC and a former mayor of Tehran, Ahmadinejad who some Iranians like to call him Ahmaq Nejad which means stupid Nejad.

So, they fielded that candidate in 2005 elections, and he won. And the first thing he did, half of his cabinet were former IRGC offices. There is no question that now is the time to absolutely take advantage of this situation that has risen in Iraq next door, that we now have the enemy at our doorstep.

So, they solve the Iranian people this idea that first it was Iraq, second it'll be Tehran. You know, if we don't embolden and strengthen and build up the IRGC to be a much greater power than it is, then the Americans will get their tanks rolling in Tehran.

And this is how the complete takeover of the Iranian state with the blessings of the Ayatollah Khamenei himself, happened by the IRGC.

Thomas: Yeah, that's the point. As supreme leader, the IRGC is ultimately under Khamenei's authority. And in the early teens, when President Ahmadinejad tried to increase the power of the presidency at the expense of the supreme leader, the IRGC actually backed the supreme leader.

They didn't even back their former boy Ahmadinejad. It shows just how deeply ingrained in the IRGC, loyalty to the supreme leader is.

At that time, Khamenei’s representative inside the IRGC said, “The authority of the grand jurist is the same as that of the Shiite Imam, and the obligation to obey him is the same.” That's saying something.

Aimen: Absolutely.

Thomas: So, Aimen, are the IRGC now, the most significant political and military body in Iran?

Aimen: Well, let me put it this way, in a commercial sense, I get asked by corporations around the world who want to enter into the Iranian market, and they'll ask the question, “What is the chance that when we do business there that we'll end up directly or indirectly doing business with the IRGC?”

I will say to them, “Well, the chances is between 105 to 107%,” and they get the message that there is no way that you can do any deal in Iran, and you can be in Iran to invest in Iran to actually have an office in Iran, and that you will not come across the IRGC and do business with them in any way, shape or form, whether directly or indirectly. In other words, Iran is IRGC and IRGC is Iran.

Thomas: It's like doing business in Sicily in the old days when eventually you're going to have to do business with the mafia.

Aimen: Oh, yes, absolutely. And the IRGC itself is a parallel army to the army. They control Hezbollah in Lebanon. They control the Shia militias in Iraq. They control the Shia militias in Syria, and they control, of course, the Houthis in Yemen.

So, they have between 300 and 400,000 fighters. And this is just only one branch inside the IRGC, which itself already doesn't have more than 250,000 fighters.

Thomas: Well, to some extent, Aimen, you're setting up the next few episodes of Conflicted when we are going to talk about Iran's terror nexus, as we're calling it around the region.

But as we reach the end of this episode, I want to ask you, what in your view is the smallest change that would need to happen inside Iran to transform Iran into a functioning country at peace with its neighbours and integrated into the world properly?

I mean, we are always talking about when is the change going to come and when is the coup going to happen? When is the revolution going to occur there? It overthrows the regime.

And we all know that if that were to happen, or God forbid when that happens, it's going to be a total bloodbath. So, nobody wants that. What would have to happen? What is the least that would have to happen to make Iran, in your view, a normal functioning cooperative, globally responsible country?

Aimen: First of all, I must state that I do not whatsoever support a violent overthrow of the regime because it'll lead to a civil war. And a civil war is what I hate to see Iran go through. The Iranian people are so sweet, so lovely, they don't deserve any of this whatsoever. They deserve a better outcome.

Coming back to this, I would say that if the Iranian decision makers and leaders, let's say in a post Khamenei world, if he were to die tomorrow and they decide that rationality should replace superstition, then the thing they should do is to abolish Article five of the Iranian constitution, which means abolishing completely the office of the Ayatollah and replace that with the president.

You don't have to replace anything else. You don't need to get rid of all the other councils, whether it is the Council of Expediency or the council of experts or guardians or whatever. Keep it, keep it all.

The whole idea is that remove this idea that Iran is a country in waiting for someone who is a saviour, a messiah, to come to lead Iran into conquering the rest of the world. This ain't going to happen, my dear friends, it ain’t going to happen.

So therefore, it is better if Iran would just return to the brilliant rationality that always characterize the Iranian personality over two and a half thousand years of civilization.

The civilization that gave us Al-Khwarizmi, the civilization that gave us Omar Khayyam, the civilization that gave us Ibn Sina, Jabbar Nahayan, goodness, and I could go on and on about how much scientific advancement that came out of the civilization.

Just return to rationality, return to reason, and abolish Article five, and just have a president and don't change anything else. That's it. That's all we need.

And then Iran would become a less belligerent, less ideologically driven, more rationally driven country that would seek its benefit rather than the fulfilment of fairytales that will never materialise.

Thomas: Well, it's funny because on the surface, it doesn't seem like abolishing Article five should be the hardest thing in the world to achieve. But as we've seen throughout this episode, the revolutionary complex that has been erected in Iran is very, very complicated indeed, and I fear very secure. I don't think Article five will be abolished anytime soon.

Now, people who followed the news of late know that there have been geopolitical changes afoot in the Middle Eastern region over the last few months regarding Iran and its rivals, especially Saudi Arabia, movements towards more peaceful and normative relations have been occurring.

We will talk about all of this in an episode that's coming up soon. We wanted to use this episode to just give a kind of lay of the land of Iran, describe the regime, how it works, describe where it came from, where it might be going.

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And in the next episode, we're going to talk about the most notorious, well established and most potent arm of the Iranian regime's external activities. We've talked about it before here and there, but we've never devoted a whole episode to it. So, coming up, Conflicted does Hezbollah. Stay tuned.

A reminder that you can follow the show over on Facebook and Twitter at MH Conflicted. And for a deeper dive into all the subjects we talk about here on Conflicted, head over to Facebook and search Conflicted Podcast Discussion Group.

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Conflicted is a Message Heard production. This episode was produced and edited by Harry Stott. Sandra Ferrari is our executive producer. Our theme music is by Matt Huxley and Tom Biddle.