Conflicted S4 E22: Yemen: From Revolution to Civil War

Speakers: Thomas Small, Aimen Dean, & Baraa Shiban

Thomas: Welcome back, dear listeners, you are tuned in to another episode of Conflicted with me, Thomas Small.

Aimen: And me, Aimen Dean.

Baraa: And me, Baraa Shiban.

Thomas: Yes, that's right. We are back again with our wonderful guest, the Yemeni political activist, Baraa Shiban, as we continue our long march through the tumultuous history of Yemen.

And for the next two episodes with a bit of a difference. You might not have realised dear listeners, but normally through the magic of audio production, we record Conflicted remotely from different parts of the globe, me in the UK, and Aimen in — I'm not saying.

But today we have a rare treat. Aimen is in London, and we are all here together in the studio. Isn't it great, Aimen, to be in the same room together for the first time in months?

Aimen: Absolutely. So, if you do any mistakes, I can always throw something at you. Perfect.

Thomas: And Baraa, it's lovely to see you in person. It's been a very long time.

Baraa: Indeed, indeed. I mean, I'm glad to see actually both of you.

Thomas: We are now entering the final stretch with two episodes left to go of this epic series. We're now on the cusp of Yemen's Civil War. The Arab Spring has brought a new hope for Baraa, and those like him yearning for democracy in Yemen.

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But will they be able to found a new constitution outside the reach of Ali Abdullah Saleh and the insurgent Houthis? Or will it all be doomed to failure? Let's find out.

The theme of today's story really is that in Yemen following the Arab Spring, nobody trusted anybody. It was a time of great mistrust and a politics of mistrust. Animated not only Yemen, but the regional geopolitical actors as well.

Baraa, first tell us, put yourself back in late 2011, early 2012, after the Arab Spring. How optimistic were you feeling, at the time?

Baraa: So, I remember at the time there were two conflicting feelings at the same time. The general, I would say, atmosphere in the squares in the protests. And me, one of them, they were very angry about the deal that was brokered by the GCC countries.

Thomas: This deal is known as the GCC Initiative. And we'll describe it in a second. So, the youth wing of the protest movement didn't like the deal.

Baraa: They didn't like the deal. And at the same time, there's a sense of hope because things were starting to look different. This is the first time that Yemen would be coming out, ruling itself without Ali Abdullah Saleh, and kind of a new political arrangement is about to be set.

Thomas: So, a bit of hope, a bit of anger on the streets. Maybe not the best combination of feelings going into a new era, but still things were looking up because of the GCC Initiative.

So, the GCC Initiative, that's the Gulf Cooperation Council Initiative, signed on the 23rd of November 2011. The signatories were on the one side President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who by signing agreed to stand down.

And a group of other Yemeni political figures, some from Ali Abdullah Saleh’s political party, the GPC. Others from the opposition political party, that big basket of parties, the joint meetings parties, the JMP and a kind of co-signatory to the deal was the Secretary General of the GCC himself. It was signed in Riyadh.

Now Aimen, the GCC, that's a group of Gulf countries, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, and Qatar. Describe why the GCC should have been the co-signatory to this Yemeni deal.

Aimen: Several reasons. First of all, the size of the Yemeni expatriate community in the Gulf is huge, so you're talking about three, three and a half million people. So, for them, that is an important thing, the stability of one of the largest foreign expat community living in the region.

And also, the fear that if there is a greater instability, that would reflect badly on the GCC, terrorism, refugees, narcotics, weapons smuggling. I mean, Yemen’s stability is the stability of the GCC. You can't separate the two at all.

Thomas: Yeah, I mean the GCC, and I think probably especially Saudi Arabia stood the most to lose from a Yemen situation that went completely out of control. But it wasn't just a regional deal.

The U.S., the EU and the UN had been very actively involved in the drafting of the GCC Initiative, which as I said, was signed in November of 2011, and was meant to solve a basic problem in Yemen.

So, the Arab Spring had revealed that the state structure that had evolved in Yemen over Saleh’s 33 years as president, was not delivering on the promises of the Yemeni Revolution of the 1960s.

And it was the promises of that earlier revolution that people like you Baraa, were agitating for. We want the Yemen that we had been promised, which Saleh had said he was going to give us, but he didn't give it to us. We want it now.

So, just to explain the initiative, it required Ali Abdullah Saleh to stand down, and a new transitional government was called into being, that was a sort of unity government.

Baraa: So, the government is split 50/50 between the GPC, Saleh’s party, and the joint meeting parties. But the prime minister is chosen by the JMP, the Joint Meeting Party, so the opposition. And the presidency, both parties would agree to nominate Saleh’s deputy as the new president, but they insisted that the public go and elect him.

Thomas: That’s right. So, the long-time vice president of Yemen, Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, from now on President Hadi, he was the one that the GCC initiative said would become president. And the initiative called for new presidential elections with Hadi as sole candidate, simply to give the Yemeni people the opportunity, I mean, to rubber stamp the agreement.

So, a new president, President Hadi, overseeing a new government with ministries, shared equally between all the political sides and with a opposition prime minister. So, there was a sense of balance.

And finally, the third major dimension of the GCC Initiative was that President Hadi was tasked with holding a National Dialogue Conference. This National Dialogue Conference would meet to discuss Yemen's problems, come up with a list of official recommendations for the drafting of a new Yemeni constitution, in general that sets the initiative.

Baraa: Exactly. It's basically political parties and Yemeni social figures. And the wider Yemeni public can come together to negotiate the framework of the new constitution.

Thomas: So, before moving into the politics, President Hadi is a new character in this story, even though throughout everything we've said so far, he was the vice president. Maybe that tells you something already. What kind of a man was Hadi?

I mean, I had the privilege of meeting President Hadi in 2015, and he was incredibly sweet, quite on the ball. Didn't strike me as the sort of guy who would naturally have been able to stand up to a guy like Ali Abdullah Saleh, though.

Aimen: He sounds like his name, Hadi. Hadi means peaceful.

Thomas: Yeah.

Baraa: Exactly.

Aimen: Yeah. Quiet.

Baraa: Quiet. And this is actually what I felt even when I met him later on, it was that he's quiet for a president and in a way that did contribute to people don't feeling that he's that strong figure that they got used to.

Thomas: I mean, I think it's fair to say that Saleh had accepted him, or had chosen him as his vice president, knowing that Hadi was so peaceful of temperament that he wouldn't get in his way.

And so, it's possible that right at the very beginning, the beginning of the GCC Initiative and the new Yemen, it's possible to think that there was already a slight fly in that ointment. Would this man be up to the job? We're not going to answer that question now. We'll find out.

So, the signing of the GCC Initiative in November 2011 and the presidential elections in February 2012 confirming President Hadi as president were sort of the inciting events in a new chapter of Yemeni history. They were like the firing shot in a race to dream up a new Yemen and draw up a new constitution, making that dream a reality.

I don't think it's a major spoiler when I say the Gulf Initiative eventually failed. And in order to understand why, we have to turn our attention briefly, at least to the regional geopolitical scene. We mentioned the GCC, the major players, the real players in this story in terms of the GCC, are Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar. Saudi more than anyone else.

So, Aimen, the GCC wants a stable and secure and peaceful Yemen that will not be a source of trouble to its neighbours, and which will be integrated into the regional economy, more cynically from which wealth can be extracted by powerful countries.

Saudi Arabia at the time, early 2012, what's its political situation like? When it turns its attention to Yemen, what is it doing there?

Aimen: Well, at the time, it was the twilight years of the reign of King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia. So, from 2005 until 2012, we would say that King Abdullah was more or less in charge, but being helped because he was old. By 2012 he was already 91. By the time he dies, he will be ‘94. So, it was a twilight of his years, and so he wasn't in control.

Thomas: When we think of Saudi Arabia now, because the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, the notorious MBS is so young and so energetic and full of ideas, we might forget that for many decades, Saudi Arabia was seen in the exact opposite way, very old men running a state that was not unified, that was divided between rival princely brothers and factions within the state.

And that was certainly the case as King Abdullah was nearing the end of his life in 2012.

Aimen: Indeed. I mean, his son, Prince Mutaib was one of those people in charge. Another son, Prince Abdulaziz bin Abdullah was in charge of foreign policy, especially with the fact that the long-term diplomat of Saudi Arabia, Prince Saud al-Faisal was about to die.

Thomas: And he was also very ill. Yeah.

Aimen: Indeed. So, the foreign policy at the time was neglected and it was weak. And what you see today as the assertive Saudi Arabia was very much a Saudi Arabia in retreat at that time, because of the Arab Spring, they were on the defensive rather than on the offensive.

Thomas: And this is true of Saudi policy in Yemen at the time. So, the kind of general sclerotic, non-unified nature of the Saudi state apparatus and government at the time was apparent in the Yemeni situation, which may have contributed down the line to the failure of the Gulf Initiative.

The one country that had the most to gain from its success simply wasn't powerful enough at the time to ensure that success. That's one way of seeing it.

Now, what about Qatar? I mean, Qatar is a funny country and in terms of Yemen, Baraa, Qatar at this time could be seen as supporting the Islah Party, which if you remember, dear listener, the Islah Party is a political party, very broad based, associated to some extent with the Muslim Brotherhood movement, to another extent with some tribal, very powerful tribal elements in the north of Yemen.

The Islah Party was the sort of the main opposition party. Qatar was backing that party. Why?

Baraa: So, a couple of reasons, mainly because first of all, Qatar, in terms of their foreign policy backed Muslim Brotherhood parties across the region.

Thomas: Especially during the Arab Spring.

Baraa: Especially during the Arab Spring. So, that was one factor. The other factor is Hamid al-Ahmar, the son of … and now he's the brother of the Sheikh of the Hashid Confederation Tribe. I mean, he managed basically to secure ties in terms literally family ties. So basically, he became very close to the royal family in Qatar.

Thomas: I see. I think there's also, with Qatar, a kind of Emirati rivalry always there on the ground. Is that right, Aimen? Where's the rivalry in Yemen at that point?

Aimen: At that time, the contradicting foreign policy objectives between the UAE and Qatar stems from two aspects here, the Arab Spring, which was raging at that time, and the Qataris were absolutely, let me use — I'm trying to make it more polite, but actually they were pissing off the Emiratis so much for their support of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood.

Thomas: Given how angry the Emiratis were. I think that was polite, Aimen.

Aimen: So, that's the first thing. And the second thing is the Emiratis in particular felt that the Qataris are playing with fire. They are being the little arsonist in the Arab Spring going from one country to another, stalking the fires of Islamist revolutionary atmosphere, especially Muslim Brotherhood revolutionary ideas.

And the last thing that the Emiratis wanted is for Yemen to turn into yet another Egypt, where the Islah Party would gain significant hold on power that would then threaten the stability of the GCC, because it'll become a new Turkey as they see it, or a new Egypt, a magnet for Islamist to flock into.

And what could go wrong? I mean, Yemen has a lot of weapons, have a lot of mountains, have a lot of-

Thomas: And a lot of Al-Qaeda members.

Aimen: Al-Qaeda members.

Thomas: So, that's the sort of way in which the GCC was arranged at the time in early 2012. Now, going into the local politics, Baraa, protestors like you at the time, along with the GCC, after the instability of the Arab Spring era, which had seen intense fighting on the street assassinations and attempted assassinations and growing unrest, you wanted Yemen to emerge stronger, stabler more progressive, more socially just.

However, to some extent, as you would find out, standing in the way of that vision, were the same cast of characters from the last episode. The military men, the tribal leaders, and the political parties that had governed Yemen for decades.

So, very, very briefly because dear listener, go back and re-listen to the last episode if you need to know who these people are. Let's just remind everyone, we have Ali Abdullah Saleh, of course, no longer president, and saying he supported the transition.

Baraa: But also, Ali Abdullah Saleh, due to the GCC Initiative, have immunity.

Thomas: So, one massive point of the GCC Initiative was that Ali Abdullah Saleh and his family were immune from any prosecution for any corruption, any crimes from his time in power.

Baraa: From everything. And that didn't basically sat well with the protestors. Ali Abdullah Saleh was making official statements when he meets, for example, the UN envoy when he meets ambassadors, that he supports the transition. Yet when he meets his party members and followers, he's saying, “I'm going to teach them how an opposition works.”

Thomas: Now, in addition to the former President Saleh, there's Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, Ali Mohsen, military man, longtime ally of the president, who had then fallen out spectacularly with the president, fought the president's forces during the Arab Spring. He's definitely around. What did the GCC Initiative give him? What was his political power in early 2012?

Baraa: Well, Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar was viewed as the person who managed to bring Ali Abdullah Saleh down. So, he is an influential figure, although the GCC Initiative did require him to step down from his military post. But he was appointed as the president's military advisor.

Thomas: So, we have Ali Mohsen, we have the former president. And then the third power sort of bloc, the al-Ahmar family in general. This is the head of the Hashid Tribal Confederation, a very complicated family.

And right now, I just want to zero in on one member of that family whom we didn't mention in the previous episode, Husayn al-Ahmar, because there is an amazing story involving Husayn al-Ahmar that just really brings to life what Yemeni politics was like behind the scenes at the time when people like you, Baraa were trying to create a new and democratic Yemen.

So, Husayn al-Ahmar, he was rich, powerful, and also in the North.

Baraa: So, Husayn al-Ahmar is the family member of al-Ahmar, who actually is based in the north. He's based in the highlands between Amran and Sa’dah, kind of like this big figure who can actually pose a counterbalance to the growing influence of the Houthis.

Thomas: So, yeah, this is Houthi country. So, this is the other side. I see.

Baraa: However, at the same time, he was a parliament member, and he is representing the GPC out of all parties. But an important factor about him, Husayn al-Ahmar tried to establish his own political party. That's even before 2011. And in one of his many trips in the region, he went and visited your friend, Gaddafi.

Thomas: Aimen, your best friend Muammar Gaddafi, president of Libya, who was-

Aimen: No, he was the leader of Libya.

Thomas: I beg your pardon.

Aimen: He was the most beloved leader of Libya.

Thomas: Husayn al-Ahmar, who had been bankrolled to some extent by the Saudis for a long time, deciding he wanted to be a political player in his own right, goes to the Saudi archenemy Gaddafi.

Baraa: So, the Saudis quickly find out, Saudi Intelligence quickly find out that actually Husayn al-Ahmar came back from Libya with a plane full of cash.

Thomas: A hundred million dollars.

Baraa: A hundred million dollars, literally. And he told Gaddafi that he would split this money with Saleh. He didn't. And he started to establish his basically own political network, which basically attracted all opportunists, who wanted little bit of cash.

Thomas: When the Saudis found out about the money that Gaddafi had given to Husayn al-Ahmar, they offered him a deal of their own.

Baraa: So, they basically told him, whatever Gaddafi is giving you, we will give you the same, just don't go to Gaddafi again.

Now, he promised them that he wouldn't. However, later on when Gaddafi actually was toppled and the rebels literally stormed into the Libyan Intelligence headquarters, it was revealed that actually the payments and cash continued flying between Gaddafi and Husayn al-Ahmar. And that angered the Saudis.

Thomas: So, Husayn al-Ahmar was taking the Saudi money and the Libyan money, angering the Saudis who cut ties with Husayn al-Ahmar.

Baraa: Exactly.

Thomas: And this is incredibly important to this story, and we're just going to leave it here, but bear this in mind. The man who was the chief sort of muscle on the ground resisting the Houthis, had just been cut out by the Saudis.

Finally, this brings us up to the sort of fourth major power player in Yemeni politics. Although in retrospect, we realise now how powerful they were. At the time, maybe people weren't paying attention. And that's of course the Houthis, the Houthis Baraa, did not sign the GCC Initiative, did not agree to the initiative. Why?

Baraa: So, the Houthis positioned themselves as the new opposition, the kind of the people who generally care about the revolution ideals and goals. And what they said is basically the GCC Initiative is a reflection of the interest of the Imperial West and the neighbouring imperial countries, like especially Saudi Arabia.

Thomas: And the corrupt Yemeni political establishment.

Baraa: Exactly.

Thomas: Which were the signatories to the deal. So, the Houthis could be like, “This is a sellout to the revolution.”

Baraa: So, in exchange, they said, we're not willing now to give up our arms and weapons because this is a stooge government that represents America and the West and the corrupt Gulf countries and does not represent the sole part of the revolution.

Thomas: Classic Hezbollah move, Aimen.

Aimen: Exactly. That's the whole idea. Just say, excuse me, we are anti-imperialist. Death to America, death to everything else.

Thomas: And so, we need our weapons.

Aimen: Yes, exactly.

Thomas: We need our weapons.

Baraa: And they started launching an attack at the end of 2011, literally right after the deal was signed, they attacked that Salafi school that Aimen had mentioned in the previous episodes.

Thomas: Yes. You remember the Dammaj School?

Baraa: The Dammaj school.

Thomas: Up in the very far north of Yemen, a Salafi school founded in the 80s and the 90s and had generated a lot of friction with the local Zaidi community, because they were engaging in proselytising activities and stuff. So, there was a kind of interdenominational struggle there.

Baraa: Exactly. So, despite the brutal fighting that happened in Dammaj and the amount of literally atrocities that the Houthis has committed, it still didn't get much attention inside the squares.

Thomas: And in Sana’a, I suppose, people looked up there and thought, oh, well, this is the same old kind of tribal partisan war going on. It's nothing really to worry about. And in fact, in the end of 2011, early 2012, the Houthis assault on Dammaj kind of failed.

Baraa: It failed due to basically, again, Husayn al-Ahmar, he basically succeeded in mobilising the tribes up north. And literally that forced the Houthis even to recognize him as a mediator, which basically meant that they had to withdraw from Dammaj.

Thomas: So that's Saleh, that's Ali Mohsen, that's the al-Ahmar situation. Those are the Houthis. The last great player was Saleh’s political party, the GPC, the party of power in Yemen. And if you remember dear listener, the GPC during the Arab Spring had split. Some people had stayed loyal to Saleh, other people had decided that he needed to go, and that split remained.

So, the GPC was also embroiled in an inner party dispute, which was not going to create good conditions for a new Yemen to be born. And this is why in that post 2012 political environment in Yemen, nobody trusted anybody.

I mean, Hadi is the president. He's trying to rally the people around him. He has to work closely with Ali Mohsen, who doesn't trust him. So, he doesn't trust him back. Both of them have to work with the al-Ahmars, but nobody trusts them. Nobody trusts Saleh. And the GCC partners don't trust each other.

And in the midst of all of this mistrust, the Houthis are doing stuff up in the north, and no one is really paying attention.

So, Baraa, at this point, you are not so aware of the intensity of the culture of mistrust because you haven't yet been invited into the inner circles of Yemeni politics. You are still down on the street in the square with the youth who were angry about the GCC Initiative. And you yourself were not happy with the GCC Initiative.

Baraa: Well, not just with the youth, with also the Houthis who have now … by this time we've come close to each other. We know they're leaders and they're acting as this, we can be the supporters of this new political movement that is emerging, angry of the establishment and angry of this new deal.

Thomas: Angry because it gave Saleh immunity. Angry because?

Baraa: Angry because it gave Saleh immunity from prosecution. And it's not clear where is Saleh heading to.

Thomas: Yeah, I see. So, you just thought the GCC Initiative is not going to give us what we wanted. When we were chanting those chants during the Arab Spring.

Baraa: And as a result, we started calling to boycott the presidential elections.

Thomas: Alongside the Houthis.

Baraa: Alongside the Houthis.

Thomas: Oh, Baraa.

Aimen: Ah, naughty Baraa.

Thomas: If you're finding yourself a lockstep with the Houthis, you need to question your judgement.

Baraa: So, what happened then, we're talking end of 2011, beginning of 2012, the Houthis are saying, “Okay, listen guys, how about we start hosting a series of workshops and conferences that's going to bring together the youth revolution.” It was called the Youth Revolution Conference. The Yemeni Youth Revolution Conference.

Thomas: Hosted by your friends, the Houthis.

Baraa: Exactly. But the caveat, they said, we will give you tickets to Lebanon, which there is another group emerging, who are going to be the hosts of this conference in Lebanon.

Thomas: Well, that doesn't sound suspicious at all.

Aimen: Absolutely. Of all the wonderful places that one could go to, like in Turkey, Maldives, Malaysia, goodness, Dubai. No, go to Lebanon.

Thomas: And South Lebanon, especially.

Aimen: Yeah. Wonder why, who's there?

Baraa: So, surprise, surprise. Many youth did respond and started to literally go in batches. And I was invited a couple of times, say, okay, you didn't go in the first one. Let's go. You can go in the second one. You didn't go in second. You still have the third, many conferences, many workshops are being organised in Lebanon.

Now in Lebanon, it turned out to be obviously Aimen's best friends, Hezbollah.

Thomas: Hezbollah, yeah.

Aimen: Absolutely.

Baraa: So, Hezbollah operatives were hosting, receiving Yemeni's coming from the revolution. Basically, what was happening was literally a vetting process. They go out and they introduce Yemenis to Hezbollah operatives, and then who's willing to play along with them, who's actually buying into their message of this is an Islamic awakening, similar to the Iranian revolution, the Islamic Revolution.

They go on into the next phase, which is they meet IRDC officers who are also stationed in Lebanon.

Thomas: So, political organisation is happening with the Houthis recruiting other Yemenis and integrating them all politically to Iran's larger kind of regional political nexus. That's happening for sure. And on the ground, eventually this leads to the creation of a specific kind of political party or something in Yemen.

Baraa: So, it's called the political office of the Houthis in Sana’a, they call it the Ansarullah's political office in Sana’a. And it's basically combined, this is what made it interesting and appealing for many Yemenis. It has this diverse group, it has young liberals, it has some women, it has lefties, it has also some Islamists. It has a combination of many different people.

Thomas: But it does not have Baraa Shiban because you smelled a rat. And as you're watching the Houthis organise and sort of peel off some of your liberal colleagues, you're also seeing the other people that you marched alongside during the Arab Spring, who had been affiliated with the more traditional, long standing political parties returned to their partisan affiliations.

And you, Baraa, were worried that independent liberal voices like you were going to be shut out of the conversation going forward in Yemen. So, you changed your view on the GCC Initiative and decided to work with it.

Baraa: So, what I felt strongly was after the elections, that actually despite our protests, we can continue being shouting in the streets. That's not going to work. We need to form a political block and we have to be engaged if we want to influence things.

Thomas: What a mature and rather conservative view, Baraa. So, this is the first time that liberal Baraa’s being mugged by reality and inching towards a more realistic perspective.

So, you thought that President Hadi needed allies. He was invested in the success of the GCC initiative. He was invested in the new constitution that that initiative was meant to result in. So, you thought, I must unite with fellow independents and participate in this process.

Baraa: And we worked closely with a guy who a lot of Yemeni observers and even foreigners who worked on Yemen know now very well. His name is Ahmad bin Mubarak.

Thomas: Ahmad bin Mubarak. Keep that name in your head, dear listener, because at the end of this story, he plays a very key role. There's a moment featuring him. It's very important.

Baraa: And what happened was basically, Hadi decided he's going to form a technical and steering committee to start preparing for the National Dialogue. It has the traditional players and said, okay, so what is missing is the people who do not have a political party.

And we started literally mobilising and meeting people from Sana’a, Taiz, Aden, Hudaydah, and doing many, many trips to try and bring a block of independent youth and women and civil society together.

And then communicating with the technical and steering committee of the National Dialogue that actually we can present representatives that can actually participate in the National Dialogue.

Thomas: Well, at the same time, your confidence in Hadi was growing and this is another aspect of the scene in Yemen at the time that we have to be very quick about, but Al-Qaeda was running rampant at the time. And Hadi had successfully brought together all the different political players, Ali Mohsen and all the others, to crush Al-Qaeda in 2012, which was a mark of success for him.

You thought, well, maybe this guy is more than his reputation says. So, with that kind of success now, that sort of quiver in his bow, President Hadi by the end of 2012 was moving confidently into the National Dialogue.

And because you had so successfully with your allies organized yourselves, you had presented your own names as a list of possible members to the National Dialogue. And through your work with bin Mubarak, your liaison within the Hadi camp, it turned out you were indeed chosen, and you joined the National Dialogue.

Baraa: Yeah. And actually, the National Dialogue is announced. It has 565 candidates. Amongst them, of course, it's all the political parties and representatives of the tribal figures and social figures of Yemen. But within it, a very important component is the youth, the women and civil society, who actually amongst the 565 has 120 seats combined. The youth, which is us, we have 40 seats.

Thomas: That first date, the 18th of March 2013, the National Dialogue begins. It's not an auspicious beginning to this because the Houthis are in the National Dialogue. Now, how the hell did that happen, Baraa. They had not signed the GCC Initiative. They had said they were going to remain pure; they weren't going to sully themselves with the imperialist ambitions of the GCC Initiative.

Baraa: So, it was the political office in Sana’a amongst — there's one important character, and he was in a way, a defacto tribal leader or leading the tribal faction of the Houthis. His name is Saleh Habra.

And he was the head of the Houthi bloc in the National Dialogue. And he went to Abdul-Malik al-Houthi. Abdul-Malik al-Houthi initially refused. He said he's not going to join, because in his words, this is an admission to recognize America and Israel.

Thomas: Which the Houthis did not want to do because remember, death to America, death to Israel, that's their chant.

Baraa: Which is obviously nonsense. But anyway, the Saleh Habra with his kind of tribal wise mindset tells him that you need to join. We cannot be an outcast out of all of the Yemeni factions and tribal groups who are coming together to negotiate the future.

And he tasked him to form alongside the political office in Sana’a the Houthi bloc. And they joined. That in a way, did give some, a huge amount of confidence in the success of the National Dialogue because it actually brought a lot of factions together.

Thomas: Including the Houthis and really, honestly, Baraa, what could go wrong. So, we're going to stop now. We're going to take our first break. This is a long episode, dear listener, but it's a great story.

We're leaving Barra there on the first day of the National Dialogue Conference with everyone sitting around a table, including the Houthis. And as we will find out, the former president Ali Abdullah Saleh behind the scenes dancing on the heads of snakes and forming secret pacts with the Houthis. Stay tuned.

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We are back. Let's get straight back in. We left you Baraa, a member of the National Dialogue Conference, where you're networking with other politicians, political players, activists inside Yemen, trying to brainstorm a new Yemeni constitution.

Your knowledge of Yemen is expanding not only because of the National Dialogue Conference, but also because of your day job at the time, which was to investigate drone strikes against Al-Qaeda.

I mean, dear listener, honestly, we people in the West, we just don't know what sort of job opportunities there are in the Middle East.

So, as you said, after President Hadi crushed Al-Qaeda earlier in 2012, Al-Qaeda members sort of dissolved, embedded themselves into society, which coincided with a renewed drone campaign against them by the United States.

People might remember that this was very controversial at the time. Many civilians died during the prosecution of these drone attacks. And you were there on the ground visiting strike sites to gather evidence and to advocate, I guess, on behalf of those civilians and their families.

Baraa: Exactly. So, I remember the first drone strike that kind of caught my attention. That was late in 2011, but specifically after Al-Qaeda was crushed in Abyan. I felt like the U.S. has gone mad.

They started conducting numerous number of drone strikes, but this time it's not in remote and very faraway places. It's starting to hit in local communities, in places that we are familiar with in some towns and villages. And this did anger the public and people were very, very angry.

Thomas: Aimen, I mean, I'm not asking you to justify America's drone campaign, really, I'm not asking that. I'm asking for you to explain it from their perspective. So, the Americans at the time, why have they upped their droning against Al-Qaeda in Yemen, even if it meant attacking neighbourhoods and killing civilians?

Aimen: Well, there was the worry that Al-Qaeda is going to take advantage of the Arab Spring, and especially the rising anger over the Syrian war and the civil war that’s happening there.

So, they wanted, and the Obama Administration in particular, they wanted to weaken Al-Qaeda significantly in order to avoid Yemen becoming yet again a safe haven. That led them, of course, to conduct significant number of operations in places that are really full of civilian population.

And sometime kids were killed, women were killed, people bystanders, they have no nothing to do with Al-Qaeda. And as usual, this obsession with Al-Qaeda at the time made them lose sight of other far more threatening realities in Yemen.

Thomas: Oh, gosh. How is that resonant with things happening in the Middle East at the moment?

Aimen: Yes.

Thomas: Honestly guys. But Baraa, back to you. So, the upshot of this work you were doing investigating drone strike sites in Yemen, was that you were actually encountering members of Al-Qaeda.

Baraa: Exactly. So, while I am now a member of the National Dialogue, out of all of the working groups I was working in, I was the repertoire of the Counter-Terrorism working group.

And one of the first thing we did as a group we requested to meet the Yemeni Intelligence, who actually were very cooperative to their credit at the time, and they allowed us to meet members of Al-Qaeda, who were actually sitting in their prisons and had been apprehended in several operations.

Thomas: So, there you are getting to know the reality of Al-Qaeda controlled areas on the ground. You're meeting Al-Qaeda members, you're getting a sense of what kind of a person, an Al-Qaeda member is.

You're also in the National Dialogue working alongside Hadi’s ally, bin Mubarak, to do the National Dialogue work. At this point bin Mubarak asks you to return to your hometowns, if you like your ancestral villages, to hold workshops and to get a sense of what those local communities wanted for Yemen.

Baraa: It was an interesting time. So, what many people kind of tend to forget about those years between 2011 until the beginning of the conflict is for many of us, it was like the golden era of Yemen, we're meeting. There is a dynamic and activist civil society. There are workshops. So, in that general environment, we're still very, very hopeful.

Thomas: This is heartbreaking to hear Baraa. It's heartbreaking. I know what's happening next.

Baraa: And in the midst of that, bin Mubarak asked me to go, and not just me, asked the several members who actually come from Hajjah and Hajjah is this beautiful place in the northern part of Yemen, and it sits literally between Amran and Sa’dah.

Thomas: So, it's right between Houthis country-

Baraa: And al-Ahmar.

Thomas: And Ali Mohsen country. Al-Ahmar country. Poor Hajjah. Okay. That's a shit sandwich, I don't want to be a part of.

Baraa: And we have an interesting discussion with the members of the local community and discussions about transitional justice and so on. Until a young, I would say very brave journalist came to me, and I still wonder where he is until today, I wish I could see him again.

He came to me, and he asked, “Can you stay until tomorrow? Instead of leaving with the convoy, with the whole delegation tonight, can you stay until tomorrow? I would like to show you something very important. It's more important than the superficial discussions that you're having because it actually touches reality on the ground.”

And at the beginning, I was hesitant. Then I said, “Fine, let me stay. It's just one day nothing's going to happen.” And the next day I went to a village with … all Yemenis would later on know it's very, well, it's called Hajur.

Thomas: Hajur.

Baraa: It's a very mountainous area, but literally a very poor tribal village, do not have much resources. And they have been surrounded, they've been fighting the Houthis for many months now, actively being shelled, burned. A lot of their farms had literally been infested, literally with landmines planted by the Houthis.

Thomas: Did you know that the Houthis had proceeded that far towards the south in the Hajjah? Did this come as a surprise to you that they were even there?

Baraa: It was kind of a surprise because they representatives at the National Dialogue were assuring us that they are invested in this process as much as us.

Thomas: The Houthis are telling you down in Sana’a, “We want a big unified happy Yemen.” But then you go to Haja and you're like, “Well, you're laying landmines in farmers' villages.”

Baraa: Exactly. I mean, it was a horrifying image. You see snipers surrounding this literally small tribal village, and people are left with no option. They can either fight or they can hand over their lands, homes and all their properties to the Houthis.

Thomas: But what about the Houthis? Did you manage to meet any Houthis?

Baraa: Of course. So, I walked in and the first thing why we encountered the Houthis is because they're literally besieging this area. And the first thing that struck me when I had the discussions with them is those are not the Houthis we are meeting inside Sana’a.

Those are like Al-Qaeda operatives that I have met and have interviewed inside the Yemeni prisons. Those are jihadists with jihadi mindset, who are actually filled with anger and rage towards anything that is not them.

Thomas: Aimen, it’s that radical mentality that we talked about at the beginning of this season of Conflicted.

Aimen: Indeed.

Thomas: You just immediately notice it when you see it, that these people are not open to compromise.

Baraa: And they are living in this world of prophecies. They have the belief that actually there is something coming in. And the only thing that is preventing this prophecy, this prophecy from happening is those infidels in Sana’a, those people who are meeting at the National Dialogue.

And which was an interesting kind of conflicted narrative because we are discussing the future of Yemen. We are kind of, in a way, in their eyes, the enemies. Yet at the same time they're saying we are part of the National Dialogue, but they're actually fighting against that.

Aimen: Yeah, exactly. You see, again, this is what we said at the beginning of the season, Thomas, when we talk about eschatology and how eschatology and prophecies are the opium of the masses, this is how they drug these people into believing that they are God's instruments for change.

And change could only happen if they are the vanguard to fulfil the prophecies. So, they are God's soldiers and therefore, they set themselves high above everyone else, and they look down on everyone else.

Thomas: God's soldiers. I mean, when the Houthis decided to rebrand themselves, what did they say? Ansar Allah.

Aimen: Yes, God's helpers.

Thomas: The helpers of God. And you saw that playing itself out there on the ground in Hajjah. I mean, and it was proper fighting a real war, wartime conditions there. So, in a way, though we think war broke out in Yemen in March 2015. It was already there.

Baraa: It was already there. And it was a frightening, frightening scene. And I remember I immediately, without hesitation, decided to — I felt it was nonsense to continue discussing and negotiating with those militants up in the mountains of Hajjah. And I decided we need to go and educate the politicians in Sana’a.

Thomas: Yeah. So, you went back down to Sana’a, and you sort of said guys, you won't believe what I just saw.

Baraa: Exactly. And that's not just me. Also, there were other members of the National Dialogue who were saying, actually, this is serious shit.

Thomas: And how was that met? What response did you get? I mean, really from the Houthis in Sana’a?

Baraa: So, the Houthis first thing they accuse me that my trip was funded by Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar.

Thomas: I see, okay.

Baraa: And then they kind of starting to shed doubt and saying like, all of the delegations that have gone to the north, they were saying those that have drank the Kool-Aid of the Islah of al-Ahmar, of Ali Mohsen.

Thomas: Just gaslighting you, classic gaslighting. So, I mean, obviously you must have thought, I mean, the National Dialogue is in peril here we must confront the Houthis. But sadly, as was seen a couple of years earlier during the Arab Spring, the truth is Baraa, that at the time, very powerful political forces in Yemen were benefiting from the Houthis rampaging in the North.

Baraa: Now, not just that. So also, around the same time we have meetings with President Hadi. And the first meeting, as I remember it very well, the first thing he started to mention to us is this shipment of weapons that the Yemeni coastal guards have seized going to the Houthis.

And he talked about five shipments. Three, I think have already managed to go through. But the Yemeni coastal guards with the help even of the U.S. had managed to seize.

Thomas: Wait, so these are boatloads of weapons going to the Houthis. From where?

Baraa: Well, according to Hadi, it was from Iran. And actually, I didn't have any reason to doubt him because I was seeing all of the signs around there. I mean, you don't need to be an expert or some genius to add things together.

Thomas: So, President Hadi knew that the Houthis were a threat and that they were being supported by Iran as early as 2013.

Baraa: I think even before that.

Thomas: So, why didn't he do anything about it?

Baraa: Well, that's the coming back to the environment of mistrust that he was feeling and the environment amongst all of the main traditional political actors in Yemen. In order to do that, he needs to support the quest of guys like Husayn al-Ahmar and the cause of Ali Mohsen that they need to support the military units in the north, which are basically still strongly affiliated with Ali Mohsen, to counter the Houthis.

And while you're doing that, then you are actually also strengthening their influence.

Thomas: I see. So, if President Hadi comes out openly and says the Houthis are a threat, and in order to combat the threat, I must empower Ali Mohsen's brigades, then Ali Mohsen is politically empowered, and then people like President Saleh won't be happy with Hadi. So, he's kind of caught between two stools.

Baraa: And I think also at the same time, it's a harsh way to say it, but I think he thought that he can play the same dance, he can dance on the heads of snakes like Saleh.

Thomas: No. You never embark on a dance off with Ali Abdullah Saleh. There should be a Yemeni Dancing with the Stars, but dancing with the snakes. We should pitch it.

Baraa: Well, that's the thing. If you see someone dancing with the snakes, do not do that.

Thomas: So, you went to President Hadi, but then you must have also gone to Ali Mohsen.

Baraa: When I meet Ali Mohsen, I see him literally conducting the official duties of the state. He is kind of unofficially the vice president. He's doing the stuff that Hadi was supposed to be doing.

Thomas: I see. So, your eyes are opening now to the GCC Initiative era that things aren't exactly as they seem. Ali Mohsen did not have any formal role in the government, but he's performing the duties of a vice president.

Baraa: Exactly. And all of the duties that I think Hadi was supposed to be doing, but for a reason he's not doing, has left it to him. So, he is kind of running those meetings and meeting tribal figures, politicians and so on. And also meeting, including mediations like the one I wanted him to be involved in.

Thomas: But then, eventually you must have brought the conversation around to what you'd seen in Hajjah.

Baraa: Exactly.

Thomas: And your worries about the Houthis. So, what did he say?

Baraa: He said that he was aware of, and he was trying to mobilise Hadi and the people around Hadi, and he was saying if Hadi gets his act together, he will pressure the other factions to join force like he did with Al-Qaeda in the south, but this time against the Houthis.

Thomas: Well, I mean, I guess that the sad truth of the matter is that more or less half of the Yemeni army remained loyal to Ali Abdullah Saleh, the former president of Yemen. And he was working behind the scenes.

Baraa: Exactly. Ali Abdullah Saleh was actually blind by revenge at that time. He didn't want to hear anything about what is the threats of allowing himself with the Houthis would look like and endanger his future.

He wanted to get revenge on all of the military commanders, politicians, tribal leaders who had defected from him in 2011. And he wanted them to pay a heavy, heavy price.

So, the military units that were still affiliated with him were literally handing over their posts and positions in the north to the Houthis.

Thomas: Working on Saleh's orders.

Baraa: Exactly. And mainly trying to counter the 310 military brigades.

Thomas: Which was Ali Mohsen's brigade.

Baraa: This is the kind of the formidable force in the north of Yemen composed of the most professional officers, military officers who are well-trained, well-equipped and know what they're doing. And they've been fighting the Houthis all along.

So, heavy fightings are happening with a 310 brigade, but they're actually losing a lot of the support they're supposed to be having from other military factions.

Thomas: And for the roughly two years before this realisation that you had, that Saleh is really working behind the scenes, Saleh had to play the game very carefully. Obviously, he wants to be president again. He wants to get his revenge; he's going to ally with the Houthis to help him achieve that.

But it was an event in Syria in 2013 that really changed the rules of the game in Yemen when President Obama refused to respond to Bashar al-Assad’s crossing the red line.

Obama had said, if you use chemical weapons, that's a red line. If you do that, Bashar, America will respond. And in 2013, Obama actually didn't, he didn't live up to that threat. And from then on, everything in the Middle East really changed because America was signalling it's not willing to go the whole way.

Baraa: On that day, actually a senior aide of Saleh told me that Saleh said, now I can come back. And that signifies how important the other regional factors are affecting also the transition in Yemen.

Aimen: Exactly. Because why? The problem you see with the Americans during the post 9/11 era, the Republicans in particular, George Bush and his administration was their overcommitment in the Middle East and Obama's problem were their under commitment in the Middle East.

Obama just wanted peace with Iran at any cost. And that involved emboldening Hezbollah to enter into Syria, emboldening the Syrian regime to continue killing their own people, allowing Hamas to continue re-arming. And we can see what is happening.

And even stopping the DEA in America, the Drug Enforcement Agency from pursuing an investigation into Hezbollah, even. All of this signalled to the Iranians that you can do whatever you want in the Middle East.

Thomas: And it didn't only signal it to the Iranians, it signalled it to Ali Abdullah Saleh, who realised, now I can come back. So, to make a long story short, Saleh was playing this game, dear listener, he thought, I'll allow the Houthis to destroy Ali Mohsen and his forces and to destroy the forces of the al-Ahmar tribal family.

And then once the Houthis are so strong, the Saudis will have no choice but to back me and my forces to defeat the Houthis. And I will be president of Yemen again, and my son will be president after me. That's Saleh's game.

And that game began to be played out in the open by the Houthis beginning in the end of 2013, when their forces enter Dammaj again, this is the town, dear listener, where that Salafi school was and which two years before the Houthis had attacked, but the forces of Husayn al-Ahmar had repelled them.

Well, now Husayn al-Ahmar was very weak because the Saudis had been pissed off with him taking money from Gaddafi. And this time the Houthis won. They didn't just win; they demolished his house.

Baraa: So, they went into Dammaj, they blew up the school, that Salafi school, and then they marched, basically embarking on revenge against all of the tribes who did support Husayn al-Ahmar to make an example of anyone who's going to fight them in the future that you are going to meet a similar fate.

And they filmed that, they filmed the blowing up of houses, and that's important and significant for tribal and local communities.

Thomas: So, this continues the Houthis advance southward from Sa’dah, Dammaj, sheikh after sheikh, tribe after tribe, village after village. Fear is spreading throughout the north. More people in Sana’a are thinking what the hell's going on?

More and more people realise the game that Saleh is playing, but those political actors at the top, because of the culture of mistrust, cannot unite against him and his chickenary.

And so, by June 2014, the temperature is very high when the Houthis make the really phenomenal achievement for militarily speaking of conquering Amran, an important military Garrison city not too far from Sana’a.

Baraa: It's only 50 kilometres away from Sana’a. And that's Amran was where the 310 military brigade was stationed. They were the protectors of the Northern Gate of Sana’a.

Thomas: Yeah. So, that's the main point. The brigade in Amran is associated with Ali Mohsen. He was ultimately their commander. And Saleh then must have thought, “Wow, my plan is working brilliantly. The Houthis have just crushed the main force of Ali Mohsen.”

So, now they're heading on their way to Sana’a. That's okay. They'll keep crushing more and more of Ali Mohsen's forces because at the end of the day, I know the Saudis will swoop in, support me to throw off the Houthis.” That's his plan.

That summer, the summer of 2014, the Houthis advance to outside Sana’a where they sit. And then some very interesting politics begin to be played out, politics that resonate with sort of Hassan Nasrallah and Hezbollah style politicking.

Baraa: So, what happened is in summer of 2014, the Yemeni government decides to remove oil subsidies. So, as a result, oil prices, petrol prices gone up in Yemen and Abdul-Malik al-Houthi now posed himself as the voice of the people.

He wants to bring the prices down and saying, this is actually not a result of, because the oil prices worldwide are going up. This is due to the corruption of this government, this stooges American supported and funded government. They're very corrupt and we need to bring them down. We need to bring the prices down and we need to start implementing the National Dialogue outcomes.

Thomas: Abdul-Malik al-Houthi’s reputation was growing in a way, and it wasn't just the Saudis in this case, the U.S. had also contributed to his growing reputation amongst activists, revolutionary liberal activists in Yemen.

Because of that droning campaign, which the Yemeni people were so angry about, and which Abdul-Malik al-Houthi was able to twist and use to his political advantage, saying, “You see the evil Americans, they are evil, death to America.”

And even more of your former sort of colleagues on the squares during the Arab Spring saw Abdul-Malik al-Houthi as a revolutionary in sympathy with them.

Baraa: Exactly. I literally was trying to go and meet them and saying, “You idiots, you don't understand what's happening because I've seen what the Houthis were doing in the north of Yemen.” And in my mind, I was saying, this is just an excuse to conquer Sana’a. The Houthis want to take over Sana’a. They're just using all of this as an excuse.

Thomas: And what about President Hadi? What about other people in the National Dialogue? I guess they're thinking if there's any fighting, it's between the Houthis and Ali Mohsen's people, this can benefit us or still it's just a partisan squabble. It's not an existential threat. You must have been so frustrated, Baraa.

Baraa: I was, it was very strange. I literally, in those final days, I went to meet President Hadi numerous times. Many, many times I go and talk to him, he would tell us something, but he's not willing to say that publicly. He say that Saleh has plotting with the Houthis, but he's not willing to call for the mobilisation.

And I remember in that week before the Houthis conquered Sana’a, I met with a top Islahi leader who was literally just done with his meeting with Hadi. As he's walking out of the presidential palace, I tell him, “What did you guys discuss?”

And he said, “He asked us to basically bring our people to fight the Houthis.” And this Islahi leader asked Hadi to go out on national TV and call for popular mobilisation against the Houthis.

Thomas: And Hadi refused.

Baraa Hadi refused. Unfortunately, I don't know what he was thinking, but I think at that time he thought that actually if they just pressured Ali Mohsen enough, that would weaken his position. They're not actually coming after me.

Thomas: That takes us to 21st of September 2014. This is when probably with less shock really by this stage, but certainly a lot of worry, concern, anxiety, despair. You watched the Houthis conquer Sana’a.

Baraa: One week of fighting. That's all what the fighting did. It did kill many people. A lot of people don't know this. It killed over 300 people, including civilians. And eventually the UN envoy literally flew to Sa’dah to meet Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, took representatives and they flew back into Sana’a. All of this, while the fighting is happening at the outskirts of Sana’a.

Thomas: I mean there on the 21st of September, he, the UN envoys in the presidential palace with some Houthis negotiating an agreement, a peace agreement, while unbeknownst to them the Houthis are conquering the city.

Baraa: It was an unbelievable scene. The Houthis are literally taking government institutions. They're taking the TV station, the military camps in Sana’a, the police stations, while those officials are still negotiating the draft of this article, put this article before that.

And only when the Minister of Defence leaves the Presidential palace and literally his guards tell him, “What are you guys doing? The Houthis have took over the capital.”

Thomas: Well, the Houthis did indeed take over the capital. Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar was extracted from a conquered Sana’a by the Saudis who flew him eventually to the kingdom.

The Houthis signed what's called the Peace and Partnership Agreement (very ironic name, with hindsight), with the UN to help form a new government and said openly, the basic plan hasn't changed the National Dialogue results. We will live up to those results. We will implement those results.

The new constitution, it's on its way, we're going to implement it. They pretended really to be the stewards of the GCC Initiative, but meanwhile, their troops continued to conquer southward from Sana’a.

Baraa: And I remember I went immediately to a province in Central Yemen called Baidhah, and it was a very frightening scene. The Houthis politicians are in Sana’a promising that they will not attack any more village or town.

When you arrive there, I saw literally two villages, it's something out of a movie, thousands of people including women, children, elderly, and literally normal locals, villagers leaving their homes as the Houthis are blowing up their houses and flattening them to the ground.

Thomas: And you're witnessing this with your own eyes.

Baraa: Exactly. It's a very surreal moment and saying what is happening? And from that moment, I decide, actually this is not going to work. The Houthis need to be met by some form of military force that is formed of those national political players to unite themselves, to counter the Houthis because the Houthis ultimate aim is to take control over the whole of Yemen.

Thomas: By this time, I think more and more people were realising what you had already realised, Baraa, because into October, November 2014, the Houthis began changing their message a bit.

I mean, when they conquered Sinai, they'd said, “Don't worry, we'll be the stewards of the Gulf Initiative. We're going to see this new constitution through.” But then more and more they were saying, “This new constitution, this is another U.S. plot to divide and conquer Yemen. We don't like this federal system.”

I mean, we now know that's because they wanted a very unitary system with them in control. So, you and other people realising what was up, you started to protest.

Baraa: We started to arrange protests similar to those of 2011, arranging them, calling university students to mobilise and start protesting. And the Houthis brutally and heavily cracked down on those protestors, literally chasing people down the streets.

I remember they arrested one journalist whom they beat until death, another journalist he literally went missing. And until today we don't know where he is. And the general environment in Sana’a has changed. So, that periods of activism and civil society, that environment is over. It's no more.

Thomas: And what about the Houthis political office that was set up and all those liberal revolutionary fellow travellers of yours who had decided to work with the Houthis inside the Houthis political office in Sana’a? What happened to those guys? I mean, they must have felt like they'd been hoodwinked.

Baraa: So, they actually split. There are the people who then felt like actually they've been betrayed by Abdul-Malik al-Houthi and the others who are saying, actually, it may be a good political move to now aligning ourselves with the Houthis. Now the Houthi ideologues in the political office are now coming up and now it's threatening messages. They are kind of like revealing their true identity.

Thomas: Well, I'm afraid now, dear listener, I'm going to have to zoom over a few months so that we can reach the climax of this very interesting, quite long story. In January of 2015, your old ally in the National Dialogue, Ahmad bin Mubarak, who was close to President Hadi-

Baraa: By that time, he is the president's chief of staff.

Thomas: So, Ahmad bin Mubarak, the president's chief of staff as arranged, is going one day to meet with national dialogue members to approve the new constitution. This was supposed to be a great day of triumph.

Sadly, this didn't happen, on his way bin Mubarak was abducted by the Houthis. The Houthis wanted to prevent the formal kind of ratification of the constitution.

At this point, finally, President Hadi decides to fight back. Sana’a devolves into fighting for three days. There's lots of fighting. Hadi is captured. He's placed under house arrest.

The Houthis now formally take over. It's an actual coup for three and a half, four weeks. Everyone is wondering what's going to happen. Hadi's there in the presidential palace in Sana’a under house arrest until, surprise, surprise, on the 21st of February 2015, Hadi pops up in Aden on the South Coast somehow, some friendly country. I don't know which one, Aimen. Do you?

Had smuggled Hadi out of the presidential palace in Sana’a to the presidential palace in Aiden, where he stated openly, this is now the capital of the real Yemen. I remain the real president of Yemen. And the Houthis say, “Get him.”

And they've already been rampaging down to the south alongside forces loyal to Ali Abdullah Saleh. And that's where, because you always turn up in the most unlucky places, Baraa. You are actually in Aden by this point, when President Hadi says, “I'm here.” And the Houthis say, “We're coming to get you.”

Baraa: And just walking few weeks before this event, first of all, we were in Sana’a, we’re arranging for those protests. But actually, I then meet with other young activists who actually say, actually, we need another move. We need to bring now a national bloc against the Houthis. That its sole purpose is to counter the coup.

We actually managed to bring all of the political parties and we make the official announcement for this national bloc. But actually, we cannot meet in Sana’a, Sana’a is run by the Houthis.

Thomas: So, you went to Aden.

Baraa: We go to Aden. I'm literally, without joking, Thomas, I was smuggled by a tribal leader who was a fellow colleague at the National Dialogue who said, “Don't worry, I'll help you to get into Aden.”

This time, I'm with literally a combination of multiple groups who in normal times would not meet with each other or trust each other. You have secessionists who are now kind of ready because they know that Saleh and Houthis are now aligning themselves for this coming attack on Aden.

You have tribal leaders who are saying let's come together and support Hadi and the traditional political parties, all of us having this meeting in Aden. And quickly, as soon as we arrived, the Houthis arrived right after us. And the fighting starts around the outskirts of Aden Airport.

Thomas: They take the airport, there's fighting in the street. It's proper fighting. And then sort of most shocking of all, there is an extraordinary air force strike on the presidential palace in Aden.

I mean, that must have been very strange. It's like the Houthis are now flying. I mean they suddenly … they have jets, they're Saleh’s jets of course.

Baraa: So, it's now like not an open secret. Everyone knows Saleh is working with the Houthis. He's using the military officers and now the Yemeni Air Force to bomb President Hadi. We actually think on that day that actually Hadi is dead.

Thomas: That’s right. So, the presidential palace in Aden is attacked by the Yemeni Air Force loyal to Saleh, and everyone thinks Hadi's dead. Let's put a pin in it there. Aimen, you've been so quiet listening to this thrilling story from our friend Baraa.

At this point, Ali Abdullah Saleh’s son, Ahmed Saleh goes to Riyadh. Now we have overlooked a very important sort of event that happened in the last two months of this story, which is that King Abdullah died, was replaced by his brother, Salman King Salman, who immediately appointed his relatively little known quite young son, Mohammed bin Salman as Minister of Defence.

Ahmed Saleh goes to visit MBS Minister of Defence because Saleh’s thinking, this is where I cash in. This was my plan. I was going to give the Houthis a lot of power. They've now conquered half the country.

The Saudis will have to intervene on my behalf, helping me to fight the Houthis and put me back in power. So, how did MBS respond to this conversation with Saleh’s son?

Aimen: In a sense, if I want to condense the whole thing, well, we don't do deals with foxes.

Thomas: So, it didn't go well for Ahmed.

Aimen: It didn't go well.

Thomas: What's the word on the street in Yemen about this conversation between Ahmed Saleh and MBS?

Baraa: So, Saleh loyalists are feeling very confident. Their guy is now, soon is going to be back in power. Hadi, no one knows where he is right now. And we are basically left in the streets of Aden.

I remember the fighting's happening from one street to another. Suddenly there is no checkpoints, there is no security officers, no police stations, nothing except Houthis and members of a combination of tribal factions and secessionist group and some Islahis and Salafis and kind of combined together in this weird moment fighting the Houthis in the streets of Aden.

And this is literally from one street to another, a street to street fighting. And Ahmed Salah, in his meeting with MBS feeling very confident, he delivers a very threatening message to MBS.

And at the same time, the Houthis alongside Saleh are deploying a military manoeuvre at the border with Saudi Arabia. And basically, what he was threatening him, he said, either you back us up or we are going to unleash hell on Saudi Arabia.

Thomas: Well, I believe that MBS responded with some pretty saucy language, and told him to go fuck himself frankly, I think that's a good summary of how that meeting went down.

Aimen: Yeah, yeah, yeah. He told them we don't entertain foxes.

Thomas: So, Saleh was sent packing and on the 25th of March 2015, out of the blue Saudi Arabia intervened in the Yemeni Civil War. The important thing to stress is the civil war had then been raging for six months and more.

It was a proper civil war. Ahmed Saleh had threatened Saudi Arabia with attack from the Houthis if he didn't intervene in the war on his behalf. So, Saudi Arabia said, actually, no, we're going to intervene on the side of the UN, supported President Hadi, the official president of Yemen.

Baraa: And as you said, Thomas, I always pop up at the interesting places. I remember very well the airport was shut down for several days. I was stuck because I wanted to fly to London to meet my wife.

And then suddenly I get a call from a friend who was at the airport saying, I can actually book you in. This is the last flight leaving Aden. And when I start to try to negotiate with him, he said, this is it. You are either on this flight or you're stuck.

I go to the airport, and I meet the Yemeni Foreign Minister at the airport, and we have a discussion. He tells me he's now flying to Cairo to the Arab Summit, and he is calling in officially the Arab intervention.

He actually doesn't believe that the Arab countries will respond or actually agree to intervene on the Yemeni government's behalf.

Thomas: Well, he was wrong about that. And as your plane took off from Aden Airport, Saudi planes backed by a large coalition of Arab countries, which would then over the next few days get larger and over the next few weeks would get UN backing, Operation Decisive Storm was launched and another chapter in Yemen's, long and complicated history opened the chapter of the great war in Yemen, which continues to rage to this day.

This is where we're going to stop. Baraa, thank you so much. I mean, I am sure the dear listener knows more about Yemen than he ever thought he would and can make sense now of all of those headlines he's seen off and on for the last eight years.

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Dear listener, we will be back for one final episode with Baraa and Aimen, for sure this time bringing us up to the present day in Yemen and showing how events in Yemen are linked to the events sadly, tragically ominously playing out on the ground right now in Palestine and Israel. So, stay tuned for that.

A reminder that you can follow the show over on Facebook and Twitter at MH Conflicted. And for a deeper dive into all the subjects we talk about here on Conflicted, head over to Facebook and search Conflicted Podcast Discussion Group.

There you will find other fans of the show engaging in heated debates, enlightening conversations, and just generally geeking out over Conflicted related topics.

Conflicted is a Message Heard production. This episode was produced and edited by Harry Stott. Sandra Ferrari is our executive producer. Our theme music is by Matt Huxley and Tom Biddle.