Conflicted S3 E9 - Hashemites!

Thomas Small Aimen, how are ya?

Aimen Dean I'm still alive, Thomas, as every listener by now …

Thomas Small Good.

Aimen Dean … would have guessed.

Thomas Small Good, good, good. You know, I had considered naming this episode Arabs are revolting, but thought – but thought maybe people would get the wrong idea.

Aimen Dean Revolting or revolting?

Thomas Small Exactly. I mean, if I had called it that, it would be in reference to the Arab Revolt, one of many topics we're going to discuss today because yes, this episode is all about the Hashemites. Proper Arabian stuff.

Aimen Dean Indeed.

Thomas Small So, Aimen, you're going to be in the driver's seat today, especially since we're going to focus on Iraq. And as you told us back in episode three, your family has close Iraqi connections.

Aimen Dean Indeed. Because, of course, my grandfather was, you know, head of the colonial police in Basrah.

Thomas Small Traitor, traitor, traitor.

Aimen Dean Yeah. Yeah, yeah, yeah. From 1919 to 1926. You know, tumultuous years. And, actually, he was involved in the suppression of the 1920 rebellion in Iraq.

Thomas Small As we will hear about. I've got a big list of questions, Aimen. I cannot wait to pick your brains. Let's get to it.

As we race toward the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars, we're putting our final duck in its row. After the fall of the Ottoman Empire, Jordan and Iraq both received Hashemite monarchs, and the rivalries and ideological conflicts that followed still reverberate today, perhaps nowhere more powerfully than on the Temple Mount in Jerusalem. Focusing mainly on the tragic history of modern Iraq, but also on Jordan, this episode engages with the clash between modern-era of republicanism and something like traditional monarchism—Aimen's favourite—as competing versions of pan-Arabism violently spread throughout the region, prompting the Hashemites into evermore desperate acts of self-preservation.

But first, Aimen, the present day. I joked that the Arabs are revolting. But in fact, on the Temple Mount in Jerusalem, the Arabs have in fact been revolting. At least some Arabs have been. What's going on?

Aimen Dean In all honesty, I've been looking at the latest clashes, you know, in Jerusalem. And all I can see basically is an attempt to buy some elements from, you know, Hamas, mostly to ignite a fourth intifada as if we had a third intifada. I don't know if we had a third Intifada by now.

Thomas Small So, just to make sure our listeners understand. In mid-April, violence broke out on the Temple Mount ostensibly, because some extremist Israeli kind of religious fanatics were intending to sacrifice a goat up there in – in line with ancient ideas of the Passover. But this – this idea that Israelis are going to start bringing back old temple sacrifices, it sometimes pops up to create a conflict over the holy spaces there. So, then, on the 15th of April of this year, Palestinian protesters began marching early in the morning. It was 4 AM. They began marching around the Al-Aqsa Mosque, carrying Palestinian and Hamas flags.

So, Aimen, you know, the – the – the media reports were a bit confusing and contradictory. What – what do you think happened?

Aimen Dean First, there was the question of, like, you know, the Passover ritual. Then, you have the marches, you know, trying to disrupt that. Then, of course, the marches, you know, start throwing stones and all of that at the protesters. The security forces wanted to clear them off the Temple Mount. And funnily enough, because there were Palestinian elder people basically who were angry about the presence of these troublemakers in the Temple Mount. And – and this is what exacerbated the clashes. What really made me question whether this was a premeditated on the part of the Hamas elements is the fact that they brought with them stones, rocks, and fireworks into the Al-Aqsa Mosque. And from inside, they were launching the fireworks and the stones and the rocks on the security forces and Jewish worshipers at the Western Wall. So, in my opinion, they really wanted to provoke a significant clash inside Al-Aqsa Mosque, in order to create the conditions for a third or fourth intifada depending on how you think about this.

But what surprised me more than ever is the – almost the lack of the predictable outrage, you know, from the Arab world, whether on social media or—. You know, it – it was more muted this time. It was more, you know, measured response rather than the out loud, you know, outrage.

Thomas Small And that's the case, even though, you know, it was violent. A hundred Palestinians, according to reports, were injured and four hundred were arrested. Only three Israeli police officers were injured. So, clearly there was a, you know, disproportionate response. Is that right?

Aimen Dean Well, in a sense, yes. But again, what really made the general, you know, sentiment among the Arabs on social media—. And I'm talking here about the Gulf Arabs, because, of course, basically, like, you know—. And to some extent, many Egyptians, and to some extent also some Moroccans and other nationalities seems to be less enthusiastic this time about supporting the Palestinians, because there were so many photos and videos spreading of these kids bringing in rocks and stones into the Al-Aqsa Mosque inside, that they were entering the mosque with their shoes. They were playing football inside the mosque itself. I mean, inside the mosque, over the carpet. That really angered many Arabs, saying, "What the hell you're doing?"

So, there was an element of, you know, are these kids really defending Al-Aqsa or taking advantage of Al-Aqsa? You know? You know, are they there because they were told to be there. Is there something else behind this?

Because there were also many Arab writers and journalists who were saying, "Don't be fooled. This time, it's not really a proper Israeli provocation. There is something else going on here."

Thomas Small The response may have been a bit more muted than in past years. But nonetheless many Arab countries, including, you know, big ones (Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Morocco), they openly condemned the actions of the Israeli government. I mean, is this going to upset any of the recent peace accords, any of the recent cooperation moves between Arab states and Israel? Or – or do you think those condemnations were just for show?

Aimen Dean Ah, for show. I mean, these condemnations basically were just recycled old condemnations. I mean, it's the same language from before. It's just a formality. That's the best way I can describe these condemnations. Because they have to do it. I mean, they have to say, "Well, look, I mean, you know, even if you – if there are provocations from inside the mosque, you have to take more measured response."

But what surprised me is that, this time, we start to see clashes between Palestinians and Palestinians inside the mosque, between the younger generation and the older generation. Between elders who are saying, "For God's sake, don't make the mosque into a—. Don't turn it into an arena of conflict between, you know, you and the Israelis," and the younger generation who are hot headed, and they really want to start yet another intifada.

Thomas Small If you remember, dear listener, in episode seven, the one on Israel, we talked about the recent Negev summit, where the Israeli foreign minister met with his counterparts from several important Arab countries, except not Jordan. Jordan was invited, but it declined to attend.

You didn't tell us why though. Aimen. What got the Jordanian king's back up? Why didn't he attend the summit?

Aimen Dean The king of Jordan, King Abdullah II, was not happy about many aspects of the reproachment and the closeness between the Gulf Arabs and Israelis, because, in particular, he is threatened by the prospect of a Saudi-Israeli normalisation of relations. Because the price that the Saudis are demanding—and this is based on in, you know, well, certain intel and certain information that are not available in the public domain, if we can call it this way—but the Saudi price for normalisation of relationships with Israel is the Temple Mount. They want to have a full custody of Al-Aqsa Mosque and the Dome of the Rock.

Thomas Small Because right now, the Temple Mount is managed as a waqf, as a charitable endowment, overseen by the king of Jordan.

Aimen Dean Yes. So, it's the Jordanian waqf, the Jordanian, you know, religious trust that, you know, looks after the Al-Aqsa Mosque and the Dome of the Rock within the Temple Mount complex.

Thomas Small But the Saudis want to get it.

Aimen Dean Yes. The Saudis, you know—. And it is, you know, for a good reason. What they are saying is that, "Look, if we want to convince our people, the most conservative Arab population in the Middle East, if we want to convince them that there is, you know, going to be a normalisation of relations with Israel, then there has to be a price."

And this price is worth that normalisation of relations. What is that price? You know, the Temple Mount itself, Al-Aqsa Mosque, and the Dome of the Rock. So, what will happen is that instead of the king of Saudi being called the custodian of the two holy mosques, he will become the custodian of the three.

Thomas Small It's – it's fascinating. You know, it's – it's—. In a way, it's also the sort of final insult of the House of Saud against the Hashemites.

Aimen Dean Indeed.

Thomas Small I mean, a hundred years – a hundred years ago, an earlier clash between the Saudis and the House of Hashim, the Hashemites laid the foundations for much of the modern Middle East.

In this episode, we're focusing on Iraq mainly, but the episode is called Hashemites. So, in geographical terms, it will be a bit discontinuous. After all, the Hashemites don't come from Iraq. And though in the modern period, they ascended the thrones of Syria briefly, Jordan and Iraq, they come from the Hejaz.

Aimen, historically, who are the Hashemites? Why are they called Hashemites?

Aimen Dean Well, the Hashemites, you know, if we go back—really, really back in time, like, you know, fifteen hundred years ago, I would say, just a hundred years before the birth of the Prophet Muhammad—the great ancestor of Muhammad from, you know, the tribe of Quraysh. So, there was a tribe of Quraysh, and Muhammad belonged to that tribe. So, the Prophet Muhammad line is that his great-great-great grandfather is Hashim. So, Hashim is, you know, the founder of one – one of the clans from within the Quraysh tribe. So, there were other, you know, clans such as the Umayyads, which, you know, would later clash with the Hashemites, you know – you know in later years after the death of the Prophet Muhammad. And also you have, you know, the [unintelligible], you know, the [unintelligible]. You know, the—. You know, there were so many different—.

Thomas Small These are all clans within the tribe of the Quraysh.

Aimen Dean Exactly. So, Muhammad was from Bani Hashim of the Quraysh. And, of course, there were other, you know, clans within Quraysh. But in order to distinguish, you know, who are, you know—. When we say – say the Hashemites, it's means the people who belong to the same clan from within Quraysh of the Prophet Muhammad.

Thomas Small So, that doesn't mean that they're direct descendants of the Prophet Muhammad in fact.

Aimen Dean No.

Thomas Small They're just direct descendants of this Hashim who lived earlier.

Aimen Dean Exactly. Bani Hashim. And, therefore, you know, when the Abbasids, the Abbasid caliphate, you know, you have that kind of dynasty, while they were not descendants of the Prophet Muhammad, they were descendants of his uncle, Al-Abbas. And as a result, they were Hashemites, even though, you know, the modern-day Shia don't like to call them Hashemites. But they are Hashemites in a sense.

So, today, whenever we say Hashemites, really, really, we really mean the descendants of the Prophet Muhammad from his two grandsons, Hasan and Husayn, and they are the sons of his daughter, Fatima. So, really that's the meaning of Hashemites

Thomas Small In the end, the Hashemites held a special title, Sharif of Mecca. And what does that mean? What is the Sharifate of Mecca? I understand it became a political power in 967—so, you know, three hundred years and a bit after Muhammad's death—during the revolt of a sect from Qatar of all places called the Qaramita. Tell us about this story.

Aimen Dean So, if we have to distinguish that there are the Ashraf of Mecca, the Sharifs, and there are As-sada. You know, the masters. So, "sharif" means noble, and "as-sada" or "as-sayid" means, you know, "masters." And so, there are the nobles and the masters. The Nobles are the descendants of Hasan ibn Ali. So, the older grandson. And the nobles or the, you know, sada, or the, you know, masters are the descendants of Husayn, the younger son.

So, you know, for the Shia that you reveal the latter. For the Sunnis, they revere, you know the earlier ones, you know. So – so, basically—.

Thomas Small Well, I am ashamed to say, Aimen, I never knew this. This is so illuminating.

Aimen Dean Yeah. That's why they—. You know, if you hear about someone called a Sharif, they are descendants of the Hasan ibn Ali. If they are a Sayyid, you know, the master, you know, then they are descendants of Husayn.

Thomas Small And also Sayyids are Shia, and all Sharifs are Sunni?

Aimen Dean No. I mean, it's still—. Like, you know, basically, from both. I mean, there are even [unintelligible], you know, who are, you know Sharif and Sayyid, and there are Sunnis who are Sharifs and Sayyid, and there are Shia who are Sharifs and Sayyid.

But, you know—. But the Sayyids have more status, you know, within the Shia. And between you and me, like, you know, I mean, let's be honest, you know. The vast majority of those who claim to be Sharif or Sayyid, basically, like, you know, is false, really. I mean, there is—. Impossible, you know, to determine the fact, like, you know, there are ten million Muslims who are descendant from the Prophet Muhammad. It's just impossible.

Thomas Small But what about your illustrious family, Aimen? Are you a Sharif or a Sayyid?

Aimen Dean No. We are not.

Thomas Small Oh, that's very humble of you. Why don't you get on the bandwagon and claim direct descendance from Muhammad?

Aimen Dean Well, at the end—.

Thomas Small Bolster your credentials?

Aimen Dean At the end of the day, what does it do? Like, you know, I mean, you know, it does nothing at the end of the day, like, you know, basically, to, you know, to elevate me above certain people. I don't believe—. I believe in egalitarian, you know – you know, societies, you know. And with monarchists being just tribal chiefs rather than, like, you know, I mean, basically, like, a, you know, just a class of nobles. I don't believe in classism. So, therefore, I don't believe in the Sharifs and the Sayyids.

But nonetheless, because of all this instability, you know, that was taking place in the Arabian Peninsula and the constant raids, you know, by either religious fanatics or by, you know, brigans against the pilgrims and their caravans, you know, their responsibility of securing the hijabs, securing Mecca, securing Medina for the pilgrims and for the Pilgrimage season fell upon the Sharifs of Mecca, you know, which means the were basically the holders of the keys to the Kaaba, but they were the servants, you know, of the shrine and servants of the Kaaba.

So, the Abbasid caliph, who was, like, you know, ceremonial position at the time, you know, bestowed upon the Sharifs of Mecca the title of princes. And that is how the Sharifate of Mecca was created in 960s.

Thomas Small Eventually, this title, Emir of Mecca, passed to a sub-branch of the Hashemites called the Banu Qatadah, and this sub-branch held the title until 1925. And these are the people that we're going to talk about now, 'cause we've got to jump forward to the crumbling Ottoman Empire.

The British were fighting the Ottomans in World War I. And when thinking about how the Middle East would be ruled after the war, they came up with the Sharifian solution.

Now, Aimen, what is the Sharifi and solution? It was Lawrence of Arabia's idea.

Aimen Dean Well, as far as Lawrence of Arabia was concerned, he was looking at the Hejaz and thinking, "Okay. There we have a family"—you know, the Banu Qatadah—"that'd been around for nine hundred years." Can you believe it? Like, you know, a royal family been around for nine hundred years. Continuous line, you know, of succession.

So, he thought, "Okay. This family could be the key to unlocking the independence of Arabia." And when we talk about Arabia at the time, you know, they meant—. You know, it wasn't just the current peninsula of Arabia, which extend, you know, just only Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and the other GCC countries. No. He—. You know, you're talking about Iraq and Jordan and modern-day Syria. All of this was included, you know, in what was known as Arabia at that time.

The idea is that since the Ottomans were on the side of the Germans in that war, since the Ottomans were an obstacle, you know, to British interest in the region, especially the Suez Canal, and, you know, other strategic assets, therefore, there is the need to unite that Arabs and to use them as the Achilles' heel of the Ottoman Empire to bring it down.

And who could be able to unite them? Except the Sharifs of Mecca who have this noble blood, you know, who could, like, you know, unite them and fight the war?

Thomas Small This plan for how the Arab Middle East was to be governed after the Ottoman withdrawal became known as the Tangle, because it – it was so convoluted. But before we go a bit more into detail about the plan, let's talk about monarchy briefly. I mean, you're a big supporter of monarchy, Aimen. God knows you've told us that many times. And the Sharifian solution, Lawrence of Arabia's solution, envisioned a monarchical future for the Middle East.

However, from what I understand throughout history, really, Muslims have sometimes believe that monarchy, milk or milkia in Arabic, monarchy is not truly Islamic, because God alone is the monarch of the universe.

So, did this British plan, which meant to kind of recreate the Middle East almost in a British constitutional monarchical way, was it destined to fail in a region that was already a little bit ambivalent about monarchy as a principle of governance?

Aimen Dean Actually, Thomas, I believe there is a misconception among Westerners that there is an antipathy in Islam or among Muslims towards the idea of monarchy. No, it's not. In fact, the founder of the Umayyad dynasty, Mu'awiya, the first Umayyad caliph, he said, [speaks in Arabic]. You know? "I'm the first king of Islam." You know, that's the first thing. And the second thing is that the title king actually is not looked up – looked down upon, you know, in the Quran. You know, you look at, like, you know, King David and King Solomon, and, you know, they were actually the, you know, the perfect image of what a king should be.

Thomas Small And does the Quran use the word melik (king)?

Aimen Dean Exactly. Yes. You know – you know – you know—. And, actually, you know, talking about David and Solomon, they were kings. And in fact, like, you know, I mean, the idea of a king to unite were enshrined in the Quran when it talks about the Israelites asking the prophets to send them a king. [speaks in foreign language]. "Send us a king, you know, from God." So, the idea of a God-anointed king is already enshrined in the Quran. And it is there. So, when many people said Islam doesn't like the idea of kings, no. Actually, like, you know, I don't know where this idea come from. But actually, it is there. Even Saladin, you know, the – the one who conquered Jerusalem from the crusaders, I mean, he was called [name], you know, which means "The Victorious King."

Thomas Small So, in Islam, then what's the difference between a king and a caliph?

Aimen Dean So, you can imagine, you know, for a Western audience, it's the difference between the Holy Roman emperor and, you know, you have the kings of Europe, you know. So, that's the only difference, is that there is someone who is a semi-pope and a semi-emperor at the same time. You know, someone who hold a religious position as well as a political position. So, it's a marriage between the Holy Roman emperor and the pope at the same time. This is what a caliph mean.

Thomas Small I see.

Aimen Dean And there can only be one caliph, but there can be so many kings subordinate to him.

Thomas Small This is very reminiscent of the ancient Persian idea of the king of kings.

Aimen Dean Yes.

Thomas Small A Shahanshah. A king that is above all other kings. And, you know, in the Roman period, this is what the Roman emperor was. He was over all the kings. He had a kind of universal monarchy, whereas kings had territorial monarchies. They were limited.

Aimen Dean Absolutely. And this is I think where the – the, you know, the idea that kings, you know, and kingship doesn't – doesn't really clash with Islam, because there can be a caliph, you know, over, you know, that can be, you know, where all other kings can be subordinate to him.

Thomas Small Well, let's go on now to outline this Sharifian solution in a bit more detailed. So, the Sharif of Mecca at the time of Lawrence of Arabia was Sharif Husayn bin Ali. And he had four sons—Ali, Abdullah, Faisal, and Zeid. Lawrence's idea was to give those sons parts of the Middle East to rule as kings. Ali, the eldest son was going to become king of the Hejaz after his father Sharif Husayn died. The next son Abdullah was supposed to be king of Iraq. Faisal, the next son, was supposed to be king of all of Syria, of Greater Syria. And finally, the youngest son Zeid was supposed to become king of northern Mesopotamia. Kurdistan, in fact.

Right. Let's see how the plan worked out. Let's start with Faisal. Now, Faisal was Alec Guinness in Lawrence of Arabia. Remember? Now, Aimen. How did Faisal's part in this plan go? He was the commander of the Arab Northern Army during the Arab Revolt against the Ottomans. And in that capacity, he worked very closely with Lawrence.

Aimen Dean Well, Faisal, of course, was a charismatic figure. I mean, no question about it. And he was, you know—. He had that charisma and the [unintelligible] and all of that. But also he had the help of the British. And what helped him also is the fact that during the late stages of the Ottoman Empire, the Ottoman rule, you know, became increasingly Turkish rule, and there was exceptional amount of xenophobia and racism from, you know, the Turks towards the Arabs. Not to mention, of course, you know, the atrocities they committed and the neglect – and the neglect they showed to many parts of the Arab world. You know, from Syria all the way to Yemen. So, his mission was made easier by the Turks. And, of course, then when the Turks decided to enter the First World War on the side of the Germans, he – he struck, you know gold—let's put it this way—British gold, when he found that the aims in off the Sharifs of Mecca now, you know, corresponded nicely with, you know, the aims of the British Empire.

Thomas Small That's true. And at the end of the war, he was at the head of an army that conquered Damascus, where he was installed as king of Syria in October 1918, again, claiming all of Greater Syria, of the traditional Syria—Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Palestine. The whole thing. Although in fact, he was only in control of the inland regions. He was only in control of the – the parts of Greater Syria on the other side of the mountains, the Levantine mountain ranges.

Now, sadly for Faisal, when the British eventually agreed with the French to withdraw to the southern half of Greater Syria only, and leaving the French in charge of the northern half, including Damascus, Faisal had to fend for himself against the French. And that didn't – didn't really go so well for poor Faisal, did it?

Aimen Dean Well, Faisal found out in 1920 that British promises are not even worth the paper they are written on.

Thomas Small You're not the first one to find that.

Aimen Dean But he found out to his, you know—. To great cost that, yeah, you know, whatever the crown – the British crown promised him, basically, means nothing really on the ground, because the British promised the same land to someone else, the French. And, you know, the French, after Versailles of 1919, were in no compromising mode at all. And so, they just, you know, chucked him out of Syria after the Battle of Maysalun.

Aimen Dean Yes. The famous Battle of Maysalun July of 1920. This was a big battle between Faisal's forces and the French army of the Levant. And Faisal, I'm afraid, was defeated.

Aimen Dean Of course. I mean, he was able to win against the Ottomans, because of British arms, British guns, and British, you know, officers. None of this was available to him at the Battle of Maysalun. And, of course, he lost, and he withdraw all the way to Jordan. And then, from there, to the Hejaz.

Thomas Small Defeated, Faisal's kingdom of Syria ceased to exist. But before long, the British installed him as king of Iraq. So, yay, Faisal. He did get something in the end. We talked about Faisal becoming king of Iraq in episode three, because his installation as king there followed the notorious crushing of the great revolt against the British, which your grandfather helped achieve, Aimen.

Aimen Dean Indeed. My illustrious grandfather,

Thomas Small Right. That's Faisal. We'll come back to Iraq. But what about Abdullah? So, he commanded the Arab Eastern Army during the Arab Revolt, and he was earmarked to rule Iraq. What happened? It's very mysterious. What – what happened about this? Apparently, you know—. You read some things, and it says that he was in fact proclaimed king by you know, a congress of Iraqi notables, but he refused the position. Why, Aimen? Why – why did Abdullah not become king of Iraq and his brother did?

Aimen Dean So, Sharif Abdullah, he decided not to take up the position in Iraq, because, one, there was already the internal family agreement that, you know, after the Battle of Maysalun, that if Faisal couldn't get the Greater Syria, then what would happen is that Faisal will end up being the king of Iraq, even though Faisal was the younger.

Thomas Small Even though Faisal was the younger brother. Because why? Actually, you know, Abdullah was having his eyes set on the greater prize, which is Jerusalem and the Transjordan region. So, for him, it's a greater price. Why? Because it is closer, you know, to the, Hejaz. You know? Remember, it is 1920. They are still in control of the Hejaz. You know, the family as a whole. So, his father Husayn, his older brother Ali. They are family in control of the Hejaz. And therefore what they – what he wanted is to have Jerusalem. So, having a holy city and for him to be the Sharif of that holy city is greater than, you know, that place called Mesopotamia or as they call it the Messy Pot.

Thomas Small Well, perhaps with Jerusalem in mind, after his brother Faisal's defeated Maysalun, Abdullah did head in the same direction towards Damascus. He hoped to defeat the French. Grabbed Damascus for himself, and from that position of power, established claims over Jerusalem. But it didn't go so well for him either. On the way, Churchill, in fact, Winston Churchill convinced him to stop in Jordan, and he ended up king there, and they founded a new kingdom, the Kingdom of Transjordan in 1921. Abdullah's desires were really cut down to size, I would say, because the Kingdom of Transjordan, it wasn't really much to sniff at at that time. Pretty, pretty poor. Pretty under-populated. Pretty bad, really.

Aimen Dean Actually, I mean, between you and me, Jordan is the most—. In its current form, it's the most natural resource impoverished country in the Middle East. And yet, it is one of the most stable. Funny enough, like, you know, it just shows you, like, you know, the power of monarchy. But, you know, it – it doesn't have that much access to the sea. It doesn't have that much water. It doesn't have any oil, any gas, any natural resources except phosphate, which has been completely, you know, ravaged by now. So, really poor Jordan.

Thomas Small Since we started out talking about political control of a holy site, Jerusalem, giving legitimacy to Muslim leaders, we can briefly mention another sad chapter in the Hashemites' story, the Sharifian caliphate. So, if you remember, dear listener, the Ottoman caliphate was abolished in 1924. Sharif Husayn, who was king of the Hejaz, claimed the title for himself. He was going to be the caliph of all Muslims based in Mecca. But sadly, this gains little traction in the Muslim world. And within a year, your friend, Aimen, King Abdulaziz of Saudi Arabia launched his successful conquest of the Hejaz and sent the Sharif of Mecca packing. Husayn, the father fled to his son King Abdullah in Oman. And – and – and there he died in the end. And – and where – where is he buried, Aimen. Where else but?

Aimen Dean Jerusalem.

Thomas Small Oh, that's right.

Aimen Dean Temple Mount, actually.

Thomas Small On the Temple Mount. Inside – inside the Al-Aqsa Mosque.

Aimen Dean Just beside it.

Thomas Small Amazing. Now, Husayn's eldest son Ali, who was supposed to be the king of Hejaz, he – he briefly did hold that title, but he ended up fleeing the Saudi onslaught to Iraq, where he died. So, you know, in the end, the Hejaz was no longer ruled by the – the House of Hashim. It had been ruled by the House of Hashim for thirteen hundred years and fell into a Najdi royal family's hands, the House of Saud.

Aimen Dean Indeed. The only thing that didn't change, though, is the, you know, the custody of the Kaaba itself. And the keys of the Kaaba remained with Bani Hashim.

Thomas Small Right. So, as I said, Husayn's eldest son Ali fled to Iraq where he died, which brings us back to Iraq. Let's talk about Iraq. Aimen, you are a big fan of a famous Iraqi sociologist called Ali Al-Wardi. What does Ali Al-Wardi have to say about Iraq and especially the Iraqi people?

Now, dear listener, I warn you. Ali Al-Wardi has some rather controversial, somewhat extreme opinions on the nature of Iraqi people.

Aimen Dean Indeed. Ali Al-Wardi, you know, of course, is one of the greatest sociologists, you know, of the entire Arab world. And he commented a lot on Iraq and, you know, Iraqi people. And he said in one of his writings, you know, he said that the census will tell us that there are fifty million people in Iraq. He said, "I disagree." You know? He said, "There are thirty million people, because each Iraqi is capable of being two people at the same time."

So, you know—. So one person—. So, if we – if we talk about, like, you know, the Iraqi person being two, one person is capable of being generous. You know, a good father, a good husband, a wonderful neighbour. You know, a charitable individual. And then, the same person will possess another personality, which will be sadistic, you know, murderous, treacherous, and, you know, capable of atrocities.

Thomas Small Oh, my goodness. What—? What—? Our – our Iraqi listeners are going to feel insulted, Aimen? I mean, I guess one of their own laid out this theory.

Aimen Dean I didn't say that, you know. I'm not Ali Al-Wardi. I'm not Professor Ali Al-Wardi, that is. You know, although he died in 1995. But, you know, his books are amazing, basically. Like, you know, I mean, if there are any Iraqi listeners, you know, they will know about [unintelligible] and many other books basically he'd written and the personality of the Iraqi individual [unintelligible]. I mean, all of these wonderful books he'd written, like, you know, and—. You know, and wonderful writings. But he never minced his words.

And why this is important. Because he talked about the difference between the civilisational, you know, progress of Iraq and of the other regions, you know. For example, he what—. He talked about the Levant, he talked Persian, he talked about Egypt, and how Iraq was different, you know. So, for example, he said Egypt and Iraq, you know, both are river civilisations. Both are very old. Seven thousand years old. Both are invaded by different empires, controlled by different empires. Invaded almost by the same set of empires, you know. Greeks, Persians, Arabs, you know, British. You name it. But how the Iraqis, you know, deposed their king in 1958 and how the Egyptians deposed their king in 1952 shows the complete difference between the two.

Thomas Small Oh, you're racing ahead. We will get back to that when we get to the infamous revolution in Iraq of 1958. But sticking with the post-Ottoman period. Now, post-Ottoman Iraq was earmarked to be a British Mandate, like Palestine and Transjordan. But immediately, in 1920, the Iraqis rebelled against this plan, and the rebellion was put down by the British and your grandfather, Aimen, quite brutally, and agreement was reached via what's known as the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1922.

Aimen, honestly, what did your grandfather, a pious Muslim, think he was doing allying with the British to crush Iraqi national aspirations?

Aimen Dean Okay. So, my grandfather had a lot to say.

Thomas Small No doubt. Your grandfather had a lot to say? I don't believe it.

Aimen Dean Yeah. He had a lot to say about the 1920 revolution. I mean, first of all, the 1920 revolution started actually, you know, as a small alliance between the [unintelligible], you know, the former Ottoman officials, and the Shia religious clerics or Karbala and Najaf and what they call the middle Euphrate region. You know, the area between Karbala all the way to Basrah. So, the middle Euphrate. So, this is where, you know, the revolution started, because, at the time, there was a British civil servant, who was the viceroy of Iraq. You know, Sir Arnold Wilson. And he wasn't exactly, like, you know, the brightest, you know, tool in the shed. Let's put it this way. And so, he didn't know how to deal with it. And that's why he – he lost control over swathes of Iraq. I mean, first it was a – a Ottoman remnants and Shia clerics, you know, revolt, you know, started the revolt.

Now my grandfather was in the south. So, as an ardent Sunni, you know, the British used him, you know, really and many other officers from the British Indian Army. And, you know, most of them are actually Afghans, just like my grandfather. You know, they were used, you know, to really crush, you know, the rebellion. And they were telling them, "These are, you know, the Shia. You are Sunni." So, you know—. So, there was.

But then—. There was an element of sectarianism there. But then – then, you know, it was a big surprise when the tribes of Shamar and Zoba and others, you know, who are Sunnis, started to rebel.

Thomas Small So, the Shia had rebelled in the south and then more in the north. The Sunni tribes from the desert are rebelling. Oh, my goodness.

Aimen Dean And even the Kurds started to rebel also. And this is when, you know, our dear friend, Winston Churchill, you know, used chemical weapons to – to subdue the Kurds and actually—.

Thomas Small Good ol' Winston.

Aimen Dean Yeah. So, Sadam, where did he get his idea to gas the Kurds?

Thomas Small Oh, no. It's true.

Aimen Dean Yeah. So, this is when Winston Churchill decided, "You know what? Like, you know, [unintelligible] use chemical weapon." Because it was mountain warfare, you know. The desert, you can, you know, have easy warfare there. But in the mountains there, just use gas. And, of course, he got the idea from what the Germans did in – during the World War I. And so, he deployed chemical weapons in Kurdistan. It's well-documented that Winston Churchill did it.

And, of course, it all came to an end because the 1920 revolution failed. Why? Because it was carried out by multitude of disparate groups. No coordination. They didn't know how to fight. They had no modern weaponry. And the most important thing is that the British deployed another viceroy, a much more competent viceroy, Sir Percy Cox. And he, of course, like, you know, I mean, reached the 1922 treaty, the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, which, you know, solve the problem. How? Again, we come back to the Hashemite solution.

Thomas Small Well, it's true. Faisal was king, and – and Iraq was pacified, I suppose. But only for the time being. In – in British mandatory Iraq following the 1922 treaty, religious ethnic groups asserted their claims to autonomy or they wanted a greater share of power in this new growing modern central government.

I mean, first, as you said, there's the Shia. They weren't so happy. In general, again, as you mentioned, Aimen, tribalism was rife in the society, and it was a huge hindrance to creating a strong modern state as tribalism always is.

So, just like as it was happening at the same time in Iran, in Saudi Arabia, really everywhere, the modern state was extending its bureaucracy into the countryside, forcing a transition away from tribal organisation, from tribal values. And as a result, in the thirties, there were tribal revolts. The tribes did not wish to be sort of subjugated to the – to the central government.

In addition to the Shia, the Sunni tribe, the Kurdish tribes, there were a lot of Christians in Iraq as well, especially in the north, especially amongst a population called the Assyrians. The Assyrians are a fascinating people descended from the ancient Assyrians who were, in fact, the first people to unite Egypt, Syria, and Mesopotamia into one empire way back in the eighth century BC. They were eventually Christianised during the First World War. They were at the receiving end of Turkish genocidal mania. And so, were resettled in Northern Iraq. And during the British period, they were organised into a colonial military unit, which the British used during the revolt in 1920 with great effect.

However, the use by the British of this Christian militia as a police force for Iraq would rebound upon the Assyrians when the British Mandate ended in 1932, and Iraq gained a greater measure of independence. In 1933, there was tremendous fighting between the Assyrians and the new Iraqi army. The Iraqi army really crushed the Assyrians. Summary executions were widespread. And in general, there was a huge increase of distrust between central governments and minorities.

In the midst of all this chaos, the military becomes politically prominent for the first time in Iraq. It would always remain so. This is the legacy of British rule in Mesopotamia. Iraq was becoming a very challenging country to run. And this brings us to a very important Iraqi, the man who was running Iraq at the start of the Cold War and would play a very important role in regional geopolitics in the 1950s, Nuri al-Said.

Aimen Dean Oh, yes. Nuri al-Said.

Thomas Small Tell us about Nuri al-Said.

Aimen Dean So, Nuri al-Said, he was born in Baghdad. You know, belongs to a family from Mosul, in northern Iraq, and, you know, of Arab origin. He—. You know, his father was actually, you know, a civil servant, you know, within the Ottoman Empire. And that's what enabled him to send his son Nuri to Istanbul. You know, to the, you know, military academy there, where he graduated, you know, one of the top of the class, you know, to put it this way. You know, he was sent to the Balkans to fight the war there for the Ottomans. So, we're talking here about someone who was, you know, Ottoman, you know, really, through and through. And he fought for the Ottoman Empire. But, of course, events in Iraq later would change his mind and change his allegiance. With the beginning of the Arab Revolt, he lent his services to the Hashemites and to the Arab Revolt. His military you know, training, his understanding of Turkish military tactics. He understands—. His understanding of automated weapons made him indispensable.

Thomas Small He fought with Prince Faisal in the Arab Revolt. He was very close to Prince Faisal and then King Faisal. In fact, he was at the head of Faisal's armies who conquered Damascus. So, he really played a very important role in the revolt and, therefore, was in a position to benefit when Faisal became king of Iraq.

Faisal actually appointed Nuri al-Said director general of the Iraqi police force in 1922, which I suppose means he was your grandfather's boss. Is that right, Aimen?

Aimen Dean Eh, in a sense. Because you see, my grandfather was, you know, distinct – distinctively in the Iraqi colonial police. Not the Iraqi national police.

Thomas Small Ah.

Aimen Dean These two forces are separate. Because my—. For example, my grandfather was more responsible for the protection of the strategic assets such as the port in Basrah, such as the canals, you know, such as the water facilities. You know, while the national police were more responsible for the day-to-day, you know, running of the security within the urban centres,

Thomas Small Right. Let's move on. Nuri al-Said eventually was made prime minister in 1930 and signed a revised Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, which granted Iraq more independence, but also gave the British the right to station its troops in Iraq. Why? Well, those – those strategic assets you just described, Aimen, especially oil. The Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, guaranteed British control of the oil industry and was, therefore, not at all popular.

Aimen Dean Not at all popular, you know. And again, it shows the short-sightedness of the British at that time for not granting, you know, favourable terms in terms of oil, exploration and oil revenue sharing that could have prolonged, you know, British influence there in the long run. Unfortunately, it was short-sighted.

Thomas Small Just like what we saw in Iran with the Mossadegh case, the – the British made this mistake a lot.

Aimen Dean Indeed. Not the Americans, though.

Thomas Small Yeah. That's one of the things that made the Americans a little bit more successful in their long-term ability to keep oil-producing nations under their umbrella.

Aimen Dean Including Saudi Arabia and other countries. Yes. Indeed.

Thomas Small So, as a result of the dissatisfaction with the new treaty, Nori was dismissed by King Faisal. But then, suddenly, King Faisal died of a heart attack and was succeeded as king of Iraq by his son, Ghazi. The British convinced King Ghazi to appoint Nuri al-Said foreign minister. And then, Nuri would go on to be prime minister eleven more times. So, fourteen times in total. And his proximity to the British made him increasingly unpopular.

As a sign of this closeness to the British, when the new king, Ghazi adopted an anti-British policy and supported a military coup against the civilian government, the first military coup in modern Middle Eastern history, the king was then killed in a mysterious car crash. People said the crash had been on Nuri al-Said's orders.

Aimen Dean Well, after King Ghazi was mysteriously and unfortunately killed, his three-year-old son became the king of Iraq, King Faisal II. Of course, he's young. So, there needed to be a regency. And, of course, who was appointed as prince regent? Prince Abdul Ilah, the uncle of King Faisal II. And who happens to be a very close friend of Nuri al-Said?

Thomas Small Yes. And the – the – the alliance between Nuri al-Said and Abdullah for the next few years was very powerful in Iraq. And – and in a way, given that Iraq's king was a small child, the civilian prime minister, Nuri al-Said and, you know, and others, but mainly Nuri. So, the civilian government was able to have a lot more control than the otherwise would.

Aimen Dean Indeed. Because, of course, the military was a little bit side-lined in that case. And the military was always more or less, like, you know, I mean, influenced by British officers as well as by – by Prince Abdul Ilah himself.

Thomas Small Anyway, Iraqi politics is as confusing as Syrian politics. So, let's jump forward to the period following the Second World War. Now, Iraq declared neutrality at the beginning of the war. So, Britain, which had actually withdrawn from Iraq in 1932, reinvaded it and occupied the country until 1947. In 1947, the British wanted to stay on. They used their closeness to Nuri al-Said to negotiate a new Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, which went down even worse than before.

Aimen Dean And the situation was changing in Iraq. Because, don't forget, the Soviet Union triumphed, you know, over Nazism. And that gave rise to many communists, you know, movements in the Middle East, including in Iraq. Communism started to find more sympathetic ears in Iraq, especially among the educated young classes, especially among the Shia young, educated classes.

Thomas Small Yes. That's right. The communists were just one of many, many groups of people who were very angry by the new Anglo-Iraqi Treaty. Massive protests broke out, which were followed by harsh police crackdown. Nuri al-Said became extremely hated, especially by those communists, whom he hated back in turn. He hated communism, and his government became harshly anti-communist.

I think it's worth pointing out, though, Aimen that the political system in Iraq at the time very much favoured big land owners and the urban rich. Inequality was – was stark. And – and, therefore, the growing dissatisfaction wasn't based on nothing.

Aimen Dean Oh no, there is no question that, you know, the south was neglected. The north was neglected. And, you know, it was, as you said, like, you know, favouring, you know, the people of the big cities—Baghdad, Basrah, and Mosul. You know, if you are – if you are not part of the urban elite there, then you are part of the peasantry.

Thomas Small At the same time, the nationalist anti-colonial movements of Mohammad Mossadegh in Iran and Abdul Nasser in Egypt struck a strong chord among the Iraqi people. Riots broke out again and again and were put down violently again and again. Trouble was on the way. Which brings us finally, after so many hints and so many episodes, to the Baghdad Pact.

All right, Aimen. Here's one of my long historical rants as I – as I tried to put the Baghdad Pact in context. Nuri al-Said had learnt from the protests following the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty that a subtler arrangement had to be found for keeping Iraq within Britain's security umbrella. He was pro-British. He wanted Britain to remain a big player in Iraq. But he needed to do it in a way that would get the Iraqi people onside. So, wanting the subtler arrangement with the British, he would soon get it. But as he'd find out, the consequences would literally be fatal.

All right. Remember back in episode six, on Nasser, we said that the us had suggested to Egypt that it participate in a new alliance, like NATO only for the Middle East, and that Nasser had said, "No. Thank you. The Soviet Union doesn't threaten us. Britain threatens us." Right? Remember that?

Well, the US pressed ahead with the alliance anyway, which they reconfigured as an alliance of "northern-tier nations of the greater Middle East." Basically an arc of nations to the south of the Soviet Union, which would help to contain Soviet expansion southward. At a first step towards this goal, in April 1954, Turkey and Pakistan signed an agreement of friendly cooperation, basically a lightweight defensive agreement. And in response, Nasser convened the Arab league and strong armed all the Arab states to promise never to join a non-Arab military alliance. Nuri al-Said, the Iraqi prime minister, rather reluctantly agreed to go along with this. Nuri al-Said favoured a military alliance with British-oriented powers.

However, this wasn't to last long. In episode six, we also covered the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement, which Nasser signed with Britain, in which Britain agreed to withdraw from the Suez Canal Zone by the summer of 1956, which it did, which prompted Nasser to nationalise the canal, which led to the Suez Crisis. Remember?

Aimen Dean Yeah.

Thomas Small Anyway, that agreement with Britain, which was signed in '54, contained an important clause. That Egypt would allow Britain to reoccupy the canal zone in the event of an attack on Turkey. Now, that may sound weird, but Turkey was in NATO. And so, an attack on Turkey would have meant a Western assault on the Soviet Union—World War III, basically—in which case control of the Suez Canal would be vital.

In Nuri al-Said, this clause that allowed Britain to reoccupy Egypt of Turkey was attacked was something like a three-way defensive alliance between Egypt, Turkey, and the UK. So, he negotiated his own defensive agreement with Turkey, which was signed on the 24th of February 1955.

Over the next few months, Britain, then Iran, then Pakistan would join this alliance. The headquarters for which was Baghdad. Thus was born the Baghdad Pact. So, the Baghdad Pact was a defensive alliance, like NATO to some extent. It was aimed at preventing the spread of communism in the region like NATO. But unlike NATO, it had no central military command or anything like Article V, which says that an attack on one is an attack on all.

So, it was – it was like kind of mini NATO, a watered down NATO for the Middle East. But most importantly, Aimen, unlike NATO, the United States was not a member of the Baghdad Pact. Why – why was that, Aimen?

Aimen Dean Well, the two reasons why the US did not join is simple. I mean, first, they wanted to stay completely away from the British sphere of influence when it comes to antagonising Nasser, as well as antagonising the, you know, the Israelis who they were supporting.

Thomas Small That's right. I mean, they supported the Baghdad Pact, but from behind the scenes. They did not join it. They were "benevolent patrons" of the Baghdad Pact. It was part of Eisenhower's ceaseless quest to balance Arab nationalism and Zionism at the same time. He didn't want to piss off either side in that divide.

It's obvious why Iraq joined a pact like the Baghdad Pact. I mean, for most of its history, Iraq has been at the mercy of whoever controlled Anatolia, like Turkey, or whoever controlled the Iranian plateau, like ancient Persia, like modern Iran. I mean, Nuri al-Said thought that joining a military pact that included both Turkey and Iran would neutralise the threat from either side. And this was actually foresighted, because as we'll see, you know, Iraq would eventually withdraw from the pact. And from that day onward, its relations with both Turkey and Iran have been dangerously strained.

Aimen Dean Oh, yes. For sure.

Thomas Small Which leaves the elephant in the room. Aimen. Why didn't Jordan join the Baghdad Pact? I mean, when we left Jordan, the Hashemite king, Abdullah, was in power. Jordan became independent of Britain in 1946. During the 1948 war with Israel, it annexed the West bank, thus expanding its borders. So, it seems natural given that it was a British protectorate, given the – the – the close relationship between the British military and Jordan that it would join the Baghdad Pact. Why didn't it?

Aimen Dean Well, because of an event that happened in July of 1951 that rocked, you know, the Hashemite monarchies of the Arab world. As you know, Jerusalem was part of King Abdullah I's domain. You know, the Trans—. The kingdom of Transjordan. And so, as usual, every Friday, he would go to a Al-Aqsa Mosque. He would pray there. And in that fateful day, a Palestinian assassin, twenty-one-year-old, who, under the influence of Hajj al-Amin al-Husseini, which we talked about before, you know, Hitler's propagandist, shot and killed, you know, the king on that fateful day. And, of course, basically, that really was a deeply shocking event and a destabilising event for the Hashemites.

And, you know, the—. Not only like, you know, the royal family in Jordan took note of it, of course, but, of course, the Royal family in Baghdad. The cousins, you know, took note of it.

Thomas Small King Abdullah's fifteen-year-old grandson, the future king, Hussein, was by his side when he was shot and killed.

Aimen Dean In fact, he – he received the bullet himself. But, you know, what happened is that he was wearing a medal that his own grandfather insisted that he wears. And it's that medal, which actually, you know, where the bullet was lodged. Otherwise, he could have been killed.

Thomas Small A miracle.

Aimen Dean Absolutely.

Thomas Small So, Abdullah's son Talal succeeded him. But Talal, King Talal, was pushed out of power the following year and – and they – and the sixteen-year-old Hussein became king. Why was Talal pushed out of power?

Aimen Dean It was a palace coup, and it was organised, of course, by the Talal's wife. You know, Queen Zein al-Sharaf. You know, so Queen Zein al-Sharaf, the mother of king Hussein, felt that her husband was too much of an Arab nationalist. I could—. At least that's one of the stories.

Thomas Small The official story is that he was suffering from schizophrenia, and he was sent to an insane asylum in Istanbul.

Aimen Dean There are two conflicting stories here about why Talal was pushed away. I mean, and this is a Conflicted, so we have to talk about the two stories here. I mean, the first story is that he was released, because [unintelligible] prone to violence and, therefore, an unstable. Therefore, you know, he needed to be removed in favour of a more stable and rational form of governance.

The second story here is that, no, he was actually a pan-Arab nationalist, and he was, you know, more or less, like, you know, I mean, trying to form an Arab alliance in order to liberate Palestine and all of this, you know, nonsense. Let's put it this way.

But nonetheless, you know, the time ago him being deposed is rather interesting. It was merely just three weeks after King Farouk of Egypt was ousted, you know, by the Free Officers Movement in Egypt, in the 1952 revolution. So, you know, two kings out within quick succession, except King Talal was deposed through an internal palace coup. And that was it. I mean, it was organised by his wife, who was very close to the British, especially the British head of the military. You know, Glubb Pasha.

Thomas Small Now, the famous Glubb Pasha. I swear,Aimen. We should just—. We should do a whole series on each one of these episodes. There are so many great personalities. Queen Zein was a very strong character.

Aimen Dean Indeed.

Thomas Small And though, her son, only sixteen years old at the time, King Hussein, became king, she remained very influential from behind the throne. King Hussein and policymakers in Jordan wanted to join the Baghdad Pact, getting back to what we were talking about in 1955, but as soon as they announced their intention to join, riots broke out across Jordan, protesting the alliance. So, Jordan didn't join. And it's important to note that these riots were largely influenced by Nasser's very sophisticated anti-Western propaganda machine.

So, the Baghdad Pact split the Arab world right down the middle. You were either pro-Western or pro-neutrality with a leaning towards the Soviets. And this began to play out as a battle between Nuri al-Said and Iraq and Gamal Abdel Nasser, the president of Egypt.

But the chips were really stacked against Nuri al-Said all along. He was already extremely unpopular inside Iraq for his draconian authoritarian, anti-communist, anti-minority regime. And then, after the Suez Crisis, Nasser became way more popular inside Iraq. Nuri al-Said was very much undermined by this.

Which takes us up to where we left off at the end of the last episode, the episode on Syria. With the formation of the United Arab Republic, the UAR. The union between Egypt and Syria, which was formed in February 1958. The idea then was that other Arab countries slowly, slowly would also join this new union. The announcement of the United Arab Republic freaked out the Hashemite monarchies. Didn't it, Aimen? Especially King Hussein in Jordan.

Aimen Dean King Hussein really freaked out about the United Arab Republic, because one reason is that, to the north, it's Syria. To the Southwest, it's Egypt. He is sandwiched between two big Arab powers, you know. And he is an underpopulated, small country.

Thomas Small It's also important that he was only twenty-two years old. I mean, a lot of the decisions that King Hussein would make over the next few years might be attributed to the fact that he was a very young man. Young men aren't really famous for their wisdom.

Aimen Dean Indeed.

Thomas Small And this brings us to the Iraqi king, Faisal II. You know, when we left Faisal II, he was only three years old following his father, King Ghazi's death in that car crash. Well, it's important to note that King Faisal had come to power properly in 1953, when he was eighteen years old. So, when the UAR was proclaimed in 1958, he was also only twenty-two years old, just like his cousin King Hussein in Jordan.

Aimen, tell me about Faisal II. I know that you love him.

Aimen Dean Well, who wouldn't? I mean, I – I would definitely uh, encourage the listeners to go and Google him. I mean, basically. I mean, and just see some of the videos of him visiting, you know – you know, world powers and all of that. I mean, you can tell, like, you know, I mean, his gentle demeanour, his, you know, charisma, his, you know – you know, good nature. He doesn't strike you as a despot, as a dictator, as someone basically, like, you know, who's bloodthirsty. In fact, he was one of the gentlest kings that ever, you know, reigned over any Arab country.

Thomas Small Yes. I mean, he—. I mean, he had received a Western education, and he—. But he, you know—. He's famed for being a proponent of – of democracy. He was hoping to turn Iraq into a proper constitutional monarchy.

Aimen Dean Indeed. And it – it was a dream. And what a dream. Unfortunately, this dream ended up a nightmare.

Thomas Small Nasser was, by this point, so popular and his brand of pan-Arabism so inspiring that both King Hussein of Jordan and King Faisal II of Iraq feared that they'd be overthrown by forces favouring joining the UAR.

Now, what does this say about monarchism, Aimen? If it's supposed to be the great unifying, stabilising force that you say it is, then – then why were the Hashemite monarchs at the receiving end of so much pro-republican agitation by their people?

Aimen Dean Because the monarchs or the time did not understand yet the power of transnational ideas and how they can cross borders and, you know, and the power of the media, the power of ideas spreading like virus. And at the time, it was communism and international socialism.

Thomas Small And Arab nationalism.

Aimen Dean And Arab nationalism. Arab nationalism, you know, based on the socialistic ideas, were really infectious at the time. And they did not have, you know, what we call the countermeasure. You know, the ability to counter this narrative, you know, with their population. So, it was all about not the monarchy or a nationalism. It was actually the failure of narratives.

Thomas Small It's interesting. I mean, Arab nationalism had, for a brief period in the 1910s and twenties, been sort of focused on the Sharif of Mecca and his sons creating a pan-Arab monarchical Imperium. And it was – it was pan-Arab. I mean, they – they hoped to unite all the Arabs under their Hashemite rule. It didn't work. The Western powers didn't play along exactly as they should have or would have or could have. And then, Arab nationalism took a secularising turn with the rise of Nasser and – and other movements like the Ba'ath Party and things. And so, the vision of pan-Arabism that the Hashemites had first propagated came back in the secular form to bite them in the butt.

Aimen Dean Indeed. And bite them, it did. And this is what will bring us, you know, to the July events of 1958.

Thomas Small That's right. In extreme haste, after the announcement of the United Arab Republic, on King Hussein's initiative, he and King Faisal proclaimed their own union, the Arab Federation. Literally, within thirteen days, they dreamt up a whole new union, the Arab Federation. Nuri al-Said was appointed prime minister of the new federation, but it was not destined to last long.

Aimen, as you say, this brings us to an episode in Iraqi history that you always speak of with great emotion: The 14 July Revolution of 1958,

Aimen Dean It was a curse day, a dark day. A black spot on the history of not only Iraq, but the entire Middle East.

Thomas Small As we've been saying, inside Iraq for several years, opposition had been brewing against Nuri al-Said, against the regime there. Whether it was led by Nuri al-Said or someone else, the regime had become very authoritarian, forcing most opposition voices underground.

The disparate strands of the Iraqi opposition at this point were either pro-Nasser or at least anti-anti-Nasser. So, this is from right-wing nationalists to left-wing communist. And the opposition coalesced into a new political organisation, the United National Front. So, uniting all the opposition under one umbrella.

At the same time, you know, as early as 1952, in fact, radical officers inside the Iraqi army inspired by Nasser and the other young Egyptian officers who had overthrown King Farouk had begun to organise. It's a sign of Nasser's influence, of how inspiring he was. Wasn't it, Aimen?

Aimen Dean Yes. I mean, this is the problem, like, you know, I mean, with Nasser's and that—. It really reminds me of the aged. You know, that the road to hell is paved with good intentions.

Thomas Small These officers loved Nasser's centralising reforms. They loved his position of non-alignment in the Cold War. They loved his boldness during the Suez Crisis. And they were itching for radical change.

Okay. So, now we're going to talk about this in detail a few episodes down the line. But in 1958, the year of the UAR and the Arab Federation, Lebanon suddenly collapsed into civil war. The young King Hussein in Jordan was spooked again.

Aimen Dean And that is why King Hussein requested military aid from his cousin, King Faisal, in Baghdad, you know, to deal with, you know, the ramifications of the Lebanese civil war.

Thomas Small He feared that the fighting in Lebanon would spill over into his country. So, he called upon his cousin in Baghdad to help. Nuri al-Said ordered Iraqi troops to Oman to defend the regime there. But instead they marched on Baghdad.

Aimen Dean Indeed. And they were marching on al-Rehab Palace, where, you know, King Faisal resided. And when the news came to King Faisal, he was told that "we can defend you. We can quickly, you know, erect the barricades. We can defend you all the way until you can get in an airplane." Because it was supposed to fly that day to Istanbul in order to seek the hand, you know, of his fiancée in marriage. You know, he was supposed to be engaged that day. That very day. His beautiful fiancée was waiting for him in Istanbul.

So, King Faisal, having already instructed the guards not to fight and open the gates of the al-Rehab Palace, he came down with his uncle, his aunts, and his cousins. And most of them were females, actually. Young girls. And he was carrying, you know, a white flag. All of this magnanimity and, you know, and surrender did not spare him at all. They were all put against the wall in the al-Rehab Palace, in the courtyard, and they were all shot dead. And, you know, even when one of the guards took him to the hospital, he was still bleeding, but alive. The soldiers prevented the doctors from saving his life, and he died bleeding on a hospital stretcher.

Thomas Small That's right. It's – it's a terrible, terrible story. The whole—. The revolution was the work of two officers, mainly Abdul Karim Kassam and – and another one. I mean, Kassam is the – the man who ended up leading the revolutionary state that – that would emerge after the revolution.

Yeah. There was no resistance from the royal palace, as you say. He – he was gentle. He said, "Look, we're going to let these people in. They're our – our fellow Iraqis." And at 8 AM, the royal family were taken out into the courtyard and executed by firing squad.

Nuri al-Said, who they were also looking to kill, escaped. But the next day, he was spotted in the street. And – and right there, right where he stood, they shot him dead. The bodies of Nuri al-Said, of the Royal family, as well as politicians and businessmen who had been hunted down and killed, the bodies were dragged through the streets, strung up. I—. You know, it was disgusting.

Aimen Dean It was extremely barbaric. And, of course, the king was buried in an unmarked grave, you know, like a commoner. Until years later, Saddam Hussein of all people exhumed – exhumed the body of King Faisal. Gave him the proper burial. And while I do believe that what happened to King Faisal, that to regicide, you know, that, you know, barbaric killing of that young, you know, king who actually had nothing but good intention towards his people and towards his country, I think it is what really sent Iraq, you know, down that spiral of instability, you know, and warfare and bloodshed that is still plaguing the country until now.

Thomas Small Well, after the revolution in Iraq in 1958, the – the era of federation that kings Faisal and Hussein had so hastily put together immediately fell apart. I think that's obvious. Iraq also withdrew almost immediately from the Baghdad Pact. In fact, the revolutionary officers had invoked the Baghdad Pact as a justification for the coup.

It's likely that most of the revolutionaries expected that Iraq would join Nasser's UAR. But Abdul Karim Kassam, the – the general who managed to grab the reins of power in Baghdad, he didn't want to surrender any power to Nasser. So, he didn't join the UAR. And the – the course towards pan-Arab union was stalled once again. Iraqi politics became very messy. For eighteen months, Iraq saw escalating violence as a new political elite, swirling around Kassam polarised. There were pan-Arab unionists versus Iraqi nationalists, socialists versus liberal democrats versus communists. Nasserists versus Ba'athists, i.e., Iraqis who were more pro-Egypt and Iraqis who were more pro-Syrian. Christians versus Muslims. Kurds versus Arabs. Poor versus rich.

Aimen Dean Shia versus Sunni.

Thomas Small Iraq, it fell apart.

Aimen Dean indeed. And, you know, one of the things, when you look at the, you know, at the what ifs of history is that there was no need to kill the king. You know, they could have easily just, you know, went all the way to him and, you know, say, "Okay. That's it. We're taking over the government. Dismiss Nuri al-Said. Dismiss your uncle, Abdul Ilah. And we are taking over as a government with you as a figurehead." And things would have been pretty much different.

Thomas Small Eventually, the general, Kassam, was able to navigate a way through this chaos, and he crushed dissent. So, he became the dictator of Iraq for five years and built a state much like Nasser's in Egypt—secular in outlook, oriented toward development and social mobility, but a military dictatorship. Oh, and also just like Nasser, he turned to the Soviet Union for loans and armaments.

Kassam himself was overthrown in a coup by the Ba'ath Party in 1963. And Iraq like Syria, at around the same time, was now fully dominated by a radical secular dictatorship espousing pan-Arab nationalism.

There's a pattern here. You say, Aimen, that monarchism is built into the Middle Eastern mindset or so or whatever. But surely, the relentless spread of pan-Arab nationalism in the fifties and sixties is a powerful argument against your view. It was all very popular.

Aimen Dean It was. And the, you know, the secret word here. It was. Was. You know? W-a-s. Was. It, you know—. It's, you know—.

Because if you look at the popularity of monarchy right now, it is really soaring. Because when you look at Egypt, when you look at Iraq, when you look at Libya, when you, you know, ask around basically the population there, and they will always now remember, you know, the monarchs of all more fondly. The monarchy has been rehabilitated, because populations went through hell, you know, due to, you know, all the decisions that were taken by these dictators, especially, like, you know, I mean, Saddam, Hafez, al-Assad, [unintelligible]. All of these dictators who ruled their countries with iron fist. You know, if they start to compare them with what came before them, they would say, "Oh, we wish that era never ended."

And the same with Iran. Many people still looking at the repressive days of the shah, you know, with more fondness when they compare it to what they are living under right now, under the, you know, Mullah's regime in Tehran.

Thomas Small Well, Aimen, I don't – I don't really have a sermon to end today's episode with. All this talk about the Temple Mount, the temple in Jerusalem, has gotten me thinking about kingship and especially sacred kingship. In – in the Hebrew Bible, the original temple in Jerusalem built by King Solomon was intimately bound up with the monarchy. The king was something like an image down here on earth of what God was up in heaven. This, despite the fact that, according to the text of the Bible, when the Israelites asked God for a king, he told them they'd be better off as they were: a loose collection of self-governing tribes, which in times of trouble would turn to divinely-inspired judges to help them through the crisis.

Nonetheless, the Israelites insisted. And so, God gave them what they wanted: a king. With decidedly chequered results, I must say.

Now, when Christianity came along, a similar sort of tension arose between right worship and kingship. Christ's kingdom was "not of this world," he said. But when the Roman emperors became Christians, they would rule as the vice [unintelligible] of God on earth.

And again, the results were not altogether Christian. We've already discussed Islam's ambivalence about kingship. I would say you disagree, Aimen. But in all three religious traditions, worldly kingship, monarchical governance existed alongside in a sort of stable tension with other more explicitly religious forms of authority. Rabbis, priests, elders, sheiks, judges, monks, ulama. But modernity and secular republicanism, which is modernity's most pure political expression, upset that balance, that tension. The part of the world that the monarch had governed was secularised and made absolute.

The other half, it was hardly even acknowledged, certainly not in the same way, and it was marginalised. Now, I don't know where I'm going with this, Aimen. But I sound like a broken record. But again, you do see modernity imposed in a non-modern, non-Western civilisation, and the result is clash, conflict, violence.

Aimen Dean Exactly. That is why, in my opinion, the best form of governments are those which are organic.

Thomas Small We agree about that, Aimen.

Okay. We've done what we can to tell the story of the rise and rise of Arab nationalism, pan-Arabism, Nasserism, whatever. With more and more Arab countries going nationalist and tilting toward the Soviet, all the pieces were in place for a couple of civilisation-shaking wars with Israel. Stay tune.

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We look forward to you joining us again in two weeks' time for the next episode of Conflicted.

Conflicted is a Message Heard production. This episode was produced and edited by Rowan Bishop. Sandra Ferrari is our executive producer production. Support and fact-checking by Molly Freeman. Our theme music is by Matt Huxley.

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