Conflicted Live Q&A

Recorded 30th November

Thomas Small Hello, Aimen. 

Aimen Dean Hello, Thomas 

Thomas Small And hello, everyone. Thank you for joining us for the very first Conflicted—. Whoop. My Apple Watch was talking to me. That's technical error number one. How many will we have during this very first Conflicted live Q&A? First of all, everyone who've – who've joined us today, welcome. We're sorry we're running a bit late. We had a little technical hiccup, but we're – we're back in action. We're certainly delighted to have you all here. 

Before we get started, we have a bit of housekeeping. First of all, you will notice the way this live streaming software works is that you can see us, but we cannot see you. So, if you have a question for us, drop it into the chat on the right side of your screen. And, you know, I'm sure I don't have to say this, because Conflicted listeners are all very civilised and polite, but we do ask that if you are sharing anything in the chat, keep it respectful. We love a lively debate. But, please, let's be cordial.

That's the one thing about Conflicted. We talk about deep subjects, but always with a friendly tone. The next thing is you'll notice, on your screen, that you have the ability to call in. However, we ask that you do not call in as we will not answer it and it will disrupt the flow of the show. 

Finally, the show will last one hour. We're going to start off, Aimen and I, by discussing recent news from Türkiye, Saudi Arabia, and Iran. And then, we'll move on to answering some of your questions. So, do share questions in the chat. We will be able to get to some of them at the end of the hour. Rightio. That's it. Let's dive in. 

Aimen, Türkiye. As of this recording, Turkish troops appear poised to invade northern Syria in force. They've been bombarding Kurdish militia positions across the border. And all of this follows a bomb attack, pretty brutal bomb attack, in Istanbul on the 13th of November, which President Erdoğan has blamed on the YPG, mainly Kurdish militia, operating in northern Syria. Will Türkiye invade, and what's Erdoğan's end game in Syria? 

Aimen Dean It looks like it. It looks like there will be a limited land incursion by the Turkish forces into the Kurdish areas of northern Syria. The trouble here is, you know, there is a good assessment by some credible intelligence analysts in Europe that the act that took place in Istanbul, that terrorist act, was actually the work of a small rogue element from the PKK/YPG nexus. And the aim is to provoke something. 

Thomas Small So, the PKK or the Kurdish groups that operate inside Türkiye are resisting the Turkish government, and the YPG are in Syria? 

Aimen Dean Yeah. But they are almost, like, you know, more or less, like, you know, having a close alliance. They are, you know, from within the same ideological, you know, makeup, if we can call it this way. 

Thomas Small Oh, I lost you there. I don't know if [inaudible].

Aimen Dean I'm here

Thomas Small Still alive. 

Aimen Dean Still alive. So – so – so – so, in a sense, you know, the – the problem here we have is that the Syrian—. Oh. So, the Syrian regime is not going to like the idea of a Turkish incursion, but they also like the idea of a Turkish incursion at the same time, because it is going to cause mayhem for the Kurds who are aligned with the Americans.

It is a very complicated situation. And Erdoğan is already trying to court Assad in order to create pincer movement at some point in the future. But, for now, whatever Turkish military step that's going to happen will be limited. 

Thomas Small And Erdoğan, him and his – his – his primary purpose in invading northern Syria. I mean, you read things like he wants to create an enclave within Türkiye, really, to – to re-export Syrian migrants. He's sick of all the Syrian migrants in Türkiye. He wants to send them back. Is that – is that what he mainly wants to do? Or is this mainly about, you know, neutralising the threat as he sees it from Kurdish militias, in general, and Kurdish separatism, Kurdish nationalism? Or is it both? 

Aimen Dean Well, remember that, always, strongmen, they need a, you know—how can I say?—a bogeyman in order to scare their people to believe that, "Look, I am protecting you from a real spectre of terrorism here." And, unfortunately, that terror attack that took place in Istanbul really played into Erdoğan's hand, because he is running for elections or re-elections and he is trying to portray himself as a strongman that Türkiye needs in order to protect the Turks from the, you know, the shadow inspector of terrorism. And, therefore, maybe by doing so, he's creating more terrorism in order, actually, to justify, you know, himself remaining in power. Unfortunately. 

Thomas Small It's an old story. 

Speaking of strongmen, since we're talking about – about Erdoğan, we might as well talk about Vladimir Putin in Russia, because Türkiye and Russia, at the moment, are – are also involved in a kind of very awkward dance over the – over the Ukrainian issue. And—. But it's tied to Syria. Because, you know, Putin has asked Erdoğan. "Please don't invade northern Syria." Russia is, still, I understand, in northern Syria or in Syria, but perhaps a little bit preoccupied with Ukraine to do any active operations on the ground in Syria. 

What is the relationship now, would you say, between Ankara and Moscow? And how is Erdoğan trying to take advantage of Putin's invasion of the Ukraine and the geopolitical fallout of that invasion in – especially in the – in the run up to these elections?

Aimen Dean As usual, Erdoğan is trying to play all parties and trying to be everything to everyone at the same time, because he is seeing the opportunity here. He is the, you know, the typical Machiavellian. You know, a strongman looking at the opportunities. And the opportunities are presenting themselves from every angle. He is looking at cheap energy from Russia. He is looking at Türkiye becoming the – an arbitrage place for energy, you know, from Asia, Russia to Europe. And this is where he wants to be. And so, therefore, his relationship with Moscow is, you know, the carrot and the stick. In one hand, he is providing weapons to the Ukrainians. On the other hand, he is providing a channel for Putin's money and money laundering machine to continue working, as well as arbitrage for the oil and gas that Russia wants to sell on the open market. 

Thomas Small Well, you know, Türkiye, what a—. It's a – it's a big beast. It has these huge geopolitical ambitions now, well beyond Anatolia, well beyond the Middle East. And it – it raises a – a question that one of our listeners, [inaudible]. I hope I got that right. He's @Harkonnen82 on Twitter, so he must be another Dune fan, Aimen. 

Aimen Dean A man of after my heart. 

Thomas Small He says Türkiye—. Exactly. So, [inaudible] on Twitter asked us, "Türkiye have historically been a military powerhouse. What are their current aims and objectives to project power beyond their borders?" 

In April of this year, The Economist wrote that Türkiye and France, after sparring in Libya, have also locked horns in West Africa, the Sahel, and the Maghreb, where Mr. Erdoğan has challenged French influence by playing on France's image as a colonial aggressor. In Somalia, Erdoğan faced off against Saudi Arabia and the UAE when their spat with Qatar, which is friendly with Türkiye, spilled over into a proxy struggle in the Horn of Africa. I've also read that, as Chinese investment in Africa is – has taken a wobble of late, Erdoğan's trying to fill in the vacuum.

So, clearly, Türkiye has big ambitions. What are those ambitions? What – what is its big vision? Because you – you framed it a bit like trying to keep the plate spinning. That kind of weird mobster – gangster state he's got on the one hand. Trying to get re-elected on the other hand. But there is some serious geopolitical strategy as well.

Aimen Dean Of course, there is a geopolitical strategy. And it centres around three objectives. You know, the first objective is economic. Türkiye is in deep economic trouble, and it needs to get itself out of it. You can't extricate yourself from economic troubles without having alliances. And he is trying to repair some of the damage that happened over the past decade. And that is starting by, you know, cosying up to Moscow, cosying up to Riyad, cosying up to Abu Dhabi, and, to some extent, cosying up to Cairo, also. 

While, at the same time, the second objective here is to become a energy powerhouse. Türkiye is poor in terms of energy resources, but it has a geographic position, which can benefit, you know, the European, Middle Eastern, Russian, and Central Asian markets by actually being the conduit through, you know, where the producers can actually pass, you know, the energy through Türkiye to consumers. And, you know, therefore, the idea is that to use this as a political leverage. It didn't do Ukraine very well. But, nonetheless, Türkiye is trying, you know, to be the – the arbiter, you know, and the middleman in this new post-Ukraine War energy geopolitics.

And the third objective here is, basically, to become a powerhouse in terms of military hardware. The idea is that Türkiye is becoming better and better at military technology and they want to be, you know, the – the poor man's, you know, exporter of weapons. 

Thomas Small Well, you know, it's funny. In – in – in season three of Conflicted, we took the broad view about Türkiye going back to the Byzantine period. And, in a way, Erdoğan is trying to return Türkiye to that strange, awkward middleman role that the Byzantines played. The Ottomans were the strongman. But the Byzantines were sort of caught between worlds and they learned to play very adroitly as a middleman between different competing powers. So, maybe Erdoğan is not actually an Ottomanist. He's a Byzantinist. 

Aimen Dean Possible. Yeah.

Thomas Small You – you mentioned the economic problems that Türkiye's been going through. Now, I'm going to have to push you on this a bit, Aimen. Because, in season two, you told us that Erdoğan's economic policies were the reason for his political success and you focused on that kind of public-private partnerships plan that he – that he had, which were allowing the government to build infrastructure and grow the economy without direct state control, but with the state benefiting from profit. So, a kind of public-private, you know, partnership. 

Now, something's gone wrong in that model. Inflation is rampant. These PPPs, as they're called, PPPs are – are rife with corruption. So, what – what do you think? Would you say now, three years later, that the Erdoğan model isn't as robust as you thought?

Aimen Dean Always remember that strongmen, unfortunately, when they see the economic success, they think that it was their miracle, it was their hands that created all of this. It's—. It happened to Erdoğan, it happened to Putin, and it happened to Xi Jinping. You know, all of these men, you know, came promising, you know, a lot of economic success. And – and, actually, they achieve economic success because they did not interfere that much in the market. But then, as soon as they saw – saw that the market as actually thriving, as soon as they started interfering, basically, you know, they just put obstacles rather than, you know, pave the way. And this is exactly what's happening in China, what's happening in Russia, and what's happening in Türkiye at the moment.

Thomas Small I read an interesting report on the Turkish economy, ‘cause it's slightly bewildering–. Oop. It’s slightly bewildering. Don't worry. You know? Dear listener—dear viewer, in this case—you know, we're new to this live Q&A show. So, there'll be a couple of hiccups along the way. 

Aimen Dean Yeah.

Thomas Small Anyway, I read a report, about how – how economists are slightly baffled by the Turkish economy's performance. Because inflation is insane. Like, eighty percent and even higher at times. And the interest rates are high, even though Erdoğan would like to push them down. That's part of the problem. But, nonetheless, GDP growth overall is – is still decent. And so, you know, I think that there's a strange kind of contradiction at the heart of Türkiye, where the people of Türkiye are very, very entrepreneurial. They're very hardworking. There's a tremendous diversity of – of private sector sort of models that follow big, huge corporations. Small family firms. A lot of – a lot of diversified investments. So, they – they can kind of adapt quite adroitly (the Turks, I should say) to these ever-fluctuating economic conditions. 

So, it may be that, in the long term, Türkiye’s sort of rise will not be arrested by this blip, by this economic kind of blip at the moment.

Aimen Dean As long as Erdoğan doesn't interfere that much in the economy. That's the first thing. And the second thing is that the Turks were, first, unlucky with COVID, because, you know, Türkiye relies a lot on the, you know, the tourist sector, you know, for hard cash coming into the country, as well as from retirees from Europe buying real estate. However, that collapsed with COVID. 

However, now, there's something here happening, which is the Ukraine War has been a blessing. First of all, a lot of Russians moved to Türkiye with their money. And they have really, you know, went into Türkiye, because they can then obtain Türkiye citizenships by basically just buying properties worth about four hundred thousand dollars. You get the Turkish citizenship within three months. And then, Russians become Turks. They have bank accounts there in dollar. And it's estimated between thirty-eight to about forty-two billion dollars from March all the way until September, six months, you know, roughly about 42 billion dollars poured into the Turkish economy. That pushed the GDP numbers a little bit, you know, farther, because the real estate markets recovered a little bit because of the Russian, you know, I would say, like, you know, I mean, influx into Türkiye and with their money, because they wanted to buy that citizenship, which can give them some room for breathing and manoeuvre in the age of sanctions that’s been, you know, slapped upon them by Western powers. 

Thomas Small What a time we're living in. So, let's move from Türkiye now to your homeland, Saudi Arabia, and from one strongman to another. I'd like to start with MBS, the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia. The notorious Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, Mohammed bin Salman.

Would you say, Aimen, that his international reputation is finally being rehabilitated properly? For example, we all saw that he – that he – that he was there at the World Cup, sitting there with the Qatari emir, Tamim, which was quite funny to see, I think, for those of us who've been following the Qatar-Saudi Arabia imbroglio IMB over the last five years. And, in fact, one of our listeners, Joe Brennan on Twitter, asked for your thoughts on the Qatari emir, on FIFA President Gianni Infantino, and MBS all sitting together during the Qatar versus Ecuador match. Well, what does that – what does that tell us about – about the ever-fluctuating dynamics of Gulf politics, Aimen? 

Aimen Dean Royal politic, man. Royal politic. That's exactly like what it – what it is. I mean, at the end of the day, you know, we are dealing with the most pragmatist of the pragmatist, you know, people. The most, you know, pragmatist people on the world are the dynastic, you know, princes. They are the ones who actually have to deal with the fact that they have to, you know, straddle, you know, several worlds in order to survive. And MBS is no different. I mean, he has to balance China against Russia, against Europe, against the US. He has to also balance the conservatives in his country against the liberals, the modernising agenda against the religious agenda. I mean, he has to really balance so many acts in order to, one, survive.

Remember, I mean, he's a young man. I mean, basically he's younger than both of us by about, what, six, seven years. So, we have to deal with the fact that he is a young man. He is a young man that he is going to inherit the crown at any – at any moment now, over the next two or three years possibly, because of the aging effects of, you know, on his father.

And, at the same time, the fact that is—. You know, can we say his image being rehabilitated? I would say you can't rehabilitate an image after what happened in Türkiye to Jamal Khashoggi, because the narrative is so much against him even though you and I discussed really what happened. The problem is the narrative was so strong against him that it will take a while for the narrative to, actually, you know, change.

But what happened here is that, in the eyes of the Saudi people, at least, he has been rehabilitated. Because he came out the other side stronger, able to challenge, to some extent, you know, the pressure from the West and from the Americans; was able to really steer the country through the COVID crisis and still stick to the diversification of the economy agenda, which is, while not going, you know, really well, it's not going terrible either. It is somewhere there in the middle. And the numbers, you know, speak for themselves. 

And so, I think, he, you know—. So far, the results are mixed, but enough to say that he is out of the danger zone by now. 

Thomas Small Well, if his domestic position is strong, you know, I—. That's – that's great, I guess. But I – I – I'm more interested in his international position. So, earlier this month, he attended the G20 summit in person. But he did not meet with President Biden, which is, you know, you know—. The – the – the president who notoriously, as candidate Biden called Saudi Arabia, a pariah state, and, many observers would say, had been particularly ham-fisted in his dealing – dealings with Saudi Arabia for whatever reasons. You know, I don't know. It seems that the Democratic Party of America has the Saudi Arabia in its sight. I'm not sure exactly why. You probably have ideas about that. 

But – but I want to focus more on – on the – on the sort of the spat at the end of the summer. So, in July, Biden went to Saudi Arabia. And, you know, actually ate humble pie, kissed the ring. Met with MBS and left, he says, believing that he received a promise or a commitment to keeping the oil price low, if possible, by increasing supply or at least not decreasing supply. That didn't happen. And it caused this huge global sort of storm of controversy where, I think, the Saudis actually behaved very professionally in the face of some pretty bratty complaints from Washington, especially the Democratic Party, as they were preparing for their midterm elections.

So, what's the long-term consequences of – of the current spat between MBS and – and President Biden? Is it just going to drive Saudi Arabia away from America even more, pivot more towards China? What do you think is going to happen?

Aimen Dean First of all, I mean, you know, no one is saying that the Saudis will ever pivot away from Washington. That's not going to happen. I mean, basically, it's just a rebalancing. The idea is that MBS wanted to tell the Americans, "Look, gone are the days when you come pick up the phone from the White House to the king of Saudi Arabia and to say, ‘You know, Hey, pal. You know, can you drop the price by twenty, thirty dollars per barrel? Thanks.’" You know? And that's it. 

You know, the vassal state relationship, you know, between Saudi Arabia and the US needed to be adjusted a bit. So, instead of the ninety-ten, you know, MBS is trying to adjust it to about seventy-thirty. You know? There is no breakaway between Saudi Arabia and DC. It's not going to happen. Not in at least the next decade or possibly two.

Thomas Small Because the Saudis still need the America security umbrella, basically. Is that the reason, the main reason? 

Aimen Dean Well, not only that. The Saudis view America as something else completely different. You know, for them, they don't view the Chinese as any alternative to America. They always say, if you ask any Saudi (and I have lots of friends, you know, Saudi friends, like, you know, in position of authority and influence) and what they say is that, "Look, you know, at the end of the day, we will only start to consider China as an alternative to America when China is transformed from a nation of imitation to a nation of innovation. And, at the moment, for as long as America is the innovator and China is the imitator, our bet will be on Uncle Sam." So, that is the—. 

Thomas Small And the PIF – the PIF is putting its money where its mouth is. I guess the PF – PIF continues to invest heavily in American corporations. 

Aimen Dean Exactly.

Thomas Small I mean, to some extent, this spat was just superficial as – as all of these Saudi American spats are. 

Aimen Dean Yeah.

Thomas Small The – the – the relationship underneath the hood is strong. It's – it's the real special relationship in the world, I would say. 

Aimen Dean Indeed. Absolutely. It's just a married couple. Like, you know, I mean, after seventy-five years of marriage, I mean, it's going to happen, man. 

Thomas Small So, I hope—. So, you know, we got a question. Well, in fact, a request from Max West on our Facebook discussion group, too, asking us to discuss the OPEC production cut and US Saudi relations. 

Aimen Dean Mmhmm. 

Thomas Small And this goes on. I mean, ‘cause there's – there's another OPEC meeting coming up in I think five or six days, you know. Already, again, the press is reporting, "What are they going to do? What are they going to do?" You know, I – I – I'd like you to sort of speak a bit, Aimen, to what is going through the Saudi oil minister's mind at any given point when he's thinking of an OPEC meeting and – and, you know—. Because people talk about Saudi Arabia like they can just unilaterally make decisions. But it is a cartel. 

Aimen Dean Yeah. 

Thomas Small I mean, it is a group decision. And with OPEC—. Plus, it involves players like Russia, who, of course, have goals of their own. So, what – what will – what will the Saudi oil minister be (who's the older brother of MBS, of course) will be – will be – will be thinking as he prepares for this meeting in a few days?

Aimen Dean Look, what OPEC ministers, you know, think about all the time are three things: the weather, the economic data, and the, you know, the disease data. You know? Seriously. I'm not kidding. They think about China and the lockdowns. They think about the weather and is it – is it going to be mild or is it going to be cold? And they are thinking about the economic data. Because all of these, you know, three sets of data would determine the demand. Oil is about supply and demand. You know? And that's it. So, what happened is that Biden was mistaken or, I would say, because of his age, kind of compos mentis, like, you know, basically he wasn't able to comprehend what MBS and everyone else was—.

Thomas Small Non – non – compos mentis. 

Aimen Dean Yeah. Non compos mentis. 

Thomas Small Maybe. No. Not—. I mean, that's not—. I don't want to be uncharitable to an old man. I mean, he's a very nice old man. But, you know, sometimes, one wonders.

Aimen Dean Yeah. A old man, like, you know, can't comprehend what young men are telling them. And so, MBS—. 

Thomas Small Isn't an amazing, Aimen—? Sorry to interrupt. But isn't it amazing? Like, twenty years ago, the problem was that the Middle East was ruled by old men and the – and the – and the West was ruled by young men. Now, look at the reverse. It's reversed. 

Aimen Dean Exactly. Yes. 

Thomas Small You look at it. You look at a sort of meeting of Biden with the Senate and the – and the House majority leaders or whatever. The house leaders. They're so old. It's like looking at a – at a cabinet meeting with King Abdullah back ten years ago.

Aimen Dean Indeed. Yes. I mean, it—. What – what a reverse of positions here. Like, the – the young—. You know, the Middle East is run by the young and the West is run by the old. Although not in the UK. Rishi Sunak is quite young. But I will say some—. 

Thomas Small That's true. 

Aimen Dean Yeah. I will say something here, is that Biden was told by the GCC leaders that "we will increase production in August." That was in July. In August and then in September. "And then, in October, we will review the data." And the three datas are, you know, weather. You know, what's the weather going to be? The pro – the projections. The economic projections. And, indeed, the lockdowns in China, the COVID situation in China. 

So, what happened is that they looked at it in October and they thought, "Oh, my God. Like, you know, I mean, we don't have very good data. We have to cut the production now." 

So, they said two million. That was a very misleading figure, because not many people, actually, are producing what they are supposed to be producing. So, the cut, really, was in effect, one million, not two. But, nonetheless, the market took it as two million. Everyone was angry. Everyone was upset. This is an attempt to bring the price (you know, at the time, it was about eighty) to bring the price up to a hundred and twenty. In reality, within nine days—within nine days—of that decision, actually, the price was at the same level as before the decision. And the reason is because these people know what they're doing. They want the price to be at eighty. And they knew that, if they didn't take that decision, the price projection was to be sixty-five. So, actually, there was going to be a downward spiral of oil prices going down. And this is why this meeting in December, most likely, you know, because of the current unrest in China, you know, the problem with the production lines there, the – the winter is mild, you know. 

Thomas Small Very mild. It's amazing. 

Aimen Dean Exactly. So, all of—. And the economic situation is actually heading into recession. The curve is actually – is kind of scary. All of this point towards low demand, which means that there will be a cut. The cut, you know, I was told, is not going to be steep, somewhere between four hundred to nine hundred thousand barrels. But they will never mention the word "million" there in order to avoid another spat with Biden and, you know, his administration, 

Thomas Small Okay. Well, that's Saudi. Now, let's move on to the – to your favourite country in the world, Iran. Iran has been in the news a lot for reasons that, you know, I think, everyone that listens to Conflicted will know. On the 16th of September of this year, Mahsa Amini, a twenty-two-year-old a woman, was arrested by Iranian religious police for not wearing her hijab properly. And she was brutally beaten, so brutally, that she died. Protests broke out around the country. They've been continuing now for over two months. And estimates—. You know, you never know how – what estimates to believe. It seems that around five hundred protestors have been killed. It's pretty bad. 

Amir Kamyar, on our Facebook discussion group, asks, "Will the current protests in Iran lead to an actual regime change?"

Now, two months ago, when these protests started, friends were asking me what I thought. And I said, "Sadly, I don't think so. You know, there's not enough political organisation amongst the protestors. They're – they're rather disparate."

But these protests are lasting. And the female dimension is slightly wrongfooting the mullahs. It's slightly making them hesitate to use outright force in the way that they did in 2009. 

What do you think, Aimen? Will these protests cause a – a – a significant change in the regime? 

Aimen Dean I don't think the regime will be toppled by these protests, but the regime will be significantly weakened. By that, I mean the authority, the respect, the fear that the people had for it, the veneration, which means that the next ayatollah, the next grand ayatollah, is going to have a legitimacy crisis. You know, it's not going to be able to galvanise. And most likely, this next ayatollah will be Ebrahim Raisi, the current president of Iran, who is most likely going to be the successor.

The problem with these protests is that they are leaderless. This is a problem on one hand. But, actually, a advantage on the other hand. You know, in the Green Revolution, in 2009, Mehdi Karroubi, Mir-Hossein Mousavi, the leaders of that revolution, they were targeted, they were taken, they were put in – under house arrest. And that's it. They killed the whole thing. And they killed the revolution. 

But this one is difficult to target, because there isn't a central nerve system here in which to target to stop them. The reality is that it's an anger. It's a festering grievance, you know, that is, you know, there. It's been there for a while. Because the problem with the Iranian regime is that they misjudged the mood among the people. The people don't want to have a diet of empty slogans and religious fanaticism. What they want is, really, you know, education, opportunities, and, you know, economic prospect, which the regime, you know, seem to be gambling with all the time. And the more the sanctions continue to go on, the more the people realise that the IRGC is controlling the economy through the sanctions and has now controlled or is now in control of forty percent of the GDP in Iran. And that is stifling small businesses, medium-sized businesses. They are unable to flourish. They are unable, basically, to have, you know, the jobs and the aspirations and the education that they want. So—. 

Thomas Small It's amazing. 

Aimen Dean Yeah. 

Thomas Small It's amazing that, you know, in – in season three, we talked about the concessions era within Iran, when Westerners (British people, mainly) had these very, very monopolistic concessions over the Iranian economy, which, you know, brought down the Qajar Dynasty and caused, you know, the first wave of revolutionary foment there.

And, now, weirdly following the – the Islamic Revolution of ‘79, a similar sort of stranglehold over the economy exists, but from within, by the IRGC, similarly being, you know, considered by the – by the lower-midde class, the business class, as very, very unjust. 

Now, I find it interesting that Mahsa Amini was a Kurd, from a Kurdish region of northwestern Iran. 

And so, we have Türkiye now about to invade northern Syria to deal with Kurds there. And IRGC troops, the IRGC, and the IRGC rather, sending troops into its own northwest to deal with Kurds there. Is this just a coincidence? I mean, this has just came into – up into my – you know, popped into my head, Aimen. Has the existence and success of Iraqi Kurdistan legitimately encouraged the courage more widely? And is this a problem for both Türkiye and Iran? Are they kind of facing the same problem at the – for different reasons in their own countries? 

Aimen Dean I mean, the Kurds, just like, you know, other, you know, I would say stateless people—. I mean, this is where we are having a problem here, is that the Kurds in northern Iraq succeeded in building a – an admirable civil society there and a – a nation that really deserve to have an independence. 

Does that mean that every Kurdish minority deserve self-determination? This question is really plaguing every commentator there. Because, if we are talking about self-determination for the Turkish Kurds, it's going to be a large chunk of the republic, like, you know, breaking away. If we are talking about Syrian Kurds, a large chunk of Syria breaking away. And the same thing with Iran. And these nations, Syria, Türkiye, and Iran, with some degree of complicity with by – by Baghdad's, you know, ruling Shia elite, they all don't want, you know, the Kurds to have their self-determination. And, you know, and in – in my opinion, that actually made me more supporting, actually, the Kurdish self-determination, because the civil societies they created not only in Iraq, but even in northern Syria. 

I remember, you know, I saw how the Kurds, who suffered so much at the hands of ISIS. You know, ISIS brutally murdered prisoners of war from the Kurdish, you know, fighters. You know, without mercy. When – when the roles were reversed, the Kurds were far more kinder to the ISIS prisoners of war. And I remember this is when I said that those people deserve nationhood just for this, just for the fact that their mannerism, their way of actually applying, you know, justice is, in itself, deserving of self-determination.

Thomas Small Now, we have, again, @Harkonnen82, [inaudible], ask on Twitter. "If Iran reached the point where they can produce nuclear weapons, how does that change the landscape in the Middle East?" And that's a very broad question, which we have covered on the show many times. But you told me, Aimen, that Iran is very close indeed to achieving the capability of manufacturing a nuclear weapon. How close would you say is – is the regime away of now?

Aimen Dean In terms of producing enough fissile material, you know, like highly-enriched uranium, you know, weapon-grade uranium, basically, like, you know, I mean, enough for two devices, yes, we do. We have – we have now crossed that threshold already, maybe weeks ago. How close are they to actually taking that material and putting it into, you know, building two devices? It is yet to be seen. It could take months. But we have now reached that level, unfortunately. You know? So, we are entering what I call the most dangerous six months the Middle East has witnessed since the invasion of Iraq in 2003. So, yeah. 

Thomas Small Yeah. So – so, obviously, you know, Israel isn't going to like this. 

Aimen Dean No. 

Thomas Small I mean, Israel is going to do something about this, especially now that, as it seems likely, Netanyahu is back again. He's like – he's like the Iranians. It's like the end of Carrie for the Iranians. He just keeps coming back. What – what do you suppose Israel will do in the face of the West or the global community’s failure now to prevent this – this eventuality of Iran becoming a nuclear state?

Aimen Dean There is no doubt in my mind that the Israelis are not going to just act alone. They will create—. You know, if they can't get a coalition behind them or if they can't convince the Americans and enough European powers to come to with their – their aid they will at least create the conditions through which, if they act, they will act in a way in which Iran's retaliation will force, you know, Western powers, you know, into intervention.

Remember here is that Iran did not do itself favour over the past three months in two fields here. The first one is by aiding the Russians in the Ukraine War. That was a mistake. That was a very big mistake. And I think the Iranian denials after that made them, you know – you know, show that they realised how big a mistake it was that they sent these, you know, suicide drones, which they used against Saudi Arabia, you know, through the Houthis before multiple times. The fact that they used them in Ukraine and the fact that they were falling over Ukrainian cities, in Kiev and other places, actually, you know, provoked the West into becoming more and more harsher on Iran. And Israel actually used that and milked it, you know, to its fullest potential. That's the first thing.

And the second thing, of course, the protests that are taking place there. So—. And not to mention the fact that, you know, that the Iranians are in a corner at the moment. 

They have now three options to get out of the current mess they have in order to unite the people around the, you know, the regime. The first one is go nuclear, which is the least likely. You know, the idea is that to test a nuclear device and to announce Iran's becoming – Iran becoming the tenth nation in the world to be a nuclear power. So, to say, "Hey. You know, nuclear glory. That's it. Like, you know, anyone who is in the streets is, you know, acting against the best interest of the great Iranian nuclear nation." 

The second, you know, way for them to get out of this corner is to actually just pick a fight with a neighbour, you know. You know, pick a fight with Saudi Arabia. Pick a fight to Pakistan or Afghanistan. With the Taliban, you know. They will try to pick a fight to someone in order to say look—. Or Azerbaijan, even, because they were threatening Azerbaijan recently, which upset the Turks very much. And this actually, like, you know, shows how complicated the situation in the Middle East is. 

And the third option they have, basically, is just capitulate, sign a nuclear deal. And that's it, you know. And, unfortunately, you know, none of these options seems to be the most viable. And the Iranians are actually desperate at the moment.

Thomas Small So, you know, I think the thing is that if Israel attacks Iran in a big way to try to really hobble its capacity to wield this nuclear material properly, what is the likely retaliation? What – what powers does Iran have to retaliate? I mean, obviously, it could – it could call on Hezbollah, invade Israel from the north, or attack Israel. It could call on Hamas, possibly, from the South, invade Israel. It could call on its Houthis allies to lob more missiles at Saudi Arabia. It can itself lob missiles or, via its proxies in southern Iraq, in oil fields in Saudi Arabia. This has the potential for a regionwide conflagration. It's a big, big problem, especially given that Saudi Arabia, actually, itself has access to nuclear weapons.

So, it's like the problems plaguing the whole world now, with a nuclear Russia fighting the – the NATO in Ukraine is kind of mirrored down at a regional level of the Middle East. It's a very dangerous time. 

Aimen Dean And this is exactly why neither the Israelis nor the Europeans want Iran to become a nuclear power. Because if they become nuclear power today, tomorrow, Saudi Arabia will become a nuclear power by default. The fact that they have access to ten percent of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, you know, which is offshore. But in the moment, the moment that Iran become a nuclear power through the testing of a viable nuclear device, then Saudi Arabia will transport this capability into its homeland and it will become an onshore nuclear power. And that's it. You know, this will prompt Egypt and Türkiye to seek nuclear weapons of their own. This is not what anyone wants. 

Thomas Small No. Except maybe the devil. I think he quite likes this – this scenario. 

So, that's it. So, we've talked about Türkiye. We've talked about Saudi. We've talked about Iran. And as we've done so, you, dear viewer, have been putting your questions in the chat. Now, my producers have been curating these questions and they've given me some to ask. Now, this is an abridged version of a question from Eli Burn. "Is there a way to incentivise Saudi Arabia to invest in building and sharing their knowledge of desalination plants, particularly in Africa?" 

This is an extremely interesting question. 

Aimen Dean Yeah. 

Thomas Small Obviously, as climate change, you know, ramps up, Africa, given its population explosion, is going to suffer – suffer from some severe water shortages. Is there an opportunity for Saudi Arabia to charitably or even commercially invest in African desalination plants? 

Aimen Dean There is a company in Saudi Arabia that is actually now owned or half-owned by the PIF, the Public Investment Fund. It is called ACWA Power. ACWA Power. A-C-W-A Power. ACWA Power is a, you know, a leading Saudi company in terms of integrating solar power with water desalination. So, they use solar power, as well as renewable energy, you know, such as wind farms in the sea, in order, actually, to generate, you know, sweet water, like, you know, drinking water and irrigation water. For example, they built one in Oman and they built one in al-Khafji, which is just in the border between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. And these were experimental at the beginning. And it – it was amazing. Like, you know, I mean, the one in al-Khafji was producing four hundred kilowatts of, you know, power, which was generating drinking water for at least seventy-seven thousand people on a daily basis. And that, in itself, shows that the ability to integrate, you know, solar, you know, power in order to generate. Because you need it during the day. You don't need to keep producing water twenty-four-seven. If you just produce during the day enough water for, you know, fifty thousand or forty thousand or twenty thousand, you know, community, that, in itself, basically, is going to make a lot of difference. 

They also cooperate with Japan, with this Japanese, you know, technology where you have little ships, actually. Like, you know, I mean, many water desalination, you know, you know, ships, basically, like, you know, [inaudible]. 

Thomas Small That’s such a Japanese thing. I love it. I love the Japanese.

Aimen Dean Yeah. 

Thomas Small Mini desalination ship. Cute 

Aimen Dean Indeed. So—. So—. And since Saudi Arabia is producing about one-third of the world's, you know, desalinated water, it means that they have now – their technology matured and they have, you know, acquired a lot of patents. Someone said to me, like, you know, "This is just the patents in the field of techno – the water desalination technology is about one thousand and seventy patents." Just in that field. Which they acquired and bought, as well as in developed themselves. So, can they be a leading light in terms of saving the, you know, the Middle East, Africa, and part of Asia from the ravages of wars over water? Possible. It is possible.

Thomas Small Mmhmm. That would be interesting. Certainly, maybe a way for MBS to solidify his – his rise back at international respectability. 

So, now, we have a question from Sam R. "Do you think—?" This is a great question, actually. This is a rather provocative question. "Do you think that Saudi Arabia will ever actually build Neom?" 

Now, we should explain for those who don't know. In north-western Saudi Arabia, opposite the Sinai Peninsula, the Saudis are building the City of Tomorrow, Neom. Neom is a portmanteau of—. What – what is it, actually? Ne—. I can't remember what it's meant to me – what it's supposed to mean. A new day, I think. New yom, maybe. Neom. Anyway. And most – most sort of notoriously, of late, they've released their – their – their plans for the line. This long, straight, narrow city that's something like a hundred and eighty kilometres long into the desert. When you see—. When you look at pictures of Neom, it does look like something out of Dune or something out of the – the imagination of George Lucas. 

Aimen, is this a typical Middle Eastern-wide element? Is this like Ozymandias fever dreams in the desert crumbling? Is this just mega – megalomania run mad? Or is MBS going to do it? Is there really going to be a twenty-second century city in twenty-first century Saudi Arabia?

Aimen Dean Well, I mean, Neom is four things, you know. We have to understand it's four things, really. First of all, there is, you know, the Oxagon, you know, basically, which is a port, as well as, you know, a trade city, as well as a place for the production of green and blue hydrogen and green and blue ammonia. So, there's the Oxagon. That, I'm more optimistic about, because it has practical, you know, applications for new [inaudible].

Thomas Small Commercial. Yeah.

Aimen Dean Yeah. Practical commercial applications. And right in a very good position actually. Then, you have Trojena, which is, you know, kind of like, you know, I mean, a skiing slope, you know – you know, in northern Saudi Arabia, in [inaudible], which is rumoured to be the mountain where God spoke to Moses, you know, basically there.

Thomas Small Ah, yes. Some American Protestants have made a big deal about this in indeed the last decade. 

Aimen Dean Indeed. Absolutely. And there are hiero – hieroglyphic writings there and all of that. So—. Discovered.

And then, you have Neom, which is the city, you know, itself, where you have the commercial scientific educational institutions, you know. That is, like, you know, basically like, you know – you know—. These three cities, you know, are—. I would say, if about half of them were built or each one achieved fifty percent of building over the next ten to fifteen years, I'll be very pleased. 

The Line, however, I'm sceptical, because, you know, it is humongous and it is like, you know, basically, like, you know, I mean, out of, like, Dune, as you said. The only reason why I believe that it's not going to be built, you know, in its entirety, but it could actually be, because it is actually designed to be built, you know, in stages. So, it can actually. We could see—. Maybe, like, you know, if it is built over a hundred stages, maybe we could see five of them only, you know. But even if five were built or five blocks were built, that’s, in itself, an achieve. 

Someone asked a question. I said, "Like, you know, really? What is The Line here?" 

And the answer that came to me from someone who was actually working as a project manager in Neon, he said, "It's Noah's Ark." And—. "It's modern-day Noah's Ark." And I was, you know, wondering what – what did he mean. Like, you know, basically. And he said, "Well, in time you will get to know what's – what's the purpose of this place." You know?

And so, it is, you know, like, is it a city to be a refuge, you know, basically for people who do escape, like, you know, basically, the horrendous effect of the overheat of the climate change? Or is it something—?

Thomas Small But this – but this sounds … 

Aimen Dean Yeah. 

Thomas Small … more megalomaniacal than I even I thought. 

Aimen Dean Yeah. 

Thomas Small This is crazy. This is – this is becoming like—. Well, this is like Elon Musk wanting to send humanity to the Mars. This is like—. Is MBS basically just a techno bro in his heart? He's all—. A futurist? By the way, my producers, you know, our producers told us that Neom is a portmanteau of neo-mustaqbal. New future. 

Aimen Dean Uh-huh. 

Thomas Small So, maybe—maybe—MBS is just a – a – a kind of Elon Musk-style futurist and thinks that the – the destiny of mankind is to populate the galaxy. It is straight from Dune. 

Aimen Dean It – it – it is possible. It is possible. I'm not, like, I mean, discounting it. But, nonetheless, I would say that, out of the four projects of Neon, three I'm excited about, one, I'm sceptical about. 

Thomas Small So, now, we have a question from Guy. He asks, "Is there a growing second Arab Spring occurring in Iran following the killing of Mahsa Amini?"

Now, obviously, the Iranians are not Arabs. Only some of them are Arabs. A small minority are Arabs. But we talked about the protests. But do you – do you think that what's happening in Iran now is – is – is similar to or equivalent to what happened ten years ago in – throughout the Arab world and – and what we call the Arab Spring?

Aimen Dean Yes and no. Yes that it is the same motivation. The – the lack of opportunities, lack of—. The light at the end of the tunnel has been switched off, you know, by the Iranian regime. And there is no light at the end of the tunnel. So, people want to, you know, have hope. And there is no hope and they are not being given hope by anyone. The only hope—the only hope—that could kill the whole in uprising right now is for the Iranians to announce that they have reached a nuclear deal with the Americans and that, finally, the sanctions will be lifted. That's the only thing that will appease the Iranian people. Short of that, nothing, you know. 

You know, pick a war with a neighbour, it will make the things worse. Going nuclear with make it worse. 

Thomas Small But the problem is – but the problem is that the IRGC benefits from the sanctions, because they're corrupt and whatever and they're gangsters. And the ideo – the ideologues at the top of the – of the movement still wouldn’t think of any such deal as – as sort of cowardice or a compromise. And they're not into it. 

Aimen Dean Exactly. And this is why I always said that, look, wherever there is ideology in the government, that there will be a civil war. So, for example, like, you know, I mean, you know, in Egypt the leadership of Mubarak. I mean, Mubarak was a tyrant. I don't have any excuse for him. But what an honourable tyrant he was. He decided, "You know what? You know, I don't want to be—." 

Thomas Small Hot take here, everyone. Mubarak, honourable tyrant. 

Aimen Dean Yes. Well, I mean, you know, there is honour among thieves, you know. So, you know, same thing with tyrants. I mean, so, there are bloody tyrants and there are honourable tyrants. He was an honourable tyrant. He decided not to, you know, kill his own people. The same thing with Ben Ali of Tunisia. And so, they decided to leave. 

The Iranian tyrants, however, are very different. This—. They are like Assad. They are very ideologically committed. They will not leave. They will fight to the last man to defend the privileges that they have gained, you know, over the past four decades. And, therefore, the collapse of Iran is going to be in a civil war. 

And this is why many people will tell me, like, you know, "Oh, the Saudis, the Emiratis, the Kuwaiti, they would be so happy." 

And the answer is no. Many people of position of power in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait and the UAE will tell you immediately that the last thing they want is a civil war in Iran. That will result in millions of people, you know, boarding boats and then coming all the way as refugees, like, you know, to the other shore of the Arabian, you know, Gulf or the Persian Gulf, depending on who you talk to. So, that's why, you know, be careful what you wish. 

Thomas Small Nicholas Mellor on Facebook, our Facebook page, he asks, Aimen, he asks you to cover the Chinese strategy for engaging with the three countries we've discussed tonight (Iran, Türkiye, and Saudi Arabia) building on your special Chinese insights and, also, to help many of us. And he's asking you now to do what it is that you do best: helping us to break out from seeing these three countries from our Western prism. So, if you—. Now—. Put – put us now in Xi Jinping's throne and how does he see these – these countries: Iran Saudi Arabia, and Türkiye. 

Aimen Dean Okay. So, for China, Türkiye is a troublesome necessity, because Türkiye is not exactly, like, you know, playing ball with China all the time. Türkiye plays a host to about four hundred thousand Uyghurs, many of them are active in opposition to China. And rightly so. You know, for reasons that we all know in terms of like, you know, I mean, the horrendous, you know, oppression that's taking place like, you know, in Xinjiang Province. But, at the same time, Türkiye knows that it cannot just keep on using the Uyghurs as a bait and as a – a pressure card on China. They need, also, to play a positive role with China in terms of business. So, the Turks are, again, just like they are doing with the Russians, sell weapon into the Ukrainians, while, at the same time, saying, "Hey. We're going to help you with your energy issues." The same thing with China. So, Türkiye is the nuisance, you know, that China have to deal with, because it is a useful nuisance nonetheless.

Iran is important for China, because China, you know, and especially China National Petroleum Company (CNPC) or PetroChina invested heavily in Iran, possibly twenty-five billion dollars at least, as well as the fact that Iran plays an important role in making sure that China's also investments in Iraq and the oil sector there, thirty-seven percent of the Iraq oil concessions go to China.

So, you know—. So, the – the oil investments in Iraq and Iran are part of the strategy through which Iran, you know, is viewed by China. And, actually, China is happy with the sanctions, because the more sanctions that there is in China (sorry, on Iran) the more Iran is beholden to China and to Chinese interests and to Chinese concessions.

Thomas Small And the Chinese can – and the – and the Chinese can extract, from Iran, concessions of their own. And – and they're getting oil from Iran at discounted rates. It's very good for China. 

Aimen Dean Yes. Of course. As, you know—. And I remember, like, you know. Because I read out of, like, you know, I mean farcy articles and farcy, you know, Twitter and all of that. And so, I see how—. You know, when I was monitoring China National Petroleum Company (CNPC), when they were, you know, based in [inaudible] and Abadan and these places and they are, like, you know, I mean, in doing a lot of, like, you know, projects in the oil fields there. And the locals always, like, you know, basically talking about, everywhere, these Chinese people, like, you know, engineers go, the turtles disappear. And so, you know, there were huge amounts of turtles that were disappearing. Like, you know, basically, like—. And this is when they discovered that turtle soup is one of the delicacies they're basically – that the Chinese engineers, like, you know, enjoy so much there. So, you know. So, basically, it's one of those eco, you know, problems that are caused, like, you know, by the oil explorations. The disappearing turtles.

But, nonetheless, the—. And this is one of the concessions that they actually took from Iran. But, nonetheless, Iran is viewed by China as an important factor in its energy security, not because of Iran itself, but also because of Iraq and the role that Iran plays in securing the Chinese oil concessions in Iraq.

Saudi Arabia is extremely important for China. The biggest exporter of energy to China is actually Saudi Arabia. Three million barrels per day. Add to this the fact that the other national oil company in China, the competitor to CNPC, which is Sinopec, you know, possess refineries there in Saudi Arabia and they have a lot of concessions with Aramco. The fact is that Saudi Arabia is the arbiter of prices to some extent. The fact is that Saudi Arabia is a important stable country that China needs in order to be the bridge, you know, between for, you know, for its, you know, policies in Egypt and Sudan and the African Horn. I know, because it's a strange thing. But, actually, China has always viewed the Saudi port of Jizan, which is on the border with Yemen, as an important stepping stone towards replenishing and exporting building materials, you know, and everything they need in order to carry out their mega projects in places like Eritrea, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somaliland, Kenya, South Sudan. Yes. So, [inaudible]. 

Thomas Small But I have a question for you, then, actually, Aimen. Because if—. Now, MBS looking at China, is he possibly thinking, "Well, look, is this a stable country?" Because we see these anti-lockdown protests there and we see the geostrategic sort of oven cooker – pressure cooker of Taiwan, you know, ratcheting up. I wonder what the Saudis are thinking. Maybe they've put too many eggs in a basket that's about to fall apart. What do you think is going on there? 

Aimen Dean Well, at the end of the day, you know, you have to understand that, from the Saudi perspective, you know, from their, you know, viewpoint, China is the factory of the world and still is going to be the factory of the world for many years to come, because no other company or no other country in the world got the same capacity as China in terms of production. You know, the production lines there are just massively huge. And no country can replace them at any given time any – any time soon. And that is why, for them, these protests are transient in their nature. They don't see them as a regime-threatening or that it will result in a fall. In fact, they believe that the Chinese, you know—. 

You remember the Tiananmen Square events were bloody and brutal. But what followed that was reform. What's happening right now, there will be broader repression, but what will follow will be relaxation of more rules. You know, it's not going to be—. But, of course, like, you know, relaxation on the surface. But beneath the surface, like, you know, it's going to be a electronic surveillance state. You know, state of art.

Thomas Small Well, we're going to wind up here. We're reaching the sixty-minute mark. Thank you very much, dear listener, dear viewer, for – for this inaugural live Q&A session with Aimen and me. 

Aimen, I have a little – a little question, if you could be brief, because I think, after the last episode of season three, some people might be interested to know how you and your family are getting on in your new home in an unmentionable and unmentioned Middle Eastern country. How are you doing? 

I mean, I got a lot of very, very heartfelt feedback from that episode. People were very concerned, given the experience you had in Scotland. So, I'm sure that everyone would love to know how you guys are getting on in your new lives. 

Aimen Dean I can report that, you know, both myself, my wife, and my two kids are extremely happy where we are and that, you know, we have put that episode behind us and that, you know, my daughter, in particular, is experiencing a very, very happy circumstances in her new school with her new friends and, you know, her new adopted country. And, you know, she's picking up Arabic very well. 

Thomas Small That's excellent. We're all very happy to hear this, Aimen. 

Our last question. We could end on this last question. Question from Nick. "I am assuming," he asked, "that there will be a Conflicted season four. Any idea how long we will have to wait for it?" 

Well, Nick and all our dear listeners, we ourselves are eager for season four to get off the ground. But just be patient with us. It's going to be bigger. It's going to be better than ever before. We're putting it together now. Can't talk about it. But it's coming. It will be here before you know it. Believe me, as I get older, time just flies by very fast. So, as soon as – as soon as—. Before you can even, you know, think, "When is the next season going to start?", you'll hear a ding in your phone and there will be. So, season four is coming and it will be bigger and better than ever. 

Thank you very much. Thank you. Aimen, my dear friend, it's lovely to see you and I'm … 

Aimen Dean Lovely to see you, too. 

Thomas Small … I'm happy to hear you – that you're thriving. 

And, dear listeners, thanks for being with us. And I guess that's it. I don't even know. My producers didn't tell me how to end this thing. Do we just – do we just hang up ? I guess so. 

Aimen Dean Yeah. We say goodbye. 

Thomas Small Okay. Aimen, we'll speak soon, man. 

Aimen Dean Thank you. 

Thomas Small All the best. 

Aimen Dean See you then. 

Thomas Small Thanks very much everyone. 

Aimen Dean Thank you, everyone. Thank you. Bye. 

Thomas Small Bye.