Conflicted S3 E14 - Lebanon: Failed Narco-Terrorist State?

Thomas Good morning. Aimen.

Aimen Good morning, Thomas.

Thomas How are you doing today?

Aimen Not bad at all. I had a tuna sandwich for breakfast today. Can you believe it?

Thomas Tuna for breakfast. You know, Aimen, you never cease to surprise me.

Both [laughter]

Thomas We're talking about Lebanon today, Aimen. Lebanon. And I came across an article which was fairly well-argued, I thought, suggesting that the solution to all of Lebanon's many, many ills is Bitcoin, that Bitcoin should become the, sort of, reserve currency—or whatever you want to call it—of Lebanon. It goes to show you: you're in a bad way when your saviour is Bitcoin.

Aimen Actually, it is a good solution in my opinion. Why? Because Bitcoin resembles Lebanon in every possible way.

Thomas Oh really? [laughs]

Aimen Yeah. It is decentralized.

Both [laughter]

Aimen There is no – no authority there whatsoever. You know, it just...

Thomas And its value is plummeting.

Aimen Yeah. It is, you know, chaotic. It's so volatile. And who the hell is the one who invented Bitcoin to begin with? The same thing with: who the hell invented Lebanon to begin with? [laughs]

Thomas Well, we'll try to figure it out in today's episode. It's going to be a complex one. Let's get into it.

[music]

Thomas "Come with me from Lebanon, my bride. Come with me from Lebanon. You are a locked garden, my sister, my bride. You are an enclosed spring, a sealed up fountain. You are a garden spring, a well of fresh water flowing down from Lebanon." That was King Solomon, Aimen. King Solomon in the Bible, singing to his beloved.

And this is his father, King David: "The godly grow like a palm tree. They grow high, like a cedar in Lebanon."

Aimen These passages from the Bible are illuminating, I must say. And it shows how Lebanon was held in high esteem by those biblical figures, such as David and Solomon, for a good reason, because actually they used the cedar of Lebanon to build their temple.

Thomas They sure did. And their palace, that's right. That's right. And – and those quotes, I mean, what a contrast to the, uh, the travel advice for Lebanon that the British government gives...

Aimen [laughs]

Thomas... on its, uh, website today. Quote: "Lebanon is experiencing a prolonged and severe economic crisis. The situation is unpredictable and could deteriorate without warning. Basic commodities have become increasingly scarce. A conflict with Israel could spark with little warning and lead to a rapid escalation in violence. Terrorists are very likely to try to carry out attacks in Lebanon. There are unexploded ordinance and landmines in many places, you should be vigilant at all times."

Holy moly.

Aimen Thomas, how did we end up, you know, from quoting the Bible to quoting the [laughs] British government travel advice? [laughs]

Thomas Well, to show that contrast. I mean, it—. Lebanon—. On the one hand, Lebanon, it – it haunts our dreams as an almost mythical place of beauty, splendour, and wonderment. And it also haunts our nightmares as the place where the Arab world most spectacularly split up and caused conflict and chaos and killing and murder and sectarian violence and all the rest.

Aimen Actually, like, you know, whenever someone asks me, like, you know, "What do you think of Lebanon these days?" And I would say the easiest way to describe Lebanon is that it is a failed terror narco-state.

Thomas Failed terror narco-state. Well, Aimen, three episodes ago, the one on Gaddafi, I said that after their comprehensive defeat to Israel in the Six-Day War, the Arab world went kinda nuts. Then we spent two episodes, now, outside the Arab world in Kashmir and Cypress talking about how modern ideas of nationhood can quickly transform ethnic and religious social divides into long-lasting conflicts.

And now we're back in the Arab world in Lebanon, whose sectarian divides are legion and where the mental crack-up following the '67 war was most pronounced and most tragic, also. Aimen, I understand you are— Yeah, you're basically Lebanese. I mean, you told us the lovely story about your parents getting married on the slopes of Mount Hermon, but I didn't know the extent to which your roots are very much Lebanese.

Aimen Well, as my father has this incredible mix of Turco-Persian and Arab roots, my roots from my mother's side is purely Lebanese. So I'm half Lebanese and the other half is a mix of Arab and Persian and Afghan and Turk. And God knows how many other... [laughs] ...ethnic groups.

Thomas In terms of blood, you're – you're half Lebanese, but your father lived in Lebanon for a long time. Your brothers were born in Lebanon. I mean, I think culturally, you're almost more Lebanese than you are Saudi.

Aimen Oh my God. Like, you know, if my Saudi friends hear you say that, I mean, they will say, "no, no, no, no, no". You know, the guy—. Whenever he speaks, like, you know, he speaks like a proper Eastern province, you know, guy. [laughs] So—.

Thomas Oh, of course. So that's true. In terms of your language, you're – you're very much Gulfy.

Aimen In terms of my father, because he moved to Lebanon in 1950, he remained there all the way until 1969. During that time, he married my mother in 1957, and in 1960, 1964, 1967, my three oldest brothers were born.

Thomas Those are some deep roots in Lebanon. Uh, and as we'll see, '69—1969—was a good year to get the hell out. Your father timed that well.

Both [laughter]

Thomas Okay. Now, before we go straight into the history and all that, let's talk about geography. I like trying to get the lay of the land before we – we discuss how the land was torn apart by the people on it.

Lebanon, if it is anything, essentially, then it is a mountain or really a mountain range called Mount Lebanon, Jabal Lubnan. The cedars of Lebanon, Aimen, as you said, were proverbial already in the Bronze Age, and for thousands of years, Mount Lebanon has been the geographical core of the country. Aimen, I mean, Mount Lebanon is stunningly beautiful, isn't it.

Aimen Anyone who goes to Faraya for the skiing will understand how amazing it is. You are actually—. They're high up in the mountains, you know, with the snow cap mountains—all around you, so much snow—yet you look in the distance and you see the sparkling blue beaches of Lebanon. How? I mean, it is amazing,

Thomas Amazing. Beautiful. And – and the mountain – the mountain range—. I mean, the – the beautiful is also home to a bewilderingly complex mix of ethnicities, religions, sects, peoples, complex beyond imagination. So that's Mount Lebanon.

It runs north-south down the line of the country to the west of the mountain range. You have the coastal strip and all of Lebanon's major cities in this order, north to south: Tripoli, Byblos, Beirut, Sidon, and Tyre, all five of them founded by the Phoenicians thousands of years ago, all five of them still heavily populated. There are other cities as well, but those five are the most ancient. They line the coastal strip.

Right, so east of the mountain range lies the Beqaa Valley, a long fertile valley, where two important Levantine rivers rise: the Orontes, which flows northward into Syria, and the Litani, which flows southward before taking a sharp right-hand turn into the Mediterranean Sea.

So that was historically Lebanon. The mountain range, Mount Lebanon, and the coastal strip to the west and the Beqaa Valley to the east. Though in recent centuries, and certainly since 1943, when Lebanon became an independent nation-state for the first time, the country has also included the western slopes of the Anti-Lebanon Mountains. So they're on the other side of the Beqaa Valley, bordering Syria. And it also now includes the north-western slope of Mount Hermon, also bordering Syria—where your parents were married, Aimen—and finally, the Jabal Amil highlands south of the Litani River that blend seamlessly into the Galilee and northern Israel.

Aimen, those are the geographical facts. Describe what Lebanon means to an Arab Middle Easterner like you. What images, what associations does Lebanon invoke?

Aimen Oh, you know, just as Lebanon is a weird mix of ethnicities, religions, and cultures and behaviours and, you know, parties and all of that, the Lebanese or Lebanon invoke a lot of contradictory emotions in the Arab public.

So for example, in the GCC, talk to people. You say, like, you know, "What is Lebanon to you?" On the positive side, he will tell you, "This is where a lot of the music come from, from the high artistic level all the way down to the cheap entertainment level". And then they will tell you, "Lebanon is where good cuisine come from, you know, from the hummus and mutabal and tabbouleh and the grills and, you know—".

Thomas Yeah. Lebanese cuisine, my goodness. It's the best.

Aimen Yeah. Then you go into the contradiction here. Lebanon is where there is drugs, narcotics, civil war, terrorism, animosity, Hezbollah, and entitled arrogant people. That is, you know, how Lebanon is viewed so different. Like, sometime, within the same mindset, they will tell you, "Oh, Lebanon is so beautiful, but it is run by, like, in the lunatics you know". That that's how Lebanon is perceived.

Thomas In terms of other Arabs attitude towards Lebanon, is there a sort of inferiority-superiority complex at play there? I mean, the Lebanese, on the one hand, they might be considered to have – to be a little bit, as you say, more worldly, more cultured, et cetera, but then, you know, they – they – they live in a failed state. They can't get their acts together. I mean, is there a sort of inferiority complex at play?

Aimen Oh my God. There exists, actually, a cultural war right now between the GCC on one hand and the Lebanese and their sympathizers within the Arab world and the other, whether Syrians or Palestinians or Egyptians. So we have, now, this cultural divide called the Arab al Shamal and the Arabs, you know.

"Arab al Shamal" means "the northern Arabs", you know, and then the Arabs, you know, the GCC, they call themselves the Arabs. "We are the Arabs. Anyone basically north of the Aqaba..." [laughs] "...you know, in Jordan, is really Arab al Shamal". So the GCC Arabs, they always say that the Lebanese people, they think they are culturally entitled, that somehow their past achievements give them that entitlement to see themselves superior to us, because when they were cultured, when they were well-educated, and when their country was well-run, we were Bedouins.

I mean, we were not exactly like an—I mean, you know—in the era of the modern nation-state. However, they descended into chaos and civil war and mass migration, in huge level to the point where twenty-two million Lebanese people around the world trace their roots back to Lebanon, when in fact only five million people live in Lebanon right now.

So actually, almost four out of every five Lebanese on the planet live outside of Lebanon. So they say that they messed up their own country, and yet they still feel that they are superior to us. No, we have now advanced to the point where we have more PhDs and master degrees and university degrees per capita than even Lebanon itself.

Thomas As a half Lebanese Guy, Aimen, I mean, you're split right – right down the middle. Do you incarnate this divide between the real Arabs and the Arabs of the north?

Aimen Uh, pretty much. Like, you know, because I'm half Arab and half Arab al Shamal, like, you know, I mean, so, you know, the northern Arabs and the, you know—.

So in one hand I so sympathize with Lebanon and the Lebanese people and their plight, and I always feel that. How could a beautiful land like this descend into such chaos and mismanagement and failure as a state? But at the same time, some people say to, you know, say to me, "Well, look at Dubai, look at Abu Dhabi, look at Riyadh, you know, look at Jeddah. These cities are in the desert. And yet the, you know, the people there turn them into modern architectural wonders, and yet Lebanon, which could have done ten times better than Dubai or Abu Dhabi because of the beauty, because of the location, because of the geography, because of the educated population, and yet they failed to do it."

Thomas Uh, now we – we – we're not going to solve the divide between north and south Arabs today. Let's – let's move on geo-strategically.

At least since the time of the Islamic conquest, the Lebanese coast has been the key to controlling and defending the Levant. So the – the whole of Lebanon, which existed for thousands of years and was in the Roman empire and everything.

And it was very civilized after the Islamic conquests, was basically turned into one big naval garrison to protect the Levant from Byzantine attacks during that great battle between the Caliphate and the Eastern Roman Empire that we talked about in the last episode. So Lebanon became a big naval garrison.

Eventually, Lebanon was conquered by the Crusaders, and then when it was wrested back from the Crusaders by the Ayyubids, the Mamluks, and then finally the Ottomans, those Muslim powers were always afraid of Christian troops from Europe landing along the Lebanese coast to reinvade the Middle East. So geo-strategically, Lebanon's position between East and West has always been very significant and remains so to this day.

Aimen Lebanon served as the first line of defence, especially since it is facing Cypress. Cypress was always used by the Byzantines, you know, in order to raid, you know, that coast.

Thomas And after them, the Franks, the Phoenicians, the British—. [laughs]

Aimen So whoever was in control of Cypress was always threatening, you know, the Lebanese coast and from there, the wider Levant.

Thomas Yes. And I'd like to say that this sort of shatters a couple of myths about, not just Lebanon, really the whole Middle East, but it certainly applies to Lebanon. The myth first that in the Ottoman period, peace reigned—peace which was shattered by Western colonialism. The other myth being that Lebanon was perfectly integrated into the Middle Eastern Arab Islamic world until recently when France screwed it up. These are both myths.

Aimen Actually, I totally agree with you, Thomas, because the Ottomans were always trying to play these religious minorities and sectarian minorities against each other, because these religious minorities who sought refuge among Lebanon—and they were always like, I mean, hiding in these – you know, building their villages in the valleys and the mountains and between all of these summits, you know. They were fighting each other, actually. Sometime Christian against Muslim, sometime Shia against Sunni, sometime Druze against Shia and Sunnis and – and Christians. And sometime within the Christians, themselves...

Thomas [laughs]

Aimen ...Christian Modernites against Christian Orthodox against Christian Americites. And, you know – you know, the list is endless. You know – you know, so basically it was a mix of many religious minorities fighting each other for the control of these beautiful mountain ranges and mountain passes.

It was a prime real estate that need to be controlled. And what the Ottomans used to do is that they will sometimes favour one minority against another in order to gain favour. For example, for the Druze, the Druze had their best time during the Ottoman era because they were given the title of emir, you know, so, you know, there are many Emirates of the Druze, you know, that were established there, and they were given the, you know, title of Royal Highness and all of that. And so they were. Being favoured by the Ottomans, you know, in order to control the, uh, sensitive mountain passes in Lebanon.

Thomas Yeah. It's not really so much that the sects, uh, and – and the different groups were vying just for land. What they were really doing was vying for military supremacy over the others so that the Ottomans would grant them the rights to tax farm.

And I think it's – it's important to really understand that in a patrimonial, aristocratic, hierarchical empire, like the Ottomans, political instability and a military jostling for power between different, sort of, warlords and their retainers was the Ottoman form of politics, of electioneering, campaigning, activism, and lobbying as we carry it out today in democracies.

So it was perfectly normal, but it was certainly not peaceful. There was incessant fighting.

Aimen It was always continuous. The only reason that we don't hear about it so much, you know, right now, is because there was no technology at that time, because most of the events were localized. And hardly anyone hear about them. But now of course, if there is any jostling, if there is any continuation of that, it will be a global news.

Thomas The other myth I mentioned was the influence of France in Lebanon. There is a common myth that France wrecked Lebanon, and this is really not true. As we've said, Lebanon has always been for hundreds and hundreds of years, a political zone of jostling conflict between sects. Also, France's influence in Lebanon is extremely old. From the Crusader period, the French—or the Franks—and their different Christian allies have always had some influence in Lebanon, whether it be political, religious, cultural, or certainly commercial.

So Lebanon has never been this place isolated off from the West that was suddenly infiltrated by the West out of the blue. It's just not like that at all. Lebanon always stood between both worlds.

Aimen I totally agree. There is no question about it, and this is why many Lebanese don't consider themselves to be Arabs.

I mean, because they don't believe that, you know, that they are truly Arabs in the sense that Syrians or Iraqis or the Saudis or, you know, the Yemenis are Arabs or Egyptians, even. They really see themselves as something very different, you know? And therefore they consider themselves the extension of the Phoenicians, you know, or the extension of the separate Greeks or anything like that. But in fact, if you look at their DNA, I'm sorry to say, hey, Lebanese people, you are Arabs. Forget it. You are absolutely Arabs.

Thomas I wish, Aimen, we could talk about medieval Lebanon, early Islamic Lebanon, and all the early modern Lebanon. But we – we just can't. We don't have time. We talked about the French mandate period in the episode on Syria.

And so for this episode on Lebanon, we're jumping straight to 1943 and independence when a Christian and a Muslim formed the so-called National Covenant, forging an independent Lebanese Republic that kept the sectarian nature of Lebanese society and politics intact. Now, I think the best way to introduce our listeners to the kaleidoscope of, uh, Lebanese sects: we can walk through the National Covenant and explain one by one, point by point, what sects were given which positions in the government.

Okay. So the president and the commander of the armed forces were always, according to the National Covenant, from the Maronite community. Let's talk about Maronites because Maronites are something very particular to Lebanon.

Aimen Indeed. They are the followers of Youhana Maroun, the Christian saint who fled into the mountains of Lebanon in 685.

Thomas Christian saint, arch-heretic, it depends on which Christian you're talking to, but sure.

Aimen [laughs] So, you know, and he formed this community in order to be safeguarded, you know, from both, you know, the Islamic conquest as well as from rival Christian sects.

Thomas The Maronites have a fascinating ancient backstory, actually. So their origins are in the early seventh century when the Roman emperor Heraclius—and it was during Heraclius' reign that the Islamic conquest began—this Roman emperor imposed a very arcane theological formula on his Christian subjects, hoping thereby to heal the divisions of the church. The church had split into all these different groups.

Now, the Maronites, or what became the Maronites, embraced this formula for centuries long after other Christians had rejected it as heresy. That's the sort of basis of the Maronites. They remained this little island of Heraclian Christians in a sea of Orthodox and Muslims.

Uh, and then in the sixteenth century, they agreed to recognize the Pope of Rome. And now the Maronite Church is part of the Roman Catholic Church, though they retain their own liturgical traditions and things like that.

Aimen Actually, Thomas, the Christians in Lebanon—their numbers actually grew exponentially in the 19th century. Not only because of the fact that they became wealthy due to their trading and commercial and political links with France and, uh, European powers, but also because of mass conversion to Christianity during the 19th century.

Thomas Really. That's extremely rare. You mean Muslims converting to Christianity?

Aimen Yes. Muslims converting to Christianity

Thomas That almost never happens, Aimen. [laughs]

Aimen I will tell you why. Because, you know, during that time, the Ottomans, you know, uh, started the process—especially during the Crimean war and the war with the Russians—they started the policy of conscription. So they started finally, you know, conscripting people to serve in the military. And if you are a non-Muslim, you are exempt.

So many of these wealthy Lebanese, you know, Sunni and Shia families, started to resent this. And they, you know, some of them started to convert their kids, you know, basically into Christianity rather than see them dead, you know – you know, in the Crimea or other conflicts in the Caucuses or, uh, somewhere else.

Thomas How ironic. The Ottoman empire was built on Christian children being press ganged into service into the Ottoman army, and at the end of the Ottoman period, Muslims were converting their children into Christianity to avoid military service.

Aimen Absolutely. And that led, actually, to the number of Christians, you know, in Lebanon, growing rapidly in the 19th century to the point where—. You know, as my mother is from the house of Hashem, so she's a Hashemite. The fact is that I have relatives who are Sunni, relatives who are Shia, but above all, there are eight hundred members of the house of Hashem who are Hashemites, descendants of the prophet Muhammad, who are Christians. And more ironic is that the, uh, house of al-Ayoubi—the descendants of Saladin, Salah ad-Din al-Ayoubi, the conqueror of Jerusalem, the one who actually defeated the Crusaders—there are a section of his descendants in Lebanon, who are Christians. They converted from Islam to Christianity to avoid the conscription. [laughs]

Thomas For these reasons, and for many other reasons, by the early twentieth century, Lebanon was unique among Arab countries because the largest single religious group was Christian—Maronite Christian. They were still a minority. No one had a – a majority in Lebanon, but they were the largest minority at about thirty percent. The second biggest were the Sunnis uh, at about twenty percent.

And for this reason, the new constitution of Lebanon gave the prime ministership always to a Sunni. Interestingly, Aimen, Lebanon's Sunnis are a relatively recent arrival. When the Ismaili Fatimids conquered the region in the late tenth century, Lebanon's Muslims became almost entirely Shia, and this remained the case during the Crusader period. Sunnis didn't arrive in numbers until the Mamluks had firmly stamped their authority on the region in the late thirteenth century.

So Lebanese Muslims in general—and let's say especially Sunnis—they have always tended to be sympathetic both to pan-Arabism—pan-Arabist ideas like Nasserism, for example—and also to the idea of a – a greater Syria.

So we've talked about the two biggest single groups in Lebanon—you know, at the beginning of its independence, at least, 'cause the Shia eventually grew in number—but at the beginning, the Maronites who were Western-leaning and tended to downplay their Arabness and the Sunnis who tended to be sympathetic to pan Arab ideas.

Aimen Okay, Thomas, you mentioned the Christian Maronites and you mentioned the second group, the Sunnis. We should not forget the third group, which is the Shia of Lebanon. And they were given the position of the speaker of parliament. While traditionally in many countries, the speaker of parliament isn't exactly a very powerful position, but in the Lebanese politics, it is, because if the speaker of parliament doesn't call the parliament into session, then all government in a business is actually shut down and suspended.

Thomas So the Shia are able to kind of hold Lebanon politically by the jugular.

Aimen Absolutely. No question about it.

Thomas As I said earlier, the Shia have traditionally lived south of the Litani River in what's called the Jabal Amil. And also they've lived in the Beqaa Valley. The Shia have been in Lebanon for a long time—really from the very beginning of Islam.

But interestingly, it's what happened in the sixteenth century that formed a lot of the modern Lebanese Shia identity. This has to do with the close connections they formed with Safavid Iran.

Aimen In fact, Thomas, Jabal Amil is considered to be one of the greatest religious learning centres of Shia Islam throughout the ages.

Even from as far back as a thousand years ago, you know, there are many scholars, you know, Shia theologians, who came from there, including Al-Hurr Al-Amili, you know, one of the greatest authors and theologians of Shia Islam. So, uh, Shia Islam traditionally been around there for more than a thousand years. And five hundred years ago when, uh, Shah Ismail Safavi, when he started to forcibly convert Iran—which, funny enough, at the time it was actually three quarters Sunni rather than Shia—when he wanted to convert Iran into Shia Islam, he actually invited religious theologians from Jabal Amil in all the way to, uh, Persia in order to start the process of the converting the Sunnis of Iran into Shia Islam.

Thomas So the links between Lebanese Shia in the south and Iran, which we associate these days with Hezbollah and groups like that is very ancient—five hundred years, at least.

Aimen Absolutely.

Thomas And for this reason, in the Ottoman period, the Shia of – of Lebanon were often very ill-treated. The Ottoman authorities understandably considered the Shia to be traitors. And so the Shia during the Ottoman period occupied a marginalized role within Lebanon. They tended to be poorer. They tended to be politically disenfranchised, which formed part of their self-understanding in the modern period.

Aimen Indeed. Because, you know, as far as the Ottoman authorities were concerned, they feared that they will be agents of the, uh, Safavid Shahs. And so that is why they were treated so badly.

Thomas It breaks my heart to do this, but we're going to skip over briefly the – the – the sect that got the role of deputy speaker of parliament to the Greek Orthodox.

Aimen [laughs]

Thomas I am Greek Orthodox. A quarter of Lebanon's Christians are Orthodox, uh, and traditionally they – they were close commercial allies of the Sunnis, interestingly enough. And like the Sunnis, they also tended to support a pan-Arab identity and the idea of a greater Syria. Uh, in fact, it was Orthodox Lebanese who were the first early exponents of both ideas.

But we can't focus on them because we've got too much to cover, and I want to talk about that sect which was given the position of chief of staff of the armed forces. You mentioned them earlier, Aimen, but we have to talk about the Druze. And holy moly, man, you're going to have to handle them. The Druze are weird.

Aimen What can I say about the Druze? Their origins could be found in Shia Ismaili Islam. So the Ismailis were a fringe of Shia Islam and the Druze are now actually a fringe, you know, of Ismaili, you know, uh, Shia Islam—.

Thomas A fringe of a fringe. [laughs]

Aimen Of a fringe, you know, to begin with, you know, so—.

Thomas [laughs]

Aimen So a fringe of a fringe of a fringe. And so therefore they became more or less like, I mean a—in the eyes of many Muslims, of course—like, you know, a heretical sect. And of course that meant that we'll have to seek the safety of the, uh, mountainous regions of Lebanon, Syria, and, uh, Palestine.

Thomas Now, you said that they're – they're rooted in Ismailism. And, now, the Fatimid Caliphate—which conquered the Levant in the tenth and eleventh centuries—they were Ismailis. So this is—. They're – they're linked to the Fatimids.

Aimen Yes. In fact, in particular, they were linked, you know, to the very weird Fatimid Caliph al-Hakim bi-Amr Allah.

Thomas Oh yes. Al-Hakim. You talked about him in the Gaddafi episode. He was a particularly crazy guy. He burnt down the Church of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem, which sparked the Crusade. So, mad Hakim.

Aimen Yes, it's a mad Hakim. And because we were comparing, you know, uh, Gaddafi to him, and we were saying basically, like, you know, Gaddafi was the reincarnation of al-Hakim and maybe, like, you know, this will, uh, give credence to the Druze who developed later the idea that, you know – you know, that reincarnation is real. [laughs]

Thomas The Druze believe in reincarnation, but what's – what's their link to this Hakim fellow?

Aimen Well, they believe that he was the manifestation of God on Earth. I mean, I don't know how anyone could reach this conclusion. He was as mad as a hat, but nonetheless, you know, they believe that he was the manifestation of God on Earth. The Druze is a secretive religion, by the way. Like, I mean, you don't learn—. You know, as a man within the sect—you don't learn the principles of the faith until you are forty. Before forty, you aren't aware even what your faith is. You just belong to it until forty. Then you start to participate in the rituals.

Thomas I think, as well, I remember reading that like most Shia, the Druze believe in taqiya. They believe that it's okay to pretend that you're a Sunni, even though you're a Shia, to protect yourselves.

And the Druze were pretty good at doing this in the fourteenth, fifteenth, sixteenth centuries. They presented as Sunnis, though they had these secretive, initiatory kind of mystical ideas, uh, about manifestations of God and things. Uh, but because they presented as Sunnis as you said, Aimen, they were frequently the most powerful players in Lebanon during the Ottoman period. And that – that sense of their aristocratic inheritance remained very powerful with them into the modern period.

Aimen Absolutely. And they are renowned warriors. I mean, actually even the Israeli army have legions, you know, basically of Druze, you know, working for the IDF and working for the security services because the Druze are relied upon, you know, by the, uh, Israeli Defense Force. They are relied upon by the Syrian army. They are relied upon even within the Lebanese army. So they are renowned warriors.

Thomas Right. Okay. So going back to the National Covenant, which established the new independent Republic of Lebanon, as we've said, the presidency was held by a Maronite as was the position of commander of the armed forces. The prime ministership was always held by a Sunni.

The speaker of parliament would be a Shia. His deputy would be Greek Orthodox. And the chief of staff of the armed forces, perhaps speaking to that martial prowess that you mentioned, Aimen, was always a Druze now. In the Covenant, Christians received just under fifty-five percent of all parliamentary seats. This was already quite a controversial move because it didn't reflect their demographics perfectly.

But what it does reflect is their relative power position during the French period, which they sought to maintain. They wanted to be the most powerful group in Lebanon and received fifty-five percent of parliamentary seats. Parliament was supposed to be the most powerful organ of government, right? And so it was tasked with electing the president. The president wasn't elected directly, but by parliament. However, things got off to a bad start when the last high commissioner of the French Mandate endowed the president with his authority.

So this confused things immediately and resulted in a much stronger, more authoritarian presidential office than the constitution had envisioned, which gave the Maronites, who always held that office, even more power than was envisioned. So, you know, this – this was the sort of starting gun in a slow process towards intercommunal conflict.

So now we've laid out the sectarian sort of divides there. We've talked about this new constitution and the way politics worked in Lebanon. Now we're going to inch our way towards the outbreak of the famous Lebanese Civil War in 1975. And to do that, we're going to re-narrate briefly several events that we've already covered, uh, in episodes of Conflicted this season. It's remarkable all the pieces come together in Lebanon.

So first, July 1952 in the Egyptian Revolution.

Aimen Ah, when Nasser and his fellow officers overthrew Fat Farouk.

Thomas That's right. So Nasser became a hero in Lebanon like everywhere else, especially for Lebanese Muslims who had been feeling hard done by that. They thought the Maronites had more power than they deserved, that Muslims wanted a new census, which they believed would force a change to the sectarian political balance.

Uh, and – and in this, Egypt and Syria were giving the Muslims their support. This was part of rising discontent which united the country, and a general strike was called. This led to the resignation of the first president of Lebanon and brought Camille Chamoun to power as president. Camille Chamoun is a very important player in the story we're telling.

So there—Egyptian revolution, sudden upsurge in pan-Arab, pro-Nasserite ideas, leading to a new president in power in Lebanon. Then, in October 1956, the Suez Crisis. During the Crisis, Lebanese Muslims expected the government to break off diplomatic relations with France and Britain like the rest of the Arab world.

But president Chamoun refused. This caused more bad feeling to rise amongst the Muslim community and the supporters of pan-Arabism inside Lebanon. Then January 1957, the Eisenhower Doctrine. Remember, dear listener, that doctrine stated that America could intervene militarily in any Middle Eastern country threatened by international communism.

Well, when Eisenhower first formulated this doctrine, President Chamoun was the only Arab leader who wholeheartedly approved of it. And it's important to note here that the National Covenant had sworn the Maronites never to ally with the West. This was something that the Muslims insisted upon at the time of the founding of the Republic.

So when Chamoun came out in favour of the Eisenhower Doctrine—which he did without receiving any parliamentary approval—this was considered treasonous by Lebanese Muslims, again, increasing the tension.

Aimen And then in the late summer of 1957, and as we explained in the Syria episode before—go and listen to it—you will find that Syria was worried about President Camille Chamoun's desire to use the Eisenhower Doctrine possibly, you know, to support Lebanon against any encroachment by Syria.

So Syria started massing troops on the Lebanese border. Turkey, which was part of the Baghdad Pact, as we talked about it in the Hashemite episode—go and listen to it, too—you will find that Turkey wanted to, you know, protect Lebanon, which was toying with the idea of joining the Baghdad Pact. And they mass troops alongside the Syrian border to scare the Syrians from threatening Lebanon.

Turkey later backed down, but nonetheless, the United Arab Republic, the UAR, was established: a union between Syria and Egypt. That was now a major threat to the hegemony of the Christian Maronites in Lebanon. Why? Because of the fact that many Sunnis and Shia Muslims in Lebanon felt more affinity with Nasser and his charismatic calls for resistance against Israel and for Arab unity and pan-Arabism.

And so they really wanted to get out of the hegemony of the Christian Maronites, who were sympathetic to the West and wanted to unite with the, uh, UAR—with the United Arab Republic.

Thomas Yes, Aimen. The – the United Arab Republic split Lebanon. The Maronites denounced it. The Muslims and the Druze applauded it.

The Syrian president, Shukri al-Quwatli. Do you remember him, dear listener? Shukri al-Quwatli? He publicly invited Lebanon to join – to join the UAR, and this led to demonstrations and riots breaking out in Lebanon which grew more intense after the Maronites were accused of murdering a Sunni journalist in Beirut. Now, Syria had already been supplying Shia groups in the Beqaa Valley with weapons, and now the UAR began providing support to the opposition, too. It soon became a full-blown civil war.

So this is the Civil War of 1958, less known than the one that broke out in '75, but extremely important to the history of Lebanon. The opposition in the war—so the Druze and the Sunnis—they had the upper hand and chunks of the country fell under the control of armed sectarian groups, a foreshadowing of things to come invoking the Eisenhower Doctrine.

President Chamoun requested that America intervene. Initially, Eisenhower demurred. He said, "No, no, I – I don't want to get involved in Lebanon" until something happened—something very important on the 14th of July of 1958.

Aimen Which is the Iraqi military uprising, you know, which toppled King Faisal II of Iraq, which we talked about in the Hashemite episode.

Thomas Yes, that's right. The tragic Iraqi revolution, which, uh, saw young King Faisal and his family murdered. That was on the 14th of July, 1958. As a sign of how shocking and how threatening that event was to the West, the very next day, July 15th, 1958, Eisenhower launched what's called Operation Blue Bat, the first military operation under the Eisenhower Doctrine.

Aimen Operation Blue Bat. This is where fourteen thousand US troops land in Lebanon. And the fact that they landed was alone, in itself, good enough deterrence, you know, for the rebel groups to come to the table and to announce that they are happy to come back under the umbrella of the state and to enter into a negotiations in order to restore the authority of the state. So America just pacified Lebanon purely by just landing fourteen thousand troops. That's all.

Thomas President Chamoun stepped down in favour of a compromise candidate between the two sides, a man named Fouad Chehab who had been the commander of the army. And throughout the crisis, Chehab had refused to allow the army to intervene. He did not believe that the army should be used in a political way like that.

Now, president Chehab, coming to power neatly coincides, Aimen, with your father's time in Lebanon. This is sort of the Lebanon of the imagination, when there was an economic boom, there was a lot of development. It seemed that the sectarian problems were being worked out. A modern state was being built. This is a Lebanon of glamor. This is a Lebanon of, uh, of mystique, almost, when it became the playground for the rich and famous throughout the Eastern Mediterranean. This is the Lebanon that would ultimately be shattered in 1975.

Aimen Well, because Fouad Chehab, you know, was a Lebanon First president. What do I mean by Lebanon First is that you have a leader of the country who put the interest of the country ahead of the interest of his own sect, then you end up in a situation where the country as a whole prosper.

Thomas What's interesting about Fouad Chehab is that he united in his person the three major old aristocratic power players of Lebanon. So he was an heir of the Sunni princely house of Chehab. This was the princely house that in the Ottoman period ruled Lebanon from Beirut. That – those – they were Sunnis. He was also a descendant of the old Druze princely house of Ma'an who had ruled Lebanon for the Ottomans before the Chehab. And through his mother, he was a member of the Maronite noble family of al-Khazen. So Chehab symbolized these three major power players coming together into one. Yet he grew up in poverty, and so he always had an instinctive sympathy with ordinary Lebanese people and wanted to, uh, improve their lot.

Aimen And President Fouad Chehab, in order to prove his policy of Lebanon First decided to meet just—you know, early in 1959, just after that brief civil war and after his ascension as a president, uh—to meet with President Abdel Nasser. You know, President Nasser, now, he is the president, not only of Egypt, but also of Syria, United Arab Republic. So Fouad Chehab set up a tent on the Syrian-Lebanese border, and he set up a long table there—Putin style, we can say—

Both [laughter]

Aimen ...where he – where the table actually straddled the border of both countries. You know?

So in that tent, it was on the border, Nasser would sit on the Syrian side of the border and Fouad Chehab would sit on the Lebanese side of the border. And this is when Fouad Chehab extracted the promise from Nasser not to meddle in Lebanese affairs anymore, because Fouad Chehab promised Nasser, you know, at least, like, in his wisdom, that Lebanon will not be used, you know, by any foreign power to undermine the interest or the sovereignty of, uh, uh, United Arab Republic, whether Syria or Egypt, or not to act against Arab interest whatsoever and not to allow Israeli activities there. So, you know, in a sense he promised what Lebanon would later be known as—the Switzerland of the Mediterranean—you know, neutrality.

Thomas So in foreign policy, Chehab pledged Lebanon to neutrality in domestic policy.

It was Chehab who really first built a modern, proper state in Lebanon. At least, he tried to. It became known as Chehabism, a bit of social welfare, a larger state sector to stimulate economic demand and provide employment and a more sophisticated, non-sectarian military intelligence core—a step, he hoped, toward undermining the potential for sectarian groups to arm again. Chehab's term in office ended in 1964, and – and people to some extent were clamouring for him to stay on, but the constitution didn't allow two consecutive terms. Instead, Chehab's ally Charles Helou became president, and the hopes were that president Helou would continue Chehab's modern state-building project.

So now we're in the mid-'60s. We're – we're racing towards the end of the '60s, and you know, Chehab and his successor, Helou, were building Lebanon. The economy was booming, but there was discontent on the margins. Muslims were still angry that the Christian Maronites had the lion's share of power. The Shia were angry that they were marginalized and poor—increasingly poor, actually.

And in general, the overheating economy was causing inflation, dislocation, and inward immigration, especially from Syria. People were beginning to feel the pinch, but none of that discontent would've caused the Civil War in 1975. This is what we're trying to explain. The Civil War of 1975. No, that civil war only happened because of another event, which we covered this season, and I'm talking about the Six-Day War.

Aimen Well, Thomas, until now we haven't mentioned yet the two hundred thousand Palestinian refugees who flooded into Lebanon. Post 1948 War of Israeli Independence.

Thomas Two hundred thousand Palestinian refugees. That's a lot.

Aimen Yeah. And they were living mostly in designated so-called camps. In fact, like they are more like cramped townships and slums, uh, you know, on the margins of big cities.

Thomas So there are two hundred thousand Palestinian refugees inside Lebanon, uh, in the mid-'60s. And remember, dear listener, if you remember back to our previous episodes, the Arab League founded the Palestinian liberation organization in 1964—the PLO. Some paramilitary training took place among Palestinians in Lebanon as early as then, as early as '64.

But it wasn't until after the '67 war, the Six-Day War, when Yasser Arafat's Fatah merged with the PLO and became its ideological guiding light, that the Palestinian cause was nationalized and mobilized. We talked about this. Palestinians would no longer wait for Arab leaders to fight for them. They adopted a policy of direct action.

So you may have noticed during this season that Lebanon has barely played any role at all in the Arab-Israeli conflicts we've been talking about. However, following the Six-Day War, that would change big time.

Aimen In the episode where we covered the 1967 war and Nasser's, you know, massive failure, the Palestinian militants—whether Fatah or the PLO—were driven, uh, from the West Bank into Jordan, and in Jordan, they decided after the failure and after the war to start some sort of a base, like some sort of a launch pad from Jordan, and that Jordan will be, you know, where they will launch their operations right into Israel.

And Nasser was supporting them with weapons, with equipments, with, uh, munitions. And it was all against the wishes of King Hussein of Jordan. He was already mourning the loss of al-Aqsa Mosque and the Dome of the Rock—I mean the holy sites that were his heirloom. And so he was not exactly happy about having a state within a state, a second army, in – within his country, Jordan, uh, that could easily turn against him, and—guess what—turned against him. They did. And the Palestinians, under the leadership of Yasser Arafat, they started the process of trying to take over Jordan. The Jordanian army resisted, and in September 1970, you know, the Jordanian military was able to push back so hard they killed more than four thousand Palestinians, actually, you know, in the process—militants, mostly.

And they were about to crush the PLO and Arafat forever, you know, but Nasser, President Nasser, as if, like, you – he needed more failures, you know, intervened in order to stop King Hussein from annihilating the PLO entirely, and he begged King Hussein to allow Arafat and the militants of the PLO a safe exit to another country.

Now, these events would later be known as Black September, which led, of course, to the formation of the famous terrorist Palestinian group, the Black September, which would carry out the Munich attack in 1972 against the Olympics which killed eleven Israeli, uh, athletes. But the reality here is that Nasser wanted those PLO militants to be transported to where? To Lebanon. To south Lebanon, because already they had a little bit of, uh, grassroot support, two hundred thousand Palestinian refugees. That is what they wanted.

Thomas That's right. As early as 1968, there were cross-border raids into Israel from Lebanon, which had invited Israeli counterattacks.

And the strength of feeling for the Palestinian cause was so powerful among Lebanese Muslims, Nasserists, leftists, that Lebanese politicians, especially Shia politicians in the beginning, were openly allowing the Palestinians to use Lebanon to launch these attacks. And as this support from within Lebanon increased, the Maronites of Lebanon, especially, became increasingly worried.

President Helou sent the army to deal with the Palestinian militia, but this caused rioting and violent clashes from leftist Lebanese in the cities. Helou had to back down. The Lebanese state was too divided to cope with the existence of what was effectively an armed Palestinian state within a state

Aimen And the arrival of Arafat in 1970 made the situation worse. And so Nasser, before he died, unintentionally threw a grenade into the Lebanese powder keg that would cause the Civil War five years later.

Thomas So there we have it. It's in the early '70s. There is a Palestinian state within a state in Southern Lebanon, launching attacks into Israel, inviting Israeli reprisals inside Lebanon, destabilizing everything there. But it didn't take just these outsiders, if you like, the Palestinians, to cause this destabilization. There was an insider inside Lebanon that was equally, if not more, responsible for what would happen in 1975. And I'm talking about Kamal Jumblatt, the leader of the Druze.

Aimen Kamal Jumblatt. How do we describe him. A lawyer and, uh—.

Both [laughter]

Thomas Bad enough.

Aimen Yeah. And as you know, Shakespeare said in Henry IV, "And before we start, let's kill all the lawyers". And somebody in the end did kill him. I mean, you know, Shakespeare, like, I mean really, ordered his killing like in five hundred years ago.

But nonetheless, Kamal Jumblatt is one of those, you know, people who really fancied himself as the new Che Guevara, as the new leader of a nationalist, you know, uh, patriotic pan-Arabist movement that really wanted to support the Palestinians to the hilt. But it's easy for him to say, because he and his sect, the Druze, were not on the firing line with the Israeli-Lebanese border.

Thomas It's interesting to ask, actually, you know: was Kamal Jumblatt actually a leftist, a radical leftist, or was this another example of the Druze taqiya—of the Druze, uh, pretending to be something in order to consolidate their own power.

He certainly adopted the persona of a hard leftist. He formed what's called the Lebanese National Movement, a coalition of leftist, Arab nationalist, communist parties, all of whom backed the Palestinians, and then were joined by the Palestinians to create this big militarized political block inside Lebanon.

Was he really a leftist? I doubt it, but he certainly used the power of leftism to create this very strong, very destabilizing political militarized force inside Lebanon.

Aimen Oh, absolutely. There's no question that what ideology he followed. Power. Simple as that.

Thomas So I said that the Maronites were becoming increasingly worried.

They were worried at the Palestinian presence in Lebanon. They were especially worried when the political class in Lebanon began to, uh, allow the Palestinians to launch attacks against Israel. This compromised Lebanese sovereignty very badly. And the rise of Jumblatt's Lebanese National Movement and its militarization really worried them. The Maronites and other opponents of Jumblatt built up their own deterrents.

They began acquiring heavy weaponry on the black market, and we're talking, you know, heavy artillery, lots of weapons. And then Jumblatt and his movement responded in turn, tit for tat. Both sides got stronger. Both sides ended up more militarily powerful than the Lebanese army.

Aimen Ah, it's a common story. But actually, funny enough, like in how our episodes are always linked. You know, the last episode we talked about the Cypriot Civil War. Many of these weapons, actually that were used in the, uh, Cypriot Civil War found its way through the short boat journey to Lebanon and the black market there.

But don't forget the Shia. You know, we have to talk about them here, and especially about the arrival of a charismatic, handsome, imposing, larger-than-life figure, Musa Sadr. Musa Sadr, in fact, is a product of Jebel Amir, a Lebanese Persian Iraqi, you know, mix in terms of blood, in terms of family, in terms of relatives, in terms of education, in terms of everything.

So actually, even when he returned back to Lebanon, even though his roots are from Lebanon, he always talked with a, uh, accent that has a tinge of Persian throughout the, uh, Arabic. And so he started this movement called the Movement of the Deprived, Harakat al-Mahrumin. You know, the idea is to say that the Shia are deprived. You know, they don't have access to high education. They don't have access to high jobs. They don't have enough capital to start the business of their own, and they seem to be completely marginalized.

Thomas All of which was true. [laughs]

Aimen Yeah, absolutely. We both agree on this. Now, he, however, wanted to politicize the role of religion in the Shia masses.

At the time, the Shia masses were mostly pan-Arabist, mostly socialists in their, uh, aspirations because of what Kamal Jumblatt was preaching, that socialism and the idea of taking from the rich and giving to the poor and all of that. However, Musa Sadr believed that Shia Islam offered the solution to Shia Muslims and Lebanon through the internal cooperation, solidarity, welfare, you know, the ability, basically, of the community as a whole, if they come together to look after themselves, but also to stand as a separate identity against others, not only in self-defence, but also in self-recognition.

So this is, I think, in a – where Musa Sadr, when he started the Deprived Movement, he would later, then, with the advent of the Civil War, start the movement called Afwaj al-Muqawamat al-Lubnaniyyah, or the Legions of the Islamic Resistance, which was abbreviated in Arabic as "Amal", which means "hope".

Thomas So here we have the PLO, an armed state within a state. We have Kamal Jumblatt and his Lebanese National Movement, which has pissed off and, uh, threatened the Maronites who have built up an army of their own. And we have a growing sense of Shia separatism, Shia politicization, a powder keg waiting to go off. And go off it did, on the 13th of April, 1975.

Aimen Ah, the event of Ain el-Rummaneh.

Thomas Ain el-Rummaneh, the Spring of the Pomegranate. It sounds so romantic. It seems – sounds so simple. Uh, you wouldn't think such a place would be the, the starting point of such a brutal civil war.

Aimen Ain el-Rummaneh is actually a Christian neighbourhood, but nearby there is a Palestinian refugee camp—where the PLO used to be based—is called Tel al-Zaatar. There was a lot of Palestinian traffic from and into Tel al-Zaatar that used to go through Ain el-Rummaneh, so sometime there were tensions between the two communities. However, in 1975, a prominent Christian Lebanese leader, Pierre Gemayel - you know, his sons will later play an important role, both of them will become presidents of Lebanon - Pierre Gemayel was a target of an assassination attempt in Ain el-Rummaneh that day, and it was blamed on Palestinians. He survived, of course, nothing happened to him, and so Pierre Gemayel supporters shot back at a Palestinian bus and twenty-seven people were killed. And immediately, PLO forces from Tel al-Zaatar retaliated, and this is how things spiralled out of control and the Lebanese Civil War started.

Thomas So as always on Conflicted, we've spent a huge amount of time leading up to the outbreak of a war. And we find ourselves now in 1975, the Civil War has broken out. The Civil War lasted sixteen years.

We don't have time, Aimen. We don't have time to relate all the episodes of this incredibly long, very complicated war. What do we do?

Aimen Okay, let me summarize it really, really quickly.

Thomas Oh, wow. Let's see how well you do this. This is Aimen Dean summarizing really quickly the most complicated civil war in modern history. Go.

Both [laughter]

Aimen Okay. So first, the Civil War in Lebanon lasted sixteen years, and actually, it went through four phases.

So the first phase between 1975 and 1977, this is basically really purely Palestinians, you know, against Lebanese factions. So Palestinians and their Lebanese allies, mostly Muslims, fighting against the Christians of, uh, Lebanon.

And then of course there was a little intervention from the Syrians. They went in to play the role of a peacekeeper, except they didn't. They became a war party themselves. Uh, that is '75 to '77. That was phase one.

Thomas Phase two now, Aimen. Go.

Aimen Phase two. We have 1977 to 1982, where we are no longer talking only about Lebanese Christians, Maronites and Shia and Druze and all of that, no, no, no. We're talking also about two major powers intervening there, Syria intervening more and more and becoming a combatant, you know, in this war, and also Israel, where they invaded from Israel to push all the way to the Litani River and to occupy that part from 1978 all the way until 2000, for twenty-two years. That was phase two.

Thomas Phase two. Whew. Okay. Now phase three, Aimen. Go.

Aimen Phase three. As if the Israelis were not contented with having a big buffer zone from the Israeli border to the Litani River, they decided to invade all the way to Beirut. So—.

Both [laughter]

Thomas Oh God. This is 1982. The Israelis say, let's go for it. They go all the way to Beirut.

Aimen Exactly. So they crushed the PLO, and with it, they also crushed, you know, the power of the Syrian army to withstand them to the point where they destroyed dozens upon dozens of, uh, Syrian anti-aircraft missile sites, as well as in one day, in one day, the biggest aerial battle, you know, since World War II happened between the Israelis, and the Syrian Air Force has lost 85 jets. The Israelis lost none.

As a result of the Israeli success, you know, in pushing the Palestinians all the way to Beirut, the Palestinians were, you know, through lots of diplomatic manoeuvring, were evacuated from Beirut and were sent on ships all the way to Tunisia, far away from Israel. And the result of all of this is that the Israelis and the Syrians split the country between them into an Israeli-controlled zone south of the Litani River and a Syrian-controlled zone north of the Awali River.

Thomas And what about the Lebanese? What about them?

Aimen Stuff them. They couldn't even make it – I mean, come together to make peace or actually to form a government. So, you know—.

Thomas Oh my goodness. So that's the end of phase three. What, we're in 1983 now? I've lost track.

Aimen Yeah. So that was 1982, 1983. So the last phase, thank God for that.

Thomas Phase four.

Aimen Phase four.

Thomas Which, from what I understand was the longest and the most bloody.

Aimen Exactly, because 1984 to 1990, enter Iran. You know, this is when—.

Thomas Oh man, I forgot about Iran. So in the meantime, we have the Amal Movement—Musa Sadr's movement has become fully militarized—the Amal, uh, brigades or whatever they're called, and Hezbollah has entered the scene.

Aimen Exactly. So now, Iran already entered the arena. They split, you know, Amal into two, you know, movements. One is Hezbollah and the other is Amal. And in this mix came the Americans.

So Iran comes in, America comes in, and America send in the Marines. They think, "Well, maybe Blue Bat could become Super Blue Bat", like in a—. So they—.

Thomas Super Blue Bat.

Aimen They send in the Marines. And guess how, you know, the first cells of Iranian-backed Hezbollah will greet them. Of course, with massive suicide bombings in the American Marines barracks, which killed nearly two-hundred forty American Marines.

It was one of the biggest single loss of life among us soldiers due to terrorist attack followed by the American embassy bombing, followed by the French embassy bombing. And it was the era of terrorism. Like, really, terrorism started to become the norm in Lebanon thanks to Iran's intervention there and the creation of Hezbollah.

Hezbollah and Amal clashed in the War of the Brothers that lasted for several years. And this is the time when Palestinian refugees were besieged in their camps, and the fighting between them and the Shia started to erupt.

Thomas Where – where are the Maronites now? Where are the Druze? What are they doing at this stage?

Aimen Well, the Druze already basically were doing their best to safeguard their prime real estate mountain locations.

The Maronites were weakened, but they actually solidified their grip on the army. So they started to align themselves more with the army, but the Maronites were also busy killing each other.

Thomas Oh, that's good.

Aimen So I don't want to go into details. Yeah.

Thomas Goodness gracious. So God help me, we're reaching the end, and I believe the story ends with the Saudis sweeping in on their white horses and saving the day, is that right?

Aimen Indeed. And this is where we come to the fact that where the Syrians failed, where the Americans failed, where the French failed, where, you know, the Iranians, you know, failed, every– everyone failed, the Saudis finally succeeded. They decided that as they—since they were not a combatant in this conflict—they, since they didn't back any party against another—.

Thomas Oh, come on, Aimen. Now let's not be naive. The Saudis were not neutral players. They're never neutral.

Aimen Well, they were never neutral, but at least like, you know, they never sent big shipments of weapons, like, you know, basically, you know, to be used to kill each other, you know, for the Lebanese.

Thomas So in the end, monarchy and money save the day and King Fahd invites the Lebanese politicians in Saudi Arabia, locks them in a hotel, and says, "You guys forge a new deal and – and come out with peace on your minds, or else." Basically, am I right? That's what happens.

Aimen Exactly. And so by 1990, finally, after, you know, two years of trying to hash together a new constitution, a new understanding, they went back actually to the pre-1975 idea of sharing power, the Covenant: a Maronite president, you know, Sunni prime minister, and a Shia, uh, speaker of parliament. But guess what? Like, and I mean, the Saudis would also like an – I mean, impose their own prime minister on Lebanon, a Saudi Lebanese prime minister, Rafik al-Hariri.

Thomas And with that, Aimen, I'm stopping you right there because that takes us well into the '90s, well outside the cold war, well outside the purview of this season—

Aimen [laughs]

Thomas —and this episode, which is far too long and far too complex. But I think you did a good job. That's sixteen years of crazy civil war summarized, what, six, seven minutes. Well done, Aimen.

Aimen [laughs]

Thomas Four phases. Four phases. First, the Lebanese sects fighting themselves and the Syrians invading. Second, Syrians, uh, and, uh, Israelis, fighting each other—.

Aimen Don't forget the Palestinians.

Thomas And then the Palestinians being ejected, and then the Iranians showing up, and the Americans, and then Hezbollah and bombings and then Saudis and money and ta-da and we're done. [laughs]

Aimen Absolutely.

Both [laughter]

Thomas So where do we conclude this episode, Aimen? I mean, after all of this madness, after all of this chaos, clash of civilizations—. Are you kidding me? It's – [laughs] it's right there. You—. The stuff writes itself.

It's clearly a clash of civilizations, but what's the larger point? What can we derive from the Lebanese Civil War, which, let's be honest, never really ended. The country never really came together. A modern state was never really founded and – and it's as the country's on its knees right now, as we speak.

Aimen Let's put it this way, Thomas. If there is any lesson to derive from the Lebanese Civil War and the aftermath, is that we never learn from history. History repeats itself again and again, because we never learn from it.

And you remember that Arafat caused the Civil War in Lebanon by building a state within a state. Now Hezbollah will cause the next Lebanese Civil War and the next Israeli invasion thanks to building a state within a state.

Thomas Well, that's a specific takeaway that Hezbollah remains there. It is a state within a state—the most heavily armed actor in the – in the field. Uh, definitely determined not to go anywhere. I agree.

I think another massive, uh, smash-up is on the cards, just around the corner. Israel's going to be forced—or feel forced—to get involved, et cetera, et cetera. But more generally, you called Lebanon a failed narco-terrorist state. And that is certainly true.

When I was thinking about Lebanon, I – I was reminded of the Kashmir episode, where at the end of that episode, uh, rather like the Pollyanna that I am, I said, "Why did the modern state even have to come to India? India had its own traditions. They were excellent, et cetera." Thinking about Lebanon, you suddenly realize what it is to have a modern state and that, you know, especially given, uh, our advanced technology these days, the old way of doing things, you know, patrimonial, clannish, uh, warlords, dominating regions and vying with each other for the power to tax essentially peasants—the old way of doing things.

Oh, okay. Maybe it worked for all those thousands of years, but when you add tanks, when you add anti-aircraft missiles, when you add bazookas and Kalashnikovs, and when you add, uh, all the – all the power of modern technology, lacking a modern state to disarm a population, to have a monopoly of force over a land mass, uh, and all of the benefits of, uh, the essential first foundational benefits of a nation-state, which neutralizes warlordism—. It has a lot to be said for, the modern state. And this is what Lebanon has never had.

Aimen Indeed. And this is why on my Twitter biography what I say, I say my allegiance is to the modern nation-state, because my years spent in four different war zones, and my mother coming from a war zone, you know, herself—Lebanon—taught me that there is no salvation for us as humans in the age of technology.

I'm not talking about the past centuries. I'm talking about the age of technology. There is no salvation for us. You know, there is no prosperity, you know, safety, stability, the rule of law, and the order of security without the modern nation-state and its institutions. The romanticism that we hold, you know—the old ways of doing business—are gone because of technology.

Thomas Oh.

Aimen It's because of technology.

Thomas Really? I'm so disappointed by this conclusion. I am such a romantic, and you know, the truth is you look – when you look at Lebanon and you see all of these sects fighting, and there's a story out there which says, "Oh, poor Lebanon. You know, this is – this is the effect of modernity on Lebanon, sectarian violence", but it's in fact the opposite is true.

Sectarian violence is what characterized Lebanon for all of time. It's the absence of the modern nation-state. That is the problem, a strong central government with a monopoly of force. Ugh, that's what's missing

Aimen Exactly. At the end of the day when people say, like, you know, "How do we build, you know, a modern nation-state?" I will say, "First, embrace the concept, you know, of the modern nation-state dearly and, you know, to your heart." And only then if everyone does that, then we will have, you know, a functioning modern nation-state. But unfortunately it never happened in Lebanon. Everyone embraced their sect, everyone embraced "I'm a Shia first and Lebanese second", "I'm Sunni first and Lebanese second", "I'm a Maronite first and Lebanese second".

No. Unless if everyone says "I'm a Lebanese first and last, and my religious identity is just, you know, to the back of the queue", only then Lebanon could prosper. But until then, never,

Thomas Well, Aimen. I don't know how many people we pissed off this time—

Both [laughter]

Thomas —but we've come to an end. I'm drawing it to a close. We ended with King Fahd of Saudi Arabia, brokering peace amongst, uh, Lebanon's warring factions, or at least a long-term truce.

In the next episode, we'll return to Saudi Arabia and focus on that institution which, perhaps more than any other in the world, exercises disproportionate geopolitical power. And I'm talking, of course, about OPEC.

A reminder that you can follow the show over on Facebook and Twitter at @MHconflicted, and for a deeper dive on some of the subjects we cover here on Conflicted, head over to Facebook and search "Conflicted podcast discussion group". There, you will find other fans of the show engaging in heated debates, enlightening conversations, and just generally geeking out over Conflicted-related topics.

Those of you who already subscribe to the show will know that at the end of each episode, Aimen and I pick a question sent in by a lucky listener to answer for our exclusive bonus content section. To access that content, be in with a chance of getting your question answered, and to listen ad-free, you can subscribe to the show for just 99p on Apple Podcasts or sign up to Conflicted Extra on Spotify, also for just 99p. That's it for this week. Join us again in two weeks' time for another episode of Conflicted.

Conflicted is a Message Heard production. This episode was produced and edited by Bea Duncan. Sandra Ferrari is our executive producer. Production support and fact checking by Talia Augustidis. Our theme music is by Matt Huxley.